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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
letter case (8690849)			
1. NSC profile (1p)	11/10/05 M1354 #31	12/29/86	P-1
2. minutes	of NSC meeting (4pp)	3/20/86	P-1, P-5
	PART. 12/21/05 M05-016#19184 R 7/13/10 M1354		
COLLECTION:			
EXEC. SECRETARIAT, NSC: Rcds (NSC Meeting Files)			dd
FILE FOLDER:			
NSC 00129A 20Mar86 Box 91304			12/12/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

ID 8690849

RECEIVED 30 DEC 86 18

DOCDATE 29 DEC 86

TO

MCDANIEL

FROM BURGHARDT

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

BY

NARA, DATE

11.0/15

KEYWORDS: MINUTES NSC

NICARAGUA

CONGRESSIONAL

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF 20 MAR NSC MTG RE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE :

STATUS X

FILES IF M O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCDANIEL

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFIED

NSC00129A() J

DM

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 12/30 Pearson Approved

RFB, chiron

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C)

DM

National Security Council
The White House

System # _____
Package # 90849
DOCLOG DM A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITI
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	<u>A</u>
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Rodman/Cockell	_____	_____	_____
Al Keel	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>Ign</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

WRP-

A meeting memo & participants list was never done on the meeting (it took place in the Cabinet Room) - Thus, it isn't recorded as taking place - do you want it retroactively recorded as an "NSC Meeting"? Julie

(yes)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Unclassified with
SECRET attachment

ACTION

December 29, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM: RAYMOND F. BURGHARDT

SUBJECT: Minutes of a Long Forgotten NSC Meeting

In cleaning out my safe I discovered my notes on an NSC meeting which I never wrote the minutes for. The March 20, 1986 NSC was convened on about one hour's notice immediately after the House vote against aid to the Contras. (Now I can depart with a clear conscience.)

Recommendation

That you review and approve the minutes for the March 20, 1986 NSC meeting.

Agree

WFB

Disagree

Attachment

Tab I NSC Minutes

Unclassified with
SECRET attachment

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

MJP
4/2/88

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Felder original of
NSC meeting 1294 missing

This was taken from Chun file
in sit room.

We are looking for original folder.

Aut
22 Apr 57

NJRTK

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~Unclassified with~~
~~SECRET~~ attachment

ACTION

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Recommendation

That you review and approve the minutes for the March 20, 1986 NSC meeting.

Agree

WRF

Disagree

Attachment

Tab I NSC Minutes

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M05-016 #19183
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 2/10/06

~~Unclassified with~~
~~SECRET~~ attachment

11FR-90849-1
5-22-87
11F

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MD8-7327-129a
BY CN NARA DATE 9/30/17

System II
90849

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council Meeting

March 20, 1986, 3:27-3:58 PM, Situation Room

SUBJECT: Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

Office of the Vice President
Mr. Craig Fuller

State
Secretary George P. Shultz
Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams

OSD
Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft IV
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Fred C. Ikle

OMB
Director James Miller
Mr. Timothy Muris

CIA
Director William J. Casey
Mr. Alan Fiers

JCS
General Paul X. Kelley
LTG John H. Moellering

White House
Mr. Donald Regan
Adm. John M. Poindexter
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
Mr. James Baker
Mr. Larry Speakes
Mr. Dennis Thomas

NSC
Mr. Rodney B. McDaniel
Mr. Raymond F. Burghardt
LTC Oliver L. North

Minutes

The President: Think how the young men who are the freedom fighters must feel now. (U)

Admiral Poindexter: The President asked that we meet this afternoon, now that the vote in the House is completed, to discuss our strategy in the Senate. We have thought of the

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Declassify on: OADR

possibility of asking the House to remain in session. That seemed possible to me, with the importance you place on this issue. The House is now scheduled to go on vacation until mid-April. The idea of asking them to remain in session could be discussed with Bob Michel. (C)

Our other concern is how the House vote will be interpreted in Central America and its effect on the Contras and the Core Four, especially Honduras, which is providing critical support to the Contras. In the past, when Congress has voted against aid to the Contras, Contra units have disbanded and Honduras has reduced its support for them. We need to decide how to deal with that problem. (S)

Secretary Shultz: We have embarked on a congressional strategy in the Senate, where there is a little better understanding of what the Sandinistas represent. What we ask the House to do is also a question we need to decide. We need a little different package for the Senate. We should note the effect of their vote on our negotiating strategy. It's devastating. We are distrusted and we must act to reassure the countries down there which are on the firing line. We need at least Elliott and maybe Jack Galvin to go right away to the four countries. Phil Habib also is ready to do anything. And he is very effective. Phil's stance is that as part of our negotiating track, it is as vital to have the capability to exert pressure as it is to have negotiations. I think Phil should circulate in the region after Easter, going to Central America and maybe to the Contadora countries also as the situation firms up. But we should send someone down there tomorrow to give assurance. Maybe someone from the Agency should go, too. (S)

President Reagan: A number of the congressmen I called said they would vote "no" this time but would vote "yes" on April 15, when Tip will let them vote again. I don't know what Tip has up his sleeve. Maybe it would be of some help to those going down to Central America to say that we know there will be another vote, even though we know that promise has been broken before. (C)

Adm. Poindexter: In the Senate we have 43 solid votes in favor, 7 leaning in favor, 6 leaning against, and 38 opposed. (C)

William Ball: That's correct. (U)

Deputy Secretary Taft: Particularly Honduras needs reassurance on this vote. We need to get down there right away. (C)

Director Casey: The Contras can hold out 60-90 days, providing they get logistical support. It would be legally possible to reprogram funds for them, but it takes a vote in the full committees. The Senate committee would vote for it, but in the House we would be defeated 9 to 7. There is the possibility we could turn McCurdy and one other in the interim period. (C)

Adm. Poindexter: There is about \$7 million left, and the program has to wind up by the end of the month. Can funds be carried over? (C)

Assistant Secretary Abrams: They can. They may last for about 60 days after March 31. (C)

Secretary Shultz: There should be about \$9 million left. (C)

Assistant Secretary Abrams: Deliveries will go on into April, May and June even without new money. (C)

General Kelley: We could accelerate military equipment deliveries to Honduras. We will take a hard look at that. We need to do something tangible. (C)

Deputy Secretary Taft: We can speed things up and maybe even increase MAP. (C)

Adm. Poindexter: There is intelligence that the Cubans are getting ready to send a Czech jet trainer which can be used as a fighter bomber, as well as more helos. We have periodically thought about a new red line. It is not clear if they will wait until April 15. (S)

Secretary Shultz: It would be comparable to Ortega's trip to Moscow if those planes are sent before the House votes. But the Sandinistas also could do something conciliatory. We have to be ready for that also. (S)

Larry Speakes: We have issued a presidential statement. The press asked us if we lost votes because of our rhetoric. I said this statement presented the President's viewpoint. (U)

The President: Some of our friends in Congress told me that we had targeted congressman as if they had already voted. Some congressmen did say that to me. Larry, why don't you read the statement so everyone can hear it. (C)

Larry Speakes: (Reads statement.)

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Adm. Poindexter: We will look at making a trip to Central America in the next day or so to reassure them. We will wait on Bob Michel's opinion to see if we should ask the House to remain. And we will look at the implications of aircraft delivery to Nicaragua. (S)

The President: If we go back a little in history, we see that when we negotiated on behalf of South Vietnam, we promised that if North Vietnam violated, we would provide the fuel and ammunition the South would need. But Congress refused to agree to what the President asked. In Angola, again the Administration--a Republican President--asked for financial help only, and Congress voted "no," so now it is a communist country with 35,000 Cuban troops. And here we go again. (C)

The meeting adjourned.

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WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1354 #32

BY KML NARA DATE 7/13/10

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