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NSC: Agency File
Folder Title: Secretary Haig's Evening
Report (03/03/1981-03/25/1981)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 3/8/2013

File Folder SECRETARY HAIG'S EVENING REPORT (03/03/1981-03/25/1981)

FOIA

M453

Box Number 6

SHIFRINSON

26

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
155353	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	2	3/2/1981	B1
155355	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	2	3/4/1981	B1
155356	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	2	3/5/1981	B1
155357	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/6/1981	B1
155358	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/9/1981	B1
155359	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/11/1981	B1
155361	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/12/1981	B1
155362	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/13/1981	B1
155363	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 155362] <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/13/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 3/8/2013

File Folder SECRETARY HAIG'S EVENING REPORT (03/03/1981-03/25/1981)

FOIA

M453

Box Number 6

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26

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
155364	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/18/1981	B1
155365	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/17/1981	B1
155366	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/16/1981	B1
155367	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/19/1981	B1
155368	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/20/1981	B1
155369	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/23/1981	B1
155370	MEMO	ALEXANDER HAIG TO RR <i>R 2/3/2016 M453/2</i>	1	3/24/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FROM:

Collection Executive Secretariat, NSC: Agency File

Series _____

File Folder Title/Casefile #/NSC # Secretary Haig's Evening Report
(3/3/81-3/25/81)

Box Number 6

Description of Material:

- memo, Richard Allen to RR re. Secretary Haig's Evening Report, 1 pg., 3/3/81

- same as above, 1 pg., 3/17/81

- " " , 1 pg., 3/20/81

- " " , 1 pg., 3/21/81

- " " , 1 pg., 3/25/81

- " " , 1 pg., 3/28/81

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Series: _____

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Box Number: _____

Transferred by: Ray Wilson Date: ~~3/11/81~~ 3/11/13

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MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 2, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

RW
3/11/81

Historical File

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Meeting with Waldheim and Von Wechmar at the UN. In my meeting today with Secretary General Waldheim and his staff at UN Headquarters in New York, I indicated that the mood of the American people had changed along with Administrations. Self-doubt and uncertainty had been replaced by pride and determination; these qualities would be reflected in our foreign policy. Moreover, we intended to state the facts as we saw them on many issues now cloaked in hypocrisy, such as the Soviet role in international terrorism and the Cuban role in El Salvador.

Among other issues covered were Afghanistan (we welcomed UN efforts so long as they never accepted the Soviet presence), Chad (Waldheim indicated the Africans had simply been too slow to organize an anti-Libyan effort in the UN) and the Middle East (Waldheim said the Palestinian problem was central to a solution, and I replied that we could not accept a PLO that was part of a worldwide, Soviet-led terror campaign). Finally, on Namibia, I left Waldheim in doubt; we were reviewing our policy but we were linking the situation there to the presence of Cuban troops in Angola.

Waldheim, who is up for reelection this fall, is now on notice that we mean to pursue our interests with vigor.

In a separate meeting, the current General Assembly President, FRG Ambassador Von Wechmar, asked about global negotiations. He was informed (as was Waldheim) that you were disposed to go to the North/South Summit in Mexico under certain conditions but that we had not clarified our views on global negotiations. (C)

2. Meeting With Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar. In a meeting with Foreign Minister Mochtar this afternoon in New York I gave him a sense of our Asian policy priorities. We recognized Indonesia's significance as the world's fifth largest nation, a leader in ASEAN, a moderate in OPEC and the Islamic Conference, and

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BY C. N. MARRAS 2/3/16

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a good friend of the US. In reply, Mochtar assured me of his country's friendship. He expressed his high regard for the new Administration and for you personally. Among other things, he also expressed appreciation for our economic development assistance. Mochtar was clearly pleased by our intention to invite President Suharto to the US soon. (S)

3. The F-15 Deal: Reaction in Saudi Arabia and Israel.

In conversation with Ambassador West, both Crown Prince Fahd and Prince Saud approved of our proposal to sell F-15 enhancement items, though Saud suggested that the Saudis may expect us eventually to sell them the bomb racks.

In Israel, Prime Minister Begin told Ambassador Lewis that he approved of your general approach towards the Soviet challenge and the Mideast region, but that he was unhappy about the F-15 issue. Lewis believes the Israelis will want an improved American financial offer or additional technology. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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The President has seen →

~~SECRET~~/NODIS ATTACHMENT

March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 4, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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3/11/81

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

March 4, 1981

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NLRM/SS/2/155355
BY CA NARA DATE 7/3/16

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AO*

1. El Salvador. This morning's Washington Post carried a story from San Salvador to the effect that we would favor a right-wing military takeover of the Duarte Government. To set the record straight, I told the assembled news media this afternoon that such an action would run counter to our policy in El Salvador; in fact, it would seriously affect our ability to pursue that policy. We have communicated this response to the Duarte Government and to appropriate members of the military high command. (C)

2. Saudi Arabia F-15 Enhancement Items. In concluding the consultation process, Fred Ikle and Jim Buckley met with the House Armed Services Committee in closed session to discuss the F-15 enhancement items sale to Saudi Arabia and financial assistance to enable Israel to purchase additional F-15's (or other military equipment). The Committee was generally supportive, suggesting that they understand that the proposed actions will contribute to our own security. It appears to be widely accepted that we must move quickly and decisively to redress the balance in the Gulf region.

Meanwhile, we should confirm our plans to the Saudi Government if we are to hold the positive Saudi reaction indicated a few days ago. I understand that you are having several domestic Jewish groups to the White House this Friday, when we had planned to make the announcement. If you decide that Friday is not possible, I hope we will be able to make the announcement Monday at the latest. It should also be preceded by advance notice to Congressional leaders and the Saudi Government. If we are to make the announcement Friday, we should start to make the calls tomorrow morning. (SECRET/NODIS)

3. Foreign Policy Briefing for United States Senate. At the request of Senator Baker, I met today for forty-five minutes in closed session with the Senate. Sixty-one Senators attended, with approximately equal representation of Republicans and Democrats. My remarks covered an overview of your Administration's foreign policy, stressing the themes of consistency, reliability and balance, and going in some detail into our positions on East-West Relations, Human Rights, Poland, Arms

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

Control and Central America. Subsequent questions by the Senators concerned Central America. Drawing on your comments to Walter Cronkite last night, I made the point that, press obsessions with the military notwithstanding, we are viewing the situation in El Salvador and the region in a broader and more balanced context. After the meeting, Senator Baker, Senator Percy and I met briefly with the press. (C)

4. North/South Summit. Myer Rashish and Larry Eagleburger briefed the Ambassadors of Canada, France, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Austria and Yugoslavia separately on your possible attendance at the North/South Summit. The Ambassadors were informed that you would be willing to attend a summit scheduled later in the year if the Cubans were not in attendance. Summit discussion should be free, open and devoted to general subjects--not specific issues. No negotiations would occur, hence no communique on the Summit would be necessary.

The Ambassadors all welcomed your decision and your conditions had been fully anticipated: Timing and format would not be a problem. On the question of Soviet participation, we doubted Moscow had much to contribute; if other participants insisted on including them, we would consider it.

We indicated you were not likely to announce a final decision until your visit with President Lopez Portillo in late April.

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

March 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of
March 5, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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3/11/81



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. El Salvador. A major threat to the Salvadoran Government from within the Armed Forces, fed by right-wing extremists, has been narrowly averted--at least for now.

Some officers of the Armed Forces leadership attribute El Salvador's economic and social disruption as much to the Duarte Government's reforms as to the communist guerrillas. On Tuesday retired Salvadoran Major d'Aubuisson surfaced at a press conference in San Salvador to state that he was informed this Administration would not be opposed to a removal of the Christian Democrats from the government.

Yesterday both I and Ambassador Chapin stated forcefully that we oppose coups and that we support the Duarte Government in its efforts to overcome the guerrillas, to institute reforms, and to build an electoral process. I also emphasized that our ability to assist the Salvadorans would be seriously undermined if the military forced out the civilians and, by implication, cancelled those reforms necessary to curtail popular support for the communists. (S)

2. Brezhnev-Polish Meeting. Judging by the makeup of the Soviet side and the tone of the communique, which Ambassador Meehan in Warsaw has termed "grim, bearish, and ultimately threatening", the March 4 meeting between Brezhnev and Kania and Jaruzelski has ominous implications. The TASS account seems to reflect frank talk and considerable differences of opinion in the meeting, much more so than at the October 30 Brezhnev-Kania meeting or the December 5 Warsaw Pact Summit. The Soviets laid out more starkly than before that they expect the Poles "to reverse the flow of events and liquidate the dangers which are threatening the socialist achievements of the Polish nation". We share Ambassador Meehan's assessment that Kania and Jaruzelski know they cannot hope to carry out such orders without major internal upset. As Meehan notes, however, Polish realities may temper the "Neanderthal severity" displayed by Soviets. (C)

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3. Meeting with Australian Foreign Minister. My meeting today with Australian Foreign Minister Tony Street involved a wide ranging and extremely friendly discussion of Administration foreign policy. I told Street that, in my view, Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser had led the way for us by turning around the inflationary economic mess left in 1975 by the outgoing Labor Government. Street responded by saying that Fraser, too, felt a special affinity for you and your policies and that the GOA believes the US-Australian alliance will be more effective as a result of your election. Street suggested a visit by Fraser, and I explained why this could not occur until after July. Street was informed that you will be sending a letter soon to Fraser suggesting that a firm date be worked out.

During our meeting we received word of Fraser's very firm public statement of support for our position on El Salvador, and I asked Street to convey our warm appreciation.

Street's visit underscored the convergence of U.S. and Australian interests on such issues as relations with the USSR and support for ASEAN on Kampuchea. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 6, 1981.

Attachment

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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3/11/81

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. (C)

1. Letter to you from Brezhnev. Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh came in late this afternoon to deliver a letter from Brezhnev to you. Bessmertnykh did not provide us with an English translation, but our initial reading indicates that it repeats Brezhnev's foreign policy proposals at the 26th Party Congress, adding a few more details and highlighting the need for dialogue and a summit. We will send you a full translation and analysis tomorrow. Bessmertnykh had little to add, except to note that the letter placed more emphasis on the positive aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations than did Brezhnev's Congress speech, which shows (he claimed) the Soviet's desire for good relations. He supposed that similar messages would be delivered in other capitals. The letter requires careful analysis and consultation with our allies before we decide on our course of action. (C)

2. PIA Hijacking Incident. Larry Eagleburger called in Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh today to emphasize our concern that the Soviets and the Afghans were using the Kabul hijacking incident to try to gain Pakistani recognition of the Afghanistan Government, and to press the Soviets again to use their good offices to get a quick, safe resolution of the incident. Bessmertnykh said he would report the demarche to Moscow immediately. He denied the incident is a recognition ploy and suggested that we were more interested in an issue for public consumption than in a settlement--a point we firmly rebuffed. (C)

3. East-West Relations. Also today Walter Stoessel chaired a small group including Dick Allen, Fred Ikle, and JCS and CIA representatives to begin an examination of our goals in East/West relations. The group agreed to continue its efforts and to have recommendations for you by early April. (C)

4. Saudi F-15's. Today's announcement of the decision on the Saudi F-15 enhancement package and our press backgrounder went very well as did earlier calls to Percy, Pell, Bloomfield and Zablocki. Nevertheless, we can anticipate strong reaction from pro-Israeli interests. We also formally informed the Saudis, and while they remain unhappy about the bomb racks, the reaction was positive. They are clearly pleased by the strategic implications of your decision.

RDS 2/3 3/6/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Brezhnev Letter. An analysis of the letter and recommended course of action has been forwarded to you separately for your approval. The letter does not contain startling new proposals, but we must consult quickly with our allies about it. Hopefully, you will have a chance to review our recommendations soon. (S)

2. Meeting with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. Foreign Minister Genscher's meeting with me today was distinguished by a very useful exchange on many subjects. As expected, Genscher sought assurances from us on our arms control policies, especially those concerning theater nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe. These assurances would enable him and Chancellor Schmidt to withstand domestic pressures against vital Western defense programs. He was therefore delighted to hear that we plan to hold an early meeting in NATO of the TNF Consultative Group. Genscher supported our efforts in El Salvador and was anxious to proceed with the "Contact Group" approach developed by the Carter Administration for resolving the Namibia crisis. He assured me that the Europeans want to make their efforts in the Middle East complementary to our policy objectives. (C)

3. Mozambique In response to the expulsion of four of our diplomats from Mozambique on March 4, the Mozambican authorities have been told that their action will impair our relationship.

An AID team, which had arrived in Maputo on the eve of the expulsions, has been withdrawn and Mozambique's share of the PL480 program has been withheld. The Mozambicans are not represented in Washington, so we cannot retaliate against their diplomats. (C)

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BY CU NARA DATE 7/3/16

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

March 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 11, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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SECRET - ALABAMA

THOMAS WYCKE
BY HOOVER

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1981*

SECRETARIES SECRETARY WITH A MARCH REPORT OF MARCH 11

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SECRET - ALABAMA

MARCH 11, 1981

SECRETARIES SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

155359

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 11, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

1. Washington Post Story and Angola. Today's Washington Post reported -- inaccurately -- that we have alerted Congress to an impending request that the restrictions on economic and military aid to factions in Angola be lifted.

In fact, Cap and I recently reached agreement on several changes in security assistance legislation that would increase our flexibility in protecting our interest abroad. One of these concerned Angola. Pending your approval, however, we have not consulted with the Hill and you should receive a decision memorandum on this subject tomorrow. (C)

2. Tentative Settlement of Belize Dispute. Concluding secret talks this week in London, the Guatemalan Foreign Minister and the Premier of Belize signed an agreement today facilitating the peaceful independence of Belize by year's end.

We urged this settlement on the Guatemalan and British foreign ministers during their recent visits to Washington. By reducing the potential for Cuban meddling and contributing to regional stability, the agreement is a success for your policy in Central America (C)

3. Meeting with British Defense Secretary Nott. In an extremely cordial meeting this afternoon, British Defense Secretary Nott pledged British support for our Rapid Deployment Force and agreed to inform the Saudis and the Gulf States (he will be visiting there soon) that the new American Administration understood the Soviet threat to their part of world and intended to help them resist it. Nott was informed of our view that it was opportune for the West to achieve a new consensus with the Middle Eastern states on security. It was also important that the Europeans not undercut the Camp David process. Nott agreed but believed that the Europeans could still play a useful role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. (S)

4. Visit of Japanese Ambassador. Japanese Ambassador Okawara expressed Japan's concern that direct U.S. military aid to Beijing might eventually threaten Japan, disturb other Asians and provoke the Soviets. The Ambassador was assured that our intention to consolidate our relationship with the PRC did not involve an arms supply at this time. Okawara also hoped we would be cautious in dealing with Taiwan.

The Ambassador was informed that we and our European allies believed that Japan must do more in providing for its own defense; its foreign assistance should be applied to such strategic countries as Jamaica, Turkey and Pakistan. We also wanted Japan to handle the PLO issue in the context of our wider interest: strengthening the Western strategic posture in the area.

Finally, Okawara was asked to stress to his Government that the automobile issue must be handled with sensitivity to the political pressures here. (LOU)

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BY [initials] NARA DATE 7/31/16

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 12, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

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3/11/81

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Warsaw Pact Exercise "Soyuz '81". We lack precise information on the size of next week's Soyuz '81 military exercise affecting Poland. It is not clear whether a maneuver exceeding 25,000 troops will take place, which would require notification under the CSCE Final Act. We want to impress upon the Soviets that their maneuver is itself a cause of increased tension. Our embassy in Moscow will make a bilateral demarche, pointing out that a failure by the Soviet Union and its Allies to notify Soyuz '81 would arouse great concern -- especially because of the tense Polish situation. (C)

2. Pakistan. On Tuesday, Under Secretary Stoessel chaired a senior interdepartmental meeting on Pakistan, with whom we are anxious to establish a new security relationship. The problem is the magnitude of the resources we should supply in FY 82 and beyond. We are preparing a paper for NSC consideration next week. (C)

3. Meeting with Senator Tower. Senator John Tower briefed me today in greater depth on his recent trip abroad. He feels that our allies thirst for new direction. Tower observed that virtually every government he visited, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, said that American security assistance had been providing "too little too late." Strongly supportive of our new budget initiatives in this area, Tower will try to reach agreement with Chuck Percy for a joint referral of these initiatives to the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations, hopefully strengthening our political position. (S)

4. Luncheon with NATO Ambassadors. In a luncheon discussion today with NATO Ambassadors, we noted the striking convergence of allied opinion as revealed in recent talks with leaders from France, Britain, Germany and Canada. The allies were not complacent about the USSR; all wanted to strengthen our defense capabilities; all wanted arms control on the basis of such strength. The Ambassadors were also told of this Administration's support for NATO's 1979 decision to deploy long-range theater nuclear systems, and to negotiate with the USSR on the theater nuclear issue. SALT talks with the Soviets, however, were further off and should be approached on the basis of greater U.S. capabilities. On El Salvador, our allies recognized the need to prevent external aggression in this hemisphere. We also agreed that a political solution leading to free elections, dominated by neither left nor right, is the solution we seek. (C)

RDS 2/3 3/12/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY CN NARA DATE 7/2/16

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RVA*
SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 13, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

RVA
3/11/81

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. NATO Contingency Responses to a Soviet Intervention in Poland. NATO permanent representatives in Brussels finished on March 13 a major review of the contingency lists of political and economic counter-measures. These would serve as the basis for discussion and decision by Allied Foreign Ministers at an emergency NATO meeting in the event of a Soviet intervention.

The key economic measure listed is an embargo of trade with the Soviet Union except where there are legally binding existing contracts, accompanied by a concomitant reduction in government credits and credit guarantees.

While the discussion revealed some differences, it established a good foundation for counter-measures with bite should the Soviets dramatically intervene in Poland. The consultations themselves have helped promote Alliance unity and the ability to work together on sensitive problems. They are also a good first step in a long-term US effort to build a Western consensus for a more careful economic relationship with the Soviets. (S)

2. Polish Debt Discussions. The March 9-11 meetings of the task force on Polish debt made substantial progress. The U.S., U.K., Germany and France pressed the Poles for details on their proposed economic reform program and for precise data on their financial situation. The Poles agreed to provide the needed information in two weeks. We stressed firmly that the Soviets must take a significant share of the burden of meeting Polish financial needs.

Given the momentum the Europeans have given this exercise and the probability the Poles will default without a rescheduling, we will need decisions next week on whether to join the Europeans in rescheduling, and on what conditions. Don Regan, John Block, Dave Stockman and I will prepare a memo for you. (S)

RDS 2/3 3/13/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY CJ NARA DATE 7/3/14

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FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

FROM: *The Situation Room*

TO: *Cdr. Schmidt for the President*

INFO:

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DAC *19* _____

GPS _____

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PAGES *2* _____

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: *141724Z MAR 81*

TOR: *141732Z MAR 81*

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[Signature]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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CLASSIFICATION

FROM: *The Situation Room*

TO: *Cdr. Schmidt for the President*

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DTG: *141724Z MAR 81*

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

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Haig Report

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The President has seen _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *RVA*

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 13, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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3/11/81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *HA*

1. NATO Contingency Responses to a Soviet Intervention in Poland. NATO permanent representatives in Brussels finished on March 13 a major review of the contingency lists of political and economic counter-measures. These would serve as the basis for discussion and decision by Allied Foreign Ministers at an emergency NATO meeting in the event of a Soviet intervention.

The key economic measure listed is an embargo of trade with the Soviet Union except where there are legally binding existing contracts, accompanied by a concomitant reduction in government credits and credit guarantees.

While the discussion revealed some differences, it established a good foundation for counter-measures with bite should the Soviets dramatically intervene in Poland. The consultations themselves have helped promote Alliance unity and the ability to work together on sensitive problems. They are also a good first step in a long-term US effort to build a Western consensus for a more careful economic relationship with the Soviets. (S)

2. Polish Debt Discussions. The March 9-11 meetings of the task force on Polish debt made substantial progress. The U.S., U.K., Germany and France pressed the Poles for details on their proposed economic reform program and for precise data on their financial situation. The Poles agreed to provide the needed information in two weeks. We stressed firmly that the Soviets must take a significant share of the burden of meeting Polish financial needs.

Given the momentum the Europeans have given this exercise and the probability the Poles will default without a rescheduling, we will need decisions next week on whether to join the Europeans in rescheduling, and on what conditions. Don Regan, John Block, Dave Stockman and I will prepare a memo for you. (S)

RDS 2/3 3/13/81 (HAIC, Alexander M., Jr.)

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BY CW NARA DATE 2/3/16

The President has seen ✓

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

March 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 18, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

AW
3/11/81

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Office

CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEY GENERAL

TO: THE DIRECTOR
FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]
BY: [Illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEY GENERAL
[Illegible]

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL - ATTORNEY GENERAL

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Van Agt Visit. The Dutch Ambassador called on Bill Clark today to express real concern about the delay in responding to his request that you receive Dutch Prime Minister van Agt in his capacity as EC Council President. The Ambassador added that it was very important that van Agt be able to announce the specific dates of his visit to Washington when the EC Heads of Government meet in the Netherlands on March 23-24 under his Chairmanship.

In view of the EC's Middle East involvement, it would be very useful if the van Agt visit occurred before my departure for the area in early April. (C)

2. House Foreign Affairs Committee Foreign Assistance Overview Testimony. My testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee provided a foreign assistance overview for FY '82. Most questions concerned economic proposals for the Middle East, the Saudi F-15 enhancement request, the grain embargo, Law of the Sea, and human rights. The El Salvador issue did not dominate the proceedings. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS 2/3 3/18/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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NLRR 11453/2 #155364

BY CW 2/3/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

March 18, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 17, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

RW
3/4/83



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Nicaragua. Our Charge in Managua has been instructed to tell the Nicaraguan Government that the strong arm tactics used to prevent an opposition political rally raise serious questions about their commitment to pluralism. It also poses a security threat to our personnel (C)

2. Testimony Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Justice, Commerce and the Judiciary. My testimony on the Department's FY 1982 Appropriations Bill before a closed session of the Subcommittee offered a general foreign policy overview emphasizing the dangers of the decade ahead. The State Department's willingness to take its fair share of austerity measures was also indicated. Committee Members asked about several current foreign policy issues but were chiefly concerned about the adequacy of plans to spend defense appropriations. (C)

3. Costa Rican Request. Costa Rican Ambassador Jose Rafael Echeverria, called on Walt Stoessel this afternoon to deliver a letter expressing regret over today's bombing incident in San Jose. (Three U.S. Marines were injured). Echeverria used the occasion to request that you receive Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo for a brief, unofficial visit to discuss Central American developments.

You will receive our recommendations on this request shortly. We are mindful of the complicity of Costa Rican authorities with Cuban subversive activities in El Salvador (including involvement of members of the President's family). (C)

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RDS 2/3 3/17/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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NLRR M453/2 #155365

BY CW NARA DATE 7/3/16

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

March 17, 1981

OK
RW

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 16, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

RW
3/11/81

Historical File

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 16, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *A*

1. Meeting with President-Designate Viola of Argentina.
The meeting with President-designate Viola was marked by full agreement on the Soviet-Cuban threat in the hemisphere and Viola pledged Argentine support for U.S. efforts in El Salvador. He also promised Argentine aid in moderating the actions of the Bolivian Government, especially on the issue of drug trafficking. He was pleased to hear that we wish to remove restrictions on U.S. arms and military training for Argentina.

Viola said that his government will ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco after working out problems on safeguards, and is looking forward to improved relations with us in the nuclear field. He said that Argentina is now a country of order and considerable liberty moving toward democracy. He was assured that the Argentines have heard their last public lecture from us on human rights. (C)

2. Meeting with FRG Economics Minister Lambsdorff. In a meeting this afternoon, FRG Economics Minister Count Lambsdorff explained in some detail the belief of the German Government that the proposed natural gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union presents no danger of increased vulnerability. The Minister was urged to delay the conclusion of the deal, allowing us sufficient time to establish the basis for a new relationship with the Soviets. Lambsdorff was encouraging but noncommittal on this point.

Lambsdorff urged that we resist restraints on Japanese imports, lest major protectionist actions be taken by the EC Ten against both Japan and the United States. (C)

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RDS 2/3 3/16/01 (HAIG, Alexander M., Jr.)

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The President has seen _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

March 20, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 19, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

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3/11/81

Historical File

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 19, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

1. Testimony Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. My testimony in open session before the Committee concerned the foreign assistance budget, but the questions covered numerous foreign policy issues and El Salvador was not the center of attention. Nearly every Senator in the Committee was present and there was full media coverage. Senators Baker, Lugar, and Hayakawa were particularly helpful. (U)

2. Automobile Imports. In line with our discussion on March 18, I discussed the automotive topic with Mike Mansfield and he will proceed to discuss the issue with Japanese Foreign Minister Ito prior to his departure to the United States on Saturday. (C)

RDS 2/3 3/20/01 (Haig, Alexander M. Jr.)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

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SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 21, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 20, 1981

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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3/11/83

Historical File

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *AMH*

1. Security Council Action on Lebanon. The UN Security Council agreed today to an acceptable statement condemning the shelling of the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon by Sa'ad Haddad's militias. At our insistence, all direct criticism of Israel was removed from the statement, and the language was broadened to condemn all those who interfere with the UN force, as well as the militias. The countries which participate in the peacekeeping force may have some bruised feelings, but are relieved at the Council's unanimous vote. (C)

2. EC Commissioner Davignon. EC Commissioner Davignon, who holds the European Community industry and energy portfolios, called on me this afternoon. Davignon sees Europe headed for an economic crisis but notes that our example impresses the Europeans. I told him that America's progress will have a beneficial world effect.

On automobiles, Davignon asked that we time our solution to the problem of Japanese imports so that the Europeans are not left behind where they might be tempted to act precipitously. Davignon was hopeful about the Ottawa Summit and agreed with the suggestion that the agenda should include East-West and other political issues. (C)

3. Congressional Consultations on Sinai Security. We have met with members of the Senate and House Middle East Subcommittees to prepare them for American military participation in a Sinai Multinational Peacekeeping Force. Both chairmen were appreciative of consultation prior to an Executive Branch decision. Several Congressmen and Senators from both parties stressed that the Executive "should not take Congress for granted on this issue." We indicated readiness to consult more broadly and with the Congress once we reach our own decision, and will work with both Subcommittees to set this up. (C)

4. Pakistan Assistance Program. Through a combination of budget measures -- including varying the mix of direct and regular military assistance credits, shifting some DOD funds from defense accounts, and cutting back on refugee and PL-480 programs -- we believe we can accomplish the first year of the Pakistan assistance program with no new outlays. On this basis, we are instructing Ambassador Hummel in Islamabad to discuss the assistance package approved by the NSC with President Zia. Hummel will seek Zia's acquiescence in our briefing the Congress next week. (S)

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The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

March 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 23, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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3/11/81

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SECRET - VLLVCHREMI

James Baker
Ed Keese
cc: The Vice President

1981
SECRETARY HATH, a PACIFIC REPORT OF MARCH 33'

SUBJECT: SECRETARY HATH, a PACIFIC REPORT

FROM: RICHARD A. ALLEN

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SECRET - VLLVCHREMI

MARCH 33' 1981

WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR : THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Ito. During a lengthy meeting today, Foreign Minister Ito indicated that Japan understood the political sensitivities of the automobile issue and was prepared to work with us to prevent protectionist legislation from being passed by Congress. Before deciding on export restraints, however, Japan wanted to hear an authoritative USG group clarify our plans to put the U.S. industry back on its feet, review the anti-trust aspects of any solution, and explain precisely what we want Japan to do.

In other highlights of the meeting, Ito described Japan's relationship with the USSR as "cool". He noted that Japan's own economic sanctions against the Soviets would have to be dismantled if we lifted the grain embargo. He was told that we would consult closely on sanctions. Ito promised that Japan would share the burden of security in terms of defense, economic assistance, and political consultation.

On North-South policy Ito was reassured that we were not going to treat developing countries on a simplistic "friend vs. foe" basis. On the Middle East and the possibility of an Arafat visit to Japan, I asked him not to take any action that would confer legitimacy on the PLO. Ito was uneasy about any changes in our China policy; he thought the current position was working out well for all parties in the region. While welcoming our refurbished relationship with South Korea, he was skeptical about the reality of a North Korean threat. Finally, Ito was emphatic in soliciting our support for the Japanese candidate to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a matter of national prestige. (S)

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BY C/L NARA DATE 7/3/14

The President has seen _____

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

March 25, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Evening Report

Herewith Secretary Haig's Evening Report of March 24, 1981.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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3/11/83

Historical File



THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *A*

1. Meeting with Mexican Foreign Secretary Castaneda. In our meeting today, we touched briefly on North/South Summit issues and on preparations for your forthcoming meeting with Lopez Portillo. Castaneda was informed of our position on the role of Cuba and USSR in El Salvador and that we supported a political solution by the Salvadorans. He also supported a political solution but suggested a different approach: negotiations between Duarte and the Left. I made clear that we would have no part in promoting or conducting such negotiations; we supported free elections instead. We parted with a promise to keep in close touch. (S)

2. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In comment on my testimony concerning the State Department, Chairman Fascell seemed particularly keen to impress upon me that the Foreign Service was a very able corps that should be used to the maximum extent in making policy. Congressman Roth echoed this concern. The Chairman also stated that he hoped the Department would emphasize its consular services and maintain the "dissent channel" through which lower-ranking officers could reach the top with dissenting views. (U)

3. Hill Briefings on Sinai Security. Nick Veliotis and Mike Sterner informally briefed the Zablocki and Hamilton Subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee this afternoon on our decision to supply U.S. troops for the multi-national peace-keeping force in the Sinai. Almost all seemed to accept U.S. participation in view of our commitment to the Parties. Several Representatives were clearly concerned about speculation that the role of our contingent might be broader than keeping peace in Sinai. We will be briefing the House Armed Services and Defense Appropriations Subcommittees in the next day or two. We have also offered further briefings for the Senate. (U)

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BY CJ NARA DATE 7/3/16

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