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PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 14, 1984
No. 132

As Prepared for Delivery

REALISM AND RESPONSIBILITY:
THE U.S. APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL

ADDRESS BY

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SECRETARY OF STATE

BEFORE THE LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

MONDAY, MAY 14, 1984

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY, SCHEDULED FOR APPROXIMATELY 3:00 P.M.
EDT., MAY 14, 1984. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY CITED, QUOTED FROM,
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For further information contact:

No issue is of greater importance to the American people than the issue of war and peace. It is the gravest responsibility of any president, any administration, to defend the peace, so that our ideals of freedom and justice can thrive in an environment of security.

History has seen fit to bestow on our country a very special challenge. The moment when the United States took its place as a leader and permanent actor on the stage of international politics -- at the end of the Second World War -- coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age. From that point, there was no turning back. America could no longer attempt to isolate itself from world affairs -- not when nations possessed the means to destroy each other on a scale unimagined in history.

But with the dawn of the nuclear age, there also came efforts -- and with a special urgency -- to limit or control this new weaponry. The United States led the way, proposing in the Baruch Plan of 1946 to eliminate nuclear weapons and place nuclear energy under an international authority. The plan was rejected by the Soviet leaders.

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Today, this aspiration to banish the specter of nuclear war is shared by all civilized human beings. We are faced today with a basic truth: "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." That's a quote from Ronald Reagan. Guided by this truth, the United States has been seeking to enhance its national security not only by strengthening its defenses and its alliances, but also -- with equal vigor -- by negotiating with the Soviet Union and other nations on the most ambitious arms control agenda in history.

I want to speak to you today about this administration's approach to arms control. I'll begin with a realistic look at the role of arms control in our overall strategy for peace and security. Then I want to say something about the various negotiations on our agenda. Finally, I'd like to tell you what I see as the prerequisites for progress toward our arms control objectives.

Arms Control as a Dimension of International Politics

Preserving peace means more than avoiding catastrophe. As President Reagan has put it: "We must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust." There is no escape from this dual responsibility. We cannot conduct national security policy as if the special danger of nuclear weapons did not exist. But in our pursuit of peace and arms control, we

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must not abdicate our responsibility to defend our values in a world where free societies are the exception rather than the norm.

The intense rivalry today between East and West has been disciplined, in the nuclear age, by the specter of mutual destruction -- but the rivalry has not ended. In any previous age, so fundamental a clash of national interests and moral perceptions might well have led to general war. In the nuclear age, this cannot be permitted, and both sides know it.

In light of that continuing rivalry, and the profound mistrust that it engenders, there are many skeptics who question the value of the arms control process. "Since we simply can't trust the Soviets to honor agreements", they say, "why bother to try to negotiate with them?" There are others who question our own commitment to the process, as though a strong defense and workable arms control agreements were mutually exclusive rather than mutually reinforcing objectives.

Well, we are committed to arms control, but that commitment is not based on naivete or wishful thinking. It is based on the conviction that, whatever the differences between us, the United States and the Soviet Union have a profound and overriding common interest in the avoidance of nuclear war and

the survival of the human race. A responsible national security policy must include both strong deterrence and active pursuit of arms control, to restrain competition and make the world safer. This is our policy.

The effort to control weapons, of course, is not a product of the nuclear age. History has seen many attempts to negotiate limits on numbers or characteristics of major armaments. The goals were -- and are -- worthy goals: to be able to shift resources to other, more productive uses, and to add a measure of restraint, predictability, and safety to a world of political rivalries. Before World War I, Britain and Germany negotiated on ways of limiting naval construction. Between World Wars I and II, there were extensive multilateral negotiations to limit the building of capital ships, including a major naval disarmament agreement signed in Washington in 1922. The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 even attempted to ban war itself as an instrument of policy.

These efforts, we well know, failed to prevent war. There is a lesson here: The endeavor to control armaments does not operate in a vacuum. It is a dimension of international politics and it cannot be divorced from its political context. Arms control cannot resolve the ideological and geopolitical conflicts that lead to competitive arming in the first place. By itself it cannot deliver security, or prevent war, and we

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should not impose on the fragile process of arms control burdens it cannot carry and expectations it cannot fulfill. While arms control agreements themselves can contribute to reducing tensions, basic stability must underlie political relations between the superpowers or else the process of arms control may not even survive. The SALT II Treaty, for example, which had many other difficulties, was withdrawn from Senate consideration at the request of President Carter after the controversy generated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Therefore, while we pursue arms control with great energy, we must bear in mind that progress depends on many factors beyond the substance of the proposals or the ingenuity of the negotiators. For arms control to succeed, we must also work to shape the conditions that make success possible: We must maintain the balance of power, we must ensure the cohesion of our alliances, and we must both recognize the legitimate security concerns of our adversaries and be realistic about their ambitions. On this secure foundation, we must seek to engage our adversaries in concrete efforts to resolve political problems.

Complexity of Arms Control

Because of this clash of interests and values, arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union are

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a difficult and laborious process, and have always been so. Ever since nuclear arms control negotiations began in earnest some twenty years ago, the Soviets' perception of their military requirements, and their aversion to thorough measures of verification, have been significant obstacles to agreement.

No wonder, then, that all our arms control negotiations with them have been protracted. The 1963 Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was preceded by eight years of negotiation and discussion. The 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty took four years to negotiate. The SALT I accords of 1972 took almost three years of effort and negotiations for the SALT II treaty lasted nearly seven years.

Even with good faith on both sides, there are differences of perspective -- deriving from history, geography, strategic doctrine, alliance obligations, and comparative military advantage -- which complicate the task of compromise. The Soviets have long had an advantage in larger, more powerful ICBMs; the United States took advantage of its technological superiority by developing missile-carrying submarines, smaller warheads, and a more broadly-based deterrent. These asymmetries in force structure and capabilities are not merely of academic interest. It is enormously difficult to define equality, for example, between very different kinds of forces. The problem is compounded by other factors such as the extent of air defenses, civil defenses, and hardening of silos and of command and control, in which the two sides' forces also differ.

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The task of arms control has been further complicated by a continuing revolution in technology. Many of our strategic assumptions have been made obsolete by technological changes in the past decades. Not only is there no "quick fix" in arms control, but there is no "permanent fix", either.

Ceilings on numbers of strategic missile launchers may have been more meaningful in an era of single warheads. Now, in an age of heavy intercontinental missiles, each capable of carrying large numbers of accurate warheads, limits on missiles alone are no longer sufficient. Significant reductions in numbers of warheads, and Soviet movement away from reliance on heavy ICBMs, are needed for strategic stability. This is the essence of our proposal in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (or START), and it is also an important message of the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission's report on the future of our strategic forces.

Current U.S. Goals in Arms Control

Previous arms control agreements have limited only partial aspects of nuclear arsenals, permitting development and deployment to proceed in other areas. Both sides have pursued technological innovation and expansion in areas not covered or inadequately covered by agreements, with the result that after each new agreement there have been more nuclear weapons, not

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fewer. The experience of the past has now brought us to a more mature phase of the arms control process, in which we are compelled to tackle the real problems of nuclear stability more comprehensively and directly than ever before. At the same time, our efforts to control non-nuclear weapons are proceeding on all fronts.

Four Basic Objectives

In all our arms control efforts today, we are guided by four basic objectives: reductions, equality, stability, and verifiability:

- Reductions: The agreements we seek should actually constrain the military capabilities of the parties by reducing weapons and forces substantially, not merely freezing them at existing or higher levels as most previous agreements have done.

- Equality: These reductions should result in equal or equivalent levels of forces on both sides. An agreement that legitimizes an unequal balance of forces creates instability and may increase the risk of eventual conflict.

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- Stability: Arms control measures must genuinely enhance the stability of deterrence in crises. This means that after reductions, each side's retaliatory force should be secure enough to survive if the other side strikes first. Hence, under stable conditions, the temptation to fire first in a crisis or confrontation will be minimized.

- Verifiability: Finally, arms control agreements must include provisions for effective verification of compliance by all parties. Experience has shown that agreements lacking such provisions become a source of tension and mistrust, rather than reinforcing the prospects for peace. The President's recent finding of Soviet violations or probable violations of a number of arms control obligations underlines that effective verification is essential.

Arms Control Agenda

With these objectives as our guideposts, the Reagan Administration has undertaken an unprecedented range of negotiations aimed at reducing the danger of war and building international confidence and security. In almost every case, the basic framework and concepts of these negotiations have been the result of Western initiatives, developed in close consultation among our allies and friends around the world.

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START. -- Our proposals in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (or START) are designed to reduce the role in our respective arsenals of ballistic missiles, especially land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet Union today holds a threefold advantage over the United States in ICBM warheads. Excessive reliance on these weapons could increase the danger of triggering a nuclear exchange because the larger yields, higher accuracy, more rapid response time -- and relative vulnerability -- of these missiles make them simultaneously more vulnerable to a first strike and more capable of being used in a preemptive strike against elements of the other side's strategic deterrent.

Since we announced our first proposals in May 1982, we have made a serious effort to meet Soviet concerns and to reflect evolving strategic concepts such as those articulated by the Scowcroft Commission. The core of our proposal is to reduce the total number of ballistic missile nuclear warheads by approximately one-third, leaving 5,000 on each side. As a way of dealing with the problem of differing force structures, we are willing to negotiate trade-offs with the Soviets between areas of differing interest and advantage. After consulting with key members of Congress, we also incorporated the concept of "build-down" into our position. This proposal would link modernization of missiles to reductions in warheads and would make mandatory a minimum annual 5 percent reduction in ballistic missile warheads down to equal levels.

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Throughout the negotiations in 1982 and 1983, however, the Soviets seemed determined to hang on to the great advantage in destructive power of their missiles. In fact, their proposals would have permitted them actually to continue increasing the number of their warheads. They also dismissed the concept of build-down. It is fair to say that there was some progress made over the five START negotiating sessions. In response to alterations in our original proposal, they offered some constructive changes in their position. With our introduction of the trade-offs concept, we seemed on the threshold of significant progress. But unfortunately, the Soviets tied progress in START to having their way in the intermediate nuclear force (or INF) negotiations; last December they suspended indefinitely their participation in START in frustration over their inability to prevent the deployment in Western Europe of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles.

INF. -- A Soviet walkout from the INF talks a month earlier also brought those talks to a halt, and the Soviets have so far refused to return without unacceptable preconditions. Since our objective in those talks was to eliminate that entire category of longer-range INF missiles, we would have preferred not to have to deploy any such missiles of our own. President Reagan's initial proposal -- and still our preferred outcome -- was to cancel NATO's planned deployments of cruise and Pershing II missiles in exchange for complete elimination of Soviet

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SS-20 missiles. In an effort to break a year-long stalemate, we then put forward an interim proposal for substantial reductions in our planned deployments if Moscow would cut back to an equal number of warheads. Then, last September, we made further modifications in our proposal in order to meet stated Soviet concerns.

But, as in START, the Soviet objective was evidently to preserve the imbalance in their favor. In this case, the existing "imbalance" was a monopoly: more than 1,000 Soviet SS-20 warheads -- with the number increasing steadily -- versus none for the United States. The last idea they surfaced, just before breaking off the talks, was that each side reduce actual or planned deployments by an "equal number" of 572 -- still leaving 700 warheads in Europe and Asia for the USSR and zero for the U.S.:

The Soviets' declared reason for withdrawing from both negotiations was that INF deployments had begun in Western Europe. But during the preceding two years, the Soviets had deployed over 100 SS-20s with more than 300 warheads; yet the United States continued to negotiate. In contrast to the Soviet build-up, NATO has been reducing the number of nuclear weapons in Europe. By the time our INF deployments are completed, at least five nuclear warheads will have been withdrawn from Europe for each U.S. missile deployed.

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We are ready to resume negotiations -- in both START and INF -- at any time and without preconditions. Our proposals are fair, balanced and workable. They remain on the table. The Soviets should need no new concessions to lure them back to Geneva. If they decide to return -- and we hope they will -- the Soviets will continue to find us and our allies serious and forthcoming negotiating partners.

Nonproliferation. -- President Reagan has also made it a fundamental objective to seek to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not now have them. We have a vigorous, two-fold approach to the problem of proliferation: First, we seek to create and strengthen comprehensive safeguards on exports of nuclear technology. We are working to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards system. At the same time, we strive to reduce the motivation for acquiring nuclear weapons by improving regional and global stability and by promoting understanding of the legitimate security concerns of other states.

These efforts have already contributed importantly to strengthening the global non-proliferation regime. One significant achievement is the clarification of China's non-proliferation policies during our negotiation of the nuclear energy cooperation agreement that was initialled during the President's trip to China. In January, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and said that it would thereafter require IAEA safeguards on its nuclear exports to

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states that do not possess nuclear weapons. Premier Zhao, in his January 10 statement at the White House, declared: "We do not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do we help other countries develop nuclear weapons."

MBFR. -- Complementing our efforts to reduce the danger of nuclear confrontation, the Western allies have since 1973 been conducting talks with the Warsaw Pact nations on the mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe. Our goal has been to reduce the conventional forces confronting each other there to a lower, equal level. Progress has been frustrated by the discrepancy between manpower figures provided by Eastern negotiators and Western estimates of actual manpower. Last month, along with the other NATO participants, we put forth a new initiative aimed at resolving this discrepancy and paving the way for verifiable reductions to parity. We hope that the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact participants will seize this opportunity to break the impasse at Vienna.

Chemical Weapons. -- The problem of chemical weapons is now taking on a special urgency. Ever since these weapons were used -- to horrible effect -- in World War I, the world community has agreed upon and observed a code of legal restraint. Now after nearly 60 years, this code of restraint is in danger of breaking down. After exhaustive analysis, we have convincing evidence that the Soviet Union and its allies

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have been using chemical and toxin weapons against civilian populations in Afghanistan and southeast Asia. More recently, mustard gas and other chemical agents have been employed in the Iran-Iraq war.

The United States has therefore taken the lead in efforts to strengthen existing agreements governing chemical weapons -- and to seek the total elimination of those weapons. Just last month, Vice President Bush presented to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft treaty for a comprehensive ban on their development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and use. Because of the easily concealable nature of chemical weapons, the draft treaty contains detailed provisions for verification, including systematic international on-site inspections. Because verification is frequently the most troublesome aspect of arms control negotiation, we are cautiously encouraged by recent signs of Soviet willingness to address some of the verification challenges. The world community must act effectively in banning chemical weapons, before existing restraints break down completely and the horrors of chemical warfare are once again loosed upon the world.

Confidence-Building Measures. -- In addition, there is a general category of confidence-building measures which we pursue in order to diminish the risk of war by surprise attack, accident, or miscalculation. Without fanfare, we and the Soviets have been holding a series of constructive meetings on

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upgrading the "hot line" direct communications link between Washington and Moscow. In the START and INF negotiations, the U.S. side tabled a set of proposals for prior notification of ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major military exercises, and expanded exchanges of data on military forces. In the Helsinki process, including the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, the United States and the allies have pursued -- and will continue to pursue -- measures of this kind to reduce the risk of war. In addition, East and West are already routinely exchanging notifications of strategic exercises that might be misinterpreted. This practice should be expanded and more of it made mandatory.

Space Weapons. -- The United States has long believed that the arms competition should not be extended to space. For that reason, we have sponsored or joined several treaties advancing this objective. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty banned, among other things, testing of nuclear weapons in outer space. That was followed in 1967 by the Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which forbids placing any weapons of mass destruction in space. We are continuing to explore whether these restrictions should be strengthened, including the question of arms control for anti-satellite weapons. A report of our initial findings was presented to the Congress in March. So far we have not been able to identify proposals to ban anti-satellite weapons that would be adequately verifiable

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and serve our overall goal of deterring conflicts. We are, however, continuing to try to identify measures that would ban or limit specific weapons systems, while meeting our verification concerns.

Let me mention, in this context, the question of space-based missile defenses. President Reagan has proposed a Strategic Defense Initiative -- a research program designed to explore the possibility that security and stability might be enhanced by a system that could intercept and destroy ballistic missiles before they reached our or our allies' territory. This research effort is fully consistent with all our treaty obligations. It could lead to an informed decision sometime in the next decade on the question of whether such defensive systems are genuinely feasible and practical. Shortly after the President announced the initiative last year, the Soviets proposed that scientists from the two countries meet to discuss the implications of these new technologies. We proposed, in turn, that experts of our two governments, including scientific experts, meeting in the context of appropriate arms control forums, would be a more appropriate and effective vehicle for such discussion. We have recently renewed our offer, and it still stands.

Deterrence and Modernization

Even as we pursue these arms control goals, our first line of defense, as far into the future as we can see, will remain

the deterrence provided by our armed forces. Thus the goals of stability and security we seek to advance through arms control can also be advanced by steps that we and our allies can take unilaterally.

Strengthening our conventional forces, for example, is a way of reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons and reducing the risk of any conflict that could escalate into nuclear war. Our strategic modernization program, of which the MX missile is a critical element, has been important to the maintenance of a strong deterrent and thus to the building of a solid foundation for progress in arms control. We can also modernize our own nuclear deterrent forces in ways that enhance stability, such as the development of a small, single-warhead ICBM that can lead both sides away from a trend, especially on the part of the Soviets, toward reliance on destabilizing multi-warhead ICBMs.

Prerequisites for Progress

As I said earlier, success or failure in achieving our objectives depends on more than the technical feasibility of the proposals or the skill of the negotiators. Our efforts to create a more secure and peaceful world cannot succeed unless certain important principles are upheld. These are prerequisites for progress in arms control.

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First, we must maintain a credible deterrent, based on restoring a balance of military forces. If we allow the balance to deteriorate badly, we cannot expect our negotiators to restore it, no matter how skilled and determined they may be. Arms control will simply not survive in conditions of inequality, real or perceived; this is a fact of life proven by the experience of the 1970's.

Second, the unity of our alliances is both a prerequisite for success and a basic interest we will not sacrifice. This is why the unanimity displayed at the Williamsburg Summit a year ago was so important. The Soviets seek to exploit arms control negotiations as a tactic to divide the West. They would like to establish a veto over NATO weapons deployments. They would like to maintain a monopoly of longer-range INF missiles in order to achieve political dominance in Europe. These things we cannot and will not let them do. Thus, we have proceeded, and will continue to proceed, in the closest consultation with our allies and friends in both Europe and Asia.

Third, experience teaches that the arms control process cannot survive constant Soviet assaults on Western interests around the globe. The future of arms control, therefore, will depend in part on a Soviet willingness to help defuse tensions and regional conflicts, rather than exacerbate them. The

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problem is not only that these expansionist Soviet actions sour the atmosphere but that they run the risk of confrontations that can erupt into war. The increased stability we are trying to build into the superpower relationship through arms reduction is bound to be undermined when the Soviets are irresponsible in other regions of the world.

Fourth, stability can be enhanced by identifying and focusing on common interests shared by the two sides, rather than concentrating solely on what divides us. Although we will continue to pursue divergent political goals, we have come together in arms control forums in recognition of our common interest in reducing the risk of war and clarifying the groundrules of international conduct. Whether through major arms control agreements or confidence-building measures, we can give concrete expression to this common interest, and make the world a safer place. Preventing nuclear proliferation is another objective in which the United States and the Soviet Union have a common stake and is an area with considerable potential for greater cooperation. And, as an important bonus, the savings of world resources could be significant.

Ultimate success in our arms reduction efforts will depend on all these conditions: a credible deterrent, strong alliances, responsible international behavior by the Soviets, and a willingness to compromise in recognition of our overriding mutual interest in the survival of civilization.

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But these conditions, in turn, depend in the last analysis on the qualities that we as a nation bring to the enterprise: patience, perseverance, and national unity.

We Americans are sometimes an impatient people. It is a reflection of our traditional optimism, dynamism, and "can-do" spirit. Usually these qualities are a source of strength -- but in a negotiation they can be a handicap. If one side seems too eager or desperate for an agreement, the other side has no reason to offer a compromise and every reason to hold back, waiting for the more eager side to yield first. It is paradoxical but true: Standing firm is sometimes the prerequisite for moving forward.

Just as cohesion among the allies is crucial to the West's bargaining position in INF, MBFR, and all negotiations affecting our allies and friends, so unity in this country is critical to our hopes for progress in all these negotiations. If America appears divided, if the Soviets conclude that domestic political pressures will undercut our negotiating position, they will dig in their heels even deeper. The constructive bipartisan spirit shown by the Congress in support of arms control and our strategic modernization programs is a model of what is needed. Those who have supported those programs deserve our gratitude; they have advanced the prospects for progress in arms control.

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If the Soviet Union rejoins the negotiating process, and shows that it is willing to advance balanced proposals, I can tell you here and now that the United States is prepared to respond in a constructive spirit.

Conclusion

For all the difficulties, strategic arms control negotiations have been virtually continuous since the first SALT talks began in 1969. The dialogue has continued between the Soviet Union and the United States even in times of tension and through major changes of leadership on both sides. The Soviets have temporarily brought part of this dialogue to a halt, but some discussions are continuing. We stand ready, with reasonable proposals, to go forward with all these negotiations in a spirit of give-and-take.

All American Presidents since the dawn of the nuclear age have committed themselves to the effort to reduce the dangers of war. They have all taken, in essence, the same path: maintaining our military strength, working with our allies, and negotiating with the Soviet Union. Ronald Reagan follows in this tradition. No President can be oblivious to what is at stake. We have learned many valuable lessons from the arms control efforts of the past. We are realistic, and we are tackling the toughest issues boldly, comprehensively, and

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without illusions. No President has been more willing to face up to the real challenge of peace and security than Ronald Reagan.

Let the national debate, therefore, be conducted at a level of serious, constructive dialogue worthy of the momentous importance of the subject. At stake is the future of all of us, and on this issue we are not Republicans or Democrats but Americans. If the President, the Congress, and the nation work together, we will be a formidable force for the reduction of both armaments and the danger of war, for the defense of freedom, and for the preservation of peace.

The problems are too urgent and the dangers too great to put off searching for solutions until we and the Soviets have resolved all of our political differences. By defending our values, while emphasizing the common interests of ourselves and our adversaries, I believe we can find a way to reduce the dangers. Then, as President Reagan has said, "we can pass on to our posterity the gift of peace; that, and freedom, are the greatest gifts that one generation can bequeath to another."

Thank you.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 15, 1984
No. 133

Dr. S. L. ABBOTT
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO LESOTHO
May 15, 1984

Dr. S. L. Abbott was sworn in today as United States Ambassador to Lesotho.

Ambassador Abbott was born on July 23, 1924 in Fairview, Oklahoma. He graduated from Pacific University (B.S., 1952; O.D., 1953).

Dr. Abbott served in the United States Army in 1943-1945. In 1953 he began his practice as Doctor of Optometry in El Paso, Texas. In 1965-1982 he was President of Sunland Management Company, Inc., in El Paso and in 1972-1983 Director of Valley Bank of El Paso. He was President of Sunland Optical Company, Inc., in 1976-1983, and presently serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors. He was a self-employed Rancher from 1976-1983. In 1979 he served as Director of the Continental National Bank in El Paso, and in 1980-1982 served as Director of Pan American Savings and Loan, and President of Sunland Builders, Inc.

Dr. Abbott's government service includes serving as Regional Director of the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration in Dallas in 1973-1976 and as a Member of the Texas House of Representatives in Austin in 1977-1979. In 1979-1983 he was Honorary Vice Consul of Space in El Paso.

Dr. Abbott is married to the former Arline Beahler. They have one son, Alan. Dr. and Mrs. Abbott resides in El Paso, Texas.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 16, 1984
No. 134

SHIPPING COORDINATING COMMITTEE Subcommittee on UNCTAD

Notice of Meeting

The Subcommittee on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development of the Shipping Coordinating Committee (SHC) will hold an open meeting at 2:00 PM on June 26, 1984 in Room 3524 of the Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss United States preparations for the United Nations Conference on Conditions for Registrations of Ships, from July 16 to August 3, 1984. In particular, the Subcommittee will discuss the development of U.S. positions regarding a proposed agreement on ship registry drafted by the UNCTAD Shipping Directorate and regarding counterproposals by industrialized countries.

Members of the public may attend up to the seating capacity of the room.

For further information, contact Mr. Gordon S. Brown or Mr. Stephen M. Miller, Office of Maritime and Land Transport, Room 5826, Department of State, 2201 C. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520. Telephone: (202) 632-0703.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 16, 1984
No. 135

SHIPPING COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Committee on Ocean Dumping

Notice of Meeting

The Committee on Ocean Dumping, a subcommittee of the Shipping Coordinating Committee, will hold an open meeting at 9:30 a.m. on Friday, June 1, 1984, in room 2409 (Mall), Waterside Mall, Environmental Protection Agency, 401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C.

The purpose of the meeting is to review the outcome of the Eighth Consultative Meeting of Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention held in London on February 20-24, 1984. The agenda will also include discussion of the draft U.S. submission concerning criteria for the allocation of substances to Annexes I and II of the Convention, in preparation for the July meeting of the intersessional working group on the Annexes to the Convention. As agreed by the Eighth Consultative Meeting, the working group is to prepare a discussion paper on this matter for consideration at the eighth meeting of the Scientific Group on Dumping, to convene in February 1985.

Members of the public may attend up to the seating capacity of the room.

For further information contact Ms. Norma Hughes, Executive Secretary, Committee on Ocean Dumping (WI-585), Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460. Telephone: (202) 755-2927.

The Chairman will entertain comments from the public as time permits.

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 17, 1984
No. 136

REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY CONFERENCE

St. Louis, Missouri
May 24, 1984

The Department of State and the St. Louis Council on World Affairs are co-sponsoring a regional foreign policy conference at the Chase-Park Plaza Hotel in St. Louis May 24, 1984. The conference is designed to encourage an exchange of views between citizens of the region and Department of State officials who formulate and implement foreign policy. Thirty organizations in the area -- representing business, education, ethnic, women's, and civic groups -- are cooperating in the day-long program.

Beginning at 9 a.m., concurrent panel discussions led by Department officials and local specialists will focus on the Soviet Bloc, the Middle East, and Central America.

Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, will deliver the keynote address on U.S.-Soviet relations, arms control and national security issues at the noon luncheon.

Attendance is by invitation only. If you wish to attend or desire additional information regarding the day's agenda, please contact:

Helen Morrin
St. Louis Council
on World Affairs
(314) 361-7333

Barbara Boller or
Eileen McCormick
U.S. Department of State
(202) 632-2134

For further information contact:

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 24, 1984

No. ~~136~~ 137

ROBERT T. HENNEMEYER SWORN IN AS
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE GAMBIA
May 23, 1984



Robert T. Hennemeyer was sworn in today as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of The Gambia. A career member of the Senior Foreign Service, class of Minister-Counselor, Mr. Hennemeyer was assigned most recently as Executive Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Management during the period 1983-84.

Mr. Hennemeyer was born in Chicago, Illinois, on December 1, 1925. He attended the University of Chicago, from which he received a Bachelor's degree in Philosophy in 1947 and a Master of Arts degree in 1950. He served in the United States Army from 1944-46 and as an instructor in the Chicago City High Schools and the city Junior College from 1948-52.

In 1952 Mr. Hennemeyer entered the Foreign Service as a Program Officer, Division of Exchange of Persons in the Department. The same year he took up his first overseas assignment as Director of the United States Information Centers in Bremen and Bremerhaven and remained until 1953. From 1953-54 Mr. Hennemeyer was Principal Officer in Bremerhaven until he took up the position of Assistant U.S. Secretary to the Allied General Secretariat of the Allied High Commission in Bonn. Mr. Hennemeyer was special assistant to the Ambassador in Bonn from 1954-56; he served as economic officer in Munich from 1956-57. Upon his return to the Department in 1958, Mr. Hennemeyer served as Assistant Chief of Protocol from 1957-58 and as a desk officer in the Bureau of African Affairs from 1958-60. From 1960-61 he attended an African studies program at Oxford University.

Mr. Hennemeyer served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Dares Salaam from 1961-64. He then returned to the U.S. as Faculty Adviser at the U.S. Naval Academy from 1964-66. In the Department, Mr. Hennemeyer was Director of the Functional Personnel Program in 1966-67 and Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service from 1967-68. He then went to Europe, where he was Chief of the Political Section in Oslo from 1968-71 and Consul General in Dusseldorf from 1971-75. From 1975-76 Mr. Hennemeyer attended the Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy at the Foreign Service Institute; he then served as Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs from 1976-78. He again returned to Europe as Consul General in Munich from 1978-80.

Mr. Hennemeyer returned to Washington and served as Senior Inspector in 1981 and Executive Director in the Office of the Under Secretary for Management from 1981-83.

Mr. Hennemeyer speaks German.

He is married to the former Joan Renaud. They have three children.

For further information contact:

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 25, 1984
No. 138



DEPARTMENT OF STATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

OPEN MEETING

The Department of State's Advisory Committee on Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs will meet at 9:00 AM on Thursday, June 21, 1984, in Room 150 of the National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. This meeting, with a break for lunch, is expected to end at approximately 3:30 PM.

At the meeting, responsible officials of the Department of State, and members of the Advisory Committee, will discuss the following subjects:

- The London Dumping Convention
- The United Nations Environmental Program
- Outerspace Commercialization
- The World Population Conference

This meeting is to be open to the public. Members of the public will be admitted to the limits of the meeting room's seating capacity and will be given the opportunity to participate in the discussions according to the instructions of the chairman.

People wishing further information on this meeting should direct their inquiries to Francesco Alberti of the Office of Science and Technology Support of the Department of State's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. He may be reached by telephone on (202) 632-2764.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 24, 1984
No. 139

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT

NOTICE OF MEETING

The Department of State will hold a meeting of the Working Group on Energy and Development of the Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development on June 13, 1984 from 10:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. The meeting will be in Room 6909 of the Department of State, 2201 "C" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520.

The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss constraints to energy investment in less developed countries.

Members of the public wishing to attend the meeting must contact the Office of Investment Affairs ((202) 632-2728) in order to arrange admittance to the State Department. Please use the "C" street entrance.

The Chairman of the Working Group will, as time permits, entertain oral comments from members of the public at the meeting.

PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 25, 1984
No. 140

NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RADIO CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE

Notice of Meeting

The Department of State announces that the National Committee of the U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) will meet on June 13, 1984, at 2:00 p.m. in Room 1912, Department of State, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

The National Committee assists in the resolution of administrative/procedural problems pertaining to U.S. CCIR activities; provides advice on matters of policy and positions in preparation for CCIR Plenary Assemblies and meetings of the international Study Groups; and recommends the disposition of proposed U.S. contributions to the international CCIR which are submitted to the Committee for consideration.

The main purposes of the meeting will be:

1. Review results of the interim Study Group meetings (1983/84);
2. Discuss preparations for the Space Conference Preparatory Meeting (June-July 1984);
3. Discuss preparations for final Study Group meetings (Fall 1985);
4. Discuss CCIR organization in general.

Members of the general public may attend the meeting and join in the discussions subject to instructions of the Chairman. Admittance of public members will be limited to the seating available. In that regard, entrance to the Department of State building is controlled. All persons wishing to attend the meeting should contact the office of Richard Shrum, Department of State, Washington, D.C.; telephone (202) 632-2592. All attendees must use the C Street entrance to the building.

For further information contact:

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 25, 1984
No. 141

SECRETARY OF STATE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Study Group on Trusts

Notice of Meeting

There will be a meeting of the Study Group on Trusts, a study group of the subject Advisory Committee, at 10:30 a.m. on Wednesday, June 20, 1984 in Room 1207 of the Department of State in Washington, D.C. Members of the general public may attend up to the capacity of the meeting room and participate in the discussion subject to instructions of the Chairman.

The purpose of the meeting is to review the preliminary draft convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition developed during three meetings of a Special Commission of the Hague Conference on Private International law and the 35-page report with commentary on that draft convention. Also to be reviewed are draft written comments for the United States Government prepared by the U.S. legal expert who attended the Special Commission meetings and will be a U.S. delegate to the Hague Conference session in October, 1984 that is to adopt the convention in its final form.

The convention, if adopted by civil law countries where the common law institution of the trust is largely unknown, would establish a treaty basis for those countries to accord recognition to trusts, for example with regard to trust property located in their territory. A number of other countries have taken the position that the convention's provisions regarding applicable law for and recognition of trusts should be binding on countries that have become parties to the convention only with regard to trusts established under the laws of countries that have also become parties to the convention -- a reciprocity requirement. The possibility that the benefits of the convention would be available to U.S. trusts only if the United States were to become a party to the convention makes particularly important the review of draft written comments for the U.S. Government and a full discussion of the draft convention by members of the Study Group and interested members of the public.

Entry to the Department of State building is controlled and members of the general public should use the "C" Street or "diplomatic" entrance. As entry will be facilitated by advance arrangements, members of the general public planning to attend should, prior to June 20, 1984, notify the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, Department of State, (telephone (202) 632-8134) of their name, affiliation, address, and phone number.

For further information contact:

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE



May 25, 1984
No. 142

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND DEVELOPMENT

NOTICE OF MEETING

The Department of State will hold a meeting of the Working Group on International Data Flows of the Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development on June 18, 1984 from 10:00 a.m. to noon. The meeting will be in the East Auditorium (Room 2925D) of the Department of State, 2201 "C" Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20520.

The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the July 2-3 session of the OECD Working Party on Transborder Data Flows and report on TBDF work related to the UN Center on Transnational Corporations.

Members of the public wishing to attend the meeting must contact the Office of Investment Affairs ((202)632-2728) in order to arrange admittance to the State Department. Please use the "C" street entrance.

The Chairman of the Working Group will, as time permits, entertain oral comments from members of the public at the meeting.

PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 31, 1984
No. 143



INTERVIEW WITH
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
ON
WORLDNET PROGRAM
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
601 D STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C.
THURSDAY, MAY 24, 1984

MODERATOR: Hello. This is Sandy Gall of Independent Television News, London, speaking to you today from Washington, D.C.

To mark the 35th Anniversary of NATO, we are broadcasting a special two-hour program live from Washington and Europe in one of the most ambitious satellite hookups outside the Olympic Games.

It was in April of 1949 that the North Atlantic Treaty was signed here in Washington, and it was in September of that year that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being. In those 35 years since its foundation, NATO has been a remarkable force for peace and stability and prosperity not only in Europe but in other parts of the world as well.

NATO has kept the balance and preserved the peace. Today, we'll be looking not only at the past but also at the present and the future. We will be hearing about the state of the Alliance, its strengths and its weaknesses. Is it as strong as it ought to be? Is Europe carrying its fair share of the burden? Above all, perhaps we should be asking, will the Alliance be in place and in good shape, if needed, in the next century?

These are big questions and not easy questions. To help us to examine them, we have an expert panel here in Washington: A Senator, a senior member of the Department of Defense, and a prominent European journalist. And in Brussels, we have a second equally expert panel, this time made up of two well-known European journalists and the American Ambassador to NATO.

Then, very fortunately for us, we have in the studio here in Washington the United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, whose predecessor, Dean Acheson, was one of the signatories of the original Treaty in 1949.

For further information contact:

Journalists from fourteen NATO countries linked to this studio by satellite will be able to put questions to Mr. Shultz in a minute or two.

But, first, let's remind ourselves of the history of the Alliance. Although NATO was founded in April 1949, it was the events of the years immediately before which brought the Alliance into existence.

The end of the Second World War meant Europeans could finally return to civilian life and the task of rebuilding. Along with disarmament came a reduction in Allied armed forces from five million men to less than a million.

While the West wound down its war machine, the Soviet Union maintained six million men in its armed forces. In its efforts to extend Soviet influence, Stalin turned his attention to Southeast Europe by arming guerrilla forces in Greece and demanding the handover of Turkey's northeastern provinces. Less than a year later Soviet pressure moved north when the communist party of Czechoslovakia gained control of the government in Prague through a coup d'etat.

Then, on June 24, 1948, Stalin imposed a total railroad and canal blockade on the former German capital. That left only the British, French and American corridors open, and the Allies responded with a now-famous Berlin airlift, flying in everything the Berliners needed to stay alive and free.

In September 1948, foreign ministers from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom met to plan a response to Soviet aggression. Six months later they signed the Brussels Treaty for collective self-defense and set up the Western European Union as a defense organization. Field Marshall Montgomery was Britain's military representative.

These steps led to a historic conference in Washington. On April 4, 1949, leaders from the twelve original member nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, establishing NATO as an organization designed to provide collective defense and to preserve peace and security. Just a month later the Berlin blockade was lifted.

But the message of the blockade had come through loud and clear to the new Atlantic Alliance. And so NATO's member nations began to reorganize and re-equip their defenses, producing their first new weapons in many years.

The main task, a military command structure with General Dwight D. Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. His mission, to organize the new Alliance's collective defense.

At that time, NATO had only fourteen divisions on the mainland of Europe to face the Soviet's 210 divisions. Then, in June 1953, riots broke out in the eastern sector of Berlin and were suppressed by Soviet tanks. Three years later, when a full-scale uprising took place in Budapest, Hungary, the Soviet Union once again sent in the tanks to crush a popular rebellion.

In 1961, President Kennedy met the Soviet leader, Mr. Khrushchev, to try and improve East-West relations. Two months later, faced with a massive exodus of East Germans to the West, Khrushchev reacted by sealing off the Soviet sector of Berlin.

During the previous six months, more than a hundred thousand East Germans had fled to the West. The East German regime barricaded off East Berlin and began to build the Berlin Wall. As the wire and the concrete grew daily higher, hundreds of people made desperate last-minute escapes.

In 1968, the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia to put an end to Alexander Dubcek's socialism with a human face. The West condemned the Czech invasion but dialogue went on.

During the era of detente, of which the high-water mark was the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the West held back on building new weapons, but the Soviets showed no such restraint.

In 1977, a new threat to Europe emerged with the initial deployment of what were to become hundreds of SS-20s, the Soviet Union's new, highly accurate and mobile intermediate-range nuclear missiles. With three warheads and a reload capability, the SS-20s posed a new threat to virtually all of Europe.

NATO agreed to begin its own INF deployment in 1983 unless an arms control agreement made it unnecessary. During this period, the Soviet Union continued to export its muscle around the world. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan. More than four years later, 120 thousand Soviet troops still occupy that country.

Then, in 1981, the Soviet Union exerted pressure to smother the Solidarity movement in Poland. Under the threat of Soviet military intervention, the Polish authorities declared martial law in December and arrested Lech Walesa and other trade union leaders.

Despite the Soviet action, the Alliance's search for arms control continued, following its zero option call to eliminate an entire category of missiles on both sides. The Alliance made a series of compromise proposals on intermediate-range nuclear forces, but the Soviet Union rejected any compromise that would deprive it of its monopoly of these weapons in Europe.

Finally, in November 1983, faced with the failure of its policy of blocking NATO deployment, the Soviet Union abruptly walked out of both INF and START negotiations. NATO and the United States have repeatedly called on the Russians to return to the negotiating table. NATO is determined to hold its nuclear stockpile down to the lowest level needed to insure deterrence, and recently decided to cut its nuclear stockpile to its lowest level for 20 years.

So this is the position in which NATO finds itself as it celebrates its 35th birthday, still facing a potential threat from the East and trying to adhere to the motto "Peace: The Atlantic Promise."

Mr. Shultz, before I turn the questioning over to my fourteen colleagues, who are waiting impatiently to talk to you, can I ask you this: Is the United States satisfied that NATO is as strong as it ought to be in this, its 35th year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's always important to look at what is going on and to develop your strength. So, certainly, there are things that ought to be done. But, basically, NATO is strong and firm, and I think continues to be the best guarantee of peace that we have.

MODERATOR: (Sandy Gall) Let's go now to Europe. First, to Copenhagen.

QUESTION: (Copenhagen, Danish Television) My question is, Mr. Secretary, in Denmark and other European countries, parliaments and the public, in various ways, have expressed growing disenchantment with the NATO policies, especially around the 572 Pershing and cruise missiles. Do you see this as a real threat to NATO solidarity?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It is, of course, a problem. At the same time, I think it's important for us to continually develop the very strong arguments there are in favor of being able to defend our values, of being able to deter aggression from the Soviet Union and standing up to these problems, and that is what we continually do.

QUESTION: (Ottawa, Global Television Network) Mr. Shultz, this week six countries -- one of them Greece, a member of NATO -- signed a peace accord telling both you and Moscow to stop testing, or deploying, nuclear arms.

In your opinion -- you opened this by saying that you feel that NATO is strong, is firm -- does this kind of cabal, this grouping of other countries, make the Alliance less strong, less firm?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, countries will speak up and develop a point of view. Not all of those countries were NATO countries, of course; only one. I think it's clear that people are concerned about nuclear weapons.

President Reagan has said that his dream is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. In the position taken by the United States on behalf of NATO, insofar as the intermediate-range weapons are concerned, that position was the total elimination of these weapons.

I think those who say that we should stop deploying have to ask themselves, do they really want a world in which only the Soviets have deployed these weapons? Do they think that is a safe world? Do they think that is the way to defend the values that I presume these countries put forward? Our answer to that is no. We want reduction, but they have to be reductions that come down in an equal way and leave us in a balanced and therefore deterrent posture.

QUESTION: (Brussels, RTVF) Mr. Secretary, President Reagan has just said that the world has never been safer. How can you explain that, knowing of the growing East-West tensions, the Gulf war, General Ustinov's threats about having more missiles, and even close to the United States?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, there are plenty of tensions, and that is the state of the world, all right. On the other hand, I think that the strength of the United States, the strength of NATO, the strength of other countries around the world, and Asia and elsewhere, is our best insurance policy that aggression will be deterred because it is apparent that it will meet strong resistance. In that sense, we have the best guarantee of peace.

We all saw, and perhaps it's useful to remind ourselves of what happened in an earlier age, in the 1930's and at the end of the 1930's when, for some reason, people thought that the road to peace and safety was disarmament. That

turned out to be a very poor idea, and it only invited aggression.

We're strong. I think it's important to stay that way. We're realistic about what's going on around the world, and it is important to continually remind ourselves of what is really taking place; and at the same time it's important always to be reasonable, to be ready to engage in discussions with the other side in an effort to bring down the levels of armaments and to work out a more accommodating and constructive pattern for our mutual behavior. Those are the principles on which the President and, I think, the NATO Alliance is operating.

QUESTION: (Madrid, weekly Cambio 16) My question is, Mr. Shultz, how would you evaluate the specific contribution of Spain in NATO if Spain should integrate the Alliance militarily?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, Spain makes a contribution right now because Spain is a place where there are bases, and Spain has an armed capability, and it has moved in the direction of NATO. I think the integration of Spain fully into NATO and full membership, and being part of the so-called joint command, would strengthen Spain and strengthen the NATO Alliance because it would further develop that Alliance and add capability to it. So I think it would be a constructive move. It would help develop the deterrent capability of the Alliance and therefore serve the cause of peace in Europe. I think that that is certainly to Spain's advantage.

QUESTION: (Oslo, Norwegian News Agency) Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union can launch a nuclear attack on the United States and Europe from the Kola Peninsula. How would NATO meet this Soviet capability; and, secondly, what are the prospects for Norway as a potential battleground?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, the cruel fact that we have to face is that the world is really a small place, whether you're talking about the ability to move information around, as is illustrated by this very program, whether it's a question of moving goods and services around in the trade that we have, or whether it's the awesome capability of modern weapons which can reach over very long distances.

The fact of the matter is that all of us together have a stake in maintaining a deterrent capability so that this kind of nuclear battleground never comes into being. I don't think that geographic nearness, so to speak, has the same meaning that it might have had in earlier days. So no doubt the United States is fully as vulnerable, perhaps more so, than

Norway. That only emphasizes the underlying reason why we have a NATO Alliance, why countries that are geographically spread apart have come together and work together to provide the deterrent capability that we need.

QUESTION: (London, Daily Telegraph) The French have proposed a renewed effort to create a European pillar of defense within NATO, and the Western European Union Foreign Ministers are meeting in Paris next month. What form do you think that pillar should take? Is there a danger it could be divided?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We have been assured that the intent is not divisive at all, but to the contrary, to strengthen the European contribution to NATO. I have every reason to believe that that is precisely the intent, and so I think focusing on the capabilities of different countries and what further things they may do is a constructive move.

QUESTION: (Reykjavik, Icelandic Television) The United States seems to be putting more emphasis on military and defense preparations in the North Atlantic than before. Does this reflect a growing importance of this area, and consequently of Iceland, or possibly a changing strategy in the northern flank?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't really want to comment on that from a strictly military point of view, but obviously, it's a very important area and has been regarded as such for a long, long time. I used to be in the Marine Corps in World War II, and of course, I fought in the Pacific Theatre -- and you associate the Marines in World War II with the Pacific Theatre -- but I well remember, when I started in, in the early 1940s, that Iceland was the place where the Marines were stationed, and people wondered if that's where they were going to be assigned. I mention that only to show how long it has been that people have seen the strategic importance of that area.

QUESTION: (Amsterdam, Volkskrant) Mr. Secretary, President Reagan, Wednesday, said at a press conference that non-deployment of cruise missiles in Holland will not affect NATO seriously. What is your opinion on this issue? And will the issue be raised, the issue about a Dutch decision, at the forthcoming NATO Council in Washington next week?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President has emphasized on a great many occasions, as have the other NATO countries, the importance of carrying through on the decision made in 1979 to follow simultaneously a track of deployment to deter the Soviet deployments of intermediate-range missiles and continually to try to negotiate a limitation or, from our point of view, ideally, an elimination of these deployments.

We support them in all of the deploying countries; we think it is very important that each country step up to the mark, and certainly, that is exactly what is taking place. I know there are difficulties in the Netherlands right now, and we continue to believe that it's very important that this go forward.

QUESTION: (Munich, Sueddeutsche Zeitung) Mr. Secretary, the German Government, especially the German Defense Secretary, Herr Werner, is not very enthusiastic over the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Germans think it could create some sort of a -- two different classes of security. Do you think the quarrels over the SDI are a danger for the Alliance's unity in the near future?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think it's essential for us to talk our differences through, and of course, it's something new to talk about, and people have to understand it. That process is well underway and I think will result in a general consensus of support.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union has a deployed anti-ballistic missile system and has been engaging in vigorous research on this subject. The President believes that it would be a very bad thing for the Alliance if we were to wake up one day and they had done all this work and they had prepared themselves and had something ready to put in place, and we were still scratching our heads. So I think that this is something where we have to move into this in a somewhat higher gear.

At the same time, the President has made it very clear that we expect to share what we're doing with our Allies so that it's not a question of the United States' doing something and the others being left behind. Of course, the fundamental motive of it is to achieve the same thing as we are trying to achieve by reductions, and reductions to zero in the case of the intermediate-range missiles -- but generally, reductions in nuclear weapons -- and that is to reduce their capacity to harm mankind.

QUESTION: (Paris, Radio Luxembourg) Mr. Secretary, before the European Parliament, President Mitterrand today spoke about the need for Europe to have a common defense policy. Do you believe that pursuing this goal, it will reinforce the Alliance?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, a common defense policy, I assume within the framework of NATO -- and that's what we hear reaffirmed all the time, and that's where we stand, and we think that is very important to keep developing. I don't have any

idea that President Mitterand is suggesting separation of Europe from the United States -- quite the contrary. We had outstanding talks with President Mitterrand when he was here not too long ago and reaffirmed all of these basic principles of our unity.

QUESTION: (Lisbon, Portuguese Television) According to Portuguese military sources, it is known that the United States has plans to intervene in the Azores to guarantee the security of the residents of the American bases in case of conflict.

My question, Mr. Shultz, is, wouldn't it be more economical to grant the Portuguese Armed Forces the means to guarantee for themselves the security of the Azores, of the Portuguese territory, and in this very same sense, couldn't the United States be ready to accept the Portuguese contention for a defined command for the whole Portuguese national territory, including the Azores in the Atlantic area?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You've asked me a question that has a great deal of detail in it. I don't want to make an effort to go through at length what it would take to answer that question fully, but I think the main points are these: first, the Azores are a very important piece of territory, as has been demonstrated many times; number two, the United States and Portugal have worked out an agreement about their use and the development of the Azores that has been signed, and so therefore, it is satisfactory to both parties; number three, the fact that it is so important and it has been developed means that if there is some threat to it, it certainly will be defended vigorously, and I assume both the United States and Portugal agree to that.

QUESTION: (Ankara, Turkish Radio & Television) My question is, Mr. Secretary: Military aid to Turkey was given to strengthen NATO's defense of (inaudible). Yet, United States Congress has made cuts in aid for other reasons. If because of this, this action passes, what do you intend to do about it?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, the President has taken a very firm position about the importance of our assistance to the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, and we continue to work and struggle to convince the Congress that they must go forward with that. The developments on Cyprus and the unilateral declaration on Cyprus of an independent state have caused great consternation in the United States -- of course, we haven't recognized it; Turkey is the only country that has -- and that has brought about a considerable amount of Congressional opposition.

Obviously, what we need is to get the Cyprus issue settled somehow or other, and that, as we all know, is a very difficult proposition. But we support the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces in its own right and for the sake of the NATO positions, as a whole; and at the same time, these issues that are basically unrelated nevertheless do have their impact on people's thinking. On the one hand, we tried to persuade the Congress to go ahead, and on the other, encourage all the efforts by the U.N. and elsewhere to bring the Cyprus question to some sort of satisfactory conclusion, or at least get it on a satisfactory track for moving ahead toward a settlement.

QUESTION: (Luxembourg) Mr. State Secretary: Do you see a concrete way to bring the Soviet Union back to the negotiation table at Geneva without eliminating Pershing II and cruise missiles?

Don't you think the European NATO partners could eventually accelerate new negotiation initiatives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think we have to recognize that the positions taken by the Alliance, by the United States on behalf of the Alliance, in the intermediate-range nuclear talks were very reasonable positions. They are not only the positions the United States thinks are right, but they have met the test of discussion in the Alliance, and during 1983 and this year, the level of consultation has been really unprecedented. So they are reasonable positions. I think it is a great mistake, when one party walks out, to say we're going to reward that kind of behavior by changing our position as an inducement to get them to come back to the bargaining table.

We're there; we're reasonable; we're ready for give-and-take, but the one thing we have to get across to the Soviet Union is, we are not ready to give away the store. To give away the store, to give them everything they want, would only lead to unequal levels of forces and increase the danger because it would lessen the deterrent capability of the Alliance. And that we have to keep reminding ourselves of, while we also remind ourselves that it is important for us to be reasonable across-the-board on issues with the East and the Soviet Union, as we are.

QUESTION: (Copenhagen, Berlingske Tidende) My question is, in view of the present development in the Persian Gulf, do you find it feasible, desirable, or possible to enlarge the area of military responsibilities for NATO in that direction -- I mean in the direction of the Middle East -- an issue that has been raised before?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the question of enlarging NATO responsibilities, as such, is one issue, and it hasn't -- I don't think I would put it quite that way: the question is how NATO, or individual member-states of NATO, will work at things that are out of the immediate area of NATO jurisdiction, you might say, to work at problems that are obviously problems that we all have a stake in.

In the case of the Persian Gulf and the flow of oil resources, of course, they flow into a world market, and everybody is affected by the world market, and so we all have a stake there. In approaching that set of problems, of course, the United States has a very firm position, as the President has stated many times, and part of that position is close consultation with our Allies and with the states of the Gulf; and we engage in that and we are very much a part of the many diplomatic efforts to try to settle that conflict down.

QUESTION: (Ottawa, Global Television Network) The Prime Minister up here, Pierre Trudeau, who is about to retire, has spent a great deal of his time in the last year on sort of a peace crusade of his own. There has been some controversy with people in the Pentagon, whom he has described as "pipsqueaks" for criticizing him.

I'm wondering whether you feel the Prime Minister's peace initiative helped the NATO Alliance, or whether or not -- just what you regard the Prime Minister's initiative as having accomplished.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, it's always important to have leaders of the West talking about peace and let it be known throughout the world that peace and stability are what we want. That's the environment within which we can preserve our values and develop our way of life and our economies. So in that sense, we welcome the Prime Minister's initiative.

Just what fruit has borne is a little difficult to say; nevertheless, we -- The Prime Minister came down and met at length with the President on this subject -- I happened to be privileged to take part in that meeting -- and we welcomed the opportunity to talk with him about his ideas.

QUESTION: (Brussels, Reuters) Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the European allies are at present carrying their fair share of the common defense burden? And do you share some of the critical views of the Allies that have been made recently by your former colleague, Mr. Eagleburger, and your predecessor, Mr. Kissinger?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, there is always more that we can do. We believe, in the United States, in our own defense capabilities that we should be doing more than we are, and we are engaged in a struggle with the Congress about that. I'm glad to say that here in the United States, and I believe in most of the countries of NATO, the question is not whether we should do more, but how much and what can we stand in the light of the other constraints on our governmental budgets, and so forth. So I think there is a big load. It is being shared, but nevertheless, more should be done.

I don't share the view that some express, that somehow or other, Europe is falling behind. Europe is a vigorous area -- many countries from which the United States has drawn our heritage -- and if it gets behind a little bit in certain technological areas, I think there are lots of capable people there, and it doesn't take a whole lot to turn it around. Of course, everybody does have to work and struggle to compete in the kind of world we're in, and Europe is no exception to that rule.

QUESTION: (Madrid, Spanish Television) My question is: Is there any chance of the Federal Republic of Germany turning to neutralist tendencies if the present East-West stalemate continues?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I couldn't understand your question. I'm sorry. Could you repeat it?

QUESTION: Yes. Is there any chance of the Federal Republic of Germany turning to neutralist tendencies if the present East/West stalemate continues?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't see any danger of the Federal Republic of Germany becoming a neutralist country. It's very firmly a part of NATO and very firmly a part of the West, and that seems to be the view of not only the party in power in the Government, but basically of the opposition party as well.

MODERATOR I think that's all we have time for, Mr. Secretary. Thank you very much for coming into the studio and giving us so much of your time.

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PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETING
THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1984
WASHINGTON, D.C.

For further information contact:

PRESS CONFERENCE
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
THURSDAY, MAY 31, 1984, 1:00 P.M.

MR. HUGHES: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. This is an ON-THE-RECORD Press Conference by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. George P. Shultz.

Secretary Shultz is accompanied by United States Ambassador to NATO David Abshire. Subject of the Press Conference is the North Atlantic Council meeting that was just concluded.

Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We just finished a meeting of immense significance, significance for the cause of peace and for the value of freedom.

We met at a time when, once again, the Soviet Union seems to have decided on a policy of chilling its relations with the West, so it is time of some testing. The meeting reviewed, among other things, an extensive study of East-West relations that was called for in our meeting in Brussels last December, and approved the report and issued a communique and statement on East-West relations that reflects it, and reflects the continued view of the Alliance that the cause of freedom and peace is served by a set of policies that involved, first of all, strength on our part; second, political solidarity; and building on those fundamentals a continued willingness to undertake a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

There was, throughout our meeting, a very free and full and interesting exchange of ideas, and a sort of quiet confidence that the Alliance for 35 years has been basically on the right track and that track remains the right one. It represents a strategy and a set of actions that have worked. As they are continually adapted to the new circumstances, we'll continue in the future to serve the causes of peace and freedom.

Any questions?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Washington Declaration, which we have just had a chance to see, states that the Allies are determined to build on areas of common interests in promoting constructive dialogue and cooperation.

What areas are there of common interests at the moment in which the Allies and the Soviet Union can engage in constructive dialogue and cooperation, understanding that the nuclear weapons talks, the INF talks are not among them?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Of course, first of all, there is the general cause of peace which we assume everyone is interested in. And then there are various ways of going about assurance of that through negotiations, and there is quite a list. You mentioned the INF talks, and the START talks are in the list; it's in the statement. The discussions going on in Stockholm are another forum in which we are addressing these issues. There are discussions in Geneva, particularly on chemical weapons. There are discussions in Vienna on conventional forces.

So there are a wide array of areas in which these discussions are going forward, and presumably the fact that everyone is represented there shows that there is some common interest. Beyond that, of course, there are common interests in economic development, and particularly poignantly for many of the countries -- Germany especially -- the common interest in seeing such things as contacts among families and the human touch so much wanted in a divided nation.

MR. HUGHES: Mr. Gwertzman?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Who's running this thing anyway?

MR. HUGHES: Would you like to run it, Mr. Secretary?
(Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, given the fact that the Soviets are not terribly interested in relations right now, what is your personal evaluation of why that is so?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It's no doubt a part of their negotiating strategy, a tactical adaptation. At least, that is my general view. But it's not so important for me to speculate about exactly why they are doing what they're doing as it is to say, what should we be doing. We feel that we should be doing, not only the United States but the Alliance, is looking to our security and deterrent capabilities, in sharing our thoughts, and being sure that we do have the political solidarity that is so essential. And continuing to reaffirm and to try to implement the dialogue that we would like to see.

Of course, we are not just looking for dialogue. We are looking for dialogue about important subjects and in a reasonable way.

QUESTION: Do you expect on the basis of your conversations with the Dutch Foreign Minister that the Dutch Government will agree to proceed with INF deployments according to the original schedule?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The Dutch Government is having its difficulties, as we all know. The Dutch Foreign Minister was very strong in his views, and I believe he expressed himself before he left last night to go back. And I understand there is a Dutch Cabinet meeting tomorrow, probably on this subject. But they are struggling to find a way of behaving that is consistent with their responsibilities in the Alliance and meets the political realities that they're facing in Holland. But we have every confidence that the Dutch will play a proper part in the Alliance activities.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, we've seen some reports of differences among the Allies on the Persian Gulf question, the security question in the Persian Gulf. Could you address the question of whether it is desirable or even obtainable for there to be cooperation, any kind of joint action among the Allies to provide greater security in the Gulf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There wasn't any particular expression of differences of opinion at all. We discussed the subject in our informal session for -- I don't know -- twenty minutes or so, and shared information and thoughts about it.

I think it is important to understand that NATO has a certain set of responsibilities. And, obviously, there are things that are in the parlance of NATO out-of-area that have an impact on all the countries concerned, and so after we have finished what you might call the more direct NATO discussions, we try to find time for discussing these out-of-area problems, and the Gulf situation was one of them. So I don't think that it is appropriate to expect that NATO, as an Alliance, would take a view or undertake something. But the different countries in the Alliance, as countries, have an interest. We have discussed it during this meeting, but we've discussed it before; more with some countries than others. There are many ways in which the collaboration goes forward, and of course, including the countries in the Gulf, as such, beyond NATO countries.

QUESTION: A follow-up, Mr. Secretary. In the past, NATO was usually flanked by two other Western alliances -- CENTO and SEATO. Do you believe that NATO is able now to operate in the area of CENTO as before, like when CENTO was there?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: You have too many initials and ideas going for me. But I think that the point is that the NATO Alliance was set up for certain very important and central purposes to our lives. It has succeeded brilliantly, and continues to work along the same basic principles that have worked so well, adapting them, studying them as we go along. I think, obviously, the different countries, in various ways, have relationships and alliances with other countries around the world, but these are important and they're related. But the NATO meeting, as such, concentrates on the NATO activities.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I would like to draw you out a little further on this question of what you think impels the Soviet Union now in its colder or harder line. You gave a personal opinion that you thought that perhaps this was a part of a new negotiating strategy. To achieve specifically what objectives?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't think I want to get drawn in too much into negotiating strategy and speculation about the Soviet Union. But they have stated objectives on one occasion or another broadly. And then, more particularly, they have negotiating positions at the table, and so do we. What we want to do is continue to engage them and try to work out a reasonable solution.

As the President said this morning, in his statement at the White House, that the United States is ready to meet them half way. So I think that is the main point to emphasize. And, of course, in many of the fora, we are very active. We have NATO proposals on the table in Stockholm. We have just tabled -- the Vice President made a trip to Geneva to table a draft treaty on chemical warfare. We have made a proposal recently on the MBFR talks. So there is a very active negotiation taking place, and I don't particularly want to characterize the particular positions within it.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said there are many ways in which collaboration goes forward among the Allies on the Persian Gulf, perhaps in a bilateral way.

How is that, in fact, happening, particularly against the background of the United States arming the Saudis, the French arming Iraq, and the U.S. hoping that nobody would send arms to either of the adversaries, Iraq and Iran?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: There are many ebbs and flows in this. But there are discussions that take place among countries that are able to have military assets in the region as a deterrent matter.

We have responded to requests from Saudi Arabia, and I believe some other countries have as well. There is a diplomatic effort going on in the United Nations in which we and others are very active, and we discuss with them their positions and our positions. And there are efforts being made with Iran and Iraq, not by us directly since our relationships with others have better relationships with the two countries than we do, although we do talk to Iraq. And so there are a great many things that are taking place.

Unfortunately, the war goes on, and there are continued threats to its escalation in the Gulf. It seems a problem that we will be coping with, so we need to be widely consultative with others in evaluating our own efforts to do so.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, reportedly, Turkey is the only NATO country who has a dialogue, a direct dialogue with Iran. The Turkish Foreign Minister gave the view that the Western side should not put too much pressure only on Iran but be more even-handed. What was your reaction on that?

And the second part of it: Do you believe in the event of a military intervention, Turkey will be with the Western powers?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: First of all, I don't want to speak for the Foreign Minister of Turkey. He will speak for himself.

I would say that he made very interesting contributions throughout our meeting, and is an experienced and wise person. So he is most welcome in the NATO Councils. And not the least of the virtues of it is, as you point out, Turkey does have a good relationship with Iran and is able to talk with them.

As far as the United States is concerned, our posture on the war is one of neutrality. Our posture in regard to the openness of international waters is one of believing that these waters must remain open. And we have stated that and have worked for it diplomatically, in support of people in the region, and directly ourselves.

QUESTION: The second part of the question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I've forgotten it.

QUESTION: Do you believe that Turkey will be with the Western powers if there will be a military intervention in the Gulf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: As far as the NATO Alliance is concerned, I'm sure that Turkey is a very firm member of the NATO

Alliance, and spoke in an interesting and thoughtful way throughout on the out-of-area questions. I'm not going to try to go beyond that, except to say that the Turkish attitude toward the issues that we were discussing was very positive.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in your view, what is the difference between the so-called Signal of Brussels and this Washington Declaration?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they are consistent with each other and they both, broadly speaking, take the same view.

At Brussels, an East-West study was commissioned. That was undertaken by NATO -- a very careful, thoughtful document produced, some 35 pages or so, I think, and from that careful evaluation, the Washington statement that you got was drawn and discussed, and it basically elaborates and goes into more detail and reaffirms.

I think beyond that, there is no doubt about the fact that, obviously, this is a continuing subject for the Alliance and we will review, I'm sure, at each meeting how the East-West situation stands and what it is that we can do about it. So I don't think it's so much that's different. In fact, I think the reverse is the important point: there is continuity and reaffirmation, and reaffirmation of a strategy that, basically, has kept the peace for 35 years.

QUESTION: Could I have a follow-up on that, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: All right. You're the first person in this room that's waited for permission.

QUESTION: You have reviewed East-West political relations. Do you think that there is a necessity to look at NATO's military strategy as well as its political strategy? Do you see any possibility for a review of that? And would you see, for example, the need to study removing battlefield nuclear weapons and improving conventional forces?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I think that in the NATO strategic doctrine, the strategy of deterrence is central. We discussed that, and I think there is no question about the centrality of that nuclear deterrent capability. At the same time, I think everyone wishes to see the nuclear threshold raised, and that does bring you to conventional forces; and we discussed that subject briefly. No doubt, it's the sort of thing that is more appropriately dealt with by Defense Ministers but, at the same time, is a matter of great interest to Foreign Ministers, so I wouldn't expect any drastic shift at all, but a continual effort to look at this matter.

I think that as soon as you utter the words "conventional forces," you also utter the word "expensive," and everybody has to recognize that going in.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could give us your analysis of the role that the Soviet Union is currently playing in the Persian Gulf crisis. We have reports that they have recently sent offensive weapons to the Iraqis.

Do you think they are trying to "steal the march" on the United States in terms of ingratiating themselves with the Arabs? And do you see any circumstances under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union could end up on the opposite sides in a confrontation in the Gulf?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think, no doubt, the Soviet Union feels as we do, that openness of international waterways is a very important principle. Beyond that, of course, we have discussed the situation, at least trying to make clear to the Soviet Union at various times what our view is, what our intentions are, including the limitations of our intentions so that they wouldn't be under any misapprehension.

They have made statements about our intentions that are incorrect, that is that the United States is seeking to use the crisis as a way of implanting itself somehow more fully in the Gulf area -- that certainly is wrong. And so we have done those things, and beyond that, I don't want to speculate about the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what other out-of-area problems were discussed besides the Persian Gulf, and in particular was Central America discussed? And if so, could you characterize those discussions?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, in truth, the discussion of East-West relationships and the analysis of the Soviet Union and of other Eastern European countries was, at least speaking for myself as a person who has now attended quite a few NATO meetings, was more interesting and superior in quality to anything that I have experienced; and it consumed most all of our time in the informal sessions.

The only out-of-area subject that was really formally discussed was the Gulf situation. I'm sure that Central American problems are on peoples' minds, and they would have liked to have discussed it, but we literally didn't have time to do so. So I don't have any report to make on that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, did any of the Ministers renew the European complaints about technology transfer and about military cooperation between the U.S. and the Allies, that is in terms of the U.S. being an unreliable supplier or in terms of the two-way street working more to the advantage of the United States than to the Allies?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, there are two very different issues -- totally different issues -- that you've raised, at least as I understand your question. One is the supplier relationship within NATO, and this is a subject that is sort of a perennial subject of discussion. But I do have the feeling and observation that some headway has been made on it, particularly in the last five or six months. I know our new Ambassador to NATO has gone there particularly having this problem in mind and has put a lot of effort into it personally, and I think that there is a better understanding and also probably more action taking place -- there's been a lot of discussion with the Pentagon about it. So that's one side of your question, and I think progress has been made. It didn't come in for a lot of discussion, and perhaps that is by way of saying that people realize that progress is being made and that the problem is getting attention.

As far as the question of technology transfer is concerned, that's a totally different issue; and the agreements that were worked out a year or so ago and started being reflected in the communiques, I think hold and are moving forward in their implementation, and I think on the whole, the situation there is reasonably satisfactory.

No doubt there are differences of view about a particular piece of technology, and of course, we have also been liberalizing our view of technology transfer with respect to China, and this has come up for discussion in COCOM. And I would be surprised if the Chinese Premier isn't talking about it to some of our European friends on his current trip.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said you have every confidence that the Dutch will play their proper part. Does that mean you believe them to deploy not on schedule, but eventually?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I don't want to try to set out various things that they might do because they are struggling with that decision. We've talked to the Prime Minister at one time or another and, of course, the Foreign Minister, and I spent a considerable amount of time with him on this subject.

There are a variety of ideas in play, and just how the Dutch Government will come out on this remains to be seen, and I think the best thing for me to do at this stage is to say no more.

MR. HUGHES: Mr. Secretary, I think we have time for maybe two more questions.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, it's up to you to decide.

MR. HUGHES: Why don't we take Mr. Ignatius and then Mr. Gutman.

QUESTION: With reference to the last paragraph of the Point 11 of the statement, I would like to ask: Is the United States ready, at the Stockholm Conference, to formally reaffirm what is called here "the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations?"

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, of course, this is a proposal that's been made by the Soviet Union, and so it's under consideration. We believe that declarations of that kind take on a great deal more meaning when they have some real content to them, along the lines of the confidence-building measures that NATO has suggested. So what we are seeking is to have a discussion of all of these various items, and we're working for that in Stockholm; and prior to the outcome of that work, I don't want to sort of lay down some decision on one element or another of it.

MR. HUGHES: We're looking for Mr. Ignatius and then Mr. Gutman.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, at the last NATO Meeting in Brussels there was considerable anticipation about your session with Mr. Gromyko which took place then in Stockholm. At this point, can you tell us whether there is any forum in which you might be able to meet with Mr. Gromyko over the next few months? And do you expect to meet with him when the United Nations General Assembly meets in the fall?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Traditionally, there has been a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the U.N. meeting. That didn't happen last year because Mr. Gromyko didn't come. As far as we're concerned, we are certainly prepared to have such a meeting, and I would expect that it would probably take place, but I can't speak for the Soviet Union, obviously.

As far as a meeting between now and then is concerned, it's always a possibility, but there is no plan for it; and if there seemed to be a good reason to have one, then it wouldn't be difficult to arrange it. There isn't any plan for a meeting, but I personally would welcome a meeting in New York; but it hasn't been formally laid on.

MR. HUGHES: Last question -- from Mr. Gutman.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you said that the quality of the discussion on East-West affairs was superior. I was wondering if you might be willing to share some of the insights that were offered in that discussion with us. And related to that is, are the Ministers concerned that the new Soviet hard line is having an impact on Western public opinion? If so, other than the Declaration that you have issued here today, what approach do you and other Ministers plan to take to that?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, taking the last part of your question first, we all believe firmly that we are on the right track, and that broadly speaking, the populations in the West support what's being done and have done so, and reaffirmed and reaffirmed and reaffirmed. At the same time, everyone recognizes that critical voices are raised and problems are talked about, and we're engaged in a continual debate, and that's well and proper. So we have to give attention to a constant process of explanation and argumentation, and so on. So that's one of the things, certainly, that motivated the putting forward of the communique each six months.

In this case, in view of the fact that an extensive East-West study had been made, of making a sort of declaration based on it, that states in detail the strategy and philosophy involved, and then goes through and identifies various pluses and minuses and ways in which we're prepared to move forward, and lists the different forums, and so on. So all of this is part of the process of maintaining the working life of the NATO alliance. And in our kind of societies, which are democratic societies, that's the name of the game -- explaining to people what you're doing and seeing to it that they are on your side.

The Permanent Representatives, I hope, will be looking at this issue especially: What is the public perception, and in what ways can we enhance understanding of what we're doing, and so on. We expect that, Dave, you're going to have a report for us when we meet the next time on this very subject.

As far as illustrations of the discussions are concerned, it's the sort of thing that's a little hard to put your finger on, but lots of discussion of Soviet behavior and of the situation in different Eastern European countries. People -- several had visited the Soviet Union and described the posture that was taken there and their own observations about the people involved.

Earlier someone asked a question about the Turkish Foreign Minister. As it emerges, he has served on three different occasions in Moscow as Ambassador there, which gives him a rather interesting insight. So all of these things together were part of our conversation. And perhaps the outstanding thing about it was that it was an easy, cordial, and strong informal discussion where I certainly felt free, as did others, to try out ideas and give information and share them, not only in the general meetings, but in the informal settings that you find yourself in.

Let me just say, winding up here, once again that this has seemed to me to be a very important occasion. It came at a time of testing and importance, and the Alliance leaders came together, the Foreign Ministers; and in a quiet, confident way reexamined and reaffirmed the strategy that we have, and I think we all left feeling that the cohesion of the West and the strength of the values that we have that lies behind that cohesion is in very good shape. And I think that's good news for the cause of freedom and it's good news for the cause of peace.

MR. HUGHES: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(The press conference concluded at 1:35 p.m.)