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Public Affairs/Media (3 of 4)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name North, Oliver: Files

Withdrawer

RBW 2/28/2011

File Folder HIJACKING OF TWA 847 06/14/1985: PUBLIC
AFFAIRS/MEDIA (3 OF 4)

FOIA

F97-046/4

Box Number 101

WILLS

33

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
105863	CABLE	RE. INDIA AIRLINER	1	6/24/1985	B3
105864	CABLE	RE. SYRIA	1	6/25/1985	B3
105865	CABLE	RE. SPAIN SENTENCING	1	6/25/1985	B3
105866	CABLE	RE. HOSTAGES	1	6/26/1985	B3
105867	CABLE	RE. HOSTAGES	1	6/28/1985	B3
105868	CABLE	RE. HOSTAGE	1	6/28/1985	B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

85 JUL 20 P12:00

LOX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SITE

IB

S/S #

0013 AT

LOX MESSAGE NO. _____ CLASSIFICATION _____ UNCLASSIFIED No. P12:01

FROM: PETE MARTINEZ (Officer name) PA (Office symbol) x22492 (Extension) 2109 (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESS GUIDANCE

LOX TO: (Agency) DELIVER TO: Extension Room No.

NSC

①

MR. MCFARLANE

NSC

②

Ms. Karna Small for UP's office

③

Speakers

④

Scissors

⑤

VP (2)

⑥

MARTIN

REMARKS:

URGENT

S/S Officer:

A

per S/S Officer

⑦

NSC/S

(Local)

⑧

North

⑨

Boindy

June 20, 1985

PRESS GUIDANCE

GREECE: WASHINGTON TIMES ARTICLE

Q: Today's Washington Times claims that intelligence information indicates two high-ranking Greek Government officials are "implicated, though perhaps indirectly" in the hijacking of TWA flight 847 at Athens Airport. Comment?

A: -- We have no evidence linking Greek Government officials to the TWA hijacking. I have nothing further to say on the matter.

Drafted: EUR/SE/GR:W McGlynn
6/20/85 x20330 (8728M)

Cleared: EUR/SE:W Rope
EUR:RHaass

June 20, 1985

PRESS GUIDANCE

GREECE: BURT-PAPOULIAS MEETING

Q: Did Assistant Secretary Burt meet with Greek Ambassador Papoulias this morning, and if so, what did they discuss?

A -- Mr. Burt asked Ambassador Papoulias to meet with him this morning for 30 minutes. We do not discuss the details of our diplomatic contacts.

Drafted:EUR/SE:WMcGlynn

Cleared:EUR:RHaass

PRESS GUIDANCE

20 June 1985

GREECE: EFFECTS OF HIJACKING ON US-GREEK RELATIONS

Q: What effect has there been on US-Greek relations following the hijacking and the US imposition of a travel advisory?

A: -- WE HOPE THAT IF THERE IS ANY EFFECT IT WILL BE POSITIVE.

-- BOTH GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS STAND TO GAIN FROM INCREASED INTERNATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN THE ADEQUACY OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AT ATHENS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

-- OUR ACTION IS FOCUSED ON THE PROBLEM OF AIR SECURITY. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TRAVEL ADVISORY WILL BE LIFTED AS SOON AS THE AIRPORT PROBLEM IS RECTIFIED.

-- WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THEM AND PROVIDE ASSISTANCE AS NECESSARY.

-- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU EXCHANGED LETTERS FOLLOWING PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S REELECTION IN WHICH BOTH EXPRESSED THE DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. THIS REMAINS OUR POSITION.

Drafted by EUR/SE/GR:DTJones

6/20/85 (x21563) 8727

Clearance: EUR/SE:WFRope
EUR: RHaass

June 20, 1985

GREECE: REACTION TO TRAVEL ADVISORY

Q: Can you comment on the Greek government's reaction to the travel advisory and to the President's statement?

A: -- We have seen a Greek Government statement taking exception to our action, but we do not feel it productive to engage in public debate over our decision.

-- We believe that the security situation at the Athens international airport justified our action and, as the advisory states, it will be maintained "until adequate security measures are in place".

-- We have repeatedly made clear our action is aimed only at the problem of terrorism and protecting the safety of US citizens.

-- We also have expressed our desire for better relations with Greece. We are willing to do our part for that and willing to help resolve this present problem.

Drafted by EUR/SE/GR:DTJones
6/19/85 (x21563) 8705M

Clearance: EUR/SE:WPrope
EUR:RNHaass

June 20, 1985

GREECE: CONTACTS WITH GOG ON HIJACKING

Q: Are you in touch with the Greek Government? What is being done?

A: -- We are in touch with the Greek Government and have been from the beginning of the hijacking. I am not prepared to comment on the details of our discussions.

-- We have made our concerns about the need for improved security at the Athens airport known clearly. We hope the Greek Government will take them seriously into account and move quickly to resolve the problem.

Q: The President said that he had asked for a full explanation of the events surrounding the taking of the aircraft in Athens. What have we learned so far?

A: -- We have indeed asked for a full explanation of events in the course of our contacts with the Greek Government.

Q: -- What have the Greeks told us so far?

A: -- We received a prompt preliminary response to our inquiries and we have made it clear that we would like to have a full report as quickly as it is available.

Q: How did the hijackers smuggle hand grenades and guns aboard the aircraft?

A: -- There is no definitive information concerning how the weapons were placed onboard Flight 847.

Drafted by EUR/SE/GR:DTJones
6/20/85 (x21563) 8727

Clearance: EUR/SE:WPrope
EUR: RHaass

19 June 1985

GREECE: INTERNATIONAL BOYCOTT?

Q: The President said he would be calling on Allied and friendly governments to take steps to prevent travel to places where lawlessness is rampant and innocent passengers are unprotected? Does this apply to travel to Greece? Does this mean you are now trying to organize an international boycott of Greece? Isn't Greece an Allied and friendly country?

A: -- Greece is an allied and friendly country. With our travel advisory, we have specifically called attention to the security situation at the Athens international airport -- a problem that we hope will be rapidly rectified. A travel advisory is by definition only an advisory view of the Department of State. It is up to individuals and organizations to decide whether and if so how to travel to, from, or through Athens.

Drafted by EUR/SE/GR:DTJones
6/19/85 (x21563) 8705M

Clearance: EUR/SE:WPrope
EUR:RNHaass

June 20, 1985

PRESS GUIDANCE

GREECE: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Q: Can you explain the Tokyo, Hague and Montreal Conventions and how they apply to the TWA hijacking situation?

A: -- These three international conventions, developed over the past two decades, deal with threats to the safety of civil aviation.

-- The 1970 Hague Convention on aircraft hijacking is intended to prevent hijackers from finding a safehaven. It provides that hijackers must either be extradited or their cases submitted to the competent authorities for purposes of prosecution.

-- The 1971 Montreal Convention provides for similar obligations in cases of aircraft sabotage. All three conventions contain other provisions regarding cooperation between governments in the event of an incident of aircraft hijacking or sabotage. These include an obligation on the part of governments into whose territory a hijacked aircraft comes to do everything possible to ensure the rapid return of the aircraft to the control of its lawful commander. It also includes an obligation to facilitate the immediate onward journey of the aircraft and passengers to the intended destination.

-- The vast majority of states, including Greece and Lebanon, are parties to these conventions.

Drafted: L/LEI:GLEvitt
Wang 8705M

Clearance: EUR/SE:WFRope
EUR:RHaass
EB/OA/AVP:EVondenSteinen

June 21, 1985

ISRAELI RELEASE OF DETAINEES

Q: What is your reaction to the announcement that the Israelis plan to release a limited number (30 to 50) of the Ansar detainees they are holding at Atlit?

A: -- This is an action by the Government of Israel. I have no comment for you.

Q: Did you ask the Israelis to release these people.

A: I am not going to comment on our diplomatic exchanges.

This is an Israeli action and I refer you to the GOI for comment.

No!

Q: Do you welcome this release?

A: I have nothing for you on that. This is an Israeli action and I refer you to the GOI for comment.

Q: Does this action change or affect your position on dealing with terrorists?

A: Our position remains we will make no concessions to terrorists nor will we encourage others to do so. The TWA hostages are victims of terrorism and must be released without conditions.

Q: Isn't there now a linkage?

A: There can be no linkage between the release of the Ansar detainees and the release of the TWA hostages. The hostages must be released without conditions.

(FYI to Briefer. Provide no further comment.)

TF:RBHall
x6610 6/21/85
wang no. 1147A
Clearances:
TP:MACasey
NEA:ARaphel
PA:BKalb
S:CHill

RBH

Statement to be issued in response to statement by Gerald Ford
group of former heads of state:

Text

We welcome the statement condemning the hijacking of TWA
flight 847 issued by former President Ford, Malcolm Fraser,
Helmut Schmidt, and James Callaghan. As former heads of
government with substantial experience in international
affairs, their counsel is a particularly timely contribution,
as efforts continue to bring this crisis to a prompt end. We
continue to believe, as do they, that concessions must not be
made in response to terrorist demands. To do so would only
encourage further terrorist acts.

TF:RBHall

x6610 6/22/85

wang no. 1176A

Clearances:

NEA/ARN:MACasey

NEA:RPelletreau

S:BMckinley

REBIEK 0820

R0450 W1111)LCZCUIVWYD

RC-HIJACK-AMERICAN 2 WASHINGTON

THE LEBANESE DAILY AN-NAHAR SAID TODAY THE U.S. AMBASSADOR IN BEIRUT HAD FORWARDED A FOUR-POINT PROPOSAL TO WASHINGTON AIMED AT BREAKING THE DEADLINE IN TALKS TO FREE THE 40 AMERICAN HIJACK HOSTAGES.

THE REPORT SAID THE PLAN INCLUDED "THE RELEASE OF ALL U.S. HOSTAGES, FOLLOWED BY A WASHINGTON STATEMENT CONDEMNING ALL VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INCLUDING HIJACKS AND THE HOLDING OF LEBANESE PRISONERS IN ISRAEL."

BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID OF THE REPORT, "WE DON'T FIND ANY SUBSTANCE TO IT AT ALL.

ASKED IF THE REPORT MIGHT BE AN INFORMAL SUGGESTION AS A WAY TO END THE CRISIS, THE SPOKESWOMAN SAID, "WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS EVEN IF THIS REPORT SHOULD BE THE SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT."

SWITZERLAND HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL, OFFERING TO HELP SETTLE THE HIJACK DILEMMA.

BUT U.S. AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS SAID THE SWISS HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE TALKS.

MORE 0833

R0460 W1111)LCZCUIVCYN

RC-HIJACK-AMERICAN 3 WASHINGTON

REUTER 0070
R025R 11111)LCZCBLWYB
BC-HIJACK 1STLD

AMAL CONFIRMS ACCEPTANCE OF SWISS MEDIATION OFFER
(EDS: ADDS AMAL REPORT OF SWISS OFFER TO END CRISIS)

BEIRUT, JUNE 23, REUTER - AN OFFICIAL OF LEBANON'S SHI'ITE
MUSLEM AMAL MILITIA SAID TODAY AMAL HAD ACCEPTED A SWISS OFFER
TO HELP END THE BEIRUT HOSTAGE CRISIS BUT DECLINED TO CONFIRM
THAT IT WAS READY TO MOVE 40 AMERICAN HOSTAGES TO SWITZERLAND.

A SWISS SPOKESMAN IN BERNE SAID YESTERDAY AMAL LEADER NABIH
BERRI HAD TELEPHONED FOREIGN MINISTER PIERRE AUBERT TO SAY "HE
WOULD BE READY TO BRING THE HOSTAGES TO SWISS TERRITORY."

THE SPOKESMAN GAVE NO DETAILS OF THE REPORTED OFFER BY BERRI
AND AMAL OFFICIAL DR GHASSAN SIBLANI SAID HE COULD NOT COMMENT
ON THE ISSUE.

"ALL I CAN SAY IS THAT WE HAVE ACCEPTED SWITZERLAND'S OFFER
OF HELP TO END THIS AFFAIR," SIBLANI TOLD REUTERS.

AMAL HAS GUARANTEED THE SAFETY OF THE 40 HOSTAGES SO LONG AS
NEGOTIATIONS THAT IT IS CONDUCTING FOR THEIR RELEASE CONTINUE.

THEY WERE AMONG 153 PASSENGERS AND CREW ON A TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES (TWA) BOEING 727 HIJACKED OVER ATHENS ON JUNE 14 BY
SHI'ITE GUNMEN DEMANDING THE RELEASE OF SOME 700 LEBANESE FROM
A PRISON CAMP IN ISRAEL.

BERRI IS TO HOLD TALKS WITH SENIOR ADVISERS LATER TODAY;
SIBLANI SAID, ADDING: "WE HOPE THE POSITION WILL BE CLEARER
AFTER OUR DISCUSSIONS."

U.S. OFFICIALS SAID YESTERDAY THE CRISIS WAS STATIC AND
FROZEN. WASHINGTON HAS SAID IT WILL NOT PRESSURE ISRAEL INTO
RELEASING ITS DETAINEES AND ISRAEL HAS SAID IT IS RELUCTANT TO
FREE THEM AS THIS WOULD APPEAR TO BE GIVING IN TO BLACKMAIL.

BEIRUT NEWSPAPERS TODAY SAID A PROLONGED IMPASSE APPEARED
LIKELY TO BECOME DEEPLY EMBROILED WITH REGIONAL POLITICS AND
POSSIBLY MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE INDEPENDENT AN-NAHAR SAID A PROLONGED CRISIS COULD EITHER
SPEED UP OR UPSET U.S.-BACKED EFFORTS FOR A MIDDLE EAST
SETTLEMENT. "WHAT IS DEFINITE IS THAT ALL CONCERNED WILL TRY
TO DRAG THIS INCIDENT INTO THE CENTER OF THE REGIONAL CONFLICT
FOR MAXIMUM GAIN," IT SAID.

SIBLANI SAID TWO SICK HOSTAGES WERE SEEN BY DOCTORS YESTERDAY,
ONE OF THEM HAVING A CHECK-UP AT BEIRUT'S AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
HOSPITAL.

R042U 11111)LCZCUIVBYL

BC-HIJACK-AMERICAN URGENT

U.S. SAYS REPORTS OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT "PURELY FICTITIOUS"

BY MIKE CLANCY

WASHINGTON, JUNE 23, REUTER - THE STATE DEPARTMENT TODAY SAID
REPORTS THAT A PROPOSAL HAS BEEN MADE TO SETTLE THE 10-DAY-OLD
HOSTAGE CRISES "ARE PURELY FICTITIOUS."

"WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY PROPOSAL. THE SWISS SAY THEY HAVE
NOT MADE ANY PROPOSAL," A SPOKESWOMAN SAID.

"IN FACT, THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEVELOPMENTS AT ALL IN SEVERAL
HOURS."

MORE 0808

R043U W1111)LCZCUIVZYR

NOTE TO EDITORS

PLEASE IGNORE AM-HIJACK-RESPONSE WHICH WAS FILED ON THE
WRONG CIRCUIT. BC-HIJACK-AMERICAN REPLACES IT.

REUTER 0809

INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATORS WORKING TO FREE THE AMERICANS HELD HOSTAGE AFTER THE HIJACK OF A T-W-A JET HAVE REPORTEDLY COME UP WITH A PLAN. AN INDEPENDENT BEIRUT NEWSPAPER (AN-NAHAR) QUOTES AN UNNAMED DIPLOMATIC SOURCE AS SAYING THE PROPOSAL CALLS FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. BUT IN ADDITION, IT REQUIRES THE U-S TO ISSUE A STATEMENT CONDEMNING ISRAEL'S HOLDING OF 766 LEBANESE AND PALESTINIAN PRISONERS. THE PLAN CALLS FOR NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT TO FREE THOSE PRISONERS -- WHICH IS WHAT THOSE HOLDING THE AMERICANS ARE DEMANDING.

SHIITE LEADER NABIH BERRI (NAH'-BEE BEN'-REE) HAS CHARGED THAT THE U-S IS PLANNING TO TRY TO FREE THE HOSTAGES BY FORCE. PENTAGON SOURCES CONFIRM THAT 18-HUNDRED MARINES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE MEDITERRANEAN TO JOIN A GROUP OF WARSHIPS -- BUT A PENTAGON SPOKESMAN WILL NOT COMMENT.

IN TEL AVIV, MEANWHILE, A CONSERVATIVE PAPER (YEDIOT AHRONOT) IS CHARGING THAT SYRIA'S PRESIDENT WAS PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THE HIJACKING OF THE T-W-A PLANE. THE PAPER CHARGES THAT SYRIA HAS SENT TERRORIST EXPERTS TO ADVISE THE MOSLEM EXTREMISTS THAT ARE KEEPING SOME OF THE AMERICANS CAPTIVE.

POLICE IN JAPAN SAY BAGGAGE TAKEN FROM A CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINE JET EXPLODED THIS MORNING AT THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT NEAR TOKYO. TWO BAGGAGE HANDLERS WERE KILLED AND FOUR PEOPLE WERE INJURED -- NONE OF THEM PASSENGERS.

AP-WX-06-23-85 0806EDT

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RB 2/28/2011
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File Folder

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F97-046/4
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Box Number

101

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"THEY BOTH HAVE AN ILLNESS. THEY WERE FEELING SICK SO WE HAD DOCTORS SEE THEM," HE SAID. "THEY ARE OKAY NOW."

THE TWO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS JIMMY DELL PALMER OF LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, AND CLAUDE WHITMOYER, OF SEVERN, MARYLAND.

AN-NAHAR SAID A DOCTOR ALSO YESTERDAY TREATED ONE OF THREE FLIGHT CREW STILL HELD ABOARD THE HIJACKED AIRLINER AT BEIRUT AIRPORT FOR INSECT BITES.

AIRLINE OFFICIALS SAID THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RELAXED AT THE AIRPORT, WHERE THE TWA PLANE IS PARKED 100 YARDS FROM THE TERMINAL BUILDING.

GUNMEN ON BOARD, NORMALLY IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH MILITIA OFFICIALS AND THE AIRPORT CONTROL TOWER, HAD NOT BEEN IN TOUCH DURING THE NIGHT, THEY SAID.

THE OFFICIALS COULD NOT CONFIRM BEIRUT NEWSPAPER REPORTS THAT ANTI-AIRCRAFT BATTERIES HAD BEEN INSTALLED NEAR RUNWAYS AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST ANY MILITARY RESCUE BID.

BERRI YESTERDAY ACCUSED WASHINGTON OF PREPARING A MILITARY RESCUE AFTER A BEIRUT RADIO STATION REPORTED THAT U.S. JETS FLEW OVER THE CITY AND A U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAD APPROACHED LEBANESE WATERS. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IN WASHINGTON DENIED THE REPORT.

AMAL POLITBURO CHIEF COLONEL AKEF HAIDAR LATER SAID THE HIJACK VICTIMS HAD BEEN MOVED TO NEW HIDEOUTS, POSSIBLY OUTSIDE BEIRUT, TO COUNTER ANY RESCUE ATTEMPT.

"BELIEVE ME, TODAY THEY (THE HIJACKERS) CHANGED THEIR (THE HOSTAGES) PLACES. THEY ARE CLEVER ENOUGH NOT TO BE DETECTED OR LET OTHERS KNOW WHERE THEY (THE HOSTAGES) ARE.... LET THE AMERICAN FLEET COME AND LOOK AFTER (FOR) THEM," SAID HAIDAR.

ASKED WHETHER THE HOSTAGES HAD BEEN TAKEN OUTSIDE BEIRUT, HAIDAR REPLIED: "MAYBE. I DON'T KNOW. EVERYTHING IS POSSIBLE."

REUTER 0552

AD79

Red Tag *Oliver North*
P 21
B8 Sims

PM-HOSTAGES 3RDLD-WRITETHRU 2TAKES 6-24

(AMAL COMMENT; SYRIA MAY INTERVENE; REPORTELY WILL ASK IRAN HELP;
DOCTOR GOES ABOARD PLANE FOR 2ND TIME; ISRAEL RELEASES PRISONERS)

BY DAVID COWELL

BEIRUT, LEBANON (UPI) -- A DOCTOR WAS SUMMONED ABOARD A HIJACKED
TWA JET TWICE TODAY TO EXAMINE THE PILOT, WHO HIJACKERS SAID WAS
SUFFERING "TERRIBLE" STOMACH PAIN, AND A HIJACKER DEMANDED AN
EXECUTIVE JET TO FLY HOME TO VISIT FRIENDS.

ISRAEL, MEANWHILE, RELEASED 31 OF THE 764 LEBANESE PRISONERS THE
HIJACKERS HAVE DEMANDED BE FREED IN EXCHANGE FOR 40 AMERICANS HELD
HOSTAGE SINCE THE PLANE WAS COMMANDEERED JUNE 14.

A LEADER OF THE SHIITE MOSLEM AMAL MILITIA, WHICH HAS TAKEN CHARGE
OF NEGOTIATING AN EXCHANGE, SAID NO AMERICANS WOULD BE RELEASED UNTIL
ALL THE LEBANESE PRISONERS WERE FREED.

HE SAID THE AMERICANS WERE "HAVING FUN" AND ENJOYING "A VERY, VERY
RICH EXPERIENCE." HE SAID THEY WERE WATCHING COWBOY MOVIES AND FILM
OF U.S. NAVY ATTACKS ON LEBANESE CIVILIANS.

THE AMAL OFFICIAL CONFIRMED THAT SYRIA, WHICH BACKS THE AMAL, HAD
BEEN IN CONTACT WITH WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS THE HOSTAGE SITUATION.

A WELL-PLACED ARAB SOURCE IN IRAN SAID SYRIA WOULD ASK IRAN TO
HELP REACH AN AGREEMENT ON RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. CONTACTED BY
TELEPHONE IN THE IRANIAN CAPITAL OF TEHERAN, THE SOURCE SAID SYRIAN
PRESIDENT HAFEZ ASSAD WAS EXPECTED TO MAKE THE REQUEST DURING TALKS
IN DAMASCUS WITH THE SPEAKER OF THE IRANIAN PARLIAMENT, WHO ARRIVED
IN DAMASCUS SUNDAY.

"THE REQUEST WILL NEVER BE MADE PUBLIC BECAUSE IRAN DENIES ANY
CONNECTION WITH THE HIJACKERS OF THE TWA PLANE," THE SOURCE SAID.

HE SAID SYRIA WISHED TO "COOL" THE SITUATION BECAUSE IT FEARED THE
UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL MIGHT ATTACK EITHER LEBANON OR SYRIA.

THE HIJACKERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH HEZBOLLAH, A
RADICAL MOSLEM GROUP WITH CLOSE TIES TO IRAN.

A HIJACKER SOUGHT HELP FOR CAPT. JOHN TESTRAKE, SAYING THE PILOT
HAD "TERRIBLE" STOMACH PAINS. BUT THE DOCTOR ASKED FOR AN ESCORT
BEFORE AGREEING TO GO ABOARD THE PLANE AT BEIRUT AIRPORT.

MEMBERS OF THE SHIITE MOSLEM AMAL MILITIA THEN ACCOMPANIED DR.
ALFRED ZEBOUNI TO THE RED-AND-WHITE BOEING 727 IN AN AIRPORT CAR.

SPEAKING BY RADIO, THE HIJACKER WARNED ZEBOUNI NOT TO SPEAK TO
JOURNALISTS ABOUT TESTRAKE'S CONDITION AND SAID IF HE HAD ANYTHING
WITH HIM BESIDES MEDICINE HE AND TESTRAKE WOULD BE EXECUTED, AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS REPORTED.

THE DOCTOR, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER FOR MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES,
BOARDED THE PLANE, STAYED FOR A TIME, THEN LEFT. HE RETURNED A SHORT
TIME LATER FOR ANOTHER VISIT.

HE SAID NOTHING TO REPORTERS, REFUSING TO COMMENT ON SPECULATION
THAT TESTRAKE'S STOMACH PAINS MIGHT BE FROM TENSION.

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ONE HIJACKER, APPARENTLY DECIDING THAT HE NEEDED A FURLOUGH, ASKED FOR AN EXECUTIVE JET TO FLY HOME TO THE BEKKA VALLEY, 50 MILES EAST OF BEIRUT.

"I'M THINKING OF GOING TO THE BEKKA TO SEE SOME FRIENDS AND RELATIONS," THE HIJACKER SAID.

"DO YOU HAVE AN AIRPORT IN THE BEKKA?" ASKED THE CONTROLLER.

"YES," ANSWERED THE HIJACKER.

"BUT IT'S A PRIVATE PLANE THAT CAN'T LAND UNLESS IT IS A CIVIL AIRPORT," REPLIED THE CONTROLLER.

THE AIRPORT IN THE BEKKA IS A MILITARY INSTALLATION USED BY THE LEBANESE AIR FORCE.

THE HIJACKERS ALSO ASKED FOR PINEAPPLE AND 17 LUNCHES AND "FOOD THAT IS GOOD FOR THEM (THE AMERICANS) -- THAT THEY LIKE."

AKEF HAIDAR, THE NO. 3 LEADER OF THE AMAL MILITIA, RULED OUT ANY COMPROMISE ON THE DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF LEBANESE PRISONERS FROM ISRAEL, BUT SAID AMAL WOULD "CAREFULLY" CONSIDER DEMANDS FROM THE UNITED STATES, SYRIA OR THE RED CROSS TO BREAK THE 11-DAY STANDOFF.

"IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF COMPROMISE," HAIDAR SAID. "THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE RELEASED. WE HAVE TO FIND AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION, NOT A COMPROMISE."

"ANY PROPOSAL FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN WE ARE READY TO STUDY IT CAREFULLY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE IS PROPOSING. MAYBE HE IS PROPOSING AN ATOMIC BOMB ON OUR HEADS," HE SAID.

HAIDAR SAID HE BELIEVED REAGAN'S PLEDGE NOT TO MOUNT A RESCUE MISSION, BUT ADDED: "IF HE DOES, THEY (THE AMERICANS) WILL DIE IN SHELLING BEFORE US."

HE DENIED REPORTS AMAL LEADER WARIN BERRI PLANNED TO MEET ASSAD IN DAMASCUS BUT CONFIRMED THAT SYRIA HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH WASHINGTON ABOUT THE HOSTAGES.

MORE

UPI 06-24-85 18:44 RED

A080

U I

PM-HOSTAGES 3RDLD-1STADD 6-24

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HAIDAR ALSO SAID THE GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES USED BY THE HIJACKERS TO SEIZE THE TWA JETLINER JUNE 14 WERE PLACED ABOARD THE PLANE IN CAIRO AND CONDEMNED THE UNITED STATES FOR BLAMING LAX SECURITY AT ATHENS AIRPORT.

HAIDAR SAID THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES WERE BEING SHOWN FILMS OF LEBANESE VILLAGES BOMBARDED BY THE BATTLESHIP USS NEW JERSEY IN 1993 AND OF A CAR-BOMBING THAT KILLED 85 PEOPLE IN THE BEIRUT SUBURB OF BEIR AL-ABED EARLIER THIS YEAR.

LEBANESE MUSLEMS CLAIM THE CIA HELPED TRAIN THE PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CAR-BOMB ATTACK BUT THE CIA DENIED IT.

HE SAID MEMBERS OF AMAL, THE RADICAL MUSLEMAN GROUP HEZBOLLAH AND THE LEBANESE NATIONAL RESISTANCE MOVEMENT -- A LOOSE GROUPING OF MOSTLY SHIITE GUERRILLAS -- HAD CUSTODY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

"AMAL IS LOOKING AFTER THEM, GIVING THEM RADIO, TELEVISION AND FILMS, COMBOY FILMS ESPECIALLY," SAID HAIDAR. "THEY GET VERY FINE AND WONDERFUL LEBANESE FOOD, NOT T-BONE STEAKS. THEY ARE HAVING A VERY, VERY RICH EXPERIENCE. THEY ARE EATING FROM THE BEST RESTAURANTS IN LEBANON.

"THEY ARE HAVING FUN," SAID HAIDAR. "THEY WENT TO THE BEACH, THEY HAVE TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSPAPERS AND HAVE A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH OUR BROTHERS," HE SAID.

"I AM SURE WHEN YOU MEET THEM LATER ON, AFTER THEY ARE RELEASED, EVERY ONE OF THEM WILL HAVE GAINED TWO OR FOUR POUNDS IN WEIGHT."

HE SAID THE TWA CREWMEN AT BEIRUT AIRPORT WERE BEING ALLOWED "WALKS AND SHOWERS."

SHIITE AMAL MILITIAMEN AND HIJACKERS HAVE HELD THE THREE AMERICAN CREWMEN ON THE BOEING 727 SINCE JUNE 16.

A GUNMAN EARLY TODAY FIRED OVER THE HEADS OF NEWSMEN AND WARNED HE WOULD SHOOT ANYONE MOVING TOO CLOSE TO THE AIRLINER.

THE INCIDENT CAME SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE ISRAEL FREED 31 OF 764 LEBANESE SHIITE MUSLEMAN PRISONERS, DROVE THEM TO THE LEBANESE BORDER AND TURNED THEM OVER TO THE UNITED NATIONS INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON. THE PRISONERS WERE PUT ABOARD BUSES FOR TYRE AND REUNIONS WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

BUT ISRAEL INSISTED THE RELEASE OF THE 31 MEN WAS NOT CONNECTED TO THE HIJACKERS' DEMANDS. AND REAGAN SAID SUNDAY THE RELEASE HAD "NOTHING TO DO" WITH THE 40 HOSTAGES AND RULED OUT CONCESSIONS TO THEIR CAPTORS.

SHIITE AMAL MILITIA LEADER NABIH BERRI REITERATED HE WOULD RELEASE THE 40 AMERICANS ONLY WHEN ALL THE SHIITES TRANSFERRED IN APRIL FROM SOUTHERN LEBANON TO THE ATLIT PRISON OUTSIDE THE ISRAELI PORT OF

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AMAL SPOKESMAN ALI HANDAN SAID: "IT WILL NOT BE DONE BY INSTALLMENTS."

TWA FLIGHT 847 WAS COMMANDEERED AFTER LEAVING ATHENS FOR ROME JUNE 14. DURING STOPS IN BEIRUT AND ALGIERS, ONE U.S. SERVICEMAN WAS BEATEN, SHOT AND KILLED, AND MOST OF THE 150 PASSENGERS AND CREW WERE RELEASED. LEBANON'S INDEPENDENT AN NAHAR NEWSPAPER REPORTED A FACE-SAVING DEAL WAS UNDER DISCUSSION TO END THE 11-DAY HOSTAGE CRISIS.

AN NAHAR SAID THE DEAL INVOLVED THE AMERICANS' RELEASE IN RETURN FOR A U.S. STATEMENT CONDEMNING THE HOLDING OF THE SHIITE PRISONERS IN ISRAEL AND NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN A WEEK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE RED CROSS FOR THEIR RETURN TO LEBANON.

U.S. AND AMAL OFFICIALS REFUSED COMMENT ON THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ONE WESTERN DIPLOMATIC SOURCE SAID: "THEY ARE IN CONSTANT CONTACT. I WOULDN'T BE AT ALL SURPRISED IF THEY ARE MEETING FACE TO FACE."

R W

PH-POLICY 18TLD-PICKUP4THORAF 6-24

(WHITE HOUSE COMMENT)

BY NORMAN C. SANDLER

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- PRESIDENT REAGAN, HOPEFUL BUT NOT OPTIMISTIC OF A BREAK IN THE IMPASSE, TODAY HELD FIRM IN A TEST OF WILLS WITH THE HIJACKERS OF TWA FLIGHT 847, REFUSING TO ACCEPT ANYTHING BUT THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF THEIR 40 AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN LARRY SPEAKES DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AS UNCHANGED, EVEN AS ISRAEL RELEASED 31 OF THE 766 ARAB PRISONERS WHOSE FREEDOM HAS BEEN DEMANDED BY THE HIJACKERS.

WHILE THE RELEASE FUELED SOME PRIVATE U.S. HOPES OF MOVEMENT, THE PUBLIC POSITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION WAS UNALTERED AND U.S. OFFICIALS SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO TANGIBLE SIGNS OF PROGRESS TOWARD ENDING THE CRISIS.

WHEN ASKED IF REAGAN WAS PREPARED FOR A PROLONGED STANDOFF, SPEAKES REPLIED, "WE HOPE IT WILL NOT BE PROLONGED."

CONTINUATION OF THE HOSTAGE SITUATION THREATENED TO CONFRONT REAGAN AND HIS ADVISERS WITH A DIFFICULT DILEMMA LATER THIS WEEK, WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN ARE SCHEDULED TO FLY TO CALIFORNIA FOR A NINE-DAY VACATION.

SPEAKES, WHO ASSERTED LATE LAST WEEK THAT SENIOR REAGAN AIDES HAD NOT EVEN ADDRESSED POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THOSE PLANS, TODAY DECLINED TO DISCUSS ANY INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS UNDER WAY WITHIN THE WHITE HOUSE.

REAGAN, WHO LAST WEEK VOWED TO NOT GIVE IN TO THE DEMANDS OF TERRORISTS, INSISTED SUNDAY THAT TODAY'S PRISONER RELEASE BY ISRAEL NOT BE VIEWED AS A CONCESSION TO WIN THE FREEDOM OF THE AMERICAN CAPTIVE IN BEIRUT.

"IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE HOSTAGES," HE SAID. "I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS ANY LINKAGE."

PICKUP4THORAF: REAGAN CALLED

UPI 06-24-83 10:23 AED

10-10-68

our response:
US ships are in
international waters

[Faint handwritten notes at the bottom of the page]

DISCUSSION

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which is a continuation of the list from the previous page. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are written in a more formal, printed script. The list is organized into two columns, with names on the left and addresses on the right.

[illegible]

100-443887-100

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1. The first part of the report is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the study and the objectives of the research. It also provides a brief overview of the methodology used in the study.

1. The first part of the report, which is the most important, is the one that deals with the main results of the study. This part is divided into two sections: the first section deals with the results of the first experiment, and the second section deals with the results of the second experiment. The first section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the results of the first experiment, and the second part deals with the results of the second experiment. The second section is divided into two parts: the first part deals with the results of the first experiment, and the second part deals with the results of the second experiment.

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[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

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NORTH

FBIS 040 (SEE 038 OF 22 JUN)

SPAIN SENTENCES 2 SHI'ITE TERRORISTS TO 23 YEARS IN PRISON

AU251130 PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH 1125 GMT 25 JUN 85

(TEXT) MADRID, JUNE 25 (AFP) -- TWO SHIA MUSLEMS OF THE LEBANESE AMAL MOVEMENT, WHOSE RELEASE FROM DETENTION IN SPAIN IS SOUGHT BY THE TWA BOEING 727 HIJACKERS IN BEIRUT, WERE SENTENCED HERE TODAY TO 23 YEARS IN PRISON FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER, COURT SOURCES SAID.

MAHMUD RAHHAL, 20, AND MUSTAFA KHALIL, 22, WERE FOUND GUILTY OF TRYING TO KILL LIBYAN EMBASSY OFFICIAL MOHAMMED IDRIS LAST SEPTEMBER 12. MR. IDRIS WAS SHOT TWICE IN THE ARM.

THE SPANISH PROSECUTION HAD CALLED FOR 36 YEARS IMPRISONMENT FOR EACH OF THE TWO MEN.

THE TWO MEN, WHO ARE LEBANESE, COULD BE SENT TO LEBANON IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS TO SERVE THEIR SENTENCE, A DIPLOMATIC SOURCE SAID.

THE TWO MEN TESTIFIED DURING THEIR TRIAL THEY DID NOT INTEND TO KILL MR. IDRIS.

THEIR AIM, THEY SAID, WAS TO DRAW WORLD ATTENTION TO THE FATE OF IMAN MUSA SADR, THE SPIRITUAL LEADER OF THE LEBANESE SHIA COMMUNITY AND FOUNDER OF AMAL, WHO DISAPPEARED DURING A TRIP TO LIBYA IN AUGUST 1978.

THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA DIRECTOR-GENERAL, MANUEL SASSOT, SAID LAST WEEK SPAIN WANTS TO NEGOTIATE AN ACCORD WITH LEBANON UNDER WHICH LEBANESE GIVEN SENTENCES HERE COULD SERVE THEM IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED THE TWA BOEING HIJACKERS' DEMAND FOR THE RELEASE OF MR. RAHHAL AND MR. KHALIL, WHO WERE EACH GIVEN 23 YEARS TODAY.

THE DEFENCE AT THEIR TRIAL ARGUED THAT THEY SHOULD BE ACQUITTED BECAUSE THEY HAD OBEYED ORDERS FROM HIGHER UP IN THE AMAL MOVEMENT.
25 JUN 1313Z NLJ

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105868	CABLE RE. HOSTAGE	1	6/28/1985	B3

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 30, 1985

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

The Hijacking of TWA Flight 847

All times EDT: Beirut and Damascus and Athens are plus 7 hours; Algiers plus 5 hours:

Friday, June 14

- Boeing 727 jet departs Athens en route to Rome with 153 people on board, including 129 American passengers, 14 foreign passengers, six American crew members, two foreign crew members and two Lebanese hijackers.
- At about 3:10 a.m., flight is diverted to Beirut, where it lands just before 5:00 a.m. over the protests of Lebanese controllers. Nineteen passengers, 17 women and two children, are released and the aircraft is refueled.
- The President's national security advisers begin a series of secure telephone conference calls which will continue throughout the hijacking situation. Initial interagency meeting scheduled. Task Force organized at State Department.
- Shortly before leaving Beirut for Algiers, 1,800 miles away, at 6:30 a.m., the hijackers list their initial demands, which include release of Lebanese held in Israeli prisons.
- At 10:00 a.m., initial interagency meeting held at White House.
- U.S. requests Algeria to allow plane to land and not depart.
- Plane arrives at 10:30 a.m. and spends several hours in Algiers, where 21 additional passengers are released. The plane is again refueled. Hijackers threaten to execute hostages if aircraft is not permitted to depart.
- U.S. urges government of Lebanon not to allow aircraft to return to Beirut and urges governments of Syria and Cyprus to accept the aircraft if diverted from Beirut.
- At 3:25 p.m., aircraft departs again for Beirut, landing at 7:20 p.m. over Lebanese objections. When requested Amal intermediary does not arrive, Navy Petty Officer Second Class Robert Stethem is shot in the head and murdered. His body is thrown onto tarmac.
- About a dozen heavily armed men, apparently Hizballah and Amal militia, board the plane and take control from the original hijackers.
- Certain passengers are then singled out, and 13 are taken off the plane.

-more-

Friday, June 14 (continued)

- Plane departs Beirut at 10:40 p.m. U.S. requests Algiers to allow aircraft to land and not take off again.
- In high level diplomatic communication, U.S. urges Syria to contact Iranian/Shia leaders to influence hijackers to release prisoners to Algerian authorities.

Saturday, June 15

- TWA plane arrives in Algiers at 2:50 a.m.
- In Algiers, 61 passengers and all five flight attendants are released in stages. International Committee of the Red Cross and Algerian officials are permitted to board the aircraft to check the health of the hostages and hear the demands of the hijackers.
- U.S. requests Algeria to keep aircraft in Algiers.

Sunday, June 16

- After 25 hours, the plane leaves Algiers for Beirut, landing for third time at about 7:45 a.m.
- Secure telephone consultations among the President's national security advisers are followed by the President's early return to White House from Camp David. His scheduled afternoon events are cancelled.
- Upon arrival at the White House from Camp David, President takes questions from the press and says "... we're doing everything we can do, but I'm not going to talk about details, I don't think that would be proper." Asked if he is ruling out military response, he replies: "I'm not going to comment on anything of that kind." Is he still opposed to negotiating with terrorists? "This has always been a position of ours, yes." Asked if he has talked to any government that morning, the President replies: "We've been in contact with the governments of Lebanon and Syria and Israel, but again, I can't go any further in any details."
- At 1:02 p.m., the President enters White House Situation Room to begin a meeting with his national security advisors. In the the meeting the President reaffirms basic policy not to negotiate; focuses attention on Amal, which now has claimed responsibility for the safety of the hostages. Meeting ends at 2:15 p.m.
- Remaining 29 passengers removed from plane. Three flight crewmen remain onboard with unknown number of hijackers.
- Amal leader Berri enters discussions for first time. Berri frees hostage Robert Peel, Sr.

Monday, June 17

- In early morning hours, National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane makes 30-minute phone call to Amal leader Berri; tells him U.S. will not make concessions or ask anyone else to do so.
- Secretary Shultz makes statement at noon briefing: "We call upon those holding the hostages to treat them properly and to release them immediately ... we will not make deals with terrorists and will not encourage others to do so."

Monday, June 17 (continued)

- At 1:00 p.m. press briefing, Principal Deputy Press Secretary Larry Speakes confirms McFarlane/Berri phone call. Says "we have made it plain what we want Berri to do, and that is to use his influence to resolve this situation. We believe he's capable of doing that. We believe he is the key to the solution there and if he wishes to step forward and take that leadership role and use his influence, then we think it could go a long way toward resolving the problems involved -- the complex problems involved in this situation, perhaps including the releases of the Israeli detainees."

Tuesday, June 18

- Berri frees three more hostages, including Greek singer, leaving 40 hostages, all believed to be Americans.
- U.S. sends demarches to various countries and international organizations, requesting they use their good auspices to influence the situation.
- U.S. decides to issue travel advisory warning to U.S. citizens about travel through Athens Airport.
- U.S. contacts with government of Syria and others focus on the need to release hostages quickly and transfer them out of Lebanon.
- The President, in the opening statement of a regularly scheduled nationally-televised press conference, announces measures to deal with airport security and terrorism. He calls for the immediate safe release of our citizens. Hijacking issue dominates news conference questions.

Wednesday, June 19

- U.S. requests International Committee of the Red Cross to see the hostages and check their welfare.
- ABC News correspondents allowed to approach airliner to interview pilot John Testrake and crew, the first of many media interviews with the hostages arranged by their captors.
- President offers thoughts at a question-and-answer session with members of the Mooresville Chamber of Commerce in Indiana: "To the families of those here from your own state, I think we all are praying -- that's all -- I've been praying ceaselessly for them and for their safety."
- President meets with hostage families in Indianapolis.
- At the Annual Convention of the U.S. Jaycees in Indianapolis, the President says: "We're continuing to do everything that we can to bring all credible influence to bear, to get our people freed and returned home safe and sound ... but let me say, we must not yield to the terrorist demands that invite more terrorism. We cannot reward their grisly deeds. We will not cave in."
- Terrorists in San Salvador kill 15, including four unarmed off-duty U.S. Marines not in uniform and two U.S. businessmen.

Thursday, June 20

- The President meets with his national security advisers in the White House Situation Room, 10:06 a.m. until 11:15 a.m.

Thursday, June 20 (continued)

- The President issues a statement on the killing of Americans in El Salvador, saying he has appointed the Vice President to take the lead within the U.S. government and with our allies "to determine what actions, military and otherwise, we and our similarly threatened friends can take to end this increasingly violent and indiscriminate but purposeful affront to humanity. ... No nation on earth has been more generous to others in need. But we also have our limits -- and our limits have been reached. We cannot allow our people to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens of this great Republic."

Friday, June 21

- Diplomatic efforts continue.
- President meets with hostage families in Dallas.
- In the President's address to the Lions Club International Convention in Dallas, he talks about terrorism: "In the last few days, it has become even more clear that the criminal threat to civilization is no mere domestic problem. Wednesday night in El Salvador, four young Marines in civilian clothes, along with civilians from America and several other countries were gunned down in a sidewalk cafe. This event was preceded by the wanton bombing of an air terminal in Frankfurt, Germany; the hijacking of one of our airlines; and the seizure of a Jordanian aircraft. The killers in El Salvador are no different than those other perpetrators of inhumane acts."

Saturday, June 22

- Diplomatic efforts continue.
- The President says in his weekly radio address to the Nation: "We will carry with us all of the grief and sorrow and rising anger of a nation whose patience has been stretched to its limit."

Sunday, June 23

- Diplomatic efforts continue. By now, numerous countries, including many in the Middle East, have condemned the hijacking.

Monday, June 24

- Israel releases 31 Lebanese detainees from Atlit prison, but says their release resulted from judicial processes and is not linked to hijackers' demands.
- In Beirut, Nabih Berri announces a new demand: that U.S. Navy ships in the area leave before the hostages can be released.
- Meeting with his national security advisors in the White House Situation Room, the President decides to let diplomatic action play out; Syria the focus of diplomatic efforts. Meeting, which began at 2:07 p.m., ends at 3:38 p.m.

Tuesday, June 25

- At 9:15 a.m. press briefing, Larry Speakes discusses options the President may consider, including limiting goods and services to Beirut and limiting use of Beirut International Airport.

Tuesday, June 25 (continued)

- At 1:47 p.m., the President chairs a meeting of national security advisors in the White House Situation Room; reviews plans to extricate the hostages and to press forward with a campaign against terrorism. Meeting ends at 3:00 p.m.
- Interagency meeting refines planning directed by the President.
- In a 4:00 p.m. press briefing, Larry Speakes reports that the President met with national security advisors, receiving a top-to-bottom review of current diplomatic efforts and the full range of future options for bringing full pressure to bear on those holding U.S. citizens. Speakes says that the review covered ongoing efforts and the assessment as to whether they will bear fruit. According to Speakes, the President also reviewed a wide-ranging series of options that could be applied to the situation should the hostages be held for a longer period. Speakes closes the briefing by saying: "The President will let diplomacy run its full course before taking further steps, but he is prepared to take whatever actions are necessary."

Wednesday, June 26

- From 10:03 a.m. until 11:00 a.m., the President chairs another meeting of his national security advisors in the White House Situation Room. Defers other steps pending diplomatic developments.
- News blackout begins.
- Another hostage, Jimmy Palmer, is released because of a worsening heart condition.
- Berri reiterates his demand that U.S. warships pull away from the Lebanese coast. He adds a new demand: that neither the U.S. nor Israel retaliate once the situation is resolved. Berri announces proposal to transfer all hostages to a Western embassy in Beirut or to Damascus, where they would remain until Atlit detainees are released.

Thursday, June 27

- Interagency group develops contingency plans.
- Wide speculation in media about whether hostages will be transferred to the French or another Western embassy. Europeans won't accept conditions.
- Secretary of State Shultz's call for release of 46 U.S. hostages (including seven who were missing in Lebanon prior to the TWA hijacking) is widely reported in media as a "new U.S. demand."

Friday, June 28

- Interagency group meets again, prepares agenda for consideration by the President and his advisors.
- More hostage interviews by television networks.
- President meets with hostage families in Chicago.
- At a luncheon with community leaders of Chicago Heights, Illinois, the President says, in response to a question about one of the hostages' critical comments on the linkage of the seven kidnapped hostages to the 39 hijacking hostages: "I don't think anything that attempts to get people back who have been kidnapped by thugs and murderers and barbarians is wrong to do. And we are going to do everything that we can to get all of the Americans back that are held in that way."

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Friday, June 28 (continued)

- In his remarks to the citizens of Chicago Heights, the President says: "When terrorism strikes, civilization itself is under attack. No nation is immune. There's no safety in silence or neutrality. If we permit terrorism to succeed anywhere, it will spread like a cancer, eating away at civilized societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere. This barbarism is abhorrent. And all of those who support it, encourage it and profit from it are abhorrent. They are barbarians... We cannot accept these repeated and vicious attacks against our nation and its citizens. Terrorists, and those who support them, must, and will, be held to account."
- After returning from Chicago trip, the President chairs another meeting in White House Situation Room, from 5:11 p.m. until 6:10 p.m. -- reviews developments and determines courses of action to be taken in various contingencies.
- More television interviews with hostages.
- At about 7:00 p.m., press reports from the Middle East say hostages will be released. White House, in change from complete news blackout, says: "We have heard the reports. We are in touch with appropriate authorities in both countries (Lebanon and Syria). We have no further comment."

Saturday, June 29

- U.S. C-141 military transport aircraft with reception team departs Washington for Frankfurt. Another C-141 goes to Damascus.
- At about 4:00 a.m., hostages are reported released, en route to Syria. There are conflicting reports on their exact status and location. Syria announces "the hostages were freed today and will be transferred to Damascus where they are expected later today."
- Later reporting, confirmed around 7:00 a.m., indicates hostages still in Beirut, with Berri apparently seeking guarantees concerning U.S. non-retaliation.
- More television interviews with hostages.
- President mentions hostage situation briefly at beginning of his weekly radio address; confers with national security advisors in Oval Office; consults with other advisors by telephone.
- At about 10:00 p.m., the following statement, approved by the President as a restatement of longstanding policy regarding Lebanon, is issued by the Department of State: "The United States reaffirms its longstanding support for the preservation of Lebanon, its government, its stability and security, and for the mitigation of the suffering of its people."

Sunday, June 30

- At 3:30 a.m., Syrian officials in Damascus tell the U.S. Embassy "Syria has solved" the problem that delayed release of 39 TWA hijacking hostages.
- Press reports from Beirut and Damascus indicate preparations are being made for hostage release.
- At 6:00 a.m., arriving at the White House, National Security Advisor McFarlane tells reporters he talked to the President several times the previous evening and says "we just hope for the best."

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Sunday, June 30 (continued)

- Hostages are reported by media to be en route Damascus. Other reports conflict with this.
- U.S. officials in Syria advise Washington that shortly before 1:30 p.m., hostages crossed the border into Syria from Lebanon. The exact number of hostages released, believed to be all 39, is not yet confirmed.
- Advised of the hostage release by McFarlane, the President says, "That's very welcome news. Let me know when they are wheels up."
- President addresses the Nation by television from the Oval Office: "The 39 Americans held hostage ...are free, safe, and at this moment, on their way to Frankfurt, Germany. They will be home again soon... We will not rest until justice is done. We will not rest until the world community meets its responsibility: We call upon those who helped secure the release of these TWA passengers to show even greater energy and commitment to secure the release of all others held captive in Lebanon. And, we call upon the world community to strengthen its cooperation to stamp out this ugly, vicious evil of terrorism."

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

INTERVIEW OF
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL
BY THE BALTIMORE SUN, THE NEW YORK TIMES AND
THE WASHINGTON POST
ON THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES

June 30, 1985

Q Could you start by telling us what undid the glitch at the end, and what was the glitch as you see it and what unscrewed it?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, if I could impose on your good will, I'd like to give you, I hope, a short Senior Administration Official Crisis Resolution 101 to start with. (Laughter.)

Q -- 03?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right. (Laughter.)

The President has expressed in the past two weeks, I think, the elements of a framework for -- or his framework of crisis resolution that, as I thought back over it this morning, seemed to have several fairly clearly articulated parts to it.

First of all, going back to the first days, when I talked to him and advised him of what had happened in Athens and his talk with me and then with George and others around the community, was to define what is it that the parties to this hijacking are after, what is their goal. Immediately, and more broader, what are the interests of the people involved? Nabin Berri? Hezbollah?

Secondly, he asked me in that first conversation pointedly, "What is it -- how do you think the Soviets will react?" But it expressed the point, the interests of third parties who may have some influence in bringing it to a close -- and I would put in that category right now the Syrians, Algerians, Russians, Iranians.

And a third element is obviously to identify what are U.S. interests in this problem? And I would say again, goals and interests, immediate goals and broader interest to be served as you work your way through this.

Fourthly, too, establish in the minds of the policy officials his sense of foundation principles that ought to be expressed however you behave.

Fifthly to identify what are your resources? What can you draw upon? What are the elements of U.S. political leverage? Economic leverage, if any? Military? Intelligence? And then, beyond the United States, what leverage can we invoke involving third countries that might be helpful, supportive, complimentary? International organizations, if any. That kind of thing.

Well, looking through those rather abstract principles and concepts -- the interests of the people involved, the other side, of us, of third parties, resources and all of that -- then you've got to get down to the nitty gritty and define your strategy for bringing, or assessing what the risks are in terms of the other side, what they can bring to bear from their side and how you can integrate the considerable resources on our side, over time, to bring a resolution of the crisis which is compatible with American values, as

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a rhetorical way of saying that you can sustain publicly with the Congress and with the American people.

Well, to apply that six-point framework to the instant case, and the President got the word two weeks ago, it seemed to him that the other side was comprised of the Shiite community in Lebanon led by Nabih Berri and, within it, the element, the Hezbollah element, that have different goals and interests.

Looking back, it seems to us that Nabih Berri's interests were political, that he saw an opportunity here to elevate his own standing within the Shiite community, if he were able to make a gain appreciable within the Shiite community, that is, the release of the prisoners in Israel. And that was his purpose, that there was a different value set within the Hezbollah. That community is broadly devoted to riding Lebanon of Western influence generally, and the United States in particular. And then, as a second but related interest, they did, too, want to get back other Shiite, which included in the prisons in Israel some extremist elements, Hezbollah. But you have to look at these as discreet players within the mix here and recognize that they're not after the same thing precisely.

And the second family of considerations was the third parties that might have some influence in bringing it to a close -- and the President recalled Syria and the Soviet Union. It seemed to us that Syria might well have an interest in influencing the Lebanese players to bring it to an end because Syria has an interest in calm stability within Lebanon, so that it can more easily assert its prevailing influence in that country.

With regard to the Soviet Union, it was not clear at the outset what might be their purposes. Their public statements are -- it's not contradictory, not entirely helpful -- they have said that they opposed the hijacking and yet they portray us as having laid the climate that invited it.

With regard to Israel, the President, in his second meeting, I think, said that, in his judgment, that Israel's purposes were to come away from this with a good solid relationship with us intact, a counter-terrorist strategy intact and, too, the release of the hostages, the humanitarian concern.

In the way of our interest and our principles, obviously, we wanted to get the Americans back, but to do it in a way that sustained a viable counter-terrorist strategy, both long-term deterrent, as well as immediate success.

In the way of foundation principles to govern as we worked our way through it, the President, on the phone call, and then emphatically at the first meeting, said that --

Q What phone call?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When I told him about the hijacking.

Q You called him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Correct. That, while we'll have to see how it develops, it's essential that we not make concessions to terrorists -- and expanded in the meeting to say, we should we urge anybody else to do so.

As a related point that derives from looking back over this experience, a principle that he espouses, I believe, is that you've got to expect that it takes patience to resolve one of these things and you can't be spooked into changing your position by extreme rhetoric from the other side or from your own country, for that matter. And the natural emotional reactions can't goad you into imprudent actions. You've got to take a longer view and have a

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considerable amount of patience.

The resources --

Q Clarify one thing real quickly?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q You said in the first phone call the President said we should not react -- you can't make concessions to terrorists. Then did you say at that meeting he later then said, "Nor can we encourage others to do it"? Or was that in the same phone call?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At the first meeting, he expanded it to --

Q To not encouraging others?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q On the phone call, he just said, "We can't give any -- make concessions to terrorists".

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

In the way of resources that we might be able to bring to bear, we have, of course, just our own political suasion, the diplomacy at hand through embassies in the Middle East and Europe, elsewhere, among great powers.

The President believed that when you'd applied all these things to the instant case that the first requirement was to apply the principle of no concessions to induce Berri to a different strategy. Berri's strategy fundamentally was use the Americans to leverage Israel. So you had to disavow -- or disabuse him of that belief that his strategy could work here. And to do that you had to start by making it very clear that there would not be any concessions from us, nor would we urge Israel to make concessions.

Now, I think, to be candid, that in the first three days -- it took about three or four days to do that -- because, as much as he said it and repeated it, speculation from within this country and the Congress and understandable speculation from the other side -- third countries about, well, couldn't you use this or that fig leaf to make it work and go behind the scenes and all of that kind of rhetoric left open, in Berri's mind, I think, as well as thoughtful people here, that maybe there was some wink in the approach that you could take to -- to have the reality of a trade, but not the perception. The President never believed that. And it took, however, about three or four days before, we think, Berri finally got the message. But the President articulated that through our -- Rich Bartolomew, his own public statements, the press conference, my call to Berri. And I think by about the middle of last week -- I say last week, the first week -- that Berri had begun to understand that. And began then to say how could he, Berri, achieve what he wanted to in some other path.

And that's when you began to hear Berri's approaches to other governments, European ones, to see if it might not be possible for him to lay off on them responsibility for holding onto these people to get out of the -- from under the -- by this time -- growing international criticism of him personally and the induced effect of internal criticism, because he simply wasn't getting results, of his own people. And he began to look to third countries. And that played out over last weekend. And -- all of you are familiar, the French, Austrian, Italian, Swiss efforts on his part, imposing pre-conditions. And ultimately, two nights ago, the last gasp of that expired, when the French wouldn't accept pre-conditions. Nor would anybody else.

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By early this week, really, while he continued to pursue that, he began to get the impression that it wasn't really working very well. And he looked to yet a third possibility, and that was that he could possibly exercise the Syrian option of turning the Americans over to the Syrians, at least getting out from under it himself and perhaps getting something in return. And yet it was not an entirely attractive option, because were he to do so, they would have been the ones who, having gotten him off the hook, he would be beholden to, and that is not entirely appealing to him in the long term.

So, from the President's point of view, going in, he said, "Let's set down the fundamental principle, which is designed to alter Berri's strategy."

The second general guidance he gave was, he said, "Assuming we can do that, then we ought to apply, over time, the resources that we have in a deliberate fashion to

place greater pressure on Berri, but do it in a way that's compatible with what we can sustain here at home and that led him to believe first, we got to try diplomacy and we got to make it try out, it's got to be credible and not flaccid and just superficial, and so let's get every avenue we can leveraging Berri diplomatically." And he did that, and there was a long discourse between us and the Algerians -- a flurry of circular cables that went throughout the world to get this outpouring of international criticism -- dialogue back and forth with the United Nations Secretary General. And, this did induce statements and a growing climate of isolation for Berri because everybody was sniping at him -- internationally criticizing him.

As that happened, and then as public perceptions in this country are expressed in editorial opinion and you gain, as I think the President did, greater support in terms of his having tried in deliberate fashion peaceful, firm, yet unprovocative steps and Berri's growing pressure as affective, then to nudge the pace of things, add to that any nonviolent measures you might take which would alter the climate in which Berri makes decisions. Now what do I mean by that rhetoric?

Well, he lives -- he swims in a sea that is created by a community of Druze, Sunni, Christians and Shiite and Hezbollah, but how can you alter that climate to maybe add to the international criticism internal frictions? Well, the President conceived -- he said, "Well, if you could do two things, you might create some internal problems and one of them would be stop traffic in and out of BIA." Why, because the Shiite get revenues from that and so it's a short term financial effect, but more significantly, that affects the perceptions of Druze, Sunnis, Shiite. And in the latter context, if you could cut off goods and services into the -- into Beirut, that really does have an effect.

You might say, why? Well, we don't pretend to siege Beirut. The purpose was not to make people hungry; it would never work. Lebanon's a very rich country in terms of just self-sustaining food and so forth. But the opinion makers, the leaders, the people that make money, do so through that port in a very major way. And both the illegal port and the normal commerce through there are very central to the day-to-day well being and -- of the heavies in Beirut. But, the President didn't do it. He said, "Let's make clear that we're considering it so that it gets the attention of those people and Nabih Berri." And he did so.

So, by Wednesday of this week, you had Berri in a position where he knew he wasn't going to get it from the United States in terms of leverage on Israel, he had a community of criticism coming from all over the world and sniping beginning from within, plus a Syrian intervention after Assad's return from Moscow this past Monday. So everybody -- there wasn't anybody standing up and saying, "Right on, Nabih Berri," but a lot of people criticizing.

It came down by the middle of this week to Berri looking at an accelerated pace for someone else to pass the ball to and, when on Thursday the French firmly said no, the Syrian dialogue began -- not didn't begin -- it picked up in earnest -- it had been going on. And the other element at play all along which was attenuated Thursday, too, was his dialogue with Hezbollah. Hezbollah's purposes, as I said, were different -- that they went into this with a kind of a general animus against the West, but a short term interest in these prisoners. And they weren't seeing anything encouraging coming out of this, and the idea of getting them to the Syrians really didn't answer that felt need. They wanted something personally.

Well, they argued at some length with Berri and the Syrians and both of them were saying in so many words, we don't think we're going to get anything except if you let loose of the Americans, there may be some change in the future in the situation in Israel. But, that wasn't enough for them and they wanted something for their own, I think, internal purposes to point to. They focused upon the fact that there might be reprisals. I honestly do not believe that that was a central demand because they really are not very vulnerable and they know darn well they are not vulnerable to reprisals.

Hezbollah lives in urban areas. It is manifestly infeasible, and they know it, to conduct violent raids against them. But it was more in the context of Berri having gotten all the news, Berri having been portrayed as the moderate, Berri being the emergent leader in the Shiite community and them not having gotten anything out of this. That, for sustaining internal cohesion, not for deterring future reprisals as -- they picked that out and they said, "Well, let's see if there can be some kind of apparent change."

But I think really what was telling was that by this time the combination of Syrian pressure, Berri's pressure and no gain had persuaded the Hezbollah that they couldn't emerge from this with any, I mean, just holding on as they were and improving their position.

The report of their criticism of that two days ago -- it was yesterday actually, was met with a firm no. Because that had come from Berri earlier through the French and others -- his commitment to no retaliation. And the Syrians last night about 8:00 p.m. came up with a formula that clearly was almost verbatim of what we had said six times in the last two months. And they said they would portray that as sufficient reassurance. And we said, "Well, do not mistake this. This is not an expression of intent to alter our policy." And they said, "Roger that. Let us handle what we think are the mindset of the Hezbollah."

But the President had discussed it with the Secretary of State. I talked to him about it last night at about 9:15 p.m. and he said, "Well, let there be no question. Either with us and the Syrians or more broadly, that this is simply the same thing the State Department said in April twice, May twice -- that it is simply a restatement of U.S. policy. And with that, the Syrians were able to bring this to a close and that's where we are."

Why don't you go ahead with your questions.

Q Well, what caused the -- presumably the Hezbollah had this -- separate agenda all along. What caused their -- the last minute glitch and did they -- even if that wasn't their real concern, did they seize upon Reagan's speech Friday as an excuse for not doing what they didn't want to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good points, Lou. I believe that what caused them to come around was, in fact, a combination of Syrian pressure and pressure from within their movement, anxiety about Berri and the future of conflict in West Beirut. So, they came to that conclusion based on those factors and nothing else.

The gasp for some element of emergent credibility in the wake of this thing led them to cast about for what might we seize on that has been said in the last few days. They happen to have picked this. I honestly don't think that that was a -- expressive of an important Hezbollah goal because it is simply not something to which they are vulnerable.

Q So what do they get out of it? They get nothing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They get what I assume they will portray as having protected their people. But their people are protected inherently by where they live.

Q Why was there this last, what would seem to be a problem with four of the hostages yesterday -- where four were not in the original roster. What -- who were the four? I mean, why were they --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We haven't seen the roster of yesterday. We assume they were the four held by Hezbollah.

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Q Oh, I see.

Q Could we just back up a bit. Are you fairly certain at this point that the Hezbollah people did the hijacking --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q And what then prompted them to turn over the hostages to Berri? What is your reading of that? Why did they give them up?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jerry, I am speculating. I think that those who did it were not directed to by the senior echelons of Hezbollah. I think Hezbollah, you have to recognize, has elements within it, and people are fairly autonomous, and individuals will go out and do something like this -- as not terribly sophisticated hijackers. The two guys that brought it to Beirut were overcome, really, by force measure. I mean, Berri had twelve guys that were -- that outnumbered them and were more, probably, skilled in terrorist tactics and took it over.

Q What is your sense of why they singled out that one Navy man, subsequently beat him, and then killed him, and why that one person?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It is -- I couldn't say with any precision, Bernie. I would guess that they checked the ID cards of everybody and the taking of a military person, given the history of the U.S. military in Lebanon, and so forth, is a publicly natural thing for them to express their animus against Americans, especially against American military people.

Q When you were considering this range of options that the President -- these discussions the first few days -- was there at some point a viable military option, such as rushing the plane, seizing it, when it was in Algiers, or at any point was that an option that was available to the United States?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, generically -- and this was the motive for putting -- for assuring the capability of doing it. In a crisis like this, you want to have at hand all the resources you can have, and so having them in theatre was a sensible thing to do. You are making sure there was in the theatre the elements you would need. We did not do it, point one, with the intent that we ought to try it. We did it to be ready. Was there in fact the option? Theoretically, yes. Politically, no. And by the time that they got off the airplane, a forceful rescue was virtually out of the question.

Q Do you think -- two questions. Do you think that the airport and port threats were successful? How much success do you think you got out of that in terms of Berri's behavior in changing his strategy? And secondly, from your account it strikes me that Assad and Syria have changed a great deal since Lebanon of a year ago. And I just wondered -- your assessment as to what his motives are, and if I accurately described that, has Assad turned over some kind of new leaf from the Assad that we knew in our last Lebanon experience?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good questions, David. On the first point, I am guessing -- and this probably is self-serving, but I did sense a change in the pace of Berri's negotiation after Tuesday, and that was after we made these references -- and that is a post hoc ergo proctor hoc -- but I believe that -- that it may also have involved word coming in from places as distant as Moscow, and surely Damascus, that the Americans are serious about this. And the second part of your question, I think Syria acted throughout out of self-interest. I mean, I don't think that it represented some new value set on the part of Syria or latent altruism, which has been -- escaped us all these years. I

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think, really, that Syria has a very high interest in stability in Lebanon.

Secondly, I think they do have an interest in elevating Berri to have a reliable surrogate whose standing is improved by an outcome here. But foremostly their interest was calm in Beirut.

Q And calm was threatened as long as these hostages were held?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right.

Q What about -- how did we do with the Israelis? I mean, there is widespread suspicion that, in fact, we gave signals, we made -- we said, "do it." What did we ever do with the Israelis?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: At no time, from the first day to the last, did we ever urge, cajole, suggest, directly or indirectly by any U.S. official to my knowledge, absolutely never any hint of it from the President, that they alter their policy about no concessions or, in this case, releases, at any point on the prisoners at Atlit.

Q Well, then, what was the gist of our policy and our communications with Israel? Were we saying, look, we want -- we would like you to stand firm? We would like you not to release these prisoners under pressure? Did we ever say that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think a kind of a benchmark for that issue was Rabin's appearance on Nightline --

Q When he said, "playing games?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Playing games, and --

Q And "why don't you ask us?"

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That they would respond to a public request -- and I guess I predated Nightline, but the "playing games" reference there. And you may recall that right after that there was a very pointed reference -- Larry may have made it, or the President, I am not sure -- the United States -- I mean, the very next day -- does not make concessions nor will we urge anybody else to do so. It was public. Now, we repeated it in exchanges diplomatically with Israel.

Q Well, just in the time frame on that -- In fact, Larry's very high visibility enunciation of that came on the first Sunday, I believe, of the crisis. The Nightline that you were referring to was several days later.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: When that happened, we pointedly said it again, just to make the point, but we said it privately to Israel, too. And we did not, in those private exchanges, ever say that we are going to try to work the hostage issue under the assumption, under the expectation, or urging that, after that you all move out with the prisoners. We did not say that -- ever.

Q But was it your reading of it that the view in Israel was one that -- it was in their interest, or interest in terms of U.S.-Israeli relations, that they in effect free the Lebanese prisoners, or sort of resolve this -- try to resolve this impasse by doing that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I would have to say that it seems to me that in the first few days, there must have been in Israel the tentative judgment on their own that maybe we would feel better if they said that in principle they were prepared to. But that was not induced or the result of any kind of suggestion by us. And when they began those hints -- well, they weren't hints,

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they were statements -- we said no, we are not asking you to -- don't intend to.

Q You said that privately through diplomatic channels? You specifically said, no, we are not asking you to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't recall what we said exactly.

Q But that was the tone --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We said, we are not asking you to.

Q -- the meaning of what you said?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That is right, yes, clearly.

Q Is there, as a result of this, a way in which this crisis seems to have been solved, going to be a new -- kind of following from Dave's question -- a new rapprochement with Syria? I mean, is this going to sort of end with this incident, or is there some way in which the United States government is going to try to actively work with the Syrian government to promote stability in Lebanon, or do anything else in the Middle East?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Lou, the thing -- the question, I think, that has emerged as a result of this two weeks is the question really, does Syria have a different attitude about terrorism than it has had? To the extent that this Syrian role has been constructive as a counterterrorist performance by them, we will urge that they continue it and be willing to cooperate on counterterrorist things with us. Our agenda more broadly in the Middle East is one of disagreement on a number of areas in the peace process. We have been, and will continue to promote, the Hussein Initiative. Syria has said that it opposes it. We believe that the disintegration of the PLO -- at least the fostering of --

Excuse me -- I will be just ten seconds.

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Q Sir, was there any realistic hope that all the hostages, including the seven who were being -- were kidnapped over the past year, would have been released? I mean, at one point this week, there was all the talk about every hostage.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think that was probably my mistake, to tell you the truth. Mistake in the sense that what had been a part of our diplomacy in the private exchanges from the beginning had always included the seven; but that I had never urged or asked Larry to make it part of the seven. And when George put it in his speech, it was, I think, probably the first time in this two-week window where we had made it public. But you can check with the governments that we dealt with, we wanted all of them back.

The second part of your question, there were efforts made. Syria tried in earnest to get the seven and we think they're still trying.

Q It's our understanding now that you did not get them?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The report is simply that there are 39 people there, so that's a --

Q We believe they're controlled by the Hezbollah?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I couldn't tell you that the same elements of Hezbollah that held the four hold the seven. I couldn't -- I don't know that.

Q Well, why isn't Syria, if they are being as cooperative as they seem to be and have the muscle that they appear to have, why couldn't they get some of these people back? I mean, don't they know where they are or do they think they've done enough with this -- getting the 39 out? What's your reading of that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that over time, Syria may well be able to succeed in that effort. But, to be fair, it is true that there are Hezbollah elements and Hezbollah elements. And in a place like Burj Al-Burajinah or Hay es-Sallum or those just squalid, very violent neighborhoods -- I couldn't fault somebody for not being able to find somebody in two weeks time, not even the Syrians. It's very hard to do.

Q Do you think this is -- their staying there, remaining there is tied in any way to fears about retribution or something -- their being used to try to guard against that, wanting to discourage that fact, or something?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That probably is psychically accurate, that they take some comfort from having a hostage. But that isn't the foremost reason for two reasons -- because I think they look to those hostages as possible leverage to secure a different political end, like getting their own brothers out of prisons here and there around the Middle East; or for -- well, just, I guess, the comfort that we may be deterred while Americans are at risk.

Q So is there any prospect that they're ever going to get out? I mean, do you have any feeling now that they're -- any time in the short term?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't like to predict about things in the Middle East. We did get four of them by people of the same strain of thinking.

Q There's a lot of people who say the President laid down the marker at the beginning of his term with the swift and

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effective retribution and that, although he has enunciated another parallel thing about not hurting innocent civilians that somehow, to maintain his credibility after this thing is over, he needs to somehow follow through on that and -- may be consistent with the other. Do you agree with that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, as tragic as this has been, one -- to the extent that there's an improved awareness in the American people of the nature of terrorism, the complexity of dealing with it, then there are benefits. And it's in the context of an improved understanding of how it works and how complex it is to deal with it, but finally, of the need to deal with it, of the catalyzing effect of this thing in urging Americans to care enough to criticize and urge action that you see a nexus between the President's theoretical assertion and the political practicalities. That is, to take strong, swift retribution, to succeed must be done within a climate that understands it and can distinguish between impulsive violence and purposeful sustained action over time.

I think that we are seeing emerge here the foundation, the base for sustaining firm action in the coming months. And I think perhaps, too, to sustaining proposals for legislation to have more resources and greater legislative -- or legal authority to act and to apprehend and to follow, track, identify and detain people.

Q It seems to me what you're saying is that the effect of this has been to get the American people to support whatever -- many of the measures the President might feel he wants to take to react to this. That being the case, is the President going to retaliate, and what is he going to do?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would put the emphasis less on retaliation and more upon the purposeful use of all U.S. resources, including force, in a consistent way to deal with the global problem. In other words, we want to transcend what has happened in Lebanon to focus upon dealing with the infrastructure of terrorism and not an isolated example of where it lives and exists; but to look at what is it that has created this infrastructure, why is it sustained, and why does it flourish, and what must you do at the roots of that infrastructure to deal with it.

Q You seem like you're talking about a general question right now. But right now, we're dealing in the context of a hijacking crisis in which the President said those responsible will be held to account. How is he going to hold them to account?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, if, over time, the tentacles of a movement see the body being treated, their survival as the digit on the end of the tentacle, the finger, the knuckle, becomes less secure, and their ability to rely on that infrastructure leads them to change their course, or it can, or at least they are cut off.

So dealing with the foundation, the body, the brains and the inspiration, whether theological or otherwise, is important.

Q Is there a new opportunity here to deal internationally against terrorism? During the same period that our hostages have been held we've had that Air India disaster, we've had the bomb in Frankfurt, we've had other things. Is there anything that the United States can or should do that this administration will do to try to get a kind of international attack on terrorism beyond this thing you were talking about the other day, about Beirut Airport, since you don't have that specific situation?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. We have, to be fair -- we've brought it up before -- the London summit, and the purpose of the London summit was to get some specifics put down behind the scenes on what each country would commit to do better in the next year. And it has worked. You have found an incredibly

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higher order of cooperation in the last year than we had before that.

There are about sixty-some odd examples in the past year of preventive terrorism. And it's been prevented on those sixty occasions because we and the British, French, Germans, Japanese, or others in the summit seven have conveyed information to each other better, detained people quicker. But, you know, it's the dog that didn't bark -- there's sixty times that we have rounded up -- 15,000 weapons in this country alone have been apprehended in the last year.

MR. SPEAKES: We'd better stop so we can get the transcript out by --

Q Can I take one last quick question, or is that it?

MR. SPEAKES: No. You can take one last quick question.

Q It seems to me that what you're saying is that the U.S. is going to respond in a broad way to this in trying to deal with the roots, causes, and everything else. But what we appear to have is two Hezbollah who grabbed the world and shook it around for two weeks. Two Hezbollah. Not Syria, not Lebanon, not Nabih Berri. How do we respond and, if you will, avenge that? Or are we not going to?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, vengeance is not a satisfactory basis for policy. It isn't to say that retaliation doesn't deter; it does. But it will be a combination of attack on fundamental infrastructure and the purposeful use of force where it can be done in an unambiguous, effective way that will follow.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

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