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Last Updated: 4/18/2024

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (01/06/198 01/24/1983) 6			FILE		hdrawer V 3/20/2013
File Folder						
Box Number				·		SHIFRINSON
ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Descriptio	on	No of Pages		Restrictions
156205 MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156185]			, · 1	1/5/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156207 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156206]	1	1/6/1983	B1
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156206 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR		1	1/6/1983	B1
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156210 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156209]	1	7/1/1983	B1
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	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156212 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR		1	1/10/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA] B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE			Withdrawer		
File Folder	SECRETA 01/24/198		EVENING REPORT	(01/06/198	RBV 3- FOI M45	4
Box Number	6				SHIFRINSON	
ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Descriptio	on .	No of Pages		Restrictions
156215 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156214]			1	1/11/1983	B1
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156214 MEMO	SHUI	LTZ TO RR		1	1/11/1983	B1
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156217 MEMO	SHUI	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156216]	1	1/12/1983	B1
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156216 MEMO	SHUI	LTZ TO RR		1	1/12/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156218 MEMO	SHUI	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156216]	1	1/12/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156220 MEMO	SHUI	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156219]	1	1/13/1983	B1
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156219 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR		1	1/13/1983	B1
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156222 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR [COPY	OF DOC. 156221]	1	1/14/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156221 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR		1	1/14/1983	B1
	R	9/2/2016	M453/3			
156223 MEMO	SHU	LTZ TO RR	·	1	1/15/1983	B1
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File Folder	SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (01/24/1983)	3- FOI	RBW 3/20/2013 - FOIA M453		
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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions	
56225 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156224] <i>R</i> 9/2/2016 M453/3	• 1	1/17/1983	B1	
56224 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	. 1	1/17/1983	B1	
56226 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156224] <i>R</i> 9/2/2016 M453/3	. 1	1/17/1983	B1	
156227 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156228] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/18/1983	B1	
156228 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/18/1983	B1	
156229 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156228] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/18/1983	B1	
156230 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/19/1983	B1	
156232 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156231] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/20/1983	B1	
156231 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/20/1983	B1	
156233 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR PAR 11/28/2017 M453/3	1	1/21/1983	B1 .	

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156234 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156233] PAR 11/28/2017 M453/3	1 1/21/1983 B1
156235 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1 1/24/1983 B1
156236 MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156235] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1 1/24/1983 B1

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MEMORANDUM

President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday, January 5, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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DECLASSIFIED Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003 BY NARA_RU___, DATE 3/20(13_

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE January 5, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

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From

: George P. Shultz 412

1. Meeting with Percy, Zablocki and Broomfield. At breakfast this morning with Senator Percy, Congressman Zablocki and Congressman Broomfield, I reviewed your various foreign policy interests around the world and underscored the urgent need for adequate resources, emphasizing especially the 1983 Supplemental request for foreign assistance. Both Chairmen indicated a willingness to cooperate. Senator Percy stated his goal of reporting out the State Authorization and the Foreign Assistance Authorization bills by April 1 and completing action in the Senate by April 15. Chairman Zablocki also wants to move expeditiously. We also had an extensive discussion of the Middle East. All three members expressed deep concern over the domestic pressure to add to your request for aid to Israel and the current campaign against arms sales to Jordan. (U)

Reprogramming of Assistance for Pakistan. With your 2. signing of the two required certifications for Pakistan, we can now move forward to reprogram \$150 million in Foreign Military Sales credits for the Pakistani F-16 program. We hope to complete the process of notifications and actual payment by late this week or early next week. This reprogramming and the departure for Pakistan of the first six F-16s on January 7 will be interpreted in Islamabad as positive indications of the strength of our commitment to Pakistan. However, we continue to confront challenges to the Pakistan assistance program on the immediate horizon. Meeting our overall FY 83 commitment level of \$525 million will be most difficult. We also face continued Congressional concerns about Pakistan and the question of technology transfer. (C) the second s

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE washington

January 7, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday, January 6, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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January 6, 1983

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FORI

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George P. Shultz 40

THE PRESIDENT

1. Visit of FRG SPD Chancellor-Candidate Vogel. I used my meeting today with Vogel to stress the importance of the US-German relationship and our firm commitment to both tracks of the INF decision. In a private meeting with me, Vogel scressed his total conmitment to the Atlantic Alliance and to the US-German relationship. While he affirmed his commitment to both tracks of the INF decision, he placed particular stress on the arms control track and urged that the United States show "flexibility" in responding to the latest Soviet proposal when the INF discussions resume at the end of this month. Senator Percy assured Vogel, and urged that he pass this on to the Soviets in Moscow next week, that the Senate would not ratify a ore-nided INF agreement but would ratify any balanced agreement your Administration negotiated. Vogel was generally supportive of our position on international economic issues and on the problems in US-EC agricultural trade. (C)

2. Spanish Base Agreement. We cabled instructions to our Ambassador in Madrid today which will permit him to conclude a protocol to the five-year bilateral base agreement with Spain signed last July 2. The new Socialist government had objected to the NATO linkage in the new agreement but, during my recent visit to Madrid, we were able to lay the foundation for a protocol to the agreement which gives the Socialist government the political cover it needs, but does not change the substance of the agreement. The protocol simply states that the question of Spanish military integration into NATO is not prejudged by the terms of the bilateral agreement. As soon as the protocol is concluded, and signed, the Gonzalez government intends to submit the agreement for parliamentary approval. Prompt approval is expected. (C)

New Japanese Policy on Defense Technology Export. The 3. Japanese Embassy has outlined to us in confidence the policy the Government proposes to announce after Cabinet approval January 14, to govern the exchange of defense technology with the United States. Unlike an earlier version proposed last summer, which was overloaded with strictures, the new version makes an exception for the United States to Japan's policies banning military exports of any sort on the grounds that special treatment is in keeping with our alliance relationship under the Mutual Security Treaty. Detailed procedures have to be worked out, but the Japanese seem to have in mind something analagous to our licensing procedures for Japan under our Military Defense Assistance Agreement. Assuming DOD finds the policy acceptable, we should be able to signal our go-ahead. We are told the new policy is the result of Nakasone's instruction to the Cabinet ministers concerned, just after he took office, to come up with arrangements that met our needs for reciprocity and continuity. (C)

156206

January 6, 1983

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT P12:08 From : George P. Shultz 4

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January 6, 1983

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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RW SECRET-ATTACHMENT 3/20/13

January 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Reprt for Friday, Jan 7, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 7, 1983

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George P. Shults

THE PRESIDENT

From

1. Breakfest with Scenter Laxalt. My breakfast with Senator Paul Laxalt this morning focused on the State Department operational budget; the Senator has recently been selected as our Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman in the Senate. Of broader interest, however, was a general discussion on overall budgetary priorities. The Senator expressed his concern about projected budget deficits and his hope that growth in the economy would help deal with these politically embarrassing numbers. I urged upon him a cautious attitude and a hope that he and his colleagues in the Senate would be a steadying influence on overall economic policy. (C)

2. Meeting with Congressman Stratton. I met with Congressman Sam Stratton, a strong proponent of our position on the nuclear freeze. He expressed his concern that a nuclear freeze resolution might pass this year, owing to the changing composition of the Democratic majority. Stratton said he would do all he could to help counteract any movement of an adverse nuclear freeze resolution, including the possibility of hearings before his Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems of the House Armed Services Committee. (C)

3. Larry Engleburger's Neeting with Ambassador Dobrynin. Larry Eagleburger called in Ambassador Dobrynin this afternoon to stress our concerns over Soviet supply of SA-5 missiles to Syria. Larry noted that Art Hartman had already made a similar presentation in Moscow earlier today, and we wanted Dobrynin also to be aware of the importance we attach to this issue. Dobrynin made three points in reply: that even by our account, the missiles were clearly in Syrian territory, and ware ground to air missiles obviously designed to defend against Israeli air attacks; that this event had no connection to the Prague Communique of the Warsaw Pact leaders; and that the Soviet Union has agreements to supply military goods to help Syria defend itself. The US supplies far more weaponry to Israel, and this is the source of the problem in the region. Larry replied that the key point of our concern was the range of these missiles, which could cover all of Lebanon and much of Israeli airspace. They are, therefore, destabilizing and we are seriously concerned. (S)

4. Reentry of Cosmos 1402. In accordance with your instructions, Richard Burt called in Boviet Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Bessmertnykh to express concern about the expected reentry into the atmosphere of Cosmos 1402 and its highly radioactive power source and the potential hasard it creates. We also requested detailed technical information on the nuclear reactor and its probable landing area which would be of assistance in locating and dealing with radioactive materials reaching the earth's surface. Bessmertnykh followed the Soviet public line that the spacecraft was under Soviet control and its cargo posed no danger to human safety, but agreed to inform Moscow of our demarche. (C) DECL: OADR

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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January 7, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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THE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz WD

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RU) SECRET ATTACHMENT

January 9, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Saturday, January 8, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

: George P. Shultz CAS

From

The Message from King Fahd. On urgent instructions from King Fahd, Prince Bandar called on me this afternoon to convey his Majesty's serious concern about the pace and content of the Lebanon negotiations. Concerning pace, Bandar said King Fahd believes that the pace must be seen to pick-up substantially in the days just ahead in order to help King Hussein and, later, King Fahd in their efforts to get Arafat to allow non-PLO Palestinians to join King Hussein in direct negotiations with the Israelis. Bandar said he believed this was possible, at least that is the Saudi judgment today, provided the Saudis and Jordanians can get the support a substantial move forward would provide. Bandar said that King Fahd was very concerned that President Gemayel was being pressed to make too many political concessions to the Israelis. Moreover, the King has the impression from various Lebanese that the Lebanese believe the US is not pressing withdrawal hard enough and is too supportive of Israeli demands with which Gemayel could not live. Bandar said he must speak candidly and say that if Gemayel goes too far in "normalization" with Israel, he, Gemayel, might have to resign. In any event, Bandar said that if Lebanon went too far with Israel, Saudi Arabia could not stand with Lebanon politically or economically. Phil Habib and I made it clear to Bandar that we had no intention of forcing Lebanon to accept conditions which would isolate Lebanon in the Arab world or destroy its internal consensus. However, his Majesty should recognize that there were elements of future relations between Israel and Lebanon which Lebanon can accept and which Gemayel seems prepared to accept in order to secure Israeli withdrawal. I told Bandar that we fully agreed with His Majesty's concerns over the pace of the Lebanon negotiations and that that is why Ambassador Habib was returning to the Middle East after meeting with you on Monday. (S)

Meeting with FRG Arms Control Chief Fred Ruth. Larry 2. Eagleburger met Friday with Ambassador Fred Ruth, Arms Control Commissioner for the Federal Republic of Germany. Ruth expressed the FRG concern that prompt US rejection of every Soviet arms control proposal runs the risk of an appearance of inflexibility. This might quickly propel the issue into the FRG election campaign, which no one wants. Ruth said that Foreign Minister Genscher's comments on positive aspects of the Andropov proposal were designed to show flexibility to the public, but no one disputed that the proposal is unacceptable. Eagleburger underscored our view that questioning the zero outcome publicly runs the risk of undermining our negotiating position in Geneva and of giving the impression that the FRG wants to play a mediating role between the superpowers. He emphasized the importance of support from our allies in the critical 1983 year. Eagleburger also stressed that any agreement must be global and exclude French and British systems. (S)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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January 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday, January 10, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver



THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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January 10, 1983

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From

THE PRESIDENT

George P. Shultz Lys

El Salvador--Power Struggle in the Army. The conflict between Colonel Ochoa and Minister of Defense Garcia remains highly fluid. The situation is evolving in a direction not favorable for Garcia's retention of the Defense portfolio. El Salvador's principal military officers yesterday decided not to. use force to oust the rebellious Ochoa while at the same time indicating support for the Lafense Minister's earlier order transferring Ochoa to Uruguay. There is little backing for Ochoa's insubordination, but the conflict has brought into the open the depth of dissatisfaction with Garcia's prosecution of the war effort.

Ambassador Hinton's assessment is that, whatever the military leaders are saying in large meetings, there is serious and widespread opposition to Garcia and the Defense Minister's position has been greatly weakened, if not_irrevocably. compromised. President Magana told Hinton January 10 that he shares that analysis. Magana has been strongly supporting Garcia but is now considering the best manner in which to strengthen his government under these circumstances.

Tuesday's meeting of the military commanders could turn into a showdown, though it is expected that even those desiring Garcia's ouster will seek a solution which saves face for the military. The situation poses a serious test of President Magana's ability to hold things together -- a test made more difficult by the anticipated upswing of guerrilla attacks in conjunction with the second anniversary of the guerrillas' "final offensive". The effects of the conflict on our interests are not yet clear, but we are closely monitoring the situation and will keep you fully informed. (S)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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January 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From

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George P. Shultz Lys

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The President has n

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 12, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday, January 11, 1982.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR JANTHE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz WHITE HOUSE

Meeting With AmerOdan Jewish Leaders. I met this 1. afternoon with a group of prominent American Jewish leaders. Their mood was gloomy, although, when I described it as such, they protested it was not. Focusing primarily on the Lebanon withdrawal issue and the peace process, these leaders expressed acute concern over what they said the Jewish community perceived as unreasonable US pressure on Israel--rather than on the Gemayal government and King Hussein--to make the concessions needed for forward movement in both areas. They were also clearly worried over what one of them characterized as a tendency on the part of the Administration to "carp" at Israel. I stressed to them that our commitment to Israel's security remains as strong as ever, and that our combined interests dictate that we strive to achieve the "full peace" that Hussein indicated might be within reach in his talks here last month. (S)

UZ

Hussein-Arafat Talks. We have a variety of reports, but 2. nothing definite yet, about Arafat's talks over the weekend with King Hussein. Ambassador Viets will see Hussein today so we will know more tomorrow. The King intended to press very hard for Arafat's public announcement of his willingness to support your initiative, but Arafat told the press afterwards that he and Hussein had reached no decisions. In a related development, the King gave a speech yesterday in which he again challenged the PLO either to effectively represent Palestinians or let Jordan do it. In his speech, the King said that his personal deadline was to have real movement by early March. He revealed that he had received a letter from you and said that the United States acknowledged "an Arab right to Jerusalem, the same as the Arab right to all occupied territories." Perhaps the most troublesome part of his remarks for us was assertion that the US is ready to exert the necessary influence so that the transition period leading to the final comprehensive settlement will be reduced to the minimum. As a result, we are bound to face questions from Israel and others about the exact nature of our discussions with the King. (S)

SECRET

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 11, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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83 JAN 12 THE PRESIDENT us

George P. Shultz

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WHITE HOUSE

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday, January 12, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz

1. El Salvador. Dissident Colonel Ochoa agreed to end his protest today. President Magana announced that Ochoa will be transferred but his new posting is still undetermined. Ochoa was reportedly promised that General Garcia will be retired "in a few months" and that there will be no reprisals against his subordinates. The timing of Garcia's departure provides the Defense Minister with a face-saving mechanism whereby his eventual removal can be linked to the military's mandatory 30 year retirement and not directly to Ochoa's demands. The resolution of the affair, and Magana's handling of it, are likely to boost Magana's standing as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The next key development will be the choice of a new Defense Minister. (C)

2. <u>Greek Protest Aircraft Sale to Turkey</u>. Greek Ambassador Karandreas today protested to Ken Dam US approval of the sale of 35 F-4's by Egypt to Turkey. The Greeks believe the sale would violate the Section of the Foreign Assistance Act requiring preservation of a balance of forces in the region. Ken noted that the Greeks were told last May of the possible sale and that we believe the sale would be in the interest of NATO and would not upset the region's military balance. Karandreas ventured to make a linkage between our base negotiations with Greece and the sale to Turkey. Ken strongly advised him against such a course. (C)

3. Dutch Concern Over US Protectionism. The Dutch Ambassador saw Ken Dam today to express the Netherlands' "grave concern" about the growing number of protectionist measures being adopted by Congress, noting specifically the restrictions on specialty metals and construction of naval vessels in foreign shipyards, "buy America" provisions and the Stratten amendment on transfer of cannon technology. Lubbers warned that as a result of these actions the 1978 US-Dutch Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation could collapse and impact negatively on the balance of defense trade--14 to 1 in our favor. He went to some length to warn of the dangers to the strength and cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance if economic protectionism becomes the rule. Foreign Minister Genscher recently wrote me expressing the same concerns. I have written Cap suggesting that State and DOD work closely to counter these anti-NATO sentiments and actions in Congress. (C)

4. Egyptian Aid Program. Peter McPherson briefed me today on his recent discussions with President Mubarak. Egypt is facing foreign exchange problems caused in part by unwise economic policies, particularly massive energy and food subsidies. To lessen foreign exchange pressures, Egypt would like our aid program shifted to a "cash transfer" basis, but such a shift would only help underwrite current subsidies. Instead, AID is proposing new programs that will directly help the Egyptian people and encourage policy changes. We will be discussing this issue in more detail later this month when President Mubarak visits. (C) DECL: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

156214

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1983

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From

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BY RW 9/2/16



s/s 8301043

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 12, 1983

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CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday, January 13, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE 156220 WASHINGTON S/S 8301185

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

1. Habib's Meeting with Prime Minister Begin. Phil Habib's meeting with Prime Minister Begin today appears to have gone relatively well. Begin scemed to warm to the concept Phil put forward. Sam Lewis found Begin's reaction to your letter remarkably mature, given the rampant press speculation in advance about a postponement of his visit. The Prime Minister resented the press stories, but understands that his visit will take place only after a Lebanese agreement has been achieved. Agreement today on the agenda for the formal Lebanese-Israeli talks is encouraging. Nevertheless, the three weeks taken to achieve what we hoped would take a day only reinforces my view that we have been correct in pressing ahead with our parallel effort. We should know by Friday whether the Israeli Cabinet will agree to our proposal. If Begin responds positively, Phil will go immediately to Beirut to present the concept to Gemayal. (S)

George P. Shultz :.

2. U.S.-China Textile Negotiations. U.S.-China textile negotiations concluded today in Beijing without agreement. In accordance with your commitment to U.S. industry, unilateral import controls will now be implemented. While the negotiations ended in a businesslike fashion, a considerable gap remains between the two positions. The U.S. delegation indicated to the Chinese a willingness to continue the talks, but the Chinese seemed resigned to the lack of progress and did not press for an interim arrangement in lieu of the imposition of the controls. A Chinese news report has blamed the U.S. for failure to reach agreement, warning that China "will have to respond strongly" if the U.S. imposes unilateral controls. If China follows through on this threat, it will most likely cut back imports of U.S. agricultural, timber, and paper products. (C)

3. <u>Meeting with Italian Christian Democrat De Mita</u>. My meeting with Ciriaco De Mita, Secretary General of the Italian Christian Democratic Party, focused on cruise missile deployment in Italy. De Mita assured me that his party had fully supported the 1979 twotrack decision with its eyes open and that the Christian Democrats continue to support that decision today "no matter what any other countries might do." I told him that you and I regarded Italy not just as a good friend but as being in the front rank of America's allies. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

'83 JAN 14 A11:58

January 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

George P. Shultz

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED NLRR M453/3 #156219 BY LW MARA DATE 9[2116 MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK W

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday, January 14, 1983.

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cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

January 14, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz 409

1. Begin and Gemayel Agree to Our Proposals on Lebanon. After consulting with his Cabinet, Prime Minister Begin told Phil Habib today of Israel's agreement to proceed with the concept Phil put forward January 13. Begin stated that Israel wants the direct Lebanese-Israeli negotiations to proceed at the same time that discussions with Phil are taking place. Friday night Habib traveled to Beirut and secured Gemayel's approval for our approach. Phil will return to Israel Sunday for intensive negotiations with Begin's team, which includes Defense Minister Sharon and Foreign Minister Shamir. Phil hopes to have a draft agreement worked out for Begin's review by next Friday. (S)

Meeting With Perez de Cuellar. In my meeting with him roday, Perez asked that we take more advantage of the UN as a forum for resolving conflicts. He argued that the UN often supported US interests, and that the impression of a rift between the US and UN was helpful to neither. On Afghanistan, Perez said he was obliged to test the Soviets' willingness to negotiate seriously but would not be a screen for Russian consolidation there and would back off if there were no progress soon. On Namibia; Perez was concerned that the negotiations were bogging down. He also deplored the leftward drift of Nicaraqua and other indications of increasing Cuban influence and said that he had warned some Latin leaders of the danger in this regard. expressed our support for the UN and admiration of the SYG but said that the UN involvement in the Mideast conflict had at times been distracting; that we were firmly opposed to politicization of technical agencies, such as the IAEA; and that we would continue to speak our minds. I pledged our continued efforts on Namibia but stressed that the Cubans had to leave Angola. Ambassador Kirkpatrick brought up our concern about appointments of Soviet bloc nationals to two important UN positions. Perez promised to check on both. (S)

Comparent Ser. Poland. At UPI Warsaw correspondent Ruth Gruber's specific 3. request, we are holding off on retaliating for her expulsion from Poland until after she leaves the country Saturday morning. Ambassador Meehan has an appointment with the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Tuesday to inform him that we are expelling a Polish journalist in retaliation for Gruber's forced departure. It is clear from discussions with the other NATO ambassadors in Warsaw that the US is being singled out for special harassment. Meanwhile, the Poles have not followed up on their decision to force a number of Polish nationals to cease working for the Embassy. It is possible they may be rethinking their position in response to Ambassador Meehan's strong warning that we will retaliate by demanding a proportionate reduction in their non-commercial representation in this country. (S)

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT 83 AN 15 PIO: 23 George P. Shultz 443

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

JANUARY 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Schultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Schultz's Evening Report for Saturday, January 15, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Michael Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

JAN 15 PID: 22 George P. Shultz

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January 15, 1983

Cosmos 1402: The Soviet Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission Friday responded to our request for information on this nuclear-powered spacecraft to enable us to take precautionary measures in case radioactive fragments survive reentry. In comparison with the previous satellite incident, we are impressed by the amount of information the Soviets have provided and their rapid response. Nevertheless, they did not answer all of our questions and we requested further details. They asked us to provide information we develop on the spacecraft. We plan to provide them with the same information we are giving other countries. (C)

Bolivia: Recognition of Cuba: Bolivia announced last week that it is establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba. President Siles Zuazo earlier established relations with the PLO, recognized the Polisario and is considering ties with North Korea. Siles apparently decided that recognition of Cuba will enhance Bolivia's credentials in the third world, perhaps to increase economic aid from non-western sources and to gain support in its outlet to the sea dispute with Chile. He also needed to satisfy radical elements in his fragile coalition so he can pursue moderate economic policies at home.

Our Ambassador conveyed our concerns to President Siles and reminded him that the resumption of US economic assistance was conditioned on the pursuit of moderate internal and external policies. Siles was also told that a planned visit to Bolivia later this month by Assistant Secretary Enders is being postponed. (Our embassy was also instructed to go slowly on economic aid negotiations.) In response, Silas' special advisor Thursday informed our Ambassador that Bolivia will restrict relations with Cuba to the Charge d'Affaires level and delay an exchange of representatives for three to six months. He added that Siles and those around him had fought too long for the return of democracy to become dependent on either Cuba or the Soviet Union. The Bolivians also again promised to address our other areas of concern. We are hopeful at Silas' quick response but will be watching his further moves carefully. (C)

Meetings with Minister-President Bernhard Vogel: Larry Eagleburger and I met with Bernhard Vogel, Minister-President of the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate, Friday to discuss INF (if deployment becomes necessary it will take place in Vogel's state). Vogel was absolutely clear in his, and in the leadership of the CDU's, commitment to both tracks of the NATO INF dual decision. He fully agreed that in the absence of an agreement we must deploy on schedule and stressed that any movement which has occurred in the Soviet position on INF is a result of our firm adherence to the NATO INF decision. (C)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 18, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday, January 17, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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Attached is George Sumitz's Svenipy Seport for Monday, Jinuary 17, 7293.

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BY RW MARADATE 9/2

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January 17, 1983

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

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MENORANDUM POR:

THE PRESIDENT

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FIOR

43 George P. Shultz

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Soviet Reply on SA-5s. Soviet Charge Bessmertnykh 2. called on Assistant Secretary-Designate Burt this evening to deliver the Soviet reply to our demarches on SA-5s in Syria. While asserting the Soviet right to assist Syrian "selfdefense", Bessmartnykh stated that the SA-5s would "serve no other purpose than to defend Syria from air attacks", and called on the US to restrain Israel from such attacks. Burt replied that we were disappointed in the Soviet response because we regard deployment of this system in Syria as a destabilizing step which could make conflict more likely and . achievement of a settlement in Lebanon as well as a broader Mideast peace more difficult. (S)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz :

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983 .

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

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January 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday, January 18, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

> DECLASCIFIED Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12953, co amonded White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008 BY NARA_RW_, DATE 3 20 [13]

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FROM: NIULIAN F. CLARK

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The Vice Predident Ed Neers Tim Baker

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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January 18, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From

George P. Shultz

Lebanon Negotiations. Phil Habib's private discussions in 1. Israel today went very poorly. The Israelis unveiled a lengthy draft agreement containing expansive proposals for normalization: of relations with Lebanon. The document is a peace treaty in everything but name, and in some respects even goes beyond the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in detailing normalization. The session did not deal with security issues since Sharon is out of Israel, but Habib is concerned the security proposals will be equally difficult. Phil's assessment is that the Israeli proposals are completely unworkable; they would be rejected in Lebanon and be opposed by even the most moderate Arab states. The proposals go far beyond the stated Israeli aims for their move into Lebanon and are even more ambitious than Sharon's secret "working paper" of December. Habib intends to tell the Israelis tomorrow that these proposals are unsuitable as a basis for negotiation and to argue strongly that the U.S. draft should be used as a working text. (S)

2. UN Renews UNIFIL. The UN Security Council voted late today to renew the mandate of the UNIFIL peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon. The vote was 13 in favor with none opposed and two abstentions (the USSR and Poland). The renewal is for six months, i.e., until July 19. Lebanon had floated the idea of permiting UNIFIL deployment throughout Lebanese territory but was unable to gain enough support among Council members and did not present the idea for a vote. (C)

3. Visit of French Defense Minister. French Defense Minister Hernu visited with me today following his longer session with Cap Weinberger. We had a very good exchange on the need for early evacuation of foreign forces from Lebanon. He indicated that France will act only in close collaboration with us in determining the mission of an expanded Lebanon MNF. On France's defense efforts, Hernu said current French military expenditures on new weapons development are the same proportion of total defense outlays as our own. He also indicated that the five-year military program, to be submitted to the French Parliament this spring, will not reduce the present level of 50,000 French troops in Germany.

4. Expulsion of Polish Newsman. We today requested the prompt withdrawal of Polish Press Agency representative Stanislaw Glabinski in retaliation for Warsaw's ouster of UPI correspondent Ruth Gruber. Glabinski will leave by Friday morning. We announced the expulsion at today's press briefing. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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THE PRESIDENT

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George P. Shultz 43

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 18, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

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January 20, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday, January 19, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Sporwtary Shultz's Evening Report

January 19, 1983.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President

From:

George P. Shultz W

1. Meeting with Foreign Minister Abe. In our meeting today, Foreign Minister Abe expressed his support for my idea of getting together four or five times a year, usually when we are at some international meeting together, to discuss the U.S.-Japan agenda. One such session would be specifically scheduled in one of our capitals. This is similar to what we have agreed to do with the Canadians. We also agreed to pursue the idea of a "Wisemen's Group" of eminent private citizens to make recommendations on long-term aspects of our relations. We will come back to this when I go to Tokyo at the end of the month. (C)

2. Meeting with Prince Bandar. Prince Bandar called on me to make three points on behalf of King Fahd. First, Fahd was very pleased with his just-completed talks with King Hussein. Fahd, according to Bandar, will make a strong effort in the next few days with Arafat to "wrap up a package" for Hussein's use. Second, Hussein reportedly told Fahd that Iraq would not be an obstacle to the peace process. He hoped, however, that the U.S. could do something to reduce Israeli support for the Iranian war effort. I responded that we would look into this question and consider raising it again with the Israelis. Finally, Bandar passed on the King's strong advice that the U.S. move quickly in Damascus to nail down Syrian assurances to the Saudis on its readiness to withdraw from Lebanon simultaneously with Israeli forces. (S)

3. PRC Announces Trade Retaliation for Unilateral Textile Controls. China announced today it will immediately stop new orders of U.S. cotton, soybeans, and chemical fibers while simultaneously reducing planned imports of other U.S. agricultural products. Our imposition of controls against Chinese textiles was clearly at the heart of Beijing's decision. We are considering how best to get the negotiations resumed and whether to lodge a protest over the discriminatory and trade-reducing actions. At this point, we do not believe the issue will have a major impact on my upcoming trip. If raised by the Chinese, I will reaffirm our willingness to seek a mutually negotiated settlement. (C)

4. Marketing Approval for Multiple Launch Rocket System. Under Secretary Schneider has approved marketing the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) to several Middle East countries: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait, the UAE, and Pakistan. Decisions on any subsequent requests to buy the system will be made on a case-by-case basis. The MLRS fires cluster rockets and will enter U.S. Army service this March. We previously approved MLRS marketing for NATO countries and our close Asian allies, but the manufacturer of the system, with the strong support of Senator Tower, has been pushing for approval to market in the Middle East. Any introduction of a new weapon system in this area could cause concern in Congress and in the region, but we believe it should not disturb the political or military environment. (C)

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday, January 20, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

> DECLASSIFIED Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12008, coemodod White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008 BY NARA RW DATE 3/20127

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FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: BACTOLARY Shults's Evening Report

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cc: The Vice President Ed Macso Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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MENORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From

George P: Shultz 40 1

1. Textiles and China. I met this afternoon with Senator Strom Thurmond, Congressman Carroll Campbell and a number of textile industry representatives to discuss our textile negotiations with the PRC. Senator Thurmond described the extent to which the textile industry in general, and South Carolina in particular, had been seriously harmed by imports. Congressman Campbell reiterated the commitment which you made during the campaign to restrict the level of growth in textile imports to the rate of growth in the domestic market. The industry representatives echoed those comments. I assured them that I was not going to Beijing to undermine our negotiators and that I understood the serious nature of the problem. I believe they left reassured about the course we are taking. (C)

Tunisian Defense Minister. Ken Dam, Bill Schneider and Dick 2. Walters met with Tunisian Defense Minister Baly today. The Minister argued that the military threat to Tunisia from Qadhafi was mounting and that President Bourguiba counted on the US to supply enough security assistance for Tunisia to finance the military equipment it had agreed to purchase from the US. The Minister was told that Tunisia was a close friend whose security remained very important to us but that Congressional action on our request for security assistance would probably preclude extending this year all the aid for which the Tunisians were asking. (C)

Multilateral Assistance Package for Yugoslavia. On January 3. 19, the US joined other Western countries in a commitment to extend commercial and financial credits totalling \$1.3 billion to the Government of Yugoslavia in support of its IMF economic stabilization program. Some countries indicated that they may pledge more and the Gulf Cooperation Council may be involved in a parallel action to contribute other medium-term financial credits. Our pledge of \$300 million was contingent on the total package reaching \$1.5 billion. We will reduce our contribution, as necessary, to maintain a 20 percent share of the total ultimately agreed. We are pleased with the results so far and hope that additional pledges to reach a \$1.5 billion package will be forthcoming soon. To firm up the entire international effort to assist Yugoslavia will also requires (a) satisfactory agreement between Yugoslavia and the primer banks; (b) IMF approval of Yugoslavia's stabilization program; and (c) final agreement on a \$500 million short-term bridging loan--all of which will demand our careful attention. (C) NLRR/1453 3# 156232

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 20, 1983

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83 JAN 21 THE PRESIDENT

From

MEMORANDUM FOR:

George P. Shultz

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE WHITE HOUSE washington

CONFIDENTIAL

January 22, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday, January 21, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

> DECLASSIFIED Sec.34(b), E.O. 12053, as emended White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003 By NARA RW, DATE 3/2013



THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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January 21, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

From

1. PERU: Visit of Prime Minister and Finance Minister. In our meeting today, Peruvian Prime Minister Schwalb dwelt at length on Peru's terrorist problem which he believes can be brought under control within a year, now that the Army is involved. Finance Minister Rodriguez Pastor, who accompanied him, described Peru's financial problems and its plans for handling them. I reaffirmed our support for Peru's democratic system, noted trade issues we need to resolve and underscored our interest in narcotics control. I also stressed our concern about Cuban actions in Central America. Schwalb shares our perception of that subversive threat, which he believes goes beyond the Caribbean region to the Southern Hemisphere. Schwalb is not on good terms with the Cubans and apparently will not normalize relations soon. (C)

2. Consultations with French on Chad and Libyan Intervention. French Foreign Ministry officials sent to Washington to discuss Libya, in follow-up to my discussions in Paris last month, initially proved overly relaxed about Qadhafi's support for dissident activity in Chad. They were somewhat taken aback, however, by

Libyan air force activity in Chad. Under Secretary Eagleburger's subsequent forceful assertion of American concern hopefully will lead the French to take the situation more seriously. The French envoys did report that French military aid is en route to Chad via intermediaries. (C)

3. Soviets Provide Information on Satellite Re-entry. The Soviets today gave us supplemental data we had requested on the re-entry of their out-of-control nuclear powered satellite. According to the Soviets, the main part of the satellite, which is radioactive, should re-enter the atmosphere on Sunday, January 24, somewhere over the Arabian Sea. This approximates our present assessment of the time and place of impact. (C)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

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CONFIDENTIAL

January 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday, January 21, 1983.

cc: The Vice President Ed Meese Jim Baker Mike Deaver

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January 21, 1983

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

1. Arms Control Briefing for University Leaders. As part of our efforts to educate key sectors about our arms control proposals, I met today with 14 Presidents and Chancellors of major American universities. I underlined the Administration's strong commitment to reducing the risk of war--both nuclear and conventional. We provided an overview of the US approach to arms control and the status of the arms control negotiations as well as a briefing on how our allies view the negotiations. The question and answer period was serious and covered a wide range of issues including the rationale behind our policies and suggestions that we explore alternative peaceful means of conflict resolution. The University leaders seemed pleased with our efforts to consult and hoped there would be more contact. Though there was some skepticism, they were not negative toward our arms proposals. Several of the University leaders, however, indicated the coming year on campus will be difficult and that US policies were not well understood by the public. The meeting underlined the importance of our public diplomacy efforts here as well as abroad. (C)

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2. Portuguese Base Negotiations. The political crisis in Portugal has brought our formal base negotiations to a halt. The current agreement, due to expire in February, was automatically extended until February 1984 by the onset of negotiations in December. The Portuguese have made it clear that formal talks cannot resume until a new government is firmly in place after elections (probably in April). We have agreed, however, that discussions on technical aspects of a new agreement may continue. Positive results from these technical talks could greatly facilitate early conclusion of a new overall agreement once a new Portuguese government is in place. (C)

3. <u>Mubarak Visit</u>. The Egyptian Economic Ministerial team advancing the Mubarak visit met today with Allen Wallis and Peter McPherson. They urged greater flexibility in our assistance program and asked for help in promoting US investment in Egypt. Both McPherson and Wallis stressed the importance we attach to Egypt's economic well-being, pointing out our high AID levels and the recent sale of wheat flour to Egypt at favorable prices. Peter McPherson will be sorting out the AID issues and will try to reach an understanding on key issues with the Ministers before Mubarak arrives Wednesday. (C)

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

George P. Shultz

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January 24, 1983

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