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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: TRIP FILE

Withdrawer

DLB 7/6/2006

File Folder [FOREIGN POLICY BACKGROUND FOR PRESIDENT'S
TRIP TO EUROPE - NOTEBOOK] (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F01-051

Box Number 91429

CHARTRAND

16

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26669	PAPER	RE: LATIN/CENTRAL AMERICA, MARKED "9" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26670	PAPER	RE: AFRICA, MARKED "10" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26671	PAPER	RE: CHINA, MARKED "11" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26672	PAPER	RE: SOUTH ASIA, MARKED "12" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26673	PAPER	RE: NORTH AMERICA, MARKED "13" R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26674	LIST	DESIRABLE RESULTS R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26675	PAPER	I. THE THIRD WORLD R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26676	PAPER	II INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26677	PAPER	III. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26678	PAPER	IV. TERRORISM R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26679	PAPER	V. SOVIET UNION/EAST EUROPE R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1
26680	PAPER	VI. WESTERN EUROPE R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051	1	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
26681	PAPER	VII. MIDDLE EAST <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i>	1	ND	B1
26682	PAPER	VIII. AFRICA <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i>	1	ND	B1
26683	PAPER	IX. LATIN AMERICA <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i>	1	ND	B1
26684	PAPER	X. AISA <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i>	3	ND	B1
26685	PAPER	XI. STRATEGIC DEFENSE <i>R 7/3/2007 NLRRF01-051</i>	1	ND	B1

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LATIN AMERICA

Latin/Central AmericaSetting:

- o The Soviet Union and Cuba will continue to use Nicaragua to export revolution to Central American nations.
- o Economic problems will mount and fray the political and social fabric of struggling democracies through Latin America.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Promote the development of democratic institutions.
 - o Encourage economic adjustments for LDC debtors.
 - o Urge the IMF to redirect its programs from an emphasis on economic austerity (largely through import contraction) to an emphasis on growth oriented programs through increased export industries.
 - o Provide friendly nations with economic security assistance.
 - o Curb Soviet/Cuban/Nicaraguan subversion.
- Encourage dialogue between the U.S. and countries of the region.

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NLRR FOI 051 #2dd69

BY CW NARA DATE 7/03/07

AFRICA

Africa

Setting:

- o Developing nations in the region will continue to face austere economic conditions due to rapid population growth and limited economic resources.
- o Political instability, poverty, hunger, and disease will represent the primary challenges of the continent.
- o Soviet and its client states activities will exacerbate African problems.
- o The reversal of Libya's expansionist policy is becoming increasingly key to the stability of the continent.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Promote the strengthening of independent nations.
- o Reverse Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan influence.
- o Continue to seek independence for Namibia.

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NLRR FOI-051 1126670

BY CU NARA DATE 7/3/07

CHINA

China

26671

Setting:

- o New realism of Chinese leadership has resulted in a remarkable ideological shift toward a kind of market socialism.
- o Unprecedented steps taken by Chinese leadership during President Reagan's visit have substantially advanced the U.S. agenda in bilateral relations and deepened understanding on key global developments.
- o Leadership of China is seeking a more active and independent role in the world community.
- o China's leadership will continue to modernize its economic, military, and political structure.
- o China's military doctrine, strategy, and war fighting capabilities will change to accomodate its more active role causing increasing concern within the region.
- o Pressing internal concern about feeding and clothing the population will persist.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Expand diplomatic, cultural, economic and security ties.
- o Seek a secure, stable, and non-aligned China.
- o Continue to meet our legal and moral obligations to Taiwan while avoiding entanglement in the China-Taiwan dispute.

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NLRR F01-051 #26671

BY CU NARA DATE 7/3/07

SOUTH ASIA

South Asia

26672

Setting:

- o India will continue to navigate a course between the U.S. and the USSR.
- o India's first concern is its relations with Pakistan, particularly because of the latter's nuclear weapons ambitions.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Maintain peace on the sub-continent
- o Promote prosperity, regional cooperation, and democratic institutions.
- o Reduce Soviet influence.

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BY QV NARA DATE 7/3/17

North America

Setting:

- o Although we continue to confront a largely intransigent Mexican position on Central America, relations between the President and President de la Madrid continue to offer substantial potential for movement on that issue and other important bilateral issues (border problems, debt management, U.S. investment, energy cooperation and common security assessments).
- o Canada is laboring under severe economic constraints imposed by several years of mismanagement.
- o Ottawa's policies have caused increased estrangement between the eastern and western sections of Canada.

Foreign Policy Objectives:

- o Encourage an economically healthy and stable Mexico which is more responsive to key U.S. objectives in the region.
- o Promote expanded ties with Canada focusing on developing a special relationship with the Western Provinces.
- o Reinforce policies between U.S., Canada, and Mexico toward common economic and security interests.

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BY CW NARA DATE 7/3/07

DESIRABLE RESULTS

V. Desirable Results (Headlines)

- o Moscow Returns to Arms Control Talks with West, Nuclear Arms Reduction Plan Agreement Reached
- o Counterterrorist Actions Stepped Up, Incidents Decline
- o International Trade Barriers Reduced Through US Lead
- o US-Led World Economic Upturn Gathers Momentum
- o Relations Improve in Aftermath of US-Soviet Summit
- o Significant US-NATO Differences Fading
- o Giant Norwegian Troll Field Comes On Stream Precluding Further Inroads Of Soviet Gas Exports To Europe
- o China-US Trade, Cultural Ties Growing Stronger
- o Agreement Reached with Japan on Trade Issues
- o President Reagan Inaugurates Pacific Basin Economic Council Spawning New Era In U.S.-Pacific Relations
- o Pacific Basin Nations Join Alaska In Cooperative Effort To Exploit Vast Natural Resource Base
- o Progress Toward Middle East Peace Plan Announced
- o Iran-Iraq Peace Talks Succeed
- o Syrian and Israeli Forces Leave Lebanon, Accord Reached
- o Tunisia, Algeria And Morocco Agree To Advance Creation Of Greater Maghred For Mutual Economic Benefit
- o Cuban, Soviet Forces Pull Out of Angola
- o Namibian Independence Agreement Reached
- o Salvadoran Fighting Ebbs As Government Gains Control
- o Democracy In Nicaragua, Promises Noninterference
- o Caribbean, Central American Economies Show Improvement
- o Debtor Countries Overcome Financial Crisis, By U.S. Lead
- o Visits Initiate New "Special Relationship" And Free Trade Zone With Provinces Of Western Canada
- o U.S. Manned Station For Scientific And Humanitarian Advancement Soon To Become A Reality

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DOCUMENTATION

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DOCUMENTATION OF SELECTED ISSUES

- I. THE THIRD WORLD
- II. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
- III. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
- IV. TERRORISM
- V. SOVIET UNION/EAST EUROPE
- VI. WESTERN EUROPE
- VII. MIDDLE EAST
- VIII. AFRICA
- IX. LATIN AMERICA
- X. ASIA
- XI. STRATEGIC DEFENSE
- XII. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

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White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 7/6/04

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I. THE THIRD WORLD

- o As the U.S. becomes more dependent on Third World resources, base facilities, and markets, political instability in Third World countries will affect our interests even more than it does today. Discontent in these countries stems from clashes between traditional and modern ways, from their socialist economies, from demographic pressures, and from ethnic and other social stresses. By 1989, the spread of illicit arms and the increase in the number of states willing to support insurgencies will make political instability an even greater problem. Dissident elements will be quicker to use violence, while an ever-growing number of experienced guerrillas will be available to teach their skills to such groups.

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/3/07

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NARCOTICS

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II. INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

- o The drug trade is so profitable that it will persist despite efforts to break it up. It will directly threaten U.S. forces stationed abroad and the U.S. population at home at least as much in 1989 as it does now. Trafficking in heroin, and to an increasing extent in cocaine and marijuana, will contribute heavily to growing corruption in key producing states -- probably so much so that it will impede U.S. efforts to influence their policies on a broad range of issues. Narco-dollars also attract organized crime and will serve to finance at least some international-terrorist endeavors. If production or trafficking are slowed or disrupted in one area the trade will shift quickly to another one.

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BY CH NARA DATE 7/3/07

NUCLEAR PROLIF.

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III. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

- o The acquisition and possible use of nuclear weapons and material by Third World states and the potential use by sub-states will represent major national-security problems for the United States in the latter half of this decade and beyond. Several countries that currently are near-term proliferation threats (e.g., Pakistan, India, Israel, South Africa, and Argentina) could develop, test, and begin stockpiling nuclear weapons in this period -- some could develop thermonuclear or other advanced weapon designs. Other countries (e.g., Brazil, Iraq, and Libya) will be moving close to the nuclear threshold.
- o Nuclear technology, facilities, and material will be much more widely available and far more difficult to control and to monitor, leading to a greater threat of terrorist acquisition or attack.

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BY CAS NARA DATE 7/3/07

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TERRORISM

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IV. TERRORISM

- o Terrorism has reached alarming proportions. It is increasingly violent and indiscriminate. An increasing number of states are using terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. Over the past decade 3,500 people were killed and double that number were wounded in 6,500 terrorist incidents. American citizens were victims in about 40 percent of these cases. In 1983, 263 American citizens were killed in terrorist attacks, the largest number in any year on record.
- o We have just submitted four bills to Congress to combat terrorism. Two would enable us to carry out commitments under previously ratified international conventions regarding the taking of hostages and hijacking of aircraft. Another would allow us to offer significant rewards for information regarding terrorism against U.S. citizens or property. A fourth would enhance our ability to prosecute those who support or cooperate with groups and states involved in terrorism.
- o We have not adopted a policy of preventive strikes, but we do not believe such a policy should be ruled out. We question whether it is reasonable and prudent simply to await and prepare for an impending attack. To forego preventive action lowers terrorists' risks and increases their likelihood of success in attacking U.S. citizens. On the other hand, while considering active defensive measures we must consciously address the moral and legal difficulties posed for our society.

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/3/07

SOVIET UNION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~V. SOVIET UNION/EAST EUROPE

- o For the foreseeable future the Soviet Union will remain the most formidable threat to the United States. The Soviets will continue to exploit regional tensions and instability throughout the Third World. Moscow will continue to exploit differences between the United States and its Western Allies, hoping to divide the alliance. The USSR's interest in Western technology will remain high, but the Soviets will also play Western nations against each other to gain maximum economic and political advantage. They will seek to manipulate public opinion to offset fears of a Soviet threat, to prevent deployment of new NATO weapons, and to decrease the level of West European defense spending.
- o In the next decade endemic instability in Eastern Europe will have substantial implications for the United States--for a shift in the balance of power in Europe, for US-USSR relations, and for U.S. relations with the NATO Allies. The precarious financial situations in Communist economies brings into question Eastern Europe's ability to retain its credit-worthiness. Without access to Western credits to modernize its industrial and agricultural sectors, stagnation or worse will be its lot. The problem is compounded by the failure to develop effective economic management systems, which in turn provides an impulse for political change. This impulse has already produced a new variant of national Communism in Poland. Similar manifestations can be detected and are likely to increase in Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia. Another impulse for political change will come from the inability of the East European regimes to live up to their commitment to raise living standards.
- o While Albania and Yugoslavia have slipped from Soviet control and Romania has achieved some independence, instability in the coming years in these areas would be viewed by the Soviets as an opportunity to regain control. This would have serious impact in the Eastern Mediterranean and weaken our influence in the Balkans.

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VI. WESTERN EUROPE

- o U.S. concerns with trans-Atlantic relations and the internal stability of Western European countries will remain high. The United States will face the impact of increasing strains within the Atlantic Alliance, growing political and social instability, and increasing domestic economic problems, including their spillover into the international scene.
- o The period will almost certainly be one of great fluidity in Alliance relationships. The fact of mutual European-U.S. dependence will not change, but maneuvering between the United States and Western Europe for advantage vis-a-vis the East--and the South--will be a pronounced feature of the period.
- o Western Europeans are likely to differentiate increasingly between their interests and ours. Western European economic and political policies that diverge from United States interests will further erode Alliance cohesion.
- o The environment in which Security policy will be made will not be an appealing one for the United States for a number of reasons:
 - Western Europeans are likely to proceed down the pacifist path and anti-Americanism will probably increase.
 - Continuing economic difficulties will almost certainly force further cutbacks in military spending.
 - Declining party discipline and increasing volatility of electorates will lead governments to embrace the status quo and give fringe groups a disproportionate influence.
 - A new generation of leaders without personal memories of World War II and the depression will likely be more skeptical toward both superpowers and will have higher economic expectations.

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MIDDLE EAST

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VII. MIDDLE EAST

- o U.S. interests in the Middle East will continue to be dominated by a number of key conditions:
 - the continued security and political stability of Saudi Arabia and other oil producers both in the Gulf area and throughout the region;
 - the continued absence of war between Israel and its neighbors;
 - the extent of external influence, Soviet, European or Japanese, on major regional actors; and,
 - the continued importance of the Islamic resurgence as a major challenge to those governments and societies having a largely secular and Western orientation.
- o The proliferation of a nuclear-weapons capability and the threats to United States and allied interests from state-supported or autonomous terrorist groups are two additional concerns that will increase in importance throughout the region during this period.
- o Continued access to oil for the United States and its allies and the ability to limit influence of other parties in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals will be a key policy interest. The evolution of Iran's revolution and its relations with all its neighbors will be a major factor in the military security and political stability of the Gulf region and will be of great significance during the 1985-89 period.
- o Israel's ability to survive not just foreign pressure but internal pressures for change will be a major question throughout the decade. Egypt's key role in the Israeli/Arab equation, and Cairo's major place in the Arab world, and the very real economic and demographic pressures facing Egypt will be the focus of increased U.S. attention.
- o U.S. competition with the Soviet Union for influence, if not actual control, of key regional powers is likely to be a continuing concern. It is also likely that the United States will find itself increasingly competing with our European and Japanese allies for influence, access to oil, and growing markets for our industrial and military exports.

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/3/07

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AFRICA

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VIII. AFRICA

- o The longer-term impact of such problems as overpopulation or urban crowding, water and food scarcity, and potential for industrialization or other economic development will begin to be felt in one or more of all countries in Africa during this period.
- o Southern Africa will likely remain the priority policy concern for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1985-89. Prospects are high for continued intervention from outside the region, which will increase the complexity of the problem and pose additional concerns for the United States. Moreover, nuclear developments in South Africa warrant concern.
- o The problems in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa will center on those nations of key interest to the United States--Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Zaire, and Liberia. In West Africa, several countries are gaining economic strength, through increased oil production, but in most, political instability and severe economic problems will invite external exploitation. As a result of the pace and scope of change, U.S.-West African relations will be complex and wide ranging.
- o In Africa we have inherited a situation of a deepening cycle of violence and increasing intrusion of Soviet and Soviet surrogate forces. We developed strategy to reduce the cycle of violence, expend economic development of area, and support peaceful change inside South Africa. This has produced real results.
- o We have taken the Namibia settlement issue from dead in the water (where we found it) to a negotiated effort which has received the support of the Contact Group and all parties in the area.
- o We sent over \$225 million in grant assistance to Zimbabwe to help the new nation get started. We are sending emergency food to Mozambique and other states in the area which were badly hit by severe drought.
- o Internally in South Africa, we fund Black education and support free trade union development. Our quiet dialogue has served as an impetus to the change in South Africa. Positive changes are occurring in South Africa - spread of free trade unionism, expansion of franchise, emergence of property and political rights for urban blacks, and we are clearly aligned with peaceful, positive change.

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/3/07

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LATIN AMERICA

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IX. LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN

- o The endemic social and economic problems plaguing Latin America will not be resolved in the 1985-89 time frame. Revolutionary ferment will intensify and probably spread. Scant prospects exist of establishing an environment in which private-sector resources can flow to the region to support greater political and social stability. Given the willingness of the Soviets, Cubans, and other leftists in the region to intervene, reconstruction will be slow and tedious, if at all.
- o The second priority in the area will be the emerging regional powers--Mexico and Brazil certainly--but possibly also Venezuela and Argentina. A key challenge for the United States will be to gain support for U.S. security, economic, and political interests from such countries at a time when they will be pursuing independent policies. Mexico poses a particular problem in this period.
- o Other than Cuba, the Caribbean mini-states are not by themselves substantial U.S. antagonists or partners; yet their proximity to this country requires careful consideration of their problems.
- o Deteriorating economies, weakening colonial ties, and prospects for instability will present intermittent problems; key among these will be migration.

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ASIA

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X. ASIA

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Japan

- o Within the Pacific region, the United States will face the problem of trade competition with Japan and the newly industrializing countries.
 - Japan's trade imbalance is causing problems in relations with other industrialized countries. The problem is likely to worsen as Japan competes for raw materials, energy resources, and an increasing share of the marketplace for its industrial output.
 - The United States and other countries will intensify their pressure on Japan to relax trade barriers and allow greater access to its domestic market.
 - Restructuring the economy to allow greater imports could cause serious political and economic difficulties for the Japanese.
- o While Japan will continue to be our leading ally and trading partner in the Pacific, some changes in this bilateral relationship are inevitable. Japan's leadership will be especially hard pressed to make a greater commitment to defense--a thorny and politically divisive issue in Japan but one of growing importance to the United States.

Newly Industrialized Countries

- o As emerging industrial states, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan will face increasingly stiff competition for raw materials, energy resources, and the international export market. This competition will lead to frictions with the United States.

Southeast Asia

- o Vietnam and China will most likely be unable to resolve their differences. Because of the strategic importance of this region, U.S. interest in the political and military plans and intentions of both China and Vietnam toward Kampuchea, Laos, and Thailand will not diminish.
- o The United States will be concerned with how the Philippines and Indonesia will deal with a continuing adjustment to political, economic, and social changes. Both countries will have to cope with powerful demographic changes and, in the case of Indonesia, declining real oil revenues. Fundamental economic development policy changes will have to be made.
- o Many troublesome regional issues will carry over into the

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1990s and cause the United States concern over whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations will become a viable alliance capable of addressing problems such as the Vietnamese occupations of Kampuchea and Laos, a continuing refugee flow, ongoing insurgencies, and competition for scarce resources. The United States will also worry about the policies and plans on the part of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines to exploit the potentially lucrative mineral and petroleum resources in disputed areas of the South China Sea.

China

- o As China takes a more active role in the world community during the latter part of this decade, the United States will be concerned about changes in its political, military, and economic policies that might lead to friction in bilateral relationships.
- o The stability of China both internally and externally is vital to U.S. security interests throughout Asia. China has had a volatile political history. The transition in Chinese leadership that will continue during this decade will determine whether the successor leadership will be able to modernize China's economic, military, and political structure.
- o Because of China's importance in countering the Soviets, the United States will be concerned about changes in China's military doctrine, strategy, and war-fighting capabilities, especially as they impact on the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Taiwan military balances.
- o During this decade and the next, China's most pressing internal concern will be feeding and clothing its population and attempting to modernize its economy. Potentially major problems will be China's needs for U.S. agricultural exports and the U.S. role in the modernization process. In particular, the United States will be preoccupied with China's attempt to acquire and integrate advance technology and modernize its agriculture, industry, and military.
- o President Reagan has strong convictions about our moral and legal commitments to the people of Taiwan. The President has said on several occasions that he "will not forsake old friends to make new ones."
- o It is important to continue to develop friendly relations with the People's Republic of China. This can be done without injury to the people of Taiwan. In fact, good U.S.-Chinese relations improve the prospects for peace and stability throughout Asia, including the Taiwan straits.

South Asia

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- o The two key issues affecting U.S. interests South Asia in the 1985-89 time frame will be the reaction of India and Pakistan to Soviet influence and the political, military, and possible nuclear competition between these two regional powers.
- o India will reemerge as an issue of primary concern to the United States as the Indian leadership comes to grips with an increased Soviet role in the area. To the extent that the Soviet effort is hurried or overly forceful India would be likely to oppose Moscow. Delhi's reaction to a continued protracted seduction would be more ambivalent and difficult to gauge. As long as the Soviets are engaged in Afghanistan, Pakistan's reactions to real or perceived Soviet pressure will be a major U.S. concern.

Korea

- o The best way to seek a reduction of tensions and a long-term solution to the hostility between North and South Korea is through direct talks between the two parties.
- o Efforts to reduce tension should be pursued despite our deep skepticism of North Korean motives in light of the Rangoon attack. We share the ROKG preference for direct bilateral negotiations between North and South or quadripartite talks.
- o The comparative military balance continues to favor the North. North Korean forces are well equipped, and have a substantial advantage in several key categories of offensive weapons. North Korean exercises have revealed impressive sophistication in terms of joint and combined forces operations.
- o In addition to their size and their capabilities, the challenge posed by North Korean forces is compounded by factors of time and distance. The bulk of North Korean forces are deployed well forward, along the DMZ. Given the proximity of Seoul to the DMZ (some 25 miles, about the distance from Washington to Dulles airport), ROK and U.S. forces are presented with an extremely difficult indications and warning problem. Consequently, a high state of readiness is required at all times.
- o North Korea devotes some 20 percent of its GNP to military expenditures, compared to about 6 percent by the ROK. However, the South's GNP is four times larger than that of the North, and its economy far more dynamic. Thus, the ROK is likely to make continued gradual gains in redressing the military imbalance. For the foreseeable future, however, the South will face a formidable military challenge.

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XI. STRATEGIC DEFENSE

- o The Strategic Defense Initiative is a technology research program with the goal of determining the feasibility of concepts to enhance deterrence by providing an effective defense against attack from ballistic missiles.
- o No decision has been made to deploy a strategic defense. The Administration is serious about examining the technological feasibility of such a proposal and fully examining its policy implications. A capability to negate the most destabilizing threat to nuclear deterrence, a ballistic missile attack, would clearly improve the world's security.
- o Our allies' security considerations are key elements of the SDI. We have been consulting with them regarding the SDI and it is the Administration's intention that, at such a point when technology might support a decision whether or not to develop a strategic defense, they will have a role in that decision.
- o The U.S. has, since the 1972 ABM Treaty, constantly sought to protect the capability to deploy a strategic defense system as a hedge against a Soviet "breakout" from the Treaty. That safeguard must continue to be an element of the SDI. But there has been no decision to deploy a near-term defensive capability.
- o The SDI is not a violation of the ABM Treaty. The Treaty will not be violated by the U.S., although there have already been well-publicized doubts regarding Soviet compliance. The research activities which characterize the SDI are fully consistent with the ABM Treaty.

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