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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

LM 3/5/2024

File Folder NIGERIA - GENERAL 08/01/1987-12/31/1987

FOIA

F12-045

Box Number 8

DEVERMONT

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
256331	CABLE	010747Z AUG 87	1	8/1/1987	B1
256332	REPORT	PAGES 7-8 ONLY	2	ND	B1
256357	CABLE	LAGOS 12809	7	10/15/1987	B1
256333	REPORT	THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA: ITS ROLE IN THE TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE	4	11/1/1987	B1
256334	REPORT	POLITICAL-MILITARY SITUATION, NIGERIA	2	12/11/1987	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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August 7, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: HERMAN J. COHEN *HR for*

SUBJECT: OWV for President Babangida of Nigeria

The Scheduling Office has requested a memorandum regarding the OWV of President Babangida, which the NSC has proposed for November (see Tab A).

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for Fred Ryan.

Marybel Batjer concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for Fred Ryan attached at Tab I.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Prepared by:
Alison P. Rosenberg

Attachments

Tab I Your Memorandum to Fred Ryan

Tab A Memo #5202 dated July 9, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, not extended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2005
BY NARA *LM* DATE *3/5/24*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5900

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN JR., Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

SUBJECT: Official Working Visit for President Babangida of
Nigeria

By memo of July 9 (see Tab A), we requested scheduling President Babangida for November. He has been unable to accept an invitation before now because he was recuperating from back surgery.

Nigeria has great importance in Africa. One-quarter of sub-Saharan Africa's population lives in Nigeria, and the Nigerians often play a leading role on major African political and economic matters. Babangida and his wife are young, very attractive, and articulate. A visit would not only be helpful for our foreign policy interests in Africa, but would constitute an excellent opportunity for the President to reach out to the American black community.

Attachment

Tab A Memo of July 9, 1987, #5202

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NSC WAIVER
BY LM 3/5/24

Hand Cohen

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5202

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 9, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR FRED RYAN

FROM:

GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

For Angel Batyn

SUBJECT:

Official Working Visits - Oct/Nov 1987

By memo of May 22, we withdrew our recommendation for the November Official Working Visit of Prime Minister Alebua and left the spot open for later consideration. We are now substituting President Babangida of Nigeria for November, moving him from October.

We are proposing the vacated October slot be filled with an Official Working Visit by the Southern African Frontline States, (the Heads of State from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, and Mozambique). This Visit will be an excellent forum for promoting peaceful negotiations leading to multiracial democracy in South Africa; reconfirm the President's strong anti-apartheid sentiments for the Black independent nations of southern Africa; and help offset a possible negative impact of the report to Congress due October 2 on the first year of economic sanctions against South Africa. The Heads of State will be in Canada the week of October 11 for an annual Commonwealth Conference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6283

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

August 26, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: HERMAN J. COHEN *HJC*

SUBJECT: Letter of Invitation to President Babangida
of Nigeria

The memorandum for Rhett Dawson attached at Tab I is self-explanatory.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Rhett Dawson requesting signature on a letter of invitation to President Babangida.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Prepared by:
Alison P. Rosenberg

Attachments

Tab I Your Memorandum to Rhett Dawson

Tab A Crosshatch Message

Tab B Proposed Letter to President Babangida

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *LM*, DATE *3/5/24*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6283

MEMORANDUM FOR RHETT DAWSON

FROM: GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

SUBJECT: Letter to President Babangida of Nigeria

An Official Working Visit has been approved for President Babangida of Nigeria for November 18th. The invitation was conveyed by cable (see Crosshatch at Tab A).

The U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria believes it is important for Babangida to receive the invitation, which was very complimentary to Nigeria, in the form of a letter as well.

We support the request because Nigeria is a major African country and is important to our foreign policy interests in Africa. A letter is attached at Tab B.

Attachments

Tab A	Crosshatch Message
Tab B	Proposed Letter to President Babangida

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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Authority

BY

DOS/NSC WAIVERS
LM NARA DATE: 3/5/24

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

87 AUG 19 P7:58

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

019413

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ALL ENCLOSURES

87 AUG 19 P7:58

MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL No. Pages 2
FROM: RICHARD MUELLER S/S 78448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION CABLE TO LAGOS: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT
BABANGIDA

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>BILL COURTNEY</u>	<u>6534</u>	
<u>NSC</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>		
	<u>Green</u>		
	<u>Cohen clears to Jan 7 8/20</u>		
	<u>Batjer ✓ clears to Jan 7 8/20</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 8/21

S/S Officer:

RICHARD MUELLER

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/W:RAPROCTOR:01176
8/19/87 647-3406
SS:

AF/W:FBCOOK
AF/W:DMALSTED
S/CPR:TTOWELL
NSCS:

AF:KLBROWN
AF/RA:DPASSAGE
S/S:JALBA

ALSO S/S-C

IMMEDIATE

LAGOS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OPDC, OVIP, PREL, US, MI

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT
BABANGIDA

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE WHITE HOUSE HAS REQUESTED THAT AMBASSADOR LYMAN
DELIVER TO PRESIDENT BABANGIDA THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT REAGAN:

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON HIS RETURN FROM LAGOS EARLIER THIS YEAR, SECRETARY
SHULTZ BRIEFED ME ON THE EXTRAORDINARY PROGRESS NIGERIA HAS
MADE UNDER YOUR LEADERSHIP IN LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR
SUSTAINED ECONOMIC GROWTH. WE ALSO DISCUSSED YOUR
COMMITMENT TO FOSTERING CLOSER RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES IN A WIDE VARIETY OF AREAS, INCLUDING IMPROVED
DIALOGUE ON AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTS, INCREASED U.S. PRIVATE
INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, AND EXPANDED LAW ENFORCEMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority NSC/DOS WRITERS
BY LM NARA DATE 3/5/24

SS
RA
FBI
K
DEN
DF
NSC

9
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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COOPERATION. I AM PLEASED THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE IN RECENT MONTHS TO MOVE FORWARD IN ALL THESE AREAS.

IT WOULD BE MY PLEASURE TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THESE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND NIGERIA AND WAYS THAT WE CAN FURTHER CONSOLIDATE THE HISTORIC FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES. WITH THIS IN MIND, I AM PLEASED TO INVITE YOU TO WASHINGTON FOR AN OFFICIAL WORKING VISIT DURING NOVEMBER THIS YEAR. I PROPOSE THAT WE MEET ON NOVEMBER 18. IF YOU AGREE, AMBASSADOR LYMAN AND YOUR STAFF CAN WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF YOUR VISIT.

SINCERELY,

RONALD REAGAN

HIS EXCELLENCY
IBRAHIM B. BABANGIDA,
PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA,
LAGOS.
END TEXT

3. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

On his return from Lagos earlier this year, Secretary Shultz briefed me on the extraordinary progress Nigeria has made under your leadership in laying the foundation for sustained economic growth. We also discussed your commitment to fostering closer relations between our two countries in a wide variety of areas, including improved dialogue on African developments, increased U.S. private investment in Nigeria, and expanded law enforcement cooperation. I am pleased that we have been able in recent months to move forward in all these areas.

It would be my pleasure to have the opportunity to discuss with you these positive developments in the relationship between the United States and Nigeria and ways that we can further consolidate the historic friendship between our peoples. With this in mind, I am pleased to invite you to Washington for an official working visit during November of this year. I propose that we meet on November 18. If you agree, Ambassador Lyman and your staff can work out the details of your visit.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Ibrahim B. Babangida
President of the Federal Republic
of Nigeria
Lagos

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Authority: NSC/DOS WAIVERS
BY: LM NARA DATE: 3/5/24

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256332	REPORT PAGES 7-8 ONLY	2	ND	B1

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHOS<DTG> 241221Z SEP 87
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8395
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 6256
RUTAGN/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 1244
RUEHCO/AMEMBASSY COTONOU IMMEDIATE 2126
RUFHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME IMMEDIATE 1772
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2305
RUTAND/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 1003
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 1297
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 3023
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE IMMEDIATE 2176
RUTADD/AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE 0911
RUTAKA/AMCONSUL KADUNA IMMEDIATE 1011
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DAH-6// AS IIR 6 871 0149 87 IMMEDIATE

file Nigeria

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: BABANGIDA ANS THE POLITICIANS AND HIMSELF

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LAGOS 11772

LONDON FOR KOLKER

PARIS FOR POPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PINS NI

SUBJECT: BABANGIDA ANS THE POLITICIANS AND HIMSELF

REF: 86 LAGOS 7269 (NOTAL)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

1. (C) SUMMARY: IN WHAT MUST BE REGARDED AS THE BOLDEST MOVE OF AN ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN MARKED BY MANY, PRESIDENT BABANGIDA ANNOUNCED WEDNESDAY NIGHT THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL DO EXACTLY WHAT HE SAID IT INTENDED TO DO IN JUNE 1986--BAN VIRTUALLY AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY THAT WILL RESULT IN THE THIRD REPUBLIC IN 1992 AND IN SOME CASES BEYOND. AMONG THOSE EMPHATICALLY INCLUDED ARE BABANGIDA HIMSELF, AS WELL AS ALL OF HIS AFRC COLLEAGUES. OVER THE PAST 15 MONTHS, MOST OBSERVERS AND ALL OF THE FORMER POLITICIANS HAD BECOME THOROUGHLY CONVINCED THAT THE EXCEPTIONS WOULD OVERWHELM THE RULE AND THAT THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC WOULD LOOK VERY MUCH LIKE THAT OF THE SECOND. DESPITE THE BAN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY, ORGANIZING HAD BEEN MOVING FIRMLY AHEAD BASED ON THESE CONVICTIONS. BABANGIDA HAS JUST AS FIRMLY SAID THAT HE WILL HAVE NONE OF IT.

2. (C) WHILE BOLD AND BOUND TO APPEAL TO MANY NIGERIANS, PARTICULARLY THE "INTELLECTUAL" COMMUNITY, WHO BELIEVE THAT ONLY A REVOLUTIONARY HOUSE CLEANING CAN SAVE THE NIGERIAN POLITY FROM YET ANOTHER MAJOR FAILURE, THE DECISION IS SIMPLISTIC AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS. IT WILL PERMANENTLY ANTAGONIZE A MULTITUDE OF NIGERIA'S MOST TALENTED AND ARTICULATE CITIZENS. THEY WILL NOT TAKE IT LYING DOWN. MANY OF THEM CAN LEGITIMATELY ARGUE THAT THEY ARE BEING FOUND GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION WITHOUT TRIAL AND DENIED THEIR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS. SOME OF THEM WILL FIND SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THEIR CONTENTION. THE FMG'S COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS WILL BE FURTHER TESTED AS IT SEEKS TO MANAGE THE TRANSITION

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Authority DOS WAIVER
BY LM NARA DATE 3/5/24

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WHILE ENFORCING THE NON-PARTICIPATION OF SO MANY. THE DECISION ALSO REFLECTS A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE LEADERSHIP BUILT UP OVER MORE THAN A DECADE CAN BE EASILY REPLACED.

3. (U) BABANGIDA CLOSED HIS SPEECH BY ANNOUNCING THE IMMEDIATE CREATION OF TWO NEW STATES (BY DIVIDING THE CURRENT KADUNA AND CROSS RIVER STATES) AND FORECLOSING THE CREATION OF ANY ADDITIONAL STATES DURING THE TENURE OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. END SUMMARY.
~END SUMMARY~

4. (C) IN JUNE 1986, IN THE MAJOR ADDRESS WHICH ALSO ANNOUNCED THE ECONOMIC MEASURES THAT WERE TO BECOME THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM (SAP), BABANGIDA ARTICULATED THE AFRC'S DECISION "THAT ALL PAST POLITICIANS ARE HEREBY BANNED FROM SEEKING OR HOLDING ANY PUBLIC OFFICE FOR TEN YEARS." WHILE THIS GENERATED SOME IMMEDIATE EXCITEMENT, THE INITIAL REACTION AMONG THE VERY INDIVIDUALS IT TARGETED WAS DISDAIN AND THE GENERAL REACTION OVER TIME WAS ALMOST UNANIMOUS CYNICISM. MANY INDIVIDUAL POLITICIANS QUICKLY RECEIVED FROM KEY FMG FIGURES WHAT THEY REGARDED AS ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD BE ON A LIST OF EXCEPTIONS. IT SOON WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTED THAT IT WOULD BE FAR EASIER TO PUBLISH THE LIST OF THOSE BANNED THAN OF THOSE GRANTED AN EXCEPTION. AS POLITICAL ORGANIZING, IN THE GUISE OF ELDERS' MEETINGS, GOOK LAUNCHINGS AND SOCIAL CLUB GATHERINGS, GAINED MOMENTUM IN RECENT MONTHS, IT WAS HARD TO TELL THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1987 AND THE TRANSITION TO 1979.

5. (C) IN HIS SEPTEMBER 23 SPEECH TO THE NATION, BABANGIDA MADE AN EXTRAORDINARILY BOLD MOVE, PROBABLY THE BOLDEST HE HAS MADE TO DATE, TO TRANSFORM NIGERIAN SOCIETY AND BREAK WITH THE FAILURES OF THE PAST. IN ESSENCE, HE SAID HE INTENDED TO DO EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD SAID IN JUNE 1986--BAN VIRTUALLY AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LAGOS 11772

LONDON FOR KOLKER

PARIS FOR POPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PINS NI

SUBJECT: BABANGIDA BANS THE POLITICIANS AND HIMSELF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM THE INCEPTION OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC AND IN SOME CASES BEYOND.

6. (U) BABANGIDA OPENED HIS SPEECH BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE NATURE OF RECENT POLITICAL ORGANIZING HAD NOT BEEN LOST ON THE AFRC. HE NOTED THAT IN JANUARY 1966 AND DECEMBER 1983 VIRTUALLY IDENTICAL SITUATIONS HAD MOTIVATED THE MILITARY TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNANCE OF NIGERIA. APPARENTLY THE ONLY THING THE CIVILIANS HAD LEARNED DURING THIRTEEN YEARS OF MILITARY RULE, HE SAID, WAS HOW TO BETTER MISMANAGE THE ECONOMY, RIG ELECTIONS AND SPREAD DISAFFECTION AMONG THE GENERAL POPULATION. THESE "BITTER EXPERIENCES OF THE PAST" COMBINED WITH "PRESENT INDICATIONS" THAT THE PAST LEADERSHIP HAS NOT CHANGED ENOUGH HAVE CONVINCED THE AFRC THAT IT CANNOT HAND OVER TO THE SAME PEOPLE ABSENT EVIDENCE OF INCREASED COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY AND NATIONAL COMMITMENT.

7. (U) HAVING THUS EXPLAINED THE AFRC'S RATIONALE, BABANGIDA ANNOUNCED THAT THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF PERSONS WOULD BE BANNED FROM PARTICIPATING IN ELECTIONS,

15
HOLDING ELECTIVE OFFICE OR HOLDING ANY POLITICAL PARTY
POSITION:

- A) ALL POLITICAL OFFICE HOLDERS FROM THE FIRST AND
- SECOND REPUBLICS, ALL CIVILIAN PUBLIC OFFICERS OF
- ANY KIND SINCE INDEPENDENCE, ANY POLICE OR MILITARY
- OFFICERS SINCE JANUARY 1966, AND ANY PRIVATELY
- EMPLOYED PERSONS SINCE INDEPENDENCE WHO HAVE BEEN
- DISMISSED OR INDICTED BY ANY JUDICIAL,
- ADMINISTRATIVE OR INVESTIGATIVE PANEL FOR CORRUPTION
- OR OTHER MISDEED;
B) ANY PERSON WHO HELD ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OFFICES
- DURING THE FIRST OR SECOND REPUBLICS:
- PRESIDENT
- PRIME MINISTER
- VICE PRESIDENT
- REGIONAL PREMIER
- STATE GOVERNOR
- STATE ADMINISTRATOR
- DEPUTY STATE GOVERNOR
- MINISTER
- PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OR ASSISTANT
- COMMISSIONER
- PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY
- PRESIDENTIAL LIAISON OFFICER
- NATIONAL ASSEMBLY LIAISON OFFICER
- PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
- DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
- SPEAKER OR DEPUTY SPEAKER OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL, OR
- STATE HOUSES OF REPRESENTATIVES OR ASSEMBLIES
- CHAIRMAN OF ALL LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEES AT NATIONAL,
- REGIONAL AND STATE LEVELS
- MEMBER OF ALL POLITICAL PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
- AT NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND STATE LEVELS
C) ALL MILITARY AND POLICE PERSONNEL WHO HAVE HELD OR
- CURRENTLY HOLD ANY OF THE FOLLOWING POSITIONS:
- PRESIDENT OR HEAD OF STATE
- CHIEF OF STAFF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS AND DEPUTY
- CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF
- CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- CHIEF OF DEFENSE STAFF AND DEPUTY
- ALL SERVICE CHIEFS OF STAFF
- INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
- MILITARY GOVERNORS OR ADMINISTRATORS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LAGOS 11772

LONDON FOR KOLKER

PARIS FOR POPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PINS NI

SUBJECT: BABANGIDA BANS THE POLITICIANS AND HIMSELF

- MEMBERS OF THE AFRC OR SMC SINCE DECEMBER 1983

8. (U) BABANGIDA STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HIS
ADMINISTRATION HAS NO DESIRE TO SUCCEED ITSELF AND HENCE
HAD BANNED ALL OF THESE CATEGORIES OF MILITARY AND
POLICE OFFICERS FROM PARTICIPATING IN ANY ELECTIONS
DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. (COMMENT: THIS APPEARS
TO LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN FOR PARTICIPATION BY THESE
OFFICERS AFTER THE TRANSITION.) HE REMINDED HIS
MILITARY COLLEAGUES OF THEIR ROLES AS NEUTRAL
ARBITRATORS OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS. NOTING THAT THE
PAPERS HAVE BEEN FULL OF REPORTS OF POLITICAL MEETINGS

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POORLY DISGUISED AS SOCIAL EVENTS, HE WARNED THE PARTICIPANTS THAT SUCH ACTIVITY REMAINS ILLEGAL AND WOULD BE SUBJECT TO LEGAL SANCTION.

9. (U) TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NEW STATES, BABANGIDA CONDEMNED THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ISSUE FOR INDIVIDUAL AND ETHNIC POLITICAL GAIN AND ANNOUNCED THE IMMEDIATE CREATION OF THE NEW STATES OF KATSINA AND AKWA IBOM FROM THE EXISTING KADUNA AND CROSS RIVER STATES RESPECTIVELY. NO OTHER NEW STATES WILL BE CREATED UNDER THE CURRENT ADMINISTRATION.

10. (U) FINALLY, BABANGIDA WARNED THE PRESS TO DESIST FROM ANY INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS ON THE TWO SUBJECTS OF HIS ADDRESS. WHILE STATING THAT THE FMG HAD NO DESIRE TO IMPOSE CENSORSHIP OR RESTRICT FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HE SAID THAT GIVING PUBLICITY TO THOSE EXCLUDED FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS OR CARRYING THE ADVERTISEMENTS OF THOSE ADVOCATING ADDITIONAL STATES WOULD BE CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF DECREE 19 (SEE LAGOS 8947).

11. (C) COMMENT: DEVELOPMENTS OF RECENT MONTHS HAD RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FMG'S ABILITY TO ENGINEER A TRANSITION THAT WOULD PRODUCE A POLITICAL ORDER SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH FAILED TWICE IN THE PAST. THIS SPEECH REPRESENTS AN EXTRA-ORDINARILY BOLD EFFORT TO ASSURE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE AND TO OVERCOME THE CYNICISM WHICH HAS THUS FAR GREETED THE TRANSITION PROCESS. BY BANNING VIRTUALLY EVERYONE, INCLUDING HIMSELF, BABANGIDA HAS AVOIDED THE IMPOSSIBLE MORASS OF TRYING TO PICK AND CHOOSE AMONG VARYING GRADES OF GUILTY PARTIES WHILE AVOIDING CHARGES OF REGIONAL AND ETHNIC BIAS. BY INCLUDING THE MILITARY, HE HAS ALSO RESPONDED TO THOSE WHO FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT MILITARY GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN EQUALLY GUILTY OF CORRUPTION AND MISMANAGEMENT.

12. (C) BUT IF THE DECISION IS BOLD, IT IS ALSO SIMPLISTIC AND FRAUGHT WITH DANGERS. IN IMPLEMENTING IT BABANGIDA WILL GAIN THE ENMITY OF A MULTITUDE OF NIGERIA'S MOST TALENTED AND ARTICULATE CITIZENS. THEY WILL NOT ACCEPT THEIR MARGINALIZATION WITHOUT A FIGHT. THEY WILL TEST THE LIMITS OF THE BAN IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE AND IN SO DOING WILL ALSO TEST THE FMG'S COMMITMENT TO RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. MANY OF THEM CAN LEGITIMATELY ARGUE THAT THEY HAVE BEEN FOUND GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION WITHOUT TRIAL AND WILL FIND SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT IN THE WIDER PUBLIC. SOME OF THEM ARE EXTREMELY POPULAR; OTHERS EMERGED FROM THE SECOND REPUBLIC WITH CLEAN HANDS; A FEW FALL INTO BOTH CATEGORIES.

13. (C) THE DECISION ALSO REFLECTS A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION THAT THE LEADERSHIP BUILT UP OVER MORE THAN A DECADE CAN BE EASILY REPLACED IN MUCH THE SAME MANNER ONE REPLACES A DIVISION COMMANDER OR A COMPANY OF TROOPS. FINDING CAPABLE INDIVIDUALS TO REFILL THE POLITICAL RANKS WILL BE A MAJOR DILEMMA. THE CATEGORIES LISTED FOR BANNING COVER A GREAT DEAL OF GROUND AMONG THE RANKS OF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LAGOS 11772
LONDON FOR KOLKER

PARIS FOR POPE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV PINS NI

SUBJECT: BABANGIDA BANS THE POLITICIANS AND HIMSELF
NIGERIANS WHO HAVE THE STATURE, INCLINATION AND

EXPERIENCE NECESSARY FOR HIGH PUBLIC OFFICE. THIS WILL
BE A GREATER PROBLEM FOR THE POORLY EDUCATED NORTH THAN
FOR MOST AREAS OF THE SOUTH. (ONE NOTEWORTHY DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN THIS SPEECH AND THE JUNE 1986 SPEECH AND A
POSSIBLE PARTIAL RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM IS THAT THE
LATTER INCLUDED ALL STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATORS. THE
FORMER INCLUDES ONLY THOSE WHO HELD LEADERSHIP
POSITIONS. THUS THE YOUNGER LEGISLATORS OF THE SECOND
REPUBLIC BECOME AN OBVIOUS SOURCE OF TALENT.)
LYMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04<SSN> 1772<TOR> 870924091945 MSG000180782385
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04<SSN> 1772<TOR> 870924092125 MSG000180782485
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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256357 CABLE

7 10/15/1987 B1

LAGOS 12809

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<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8852
INFO RUEABND/DEAHQS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 4444

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: MRS. BABANGIDA LAUNCHES NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
- AGAINST DRUG ABUSE

File: Nigeria

<TEXT>

UNCLAS LAGOS 13014
STATE FOR INM AND AF/W
STATE ALSO PASS CONGRESSMAN CHARLES RANGEL
DEA FOR OF
E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: SNAR NI US
SUBJECT: MRS. BABANGIDA LAUNCHES NATIONAL CAMPAIGN
- AGAINST DRUG ABUSE

1. ON OCTOBER 14, NIGERIA'S FIRST LADY MARYAM BABANGIDA PRESIDED AT THE LAUNCHING OF THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST DRUG ABUSE. IN ADDITION TO KEYNOTE ADDRESS BY FIRST LADY, MAJOR SPEECHES WERE DELIVERED BY MINISTER OF HEALTH RANSOME-KUTI, MINISTER OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, YOUTH AND SPORTS LAWAL AND DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF UN FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL BEACHNER. OTHER IMPORTANT FIGURES PRESENT INCLUDED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE SECRETARY TO THE FMG, SEVERAL OTHER MINISTERS, SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, AND WIVES OF STATE GOVERNORS. RANSOME-KUTI'S SPEECH MADE PARTICULAR POINT OF EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO THE USG FOR COOPERATION AND SUPPORT, THE ONLY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT SO MENTIONED. PUBLICITY MATERIALS FOR THE CAMPAIGN DRAW HEAVILY ON U.S. MATERIALS PROVIDED BY USIS AND ADAPTED TO NIGERIAN AUDIENCE. LAUNCHING RECEIVED WIDESPREAD MEDIA ATTENTION.

2. CAMPAIGN IS A MAJOR POLITICAL STATEMENT BY THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGING THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THREAT POSED TO NIGERIAN SOCIETY, QUITE APART FROM ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT, AND THE NEED FOR A GOVERNMENT COMMITMENT TO DEALING WITH IT. IN A TIME OF SEVERE FISCAL AUSTERITY, THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON NARCOTIC DRUGS AND DRUG ABUSE CONTROL IS RELATIVELY WELL FINANCED HAVING RECEIVED A GRANT OF 1.5 MILLION NAIRA (APPROXIMATELY \$320,000). AS RANSOME-KUTI POINTED OUT, THIS IS THE FIRST SUCH FUNDING PROVIDED BY ANY NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT. MRS. BABANGIDA'S PARTICIPATION DEMONSTRATED BOTH HIGHEST LEVEL COMMITMENT AND THE INSPIRATION OF MRS. REAGAN'S LEADING ROLE IN U.S. EFFORTS.
LYMAN

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 3014<STOR> 871020132145 MSG000183043304
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256333 REPORT

4 11/1/1987 B1

THE MILITARY IN NIGERIA: ITS ROLE IN THE
TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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BMC -

Since HOC is pessimistic
about a Bahazida visit
in the 1st part of 1988, I suggest
you merge the "Bahazida visit"
file with the "Nigeria" file
for now.

A.

<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY<CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~<OSRI> RUEHOS<DTG> 011557Z DEC 87
<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
<TO>TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9733

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file - Nymid

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 LAGOS 15186

EXDIS
FOR AS CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NI, US
SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING IS AMBASSADOR'S ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S SITUATION, BOTH DOMESTIC AND IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. PRESIDENT BABANGIDA APPROACHES 1988 WITH SEVERAL MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS BEHIND HIM IN BOTH THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS. HIS ABILITY TO CARRY THESE OUT WITHOUT SERIOUS DISSENSION WITHIN THE MILITARY OR POPULAR UPRISING HAS GIVEN HIM A DECIDED AIR OF CONFIDENCE AND PERHAPS NEW BOLDNESS. YET 1988 CARRIES SERIOUS CHALLENGES ABOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE WISE TO BE CONCERNED: ANOTHER DIFFICULT ECONOMIC YEAR PERHAPS MADE
~END SUMMARY~

WORSE BY RISING FOOD COSTS, CONTINUED CYNICISM ABOUT THE POLITICAL TRANSITION PROCESS, DETERMINED OPPOSITION FROM THE ENTIRE CLASS OF POLITICIANS BANNED FROM POLITICAL PARTICIPATION UNDER HIS REGIME, AND STILL SIMMERING IF CURRENTLY SUPPRESSED RELIGIOUS TENSION. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BABANGIDA HAS BECOME UNCHARACTERISTICALLY ACTIVE, WITH VISITS TO SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND AT LEAST A FEINT AT THE OAU CHAIRMANSHIP. YET HIS APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS REMAINS FITFUL AND DISORGANIZED, FRUSTRATING ESPECIALLY TO HIS FRIENDS IN THE WEST. OVERALL, HE ENJOYS INCREASING POPULAR RESPECT AND FOR MOST NIGERIANS AND NIGERIA'S WESTERN FRIENDS, REMAINS THE BEST HOPE FOR NIGERIA'S POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY. END SUMMARY.

3. POLITICS: A YEAR OF BOLD DECISIONS. IN 1987, BABANGIDA ANNOUNCED THE TERMS AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE, EXTENDING THE DATE FROM 1990 TO 1992 AND PROVIDING A VISION OF A NEW POLITICAL ORDER; LAID OUT A TRANSITION PLAN OF GREAT COMPLEXITY; CREATED TWO NEW STATES (AN ISSUE FRAUGHT WITH REGIONAL/RELIGIOUS TENSIONS), AND AGAINST ADVICE OF SOME PLOUGHED AHEAD WITH THE FIRST STAGE OF THE TRANSITION PROCESS, I.E. THE HOLDING OF LOCAL NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS. PERHAPS BOLDEST OF ALL, BABANGIDA CUT OFF AN ENTIRE GENERATION OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND PROFESSIONALS BY BANNING VIRTUALLY ALL PREVIOUS AND PRESENT OFFICE-HOLDERS (INCLUDING HIMSELF) FROM ELECTIVE OFFICE OR PARTY ACTIVITY THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS.

4. SEEKING A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE. BABANGIDA'S PLAN REFLECTED HIS OWN STRONGLY HELD VIEW THAT ONLY A NEW GENERATION OF POLITICIANS, OPERATING IN A NEW POLITICAL

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Authority: DOS WAIVER
BY: LM NARA DATE: 3/5/24

CULTURE, WOULD BRING TO AN END THE CYCLE OF ELECTED GOVERNMENTS-MILITARY COUPS OF THE LAST 27 YEARS. BY BANNING HIMSELF AND HIS MILITARY COHORTS FROM OFFICE BESIDES, HE SOUGHT TO DEMONSTRATE THE SINCERITY OF HIS OBJECTIVES AS WELL AS TO UNDERLINE HIS STATED BELIEF THAT THE MILITARY ITSELF HAS BEEN CORRUPTED AND LOST ITS PROFESSIONALISM BY ITS ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICS

5. CAN THE POLITICAL CULTURE BE CHANGED? BABANGIDA'S PLAN RESTS ON THE PROPOSITION THAT THE MASSES CAN BE MOBILIZED TO THINK MORE CONSTRUCTIVELY ABOUT THEIR POLITICAL PARTICIPATION (E.G., NOT SELL THEIR VOTES, HOLD ELECTED LEADERS TO HIGHER STANDARDS OF CONDUCT, ETC.), AND THAT NEW ENTRANTS TO POLITICS CAN BE ATTRACTED IN THIS SPACE OF FIVE YEARS WHO SHARE THIS SAME PHILOSOPHY. BUT EVEN BABANGIDA'S BEST FRIENDS, IF FOR SELF-SERVING REASONS, BELIEVE HE HAS SET A TASK THAT CANNOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN THAT TIME FRAME AND WISH HE HAD COMMITTED HIMSELF TO A LONGER PERIOD OF RULE, E.G. BY FORMING HIS OWN POLITICAL MACHINE/PARTY AND BECOMING AN ELECTED PRESIDENT IN 1992. THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF HIS PROGRAM LEAD TO CYNICISM AMONG MANY WHO SUGGEST AT BEST THE THIRD REPUBLIC WOULD LAST BUT A FEW YEARS BEFORE THE NEXT COUP. TO HIS OPPONENTS, THE PROGRAM WAS PURPOSELY FLAWED TO JUSTIFY, WHEN IT FAILS, THE RETURN OR EXTENSION OF MILITARY RULE. WE DO NOT/NOT SHARE THAT VIEW, BELIEVING THAT BABANGIDA, IF NOT ALL HIS COLLEAGUES, IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO HIS REFORM OBJECTIVE. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS AN AIR OF IDEALISM BORDERING ON NAIVETE IN THE PROGRAM'S TIMETABLE AND OBJECTIVES THAT WILL CERTAINLY CHALLENGE THE REGIME MORE AND MORE AS IT PROCEEDS.

6. FISSURES IN THE SYSTEM. BABANGIDA HAS BEEN EXPERTLY ADEPT AT KEEPING THE AFRC AND OTHER KEY MILITARY OFFICERS UNITED AS HE TOOK EACH ADDITIONAL BOLD STEP THIS YEAR. THE DISCIPLINE IS REMARKABLE. NEVERTHELESS, ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 LAGOS 15186

EXDIS

FOR AS CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NI, US

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END

IN BANNING EVERY POLITICAL FIGURE, CURRENT MILITARY OFFICE HOLDER AND RETIRED MILITARY EX-OFFICE HOLDER FROM PROSPECTS OF POWER IN THE NEXT FIVE TO SEVEN YEARS, BABANGIDA HAS MADE ENEMIES OF SOME OF THE MOST POWERFUL AND RICHEST MEN IN NIGERIA, AND NOT A FEW OF WHOM HAVE TIES INTO THE PRESENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THEY WILL LOOK FOR ANY WEAKNESS, ANY ISSUE ON WHICH THEY CAN MOBILIZE MASS SUPPORT, ANY WAVERING OR EXPLOITABLE PERSONAL AMBITION WITHIN BABANGIDA'S RANKS TO SOW DISSENT AND THOUGHTS OF CHANGE. BABANGIDA IS NOT UNAWARE OF THIS ENMITY, YET HE ACTS SUPREMELY CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN OUTMANEUVER AND/OR COUNTER IT.

7. RELIGIOUS TENSION: A FEW MONTHS AGO, RELIGIOUS TENSIONS SEEMED TO BE THE MOST THREATENING FACTOR ON THE HORIZON, WITH RIOTS IN MARCH AND FIERY STATEMENTS EMANATING FROM BOTH MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS. BABANGIDA HAS SUCCESSFULLY LOWERED THE VOLUME, THROUGH THE TIME-HONORED PROCESS OF TRIBUNALS AND INVESTIGATORY BODIES WHICH MAKE NO ONE HAPPY BUT TAKE SO MUCH TIME

THAT EMOTIONS SUBSIDE, AND BY SOME SERIOUS WARNINGS TO RELIGIOUS TROUBLE-MAKERS. PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANT IS THAT MOSLEM POWER AS IT HAS TRADITIONALLY EMANATED FROM THE NORTH MAY BE DECLINING. SENSING THAT, NOT ONLY ARE CHRISTIANS MORE ORGANIZED AND POLITICALLY UNITED, BUT GOVERNMENT IS BECOMING MORE WILLING TO STAND UP TO THE OLDER NORTHERN ELITE WHICH FORMERLY HAD EVERYONE A BIT COWED. IT IS IN THIS REGARD THAT BABANGIDA HAS RECENTLY SPOKEN OUT WITH UNUSUAL SHARPNESS AGAINST THE TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY, CALLING THEM BIGOTS AND HYPOCRITES AND WARNING THEM THAT NATIONAL INTERESTS WILL TAKE PRIORITY OVER RELIGIOUS ZEALOTRY.

8. RELIGION (CONT'D.). BABANGIDA SEEMS QUITE PREPARED IN FACT TO PRESIDE OVER A REDISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER IN NIGERIA, AWAY FROM THE NORTHERN ELITE TO MIDDLE STATES (HIS ORIGIN), MINORITIES, AND INDEED CHRISTIANS. IT IS NOTABLE (AND TO NORTHERN MOSLEMS A SIGN OF BABANGIDA'S PERFIDY) THAT CHRISTIANS OCCUPY KEY MILITARY COMMANDS AND A MAJORITY ON THE AFRC. BUT EVEN IF THIS IS THE LONG-TERM TREND IN NIGERIA, AWARENESS OF IT CREATES THE DANGER OF AN EVEN STRONGER BACKLASH FROM THE NORTH. VETERANS OF THE OLD NPC AND NPN, IF AGING, ARE STILL AMONG THE BEST ORGANIZERS IN THE COUNTRY, AND THEY CONTINUE TO SEE THEIR FUTURE NOT IN DEMOCRATIC COMPETITION WITH WESTERN-EDUCATED SOUTHERNERS OR IN AN OPEN-MARKET ECONOMY, BUT THROUGH FOSTERING RESPECT FOR TRADITION, BEHIND-THE-SCENES WIELDING OF POWER AND ECONOMIC FAVORITISM. THEY ARE FULLY PREPARED TO USE RELIGION FOR THIS END, AND EVEN TO PLAY WITH FUNDAMENTALISM (THOUGH IT THREATENS THEM AS MUCH AS ANYONE) IF THEY FEEL THAT IS THE ONLY COURSE. IT IS THIS VERY DETERMINATION TO DOMINATE THROUGH POLITICAL-RELIGIOUS AMALGAMS THAT SETS CHRISTIANS' TEETH ON EDGE, AND WHICH MAKES SUCH ISSUES AS OIC OR EVEN MEMBERSHIP IN THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK SO CHARGED WITH EMOTION. IN SUMMARY, RELIGION IS STILL A POTENT FORCE FOR INSTABILITY, INTRIGUE AND THE UPSETTING OF THE BEST-LAID PLANS FOR "RATIONAL" POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM.

9. TRANSITION: THE FIRST STEPS. BABANGIDA, AGAINST THE ADVICE OF MANY, INSISTED ON ADHERING TO HIS TIMETABLE FOR THE FIRST STAGE OF RETURN TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT: LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS IN DECEMBER. PREDICTABLY, THE MACHINERY FOR REGISTERING VOTERS WAS AMATEURISH AND INADEQUATE TO THE TASK, BANNED POLITICIANS INFILTRATED THEIR FOLLOWERS INTO THE PROCESS, FRAUD AND STOLEN REGISTRATION FORMS WERE WIDELY REPORTED, ETC. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PUT A GOOD FACE ON THE WHOLE PROCESS BUT IT SHOULD BE A LESSON THAT THE NITTY GRITTY OF REGISTERING VOTERS, FINDING "NEW" CANDIDATES, AND PUTTING INTO PRACTICE AN ELECTED GOVERNMENT IS NOT GOING TO BE EASY. ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, BABANGIDA CREATED A CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW COMMITTEE MADE UP OF ACADEMICS, JURISTS, AND OTHER NOTABLES THAT HAS GONE ABOUT ITS TASK QUIETLY AND PROFESSIONALLY. WHETHER THE ELECTED CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY THAT IS TO SUCCEED IT NEXT YEAR WILL BE SO BUSINESSLIKE IS DOUBTFUL.

10. THE ECONOMY. LIKE A POWERFUL UNDERCURRENT, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING CONTINUES TO AFFECT

EXDIS

FOR AS CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NI, US

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END

THE DIRECTION OF ALL OTHER ISSUES. HOW SUCCESSFUL BABANGIDA IS IN THIS REALM WILL DETERMINE HOW WELL THE COUNTRY CAN MANAGE SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS TENSIONS, MAINTAIN STABILITY AND STAY UNITED UNDER HIS LEADERSHIP. BABANGIDA HAS LARGELY OVERCOME PRACTICAL OPPOSITION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM, AND IN THIS AREA AS IN THE POLITICAL, HE SEEMS MORE ASSURED AND DETERMINED. ON THE AGENDA FOR 1988 IS A NEW POLICY ON PRIVATIZATION/ COMMERCIALIZATION OF PARASTATALS, THE REMOVAL OR REDUCTION OF POLITICALLY SENSITIVE SUBSIDIES, GREATER INCENTIVES TO FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT (UNDER WORLD BANK PRODDING), AND FURTHER LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE AND FINANCE. BABANGIDA FIRMLY REJECTED THE POLITBURO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SOCIALISM AND HAS MADE CLEAR THAT A BASIC PART OF HIS VISION FOR NIGERIA IS TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE GAINS OF THE SAP.

11. HOW WELL IS IT WORKING? THE ADAGE COMES TO MIND, "THE OPERATION WAS A SUCCESS BUT THE PATIENT DIED." IT IS NOT AS SERIOUS AS THAT, BUT THE REALITY IS THAT WHILE THE STEPS TAKEN TO RESTRUCTURE THE ECONOMY WERE BOTH CORRECT AND NECESSARY, THE ECONOMY HAS CONTINUED TO STAGNATE, AND THE POPULATION IS SUFFERING IN A PROLONGED WAY THAT EVEN MANY THAT SUPPORTED SAP DID NOT FULLY ENVISION. NONE OF THIS IS BABANGIDA'S FAULT. INDEED MANAGEMENT OF SUCH TRICKY POLICY MATTERS AS THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE AUCTION, THE LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE, ONETARY POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF INFLATION HAS BEEN BRILLIANT. THE GOVERNMENT NEITHER LOST CONTROL OF THE PROCESS (AS ZAMBIA DID OF THE EXCHANGE RATE) NOR WENFASTER THAN POLITICALLY MANAGEABLE, YET KEPT MOVING FORWARD. IN CERTAIN AREAS, RESULTS WERE QUICKLY VISIBLE, E.G. COCOA FARMERS ENJOYED A WINDFALL AND OTHER CASH CROPS ARE ENJOYING A COMEBACK, FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY WAS ALMOST (SAVE FOR SMUGGLING) ACHIEVED, FOREIGN EXCHANGE BECAME MORE REGULARLY AVAILABLE AND BASIC PRODUCTION MORE PREDICTABLE.

12. NEVERTHELESS, GROWTH HAS REMAINED ZERO OR NEGATIVE, UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG MANUFACTURING AND SERVICE INDUSTRIES IS SEVERE, WAGE FREEZES HAVE LED WORKERS IN BOTH THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS TO A QUIET DESPERATION, AND THE MIDDLE CLASS HAS WATCHED ITS STANDARD OF LIVING AND ITS EXPECTATIONS FOR THE FUTURE DWINDLE. EVEN THOUGH INTELLIGENT PEOPLE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL OF THIS MAY BE NECESSARY, THAT INDEED THE PROBLEM IS NOT THE SAP BUT THE END OF THE OIL BOOM, STILL PATIENCE IS WEARING THIN. THE RECENT RIOTS IN LAGOS OVER POLICE BRUTALITY, WHILE VERY MUCH IN RESPONSE TO THAT ISSUE, WERE ALSO SIGNS OF THE URBAN POOR'S FRUSTRATIONS.

13. FOOD PROBLEMS ON THE HORIZON? THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE SAP WERE BLESSED BY BUMPER CROPS KEEPING FOOD COSTS LARGELY STABLE AND THUS TAKING THE EDGE OFF THE HARDSHIPS OF ADJUSTMENT. BUT EARLY ESTIMATES FOR THIS YEAR PREDICT AT LEAST SOMEWHAT REDUCED HARVESTS FOR

ALMOST EVERY MAJOR FOOD CROP, PORTENDING RISING FOOD COSTS. TOGETHER WITH THE DISAPPEARANCE OF BREAD AS A RESULT OF THE WHEAT BAN (WHICH IS ONLY NOW BEING FELT), THIS COULD MAKE THE PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMY ACUTE. SO FAR THE GOVERNMENT HAS SHOWN LITTLE OUTWARD CONCERN, PERHAPS COUNTING ON PREDICTIONS BEING WRONG OR REDUCTIONS OF ONLY MARGINAL SIGNIFICANCE. BUT IF FOOD PRICES DO RISE SHARPLY, AND THE GOVERNMENT GOES AHEAD AT THE SAME TIME WITH REDUCTION OF SUCH PRICE SENSITIVE SUBSIDIES AS ON PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, THE TEMPERATURE OF DISCONTENT COULD RISE TO THE DANGER POINT.

14. BABANGIDA HAS LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO PUSH AHEAD WITH THE SAP. NIGERIA'S LONGER TERM FUTURE ABSOLUTELY DEPENDS ON RESTRUCTURING THE ECONOMY TO A POST-OIL BOOM BASIS, WITH REALISTIC PRICES, AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION AND NEW MORE EFFICIENT INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS. BUT THE PROCESS IS INEVITABLY LONG TERM. THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY, EVEN MORE THAN OUR OWN, DOES NOT RESPOND TO NEW EXCHANGE VALUES OR FISCAL AND MONETARY INCENTIVES OVERNIGHT. THAT IS THE MEANING OF STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS. THUS, TO SURVIVE BOTH THE SHORT AND LONG TERM, BABANGIDA WILL HAVE TO CONTINUE TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF HIS MILITARY CONSTITUENCY AND THE FEELINGS OF THE GENERAL POPULATION, DEFTLY TO OFFER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 LAGOS 15186
EXDIS
FOR AS CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NI, US
SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END
ALLEVIATION OF SOME OF THE MOST PAINFULLY FELT BURDENS AT CRUCIAL MOMENTS, AND STILL NOT UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF REFORM. THE 1988 BUDGET SPEECH WILL BE A MAJOR TEST OF THAT BALANCE. HIS ADVISORS RECOGNIZE THAT SOME "REFLATIONARY" STEPS ARE NEEDED, PERHAPS SOME INCREASE IN WORKER BENEFITS, SOME OTHER PUMPING UP OF CONSUMER PURCHASING POWER, YET THE BUDGET MUST RESPOND TOO TO THE DEMANDS OF THE IMF (AND TO THE REALITIES OF THE BUDGET DEFICIT) IN ADDRESSING SUBSIDIES, CONTROLLING INFLATION, AND KEEPING THE FOCUS OF NEW EXPENDITURES ON THE POLITICALLY LESS VOCAL BUT MUCH MORE POPULOUS RURAL AREAS ON WHICH BABANGIDA HAS LAVISHED MUCH ATTENTION IN THE PAST AND ON WHICH HE CONTINUES TO PIN MUCH OF HIS HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

15. RELATIONS WITH EXTERNAL CREDITORS AND DONORS: NIGERIA, WITH ITS EXTRAORDINARY SAP, SHOULD BE THE DARLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL WORLD, A PARAGON OF THE PRINCIPLES THAT THE BAKER PLAN REPRESENTS. AND IN FAC', NIGERIA IS ADMIRER FOR WHAT IT IS DOING; MORE THAN ADMIRER, THE WORLD BANK'S ANTICIPATED EXPOSURE OF 1 BILLION A YEAR IS ONE OF ITS LARGEST. HOWEVER, NIGERIA HAS TENDED TO TAKE THE EXTERNAL WORLD FOR GRANTED, TO BELIEVE THAT BECAUSE OF SAP, SUPPORT SHOULD FLOW ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY. AS A RESULT IT HAS NOT/NOT ORGANIZED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEMS WITH CREDITORS IN ANY KIND OF SYSTEMATIC FASHION. BUREAUCRATIC AND PERSONAL RIVALRIES HAVE AGGRAVATED THIS PROBLEM.

16. LOSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES. THUS THE DEBT RESCHEDULING EXERCISE, ADMITTEDLY INCREDIBLY COMPLEX, HAS BEEN HANDLED IN FITS AND STARTS, WITH NIGERIA

ALTERNATING BETWEEN THE CALM, PROFESSIONAL, RESPECTED LEADERSHIP OF THE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR AND THE VOLATILE, PERIPATETIC OPERA-LIKE PERFORMANCE OF THE MINISTER OF FINANCE. CREDITORS ARE ALSO TO BLAME, EACH ONE SEEKING SPECIAL ADVANTAGE OR PAYMENT OF UNRELATED ITEMS AS PART OF BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS (WE ARE NO EXCEPTION). THE RESULT HAS BEEN THAT IN SPITE OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR NIGERIA'S SAP, AND AN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON RESCHEDULING AND NEW CREDITS AS FAR BACK AS DECEMBER 1986, NIGERIA HAS IRRITATED EVERY EUROPEAN CREDIT AGENCY TO THE POINT THAT NEITHER ECGD, COFACE, NOR THE GERMANS HAS YET REESTABLISHED COVER. EX-IM IS ON THE BRINK BUT HAS NOT CROSSED OVER YET. NIGERIA HAS THUS LOST THE BENEFIT (AND ADDED STIMULUS TO THE ECONOMY) OF MORE THAN \$1 BILLION THIS PAST YEAR.

17. THERE IS A GROWING RECOGNITION OF THIS PROBLEM WITHIN THE FMG. ADDRESSING IT WILL NOT BE EASY. THERE IS A REAL PROBLEM IN SHORTAGE OF SKILLED PROFESSIONALS, AND IN THE FACT THAT BENEATH THE TOP LAYERS OF THE FINANCIAL MINISTRIES, THE CIVIL SERVICE STANDS OBSTINATE IN ITS OPPOSITION AND SOMETIMES SABOTAGE OF A PROGRAM (THE SAP) THAT WILL TAKE AWAY ITS POWERS AND PERSONAL SOURCES OF GRAFT. WE SHOULD EXPECT CONTINUING FRUSTRATIONS, MADE ALL THE MORE LIKELY BY THE ABILITY OF PARTICIPANTS WHO APPEAR TO BE LOSING OUT TO APPEAL TO POPULAR ANTI-FOREIGN SENTIMENTS (E.G, THE CREDITORS ARE BEING RAPACIOUS, FOREIGN LOANS ARE BAD FOR US ANYWAY, ETC.). ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE FMG HAS A MUCH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT ITS REAL DEBT IS TODAY THAN A YEAR AGO, AND WILL HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THIS YEAR'S EXPERIENCE WHEN IT STARTS THE NEXT RESCHEDULING.

18. AS FOR THE CREDITORS: MOST OF THE WESTERNERS REALIZE THAT WE ARE ALL IN JEOPARDY OF CUTTING OFF OUR NOSES TO SPITE OUR FACES, I.E. THAT IN WORKING TO GET EVERY DOLLAR DUE WE MAY FAIL TO SUPPORT THE ONE CHANCE FOR STABILITY AND INDEED LONG TERM REPAYMENT THAT WE HAVE IN NIGERIA. YET WE, LIKE THE NIGERIANS, CANNOT QUITE GET OUR ACT TOGETHER. WE ARE PRISONERS OF OUR OWN SPECIAL INTERESTS AND CLAIMS. EACH TIME ONE OF US GETS READY TO OPEN UP FOR BUSINESS, SOME ITEM OR DIFFERENCE PULLS US BACK. THE SIGNING (FINALLY) OF THE LONDON CLUB AGREEMENT ON NOVEMBER 23, WHICH MOREOVER MODIFIED THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL SCHEDULE IN NIGERIA'S FAVOR, WAS PERHAPS A GOOD OMEN. LED BY THE COMMERCIAL BANKS, PERHAPS THE NEXT ROUND OF THE PARIS CLUB WILL PRODUCE SOME CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP ON THE OFFICIAL SIDE WITH WHICH BETTER TO RAISE THE SIGHTS OF THE NIGERIANS.

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EXDIS

FOR AS CROCKER FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NI, US

SUBJECT: NIGERIA AT YEAR'S END

19. FOREIGN AFFAIRS: BABANGIDA HAS BEEN ON A ROLL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, IN SHARP CONTRAST TO HIS FIRST YEAR WHEN HE SEEMED TO ESCHEW SUCH INVOLVEMENT. HE HAS VISITED VIRTUALLY ALL HIS NEIGHBORS PLUS KENYA, KEPT THE PRESIDENCY OF ECOWAS A SECOND YEAR, AND BECOME ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. I WOULD NOT/NOT RULE OUT A BID FOR THE OAU CHAIRMANSHIP NEXT YEAR DESPITE THE DISAVOWALS MADE

EARLIER. BABANGIDA STILL SEEMS PERSONALLY UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE TRAPPINGS OF DIPLOMACY, BUT INTELLECTUALLY CHALLENGED BY THE PROBLEMS. MOREOVER, HE HAS KEPT REIN ON THE JINGOISTIC TENDENCIES OF THE PRESS AND MEA REGARDING NIGERIA'S NEIGHBORS, E.G., SCOTCHING EFFORTS TO AGGRAVATE BORDER TENSIONS WITH CAMEROON AND USING MORE CARROTS THAN STICKS WITH EQUATORIAL GUINEA.

20. WITH THIS ADDED ACTIVITY, HOWEVER, HAS COME NO BETTER ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANAGEMENT. MEA AKINYEMI HAS CONTINUED ON HIS PERSONALIZED ODYSSEYS SUCH AS THE LAGOS FORUM WHILE BEING PERFECTLY IMPOSSIBLE OR INCONSEQUENTIAL ON SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. HE HAS BEEN VIRTUALLY SHUT OUT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA INITIATIVES. YET THERE IS NO STRUCTURE FOR DEALING WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITHIN DODAN BARRACKS. RESPONSIBILITIES THERE APPEAR TO BE MADE AD HOC OR BASED ON PERSONAL AFFINITIES OR PREDILECTIONS (ALIYU MOHAMMED ON LIBYA, OLAGUNJU ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, ALFA ON EQUATORIAL GUINEA). SOME OF THE PEOPLE INVOLVED, MOREOVER, ARE NOT PARTICULARLY FRIENDLY TO THE U.S., BUT BECAUSE THEIR INFLUENCE DERIVES FROM ETHNIC, MILITARY, OR OTHER DOMESTIC CONCERNS, HAVE ENTREE INTO THESE DECISIONS. AS A RESULT, THINGS FALL THROUGH THE CRACKS OR GET SCREWED UP (VISIT TO WASHINGTON, THATCHER VISIT TO NIGERIA). BABANGIDA HAS SEEMINGLY NOT WANTED TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPLICATIONS, FOR HIM AND HIS STAFF STRUCTURE, OF THE EXPANDED EXTERNAL ROLE HE IS ADOPTING. THIS TOO MAY BE ADDRESSED IN THE NEW YEAR, OR SHOULD BE.

21. AND FOR THE U.S.: WHEN ALL IS SAID AND DONE, BABANGIDA REPRESENTS STILL THE BEST HOPE FOR NIGERIA AND THE BEST FRIEND OF THE WEST WE HAVE HAD FOR SOME TIME HERE. HE REMAINS PRAGMATIC, PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, DEEPLY COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING, MODERATE IN EXERTING POWER, AND POSSESSED OF SOME VISION. HE IS RESPECTED, NOT CONSPICUOUSLY CORRUPT, AND HAS THE SOLID BACKING OF THE MILITARY AS HE TACKLES HEAD-ON BOTH THE GIANTS OF THE POLITICAL PAST AND THE RIGORS OF ECONOMIC REFORM. IF THERE IS A DANGER AHEAD, AND THIS IS NOT NECESSARILY THE VIEW OF THE CT AS A WHOLE, IT IS IN OVER-CONFIDENCE. BABANGIDA HAS ACCOMPLISHED AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT, DONE THINGS NO ONE THOUGHT WAS POLITICALLY OR ECONOMICALLY POSSIBLE, GOTTEN AWAY WITH IT, AND KEPT HIS MILITARY BACKERS WITH HIM. THAT CAN MAKE HIM HEADY, A LITTLE TOO SURE OF HIMSELF. WE HAVE NOT SEEN EVIDENCE OF CARELESSNESS, OR DELUSIONS OF GRANDEUR, BUT CAUTION IS IN ORDER. OVERCONFIDENCE COULD LEAD TO THE ONE SERIOUS MISSTEP HIS ENEMIES AWAIT.

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<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS: AN UPDATE

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LONDON FOR KOLKER

PARIS FOR POPE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: KPRP PGOV PINS ECON NI

SUBJECT: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS: AN UPDATE

REF: (A) 85 LAGOS 13764, (B) LAGOS 12809

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: REF A OFFERED AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL FORCES BEHIND THE THEN UNFOLDING NATIONAL DEBATE OVER WHETHER OR NOT TO ACCEPT AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IMF AND OF THE LIKELY IMPACT OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING ON THOSE FORCES. ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING IS NOW A WELL ADVANCED, THOUGH INCOMPLETE, REALITY. THIS, COMBINED WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, MOST NOTABLY THE INCREASED SALIENCE OF RELIGIOUS ISSUES AND THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM FOR TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE IN 1992, HAS BROUGHT ABOUT IMPORTANT SHIFTS IN THE RELATIVE POWER OF KEY GROUPS. VARIOUS FACTORS HAVE COMBINED TO ERODE THE INFLUENCE OF THE TRADITIONAL NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT. CHRISTIAN MILITANCY IN THE MIDDLE BELT HAS GENERATED WHAT IS ARGUABLY THE NEWEST POLITICAL FORCE IN THE COUNTRY, CAUSING ITS ADHERENTS TO LOOK INCREASINGLY TO POLITICAL ALLIANCES WITH FELLOW CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTH RATHER THAN TO LONGSTANDING ASSOCIATIONS DATING FROM THE OLD NORTHERN REGION.

3. THE INCREASING ISOLATION AND FRAGMENTATION OF THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT HAS BEEN MATCHED BY A GROWING SOUTHERN RECOGNITION THAT THE POLICIES OF THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT ARE WEAKENING THEIR OLD ADVERSARIES AND CREATING OPPORTUNITIES THAT COULD/COULD ASSURE THAT THE TOP LEADERSHIP OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC COMES FROM THE SOUTH. IT IS INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE NORTH IS AT A DISADVANTAGE THE MORE THE GOVERNMENT RELAXES ITS GRIP ON THE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC DECISIONS BECOME LESS

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BY LM NARA DATE 3/5/24

OVERTLY POLITICAL. YET, THIS PREOCCUPATION WITH THE NORTH ONLY UNDERLINES THE DILEMMA OF THE SOUTH AND ITS POTENTIAL NORTHERN "PROGRESSIVE" AND MIDDLE BELT CHRISTIAN ALLIES. POLITICAL IDEAS OR IDEOLOGIES, PROGRESSIVE OR OTHERWISE, DO NOT YET PLAY A SUBSTANTIAL ROLE IN NIGERIAN POLITICS. ETHNIC, REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS LOYALTIES ARE STILL THE FUNDAMENTALS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE POTENTIAL ANTI-NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT ALLIANCE REMAINS AN EXTREMELY DISPARATE GROUP WITHOUT IDENTIFIABLE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. EVEN SERIOUSLY WEAKENED, THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT REMAINS A FORMIDABLE FORCE CAPABLE OF EXPLOITING THE DIVISIONS OF THOSE INTENT ON ENDING ITS LONG-TERM GRIP ON NATIONAL POWER. UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF NEW ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITIES, AND THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES, THE BALANCE OF POWER IN NIGERIA IS EVOLVING. BUT THE BASIS FOR STABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. BABANGIDA STILL HAS TIME BUT THE EXTRAORDINARY ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS WILL HAVE TO BE MATCHED BY EQUALLY IMPRESSIVE ONES OVER THE NEXT FIVE. END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~

4. IN DECEMBER 1985, DAYS BEFORE A "COUP PLOT" BROUGHT THE NATIONAL DEBATE ON THE IMF TO A PREMATURE CLOSE, THE EMBASSY PROVIDED AN ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL FORCES BEHIND THE DEBATE AND THE LIKELY IMPACT ON THOSE FORCES OF THE MAJOR CHANGE OF DIRECTION THAT THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT WAS ADVOCATING FOR THE COUNTRY (REF A). IN BRIEF, THAT ANALYSIS PREDICTED AN EROSION OF THE LONG STANDING POLITICAL DOMINANCE OF THE TRADITIONAL NORTHERN HAUSA-FULANI ELITE, A REDUCTION OF THE POWER OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TO THE BENEFIT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND ENHANCED STATURE FOR THE LEAST INFLUENTIAL SEGMENT OF NIGERIA'S POPULATION, THE SMALL FARMER. FOR VARIOUS

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REASONS, NOT THE LEAST THE ADAMANT OPPOSITION OF THOSE GROUPS WHICH SAW THEIR INTERESTS THREATENED, THE IMF DEBATE FAILED TO GENERATE THE SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT FOR IMMEDIATE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY CHANGES. YET ECONOMIC REALITIES OFFERED NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVES AND AFTER SOME DELAY, THE GOVERNMENT INITIATED A STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM (SAP) WHICH IN SOME RESPECTS IS MORE STRINGENT THAN THAT ADVOCATED BY THE IMF. THAT PROGRAM HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE PREDICTED CHANGES BUT NONE OF THOSE CHANGES CAN AS YET BE VIEWED AS PERMANENT OR ADEQUATE TO ASSURE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE NIGERIAN POLITY OR THE PROSPECTS FOR STABLE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN 1992.

5. THE LONG DELAYED SEPTEMBER 1986 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAP WAS A BODY BLOW TO THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL POWER OF THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HAD PROSPERED OVER THE YEARS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF TAFAWA BALEWA, YAKUBU GOWON, MURTALA MUHAMMED, SHEHU SHAGARI AND

FINALLY MUHAMMADU BUHARI, ALL MOSLEMS SAVE ONE AND ALL BEHOLDEN TO THE ALLIANCE OF TRADITIONAL RULERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS WHICH THE SARDAUNA, SIR AHMADU BELLO, HAD SO SKILLFULLY FORGED WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE NORTHERN REGION. THE EROSION OF NORTHERN UNITY AND DOMINANCE HAS BEEN A GRADUAL PROCESS. IN PART THE NORTH IS THE VICTIM OF ITS OWN SUCCESS. SUSTAINED POLITICAL INFLUENCE HAS BROUGHT RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS INDUSTRY AND EDUCATION AND AN INCREASINGLY LARGE AND DIVERSE ELITE WHERE ONCE THERE WAS A TIGHT LITTLE CLUB. THE CREATION OF STATES AND THE INCREASING PROMINENCE OF MIDDLE BELTERS IN THE MILITARY GAVE NEW LATITUDE TO THE MINORITY GROUPS PREVIOUSLY OVERWHELMED BY THE DOMINANT HAUSA-FULANI. WITH THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC AND THE PETROL BOOM ECONOMY, THE NORTHERN LEADERSHIP COULD NOT ESCAPE THE NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ITS STATURE OF A LARGE SHARE OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY'S PREDICAMENT.

6. THE TENURE OF THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT HAS SEEN A RATHER MORE PRECIPITOUS DECLINE OF NORTHERN FORTUNES. FROM ITS INCEPTION, THIS GOVERNMENT HAS HAD LESS NORTHERN PRESENCE IN ITS SENIOR RANKS, PARTICULARLY WHEN CONTRASTED WITH ITS MILITARY PREDECESSOR. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SAP, MOST PARTICULARLY THE ABOLITION OF THE IMPORT LICENSE SYSTEM, HAS DEPRIVED NORTHERNERS OF A POWERFUL INSTRUMENT FOR THE DIVERSION OF GOVERNMENT FUNDS. ONCE ABLE TO MANIPULATE ETHNIC RELATIONSHIPS WITH KEY GOVERNMENT FIGURES (OR TO OCCUPY MAJOR POSITIONS THEMSELVES), MEMBERS OF THE NORTHERN ELITE ARE NOW OBLIGED TO COMPETE ON COMMERCIAL TERMS. MANY OF THEM ARE ILL EQUIPPED TO DO SO AND THE LESS DEVELOPED NORTHERN BANKING SYSTEM PUTS THEM AT AN ADDED DISADVANTAGE. OVER THE LONGER RUN, THE SAP IS ANATHEMA TO THE STRATEGY THAT HAS GUIDED THE NORTHERN LEADERSHIP SINCE INDEPENDENCE -- GOVERNMENT DOMINANCE OF THE ECONOMY AND NORTHERN DOMINANCE OF GOVERNMENT. THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT AS A WHOLE (WITH SOME IMPORTANT EXCEPTIONS NOTED BELOW) HAS RESISTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST SAP EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. A PARTICULAR FOCUS OF CURRENT RESISTANCE IS PRIVATISATION. WHILE THE FMG AGREES ON THE PRINCIPLE, THE RESISTANCE OF THE NORTH (AND OTHERS) HAS MANAGED TO DELAY DECISIONS ON BOTH THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THE PROCESS. THEY HAVE NO HOPE IN THE SHORT TERM OF REVERSING THE DIRECTION IN WHICH ECONOMIC POLICY IS MOVING, PARTICULARLY AS THEY CAN ARTICULATE NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. BUT CONTINUED DELAY IN IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF THE POLICY

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COULD UNDERMINE ITS EFFECTIVENESS AND THE FRAGILE NATIONAL ACCEPTANCE WHICH HELPS TO SUSTAIN IT.

7. THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM FOR TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN RULE, MOST PARTICULARLY THE BAN ON FORMER POLITICIANS, MUST ALSO BE SEEN AS AN IMPORTANT BLOW TO THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT. (IMPORTANT QUESTIONS REMAIN ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE FMG IS PREPARED TO PERMIT BACKSTAGE

ORGANIZING BY FORMER POLS, MAKING IT HARD TO BE VERY PRECISE ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BAN. THUS FAR IN THE LGA ELECTION PROCESS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A VERY RELAXED ATTITUDE, MIXING HARDLINE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WITH LITTLE OR NO ACTION. THE FORMER POLS ARE EXPLOITING THIS ATTITUDE TO THE FULLEST.) THE BAN FALLS EQUALLY ON FORMER POLITICIANS FROM ALL AREAS OF THE COUNTRY BUT IT POSES SPECIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE NORTH. THROUGH THE BAN, THE FMG SEEKS TO INJECT A "NEW BREED" OF ACTORS INTO THE POLITICAL SCENE. WHILE THERE ARE SERIOUS QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER THIS WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO THE NATURE OF NIGERIAN POLITICS, THERE CAN BE NO QUESTION AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF A CADRE OF WELL-EDUCATED, ARTICULATE AND AMBITIOUS INDIVIDUALS TO REFILL THE RANKS. BY AFRICAN STANDARDS, VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF NIGERIA ENJOY A GREAT DEPTH OF THAT KIND OF MAN (AND TO A MORE UNEVEN EXTENT WOMAN) POWER. HOWEVER, THERE ALSO CAN BE NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE NORTH IS LESS WELL EQUIPPED IN THIS REGARD THAN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY. ADD TO THIS THE FACT THAT THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A MUCH TIGHTER, RESTRICTED CIRCLE WHOSE RANKS HAVE BEEN DECIMATED BY THE BAN AND THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE A MUCH GREATER GULF BETWEEN THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT AND A MORE RADICAL GENERATION OF YOUNG NORTHERNERS WHO MIGHT FORM THE "NEW BREED" THAN IS THE CASE FURTHER SOUTH.

8. WHILE FORGING AHEAD WITH POLICIES THAT DO FUNDAMENTAL DAMAGE TO THE NORTHERN POWER STRUCTURE, BABANGIDA HAS BEEN EVER MINDFUL OF THE CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF THAT POWER STRUCTURE AND HAS SOUGHT WAYS TO CURRY FAVOR WITH IT OR COOPT IMPORTANT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS. THIS APPROACH WAS CENTRAL TO WHAT MUST BE CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT MISJUDGMENT OF HIS TENURE, THE CONSPIRATORIAL DECISION TO SEEK FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE OIC. THAT DECISION, OF COURSE, DID MAJOR DAMAGE TO HIS STATURE IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY AND CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO RISING RELIGIOUS TENSIONS. HIS EVENTUAL EFFORTS TO RETREAT FROM HIS EARLIER DECISION AND BURY THE ISSUE IN AMBIGUITY ONLY ADDED TO NORTHERN RESENTMENT WITHOUT FULLY SATISFYING CHRISTIANS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT CAN BE TRUSTED, WITNESS THE RECENT CONTROVERSY OVER RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK.

9. BABANGIDA HAS BEEN MORE SUCCESSFUL IN COOPTING KEY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NORTH TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS GOVERNMENT AND ITS EFFORTS TO RESTRUCTURE THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY. PETROLEUM MINISTER (AND OPEC PRESIDENT) LUKMAN AND EDUCATION MINISTER AMINU ARE EXAMPLES AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL. LUKMAN'S APPOINTMENT WAS THE OBJECT OF CONSIDERABLE RESENTMENT IN THE EASTERN STATES, PERCEIVED AS AN EFFORT TO GIVE THE NORTH CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT NATURAL RESOURCE, ONE WHICH IS DERIVED EXCLUSIVELY FROM EASTERN AND MIDWESTERN STATES OR OFFSHORE OF THOSE SAME STATES. LUKMAN IS A VOICE FOR NORTHERN INTERESTS (HE WAS A KEY ACTOR IN THE OIC DECISION) BUT HE OUTSPOKENLY SUPPORTS THE SAP, CURRENTLY SERVING AS A POINTMAN IN THE ATTACK ON

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PETROLEUM SUBSIDIES.

10. AMINU IS DEEPLY DISTRUSTED BY SOUTHERNERS AND IS A KNOWN HARDLINER ON RELIGION. YET HE IS WIDELY CREDITED, EVEN BY MORE OBJECTIVE SOUTHERNER OBSERVERS, FOR EFFECTIVELY RESTRUCTURING THE EDUCATIONAL ESTABLISHMENT TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC REALTIES.

11. SOME KEY CIVIL SERVICE POSITIONS ARE FILLED BY NORTHERNERS FROM A SIMILAR MOLD. FOR EXAMPLE, PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR POLICE AFFAIRS GIDADO IDRIS IS A CLASSIC KADUNA MAFIOSO. HE WAS THE SARDAUNA'S PERSONAL SECRETARY FROM 1954 UNTIL HIS DEATH AND IS OF ROYAL BLOOD (ZARIA). HE IS ALSO AN ADAMANT ADVOCATE OF THE SAP AND THE BAN ON FORMER POLITICIANS (HE FULLY INTENDS TO BE A LEADER OF THE "NEW BREED"). HE FAVORS ANY MEASURES WHICH UNDERMINE THE EMIRATES WHICH HE VIEWS AS DECADENT ANACHRONISMS. AT THE SAME TIME, HE DESPISES THE INDISCIPLINE THAT HE PERCEIVES IN SOUTHERN (READ CHRISTIAN) SOCIETY.

12. MANY SOUTHERNERS WERE SLOW TO PERCEIVE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES FOR NORTHERN DOMINANCE. WHILE MANY SOUTHERN BUSINESSMEN WERE QUICK TO APPLAUD THE END OF NORTHERN INFLUENCE OVER IMPORT LICENSES, THE PREOCCUPATION OF MOST SOUTHERNERS WAS WITH SEEMING GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM TOWARDS ISLAM AS MANIFESTED IN THE INITIAL OIC DECISION AND A VARIETY OF KEY APPOINTMENTS WHICH WERE SEEN TO SHIFT POWER TOWARDS THE NORTH (I.E. LUKMAN TO REPLACE DAVID-WEST AS PETROLEUM MINISTER, GAMBO TO REPLACE INYANG AS POLICE INSPECTOR-GENERAL AND UKIWE TO BE REPLACED BY THE MUCH LESS DYNAMIC AIKHOMU AS CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF). IN PART, THIS FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE AN IMPORTANT EVOLUTION IN THE BALANCE OF POWER REFLECTED AN INITIAL OVER ESTIMATION OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE AUGUST 1985 COUP HAD SHIFTED THE POLITICAL CENTER OF GRAVITY TOWARDS THE SOUTH. CONVINCED THAT THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT WOULD USHER IN A DRAMATIC END TO NORTHERN INFLUENCE, MANY SOUTHERNERS WERE DEEPLY DISILLUSIONED AS IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT BABANGIDA INTENDED TO PLAY POLITICS ON A NATIONAL SCALE, SEEKING TO ACCOMMODATE A WIDE RANGE OF REGIONAL INTERESTS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A LARGER SENSE OF NATIONAL DIRECTION.

13. WITH TIME, MORE SOUTHERNERS HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT BABANGIDA'S OVERALL SENSE OF DIRECTION IS UNDERMINING NORTHERN INTERESTS AND CREATING NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR THEM. AS THIS LIGHT HAS DAWNED, BABANGIDA HAS GAINED INCREASING SOUTHERN RESPECT FOR HIS LEADERSHIP QUALITIES. NORTHERNERS, WHO HAVE ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THAT BABANGIDA'S PERCEPTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST IS INIMICAL TO THEIR MORE PAROCHIAL INTERESTS, RESPECT HIM ALSO, BUT AS A WILY POLITICAL OPERATIVE RATHER THAN AS A LEADER.

14. FACED WITH THE OPPORTUNITY OF A SHIFTING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, SOUTHERNERS, AND AN ARRAY OF POTENTIAL NORTHERN ALLIES, ARE FACED WITH A MAJOR DILEMMA. ON THE ONE HAND, THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT, DESPITE ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT HAVE DIMINISHED ITS AUTHORITY, REMAINS THE

LARGEST, MOST COHESIVE POWER BLOC IN THE COUNTRY. IT HAS A CLEAR SENSE OF PURPOSE AND NUMBERS AMONGST ITS RANKS AN INORDINATE NUMBER OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST EXPERIENCED AND SKILLFUL POLITICIANS. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOUTHERNERS AND A DISPARATE GROUP OF NORTHERNERS (MIDDLE BELT CHRISTIANS AND FORMER ADHERENTS OF AMINU ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 07 LAGOS 15432

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SUBJECT: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS: AN UPDATE

KANO'S PRP AND WAZIRI IBRAHIM'S GNPP) ARE UNITED ONLY BY THEIR OPPOSITION TO CONTINUED DOMINANCE BY THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT. THE POLITICS OF IDEAS WHICH MIGHT CUT ACROSS THE FUNDAMENTAL ETHNIC, REGIONAL AND RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS REMAINS A FEEBLE FORCE IN NIGERIA. (THOUGH THE SAP IS MORE ACCEPTABLE IN SOME AREAS THAN OTHERS, MOST ARE FEELING ITS PINCH MAKING IT A HIGHLY UNLIKELY RALLYING POINT.) THIS LOSE ALLIANCE COMPRISES AN EXTREMELY DISPARATE GROUP WHICH EVEN BEFORE THE POLITICAL BAN HAD NO REALLY CONVINCING NATIONAL LEADERSHIP. (ONLY FORMER LAGOS GOVERNOR LATEEF JAKANDE HAD MADE A CREDIBLE START IN THIS DIRECTION AND HE SUFFERED FROM SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN HIS OWN YORUBA BASE AND IS A MOSLEM.) DESPITE THE POLITICAL BAN, THE MUCH THINNED RANKS OF THE NORTH ARE STILL THE SOURCE OF UNBANNED POLITICAL FIGURES WHO ARE BEING MENTIONED IN THE EARLIEST SPECULATION/SPECULATION ABOUT WHO MIGHT BE OF PRESIDENTIAL CALIBER IN 1992 (I.E. LUKMAN AND AMINU). AT THIS JUNCTURE ONE CANNOT DISMISS THE NORTH'S ABILITY TO SKILLFULLY DIVIDE AND CONQUER AS IT HAS DONE SO PERSISTENTLY IN THE PAST.

15. SOUTHERNERS ARE BY NO MEANS OBLIVIOUS TO THE FORCES THAT DIVIDE THEM. PRIOR TO THE BAN, THERE HAD BEEN AN EXTRAORDINARY LEVEL OF ACTIVITY AIMED AT BRIDGING SOME OF THESE GAPS. PROBABLY THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT FAVORING THESE EFFORTS IS THE INCREASED SALIENCE OF RELIGION AS A POLITICAL ISSUE IN NIGERIA. THIS ISSUE HAS SERVED TO FORCE A DEGREE OF UNITY BETWEEN EASTERNERS AND CHRISTIAN YORUBAS AND BETWEEN IBOS AND EASTERN MINORITY TRIBES WHICH STILL HARBOR BITTER MEMORIES OF IBO DOMINANCE IN THE OLD EASTERN REGION. BUT CERTAINLY THE MOST IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT HAS BEEN A GROWING CHRISTIAN MILITANCY IN THE MIDDLE BELT. LONG INCLINED TO PERCEIVE THEMSELVES AS NORTHERNERS WHO WERE ALSO CHRISTIANS, AND TO SEEK POLITICAL ALLIANCE WITH THE NORTHERN ESTABLISHMENT WHICH CURRIED THEIR FAVOR, MIDDLE BELTERS HAVE BEEN GALVANIZED BY THE OIC CONTROVERSY AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO, BY THE MARCH RIOTS IN KADUNA STATE. WITH RELIGION IN THE FOREFRONT, ALLIANCES WITH FELLOW CHRISTIANS IN THE SOUTH BECOME A MORE ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE AND WITH A NEW POTENTIALLY CHRISTIAN STATE IN THE NORTH WITH THE DIVISION OF KADUNA STATE, THE SOLIDLY MUSLIM NORTHERN BASE IS DIMINISHED.

16. CUTTING ACROSS THE VARIOUS RELIGIOUS, REGIONAL AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS OR ALLIANCES DESCRIBED ABOVE IS THE ABIDING RESISTANCE OF THE CIVIL SERVICE TO A STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAM WHICH HAS ALREADY HAD A MAJOR ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE AVERAGE CIVIL SERVANT'S INFLUENCE AND LIFE

STYLE. POLICY EXECUTION IN THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT IS A CHRONIC PROBLEM. COORDINATION AMONG MINISTRIES IS RARE AS IT IS SEEN IN TERMS OF ONE PARTY OR THE OTHER LOSING INFLUENCE. THE PRESIDENCY'S MACHINERY FOR ASSURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS IS AD HOC AT BEST AND NON-EXISTENT IN MANY CASES. WHILE COMMITTED ADVOCATES OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT ARE IN KEY POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT (MINISTERS OF FINANCE AND PLANNING, PERM SEC IN PLANNING, CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR, SECRETARY TO THE FMG), THEIR RANKS ARE THIN AND THEY PRESIDE OVER A HORRIBLY INEFFICIENT BUREAUCRACY WHERE LINES OF AUTHORITY AND THEREFORE ACCOUNTABILITY ARE MURKY.

17. THIS SITUATION IS TAILOR MADE FOR RESISTANCE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF MAJOR DECISIONS ON RESTRUCTURING. AS CIVIL SERVANTS HAVE WATCHED THE PURCHASING POWER OF THEIR LEGITIMATE INCOMES DECLINE DRAMATICALLY AND THEIR

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MEANS OF CONTROL ON THE ECONOMY (E.G., IMPORT LICENSES, PRICE CONTROLS, PERMITS, ETC.) AND HENCE THEIR MEANS OF SUPPLEMENTARY INCOME COME UNDER CONTINUING ATTACK, THEY HAVE DRAGGED THEIR FEET IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE. THEY HAVE BEEN AMONG THE MOST EFFECTIVE FORCES DELAYING GOVERNMENT PLANS FOR PRIVATISATION. THEIR FIGHT IS IN MANY WAYS A REAR GUARD ACTION WHICH RUNS AGAINST THE TIDE OF THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO CHANGE. STEP BY STEP THEY ARE LOSING GROUND. BUT DELAY CAN EVENTUALLY BE A SERIOUS THREAT TO THE SAP. WITHOUT FURTHER MEASURES, MOST PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT WILL ATTRACT NEW INVESTMENT AND CREDITS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE INCREASINGLY HARD PRESSED TO DEMONSTRATE RESULTS TO SUSTAIN THE FRAGILE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF ITS PROGRAM.

18. REF A DID NOT MAKE MENTION OF THE POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF THE URBAN POOR. THIS IS A VERY AMORPHOUS FACTOR IN NIGERIAN POLITICS BUT THE NOVEMBER LAGOS RIOTS HAVE MADE IT OBVIOUS THAT IT IS NOT TO BE DISMISSED. BREAD RIOTS ARE NOT IN THE NIGERIAN TRADITION AND THE NOVEMBER PROBLEMS WERE PROVOKED BY THE SPECIFIC TENSIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND AVERAGE CITIZENS. HOWEVER, DISCONTENT WITH FIVE YEARS OF ECONOMIC DETERIORATION IS PERVASIVE AND CREATES AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH IF ONE SET OF UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES DOESN'T GENERATE VIOLENCE ANOTHER MAY (I.E. THE MARCH RELIGIOUS RIOTS IN KADUNA STATE). THE FMG IS NOT OBLIVIOUS TO THIS FACTOR AND MAY BE RECONSIDERING MAJOR DECISIONS ON SUBSIDIES IN LIGHT OF THEM. BANNED POLITICIANS ARE CERTAINLY AWARE OF IT ALSO AND MAY COME TO VIEW IT AS AN EXPLOITABLE INSTRUMENT OF THEIR ENMITY FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S POLITICAL TRANSITION PROGRAM.

19. FINALLY, THERE ARE THE RURAL POOR - THE REAL "MASSES" IN THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT. OPPONENTS OF THE SAP ARE FOND OF RECOUNTING THE HARDSHIPS IT HAS BROUGHT UPON THE "MASSES". IN FACT, WHILE MUCH OF THE SAP IS INTENDED BY THE FMG TO BENEFIT THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR,

THE RURAL POOR HAVE FEW IF ANY VOICES IN THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL ARENA. THEIR PLIGHT IS A PROXY FOR THOSE RICH AND MIDDLE CLASS OPPONENTS OF THE BABANGIDA GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES WHO RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS MORE POLITIC TO PRESENT THEIR GRIEVANCES IN THE TERMS OF THE DILEMMA OF THE MAJORITY.

20. IN FACT, THE IMPACT OF SAP ON THE RURAL POOR HAS BEEN MIXED. THE LARGE NUMBERS OF SUBSISTENCE FARMERS ARE ONLY marginally AND INFREQUENTLY INVOLVED IN THE MONEY ECONOMY AND THEY THEREFORE, ARE LITTLE AFFECTED. OTHERS, NOTABLY PRODUCERS OF NON-TRADABLES LIKE CASSAVA AND YAMS, ARE NOT RECEIVING SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FOR THE PRODUCE THEY SELL, YET THEY ARE BY NO MEANS COMPLETELY DIVORCED FROM THE IMPORT ECONOMY AND HAVE FELT THE IMPACT OF THE DEVALUED NAIRA AND THE DECREASE IN SUBSIDIES, PARTICULARLY FOR PETROLEUM. THEY BENEFITTED TOO FROM SOME OF THE FALL-OUT OF THE ERSTWHILE OIL BOOM, SO MANY ARE SUFFERING FROM DECLINE IN CASH INCOME. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME SECTIONS OF THE AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY, MOST PARTICULARLY PRODUCERS OF CASH CROPS INCLUDING COCOA, COTTON, OIL PALM AND RUBBER, HAVE BEEN AMONG THE CHIEF BENEFICIARIES OF THE SAP. THE GOVERNMENT ALSO RECOGNIZES THE RHETORICAL VALUE OF BEING ABLE TO RELATE ITS POSITION TO THE "MASSES" AND HAS PUT SIGNIFICANT RESOURCES INTO THE DIRECTORATE OF FOOD, ROADS AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE (DFRRI). TOO MUCH OF THE MONEY HAS BEEN DIVERTED AND THE PROGRAM IS TOO NEW TO

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PERMIT ANY MEANINGFUL EVALUATION BUT IT DOES REPRESENT AN IMPORTANT GESTURE TO AN ESSENTIALLY POWERLESS SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION.

21. WITH CIVILIAN RULE ALMOST FIVE YEARS AWAY AND IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF EXTRAORDINARY UNCERTAINTY CREATED BY THE SWEEPING POLITICAL BAN, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY RISKY TO PREDICT THAT ANY OF THE TRENDS NOTED ABOVE IS SUBSTANTIAL ENOUGH TO GUARANTEE A POLITICAL LINE UP IN 1992 THAT IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH PERVADED THE SECOND REPUBLIC. BY ANY MEASURE, THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE PAST TWO YEARS HAVE BEEN EXTRAORDINARY WHEN MEASURED AGAINST THE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS. THEY WILL HAVE TO BE EQUALLY EXTRAORDINARY OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS IF BABANGIDA IS TO LEAVE A LEGACY OF A RESTRUCTURED ECONOMY CAPABLE OF SUSTAINED GROWTH AND A CIVILIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURE STABLE AND RESPONSIBLE ENOUGH TO DISCOURAGE ANOTHER MILITARY TAKEOVER.

22. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.: ON BALANCE, IT IS DIFFICULT TO BE VERY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT BABANGIDA'S CHANCES FOR ULTIMATE SUCCESS. TO DATE, HIS PROGRAMS HAVE DONE LITTLE TO CHANGE THE BASIC PAROCHIAL INTERESTS WHICH MOTIVATE NIGERIAN POLITICS. IN SOME CASES, HIS PLANS FOR REMAKING THE NIGERIAN POLITY SEEM TO BORDER ON THE NAIVE. YET, HE HAS DEMONSTRATED EXCEPTIONAL SKILL AT TESTING THE LIMITS OF NIGERIAN POLITICS; SKILL WHICH MAKES FAILURE FAR FROM A FOREGONE CONCLUSION. HIS

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SUCCESS IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST. OUR ABILITY TO
INFLUENCE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IS
EXTREMELY LIMITED BUT WE CAN CONTRIBUTE AT THE MARGINS
TO THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT IN WHICH THEY OPERATE.
MANAGEMENT OF THE POLITICAL FORCES WILL BE MUCH EASIER
IF THE SAP CAN PRODUCE DEMONSTRABLY POSITIVE RESULTS.
LYMAN

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