

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Agency File

**Folder Title:** Secretary of State's Evening Reports  
(03/15/1983-04/01/1983)

**Box:** RAC Box 6

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*Last Updated: 4/18/2024*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 4/1/2013

**File Folder** SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (03/15/1983-04/01/1983)

**FOIA**

M453

**Box Number** 6

SHIFRINSON

53

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156697	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156696] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/14/1983	B1
156698	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/15/1983	B1
156699	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156698] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/15/1983	B1
156700	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/16/1983	B1
156701	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/17/1983	B1
156702	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156701] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/17/1983	B1
156703	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/18/1983	B1
156704	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156703] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/18/1983	B1
156705	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/19/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156706	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/21/1983	B1
156707	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156706] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/21/1983	B1
156708	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/22/1983	B1
156709	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/23/1983	B1
156710	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/25/1983	B1
156711	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156710] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/25/1983	B1
156712	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/25/1983	B1
156713	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156712] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/25/1983	B1
156714	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156712] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/25/1983	B1
156715	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>PAR 11/28/2017 M453/3</i>	1	3/26/1983	B1

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**File Folder** SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (03/15/1983-04/01/1983)

**FOIA**

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SHIFRINSON

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156716	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/28/1983	B1
156717	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156716] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/28/1983	B1
156719	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156718] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/29/1983	B1
156718	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/29/1983	B1
156720	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156718] <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/29/1983	B1
156725	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/30/1983	B1
156726	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 9/2/2016 M453/3</i>	1	3/31/1983	B1

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 15, 1983

NR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday,  
March 14, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 19, 2009  
BY NAME RW DATE 4/1/13

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1983

156697

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/86

83 MAR 15 A 8:47

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

SITUATION ROOM

1. Meeting with Shamir. After your meeting, Foreign Minister Shamir and I had a lengthy discussion. Shamir wanted to know specifically what would be "acceptable" to us in Lebanon. Building upon your presentation, I reiterated the requirement for total withdrawal of Israeli and other foreign forces and the unacceptability to the Lebanese of a role for Haddad in the south. I urged that we try to develop alternative security arrangements based upon the areas of Lebanese-Israeli agreement--joint military commissions and intelligence cooperation. Shamir expressed his disappointment with our views, but suggested that there may be another way to work out the problem. Shamir's comment may have been a signal of willingness to put forward new ideas. I offered to meet with him Tuesday if it would be useful and the Israelis later requested a meeting Tuesday morning. In the meantime, Phil and Morrie put together a list of additional steps which would go a long way toward satisfying Israel's security concerns. After discussing some of these with the Lebanese at dinner (below), it appears that we may have a few options in reserve to offer Shamir.

Shamir also raised familiar bilateral issues, including the Lebanon-related delay in Congressional notification of 75 F-16s for Israel, US military aid to Arab states, Israel's quest for help in its LAVI jet fighter program, the MOU on intelligence sharing from Lebanon, and problems surrounding Marine Corps-IDF liaison near Beirut. On the MOU, I urged that Israel respond to the draft which Cap gave Moshe Arens several weeks ago. I also promised to continue to work on the liaison problem. I am convinced that it would be useful and relatively easy to put the MOU and liaison issues behind us. (S)

2. Meeting with the Lebanese. We had a working dinner tonight with the Lebanese delegation headed by Foreign Minister Salem and Muslim Elder Statesman Saeb Salam. Before dinner, the latter made clear that Lebanon would go as far as possible in allowing the movement of goods across the Lebanese-Israeli border. There would have to be some limits, however, to prevent damage to Lebanon's economy. At the dinner itself, we informally discussed some of the additional steps which Phil and Morrie had developed earlier, in the context of promoting greater Israeli confidence in Lebanon's abilities to control terrorism and PLO reinfiltration. These included practical arrangements at the border and a regular review process to correct errors and strengthen measures. I warned that if the Israelis were unsatisfied with Lebanon's abilities, they might be tempted to take matters into their own hands. To avoid this, it would be best to develop improved methods of control at this stage in the negotiations. The Foreign Minister and Elder Statesman Salam reacted constructively, but one member of the delegation became ideological. The Foreign Minister asked to meet alone after dinner, at which time he made clear that he wanted to be pragmatic and reach sensible decisions while he was in Washington. This was useful. He will meet with Phil and Morrie Tuesday morning to examine carefully our ideas. Assuming that his reaction remains constructive, I hope to outline some agreed ideas with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir. I want Shamir to return to Israel later in the day knowing that we have explored every opportunity to satisfy Israel's security concerns. (S)

~~SECRET~~



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THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON83 MAR 16 March 15, 1983  
A 9: 29

15648

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Concluding Talks With Shamir. Foreign Minister Shamir asked to see me alone this morning. In the aftermath of the strong position you set forth to him yesterday, Shamir worried about returning to Jerusalem with nothing new in his pocket on security arrangements. This, he said, could produce anti-American sentiment in the Israeli Cabinet. The impasse could fester; Sharon would be critical of what has been happening. Without committing myself, I responded that we have been considering means to strengthen the security arrangements in ways which would neither involve a residual Israeli military presence nor permit Israeli military operations in Lebanon. Phil Habib then met with Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem. He was generally positive in response to our concepts on reinforced security arrangements, but has asked Phil to meet with the rest of his delegation Wednesday, after his meeting with you. This will give us an opportunity to sell our adjusted formula to the full Lebanese delegation.

Given this relatively positive initial reaction, I reviewed with Shamir this afternoon some of what we had in mind. Shamir's spirits lifted a bit in response to what he acknowledged was an interesting series of ideas. He said, however, that they still fell considerably short of what he and his military advisor, General Tamir, consider acceptable to Israeli public opinion. He said he wanted to have our ideas analyzed carefully, and proposed that we deliver to him a "non-paper," which he promised would remain confidential. He left for Israel tonight and we expect to have Sam Lewis deliver a non-paper to him by Thursday. (S)

2. Seaga Suggests Williamsburg Initiative on North-South Dialogue. Prime Minister Seaga, in Washington for informal discussions with the IMF, has outlined to Under Secretary Wallis an idea for a Williamsburg Summit initiative to call for a dialogue between the industrialized countries and twenty moderate LDCs. Seaga wants to focus on specific proposals, drawn largely from the Second Report of the Brandt Commission, which recognize the central role of existing financial institutions while addressing LDC concerns about international liquidity, aid flows, and debt burdens. As a result of his recent discussions with radical LDC exponents of the "New International Economic Order," Seaga is convinced that revival of global negotiations in a broader forum would be unproductive. Seaga said he would contact Prime Minister Trudeau about the proposal and report back to Wallis, who expressed his appreciation for Seaga's suggestion but remained non-committal on the eventual US position. (C)

3. Discussions with Nigeria. In a meeting today with Ken Dam, Shehu Musa, a key Presidential adviser, clearly signalled Nigeria's desire for closer relations with the US and specifically inquired about possible US assistance (including oil purchases, food import credits, and moral support with the IMF and commercial banks) in resolving its current economic crisis. This visit follows up the offer Vice President Bush extended to Shagari last November of periodic high-level discussions. (C)

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

PR

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday,  
March 15, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver





DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

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156699

NLRR M453/3 #19269

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

March 15, 1983

WASHINGTON

83 MAR 16 A7:54

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz <sup>ups</sup>

1. Concluding Talks With Shamir. Foreign Minister Shamir asked to see me alone this morning. In the aftermath of the strong position you set forth to him yesterday, Shamir worried about returning to Jerusalem with nothing new in his pocket on security arrangements. This, he said, could produce anti-American sentiment in the Israeli Cabinet. The impasse could fester; Sharon would be critical of what has been happening. Without committing myself, I responded that we have been considering means to strengthen the security arrangements in ways which would neither involve a residual Israeli military presence nor permit Israeli military operations in Lebanon. Phil Habib then met with Lebanese Foreign Minister Salem. He was generally positive in response to our concepts on reinforced security arrangements, but has asked Phil to meet with the rest of his delegation Wednesday, after his meeting with you. This will give us an opportunity to sell our adjusted formula to the full Lebanese delegation.

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*  
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday,  
March 16, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 14, 2006  
BY NARA *RW* DATE *4/1/13*



~~SECRET~~ 1THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTONSENSITIVEMarch 16, 1983  
156700

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *gps*

1. Israeli-Lebanese Negotiations. Phil Habib and Morrie Draper today reviewed with the Lebanese the various bridging ideas on security which I had discussed with Foreign Minister Shamir Tuesday. These measures are designed as substitutes for a residual Israeli presence in southern Lebanon and for certain other proposals which are unacceptable to the Lebanese. Though generally supporting our ideas, Foreign Minister Salem cautioned that he was not prepared to have the Israelis pocket these new ideas and then ask for more. The Lebanese, he said, had gone as far as they could go. Even these new ideas could cause problems for Lebanon.

Ambassador Sam Lewis will now deliver to Shamir a "non-paper" which incorporates our new ideas into a detailed approach to the security arrangements. Sam will deliver an oral message from me stressing the confidentiality of this "non-paper" and informing him that Phil and Morrie will return to Israel this weekend to hear the Israeli reaction to our "non-paper" and to work cooperatively for a quick overall agreement. Phil gave an identical copy of the "non-paper" to Foreign Minister Salem. I remain hopeful that these Washington meetings and our new ideas will overcome the remaining obstacles, but the reaction of the Israeli Cabinet remains an important question mark. (S)

2. Meeting With Dobrynin. I met today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to make the points on the Pentecostals which you and I had discussed. I said you were pleased with the prompt Soviet response to our concern and gave our interpretation of their position--that if the Pentecostals in the Embassy go home and apply for visas, their requests will be acted upon favorably. I said if we are not correct, I would like to know. I told Dobrynin that persuading the Pentecostals would not be easy, but allowing Lidia Vashchenko to leave the country would offer persuasive evidence. Dobrynin was unable to offer additional assurances. He said we should read the Soviet message carefully and that the Soviet authorities would take into account all factors, including our appeal. He doubted that Moscow could give additional assurances as matters of principle and sovereignty are involved, but he would report our message. (Dobrynin's response was predictable. However, the ball is now in the Soviets' court.) In conclusion, I told Dobrynin I would call him in soon to convey your views on other issues. Dobrynin expressed particular interest in arms control. I responded that we could certainly discuss arms control, but we also would address regional issues, human rights and other bilateral issues. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DECL:OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3#156700

BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16



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~~SECRET~~

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156701

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

83 MAR 18 A 9:37

1. Visit of Dutch Foreign Minister. Foreign Minister van den Broek and I discussed at length the Middle East. The Dutch are in close agreement with our overall approach, with their usual emphasis on getting the Palestinians more involved and the need to halt further Israeli settlement activity. In his discussions earlier with Ken Dam and Tom Enders on Central America, van den Broek stressed the necessity for a political settlement while conceding that continued military aid is required to prevent the violent overthrow of the Salvadoran government. The Dutch emphasis, however, is on a dialogue between the government and the guerrillas coupled with an electoral process that is free from violence. There may be more difference over nuance than substance between our two positions. The situation in their former colony of Suriname seems to have made them less tolerant of revolutionary violence. (C)

2. El Salvador. I discussed El Salvador this morning with Senators Hatfield, Johnston, Specter and Leahy, members of the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee. Hatfield thought that short-term support for our assistance request might be achievable, but felt it would be difficult to sustain on a long-term basis. Leahy argued that the Administration's credibility was being called into question, citing the increase from \$60 million to \$110 million. The support of Senator Johnston, a moderate Democrat, is especially important. He believes we should emphasize our willingness to negotiate and not restrict those negotiations to arrangements under which the insurgents could safely enter the democratic process. (C)

3. Guatemala: Recent Developments. Ambassador Chapin has returned to Guatemala to dispel rumors being spread by reactionary coup plotters that his absence signifies tacit US support for Rios Montt's overthrow. The plotters do not yet appear to have sufficient military support to move against the present Government. Meanwhile, the failure of the Guatemalan Government to resolve the murder of an AID contract employee and his three companions by a military officer remains a thorn in our relations. To bring home our concern to the Guatemalan Government, we have deferred reprogramming \$10 million in ESF funds and asked Congress to defer temporarily its consideration of another \$6 million in the FY 83 supplemental. Without progress soon, Congress may very well cut economic and security assistance for Guatemala. (S)

4. Meeting With Bolivian Foreign Minister. Larry Eagleburger met with Bolivian Foreign Minister Mario Velarde today for a lengthy discussion of our bilateral concerns, especially Bolivia's leftward drift in foreign policy and its need to control narcotics. I dropped in briefly and underscored our interest in progress on the narcotics front and fair treatment for US firms doing business in Bolivia. Velarde indicated that Bolivia would take steps upon his return to institute a new anti-narcotics effort. (C)

DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1983

PR

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Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RUJ, DATE 4/1/13

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NLRI M4533 #156702

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

83 MAR 18

March 17, 1983

BY

NARA

DATE

9/2/11

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

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DECL: OADR



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday,  
March 18, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*NLRR M453/3 #156703  
BY *fw* NARA DATE: 9/2/16

1. Preparations for Williamsburg Summit. The San Diego Sherpa meeting, chaired by Allen Wallis, achieved agreement to a Summit agenda which includes our major objectives on economic policy, trade, debt and finance virtually unchanged from your instructions. The remarkable agreement on the substance of the economic policy issues, did not carry over to our proposals for East-West issues. There is a significant problem with France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, on the basic question of how the Summit should deal with these issues. The French categorically rejected any public statements on principles governing East-West economic relations. They stated that their emphasis was on publicity, not substance. One of them even asserted that if at the close of the conference you make any statement whatsoever about agreement on East-West economic relations, Mitterrand will have to contradict it. They and the Germans are opposed to the Summit addressing specific future or follow-up action. No one implied trouble on the substance of the study process underway, but there was clear resistance by many to making East-West issues a significant item for the Summit. All of the representatives were worried that insistence on it would be divisive and would detract from their central objective for the Summit of restoring confidence in Summit leaders' ability to promote sustainable economic recovery.

2. Introductory Meeting with New Chinese Ambassador. China's new Ambassador, Zhang Wenjin, and I met briefly this afternoon after which I introduced him to Bill Clark, Cap Weinberger, Mac Baldrige, Bill Brock, Jay Keyworth, Marty Feldstein and some of my staff. This was a unique effort to start him on a constructive footing, so he can understand and report our system and views to his government--and convey his government's working and views to us--more effectively than his predecessor. He heard a bit from each guest about how we work and our views on major world and bilateral issues. He expressed great appreciation for the honor extended. I hope the results will justify the effort. Ambassador Zhang made clear he does not underestimate the bilateral problems but expressed optimism that, with good will and hard work, we can narrow differences and improve relations over time. He makes a good impression. Zhang will present his credentials to you on April 7.

3. US-EC Agricultural Dispute: Meetings with EC Commissioners. Bill Brock and Dick Lyng met with the Commissioners last night and I talked with them this afternoon. We were encouraged to see that the EC is evidently treating our concerns seriously and appears willing to take some additional steps to try to contain, and perhaps resolve, some of the outstanding issues. I encouraged them and said we needed some positive steps on their part if we were able to contain pressures in the Congress for major new export subsidy measures of our own. The key question remains whether the member states will give the Commission the broader authority that it needs. The French are the main problem here. We are talking with the member states directly on the need for more negotiating room for the Commission, if we are to avoid an open confrontation over agricultural trade. There will be additional meetings with Commission officials at the working level towards the end of April.

DECL: OADR

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday,  
March 18, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/1/13

~~SECRET~~

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156704

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

NLRR M453/3#156704  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *9/2/16*

1. Preparations for Williamsburg Summit. The San Diego Sherpa meeting, chaired by Allen Wallis, achieved agreement to a Summit agenda which includes our major objectives on economic policy, trade, debt and finance virtually unchanged from your instructions. The remarkable agreement on the substance of the economic policy issues, did not carry over to our proposals for East-West issues. There is a significant problem with France and, to a lesser extent, Germany, on the basic question of how the Summit should deal with these issues. The French categorically rejected any public statements on principles governing East-West economic relations. They stated that their emphasis was on publicity, not substance. One of them even asserted that if at the close of the conference you make any statement whatsoever about agreement on East-West economic relations, Mitterrand will have to contradict it. They and the Germans are opposed to the Summit addressing specific future or follow-up action. No one implied trouble on the substance of the study process underway, but there was clear resistance by many to making East-West issues a significant item for the Summit. All of the representatives were worried that insistence on it would be divisive and would detract from their central objective for the Summit of restoring confidence in Summit leaders' ability to promote sustainable economic recovery.

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DECL: OADR

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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4/11/83  
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

15  
March 19, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Saturday  
March 19, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver



~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

8308153

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

16  
NLPR M453/3 #156705  
BY *EW* NARA DATE 1/2/16

1. My Breakfast with the French Ambassador. My breakfast meeting with Vernier-Palliez covered a broad range of issues, with emphasis on East-West relations, INF and themes for the Williamsburg summit. The French stand firmly with us on INF. Vernier-Palliez emphasized that France is not pressing us publicly to take a new initiative on the grounds that such activity damages our negotiating posture; but asked we continue to consult with France on our intentions. I confirmed that we would. I also told him how much you appreciated Mitterrand's supportive Bundestag speech. The Ambassador said the French analysis is that Kohl won largely on economic issues, that there is not yet a clear consensus within Germany in favor of INF deployment, but there is still, because of Germany's peculiar situation, a desire to continue trade and other contacts with the East. Linking INF and the Williamsburg summit, the Ambassador stressed the French view that we should all be concentrating our efforts this year on assuring that Germany maintains its commitment on deployment. Based on this, the French fear that if we over-emphasize the subject of restraints in East-West economic relations at the summit, there could well be a German reaction which would adversely affect the deployment decision. Instead, he suggested that the OECD or NATO Ministerials flanking the summit should be the focal points for efforts on East-West economic relations and the Williamsburg summit should concentrate instead on discussion of the global economic recovery, with East-West economic matters discussed, but not as a central matter. (S)

2. Lunch with Perez de Cuellar. I had a private lunch today with UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar at his request. The Secretary General will travel to Moscow next Friday and wanted to talk with me before he went. On Afghanistan, the Secretary General said he intends to test Soviet intentions; if he finds that there is no real chance for further progress in the UN effort to arrange a settlement, he will give up the effort. He does not want the UN to be used as a cover for a continued Soviet presence in Afghanistan, he said. He went on to remark that he was not confident that there was any real solution possible, but that he was willing to continue his efforts if there was even a slim hope. He added that he has emphasized to the Soviets--and will to Andropov next week--that he must have a timetable which identifies when Soviet withdrawals will begin and when they will end. Given his international position, he cannot, he said, refer to the rebel forces in Afghanistan, but has dealt with this problem by talking to the Soviets about the need to see the refugees returned to Afghanistan. In response to a question by the Secretary General on what he might say to the Soviets about the US attitude toward Afghanistan, I said that Perez de Cuellar could assure the Soviet Union that the United States does not wish to put Moscow in an embarrassing situation; nevertheless, a satisfactory solution must include: (a) the withdrawal of Soviet troops; (b) the return of the refugees to Afghanistan; (c) a neutral and nonaligned Afghanistan under a government acceptable to the Afghanistan people. Perez de Cuellar then turned to Central America. He indicated great sympathy for the position of the US, said that Mexico was the ultimate objective of the Soviet and Cuban-supported guerrilla movement in Central America, complained about the inability of Mexicans to recognize that they are the ultimate target, and described various Mexican efforts to persuade the Secretary General to act as intermediary between the Government of El Salvador, the guerrillas, and the United States (he indicated substantial lack of enthusiasm for his suggestion). The Secretary General said that he had discussed Central America with Castro at the New Delhi nonaligned meeting, and had found the latter extremely "evasive." He said that Castro's attitude was "not a good sign." Finally, the Secretary General touched briefly on southern Africa; he gently argued against the US-South African position that a Namibia settlement was not possible without parallel withdrawal of Cuban troops. He said that it is of vital importance to get Cuba out of Africa, thus demonstrating that its efforts are in vain. But he believes a Namibia settlement would make the continued presence of Cubans in Angola unnecessary and that under such circumstances the Government of Angola would push for Cuban withdrawal. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DECL:OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

BY AW NARA DATE 9/2/16  
NIR 1453/3 #156706

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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~~SECRET~~

156706

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
March 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

1. Australian Prime Minister Hawke. Bob Hawke, Australia's newly-elected Prime Minister, called me this evening to underscore his eagerness to meet you and his desire for continued strong US-Australian relations. Hawke hopes to visit Washington in mid-June. He assured me that despite some "messy" statements in the Labor party platform on Indonesia and aid to Vietnam, he would not undertake any new moves without thorough consultations with us. In response to his queries, I gave an upbeat briefing on our Middle East efforts and promised a thorough briefing on US-Chinese relations before PRC Premier Zhao's visit to Australia next month. Hawke fully agreed that we should continue our regular consultations. I underlined that all in Washington valued his public statements in support of US-Australian ties and looked forward to working with him. (C)

2. Ken Dam's Meetings in Europe. At the start of a week-long visit to Europe, Ken called on the Swiss President and Foreign Ministry officials. The Swiss stressed that NATO must remain militarily strong and stick to the two-track decision if there is to be any hope of Soviet movement on INF. They also expressed concern that a continued stalemate at the CSCE meeting in Madrid would undermine European public support for INF deployments. Ken also delivered a speech in Geneva on US international economic policy and later, in Oslo, Norway, gave an address on Western security and US arms reduction policy. (C)

3. Greek Base Negotiations Resume. The Greek side reacted positively to our assurance that we would propose to Congress additional FMS credits for a possible total of \$500 million in FY 84, if we are able to conclude a satisfactory base agreement. Negotiations have resumed and are making progress, though a number of difficult issues remain. (S)

4. European Monetary Realignment. The European Community agreed today on a realignment of currencies in the European Monetary System (EMS), after an acrimonious exchange between the French and Germans over how to divide the economic and political costs of realignment. The crisis was largely brought about by lack of market confidence in French economic policy, but the French had threatened to pull out of the EMS and/or impose import restrictions on German goods unless the German's also revalued. A compromise finally emerged in which the French franc was devalued by 2.5% and the German mark was revalued upward by 5.5%, with other European currencies changing values as well. While the institution of the EMS--an important symbol of European intergration--was preserved, the Europeans continue to practice widely divergent macroeconomic policies. This divergence could well intensify pressure on us at Williamsburg to take the lead in ensuring international monetary stability. (C)

~~SECRET~~

DECL. 0000

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday,  
March 21, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 2.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13

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NLRR M453/3 #156707

BY W NARA DATE 9/2/11THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
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83 March 22 24, 81985

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz WPSWHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Australian Prime Minister Hawke. Bob Hawke, Australia's newly-elected Prime Minister, called me this evening to underscore his eagerness to meet you and his desire for continued strong US-Australian relations. Hawke hopes to visit Washington in mid-June. He assured me that despite some "messy" statements in the Labor party platform on Indonesia and aid to Vietnam, he would not undertake any new moves without thorough consultations with us. In response to his queries, I gave an upbeat briefing on our Middle East efforts and promised a thorough briefing on US-Chinese relations before PRC Premier Zhao's visit to Australia next month. Hawke fully agreed that we should continue our regular consultations. I underlined that all in Washington valued his public statements in support of US-Australian ties and looked forward to working with him. (C)

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~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

83 MAR 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 22, 1983

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

156708

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

1. Testimony on El Salvador. I testified today on El Salvador before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Interest was intense (Senator Stennis made a rare appearance). The questioning was polite but tough, with heavy emphasis on the Salvadoran legal system and the lack of progress in the religious workers' case. Even supporters were concerned with the situation in El Salvador. As Senator Specter put it, we can count on his support for now but, in a few months, he will withdraw it unless there are some dramatic improvements in the overall performance of the El Salvador Government. (U)

2. Meeting with Chairman Whitten. In line with our discussion, I followed up your conversation with Chairman Whitten with a call on him at noon. He emphasized his belief that we should attempt to avoid a confrontation with Congress over Central America and seek a consensus whenever proceeding on an issue like this. (C)

3. Senate Republican Policy Committee Luncheon. At their request, I met over lunch today with the Senate Republican Policy Committee. We discussed the full gambit of current foreign policy issues. I took the opportunity to reinforce our commitment to the Adelman nomination, to an arms control policy that seeks reductions rather than a "freeze" and to a multidimensional approach to our policy in El Salvador. (U)

4. Security Council Meeting on Chad's Complaint Against Libya. The Security Council began debate today on the Chadian complaint against Libya. Chad has floated a draft resolution condemning Libya and asking for Libya to withdraw its forces from the Aouzou Strip in the North (occupied by Libya since 1973). We strongly support Chad's initiative. The French, however, believe a more effective approach would be a resolution calling for submission of the border dispute to the International Court of Justice. Although it is unlikely that the Council will take strong or effective action, Chad's complaint is focusing public attention on Libya's encroachment. (C)

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~NLRR M453/3 #156708  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report *PS*

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday,  
March 23, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *4/1/13*



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BY

NARA DATE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SENSITIVE

WASHINGTON

83 MAR 24 A 6:46 March 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

156709

1. Meeting with Dobrynin. This afternoon Ambassador Dobrynin delivered Andropov's response to your message on MBFR. Andropov reiterated existing Soviet positions, but in a straight-forward and non-polemical manner. (The text is being sent separately.) I reinforced your message and underscored the importance of adequate verification for progress. We will have Ambassador Abramowitz follow up vigorously in Vienna. I then expressed your appreciation for the new movement on the Pentecostalist issue (described below), and said we would approach those still in the Embassy once the Pentecostalist outside the Embassy actually has left the Soviet Union. Dobrynin stressed that the less said publicly about this matter, the better. I agreed we would be as low key as possible. I gave Dobrynin a copy of your speech, and drew his attention to the section on ABMs. I stressed that this is an R&D effort consistent with the ABM treaty, that we presume they are pursuing such efforts as well, and that our programs are designed to enhance stability. I told him you would have more to say on arms control in a speech a week from tomorrow and that we would be in touch both at the negotiating table and here in Washington before then. Dobrynin said that he was disturbed that we appeared to be opening up a new area of the arms race and that there is no movement in the negotiations. I responded that this was not a "new area" and reiterated that our objective is to enhance stability.

(S/SENSITIVE)

2. Movement on Pentecostalists Case. We have learned that the Embassy family member who returned to Siberia last February, Lidia Vashchenko, has been summoned to the visa office and told to submit a complete application and the sum required for an exit visa. She plans to do so Thursday. This development is almost certainly a response to the March 16 suggestion made to Dobrynin on your behalf that her departure would be a way of convincing the remaining family members to return to their hometown to apply for visas. The quick response suggests the importance with which Moscow views your personal interest in the case.

(S/SENSITIVE)

3. Nicaragua in the UN Security Council. The UN Security Council began debate this afternoon on Nicaragua's allegations of US supported military intervention in Nicaragua. Nicaragua led off with a sharp attack on the US. Ambassador Kirkpatrick delivered a hard-hitting statement exposing Nicaragua's destabilizing activities, rejecting charges of US intervention, and endorsing peace initiatives by democratic Latin states. We are urging the Foreign Ministers of Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica to come to New York and support the democratic side in the debate. We are also trying to mobilize other moderate states, who can be helpful, to participate. (C)

4. Trip to Mexico. Secretary Regan and I plan to visit Mexico April 18 and 19. We hope the visit will allow an integrated review of the principal issues in US-Mexican relations, development of a bilateral work program for the next two years, and an in-depth exchange on the future of our relationship, including the potential for cooperation on regional issues. (C)

DECL:OADR

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~~SECRET~~ 23

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

83 MAR 25 A 9: 22

156710

WHITE HOUSE  
March 25, 1983  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Gromyko's New Position. Today's announcement of Gromyko's appointment as First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers leaves unclear whether he will relinquish his job as Foreign Minister. If, as has recently been rumored, Dobrynin or someone else of his stature replaces Gromyko as Foreign Minister, Gromyko will in effect have been kicked gently upstairs. Our Embassy in Moscow has no word regarding Gromyko's future as Foreign Minister. (C)

2. Denmark Withdraws from EC Sanctions Against Soviets. The Danish Government, as the result of a vote it lost in Parliament, finds itself unable to participate in the Poland-related EC import measures against the Soviets. We expect that the EC will continue sanctions even without the Danes, and we have urged them to. (C)

3. Lebanon: Marine-IDF Relations. Following a meeting Wednesday between Ambassador Habib and Defense Minister Arens to discuss ways to improve the situation between our Marines and the IDF in Beirut, our marine commander met with his IDF counterpart today. They agreed to establish an additional channel of communication and to exchange information on the operations of their respective units in the Beirut area. (C)

4. Egypt: Strategic Cooperation. Assistant Secretary Veliotes earlier this week chaired bilateral talks in Cairo on U.S.-Egyptian strategic military cooperation. The talks were prompted by indications that this cooperation was beginning to be strained by Egyptian concerns we were disregarding their political sensitivities about U.S. military activities in Egypt. The atmosphere for the talks was excellent; the Egyptians reiterated the continuity of their policy in this area. Several outstanding issues were resolved, while proposed solutions to others are still being considered by the Egyptians. On balance, we seem to have reassured the Egyptians of our sensitivity to their concerns and demonstrated the importance to us of Egyptian strategic cooperation. (S)

5. Trip to OECD Ministerial. I intend to lead the U.S. delegation to the OECD Ministerial in Paris, May 9-10. This will provide an important opportunity to describe in detail the U.S. economic recovery and to further the process of East-West economic and trade policy discussions now underway. I am planning stops in Turkey, Greece, and Germany prior to the Paris meetings. (C)

DECL:OADR

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRP M453/3 #156710

BY *RW*

NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1983  
102

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for March 25, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(h), E.O. 12058, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW DATE 4/11/13

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WASHINGTON

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RECEIVED  
March 25, 1983

83 MAR 25 A 8: 01

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

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DECLASSIFIED

DECL:OADR

**SECRET**

BY

NLRR M453/3 #156711  
RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

DECLASSIFIED

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NLR: M453/3 #156712

NARA DATE 9/2/16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

156712

March 25, 1983

83 MAR 27 A 6: 22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTFrom: George P. Shultz *WPS*WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NATO's Special Consultative Group Endorses INF Proposal. Friday, NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), meeting in Brussels, expressed strong support for the new INF initiative you have suggested. Allied representatives fully endorsed the interim proposal outlined in your March 22 letter. They agreed upon a public statement expressing unanimous Allied support which will be issued following your speech. They were also very grateful for our thorough consultations. Two points emerged from the discussion. First, all expressed the hope that your speech could be moved back a day from the 31st to the 30th, in order to maximize public impact in Europe and the ability of Allied leaders to endorse your proposal immediately. (Many European newspapers do not publish on Good Friday and many Allied leaders are planning to be away from their capitals for the Easter weekend.) Second, there was considerable discussion of whether we should offer a concrete figure for U.S. and Soviet limits. All felt that we should advance specific numbers at some not too distant point. The German representative expressed a preference for waiting until the next negotiating round in May, while the representatives of the U.K., Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Canada, and Norway argued that it was important that their publics know next week that we had put a concrete proposal to the Soviets, including a specific number. (SECRET)

CSCE Meeting Recesses. The CSCE review meeting in Madrid today recessed until April 19. A revised concluding document tabled by the neutral and non-aligned participants is now the focus of debate. We believe this document stops short of what we need on human rights, given the deteriorating Soviet and Eastern European record. The language on the mandate for the European security conference also needs tightening. The Dutch and British support us. Other Allies, including the FRG, would like to conclude the meeting soon on the basis of minimal revisions to the neutral's draft. We will use the recess to work for continued Allied unity on a firm approach. The Soviets have not yet shown their hand. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Nicaraguan Interior Minister Requests Trip to U.S. Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, a founder of the Sandinista Front, has requested talks with senior U.S. officials "to explore the possibility of rapprochement" during a proposed visit to the U.S. in April. Borge and a large delegation plan to visit U.S. universities. We have instructed our Ambassador in Nicaragua to inform Borge that: we see no useful purpose in talks when Nicaragua is attacking the U.S. and Honduras in the UN Security Council; if Nicaragua is serious about improving relations, it must first take steps to promote pluralism, respect the principles of the San Jose Declaration, and end support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Our Embassy is also instructed to refer any visa application by Borge to Washington for a decision. (SECRET)

OADR: GDS


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~~SECRET~~ 27

156713



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1983

83 MAR 27 A 6: 22

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTFrom: George P. Shultz *GPS*WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

NATO's Special Consultative Group Endorses INF Proposal. Friday, NATO's Special Consultative Group (SCG), meeting in Brussels, expressed strong support for the new INF initiative you have suggested. Allied representatives fully endorsed the interim proposal outlined in your March 22 letter. They agreed upon a public statement expressing unanimous Allied support which will be issued following your speech. They were also very grateful for our thorough consultations. Two points emerged from the discussion. First, all expressed the hope that your speech could be moved back a day from the 31st to the 30th, in order to maximize public impact in Europe and the ability of Allied leaders to endorse your proposal immediately. (Many European newspapers do not publish on Good Friday and many Allied leaders are planning to be away from their capitals for the Easter weekend.) Second, there was considerable discussion of whether we should offer a concrete figure for U.S. and Soviet limits. All felt that we should advance specific numbers at some not too distant point. The German representative expressed a preference for waiting until the next negotiating round in May, while the representatives of the U.K., Belgium, Portugal, Italy, Canada, and Norway argued that it was important that their publics know next week that we had put a concrete proposal to the Soviets, including a specific number. (SECRET)

CSCE Meeting Recesses. The CSCE review meeting in Madrid today recessed until April 19. A revised concluding document tabled by the neutral and non-aligned participants is now the focus of debate. We believe this document stops short of what we need on human rights, given the deteriorating Soviet and Eastern European record. The language on the mandate for the European security conference also needs tightening. The Dutch and British support us. Other Allies, including the FRG, would like to conclude the meeting soon on the basis of minimal revisions to the neutral's draft. We will use the recess to work for continued Allied unity on a firm approach. The Soviets have not yet shown their hand. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Nicaraguan Interior Minister Requests Trip to U.S. Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, a founder of the Sandinista Front, has requested talks with senior U.S. officials "to explore the possibility of rapprochement" during a proposed visit to the U.S. in April. Borge and a large delegation plan to visit U.S. universities. We have instructed our Ambassador in Nicaragua to inform Borge that: we see no useful purpose in talks when Nicaragua is attacking the U.S. and Honduras in the UN Security Council; if Nicaragua is serious about improving relations, it must first take steps to promote pluralism, respect the principles of the San Jose Declaration, and end support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. Our Embassy is also instructed to refer any visa application by Borge to Washington for a decision. (SECRET)

OADR: GDS

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

The President has seen

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 26, 1983

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday, March 25, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13



cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

Attached is George Shultz's evening Report for Friday, March 22, 1983.

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report  
FROM: WILLIAM F. CLARK

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

69

March 22, 1983

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. President

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

156714

March 25 1983  
83 MAR 26 A 8: 25MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENTFrom: George P. Shultz *WBS*WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

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OADR: GDS

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~~SECRET~~ 30

## THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)&gt;25Yrs

March 26, 1983

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *WJS*

83 MAR 27 A 6: 22

Nicaragua -- Movement or Ploy? Ambassador Quaintanilla privately Friday with Nicaraguan leader Tomas Borge to turn off Borge's proposed trip to the U.S. Borge said he had wanted to make contact for the purpose of improving relations. Quainton restated our position: improvement in relations depends on Nicaraguan performance not on trips. Borge said that if so, the U.S. has his assurance that effective now there will be no more arms resupply flights to El Salvador from Nicaragua. He added that this undertaking did not constitute an admission that resupply was going on. Borge said he was sure that the U.S. could verify Nicaraguan performance. At the same time, he rejected any possibility of a deal exchanging an end of the Salvadoran insurgency for an end to the anti-Sandinista movement. As     Salvadoran guerrilla stocks are up, Borge's offer may be a throwaway or he may be prepared to release the offer as part of a public play. In any case, we are holding this information very closely and will watch for evidence of Nicaraguan good will. (SECRET)

Nicaragua in the Security Council. Friday, the Security Council continued debate on Nicaragua's complaint. Nicaragua reported new border incidents and warned of possible internationalization of the conflict. Most speakers urged a regional settlement, with a number supporting Nicaragua. Ambassador Kirkpatrick strongly rebutted accusations against the U.S. and detailed Cuban/Nicaraguan destabilization activities. The debate is expected to continue into early next week. At our urging, the foreign ministers of El Salvador and Honduras are coming to New York to address the Council on Monday, March 28.

Meeting with OECD Secretary General. Friday OECD Secretary General Van Lennep expressed his willingness to work closely with us in achieving our goals on the East-West trade studies. He suggested that this spring the OECD Secretariat might put forward conclusions that would: 1) suggest that there's not much commercial future in trade in manufactured goods with the Eastern Bloc; 2) that OECD countries are defying the judgment of the market by expanding government-guaranteed credit while banks are cutting back; 3) that the USSR may be able to twist the balance of advantage in trade to its advantage; 4) that the prospective balance of payments problem of the USSR poses the possibility it will seek more credit from the West--something which the West should not want to grant in view of its experience in lending to Eastern Europe. I welcomed these views and encouraged Van Lennep to do his best to get agreement to them by the member countries of the OECD. (SECRET)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

OADR: GDS

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NLRR M459/3 #152715  
BY *PN* NARA DATE *11/28/17*



156716  
~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

83 MAR 29 AID: 42

March 28, 1983  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

1. Initial Soviet Reaction to INF Proposal. Paul Nitze met privately with Soviet Ambassador Kvitsinskiy today to preview the INF interim proposal he will table tomorrow. I covered the same points with Ambassador Dobrynin (reported to you in a separate memo). Kvitsinskiy indicated that the Soviets had anticipated such a proposal, and it might have led to progress if it had been made two months ago. Now, it was "too late". In tomorrow's plenary, he would agree to report our proposal to Moscow. However, Kvitsinskiy anticipated "an immediate and unambiguous rejection" from Moscow after your speech. (S)

2. Chilean Foreign Minister's Visit. Miguel Schweitzer, Chile's new Foreign Minister, met with me today to seek our help with the IMF and a bridge loan to restore confidence in his country's economy. I urged that Chile look for ways to comply with the IMF. Schweitzer also urged that we not certify Argentina soon, despite its human rights improvements. He argued it would lead to a political and military imbalance between the two countries. I replied that we had not made a final decision, but could not hold back, given Argentina's progress, just because of parallelism with other friends of ours. We agreed to stay in close touch on both issues. (S)

3. Greek Base Talks. We gained ground in the last round of the Greek base talks. The prospects for an agreement in the reasonably near term are looking up. Tabling the \$220 million FMS increase which you approved got the Greeks moving in the negotiations. Nevertheless, hard issues remain that could drag out or indeed derail an agreement. These include: a US commitment to preserve the balance of forces (read: against Turkey); a specific commitment to annual increases in security assistance; and a Greek representative at US military facilities charged with "verifying" US observance of the agreement. The fifth round begins in two weeks. (S)

4. Kidnapping of Texaco Executive in Colombia. Tuesday is the deadline imposed by the abductors of Kenneth Bishop for Texaco to agree to their demands. To date, after several telephonic contacts between the abductors and a negotiator for Texaco, the kidnappers appear to be interested in only a ransom payment of \$10 million, rather than any political demands. There are some indications that Bishop was kidnapped by the Revolutionary Peoples' Organization, which abducted and killed a Colombian official last year. Texaco and its security consultants seem pessimistic regarding Bishop's ultimate fate, but are willing to pay a ransom. (S)

DECL:OADR

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NLR 1145313 #156716  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

32  
The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

March 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday,  
March 28, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/11/13





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~~SECRET~~ 33

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

S/S 8309158

March 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GPS*

*DR* 83 MAR 29 A 9:27

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3#156717

~~SECRET~~

BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday,  
March 29, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

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MARCH 30, 1983

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156719  
~~SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1983

BY *DL* NLRR M453/3 #156719  
NARA DATE 9/2/16  
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *47*

S/S 8309330  
83 MAY 30 A 7:40

1. Soviet Reaction in Geneva to INF Proposal. Responding to Ambassador Nitze's presentation of your interim proposal, Soviet negotiator Kvitsinskiy said that the US proposal would be analyzed, but that the USSR could not accept either deployment of any new US missiles in Europe or Soviet missile levels below that of the UK and France. Kvitsinskiy remarked that the US proposal contained nothing new. The Soviets were required to reduce unilaterally while the US deployed. This would not be seen as a positive move in Moscow. Kvitsinskiy did, however, accept the US proposal to resume negotiations on May 17. The negative Soviet reaction was roughly what we expected. The Soviet delegation has been negative and uncooperative throughout this round, apparently in an effort to deepen European apprehensions that the talks are at an impasse, and thereby to create added public pressure to delay or abandon US deployments. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

2. Meeting with Zambian President Kaunda. I saw the Zambian President for thirty minutes this afternoon in preparation for your meeting and lunch with him Wednesday. I told him we are aware of the very difficult drought conditions in southern Africa and said we will try to help. Kaunda was grateful. Tomorrow morning I will meet with him for an hour to discuss southern Africa. I also plan to meet with Kaunda after lunch for an intimate session on Angola and UNITA. Kaunda said he is very much looking forward to meeting you and has come here to learn. I hope by the end of his stay he will be persuaded of our commitment to a Namibia settlement and of our competence to achieve one. He is superbly placed to reassure the leaders of southern Africa, including the Angolans, about our readiness to work for a fair deal. (S)

3. Ken Dam's Visit to Hungary. Ken was warmly received in Hungary last week at the end of his European trip. He met with the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The Hungarians have taken major steps away from the Soviet economic model and are actively considering democratic reforms which they see as linked to the success of their economic reforms. The Hungarians gave Ken the opportunity to go on national television to give their people an opportunity to hear directly our side of the arms control debate. The technique they use is to ask hard-line Soviet questions but allow the foreign guest to answer as he pleases and at length, thereby assuring the Soviets that the interviewer is a reliable Communist while allowing the Hungarian public to hear a Western point of view. (C)

DECL:OADR

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~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

156718

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GP*

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DECL:OADR

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MLR M453/3#156718  
BY *LW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

~~SECRET~~

156720  
37  
SENSITIVE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 29, 1983

S/S 8309330

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *GP*

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/3 #156720  
BY *FW* NARA DATE 9/2/16

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 31, 1983

*RC*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK  
SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday, March 30, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *4/11/13*

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

156725

39

BY fw NLRR M453/3 #156725  
NARA DATE 9/2/16THE SECRETARY OF STATE MAR 31  
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE

MAR 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz <sup>MS</sup>WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Meeting with President Kaunda. After your discussions with President Kaunda, I spent another hour with him on southern Africa. I reviewed in great detail the proposals we have given the Angolans. Kaunda wished us well and said he was prepared to be helpful if he could find the right way to do so. He expected us to stay in touch with him. Kaunda knows the odds are long and is worried for us; he would have preferred that we not insist on the withdrawal of Cuban troops. Nevertheless, he will support the process of negotiations privately and work behind the scenes to bolster Angolan confidence. (S)

2. Poland. The Polish Charge today provided his government's response to our warning that if Warsaw went ahead with its threat to force five Polish nationals to end their employment with our Embassy we would expel five non-diplomatic Polish commercial representatives from the US. The Charge said Warsaw had decided that the five individuals involved could continue their work at the Embassy. We suspect that the fact that we are continuing to work on a response to the visit of the special Polish emissary last January, combined with our expulsion threat, led Warsaw to reconsider its position. The Poles have also informed us that they are ready to accredit a UPI correspondent in Warsaw, and we now plan to accredit their official news agency's correspondent here. Both will be accredited on April 1. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

3. El Salvador: Release of Two American Journalists. The Government of El Salvador announced today the release of two American journalists detained under suspicion of having contacts with a US-based gun dealer. One of the reporters has been ordered not to leave the country until completion of the investigation. Ambassador Hinton had raised the detention of these journalists with both President Magana and Defense Minister Garcia. The FBI will follow up on El Salvador's request for information on the reporter's alleged contact. (C)

4. Proposed Travel of Central American Political Figures. We expect some public reaction to our decisions on the visa requests of three Central American political figures who wish to visit the US. We have granted Roberto D'Aubuisson, president of the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly and President of the right-wing ARENA party, a one-entry tourist visa to visit the US on private business. This decision reverses a 1980 determination that D'Aubuisson's entry was not then in the US interest. D'Aubuisson's current participation in the evolution of democratic institutions in El Salvador, however, warrants issuance of a visa at this time. We intend to deny a visa to Tomas Borge, member of the Sandinista ruling junta, who has requested a visa to fulfill speaking engagements at Harvard and Johns Hopkins. Borge intended to visit in the company of approximately 15 Sandinista revolutionaries. Eden Pastora, a former Sandinista commander and now leader of an opposition exile group operating from Costa Rica, also plans a US visit. We have not yet received a visa application, but would view his request favorably. (C)

DECL:OADR

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday,  
March 31, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/1/13



~~TOP SECRET~~

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156726

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

83 APR 1

A 9:51

SENSITIVE

March 31, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Negotiations with the UK on Nuclear Control. Larry Eagleburger led an interagency team in the second round of discussions with the British to update our arrangements on control of nuclear weapons. The update takes account of the scheduled deployment of cruise missiles later this year. A mutually acceptable compromise was reached on the one remaining technical issue. The most difficult problem remains, however--what Mrs. Thatcher might say about these arrangements in response to public calls for more explicit British control over the use of US weapons. She is under considerable political pressure on this issue and consequently wants to go further publicly than we can accept. (We want to avoid demands for similar arrangements from other allies.) Larry and his British interlocutor agreed to correspond further, but in the end Mrs. Thatcher may want to raise this with you directly. (TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE)

2. China: Hu Na Political Asylum Case. The new Chinese Ambassador, Zhang Wenjin, expressed strong concern to Ken Dam today over press reports that the State Department had advised INS to grant political asylum to Chinese tennis player Hu Na. Zhang argued that if Ms. Hu returns to China, she will not be persecuted and will be allowed to continue to play tennis both at home and abroad. He noted that he was impressed by the importance all whom he had met in Washington placed on good US-China relations and had conveyed this to Beijing. A decision to grant Ms. Hu political asylum would send the opposite message and be a "heavy blow" to the relationship. Ken told Zhang that he could not confirm the press reports. He emphasized that Ms. Hu's case must be handled according to established legal procedures and offered a briefing by our lawyers. Ken emphasized that it would be unfortunate if this case were allowed to interfere in our relationship. (C)

3. Cuban Apology for Overflights. On March 4 and 5 the Cuban state airline, Cubana, violated air traffic control regulations and overflew Griffiss Air Base, a SAC installation. On March 21, we informed the Cuban Interests Section in Washington that Cubana overflights between Canada and Cuba were being suspended from March 25 to April 7. The Cubans responded Monday with a note stating that Cubana acknowledged the violations, had relieved the responsible crews of their duties, and asked the Cuban Foreign Ministry to convey the "appropriate apologies" for the incidents. While the Cubans are anxious to protect their overflight rights in the United States, the apologetic tone of the Cuban note is highly unusual. (C)

4. Soviet Response on Nuclear Treaties. The Soviet Minister-Counselor called on Rick Burt today to register Moscow's exception to the "impression created" that it had simply rejected the US proposal to negotiate verification improvements in the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion treaties, and that it was against effective verification in general. He indicated that the Soviets intend to make all the elements of their response public. Mr. Burt cautioned against starting a propaganda campaign and emphasized the importance which you attach to these treaties, and to verification problems overall. (S)

DECLASSIFIED

DECL:OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

RV

NLR M453/3#156726

NADA DATE 4/24/00