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Agency File

Folder Title: Secretary of State's Evening Reports
(01/25/1983-02/10/1983)

Box: RAC Box 6

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Last Updated: 4/18/2024

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 4/1/2013

File Folder SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (01/25/1983-02/10/1983)

FOIA

M453

Box Number 6

SHIFRINSON

51

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156623	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156236] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/24/1983	B1
156624	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/25/1983	B1
156625	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156624] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/25/1983	B1
156626	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156624] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/25/1983	B1
156627	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/26/1983	B1
156628	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156627] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/26/1983	B1
156629	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156627] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/26/1983	B1
156631	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156630] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	1/27/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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156630	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	1/27/1983	B1
156632	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	1/28/1983	B1
156633	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	1/31/1983	B1
156634	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/1/1983	B1
156635	CABLE	WH00566 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 156633] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	3	2/1/1983	B1
156636	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156634] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/1/1983	B1
156637	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/2/1983	B1
156638	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156637] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/2/1983	B1
156639	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 8/2/2017 M453/3</i>	1	2/3/1983	B1
156640	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156639] <i>R 8/2/2017 M453/3</i>	1	2/3/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156641	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156639] R 8/2/2017 M453/3	1	2/3/1983	B1
156642	MEMO	DAM TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/4/1983	B1
156643	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156642] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/4/1983	B1
156657	CABLE	WH00822 [SIMILAR TEXT OF DOC. 156642] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	2	2/5/1983	B1
156658	MEMO	DAM TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/5/1983	B1
156659	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156658] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/5/1983	B1
156660	MEMO	DAM TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/7/1983	B1
156661	CABLE	WH00838 [SAME TEXT AS DOC. 156658] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	2	2/5/1983	B1
156662	MEMO	DAM TO RR R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/8/1983	B1
156663	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156662] R 9/2/2016 M453/3	1	2/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156664	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/9/1983	B1
156666	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156664] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/9/1983	B1
156665	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156664] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/9/1983	B1
156667	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/10/1983	B1
156668	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156667] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/10/1983	B1
156669	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156667] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	2/10/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday,
January 24, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13

'83 JAN 25 AIO:38

WIRE DESPATCH
TO: DIRECTOR
BY: WOODS
CC: LPO (FOR INFORMATION)

RE: WIRE DESPATCH
FOR: DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: WIRE DESPATCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FROM: DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: WIRE DESPATCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: WIRE DESPATCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE DIRECTOR, FBI, WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S 8302431 156623

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1983

83 JAN 25 A 8: 48

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz ^{WJ}

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. Arms Control Briefing for University Leaders. As part of our efforts to educate key sectors about our arms control proposals, I met today with 14 Presidents and Chancellors of major American universities. I underlined the Administration's strong commitment to reducing the risk of war--both nuclear and conventional. We provided an overview of the US approach to arms control and the status of the arms control negotiations as well as a briefing on how our allies view the negotiations. The question and answer period was serious and covered a wide range of issues including the rationale behind our policies and suggestions that we explore alternative peaceful means of conflict resolution. The University leaders seemed pleased with our efforts to consult and hoped there would be more contact. Though there was some skepticism, they were not negative toward our arms proposals. Several of the University leaders, however, indicated the coming year on campus will be difficult and that US policies were not well understood by the public. The meeting underlined the importance of our public diplomacy efforts here as well as abroad. (C)

2. Portuguese Base Negotiations. The political crisis in Portugal has brought our formal base negotiations to a halt. The current agreement, due to expire in February, was automatically extended until February 1984 by the onset of negotiations in December. The Portuguese have made it clear that formal talks cannot resume until a new government is firmly in place after elections (probably in April). We have agreed, however, that discussions on technical aspects of a new agreement may continue. Positive results from these technical talks could greatly facilitate early conclusion of a new overall agreement once a new Portuguese government is in place. (C)

3. Mubarak Visit. The Egyptian Economic Ministerial team advancing the Mubarak visit met today with Allen Wallis and Peter McPherson. They urged greater flexibility in our assistance program and asked for help in promoting US investment in Egypt. Both McPherson and Wallis stressed the importance we attach to Egypt's economic well-being, pointing out our high AID levels and the recent sale of wheat flour to Egypt at favorable prices. Peter McPherson will be sorting out the AID issues and will try to reach an understanding on key issues with the Ministers before Mubarak arrives Wednesday. (C)

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRP M453/3 # 156623

BY RW DATE 9/2/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

156624
3
SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M453/3 #156624
BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

1. Meeting with German Foreign Minister Genscher. In our meeting today, Foreign Minister Genscher was at pains to stress that there were no differences within the German government on the INF issue and that he stood firmly with the Chancellor in his personal support for our negotiating position. At the same time, he argued that it was important for the US not to give the impression that it was delaying the introduction of new ideas in Geneva because of the German election. If such an impression gained credence, he said, it would do harm to the election chances of the present coalition. In addition, while saying we should keep zero as our ultimate negotiating goal, Genscher suggested that we jointly examine various adjustments to our current position. He suggested that the West should take the initiative on INF by calling an informal meeting of foreign ministers to discuss arms control.

Genscher eloquently refuted Andropov's proposal which would allow the Soviets as many SS-20s as the combined total of British and French forces, saying that this was in fact an effort to split the Alliance and decouple the defense of Europe from the US. He suggested that the main reason for Soviet opposition to deployment of the Pershing II is that this is the system which is to be deployed in Germany beginning at the end of 1983 if negotiations fail. If the Soviets could block it, then the whole deployment schedule would be disrupted and the December 1979 decision would quickly come unstuck.

Genscher reiterated Kohl's earlier suggestion of a US-Soviet summit, arguing that your strong powers of persuasion could have an important effect on Andropov's assessment of US intentions. I said that I understood the logic of Genscher's thinking, but that we still believed a summit would not be useful unless it was carefully prepared. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

2. West European Interest in Vice President's Trip. At lunch today with Larry Eagleburger, the British, French, and West German ambassadors all emphasized the importance of Vice President Bush's forthcoming trip to Europe. Larry agreed, stressing that demonstration on both sides of the Atlantic of steadiness and determination to fulfill both parts of NATO's 1979 INF decision was necessary. FRG Ambassador Hermes hoped that Vice President Bush would announce some sort of East-West political initiative, such as US willingness to participate in a US-USSR Summit, during the trip. French Ambassador Vernier-Palliez acknowledged in private to Larry that French President Mitterrand's recent speech in Bonn had been aimed at stiffening what is perceived in Paris as the weakening resolve of the FRG leadership on INF. Vernier-Palliez stated that the French government is seriously concerned over the direction in which the FRG is heading. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

156625

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVE

BY

NLRR

M453/3 #156625

NARA DATE

9/2/116

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 25, 1983

S/S 8302588

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz ^{GPS}

1. Meeting with German Foreign Minister Genscher. In our meeting today, Foreign Minister Genscher was at pains to stress that there were no differences within the German government on the INF issue and that he stood firmly with the Chancellor in his personal support for our negotiating position. At the same time, he argued that it was important for the US not to give the impression that it was delaying the introduction of new ideas in Geneva because of the German election. If such an impression gained credence, he said, it would do harm to the election chances of the present coalition. In addition, while saying we should keep zero as our ultimate negotiating goal, Genscher suggested that we jointly examine various adjustments to our current position. He suggested that the West should take the initiative on INF by calling an informal meeting of foreign ministers to discuss arms control.

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DECL: OADR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

~~SECRET~~

January 26, 1983

NR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday,
January 25, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

666111

'83 JAN 26 A8:10

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110 1000
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QUANTITY 100 1000
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REMARKS: 1000000 1000000 1000000 1000000

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

156624

NLRR M453/3 #156624
BY W NARA DATE 9/2/11THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONRECEIVED
January 25, 1983

83 JAN 26 83025887

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz ⁷⁰⁵WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

156627

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *WPS*

1. Mubarak Visit. After greeting President Mubarak this afternoon, I briefed him on the status of our discussions with King Hussein. He was very supportive of your initiative. He wants us to move forward quickly so that Lebanon and Israeli actions on the West Bank do not drain all the momentum from the peace process. When the others joined us, Phil Habib reported on his talks in Israel. Mubarak said the presence of Israel's warning stations in Lebanon would be a good excuse for the Syrians to stay. Mubarak argued that Lebanese-Israeli normalization already exists, as evidenced by the flood of Israeli goods in Lebanon, but said Lebanon should not be required to sign a formal agreement. In a separate meeting with Ken Dam, Egyptian Minister of State Butrus Ghali asserted that Israel could obtain most of its normalization goals in Lebanon if it would accept informal arrangements, rather than formal commitments which the Arabs would have to oppose. Ghali also reiterated his denial of the Israeli charge that he or any other Egyptian had counseled the Lebanese not to show flexibility in the negotiations with Israel. He emphasized that Egypt supports US efforts to resolve the Lebanon problem and expand the peace process and hopes that the US will look to Egypt to play a more active role on these issues in the future.

Mubarak will take up with you Thursday the peace process, Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran war, his concerns over Libya's intentions toward Chad, and bilateral relations. I said you would also want to talk about Egyptian-Israeli relations. He responded that he would speak frankly to you about what Egypt can and cannot do. We also agreed to work toward an agreement on AID programs involving water and sewerage projects and a loan for electrical generation. Mubarak mentioned rumors that the US was urging the Saudis to oppose the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold. I flatly denied there was any truth in that story. (S)

2. Meeting with Genscher. I lunched with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher today. The discussion, as expected, focused on arms control issues. Genscher pressed hard for US agreement to a statement on the INF negotiations which would have implied a somewhat greater degree of flexibility on our part in exploring negotiating outcomes other than the zero-zero solution. I rejected this request, stressing the need to avoid the continuing interpretation of our position through press statements. In the end, Genscher accepted this. He agreed to restrict his public comments to reaffirmation of existing policy with quotations from your statements demonstrating our readiness to negotiate seriously for equitable agreements. We also agreed that the US and the FRG will coordinate their efforts to obtain a decision by the members of the European Community to unblock their assistance to Turkey, which has been held up because of human rights concerns. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156627

BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

156628

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1983

S/S 8302761

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *WS*

1. Mubarak Visit. After greeting President Mubarak this afternoon, I briefed him on the status of our discussions with King Hussein. He was very supportive of your initiative. He wants us to move forward quickly so that Lebanon and Israeli actions on the West Bank do not drain all the momentum from the peace process. When the others joined us, Phil Habib reported on his talks in Israel. Mubarak said the presence of Israel's warning stations in Lebanon would be a good excuse for the Syrians to stay. Mubarak argued that Lebanese-Israeli normalization already exists, as evidenced by the flood of Israeli goods in Lebanon, but said Lebanon should not be required to sign a formal agreement. In a separate meeting with Ken Dam, Egyptian Minister of State Butrus Ghali asserted that Israel could obtain most of its normalization goals in Lebanon if it would accept informal arrangements, rather than formal commitments which the Arabs would have to oppose. Ghali also reiterated his denial of the Israeli charge that he or any other Egyptian had counseled the Lebanese not to show flexibility in the negotiations with Israel. He emphasized that Egypt supports US efforts to resolve the Lebanon problem and expand the peace process and hopes that the US will look to Egypt to play a more active role on these issues in the future.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156628

ELN

9/2/16

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PR

~~SECRET~~

January 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday, January 26, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 2.4(d), E.O. 12858, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13

118/11

'83 JAN 27 A8:04

WTKS DEVAEL
JLW BOKER
EC HEGGE
CC: JPS AIGC BLOTTQAM

TELETYPE 30: 1983
URGENT TO BOSTON 1/27/83, 12:00PM. RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

RE: BOSTON 1/27/83, 12:00PM. RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
FROM: BOSTON 1/27/83, 12:00PM.
SUBJECT: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

END

TELETYPE 31: 1983

URGENT TO BOSTON 1/27/83, 12:00PM. RE: MURDER OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

END

RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

83 JAN 27. A 7: 55

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1983

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

S/S 8302761

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *WS*

1. Mubarak Visit. After greeting President Mubarak this afternoon, I briefed him on the status of our discussions with King Hussein. He was very supportive of your initiative. He wants us to move forward quickly so that Lebanon and Israeli actions on the West Bank do not drain all the momentum from the peace process. When the others joined us, Phil Habib reported on his talks in Israel. Mubarak said the presence of Israel's warning stations in Lebanon would be a good excuse for the Syrians to stay. Mubarak argued that Lebanese-Israeli normalization already exists, as evidenced by the flood of Israeli goods in Lebanon, but said Lebanon should not be required to sign a formal agreement. In a separate meeting with Ken Dam, Egyptian Minister of State Butrus Ghali asserted that Israel could obtain most of its normalization goals in Lebanon if it would accept informal arrangements, rather than formal commitments which the Arabs would have to oppose. Ghali also reiterated his denial of the Israeli charge that he or any other Egyptian had counseled the Lebanese not to show flexibility in the negotiations with Israel. He emphasized that Egypt supports US efforts to resolve the Lebanon problem and expand the peace process and hopes that the US will look to Egypt to play a more active role on these issues in the future.

Mubarak will take up with you Thursday the peace process, Lebanon, the Iraq-Iran war, his concerns over Libya's intentions toward Chad, and bilateral relations. I said you would also want to talk about Egyptian-Israeli relations. He responded that he would speak frankly to you about what Egypt can and cannot do. We also agreed to work toward an agreement on AID programs involving water and sewerage projects and a loan for electrical generation. Mubarak mentioned rumors that the US was urging the Saudis to oppose the reintegration of Egypt into the Arab fold. I flatly denied there was any truth in that story. (S)

2. Meeting with Genscher. I lunched with FRG Foreign Minister Genscher today. The discussion, as expected, focused on arms control issues. Genscher pressed hard for US agreement to a statement on the INF negotiations which would have implied a somewhat greater degree of flexibility on our part in exploring negotiating outcomes other than the zero-zero solution. I rejected this request, stressing the need to avoid the continuing interpretation of our position through press statements. In the end, Genscher accepted this. He agreed to restrict his public comments to reaffirmation of existing policy with quotations from your statements demonstrating our readiness to negotiate seriously for equitable agreements. We also agreed that the US and the FRG will coordinate their efforts to obtain a decision by the members of the European Community to unblock their assistance to Turkey, which has been held up because of human rights concerns. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~NLRR M453/3 #156629
BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 28, 1983

ml

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday, January 27, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

'83 JAN 28 A8:06

WIFE DORIS
1125 BAKER
BETHLEHEM
PA 18015-1010

RECEIVED JAN 28 1983
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK
SUBJECT: [illegible]

65

END, 1010

SECTION 211, 111

RECEIVED

~~SECRET~~

156631

RECEIVED

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 27, 1983

83 JAN 28 A 7: 50

S/S 8302886

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz ¹⁰³

1. Meeting with Mubarak. My meeting this afternoon with President Mubarak was dominated by a discussion of assistance issues and the dispute over the Taba enclave on the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai. We went over some of the details of a five-year program to rebuild the water and sewer systems in Egypt's major urban centers. On military assistance, Mubarak pressed for parity with Israel and complained about the effect in the Arab world of additional military aid for Israel. We explained the political realities involved, and agreed to continue to be alert to Egypt's needs. Stressing the importance of progress in improving Egyptian-Israeli relations, I urged Mubarak to find an acceptable formula to resolve the border dispute over Taba. He agreed to a position effectively trading Israel's agreement to discuss Taba for Egypt's willingness to take up commercial questions of importance to Israel. We will be working out details in our final meeting tomorrow. (S)

2. Meeting with Korean Ambassador Lew. In my meeting with Korean Ambassador Lew, we discussed the agenda for my upcoming visit to Seoul. On security assistance, I told him there would be unavoidable cuts, but that we hoped to help in other ways. Lew expressed concern about possible weapons sales to China, noting the danger of diversion to North Korea. I acknowledged that concern. I said we recognized that while China was a strategic asset in relation to the Soviets, its Asian role also needed to be borne in mind. Lew gave considerable credit to our policy of quiet diplomacy as having made possible recent progress in the human rights area in Korea. He also probed regarding your interest in a visit to Korea later this year. (C)

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156631

BY

RW

NARA DATE 9/2/116

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

156630

13

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz ³⁰⁸

1. Meeting with Mubarak. My meeting this afternoon with President Mubarak was dominated by a discussion of assistance issues and the dispute over the Taba enclave on the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai. We went over some of the details of a five-year program to rebuild the water and sewer systems in Egypt's major urban centers. On military assistance, Mubarak pressed for parity with Israel and complained about the effect in the Arab world of additional military aid for Israel. We explained the political realities involved, and agreed to continue to be alert to Egypt's needs. Stressing the importance of progress in improving Egyptian-Israeli relations, I urged Mubarak to find an acceptable formula to resolve the border dispute over Taba. He agreed to a position effectively trading Israel's agreement to discuss Taba for Egypt's willingness to take up commercial questions of importance to Israel. We will be working out details in our final meeting tomorrow. (S)

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M453/3 # 156630
BY LW NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *RR*
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday,
January 28, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.4(2), E.O. 12858, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RU* DATE *4/11/13*

928111

'83 JAN 29 A9:36

WIRE DELETED
TID EYER
30 HOURS
CO: THE ALICE BARRINGTON

RECEIVED 30 JAN 83
FBI/DOJ IS REQUESTING A BARRINGTON REPORT FOR LITIGATION

RECEIVED: BARRINGTON REPORT, A BARRINGTON REPORT

FROM: BARRINGTON REPORT

REMOVALS AND A BARRINGTON REPORT

RECEIVED

RECEIVED 30 JAN 83

RECEIVED 30 JAN 83

RECEIVED 30 JAN 83

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~156632
SENSITIVEBY lw 1/4/83 #156632
DATE 7/2/86THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON83 JAN 29 A 9: 26
January 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1. Meeting with Dobrynin. I saw Dobrynin today for an informal, wide-ranging discussion of US-Soviet relations. He emphasized the importance of arms control and suggested this should be the primary focus of our talks. He also said I should be prepared to meet with Gromyko to resolve the tough issues in the Geneva negotiations. I noted that serious negotiations were now underway in Geneva and we should see what happens in the current rounds of INF and START before undertaking any such discussion. I emphasized that along with arms control, the US-Soviet dialogue needed to focus on such regional problems as Poland, Afghanistan, and Central America as well as human rights. Dobrynin suggested that we could examine the status of the various bilateral agreements between the two sides to see whether some forward progress could be made on exchanges, establishment of Consulates and cooperative agreements. I agreed, and suggested that both sides put together an inventory of various bilateral agreements so that we could discuss them later in February. Dobrynin expressed an interest in reviving various arms control exercises such as the Indian Ocean talks and the negotiations on conventional arms transfers, but I was non-committal. On regional questions, Dobrynin proposed further discussions on South Africa and continuation of our talks on nuclear non-proliferation. I agreed it would be worthwhile to explore the non-proliferation issue further. He made a predictable pitch for dialogue on the Middle East, but I put him off. I added that human rights was an "historic issue" for the United States and that we hoped some progress could be made here without a lot of publicity. Dobrynin replied that an improvement in the overall climate of US-Soviet relations might produce some movement on human rights. I noted confidence building measures might be one area where we could make some progress in the near future. We agreed to meet following my return from the Far East. (S)

2. Mubarak Visit: Taba. In my final meeting with Mubarak I obtained his commitment to a formula on the Taba border dispute in the Sinai. He will now present it to Israel. If we are successful in re-starting conversations on both Taba and bilateral normalization issues of interest to Israel, the result will be a thaw in Egyptian-Israeli relations. (S)

3. Ambassador Arens. Ken and Phil Habib told Ambassador Arens today that his proposal for a partial withdrawal in Lebanon would not be acceptable to the US or to Lebanon. It would suggest a de facto division of Lebanon and leave the impression that full withdrawal is less urgent than it is. Larry Eagleburger saw Arens Thursday to convey our views on Pakistan nuclear activities and our firm opposition to any unilateral Israeli action against Pakistani nuclear facilities. Larry stressed Pakistan's important regional role and our reasonable confidence that we can influence their judgments regarding such a step. Arens' believes the Paks are close to producing a bomb. He argued the US should not provide F-16s which might be used as a carrier. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

4. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Session. I met in closed session with the SFRC today and urged Senators to avoid signing the Kennedy-Heinz Resolution opposing the sale of arms to Jordan, which would discourage and confuse King Hussein. I also described Israeli demands for security arrangements in Southern Lebanon and noted that we regard some elements of the Israeli position as inconsistent with the continued existence of Lebanon as an independent state. (S)

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Monday January 31, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *fw*, DATE *4/1/13*

156633

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

January 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. El Salvador. Guerrilla attacks have escalated in many areas of El Salvador in conjunction with certification in the United States. Salvadoran military units, including all three US-trained immediate reaction battalions, are moving slowly from south to north against a high concentration of guerrillas deployed along the southeastern border with Honduras. It is the Embassy's judgment, however, that the GOES can handle the guerrillas' challenge.

Last Friday's vote by the Constituent Assembly confirming President Magana's choice to be Minister of Health and a subsequent vote which curtailed the power of ARENA leader and Constituent Assembly President Roberto D'Aubisson, constitutes a political setback for the far right.

2. Meeting with Polish Emissary. Polish emissary Kinast met with Under Secretary Eagleburger this afternoon. Kinast said that the decision to send him was taken at the highest level. His message was that US-Polish relations are at a critical point -- they can either go up or down -- and Warsaw strongly prefers to prevent further erosion. At the end of his formal presentation Kinast, speaking "totally uninstructed", raised the possibility of the U.S. telling Poland it is prepared to take some step to reverse the deterioration in relations and then Poland stating that it is prepared to take a step. Clearly, they sent Kinast to see what can be done to improve relations, but they don't want to appear to be the demandeur.

Eagleburger reviewed at length our concerns about human rights in Poland and the harassment of our Embassy, but undertook to get a response as soon as possible. After seeking the Secretary's views, we will have recommendations for your consideration on how to respond within the framework we have been pursuing.

3. Pakistan: F-16s Arrive. At a highly-publicized arrival ceremony for the first F-16s, President Zia emphasized both the importance of Pakistan's self-reliance for defense and the need for friends. He thanked the U.S. Government "and particularly President Reagan" for the planes, whose arrival symbolizes the reinvigorated US-Pakistan security relationship which Zia has sought.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

BY *KW* M453/3 #156633
NARA DATE 9/2/16

~~SECRET~~ 18

156634

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Afghan Witnesses Call at the Department. I met yesterday with a group of Afghan resistance figures who have come to the United States to publicize Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. They told me with simple eloquence of their opposition to Soviet occupation. They also made a plea for arms, especially weapons to attack Soviet helicopter gunships. I expressed our appreciation for their visit and the job they are doing in telling the world of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, and emphasized the strength of American sympathy and support for the freedom fighters. The Afghans will meet with you and with Congress tomorrow.

2. Reversing the Deterioration of Egyptian/Israeli Relations. I called in Israeli Ambassador Arens on Monday to brief him on the Mubarak visit and to present him with the formulation worked out with Mubarak aiming at resumption of the Taba negotiations and Egyptian-Israeli discussions on trade and other matters. I stressed to Arens your determination to obtain movement in this area and asked that Israel give serious consideration to our proposal. A parallel approach was also made in Jerusalem to Foreign Minister Shamir, who promised to give us his reaction within the next several days.

3. US-Austrian Agreement on Technology Transfer. A team of officials from State, Defense and Commerce reached agreement today with an Austrian delegation on establishing an Austrian system of export controls for sensitive U.S. technology. The agreement followed two days of negotiations. The Austrian commitment, coming on the eve of Chancellor Kreisky's arrival in Washington, resolves a potential irritant in US-Austrian relations. A U.S. team will travel to Vienna in a few weeks to work out the details of implementing the system.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M453/3 #156634
BY *KW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

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FM THE WHITE HOUSE

TO DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT

MR. BAKER

MR. DEEVER

ZEM

~~SECRET~~ VIA AIR FORCE ONE WH00566

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: ACTING SECRETARY DAM'S EVENING REPORT

FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING SECRETARY

1. EL SALVADOR. GUERRILLA ATTACKS HAVE ESCALATED IN MANY AREAS OF EL SALVADOR IN CONJUNCTION WITH CERTIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES. SALVADORAN MILITARY UNITS, INCLUDING ALL THREE US-TRAINED IMMEDIATE REACTION BATTALIONS, ARE MOVING SLOWLY FROM SOUTH TO NORTH AGAINST A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF GUERRILLAS DEPLOYED ALONG THE SOUTHEASTERN BORDER WITH HONDURAS. IT IS THE EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT,

150675 19
DECLASSIFIED

BY RW

DATE 11/4/83 #150675
7/2/16

HOWEVER, THAT THE GOES CAN HANDLE THE GUERRILLAS' CHALLENGE.

LAST FRIDAY'S VOTE BY THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY CONFIRMING PRESIDENT MAGANA'S CHOICE TO BE MINISTER OF HEALTH AND A SUBSEQUENT VOTE WHICH CURTAILED THE POWER OF ARENA LEADER AND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT ROBERTO D'AUBISSON, CONSTITUTES A POLITICAL SETBACK FOR THE FAR RIGHT.

2. MEETING WITH POLISH EMISSARY. POLISH EMISSARY KINAST MET WITH UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER THIS AFTERNOON. KINAST SAID THAT THE DECISION TO SEND HIM WAS TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL. HIS MESSAGE WAS THAT US-POLISH RELATIONS ARE AT A CRITICAL POINT -- THEY CAN EITHER GO UP OR DOWN -- AND WARSAW STRONGLY PREFERS TO PREVENT FURTHER EROSION. AT THE END OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION KINAST, SPEAKING "TOTALLY UNINSTRUCTED", RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE U.S. TELLING POLAND IT IS PREPARED TO TAKE SOME STEP TO REVERSE THE DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS AND THEN POLAND STATING THAT IT IS PREPARED TO TAKE A STEP. CLEARLY, THEY SENT KINAST TO SEE WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, BUT THEY DON'T WANT TO APPEAR TO BE THE DEMANDEUR.

EAGLEBURGER REVIEWED AT LENGTH OUR CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND AND THE HARASSMENT OF OUR EMBASSY, BUT UNDERTOOK TO GET

A RESPONSE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AFTER SEEKING THE SECRETARY'S VIEWS,

WE WILL HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION ON HOW TO
RESPOND WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING.
3 PAKISTAN: F-16S ARRIVE AT HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED ARRIVAL

END OF PAGE 01

CEREMONY FOR THE FIRST F-16S, PRESIDENT ZIA EMPHASIZED BOTH THE
IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN'S SELF-RELIANCE FOR DEFENSE AND THE NEED FOR
FRIENDS. HE THANKED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT "AND PARTICULARLY PRESIDENT
REAGAN" FOR THE PLANES, WHOSE ARRIVAL SYMBOLIZES THE REINVIGORATED
US-PAKISTAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WHICH ZIA HAS SOUGHT.

0445
#0566

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

22
The President has seen _____

~~SECRET~~

February 2, 1983
RZ

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Tuesday,
February 1, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW DATE 4/1/13

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'83 FEB -2 A8:02

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~~SECRET~~ 13

S/S 8303425

156636

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

83 FEB 2 WASHINGTON 52

February 1, 1983

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Afghan Witnesses Call at the Department. I met yesterday with a group of Afghan resistance figures who have come to the United States to publicize Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan. They told me with simple eloquence of their opposition to Soviet occupation. They also made a plea for arms, especially weapons to attack Soviet helicopter gunships. I expressed our appreciation for their visit and the job they are doing in telling the world of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, and emphasized the strength of American sympathy and support for the freedom fighters. The Afghans will meet with you and with Congress tomorrow.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156636

BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~ 22

156637

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. IDF/USMC Incident: Protest to Israeli Charge. I called in the Israeli Charge this afternoon to protest the incident in Beirut earlier today when a Marine captain turned back three Israeli tanks approaching a Marine checkpoint. I told the Charge that this clearly appeared to be an IDF probing operation and an attempt to test by force the Marines' willingness to carry out their mission. I stated that these incidents had to stop and there was danger that the situation could get out of hand. The Israeli Charge gave a different version of today's incident and claimed that there had been no intention to challenge USMC positions. He also argued that Israel believed there was U.S. agreement to IDF operations in the area. He agreed on the need to prevent future incidents and stated that Israeli officials were willing to consult urgently with us on the problem. A meeting is scheduled to take place Thursday between Embassy Beirut representatives and IDF officers to correct the situation.

2. El Salvador Certification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held its first El Salvador Certification hearing today. Administration witnesses were preceded by Congressman Phil Crane, who recently visited El Salvador and who gave an effective, hard-hitting presentation. The session was uneventful -- probably a reflection of the realization of Congress that the certification process no longer accomplishes very much. Media attention was heavy, but the public audience was much smaller than last year.

3. Japanese Business Interest in Sea-Level Canal. Shiego Nagano, President of the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, met with me and Allen Wallis Tuesday to urge U.S. support for the sea-level canal option in the prospective study of alternatives to the present Panama Canal. Nagano was accompanied by a large business delegation representing a consortium he has organized to compete for contracts to build a sea-level canal through Panama. I welcomed potential Japanese funding of the feasibility study, but stressed to Nagano the very preliminary stage of American, Panamanian and Japanese government interest. Dick Allen escorted the group and had also arranged appointments with Assistant Secretary Enders, Ambassador Middendorf and Senators Laxalt and Percy, Secretary Regan and Under Secretary Olmer.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

BY *RW* NLRR M453/3 #156637
NARA DATE 9/2/86

~~SECRET~~

156638

S/S 8303530

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 2, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. IDF/USMC Incident: Protest to Israeli Charge. I called in the Israeli Charge this afternoon to protest the incident in Beirut earlier today when a Marine captain turned back three Israeli tanks approaching a Marine checkpoint. I told the Charge that this clearly appeared to be an IDF probing operation and an attempt to test by force the Marines' willingness to carry out their mission. I stated that these incidents had to stop and there was danger that the situation could get out of hand. The Israeli Charge gave a different version of today's incident and claimed that there had been no intention to challenge USMC positions. He also argued that Israel believed there was U.S. agreement to IDF operations in the area. He agreed on the need to prevent future incidents and stated that Israeli officials were willing to consult urgently with us on the problem. A meeting is scheduled to take place Thursday between Embassy Beirut representatives and IDF officers to correct the situation.

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M453/3 #156638

BY *RW*

NARA DATE 9/2/16

156639

26

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. IDF/USMC Incident. A meeting between U.S. Embassy and military officers and their Israeli counterparts was held today in Beirut to clarify the incident that occurred yesterday and explore ways of preventing a recurrence. The Israelis have asserted that they have the right to patrol in a disputed area between railroad tracks east of the Beirut airport and the nearby Sidon Road; we have never recognized this position but have accepted the fact of Israelis patrolling in the area. The Israelis had agreed that their patrols would not cause any problem for the single Marine post in the disputed area. In the aftermath of the incident, the Israelis have been claiming that the Marine captain violated an "understanding" that they could patrol in the area, and that the U.S. has inaccurately portrayed the incident and over-reacted. We countered that a rapid approach by IDF tanks toward the Marine checkpoint triggered the incident. U.S. personnel and the Israelis examined the disputed terrain today and reached a general agreement on "no-go" lines to prevent further incidents.

The Israeli Charge called on me today to state that there should be on-the-ground USMC-IDF coordination at the level of the commanders; that the U.S. had admitted in Beirut that the IDF was acting properly; that the Marine captain was exceeding his authority; and that the U.S. should publicly apologize. I replied that we had not made an admission as characterized by Netanyahu and that our versions continue to differ. We had indicated in Beirut that there was a misunderstanding. I pointed out that with the agreement reached in Beirut, existing mechanisms are in place to deal with the problem and that direct coordination outside the umbrella of these mechanisms was inappropriate.

2. El Salvador. The Embassy has received unconfirmed reports of coup plotting by the far right. A source told Ambassador Hinton that "something could happen the evening of February 4." The Embassy has no tangible evidence to support the rumor but is monitoring the situation closely.

3. Australian Prime Minister Fraser Calls Elections. Fraser February 2 had the Governor General dissolve the two Houses of Parliament and called for general elections on March 5. Accordingly, he has cancelled his visit to the U.S., but has expressed the hope it can be rescheduled in early April (depending, of course, on the election outcome).

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156639

BY *RW*

NARA DATE 8/2/17

~~SECRET~~

S/S 8303664

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. IDF/USMC Incident. A meeting between U.S. Embassy and military officers and their Israeli counterparts was held today in Beirut to clarify the incident that occurred yesterday and explore ways of preventing a recurrence. The Israelis have asserted that they have the right to patrol in a disputed area between railroad tracks east of the Beirut airport and the nearby Sidon Road; we have never recognized this position but have accepted the fact of Israelis patrolling in the area. The Israelis had agreed that their patrols would not cause any problem for the single Marine post in the disputed area. In the aftermath of the incident, the Israelis have been claiming that the Marine captain violated an "understanding" that they could patrol in the area, and that the U.S. has inaccurately portrayed the incident and over-reacted. We countered that a rapid approach by IDF tanks toward the Marine checkpoint triggered the incident. U.S. personnel and the Israelis examined the disputed terrain today and reached a general agreement on "no-go" lines to prevent further incidents.

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL. OADR

NLRR 11453/3*156640
BY *RW* NARA DATE 8/2/17

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

February 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Thursday,
February 3, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/1/13

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

February 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. IDF/USMC Incident. A meeting between U.S. Embassy and military officers and their Israeli counterparts was held today in Beirut to clarify the incident that occurred yesterday and explore ways of preventing a recurrence. The Israelis have asserted that they have the right to patrol in a disputed area between railroad tracks east of the Beirut airport and the nearby Sidon Road; we have never recognized this position but have accepted the fact of Israelis patrolling in the area. The Israelis had agreed that their patrols would not cause any problem for the single Marine post in the disputed area. In the aftermath of the incident, the Israelis have been claiming that the Marine captain violated an "understanding" that they could patrol in the area, and that the U.S. has inaccurately portrayed the incident and over-reacted. We countered that a rapid approach by IDF tanks toward the Marine checkpoint triggered the incident. U.S. personnel and the Israelis examined the disputed terrain today and reached a general agreement on "no-go" lines to prevent further incidents.

The Israeli Charge called on me today to state that there should be on-the-ground USMC-IDF coordination at the level of the commanders; that the U.S. had admitted in Beirut that the IDF was acting properly; that the Marine captain was exceeding his authority; and that the U.S. should publicly apologize. I replied that we had not made an admission as characterized by Netanyahu and that our versions continue to differ. We had indicated in Beirut that there was a misunderstanding. I pointed out that with the agreement reached in Beirut, existing mechanisms are in place to deal with the problem and that direct coordination outside the umbrella of these mechanisms was inappropriate.

2. El Salvador. The Embassy has received unconfirmed reports of coup plotting by the far right. A source told Ambassador Hinton that "something could happen the evening of February 4." The Embassy has no tangible evidence to support the rumor but is monitoring the situation closely.

3. Australian Prime Minister Fraser Calls Elections. Fraser February 2 had the Governor General dissolve the two Houses of Parliament and called for general elections on March 5. Accordingly, he has cancelled his visit to the U.S., but has expressed the hope it can be rescheduled in early April (depending, of course, on the election outcome).

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DECL: OADR

NLRR M433/3 #156641

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156642

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. El Salvador: Coup Plotting. The Embassy has received further reports that a number of military officers, possibly in coordination with right-wing civilian elements, are plotting a coup to oust Salvadoran Defense Minister Garcia and possibly President Magana. Indications are that a coup attempt aimed at least at General Garcia could take place within the next few days. Ambassador Hinton has been instructed to say that the U.S. would not object to an orderly change of command within the military, but that the overthrow of President Magana would result in the termination of U.S. assistance to El Salvador. Our efforts will be devoted to ensuring that the ouster of Garcia does not also precipitate the collapse of the civilian government.

2. Laos Agrees to MIA Experts Visit. The Lao Government has finally agreed to a visit by U.S. Government MIA/POW technical experts for discussions with Lao counterparts. This is an important step forward in our efforts to account for our MIAs. Your and Judge Clark's remarks to the League meeting a week ago certainly contributed to the Lao decision. During the visit in mid-February, we will seek to establish regular exchanges of information on MIAs and joint visits to crash sites.

3. Arms Sales to Jordan. I met yesterday with Senator John Heinz, who, along with Senator Kennedy and 46 others, is a cosponsor of a prospective Senate resolution to oppose advanced arms sales to Jordan. I encouraged him to postpone the introduction of this resolution, because it might discourage King Hussein from entering the peace process. Heinz indicated that it would not be introduced any time soon.

4. Aid to Greece. The Greek Ambassador today gave me a letter to you from Prime Minister Papandreu expressing concern about the balance of military strength in the Aegean and calling for an upward adjustment of our military assistance program for Greece in relation to Turkey. Our FY 84 proposal provides \$280 million for Greece, which we would increase in the context of a base agreement, and \$755 million for Turkey. We had foreseen strong negative Greek public reaction on an issue they consider important, but believe this rather mild letter may be designed to minimize Greek domestic criticism of the aid figures and permit the base negotiations to continue.

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DECL: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

S/S 8303758

156643

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1983

BY

RW

NARA DATE

9/2/16

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

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FOR DELIVERY TO DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT

FEBRUARY 4, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156657

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING SECRETARY

1. EL SALVADOR: COUP PLOTTING. THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED FURTHER REPORTS THAT A NUMBER OF MILITARY OFFICERS, POSSIBLY IN COORDINATION WITH RIGHT-WING CIVILIAN ELEMENTS, ARE PLOTTING A COUP TO OUST SALVADORAN DEFENSE MINISTER GARCIA AND POSSIBLY PRESIDENT MAGANA. INDICATIONS ARE THAT A COUP ATTEMPT AIMED AT LEAST AT GENERAL GARCIA COULD TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. AMBASSADOR HINTON HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO AN ORDERLY CHANGE OF COMMAND WITHIN THE MILITARY, BUT THAT THE OVERTHROW OF PRESIDENT MAGANA WOULD RESULT IN THE TERMINATION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO EL SALVADOR. OUR EFFORTS WILL BE DEVOTED TO ENSURING THAT THE OUSTER OF GARCIA DOES NOT ALSO PRECIPITATE THE COLLAPSE OF THE CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT.

2. LAOS AGREES TO MIA EXPERTS VISIT. THE LAO GOVERNMENT HAS FINALLY AGREED TO A VISIT BY U.S. GOVERNMENT MIA/POW TECHNICAL EXPERTS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH LAO COUNTERPARTS. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD IN OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOUNT FOR OUR MIAS. YOUR AND JUDGE CLARK'S REMARKS TO THE LEAGUE MEETING A WEEK AGO CERTAINLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE LAO DECISION. DURING THE VISIT IN MID-FEBRUARY, WE WILL SEEK TO ESTABLISH REGULAR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ON MIAS AND JOINT VISITS TO CRASH SITES.

3. ARMS SALES TO JORDAN. I MET YESTERDAY WITH SENATOR JOHN HEINZ, WHO, ALONG WITH SENATOR KENNEDY AND 46 OTHERS, IS A COSPONSOR OF A PROSPECTIVE SENATE RESOLUTION TO OPPOSE ADVANCED ARMS SALES TO JORDAN. I ENCOURAGED HIM TO POSTPONE THE INTRODUCTION OF THIS RESOLUTION, BECAUSE IT MIGHT DISCOURAGE KING HUSSEIN FROM ENTERING THE PEACE PROCESS. HEINZ INDICATED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED ANY TIME SOON.

4. AID TO GREECE. THE GREEK AMBASSADOR TODAY GAVE ME A LETTER TO YOU FROM PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT THE BALANCE OF MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE AEGEAN AND CALLING FOR AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

END OF PAGE 01

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PROGRAM FOR GREECE IN RELATION TO TURKEY. OUR FY 84 PROPOSAL PROVIDES \$280 MILLION FOR GREECE, WHICH WE WOULD INCREASE IN THE CONTEXT OF A BASE AGREEMENT, AND \$775 MILLION FOR TURKEY. WE HAD FORESEEN STRONG NEGATIVE GREEK PUBLIC REACTION ON AN ISSUE THEY CONSIDER IMPORTANT, BUT BELIEVE THIS RATHER MILD LETTER MAY BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE GREEK DOMESTIC CRITICISM OF THE AID FIGURES AND PERMIT THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS TO CONTINUE.

DECL: OADR
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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Saturday, February 5, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(h), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guideline, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/1/13

156658 25
~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

83 FEB 5 P 6: 05

February 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: ~~WHITE HOUSE~~ THE PRESIDENT
~~SITUATION ROOM~~

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Mozambique. Our decision to seek better relations with Marxist-oriented Mozambique is beginning to pay off. Mozambique has promised not to provide the Soviets with facilities which could be used against the United States, or involve outside forces, like the Cubans, against its insurgents. The government is also seriously committed to seeking an accommodation with South Africa and a reduction in regional violence. The Mozambican President recently called off his anti-American press campaign, and this week he acceded to our request to release an imprisoned Israeli national.

2. Meeting with Pakistani Ambassador. Under Secretary Eagleburger told Pakistani Ambassador Ejaz Azim Thursday that Pakistan was the Administration's number one priority among non-earmarked programs in determining the allocation of funds from the second CR, as evidenced by our relative success in funding the Pakistan program (\$200 million in Economic Support Funds and \$200 million in Foreign Military Sales credits). He said that we will be fighting as hard as we can for a Supplemental Appropriation (to provide the \$75 million in FMS credits we failed to allocate from the second CR) and remain totally dedicated to completing the Pakistan program as scheduled. Ambassador Azim expressed his confidence in the intention of the Administration to win full funding for Pakistan.

3. Meeting with Senator Sarbanes. Under Secretary Bill Schneider met Thursday with Senator Sarbanes to discuss the FY 1984 Assistance levels for Greece. Schneider explained that the FY 1984 numbers were the result of a consensus, including Special Negotiator Bartholomew; and that the numbers were viewed as those most likely to achieve a successful conclusion to the DECA negotiations. Sarbanes replied that this strategy would inflame Greek public opinion, and that he would prefer straight-lining Greece and Turkey for FY 1984 at the FY 1983 CR levels, with a supplemental request for both countries. However, Sarbanes indicated that he did not intend to press the matter at this stage. Schneider assured him that the FY 1984 numbers for Greece would remain open until the DECA negotiations were complete. Finally, Sarbanes registered his opposition to the FY 1983 Supplemental for Turkey as it failed to respect the 7/10 ratio for Greece and Turkey.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M453/3#156658

BY *RW*

NADA DATE 9/2/16

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

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NLRR M453/3 #156659
BY RAS NADA DATE 9/2/11

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

fw
all/13 ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

February 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report for Monday, February 7, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Jim Baker
Ed Meese
Mike Deaver

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOMDEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Meeting with Wadia Haddad. Wadia Haddad, President Gemayel's national security advisor and I met for one hour today. He confirmed that Israeli insistence on "normalization" of movement of people and things across the Lebanon border is the most difficult issue for the Lebanese. He said that the Saudis twice had made clear that such Israeli demands constituted a "red line" with respect to future Lebanese relations with the Arab world. I urged the Lebanese to offer creative formulas which would include something of substance in this area.

Haddad presented a generally reassuring picture of the relations between the Christian Militia Lebanese Forces and President Gemayel. He claimed that the mainstream of the Lebanese Forces leadership was supportive of the Government of Lebanon, and expressed confidence that the Lebanese Forces and the Druze would keep the peace in the Shuf when the Israelis withdraw. Finally, Haddad expressed his gratitude that you are sending Phil back with a renewed mandate to achieve an early agreement.

2. El Salvador. Rumors of an impending coup abated over the weekend. President Magana has appointed a six-officer commission to look into Minister of Defense Garcia's pursuit of the war effort. The Embassy reported that rightist politicians and senior military leaders wishing a Garcia ouster appear to be awaiting the results of the commission, which is expected to report to President Magana on February 19. If the President fails to remove Garcia following the report, there is a high probability that the military will oust Garcia and also President Magana. The Embassy reports that ARENA leader D'Aubuisson is likely to resign as President of the Constituent Assembly. By resigning now, D'Aubuisson can pave the way for his run at the Presidency in 1984.

3. Sudan: Extraordinary Economic Rescue Effort. Our intensive efforts of the past six months to prevent serious economic disruption in Sudan are on the verge of succeeding. Following Sudan's implementation of austerity measures, donor countries and organizations met in January and pledged \$800 million in assistance. On February 4, following intensive U.S. lobbying, Sudan's official OECD creditors concluded an extraordinary debt rescheduling agreement which will enable Sudan to negotiate comparable agreements with other official and private creditors, and hopefully to begin drawing on IMF resources.

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DECL: OADR

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NLRR M453/3 #15666D

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

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~~SECRET~~ DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH00838
FOR DELIVERY TO THE MILITARY AIDE FOR THE PRESIDENT

FEBRUARY 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: KENNETH W. DAM, ACTING SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRP M453/3 #156661

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

1. MOZAMBIQUE. OUR DECISION TO SEEK BETTER RELATIONS WITH MARXIST-ORIENTED MOZAMBIQUE IS BEGINING TO PAY OFF. MOZAMBIQUE HAS PROMISED NOT TO PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH FACILITIES WHICH COULD BE USED AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, OR INVOLVE OUTSIDE FORCES, LIKE THE CUBANS, AGAINST ITS INSURGENTS. THE GOVERNMENT IS ALSO SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO SEEKING AN ACCOMMODATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND A REDUCTION IN REGIONAL VIOLENCE. THE MOZAMBIKAN PRESIDENT RECENTLY CALLED OFF HIS ANTI-AMERICAN PRESS CAMPAIGN, AND THIS WEEK HE ACCEDED TO OUR REQUEST TO RELEASE AN IMPRISONED ISRAELI NATIONAL.

2. MEETING WITH PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR. UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER TOLD THE PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR EJAZ AZIM THURSDAY THAT PAKISTAN WAS THE ADMINISTRATION'S NUMBER ONE PRIORITY AMONG NON-EARMARKED PROGRAMS IN DETERMINING THE ALLOCATION OF FUNDS FROM THE SECOND CR, AS EVIDENCED BY OUR RELATIVE SUCCESS IN FUNDING THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM (\$200 MILLION IN ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUNDS AND \$200 MILLION IN FOREIGN MILITARY SALES CREDITS). HE SAID THAT WE WILL BE FIGHTING AS HARD AS WE CAN FOR A SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION (TO PROVIDE THE \$75 MILLION IN FMS CREDITS WE FAILED TO ALLOCATE FROM THE SECOND CR) AND REMAIN TOTALLY DEDICATED TO COMPLETING THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM AS SCHEDULED. AMBASSADOR AZIM EXPRESSED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE INTENTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO WIN FULL FUNDING FOR PAKISTAN.

3. MEETING WITH SENATOR SARBANES. UNDER SECRETARY BILL SCHNEIDER MET THURSDAY WITH SENATOR SARBANES TO DISCUSS THE FY 1984 ASSISTANCE LEVELS FOR GREECE. SCHNEIDER EXPLAINED THAT THE FY 1984 NUMBERS WERE THE RESULT OF A CONSENSUS, INCLUDING SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR BARTHOLOMEW; AND THAT THE NUMBERS WERE VIEWED AS THOSE MOST LIKELY TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION TO THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS. SARBANES REPLIED THAT THIS STRATGEY WOULD INFLAME GREEK PUBLIC OPINION, AND THAT HE WOULD PREFER STRAIGHT-LINING GREECE AND TURKEY FOR FY 1984 AT THE FY 1983 CR LEVELS, WITH A SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR BOTH COUNTRIES. HOWEVER,

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SARBANES INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO PRESS THE MATTER AT THIS STAGE. SCHNEIDER ASSURED HIM THAT THE FY 1984 NUMBERS FOR GREECE WOULD REMAIN OPEN UNTIL THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS WERE COMPLETE. FINALLY SARBANES REGISTERED HIS OPPOSITION TO THE FY 1983 SUPPLEMENTAL FOR TURKEY AS IT FAILED TO RESPECT THE 7/10 RATIO FOR GREECE AND TURKEY.

DECL: OADR
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Dobrynin Demarche on Syria. Ambassador Dobrynin called on Larry Eagleburger this afternoon to present further Soviet views on the deployment of the SA-5 missile to Syria, about which we had an exchange with the Soviets last month. Dobrynin expressed heightened Soviet concern that the Israelis might launch a preemptive strike against the missiles. Although Dobrynin said that according to "available information the Israelis are carrying out...preparatory measures" for such an action, he personally could provide no further information to clarify the point. In response, Larry reinforced the major point of our earlier exchange with the Soviets: that we believe the SA-5 deployment escalates tensions in the region and it would be better if it were not deployed. He told Dobrynin that we would study his demarche and provide him with a response. We will soon provide you an analysis of the Soviet statement.

2. Arabs May Call For UN Security Council Session on Israeli Settlements. USUN has heard that the Arab delegations in New York have decided to seek a meeting of the Security Council to consider Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza. This would be a resumption of an earlier Council meeting on this topic that ended without significant result due to lack of enthusiasm. Rumors of this resumed session first surfaced last week, but we urged the Jordanians, who hold the Arab seat on the Council, to oppose the idea. We intend to approach Jordan again in another effort to head off an unconstructive meeting of the Council.

3. Meeting with Romanian Ambassador. In a meeting Monday with Romanian Ambassador Malitza, Larry Eagleburger expressed concern over reports that intending emigrants are being told that they must repay the costs of their education before they will be allowed to leave Romania. Malitza said that as far as he knew, the education repayment decree had not been implemented. He agreed, however, to transmit Eagleburger's request that the Romanian Government inform us officially on the decree's current status. Eagleburger said that unless this issue is clarified in about a week, we would have to start warning U.S. firms dealing with Romania that Romania will lose its Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) tariff status if implementation of the decree continues.

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DECL: OADR

NLRR M453/3#156662
BY RW
DATE 9/2/06

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Tuesday, February 8, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12858, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA RW DATE 4/1/13

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

83 FEB 9 A 8: 22

February 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Dobrynin Demarche on Syria. Ambassador Dobrynin called on Larry Eagleburger this afternoon to present further Soviet views on the deployment of the SA-5 missile to Syria, about which we had an exchange with the Soviets last month. Dobrynin expressed heightened Soviet concern that the Israelis might launch a preemptive strike against the missiles. Although Dobrynin said that according to "available information the Israelis are carrying out...preparatory measures" for such an action, he personally could provide no further information to clarify the point. In response, Larry reinforced the major point of our earlier exchange with the Soviets: that we believe the SA-5 deployment escalates tensions in the region and it would be better if it were not deployed. He told Dobrynin that we would study his demarche and provide him with a response. We will soon provide you an analysis of the Soviet statement.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156663

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BY *RW*

NARA DATE 1/2/14

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Dutch Defense Minister on INF. I met with Dutch Defense Minister de Ruyter today for a discussion of defense and security issues focusing on INF. He spoke very highly of the Vice President's visit to the Netherlands but repeated the request he had made to Bush for greater U.S. "flexibility" at Geneva and acceptance of some "interim" step on the way to an eventual zero-zero outcome. When pressed on specifics, he suggested combining elements from INF and START so as to correct the current imbalance in INF forces on the table (i.e., the Soviets have S/S-20s, S/S4s and 5s and we have nothing) and inclusion of other systems not yet in the negotiations. Even then, however, he was not certain whether the Dutch public would accept cruise missile deployments in the Netherlands. I emphasized to him that you believed that this entire category of weapons ought to be eliminated. Larry Eagleburger had passed him the same message over breakfast. Bud McFarlane and Cap Weinberger will do likewise, but the Dutch are going to remain a problem on INF.

2. Proposed UN Security Council Meeting on Israeli Settlements. The Security Council will meet Friday afternoon to consider the request of the Arab group for a resumed session on settlements. Jordan, the President of the Arab group this month, has informed us that it believes a meeting is unavoidable, but recognizes the dangers to the peace process of any Council resolution on settlements. We are lobbying other moderate Arabs and friendly members of the Council to work with us and Jordan to limit the meeting to a simple debate.

3. Meeting with Senator Tsongas. I met with Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts on Monday to hear about his recent Middle East trip, which included meetings with Prime Minister Begin, President Mubarak, and King Hussein. Tsongas said that progress in Southern Lebanon and a settlement freeze are necessary to make it easier for King Hussein to come into the peace process. He also expressed an understanding of our position that Senators should refrain from commitments on Jordanian arms. He was a cosponsor of last year's resolution but has declined to become a cosponsor this year. Tsongas reiterated his opposition to the Adelman nomination and said there is strong skepticism in the country about the Administration's commitment to arms control.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRPM453/3 #156664
BY *KW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

156666p 45
~~SECRET~~

S/S 8304137

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Dutch Defense Minister on INF. I met with Dutch Defense Minister de Ruiter today for a discussion of defense and security issues focusing on INF. He spoke very highly of the Vice President's visit to the Netherlands but repeated the request he had made to Bush for greater U.S. "flexibility" at Geneva and acceptance of some "interim" step on the way to an eventual zero-zero outcome. When pressed on specifics, he suggested combining elements from INF and START so as to correct the current imbalance in INF forces on the table (i.e., the Soviets have S/S-20s, S/S4s and 5s and we have nothing) and inclusion of other systems not yet in the negotiations. Even then, however, he was not certain whether the Dutch public would accept cruise missile deployments in the Netherlands. I emphasized to him that you believed that this entire category of weapons ought to be eliminated. Larry Eagleburger had passed him the same message over breakfast. Bud McFarlane and Cap Weinberger will do likewise, but the Dutch are going to remain a problem on INF.

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRP M453/3 #156666p
RV RW NADA DATE 9/2/11

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1983

PC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Wednesday, February 9, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *4/1/13*

11926

156665
~~SECRET~~

S/S 8304137

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

9:50

February 9, 1983 HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

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DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

NLRR M453/3 #156665
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/24/16

~~SECRET~~

156667

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Romanian Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Status. Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei informed Ambassador Funderburk today that Romania has "irrevocably" decided to apply the education repayment decree. Acknowledging that MFN status with the United States would be lost as a result, Andrei said the Romanians nonetheless intended to maintain the best possible relations with the U.S. under the circumstances. We are studying the modalities of MFN withdrawal, dealing not only with the statutory requirements but also with the need to mitigate the consequences for the American firms and jobs involved in US-Romania trade.

2. Canadian Weapons Testing Agreement. Canadian Ambassador Gotlieb and I signed a Weapons Testing Agreement today. While this umbrella agreement does not specify weapons systems, a fundamental purpose is to permit cruise missile testing. There is highly vocal opposition to the agreement in Canada. Ambassador Gotlieb stated that the Geneva arms control negotiations, INF deployments in Europe, and cruise missile testing in Canada are all related. He stressed the importance Canadians attach to the success of the negotiation track and to close consultations on arms control issues.

3. HFAC Briefing on Suriname. Tom Enders gave a classified briefing on Suriname to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this morning. He explained our conclusion that Bouterse should be deprived of aid and isolated in the international community. Chairman Zablocki and others seemed to want the U.S. to become more active in resolving the Suriname problem. Zablocki concluded that the HFAC might help get out the word on Bouterse by holding public hearings. We believe we have set the stage for further explaining our policy options to the intelligence committees. We plan to brief the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following the recess.

4. US-EC Agricultural Trade Talks. The second round of US-EC agricultural trade talks concluded today. The tone was generally good, notwithstanding EC pique at the recent sale of subsidized US wheat flour to Egypt and the threat to respond to further US measures aimed at the EC. The EC indicated that it would hold this year's wheat and wheat flour exports to last year's level of 14 million MT, about 4 million MT below current potential. This restraint will help, but we reached no understanding on the EC's continued massive use of export subsidies. Further EC concessions at this time appear unlikely.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M453/3 #156667
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

156668 49
~~SECRET~~

S/S 8304260

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 10, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

1. Romanian Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Status. Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei informed Ambassador Funderburk today that Romania has "irrevocably" decided to apply the education repayment decree. Acknowledging that MFN status with the United States would be lost as a result, Andrei said the Romanians nonetheless intended to maintain the best possible relations with the U.S. under the circumstances. We are studying the modalities of MFN withdrawal, dealing not only with the statutory requirements but also with the need to mitigate the consequences for the American firms and jobs involved in US-Romania trade.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M453/3 #156668
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

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The President has seen _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Thursday, February ¹⁰/₉, 1983.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED
ON 8/10/03, E.O. 12958, as amended
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/1/13

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RECEIVED
S/S 8304260

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 10, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary

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DECLASSIFIED

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DECL: OADR

NLRR M453/3#156669
BY fw NARA DATE 9/2/16