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9
MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT T. JOHNSON
Army of the United States, Retired

6265
RCM HAS SEEN
902 Drummond Drive
Ferguson, MO 63135-1522

→ Ron Lehman for draft pls
212
Date: - 14 August 1984 264867

Honorable Robert McFarlane
National Security Advisor
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

1161

20165

FG006-12

Dear Mr. McFarlane:-

After reading the article about you in the 10 August 1984 issue of The Wall Street Journal, I decided to write and see if a retired Lt. Colonel of the US Marine Corps could give me an answer that I have been asking for some months now without getting any satisfaction:-

As you well know the Soviet Mafia in the Kremlin have been injecting themselves into our political process by means of their disinformation program. And I am sure that you will agree that certain in-country KGB surrogates are readily echoing this disinformation; and to this we can add a number of glib people who would rather have their party elected rather than to coldly sift facts from Soviet fiction.

And so, the question I pose is:- Why has not the President, or his spokesmen, made a point of the fact that the Administration is engaged in a unilateral disarmament program?

When this Administration entered into the White House, we - the US - had 1054 ICBMs. The 54 represented the Titan IIs; now I know that the Titan II is an obsolete, liquid-fueled ICBM; but I also know that General Davis, CinC, SAC, has been quoted as saying he would keep the Titans if the money were available. However, a decision has been made to deactivate these ICBMs, and now - mid-1984 - we should be down to 33 Titans (according to the Secretary of Defense).


And I see no parallel effort on the part of the Soviet Mafia!

I also am aware that the President would replace the Titans with the MX Missile, and since the Congress has dragged its feet, we are engaged in a unilateral disarmament program.

Why cannot the President take credit for this unilateral disarmament program?

I would greatly appreciate an answer,

Sincerely,


HERBERT T. JOHNSON
Major General, AUS Retired

NSA# 8406265

RECEIVED 17 AUG 84 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM JOHNSON, HERBERT T

DOCDATE 14 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: DISARMAMENT

MP

USSR

SUBJECT LTR TO MCFARLANE FM JOHNSON RE SOVIET MAFIA & DISARMAMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 23 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

LEHMAN, R

MATLOCK

KRAEMER

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

SHULL

HALL

Close Out

COMMENTS LOGGED PER BUD.

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

*Completed sometime ago by Dy Gp WH Fellow**C 9/12/84*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

WH

(C)

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6187

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ED

JV

TR

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1984

Bob

Dear Dr. Pfaltzgraff:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of John P. Roche's latest book, The History and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational Theory. A quick glance at it already reveals that it contains some useful insights on communist political methods. Roche's background in various political movements certainly gives him a unique perspective on this subject.

With many thanks again and best wishes.

Sincerely,

Bud

Robert C. McFarlane

X
Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.
Central Plaza Building
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139

NSC 8406187

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Mr. Pfaltzgraff

Attached at Tab I is a response for your signature to a letter from Bob Pfaltzgraff (Tab II), which includes a copy of John Roche's latest book, The History and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational Theory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I to Mr. Pfaltzgraff.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed response

Tab II Incoming letter, dated August 2, and book

National Security Council
The White House

1354 81F

System #

I

Package #

6187

10 P4 41

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull	3	JS	
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	W	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6		D
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

4 SEP 18 P 5: 25

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

In association with The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University



Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

AUG 2 1984

May 2, 1984

Central Plaza Bldg., Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone (617) 492-2116
TELEX/TWX: 710-323-1128

*Short and
p/b*

RCM HAS SEEN
8-14-84

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

I am enclosing a copy of the latest Foreign Policy Report of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The History and Impact of Marxist-Leninist Organizational Theory, by John P. Roche.

The author examines Marxism-Leninism at the operational level in its historic context. The Report contains an epilogue in which implications are drawn for the present, and, in particular, the use by the Soviet Union of "front organizations" in support of its strategic political objectives.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:md
Enclosure

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8406187

RECEIVED 15 AUG 84 11

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM PFALTZGRAFF, ROBERT

DOCDATE 02 MAY 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

MP

SUBJECT LTR TO MCFARLANE FM INSTITUTE FORN POLICY ANALYSIS FWDING FORN POLICY
REPORT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 21 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

HALL

SHULL

COMMENTS PLS NOTE THAT INCOMING LTR IS DATED 2 MAY, HOWEVER, IT HAS

JUST BEEN RECEIVED FOR STAFFING. *only 1 Book Rec'd in 8/20/84*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LB)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
MCFARLANE	X 9/18 C 9/29	For Signature MCFARLANE LTR	9/19	JL - WH TS
DISPATCH 27 1/1				W/ATTCH FILE WH 27 (C)

TRANSFER SHEET
RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

COLLECTION: *WHORM: SUBJECT FILE 1981-1989* ACC. NO.:

The following material was withdrawn from this segment of the collection and transferred to the _____
AUDIOVISUAL COLLECTION ☒ BOOK COLLECTION _____ MUSEUM COLLECTION _____
OTHER (SPECIFY: _____)

DESCRIPTION: *PAPERBACK FOREIGN POLICY REPORT*
"THE HISTORY AND IMPACT OF MARXIST-LENINIST
ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY"
BY JOHN P. ROCHE

C0165 #265549

SERIES <i>C0165 USSR</i>	BOX NO.
FILE FOLDER TITLE: <i>C0165 USSR (265000-266999)</i>	
TRANSFERRED BY: <i>DONALD DILLON</i>	DATE OF TRANSFER: <i>8/24/93</i>

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1984

Dear Mr. McMichael:

Thank you for sharing with me General Matthew B. Ridgway's prophetic memorandum from 1947. *MC*:
Indeed it demonstrates that there are
continuities in Soviet foreign policy which
we will ignore at our peril. Fortunately,
our President is all too conscious of these
realities of Soviet policy, and it is in the
context of this realism that we are shaping
our national defenses.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

Bob McFarlane
Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. R. Daniel [✓]McMichael
P.O. Box 268
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

775C 8406652

6652
265553

4200

4690

CO165

FO

FG00672

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI JL

SUBJECT: Response to Letter from Mr. McMichael

SIGNED

Attached at Tab I is a response for your signature to a letter from Mr. R. Daniel McMichael (Tab II) which shares with you a 1947 memorandum by General Matthew Ridgway.

Jack Matlock and Steve Sestanovich concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed response to Mr. McMichael at Tab I.

Approve ✓ Disapprove

Attachments:

Tab I Proposed response

Tab II Incoming letter, August 31, 1984

National Security Council
The White House

1353

91F

System #

I

Package #

6652

SE 18 P4: 21

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	1	✓	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull	3	MS	
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6	SEP 8 8 1984	D
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

4 SEP 18 10 5: 26

Matlack

R. DANIEL McMICHAEL
3900 MELLON BANK BUILDING
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA
(412) 392-2919

Mailing Address:
P. O. Box 268
Pittsburgh, PA 15230

August 31, 1984

The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

The attached document written by General Matthew B. Ridgway to General Eisenhower in 1947 recently was made public. General Ridgway was kind enough to share it with me and I have his permission to share it with you.

The clarity with which General Ridgway predicted future Soviet behavior is as remarkable as it is accurate -- given all that has happen since then. You will be interested to know that this memo made it all the way through the Cabinet to President Truman and, according to Dean Acheson, "had made policy."

I would argue that it is at least as useful a document today as it was in 1947. It is a sober reminder that this or any other administration and this or any other President have the primary leadership obligation to see that the American people understand clearly the stark realities that exist between the Soviet Union and both the existing free world and those who seek to be free.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Dan McMichael

Attachment

cc: General Matthew B. Ridgway

250 West 57th St. New York, NY

3 February 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

SUBJECT : Military Staff Committee - Report No. 8
(Russian Objectives).

1. Against the background of ten months continuous contact with Russian Representatives to the United Nations, I am impressed with what appears to me to be the emergence of a pattern of Russian objectives. The opinions stated herein are for your information. They derive from my evaluation of the facts of Russian action before the United Nations on the subjects of Atomic Energy Control, Disarmament and the establishment of United Nations armed forces under Article 43 of the Charter.

FACTS

2. a. Atomic Energy:

The USSR insists upon the conclusion of an international convention designed to prohibit the employment of atomic energy for military purposes and to accomplish the destruction of all existing atomic weapons within a period of three months after the ratification of such convention. Concurrently, the USSR has so far refused to accept the US proposals for effective safeguards and for the collective imposition of sanctions.

b. Disarmament:

The USSR introduced the disarmament resolution to the General Assembly and presses for United Nations action thereon.

c. Establishment of United Nations Armed Forces under Article 43 of the Charter:

The USSR Delegation in the Military Staff Committee has for ten months obstructed and so far has effectively prevented, any substantial progress towards the establishment of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council. Further, the Soviet Representatives have recently emphasized their insistence that the contributions from each of the Big Five shall be equal in overall strength and composition. In other words, each of the Big Five shall furnish equal air, ground, and sea contingents.

EVALUATION

3. USSR OBJECTIVES:

At present, these facts indicate to me the existence of coordinated USSR objectives embracing:

a. Public agreement by the US to:

(1) Prohibit the use of atomic weapons for military purposes and destroy all existing atomic weapons.

(2) Prohibit the use of all other weapons of mass destruction, in which classification, the USSR may seek to include such instruments of long-range warfare as strategic air forces, guided missiles, and certain naval categories.

(3) Ultimately reduce each Member's armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available by that Member to the Security Council.

(4) Establish United Nations armed forces, in which the contribution of each of the Big Five shall be equal in over-all strength and composition in their air, ground and sea contingents.

b. Use of world public opinion and US national conscience to compel the US to comply with its agreements on the above subjects, while the USSR by equivocation and delay, evades the establishment and operation of effective safeguards on atomic energy and disarmament, and concurrently by intensive national effort, develops and produces atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.

CONCLUSIONS

4. a. Well known USSR moral codes and conduct indicate the following as capabilities with a high degree of probability:

(1) An attempt to secure United Nations approval of an international convention outlawing the use of atomic energy for military purposes and requiring early destruction of all existing atomic and other weapons adaptable to mass destruction; to keep this convention separate from any convention dealing with safeguards; to avoid pushing the question of safeguards; and ultimately, to refuse to accept, or if forced to accept, to fail to comply with them. If these attempts succeed, we shall have been deprived of atomic weapons at no cost to the USSR. In that event, we can not ignore the possibility that the USSR would continue its present great national effort to develop and produce such weapons clandestinely.

(2) An attempt to bring about a convention reducing world armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available to the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter.

(3) An endeavor to secure United Nations approval of the principle of equality in strength and composition of the air, sea and ground contingents of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each of the Big Five. This would compel us largely to renounce our modern complex armaments and would vastly increase the relative value of man-power as a determining factor in war.

(4) A concurrent effort to infiltrate Soviet agents into our industrial structure in such manner as to increase their capability, at a time of Russia's choosing, of paralyzing our national systems of transportation, fuel and telecommunications, for the purpose of preventing the timely restoration of our ability to exploit our superior industrial potential.

5. The foregoing actually amounts to an integrated plan to bring about unilateral disarmament by the US under the guise of a plan for general regulation and reduction of armaments by all nations; to strip us of our present technological, managerial, and scientific superiority; and to elevate the USSR to the position of the dominant military power in the world.

6. No effort is made to fix a period of time within which attainment of these objectives by Russia might be reasonably expected. However, regardless of when attained, their attainment at any time under currently existing world power relationships, would represent a grave menace to US security and to the peace of the world.

M. B. RIDGWAY,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army.

UNCLASSIFIED

260 West 57th St. New York, NY

8 February 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.

SUBJECT : Military Staff Committee - Report No. 8
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REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ORDER
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M-60 # 831214
BY PARKERS ON 8/19/83

UNCLASSIFIED

all strength and composition. In other words, each of the Big Five shall furnish equal air, ground, and sea contingents.

EVALUATION

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UNCLASSIFIED

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(2) An attempt to bring about a convention reducing world armaments and armed forces to the level of those to be made available to the United Nations under Article 43 of the Charter.

(3) An endeavor to secure United Nations approval of the principle of equality in strength and composition of the air, sea and ground contingents of the armed forces to be made available to the Security Council by each of the Big Five. This would compel us largely to renounce our modern complex armaments and would vastly increase the relative value of man-power as a determining factor in war.

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6. No effort is made to fix a period of time within which attainment of these objectives by Russia might be reasonably expected. However, regardless of when attained, their attainment at any time under currently existing world power relationships, would represent a grave menace to US security and to the peace of the world.

M. B. RIDGEWAY,
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army.

*Noted by Gen J. L. Danner
4 April 1947*

*Read by Gen BARD
22 May 1947
who remarked "I agree with
this" and
4*

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8406652

RECEIVED 06 SEP 84 12

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM MCMICHAEL, R D

DOCDATE 31 AUG 84

KEYWORDS: USSR

NUCLEAR ENERGY

RIDGWAY, M B

DISARMAMENT

MP

EISENHOWER, D D

SUBJECT: LTR TO MCFARLANE FM MCMICHAEL RE A DOCUMENT WRITTEN BY GEN RIDGWAY
TO GEN EISENHOWER IN 1947 RECENTLY MADE PUBLIC

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 10 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

LENCZOWSKI

SESTANOVICH

ROBINSON

FORTIER

KRAEMER

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(LF)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

MCFARLANE x 9/18 For Signature 9/19
C 9/29 MCFARLANE, R D JLM SES

DISPATCH

27 1/1

W/ATTCH FILE WH (C)

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

00165

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

84/10/04

Name of Correspondent:

Henry Baccus

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A)

(B)

(C)

Subject:

sends his proposal for negotiating with
the U.S.S.R.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
✓ CS	K. Camalier	ORIGINATOR	84/10/15	LD	C 84/11/02
✓ DOS	Exec. Secretariat	R	84/10/17	LD	A 84/10/24
		Referral Note:			
			/ /		/ /
		Referral Note:			
			/ /		/ /
		Referral Note:			
			/ /		/ /
		Referral Note:			

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: L Individual Codes: 1161 4640

Prime Subject Code: C0165 Secondary Subject Codes: FO
FB 00601
IL 007

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C		Time: _____	P- _____
DSP		Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

CPn - Presidential Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
- n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
- n - 3 - Ron
- n - 4 - Dutch
- n - 5 - Ron Reagan
- n - 6 - Ronald
- n - 7 - Ronnie

CLn - First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 0 - Unknown
- n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Nancy
- n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence

- n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
- n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8428923

Date October 29, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: James Baker From: Henry Baccus

Date: October 4, 1984 Subject: Sends his Proposal for
Negotiating with the USSR

WH Referral Dated: October 17, 1984 NSC ID# 266149
(if any)

The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached.
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded.
- ☐ A translation is attached.
- ☒ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- ☐ The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- ☐ Other.

Remarks:

James A. Hill
for Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 24, 1984

Mr. Henry L. Baccus
President
Dallas Publishing, Inc.
777 South Central Expressway
Suite 1-A
Richardson, Texas 75080

Dear Mr. Baccus:

On behalf of Mr. Baker I would like to thank you for your letter of October 4. We always are appreciative of hearing new ideas from those genuinely concerned with Soviet-American relations.

Your proposal is an interesting one and we will examine it closely. As you no doubt are aware, the Soviet Union walked out of the INF negotiations and have thus far refused to come back to the table. Soviet spokesmen have demanded, as a precondition to resuming negotiations, that we remove the "obstacles" -- ie. the Pershing II and cruise missiles -- that were deployed as a unified NATO response to their vast SS-20 build-up. This is, and will remain, unacceptable to us. We remain committed, however, to resuming negotiations at any place, and at any time, and have stressed our readiness to be flexible in the search for agreements to reduce nuclear weapons.

Thank you again for your thoughts on this subject.

Sincerely,

Thomas W. Simons, Jr.

Director

Office of Soviet Union Affairs

8428923

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

OCTOBER 17, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ATTN: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 266149
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED OCTOBER 4, 1984
TO: JAMES BAKER
FROM: MR. HENRY BACCUS
DALLAS PUBLISHING, INC.
777 SOUTH CENTRAL SUITE 1-A
RICHARDSON TX 75080

SUBJECT: SENDS HIS PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATING WITH THE
U.S.S.R.

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

777 South Central Expressway, Suite 1-A; Richardson, Texas 75080

Telephone (214) 238-9969

October 4, 1984

Mr. James E. Baker, Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Baker:

Neville Chamberlain demonstrated the futility of appeasement (read "freeze" or "unilateral disarmament" or whatever the current buzz-word is) some 45 years ago. Whatever the name, it didn't work then nor will it work now. Maybe some of the hand-wringers of today, no matter how sincere, are too young or too forgetful to remember.

Thinking about this, I have come up with a concept that might solve several problems. It is really rather simple. The nay-sayers will put it down as too simple, even simplistic, but I believe that a competent staff can refine it into a proposal that will stand up to rational objections. Anyway, here it is:

FACT The Russians are buying U.S. wheat and other grain, and our farmers need the money.

FACT The Russians are deploying SS-22s in Warsaw Pact countries.

FACT Governments of the West are under intense pressure to stop the arms race, unilaterally if necessary.

PROPOSAL Why not ask the Russians to pay for the grain with missiles? This would be barter, a real physical exchange, e.g. one SS-22 equals so many tons of grain. An agreement would have to be worked out with other exporters of grain, such as Canada or Argentina, under which they would refuse to supply Russia the shortfall in their needs.

RESULT The SS-22s themselves would be delivered to a team of Swiss or other neutral experts, who would verify that they were indeed the agreed missiles. After the neutral team dismantled the missiles (on live satellite TV), the enriched uranium recovered from the warheads could be allocated to developing countries (preferably genuinely uncommitted to either Superpower) as fuel for nuclear power plants. For example, Lebanon needs a rebuilt infrastructure.

RESULT Hungry Russians would get the food they need.


RESULT Tensions would be reduced, and NATO might thus justify a moratorium, or even a pullback, of the deployment of our Pershing IIs.

RESULT Funds now allocated to the U.S. Defense Department would be the source of funds to pay the U.S. farmers for the grain. This would be a budgetary trade-off of Defense cuts equalling grain purchases, with the reduction in the Russian order of battle justifying the Defense cuts. It would be a nice gesture for our NATO allies to contribute some of the funds, since they would be facing fewer missiles.

RESULT A genuinely new proposal would be out on the international negotiating table, an immediate, specific peace initiative where none was remotely expected.

At your convenience, I shall consider it an honor to clarify and amplify my ideas concerning this proposal.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Henry L. Baccus". The signature is fluid and elegant, with the first letters of each word being capitalized and prominent.

Henry L. Baccus
President

October 4, 1984

Dear Mr. Baker,

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Inasmuch as we both graduated from the University of Texas Law School in 1956, I wish I had made your acquaintance sufficiently to address you as "Jim." However, I was a little busy with completing some 18 hours in a semester and a summer, plus the Bar exam, after having had my law studies interrupted by 3½ years in the Navy.

I hope this proposal can at least be a useful campaign ploy. If it should be a diplomatic success, so much the better.

Yours,

Henry Baccus