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Folder Title: The President's Trip to Europe: Ireland,
UK, and Normandy, 06/01/1984-06/10/1984 – The President
(Notebook) (5 of 5)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: TRIP FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 7/5/2006

File Folder THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE: IRELAND, UK,
AND NORMANDY 06/01/1984-06/10/1984 - THE
PRESIDENT (NOTEBOOK) (5 OF 5)

FOIA

F01-051

Box Number 91427 RAC Box 8

CHARTRAND

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26541	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #26537; CENTRAL AMERICA - OVERVIEW OF US POLICY R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	2	ND	B1
26542	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #26539; EAST-WEST RELATIONS R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	2	ND	B1
26543	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #26540; EXTRATERRITORIALITY R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26544	PAPER	BIO PAR 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	1	5/11/1984	B1 B3 B6
26545	PAPER	BIO R 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	1	5/11/1984	B1
26546	PAPER	BIO PAR 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	2	2/27/1984	B1 B3 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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26547	PAPER	BIO R 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	1	3/5/1984	B1
26548	PAPER	BIO D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	1	5/18/1984	B1 B3 B6
26549	PAPER	BIO D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	1	5/16/1984	B1 B3 B6
26550	PAPER	BIO D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	2	5/17/1984	B1 B3 B6
26551	PAPER	BIO D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	2	5/15/1984	B1 B3 B6
26552	PAPER	BIO D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051	2	5/17/1984	B1 B3 B6

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26553	PAPER	BIO	1	4/27/1984	B1 B3
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26554	PAPER	BIO	2	5/18/1984	B1 B3
		D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051			B6
26555	PAPER	BIO	2	5/17/1984	B1 B3
		D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051			B6
26556	PAPER	BIO	3	5/18/1984	B1 B3
		D 1/9/2008 NLRRF01-051			B6

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26541

CENTRAL AMERICA - OVERVIEW OF US POLICY

Our goals: Promote democratic institutions; assist in improving living conditions and economic development; provide friendly governments security assistance to meet the threat posed by expanded Soviet bloc/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion; and encourage dialogue for national reconciliation within and negotiations among countries to resolve regional problems.

The Bipartisan Commission reported in mid-January that Central America is a vital national security interest and concluded: further communist guerrilla warfare success there will mean that we would have to either substantially increase our defense capabilities along our southern border or sharply reduce our commitments to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Regional Issues: The U.S. commitment to negotiating has not diminished; we are strongly committed to Contadora, which deserves the understanding and support of our allies. Ambassador Shlaudeman has visited every country involved with Contadora to encourage the process. Democratic elections in El Salvador, and coming elections in Guatemala will leave Nicaragua the only non-democratic country in Central America. We hope our allies hold Nicaragua to the same standards they apply to the rest of Central America.

Nicaragua: Relations with Nicaragua are seriously strained as a result of Sandinista support for subversion of its neighbors and the GRN's close alignment and security ties with Cuba and the USSR. We do not seek to overthrow or destabilize the GRN; we do believe the Sandinistas only respond positively to pressure.

Our policy has four purposes: (1) implementation of Nicaragua's democratic commitments to the OAS; (2) termination of its export of subversion; (3) reduction of its military apparatus to a point of equilibrium with the rest of the region; (4) termination of its military and security ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. We maintain a dialogue with the GRN, and are prepared to respond to meaningful efforts in the areas we have identified to the GRN as critical to us.

Nicaraguan elections scheduled for November 4 are a potential opportunity for national reconciliation, but Sandinista efforts to block fair elections, e.g., denying access to the media, continuing the state of emergency, and excluding armed opposition leaders from the elections, will make this difficult.

El Salvador: The massive turnout of voters in El Salvador in two elections shows strong desire of Salvadorans for democracy. We are prepared to work closely with the new government headed by Christian Democrat Duarte. The communist guerrillas tried and failed to disrupt the elections. We will continue to support El Salvador in its efforts to combat

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communist terrorism.

Costa Rica: We look to Costa Rica as a model of social and political development for the region. It is an important regional force for peace and democracy. Our policy objectives are to preserve its independence and sovereignty in the face of Nicaraguan aggression and subversion. Recent Nicaraguan attacks have alarmed the GOCCR; it has requested additional security assistance. We have agreed on a formula for providing this, and assured Costa Rica we will be responsive if the situation deteriorates further.

Honduras: Honduras is the bulwark of our Central American security policy. It is essential to our regional interests that Honduras continue to strengthen its democratic institutions. Our programs of economic and military assistance are designed to support it in this vital effort. Honduras is the site of the regional military training center - and consequently an important force in our security assistance to El Salvador - and of bilateral military exercises. Honduran support for the FDN is fundamental to our policy of bringing pressure on Nicaragua.

Guatemala: A stable democratic Guatemala fully involved in solving regional problems remains a key but elusive goal. With Central America's largest population, potentially strongest economy and proximity to Mexico, Guatemala has been a prized target for Marxist insurgents since the early 1960's. Reduction of political violence against noncombatants (from 300 deaths/month to 40/month) and commitment to constituent assembly elections July 1 show officials recognize change must come. We will encourage them through discussion, a significant infusion of economic assistance, and modest military assistance.

Panama: 75 percent of traffic through the Canal is to or from the U.S.; our private investment in Panama is third in Latin America behind Mexico and Brazil. The Canal will remain important to us indefinitely, and we will defend our interests there. We want to continue use of our military bases there. Panama has played a moderately helpful role in regional efforts to promote peace and national reconciliation. We strongly supported its return to full democratic government, and have successfully avoided appearance of favoritism. We will continue to provide adequate economic and military assistance.

Belize: We support a peaceful resolution satisfactory to both parties of democratic Belize's border dispute with Guatemala. FOR UK ONLY: Withdrawal of the British garrison in Belize in the absence of a resolution of the territorial dispute would dangerously increase instability in an area of central concern to the U.S. There is no adequate alternative to the British presence.

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/3/07

East-West Relations

Your speech of January 16 underscored the US desire for a more constructive relationship with the USSR based on realism, strength and dialogue. Vice President Bush conveyed this message to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko in February. In his January meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Secretary Shultz stressed his desire to move ahead on the full range of the East-West agenda: 1) arms control; 2) bilateral affairs; 3) human rights; and 4) regional issues. Our allies appreciate the moderate tone of our policy, but remain anxious about East-West tensions.

The new Soviet leadership took a relatively moderate tone in its initial approach to US-USSR relations, particularly in Chernenko's public statements following Andropov's death and in his meeting with the Vice President. Since then, however, the Soviets have increasingly been taking a harsh line in public statements and private comments. Moscow has been especially rigid on START and INF, with the Soviets insisting on withdrawal of US INF deployments as a precondition to resumption of these two negotiations.

On lower-profile issues, the Soviets have been careful not to exclude possibilities for progress, and have shown willingness to discuss a range of bilateral and non-nuclear arms control issues. In part to deflect attention from its rigid stance on nuclear arms reductions, the USSR has emphasized Soviet initiatives on outer space arms control and "nuclear norms" (declarations of no-first-use and non-use of force). In April, the USSR returned to the MBFR talks, and is also participating in the CDE process.

The Soviets recently underscored their tough rhetoric with two harsh actions: withdrawal from the summer Olympics and sharply increased pressure on the Sakharovs. In the latter case, the Soviets have refused to allow Dr. Sakharov's wife to go abroad for medical treatment, and have as well threatened her with imprisonment. Dr. Sakharov, in response, has begun a life-threatening hunger strike. This hard Soviet line reflects Moscow's hope that intransigence in US-Soviet relations will damage the Administration's reelection efforts and help sow divisions between the US and its European allies. There is also continuing Soviet resentment over the failure to block INF deployments -- a defeat that compounded the acute embarrassment of KAL 007 -- as well as residual tensions within the Soviet leadership as Chernenko tries to consolidate his position and others maneuver for the next transition of power.

There has been no real flexibility in Soviet positions on regional issues, including Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Central America, Southern Africa, or the Middle East. We have, however,

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restated our willingness to engage in constructive dialogue with the Soviets on these topics, as well as on a variety of other issues. On the bilateral front, we have put forward a number of initiatives, including talks on New York and Kiev consulates, a new cultural agreement, and revitalization of scientific and technical exchanges. Late April saw the latest round of US-Soviet hotline improvement talks, as well as the Moscow visit of Ambassador Goodby for discussions on CDE.

We have been especially mindful of the need for high-level dialogue: Ambassador Hartman has met with Gromyko on several occasions for talks on a wide range of issues, while Dobrynin has had a number of exchanges with Secretary Shultz. And of course your letters to Chernenko are our most explicit statements of commitment to a real improvement in relations. The US has made it clear that we do not seek to threaten Soviet security and that we are prepared to engage in serious discussions on START and INF, as well as on the full range of issues which engage our countries.

One persistent problem in East-West relations is the unsatisfactory human rights situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In particular, emigration from the USSR remains at exceptionally low levels, and the crackdown on dissent in the USSR shows no sign of abating. Following last September's conclusion of the Madrid CSCE review meeting -- which advanced human rights standards beyond the Helsinki Final Act -- the US has worked to maintain allied pressure for an improvement in Communist human rights performance.

Since the NATO Ministerial last December, NATO allies have been engaged in a major review of East-West relations. Our goal has been to strengthen alliance consensus on this central issue and point the way to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Shortly before the start of your trip, NATO foreign ministers will have approved the classified study and issued a public statement at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington May 29-31.

United States East-West economic policy is largely determined by our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, and heavily influenced by the Afghanistan and Poland sanctions and by our policy of "differentiation" toward the countries of Eastern Europe. We have been working closely with our allies to strike a consensus for a comprehensive and prudent economic relationship with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Key elements of this approach include: 1) no subsidization of the Soviet economy through preferential trade or financing; 2) curbs on militarily-significant exports to the Warsaw Pact; and 3) avoidance of dependence on the USSR as an energy supplier.

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STATUS OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

START

The Soviets have refused to return to the START negotiations since Round V ended on schedule in December 1983 without agreement to a resumption date. At that time, the Soviets stated that the U.S. LRINF deployments had so changed the strategic situation as to require a full review of their START position.

During the last round their approach, with few exceptions, remained one of wholesale condemnation of the U.S. position. The only positive development was the establishment of a working group on confidence building measures. With respect to a merger of INF and START, we continue to believe that a merger would complicate the negotiations and impede progress; however, we are ready to consider any serious Soviet proposal for resuming the nuclear arms control dialogue.

INF

On November 24, 1983, Andropov announced a unilateral suspension of the INF talks. Chernenko maintains the Soviet formula that their walkout is irreversible unless NATO demonstrates readiness to reverse deployments. The Soviet walkout is regrettable and unjustified, since their SS-20 deployments continued without pause for two years while the U.S. pursued a negotiated solution with the Soviets. The U.S. believes that all the elements for an agreement are on the table; the U.S. is willing to resume the INF talks at any time and place, however, without preconditions. In the absence of a concrete agreement, deployments of U.S. LRINF missiles are moving ahead on schedule.

MBFR

The negotiations resumed on March 16 after an unusually long break (three months) brought about by Soviet refusal last December to continue the talks. With our NATO Allies, we created and tabled a new proposal aimed at breaking the deadlock. We are hopeful that the East will respond constructively in the next round which begins May 24.

CDE

The West has proposed Confidence and Security Building Measures which would make military activities in Europe more open, and therefore harder to use for surprise attack or intimidation. Our measures would also reduce the danger of war from accident or miscalculation.

The Soviets have offered declaratory measures -- non-use of force, etc. Their measures sound more ambitious than NATO's, but they only reiterate existing pledges in the U.N. Charter and Helsinki Final Act, which often have been violated. Our challenge is to achieve agreement on NATO's more modest but concrete measures which would do more for European confidence and security than agreement on Soviet proposals would do.

CW Arms Control

On April 18, Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The draft treaty proposes a comprehensive and global ban on CW development, production and stockpiling, under effective international verification (including challenge inspections). The U.S. recognizes that verification of such a ban is a difficult task, therefore, conclusion of an effective CW agreement will take some time to achieve.

Arms Control Compliance

The U.S. has determined that the USSR is violating or probably violating several arms control agreements. Soviet non-compliance calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. The U.S. will continue to press its compliance concerns with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, and insist on explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. At the same time, the U.S. will continue to carry out its own obligations and commitments under relevant agreements, and will ensure that future arms control agreements contain effective verification and compliance provisions.

Outer Space Arms Control/SDI

A comprehensive ban on ASAT's appears impossible to verify, but the U.S. is continuing to review other approaches that could be effectively verified and that would enhance NATO security interests. With respect to the strategic defense initiative, the research program is completely consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations.

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Extraterritoriality

With the increasing integration of the world economy, strong regulatory and enforcement interests necessitate application of U.S. law (e.g., antitrust laws, re-export controls, compelled disclosure of offshore documents) to persons or conduct outside U.S. territory. While the U.S. is not alone in applying its laws in this manner (West Germany, Sweden and the European Commission also do so to a lesser extent), we are in a decided minority. The U.K., Canada and most others oppose this "extraterritorial" application of law to persons or conduct in their territories, which they view as intruding upon their sovereignty. They are most disturbed when they think the U.S. is attempting to control activities in their territory in accordance with U.S. interests and without regard to their own distinct interests. The U.K., Australia and others have adopted domestic legal measures to block such actions.

This has led to confrontations over specific cases and to heavy pressure on the U.S. to address this issue bilaterally and multilaterally. We have discussed it separately with the Canadians and British and multilaterally with the OECD. In these meetings, some allies argue that the interests of the territorial sovereign predominate over the interests of all others. The U.S. has countered that more than one state may have jurisdiction concurrently, and that the real need for measures reaching outside a state's own borders precludes any simple solution, such as a commitment to "territorial primacy," in deciding which of these states can properly exercise jurisdiction in a specific case. Rather, we have urged use of a balancing of interests approach through which other states would recognize the authority of the state with the greatest interest in conduct to exercise jurisdiction in that case.

The U.S. has also urged focusing on managing and mitigating the problem by accommodating the interests of all involved governments when possible. This would be achieved by (1) establishing an internal USG mechanism through which foreign interests in proposed conduct can be identified and taken into account (a mechanism for notice to State is presently under study by the SIG/IEP), and (2) creating procedures, such as those now in place for antitrust enforcement, through which other governments would be notified and consulted, in advance when feasible, about proposed actions which might affect their interests. This approach would also promote intergovernmental cooperation in lieu of unilateral action.

While our allies continue to express their opposition to U.S. assertion of extraterritorial authority as a matter of principle, they have indicated willingness to explore our conflict management approach, as indicated by recent negotiation of an OECD recommendation supporting this approach, adoption of antitrust consultation arrangements with Australia and Canada, pending negotiation of law enforcement assistance agreements with Canada and West Germany, and recent U.K. interest in exploring this approach generally.

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Normandy Events

The greatest amphibious landing in the history of war took place on the morning of June 6, 1944, when elements of nine Allied divisions (five American, four British-Canadian) landed on the coast of Normandy. For reasons of communications security, the time and place of the landing were not communicated to General de Gaulle in London, and he never forgave the Allies for this. As a consequence the Normandy landings have traditionally been commemorated only by the Allies and by local French committees.

President Mitterrand decided to correct this historical anomaly and give to the Normandy commemoration this year the importance and national recognition it deserves in view of its historic importance for France. This is all the more important because the generations that actually remember D-day in Normandy will soon be passing on. Mitterrand wanted to establish a new tradition of French national celebration of the D-day anniversary. The coincidence with the London Economic Summit this year enables the extraordinary presence on June 6 of the heads of state or government of all the participants in the Normandy landings.

While the French landed only a commando battalion on D-day, the French Forces of the Interior played an important role in disrupting enemy lines of communication and harassing the movement of Wehrmacht reinforcements to the battle zone.


Commemoration of the American role in the Normandy landings will focus on three main events:

(1) Pointe du Hoc. This is a jut of land west of Omaha beach, a high cliff scaled by the Second Ranger Battalion. Its mission was to put out of action a heavy enemy gun battery which was a dangerous threat to troops landing on both Omaha and Utah beaches. The memorial site has been maintained by local residents and was only recently ceded to the United States Government. The commemorative plaque is being installed for dedication on June 6.

(2) Omaha beach. Combat teams of the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions, comprising the Fifth Corps commanded by General Gerow, landed along this three-mile stretch of beach in the most costly of the D-day battles. British and Canadian forces landed at three beaches to the east of Omaha. President Mitterrand, after first participating in ceremonies for French and British war dead at Bayeux, is to proceed to the American Military Cemetery at Omaha beach for the French-American ceremony,

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(3) Utah beach. Regimental combat teams of the 4th Infantry Division, under the Seventh Corps commanded by General Collins (who will be present on June 6) landed along this stretch of sand dunes to the west of the Carentan marshes. They linked up with the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions which had been dropped inland just after midnight. President Mitterrand will speak at this site, in the presence of all the Allied leaders. He is later to attend additional ceremonies at Canadian and French cemeteries east of Omaha beach.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The Public Statements will be provided to you during the trip through normal channels.

PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

I. Central Perceptions

A. Scene

- The President's trip to Ireland, France and the London Economic Summit should be publicly viewed as a practical expression of the foreign policy principles articulated in the April 6th CSIS speech: Realism, Strength, Economic Growth, Shared Responsibility With Allies, Non-Agression, and Dialogue With Adversaries.
- Explicitly or implicitly every part of the June itinerary should provide mutual reinforcement for one or more of these principles.
- The importance of the President's June travel will transcend not only the London Summit itself but in a real sense the entire European itinerary: our objective, by the time the trip is completed, will be to reassert U.S. interest in a stronger and viable Europe within a larger policy context embracing both the Atlantic and Pacific communities, while stressing shared democratic values.

B. Primary Perception

- A Strong President and the American Renewal: assertive U.S. leadership is essential to world peace and prosperity.

C. Supporting Perceptions

- The Dynamics of Interdependence: genuine peace is a product of Western strength, constancy, and cohesion.
- Keeping Our Powder (And Our Provender) Dry: viable Western security depends on both economic and defense cooperation.
- Reality Is Catching Up With Reagan's Vision: convergence of the Atlantic and Pacific communities as a positive trend in the late 20th Century.
- Continuity and Consistency: from Williamsburg to London, a full year of successful high-level meetings with foreign leaders (forging solidarity at Williamsburg Summit; expanding Pacific ties with Korea and Japan; further normalization with China; re-emphasis on the Atlantic relationship).

PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

- 2 -

D. Individual Locations and Matching Themes

1. Ireland

- General Theme: "Return to American Roots"
- Specific Emphases
- Ireland as an island link between two continents
- Importance of European integration Ireland assumes EC presidency in July
- Reaffirmation of cultural and historic ties
- Partnership of shared values
- Peaceful settlement of conflict (rejection of violence)
- Importance of East-West dialogue

2. France/Normandy

General Theme: "Reconciliation and the Primacy of Peace"

Specific Emphases

- The legacy of D-Day: 40 years of peace and prosperity in Europe
- The meaning of American leadership: an enduring commitment to eliminate the world's most destructive weapons
- Creativity of today's coalition: prepared to counter new forms of aggression (terrorism)
- From Normandy to the farther shore: America's unflagging efforts to eliminate the world's most destructive weapons

3. Bilaterals in London

General Theme: "The sacred trinity of tested ties - tradition, trust, and vitality"

Specific Emphases

- Recommitment to the consultative process
- Necessity of united stand on East-West issues

PRESERVING PEACE AND PROSPERITY:
The President's Trip to Europe, June 1984

- 3 -

- Sincerity of American efforts to deal constructively with the Soviets
- More direct Japanese role in defense of its own regional area

4. London Economic Summit

General Theme: "The Spirit of Williamsburg Continues"

Specific Emphases

- U.S. economic expansion as major stimulus for world recovery (due primarily to the policies President Reagan has pursued since 1981 Ottawa Summit)
- Continued pursuit of non-inflationary growth (sustains and spreads recovery, creates jobs, increases prosperity)
- Trade liberalization (despite problems, post-Williamsburg actions work to create more open markets and greater competition)
- New partnerships and the vitality of the Summit process (at and after the Summit, Western leaders are pioneering creative approaches to joint cooperative ventures e.g., space research, counter-terrorism)--
(tentative depending on evolution of pre-Summit preparations)
- London Summit and the political dimension
 - (President Reagan, while maintaining America's deterrent strength, is taking a realistic, positive approach vis-a-vis the USSR and the issue of arms reductions)
 - Need for Western unity on major security issues (global political outlook, increasing Asia-Europe-U.S. consultations)

Prepared by:

James M. Rentschler

B1, B3, B6

26544

Patrick John HILLERY

IRELAND

*President**(since December 1976)**Addressed as:**Mr. President*

Despite his public avowals that he would retire after serving his first seven-year term as President, Patrick Hillery yielded to the pleas of Ireland's three major political parties and nominated himself for a second term, a procedure provided for by the Irish Constitution. Because there were no other candidates, he was deemed "elected" and was sworn in for his second term in early December 1983. At the time of his first inauguration in 1976,



He has nonetheless managed to keep the largely ceremonial presidency above politics, as custom dictates. He is well disposed toward the United States, which he has visited often.

Educated at University College, Dublin, Hillery followed his father into medical practice. In 1951 he was elected to the Dail (lower house of parliament). He has held several Cabinet portfolios, including Education, Industry and Commerce, Labor, and Foreign Affairs. One of the few early Irish "Europeanists," Hillery was responsible for negotiating Ireland's entry into the EC (it became a member in 1973). He resigned from the Dail in January 1973, when he was appointed a vice president of the EC Commission, with responsibility for social affairs; he held that post until he received his current position.

Hillery, 61, is a prize-winning golfer and also enjoys swimming, fishing, and painting. He is married to the former Mary Finnegan, who is, like her husband, a medical doctor. She enjoys attending auctions and plays golf and bridge. Both Hillerys speak French. They have a son and a daughter.

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11 May 1984

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Mary Finnegan HILLERY

IRELAND

Wife of the President

Addressed as:

Mrs. Hillery or

Dr. Hillery

Mary Finnegan and Patrick Hillery were married in October 1955. Hillery has been President since December 1976. Like her husband, Mrs. Hillery is a medical doctor. A member of the executive board of the National Association for the Mentally Handicapped, she is currently involved in volunteer research in this area. She has publicly supported equal opportunity for women, but she says she is not a feminist. Mrs. Hillery, who enjoys traveling, owns a house in Spain. Her other leisure interests include attending auctions and playing golf and bridge. She speaks French. The Hillerys have a son, who is a medical student, and a daughter.



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Garret Michael FITZGERALD

IRELAND

Prime Minister
(since December 1982)

Addressed as:
Mr. Prime Minister

A politician whose personal popularity generally exceeds the popularity of his party, Fine Gael party leader Garret FitzGerald is heading his second Fine Gael-Labor Party coalition government. The Irish press describes FitzGerald as an intellectual and an honest politician but has frequently doubted his political sagacity.



In mid-1983, however, the British press criticized FitzGerald for his alleged mishandling of a political dispute centering on the language for a proposed constitutional ban on abortion. The government's proposal was defeated in the Dail, the lower house of parliament, with eight of FitzGerald's fellow Fine Gael members voting against him.

Economic Problems and Policy

As Prime Minister, FitzGerald faces difficult decisions on the economy. Ireland boasted one of the highest growth rates in the West during the early 1970s, but since then the economy has faltered severely. The country has a huge public debt, and inflation and unemployment are about 12 and 16 percent, respectively. FitzGerald has pledged to eliminate the budget deficit by 1987. In his first budget, in February 1983, he introduced new, harsh measures that increased income and consumer taxes. His 1984 budget, while somewhat less restrictive, is nearly as harsh. Both budgets have contained measures to deal with Ireland's high unemployment rate, although FitzGerald holds no immediate hope of alleviating that problem: in mid-1983 he publicly stated that unemployment in Ireland would probably get worse before it got any better (he was right). FitzGerald's tough budgets have produced some political strains with his coalition partners in the left-of-center Labor Party. However, the Labor Party is likely to stick with the coalition for the foreseeable future.

Foreign Affairs

FitzGerald has a nearly encyclopedic knowledge of world affairs. He is a strong supporter of the European Communities.

He has visited this country many times, most recently in September 1982, when he met with Vice

(cont.)

CR M 84-11058

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BY CJ NARA DATE 1/9/08

[REDACTED]

President George Bush. FitzGerald's foreign policy positions have often coincided with those of the United States: he publicly condemned the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the subsequent Olympic boycott and grain embargo. He does not hesitate to disagree with US policies, however, and he has publicly criticized US actions in Central America. FitzGerald was reluctant to take any measures in response to the Soviet downing of a South Korean airliner in 1983. He opposes Irish membership in any military alliance, favoring the continuation of his country's Westward-leaning neutrality. [REDACTED]

The Northern Ireland Problem

FitzGerald supports the peaceful unification of Ireland. He has long been critical of terrorist activities, and he has publicly denounced the Provisional Irish Republican Army for waging "a campaign of sectarian genocide against the Protestants." He has often appealed to Americans to refuse to contribute funds to organizations linked to terrorism in Ulster. [REDACTED]

To achieve peaceful unification, FitzGerald advocates cooperation between Dublin and both the British Government and moderate political forces in Ulster. He has met with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher twice: in November 1981 and in November 1983. At the first meeting the two leaders agreed to establish an Anglo-Irish intergovernmental council as a framework for bilateral consultations, and at the second session they reviewed the accomplishments of the council. FitzGerald has called for changes in the Irish Constitution that would make unification more attractive to the Protestants in the North. [REDACTED]

In early 1983 FitzGerald was a leading proponent of the establishment of the Forum for a New Ireland, a group open to any party disavowing the use of violence and having elected representatives in either the Republic of Ireland or Ulster. He has asserted that the creation of the forum demonstrated to the "men of violence" in the North that Ireland's future will be built by the ballot box and not the bullet. The forum met between May 1983 and early February 1984 and is now drafting a report on its proposed new solution to the Northern Ireland problem; the report is expected to be released in March. [REDACTED]

FitzGerald holds a law degree and a Ph.D. in economics. First elected to the Dail in 1969, he served during 1973-77 as Foreign Minister (a post his father, Desmond, had held during the 1920s and 1930s). FitzGerald was elected leader of Fine Gael in 1977, after the party suffered an unexpected and devastating election defeat. He is widely credited in Ireland with converting the once disorganized party into a formidable political power. During June 1981-March 1982 he led a minority coalition government that fell after losing a budget vote in the Dail. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

27 February 1984

26547

Joan FITZGERALD

IRELAND

*Wife of the Prime Minister**Addressed as:**Mrs. FitzGerald*

Joan O'Farrell married Garret FitzGerald in October 1947. According to the press, she met him at a French Society meeting at University College in Dublin, where she studied history, economics, and politics. (She learned to speak French while living in Geneva as a child.) Mrs. FitzGerald travels frequently with her husband. The press has described her as a brilliant woman who serves as his sounding board. The media also note that she is active in theology discussion groups.



The FitzGerald family have three children: John, an economist in the Department of Finance; Mary, a lecturer in American literature at the University of Tromsø in Norway; and Mark, an auctioneer. Mrs. FitzGerald is about 61 years old.

CR M 84-11259
5 March 1984

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26548	PAPER	1	5/18/1984	B1
	BIO			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
26549	PAPER	1	5/16/1984	B1
	BIO			

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26550	PAPER BIO	2	5/17/1984	B1

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26551	PAPER BIO	2	5/15/1984	B1

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26552	PAPER	2	5/17/1984	B1
	BIO			

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26553	PAPER	1	4/27/1984	B1
	BIO			

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26554	PAPER BIO	2	5/18/1984	B1

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26555	PAPER BIO	2	5/17/1984	B1

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26556	PAPER	3	5/18/1984	B1
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