

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

## Digital Library Collections

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Agency File

**Folder Title:** Secretary of State's Evening Reports  
(06/16/1983-06/30/1983)

**Box:** RAC Box 6A

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*Last Updated: 4/18/2024*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 4/3/2013

**File Folder** SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (06/16/1983-06/30/1983)

**FOIA**

M453

**Box Number** 6A

SHIFRINSON

57

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156957	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/15/1983	B1
156958	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/16/1983	B1
156959	MEMO	GEORGE SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/17/1983	B1
156960	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR RE. CSCE <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	2	6/20/1983	B1
156962	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156961] <i>R 3/21/2018 M453/4</i>	1	6/20/1983	B1
156961	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 3/21/2018 M453/4</i>	1	6/20/1983	B1
156963	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/21/1983	B1
156964	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR RE. SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA TRIP <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/23/1983	B1
156965	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/23/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156967	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156966] <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/22/1983	B1
156966	MEMO	SHULTZ TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/22/1983	B1
156968	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/24/1983	B1
156969	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156968] <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/24/1983	B1
156970	CABLE	SECTO07034 <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	3	6/26/1983	B1
156971	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/27/1983	B1
156972	CABLE	SECTO 7059 <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	3	6/28/1983	B1
156974	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156973] <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/28/1983	B1
156973	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/28/1983	B1

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**File Folder** SECRETARY OF STATE EVENING REPORT (06/16/1983-06/30/1983)

**FOIA**

M453

**Box Number** 6A

SHIFRINSON

57

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
156975	MEMO	DAM TO RR <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/29/1983	B1
156976	MEMO	DAM TO RR [COPY OF DOC. 156975] <i>R 7/20/2016 M453/5</i>	1	6/29/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED  
SS

MEMORANDUM

1983 JUN 16 PM 12: 13

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

*The President has seen*

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 16, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*OR*

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday,  
June 15, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

*RW* ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*4/3/13*

146400

146400

NY 100-100000  
TO DIRECTOR  
FROM NEW YORK  
SUB: [illegible]

RE: [illegible]  
[illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

RE: [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]  
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]  
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

65

146400

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28  
RECEIVED



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

S/S 8318527

156957

June 15, 1983

RECEIVED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *WPS*

83 JUN 16 P2: 14

1. SFRC Testimony: U.S./Soviet Relations. I testified yesterday before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the current state of U.S./Soviet relations. Most of the Committee attended, and we had a detailed, friendly exchange. I laid out the challenges posed by the Soviets in recent years and steps the Administration has taken to implement our responses. I defined our agenda as seeking improvement in Soviet performance on human rights, reducing the risk of war through sound agreements on arms control, managing and resolving regional conflicts, and improving bilateral relations through a series of confidence-building measures. Senators Percy, Pell, and Tsongas urged us to arrange a summit meeting with Andropov. I countered that we believed such a meeting could only be worthwhile if it were well-prepared in advance and if there were some prospects for success; we would not push a summit just for its own sake. (UNCLASSIFIED)

2. Meeting on Soviet Jewry. I met yesterday with leaders of the major American Jewish organizations to reaffirm our commitment to Soviet Jews. I also informed them of the reasons for recommending continued Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment for Romania. Earlier, the group told Larry Eagleburger they would make Congress aware of their generally supportive position on continued MFN. The Jewish leaders expressed very warm appreciation for your efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry, including your recent remarks to the Anti-Defamation League. They expressed strong support for opening a Consulate General in Kiev because they consider the American diplomatic presence in the Soviet Union a "lifeline" for Soviet Jews. (SECRET)

3. Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) Plenum. The Party Plenum concluded its two-day meeting June 15 with no major departures in the economic and foreign policy fields. The changes in the Soviet leadership which took place were also limited and very conservative considering the importance of the event. Andropov's standing appears not to have been strengthened significantly, although he was greatly praised by Konstantin Chernenko, his erstwhile rival. The Plenum marked the return of Chernenko to the spotlight, with his first major speech in several months. Andropov closed the Plenum with a relatively orthodox speech of his own. Today the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet chose Andropov as the President. (CONFIDENTIAL)

4. Papal Visit to Poland Begins. The Pope will arrive in Warsaw today to begin his seven-day visit to his homeland. Although Government and Church hope the visit goes smoothly, interest currently focuses on the reported house arrest of Lech Walesa and government statements that there will be no meeting between him and the Pope. The question is still open, however, and a top Polish leader has told the foreign press that a compromise is possible on the question. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

BY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLR 1453/5 #156957  
RW 7/20/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday,  
June 16, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

RW  
4/3/13



146 429

144

SECRET

TO: DIRECTOR  
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK  
SUBJECT: [illegible]

Re New York letter to Bureau dated 1/15/54.

RE: [illegible]  
[illegible]  
[illegible]

65

SECRET

1/15/54

THE WHITE HOUSE

1/15/54

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR

M453/G#156958

NARA DATE 7/10/16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 16, 1983

~~SECRET~~

83 JUN 17 AIO: 09

156958

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *ups*

1. Meeting with President Magana. In a cordial meeting upon his arrival, I assured President Magana that recent U.S. personnel changes would not affect our policies toward Central America. Magana expressed appreciation for our continued support. We agreed that the search for peace should exclude negotiations over power sharing. I told Magana his talks here would touch on the scheduling of elections, the performance of the armed forces, human rights, and the functioning of the judicial process, including the cases of murdered Americans. I suggested that there was still an opportunity for positive steps on these issues to be included in the record for the next certification to Congress in July. Magana assured me of his support for elections this year, but noted recent Constituent Assembly uncertainty on this issue. He also underlined El Salvador's pessimism about the Contadora process, especially in view of Mexico's tilt toward Nicaragua.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

2. Meeting with Israeli Negotiator Kimche. Israel's Chief Lebanon negotiator, David Kimche, saw Assistant Secretary Veliotes today and made absolutely clear that Israel wants to move just as soon as possible to partial withdrawal from Lebanon. Kimche said his Government ideally would have preferred to have started yesterday, but recognizes it must consult with Lebanon and the U.S. The Israeli scenario includes the immediate exchange of instruments of ratification of the Agreement and the setting up of the Joint Liaison Committee. Israel and Lebanon would agree in the Committee to describe Israeli redeployment in Lebanon as a demonstrable step towards full withdrawal consistent with the Agreement. Israel would then redeploy, perhaps to the Damur River. When Veliotes asked what would happen once the clock was ticking and 90 days were up, Kimche said that the parties would simply say there was a suspension in the timetable. Veliotes and Draper outlined a number of the difficulties entailed in such a scenario and promised to address the issue immediately. Kimche also asked that Draper be sent back to the region just as soon as possible. (SECRET)

3. Chinese Protest of Pan Am's Service to Taiwan. The PRC today delivered a formal protest to our Charge in Beijing over Pan Am's renewed service to Taiwan, and announced measures including the termination of Guangzhou as an alternate airport for Pan Am's flights to Hong Kong. The PRC has asked us to designate a new airline which does not serve Taiwan to replace Pan Am, and called for consultations under the civil aviation agreement, while indicating that Pan Am can continue service to China "for a period of time." The Guangzhou decision does not violate our bilateral civil aviation agreement but will entail higher fuel costs and violates, at least in spirit, our interpretation of the Normalization Communique. We will consult with Pan Am and formulate next steps including a possible U.S. protest.  
(CONFIDENTIAL)

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

DACOM # 93

DEX # \_\_\_\_\_

TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

PAGES 2

RELEASER JF

DTG 181355Z

FROM/LOCATION/

1. WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT// CAMP DAVID

2. \_\_\_\_\_

3. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

2. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

FOR THE MORNING PACKAGE

Shultz Report

~~SECRET~~ RW 4/3/13

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED

1983 JUN 18 A 10:08

CAMP DAVID

6

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

June 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Friday,  
June 17, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

4/3/13





THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

7  
~~SECRET~~

156959

June 17, 1983

83 JUN 18 P 3: 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. My Meeting with Ambassador Rosenne. I had newly arrived Israeli Ambassador-designate Rosenne and Israel's Chief Lebanon negotiator, David Kimche, in Friday afternoon for an informal get-acquainted session with my senior staff and some others from around town. Rosenne told me we can expect early next week to have Prime Minister Begin's reaction to your letter inviting him to visit. Kimche rehearsed the arguments for moving toward Israeli partial withdrawal that he had raised with Nick Veliotis the previous day and once again urged that we send a representative of the stature of Morris Draper back to the region. I cautioned Rosenne and Kimche that we must all carefully think through the implications of starting the clock ticking on the Agreement. Rosenne also pressed for our continued help with Spanish recognition of Israel, particularly in light of the visit by Gonzalez next week. (SECRET)

2. Eagleburger-Kimche Discussion. Larry Eagleburger held more than seven hours of discussions on Thursday and Friday with Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General David Kimche on global issues ranging from Soviet intentions to the situation in Africa. As has traditionally been true, the Israelis are anxious to collaborate with us on projects in Central America and Africa if we can develop funding mechanisms. It is clear that in general there is a considerable coincidence of views on trends in these regions. Kimche will be seeing Bud McFarlane before he departs for Israel Saturday, and Larry agreed in principle to visit Israel in the early fall for the next round of what will be an ongoing series of exchanges with Kimche. (SECRET)

3. Greek Base Negotiations. Agreement has at times seemed near but, in the end, the negotiators were unable to conclude a new defense agreement. Ambassador Bartholomew will return to Washington this weekend for further consultations. Over the past two weeks, the Greek side sought a number of changes precipitated by expert and political level review of the previously closely held text. Particularly sensitive is the issue of how, or if, the agreement will incorporate a provision for continuity beyond the initial period of five years. A further round of talks is expected next month. (SECRET)

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/5 #156959  
BY *LW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1983

*President has seen*  
**SECRET**  
156960

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject: CSCE - Spanish Initiative to End the Madrid Meeting

On June 17, Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez put forward a personal initiative to end the impasse that has blocked a conclusion at the Madrid CSCE review meeting. When you meet Gonzalez on June 21, he will be hoping for your reaction to his proposals.

Gonzalez's initiative consists of a proposal for agreement to four basic points concerning the neutral and non-aligned draft final document (RM-39, Revised) that have been most essential to us. Specifically, he proposes: (1) agreement to hold a "human contacts" experts' meeting in Switzerland in 1986 to take up problems in the field of emigration and family reunification, (2) that the language referring to the rights of citizens to review implementation of CSCE commitments be amended to incorporate one of the West's two suggested improvements, (3) that an undesirable ambiguity be removed from the mandate for the Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament (CDE), and (4) that the CDE begin in January 1984 rather than in November 1983.

The Spanish package does not contain certain other Western proposals that we have kept as negotiating points until now. These include clarification of the mandate for the human rights experts' meeting, addition of language against jamming, and the second of our two suggested improvements in language referring to the rights of citizens to review implementation of CSCE commitments. In addition, we would have to cease our unilateral efforts to achieve better language on trade union rights, on the timing of the next CSCE follow-up meeting, and on other aspects of the CDE mandate.

Prior to the Spanish initiative, the Madrid meeting had been stalemated since May 6, when the Soviet Union accepted RM-39, Revised, in its entirety and called upon other

**SECRET**

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/5 #156960  
BY *RW* NARA DATE *7/20/14*



participants to do the same. The Soviet Union had refused even to discuss any of the changes which the West advocated. Initial Soviet reaction to Gonzalez's initiative has been negative, but there has not yet been a formal Soviet response. It seems clear that the European Community is prepared to accept the Spanish initiative, although publicly the Europeans have so far stopped short of doing so, in order to avoid branding this a "Western" initiative before the neutral and non-aligned governments have given it their support. That support will almost certainly be forthcoming.


Response to Gonzalez: Coupled with the assurances which Max Kampelman has received from the Soviets on concrete "gestures" in the human rights field, the Spanish initiative meets our essential needs on CSCE and a CDE. I recommend that when you meet with Gonzalez on June 21 you tell him that we welcome his leadership, that we are prepared to agree to bring the Madrid meeting to a close on the basis of his proposals, and that we will do what we can to make his initiative a successful one. You should emphasize that agreeing to his proposals takes us to the outer limits of our flexibility, and that if others did not also agree we would have to go back to our earlier positions. We are not in a position to bargain down from the Spanish initiative.

Public Handling: We believe it is preferable not to go public at this stage with our support. Our public endorsement should be channeled through NATO, where we will be consulting in the next few days. What we should say publicly is similar to what Max Kampelman has said in Madrid and to the European Community statement, i.e., we welcome Spain's having advanced the initiative; we will be discussing it with our Allies in the next few days; and we hope for an early successful conclusion of the Madrid meeting.

Recommendation:

That you accept Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez's initiative to end the Madrid CSCE review meeting, contingent upon agreement of all other participating countries, and take the approach set out above for your private discussion with Gonzalez and public statements to the press. All interested agencies concur on this recommendation.

Approve



Disapprove

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

RECEIVED  
SS

1983 JUN 21 AM 10:02

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET ATTACHMENT

June 21, 1983

PR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Monday,  
June 20, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

SECRET ATTACHMENT

FW  
4/13/13

10/11/68

44/68

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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RECEIVED  
NOV 15 1968

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

5/5 8319029

156962

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz <sup>243</sup>

83 JUN 21 A 7: 48

1. Spanish Prime Minister's Arrival. In our brief meeting today upon his arrival, Prime Minister Gonzalez said he wants to give priority in his talks with you Tuesday to reviewing bilateral relations. He said these were good due to the recent ratification of our security agreement. Gonzalez intends to discuss the weekend EC Summit at Stuttgart and his initiative to break the deadlock in the CSCE Conference. He is also interested in hearing our assessment of the Geneva INF negotiations. On Latin America, Gonzalez wants to describe the King's recent visit to Uruguay, and Spain's hope for political liberalization there. You may wish to comment on the exceptionally warm welcome the King received, and express your admiration for the King and for his contributions to Spanish democracy. (C)
2. Meeting with Lebanon's National Security Advisor. Lebanon's National Security Advisor Wadia Haddad informed me today that, according to his intelligence, Syria has not yet decided whether to withdraw its forces from Lebanon. His judgment is that Assad believes he can hold off making such a decision. Haddad also asserted that there is a division of opinion in Syria between hardliners (Assad, Khaddam) and moderates (Rifaat al-Assad, Assad's brother) which could be exploited. If Saudi Arabia were to offer \$5-6 billion to Syria for withdrawal, the moderates would be able to force a decision on Assad. Haddad confirmed that President Gemayel did not want to exchange instruments of ratification, thus putting the Lebanon-Israel Agreement into effect, until Syria's intentions on withdrawal became clear. He said that if Israel decided on a partial withdrawal, the Lebanese Armed Forces would be capable of moving in behind them, but an MNF presence would be required as a buffer to Syria's forces. (S)
3. Meeting with the EC-10 Ambassadors. Discussion today at my meeting with the EC Ambassadors focused on US-European relations and US-Soviet issues. The Ambassadors seemed to share my view that much progress in our mutual relations had been made during the last year, but that we needed to push ahead on tough issues such as agricultural trade. The Europeans objected strongly to aspects of the Administration's position on the Export Administration Act. On US-Soviet relations, I outlined in general our basic approach, noting the fact of my Saturday meeting with Dobrynin. The Europeans seemed generally supportive. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
4. Attack by Libyan-Supported Dissidents Imminent. The dissident forces of former President Goukouni, heavily fortified by Libyan arms and recruits, are now within 15-20 kilometers and are preparing to attack the northern Chadian stronghold of Faya Largeau very shortly. Faya has been reinforced by Chadian President Habre's forces. There is no confirmation of Libyan troop involvement, but we continue to believe Libyan air support for the upcoming attack is likely. Over the weekend we alerted a number of friendly African countries of our concern and also consulted closely with the French who continue to refuse additional support for Habre. (S)

DECL:OADR



DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

S/S 8319029

SENSITIVE

156961

M45315 #156961  
NARA DATE: 3/21/88THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz <sup>ups</sup>

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DECL:OADR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report *DR*

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Tuesday, June 21, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

*RW* ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*4/3/13*



DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

SUPER SENSITIVE

S/S 8319204

156963

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 21, 1983

RECEIVED

83 JUN 22 A 8:20

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *ups*

1. Bandar Delivers Message on Middle East. Saudi Prince Bandar today expressed King Fahd's deep concern about the Middle East situation and briefed me on his own June 19 meeting with Syrian President Assad. Fahd believes the Soviets are adroitly playing their cards in being fully supportive of Assad and that it is essential that we work closely together at this critical juncture. Bandar touched on the strong family pressures on Fahd to pull back from our close relationship because we cannot be counted on to deliver. Bandar reported that Assad is bitter towards the US, believing that he has been disdained and ignored, after being lied to by us regarding the June 1982 ceasefire. Assad nonetheless wants a dialogue with the US. He believes he is in a better position to confront Israel today than he would be should the Lebanese-Israeli agreement be implemented, and is unwilling to accept the existing Lebanon-Israel accord. He assured Fahd that he will not initiate hostilities, but if attacked would launch surface-to-surface missiles against Israeli population centers. Bandar strongly implied that an agreement focusing on the security interests of Israel and Syria might be possible. (SECRET/SUPER SENSITIVE)

2. Further Discussions with Gonzalez. Tuesday afternoon I spent another hour with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez who remarked that he felt his meeting with you had been extremely positive. He particularly appreciated the ease and sincerity of communication. I told Gonzalez we were prepared to accept the Spanish CSCE initiative, and that we would announce this in a NATO context in the near future. I cautioned Gonzalez that this represented the limit of our flexibility, and he assured me that Spain did not intend to put forward additional proposals in response to possible Soviet pressure. I also told Gonzalez that the US supports Spanish accession to the EEC. He replied that he considers this to be a "decisive step" for the psychological orientation of the Spanish people. (C)

3. Cuban Response on Mariel Talks Proposal. Cuba responded with a diplomatic note June 17 to our May 25 request that it accept certain Cuban nationals from the Mariel Boatlift, calling our approach an "unacceptable" attempt to impose "unilateral" solutions on Cuba. We have reports indicating Cuba does not want to take back the excludables and is seeking to find a way to blame the US for the impasse. The note may have been formulated with that objective in mind. It does not close the door, however, to migration talks, and we are studying how best to respond. (S)

4. Japanese Expel Soviet Diplomats. The Japanese Government announced today that two Soviet KGB officers who tried to acquire computer technology illicitly have been ordered out of the country. This is the first time Japan has expelled a Soviet diplomat since World War II. The Foreign Ministry told our Embassy that it took this action to indicate solidarity with the US and Western European countries against Soviet espionage and to demonstrate increased Japanese resolve to prevent the illegal flow of high technology to Warsaw Pact countries. (C)

DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~

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156964

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

83 JUN 22 P11: 51  
June 23, 1983

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*  
SUBJECT: My South and Southeast Asia Trip

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
*PS*

I leave this morning on a 13-day trip to Southeast and South Asia, my first visit to these areas since becoming Secretary of State. At all my stops, I will seek support for our global security and economic objectives as reflected in the Williamsburg Summit declarations, stressing that our economic recovery is well underway. Additionally:

Southeast Asia

I will be joining the Foreign Ministers of the five members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bangkok for a "post-ministerial meeting" between ASEAN and its "dialogue partners" (the US, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the EC). I will emphasize strong American support for ASEAN efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem, and reassure them that we are responding constructively to their trade and other economic concerns. I will also ask their continued help in providing initial haven for Indochinese refugees and assure them of US determination to meet our responsibilities for ultimate resettlement. I will end my Bangkok stay with a morning of meetings with the Thai officials, capped by an audience with the King of Thailand.

Enroute to Bangkok, I will stop in Manila to give evidence of our satisfaction with the results of the recent review of our basing agreement. I will also stress to Marcos the importance of holding parliamentary elections next year and related human rights matters.

South Asia

I expect frank exchanges in New Delhi on a number of issues, e.g., Tarapur reactor spares, India's desire to borrow from the Asian Development Bank, high technology controls, Afghanistan, and India's proposal for a UN summit this fall. Throughout, I will convey to the Indians our desire to build constructive relations despite continuing differences, and nudge them to seek better ties with Pakistan and China.

In Islamabad, I will stress that progress toward democratization and in narcotics control will make it easier for us to sustain our renewed close ties, and exchange views with the Pakistani leaders on Afghanistan (reiterating our support for the four points of the UN resolutions) and on the Middle East (seeking Pak help in getting the Syrians out of Lebanon). I will express strong support for normalization of Indo-Pakistani ties.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/5 #156964  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/20/16



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

156965

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83 JUN 24 AIO: 33

S/S 8319452

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 23, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Chad: Attack by Libyan-Backed Dissidents Begins. The expected dissident attack on President Habre's northern Chadian outpost of Faya Largeau began at around 11:00 a.m. local time June 23. Libyan-backed dissidents attacked Faya from both the north and the west of the town. By nightfall, the dissidents had not been able to penetrate into the city, and Habre's troops were holding their own on the western outskirts. There is no indication yet of Libyan Air support for the attack or of direct Libyan ground troop involvement in the fighting. (C)

2. Embassy Pentecostals. The Vashchenko family received permission to leave the Soviet Union and is now on a train en route to Moscow. They should arrive there Sunday, June 26, and then travel on to Vienna. We believe the family will want to depart Vienna for Israel. The Israelis have preliminarily agreed to issue tourist visas in U.K. travel documents, which the Vaschenkos will receive in Vienna. As a fallback, we are prepared to bring them to the U.S. to obtain refugee travel documentation, as Lidia did. The other Pentecostal family, the Chmykhalovs, is still awaiting exit permission. The Soviets have made clear that an invitation from Lidia Vaschenko is needed to get the process moving, but Lidia does not want to do this until her family is out. Our public comments on developments, as in the departure of Lidia Vashchenko, will be kept to a minimum. (C)

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OADR

NLRR M453/5 #156965  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

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SS

1983 JUN 23 AM 8:35

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

SECRET-ATTACHMENT

June 23, 1983

*W*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Wednesday,  
June 22, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

*RW* SECRET-ATTACHMENT

*4/3/13*

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE

BY

NARA DATE

1/20/10

WASHINGTON

83 JUL 23

June 22, 1983

A 8: 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *gsh*

SITUATION ROOM

1. Breakfast with House and Senate Leaders. Minority Leader Bob Michel, Chairman Percy, Senator Kasten, Congressman Kemp and Congressman Broomfield had breakfast with me today at the State Department. We had a wide-ranging conversation about US-Soviet relations, the Middle East and Central America. They seemed particularly interested in Saudi efforts to bring about Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, our assessment of the relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union and domestic pressure in Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. On the legislative front, Senator Kasten, whose subcommittee fully funded our IMF request, urged the Administration to work the House conferees, specifically Chairmen Whitten and Long, possibly through the Speaker, to get them to accede to the Senate position and waive authorization. Bob Michel believes this outcome is unlikely and favors slowing down the conference on the 1983 supplemental in order to get an IMF authorization through the House, making an authorization waiver more achievable. In addition, Bill Broomfield urged us to find a suitable compromise with regard to the Zablocki-Boland bill prohibiting covert operations in Nicaragua. (C)

2. US-Japan Advisory Commission. Following your meeting this morning with the United States-Japan Advisory Commission, I hosted the group at lunch. I emphasized, as you had, our desire for views on how we can improve our relationship over the long haul without getting bogged down in the more emotional, current issues. I also pointed out our desire to have ideas and advice on significant issues, current and long-term, without necessarily waiting for final reports to be prepared. Judging from comments by Dave Packard, Ambassador Ushiba, the Japanese Chairman, and others, your comments had set the stage for proceeding this way. Dave indicated that rapport at the meeting was first-rate and the members got down to substantive discussion right from the start. (LOU)

3. Gonzalez Visit. Spanish Foreign Minister Moran told me this morning that Gonzalez was satisfied with his visit. Moran said that it had been "almost perfect", and that the Spanish press was taking a positive line. Moran alleged British inflexibility over Gibraltar, and hinted at a connection with Spanish decisions on NATO. I replied that we did not want to get in the middle of a problem involving two good friends and allies. I suggested that he talk directly with the new British Foreign Secretary. Also Moran suggested that US military aid to Morocco could encourage irredentist sentiments regarding the Spanish enclaves there. I assured him that was not our intention. (C)

4. CSCE. Following up on your expression of support to Felipe Gonzalez yesterday, we are working to secure a united allied position in favor of the Spanish CSCE initiative and to get Soviet agreement as well. Rick Burt, accompanied by Max Kampelman, who is back this week for consultations, also met today with Soviet Deputy Chief of Mission Sokolov to discuss the Spanish proposal. Both Rick and Max emphasized that we and the allies welcomed the Spanish package and were studying it. If we were to find it acceptable, it would be in lieu of our original amendments, embody the outer limit of our flexibility, and represent the basis for concluding the meeting. Sokolov noted the Spanish initiative "did not take the Soviet position into account." Max emphasized that the question was whether it was close enough to split the difference between us. Sokolov expressed appreciation for this exchange and undertook to report it to Moscow immediately. (S)

DECL:OADR



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19

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1983

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From : George P. Shultz *gps*

NLR 11453/5 #156966  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

1. Breakfast with House and Senate Leaders. Minority Leader Bob Michel, Chairman Percy, Senator Kasten, Congressman Kemp and Congressman Broomfield had breakfast with me today at the State Department. We had a wide-ranging conversation about US-Soviet relations, the Middle East and Central America. They seemed particularly interested in Saudi efforts to bring about Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, our assessment of the relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union and domestic pressure in Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. On the legislative front, Senator Kasten, whose subcommittee fully funded our IMF request, urged the Administration to work the House conferees, specifically Chairmen Whitten and Long, possibly through the Speaker, to get them to accede to the Senate position and waive authorization. Bob Michel believes this outcome is unlikely and favors slowing down the conference on the 1983 supplemental in order to get an IMF authorization through the House, making an authorization waiver more achievable. In addition, Bill Broomfield urged us to find a suitable compromise with regard to the Zablocki-Boland bill prohibiting covert operations in Nicaragua. (C)

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DECL:OADR

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 25, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Friday, June 24, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 4/3/13



~~SECRET~~

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SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
83 JUN 25 10 00 AM '83  
WASHINGTON 24

June 24, 1983  
WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Arafat Arrives in Tunis. Yasser Arafat arrived in Tunis today after being expelled by Syria. Arafat told the press he had been "officially informed of the necessity to leave Syria" despite his having been "officially" invited to Damascus in the first place. He added that the Syrian decision to expel him reminded him of his being forced to leave Beirut earlier and that he would place the issue of his expulsion by Syria "before the whole Arab nation."

Before leaving Damascus, Arafat had a meeting on June 24 with Soviet officials, who reportedly gave him a letter from Andropov. However, he apparently did not see Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud who arrived in Damascus at midday June 24.

2. Chad: Faya Largeau Falls. Chadian dissidents under former President Goukouni, with substantial Libyan logistical support, attacked the Habre Government's principal northern stronghold of Faya Largeau on June 23. By the morning of June 24 the attackers had taken the town. There is no indication of Libyan air strikes or other overt intervention in the attack.

The French plan to ship additional military supplies to Habre, and they have initiated a round of consultations with their EC partners and with African moderates. They may be preparing to broker a political solution to the conflict.

We doubt Habre can hold the capital against an attack which might come in another 10 days. Our ambassador has been instructed to tell Habre that he still has our backing, but that there will not be any dramatic increase in American support. With our prompting, the Nigerians and Chadians will be meeting in Lagos tomorrow to try to resolve outstanding differences stemming from their border dispute.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M45315 #156968  
BY *AW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

June 24, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz's Evening Report

Attached is George Shultz's Evening Report for Thursday,  
June 23, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

RW  
4/3/13



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24

156969

S/S 8319452

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

83 WASHINGTON 30

June 23, 1983

SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Chad: Attack by Libyan-Backed Dissidents Begins. The expected dissident attack on President Habre's northern Chadian outpost of Faya Largeau began at around 11:00 a.m. local time June 23. Libyan-backed dissidents attacked Faya from both the north and the west of the town. By nightfall, the dissidents had not been able to penetrate into the city, and Habre's troops were holding their own on the western outskirts. There is no indication yet of Libyan Air support for the attack or of direct Libyan ground troop involvement in the fighting. (C)

2. Embassy Pentecostals. The Vashchenko family received permission to leave the Soviet Union and is now on a train en route to Moscow. They should arrive there Sunday, June 26, and then travel on to Vienna. We believe the family will want to depart Vienna for Israel. The Israelis have preliminarily agreed to issue tourist visas in U.K. travel documents, which the Vaschenkos will receive in Vienna. As a fallback, we are prepared to bring them to the U.S. to obtain refugee travel documentation, as Lidia did. The other Pentecostal family, the Chaykhalovs, is still awaiting exit permission. The Soviets have made clear that an invitation from Lidia Vaschenko is needed to get the process moving, but Lidia does not want to do this until her family is out. Our public comments on developments, as in the departure of Lidia Vashchenko, will be kept to a minimum. (C)

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
OADR

NLRR M453/5 # 156969  
BY RW NARA DATE 7/20/16



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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156970

PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0023 DTG: 260328Z JUN 83 PSN: 018260  
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WHSR COMMENT: FOR THE PRESIDENT

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.) XB, XC  
SUBJECT: MY VISIT TO THE PHILIPPINES, JUNE  
25-26, 1983  
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ

DECLASSIFIED

NLRP M453/5 #156970

BY RW NARA DATE 7/20/16

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WE ARRIVED IN THE PHILIPPINES SATURDAY MORNING FOR A  
BRIEF STOPOVER ENROUTE TO BANGKOK FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING  
WITH THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS. THERE WAS TIME,  
HOWEVER, FOR A LONG BUSINESS MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS  
AND A HEAVY DOSE OF THE HOSIPTALITY THE PHILIPPINES ARE  
SO FAMOUS FOR.

3. YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MARCOS LAST SEPTEMBER--  
WHICH HE MENTIONED A NUMBER OF TIMES--SET A VERY  
POSITIVE TONE FOR THE U.S. PHILIPPINES RELATIONSHIP. MY

~~SECRET~~

26  
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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0023 DTG: 260328Z JUN 83 PSN: 018260

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VISIT CAME SHORTLY AFTER THE COMPLETION OF A REVIEW OF OUR MILITARY BASES AGREEMENT WITH THE PHILIPPINES THAT ESTABLISHES THE CONDITIONS FOR OUR ACCESS THROUGH THE END OF THE DECADE TO THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE MILITARY FACILITIES AT CLARK FIELD AND SUBIC BAY.

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4. PRESIDNET MARCOS'S MOST IMMEDIATE CONCERN, WHICH HE ASKED TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH ME TO DISCUSS, IS THE PRECARIOUS FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE PHILIPPINES. HE IS WORRIED THAT COMMERCIAL BANKS MIGHT FAIL TO RENEW THE PHILIPPINES' VERY LARGE SHORT-TERM DEBT, IN WHICH CASE THE CENTRAL BANK WOULD FIND ITSELF UNABLE TO MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE ASKED FOR OUR HELP AND, WHILE SOME OF THE THINGS HE ASKED US TO DO ARE CLEARLY NOT POSSIBLE, WE SHOULD DO WHATEVER WE PROPERLY CAN.

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5. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT HAS MANAGED ITS ECONOMY RELATIVELY WELL. THEY HAVE A FIRST CLASS GROUP OF ECONOMIC MANAGERS, HEADED BY PRIME MINISTER VIRATA (WHO IS ALSO FINANCE MINISTER) AND MARCOS HAS TAKEN SOME DIFFICULT DECISIONS, AT THEIR URGING, TO ADJUST TO THE PRESENT DIFFICULT WORLD ECONOMIC CONDITIONS. VIRATA AND THE TECHNOCRATS HAVE BEEN ATTACKED BY SOME OF THE OTHER MARCOS ADVISORS, LED BY MRS. MARCOS, AND I WENT OUT OF MY WAY TO EMPHASIZE TO PRESIDENT MARCOS THE CONFIDENCE THAT THE WORLD FINANCIAL COMMUNITY HAS IN VIRATA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE COURAGEOUS ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT ACTIONS THAT MARCOS HAS TAKEN.

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6. WITH CONTINUED GOOD MANAGEMENT, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY WILL BEGIN TO RESPOND WELL TO THE IMPROVING WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK. WHAT IS NEEDED IS SOME SHORT-TERM CREDIT BACKING TO GET THEM OVER THE PRESENT ROUGH PATCH. I TOLD THEM THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD WANT TO BE HELPFUL. DON REGAN IS DISCUSSING WITH THEM POSSIBLE WAYS THAT WE MIGHT DO SO. I HOPE THIS EFFORT SUCCEEDS,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY AIR 0023 DTG: 260328Z JUN 83 PSN: 018260

BECAUSE WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT STAKE IN THE ECONOMIC STABILITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND IN PREVENTING THE DEBT VIRUS FROM SPREADING TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN ASIA.

7. I AM LESS CONFIDENT OF PRESIDENT MARCOS' MANAGEMENT OF HIS INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS. THE PHILIPPINES BADLY NEEDS TO REBUILD THE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS THAT ATROPHIED DURING TEN YEARS OF MARTIAL LAW. THAT IS A DIFFICULT THING TO DO AT A TIME WHEN THE COUNTRY IS FACING A GROWING PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST INSURGENCY. HOWEVER, THE PHILIPPINES WILL BE STRONGER IN THE LONG-RUN IF REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS ARE STRENGTHENED AND WE SHOULD KEEP UP QUIET PRESSURE ON MARCOS TO HOLD FREE AND FAIR PARLIMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 1984 AS HE HAS PROMISED.

SHULTZ.

BT

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

Received SS

1983 JUN 28 AM 9:39

28

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 28, 1983

DZ

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for  
monday, June 27, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

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4/3/83



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SENSITIVE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 27, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Nuclear Discussions with South Africa. South African Ambassador Fourie met with Department officials today to respond to our suggested changes in his non-paper on South African safeguards and nuclear export policies. In the paper, the SAG would initiate talks with the IAEA Secretariat on placing safeguards for their semi-commercial enrichment plant and abiding by the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines as a nuclear exporter. Fourie said that the SAG would proceed on the basis of the amended non-paper, assuming that a way also were found to provide relief from existing contract obligations with DOE. We welcomed this answer, and said that we would consult on the Hill, and with DOE about getting the legal process underway. (S)

2. Electoral Victory Strengthens Nakasone's Hand. Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's hand has been strengthened by his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) win in the Upper House elections on Sunday. The opposition Socialist Party, which has been leading the attack on Nakasone's defense and foreign policies, was weakened by the loss of 4 of its 26 seats. The decisive victory means Nakasone now stands in a strong leadership position within his party. Our Embassy believes Nakasone will act with even greater confidence in the future, including on trade and defense issues. (C)

3. Italian Parliamentary Election. Firm election projections show a stunning setback for the Christian Democrats (DC), whose vote loss of about six percentage points (a huge fall in Italian terms) translated into modest gains for the Socialists, Republicans, Liberals, and, surprisingly, the neo-Fascists. The final results could put the Communists on an almost equal footing with the DC. Italy's most likely next government will be a renewed center-left coalition of the DC, Socialists, and smaller parties. The DC may not be able to impose its choice for the prime ministry. Such a coalition should preserve Rome's present foreign policy course on INF deployments and on Lebanon.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M453/5 #156971

BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 4608 DTG: 280503Z JUN 83 PSN: 020908  
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O 280503Z JUN 83 ZFF4  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK

*Handwritten mark*

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8069  
WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTO 7059

SECTO  
FOR THE PRESIDENT  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)  
SUBJECT: SEC-PRES: FIRST DAY OF POST-MINISTERIAL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SUBJECT: FIRST DAY OF ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL

I HAVE HAD A GOOD TWO DAYS IN BANGKOK. THE ASEAN POST-MINISTERIAL BEGAN THIS MORNING WITH A FOUR HOUR SESSION COVERING SOUTHEAST ASIA, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ISSUES, AND A TRUNCATED DISCUSSION ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE AN IMPRESSIVE, ARTICULATE GROUP. THEY MADE A STRONG PRESENTATION OF THEIR POLICY ON KAMPUCHEA, STRESSING THE TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR ANY KAMPUCHEAN SETTLEMENT -- FULL WITHDRAWAL OF THE VIETNAMESE FORCES AND THE ESTABLISHMENT THROUGH SELF-DETERMINATION OF AN INDEPENDENT CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR: M453/5 #156972

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY *DN* NARA DATE 7/20/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 4608 DTG: 280503Z JUN 83 PSN: 020908

AS I HAD EARLIER PROMISED THAI FOREIGN MINISTER SIDDHI PRIVATELY, I QUICKLY MADE CLEAR IN THE MEETING YOUR FIRM SUPPORT FOR ASEAN AND ITS POLICY. I WAS JOINED BY THE GERMANS, JAPANESE, AND CANADIANS. THE NEW ZEALANDERS AND THE AUSTRALIANS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ALLEGED LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SETTLEMENT ON KAMPUCHEA AND SPOKE VAGUELY OF THE NEED FOR NEW UNDEFINED INITIATIVES (READ HERE CONCESSIONS). THEY WERE FIRMLY REBUTTED BY THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS LED BY SIDDHI, THE SINGAPOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER DHANABALAN, AND ROMULO.

I LED OFF, AT THEIR REQUEST, ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION AND WE HAD A GOOD, PRODUCTIVE SESSION WITH MOST OF THE OTHERS EXPRESSING A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR OBJECTIVES AND POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION AND AN IMPRESSIVE MEASURE OF SUPPORT FOR THEM. ALL IN ALL, I WAS EXTREMELY IMPRESSED BY THE CALIBER OF THE ASEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS, THE CLARITY OF THEIR EXPOSITION AND THE FINE BLEND OF FLEXIBILITY AND FIRMNESS THAT THEY ARE BRINGING TO THE KAMPUCHEA ISSUE. THEY FOR THEIR PART WERE MOST APPRECIATIVE OF OUR SOLID SUPPORT.

BESIDES THE FORMAL SESSION, I HAD BILATERALS WITH SINGAPOREAN DHANABALAN, ABE, GENSCHER, HAYDEN, AND MALAYSIAN GHAZALI SHAFIE AND THE PAPUA NEW GUINEA PRIME MINISTER NAMALIU. INEVITABLY, THESE WERE OF VARYING UTILITY. THE EXCHANGES WITH THE SINGAPOREAN AND MALAYSIAN WERE EXCELLENT WITH A GOOD BLEND OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES. CLEARLY OUR RELATIONS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENTS ARE GOOD, ALTHOUGH WE DO NEED TO PAY MORE HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION TO THE MALAYSIANS. MY LUNCHEON MEETING WITH ABE RANGED OVER A SERIES OF ISSUES FROM THE JAPANESE ELECTIONS (I CONGRATULATED HIM) TO THE COMMON FUND ON WHICH WE AGREED TO DISAGREE. WE HAD HONEST, SUBSTANTIVE DISAGREEMENT OVER THE COMMON FUND, WITH ABE URGING THAT WE ACCEPT IT AS THE LEAST OF ALL EVILS, WHILE I REMAINED SKEPTICAL, QUESTIONING THE VIABILITY OF A COMMON FUND. I HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 03 OF 03 USDEL SECRETARY IN 4608 DTG: 280503Z JUN 83 PSN: 020908

HAYDEN'S DEPTH AND JUDGMENT. HIS PERFORMANCE IN AN ASEAN SESSION AND IN OUR BILATERAL DID NOTHING TO DISPEL MY CONCERNS.

THE MOST IMPORTANT SUBJECT IN MY MEETINGS WITH THE ASEAN MINISTERS AND WITH ABE HAS BEEN THE PROSPECT OF YOUR NOVEMBER TRIP TO ASIA WHICH WAS JUST ANNOUNCED THIS EVENING. THE ASEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE DELIGHTED BY YOUR INTEREST. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO AN ASEAN COUNTRY IN EIGHT YEARS. WHILE EACH ONE OF THEM WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO HAVE BEEN YOUR HOST -- PARTICULARLY THE THAI -- THEY UNDERSTOOD OUR RATIONALE IN PICKING JAKARTA AND THEY ALL SEE YOUR VISIT AS A MAJOR PLUS FOR ASEAN. I DO BELIEVE A REALLY STRONG CASE CAN BE MADE FOR A BRIEF BANGKOK STOP (AS IN COLOMBIA DURING THE SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP), AND I WILL BE TALKING TO BILL CLARK FURTHER ABOUT THIS. I ALSO URGE YOU TO STOP IN THE TIME ZONE BEFORE THE OFFICIAL MEETINGS START. THE PHILIPPINES (CLARK OR SUBIC) WOULD ENABLE YOU TO DO THIS AND, AT THE SAME TIME, SEE MARCOS AND IDENTIFY WITH THESE KEY OVERSEAS BASES. SHULTZ

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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TTY # \_\_\_\_\_

THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

ROBERT KIMMITT FOR THE PRESIDENT/LOUISVILLE

TOR 291415Z

➔ ROBERT KIMMITT FOR JUDGE CLARK/LOUISVILLE

ROBERT KIMMITT/LOUISVILLE

MICHAEL DEAVER/LOUISVILLE

INFORMATION ADDEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

read by pms

## CLASSIFICATION

RW  
4/3/13

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Tuesday, June 28, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2003  
BY NARA RW DATE 4/3/03

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**SECRET**

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8319921

SENSITIVE

83 JUN 29 AIO: 74

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

1. Sudan: Hostage Situation. We understand that the hostages seized over the weekend were alive and well as of mid-afternoon Tuesday Washington time. The Embassy in Khartoum has sent a representative to work with local Sudanese Government officials and U.S. technical specialists will join them tomorrow. Meanwhile, the Sudanese military have orders to avoid precipitate action. We anticipate that a respected southern (non-Arab) Sudanese official will assist in the negotiations. (S)

2. Chad: French Military Aid to Habre. The French Government has decided to provide substantial military assistance to prop up Habre's sagging defenses in the wake of the loss of Faya Largeau to Libyan-supported dissidents. The French have already begun supply flights of between 30 and 40 planeloads of military equipment worth \$20 million, primarily small arms, ammunition and armored vehicles. In addition, the French plan to send up to 100 mercenaries as advisors to Habre's forces and have said they would dispatch their Jaguars if Libya used its aircraft in combat in Chad. This French intervention represents a belated decision to take the lead in resisting Libyan expansionism in Chad. The aid may very well turn the tide and enable Habre to remain in N'Djamena for an indefinite period. This major shift in French policy comes after prolonged efforts by the U.S. and francophone African moderates to push France to the fore, combined with the grim realization, after Faya, that Libya indeed means business in Chad. (S/Sensitive)

3. Congressional Testimony on the Beirut Embassy. Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger and other Department officials testified today before the combined Fasel and Hamilton Subcommittees of HFAC on the destruction of our Embassy in Beirut and our plans for construction of new facilities. The hearing moved quickly from open to closed session for a thorough consideration of the circumstances surrounding the bombing of the Embassy and the security precautions in effect at the time. Members also requested information on individuals or countries responsible for the explosion. While the Subcommittees dealt only briefly with our request for an additional \$30 million authorization to construct new facilities in Beirut, it seems clear that they will support it. (S)

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL: OADR

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BY *RW* NLRR M453/5 #156974  
NARA DATE 7/20/10



~~SECRET~~

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SENSITIVE

RECEIVED

83 JUN 29 AIO: 14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

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DECL: OADR

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HLRR M453/5 #156973  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 7/20/16

**SECRET**

156975

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON 30 P 1: 49  
June 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

1. Guatemala: Attempted Coup? An attempt by Lionel Sisniega, a reactionary politician, and Col. Francisco Gordillo, a former junta member ousted by Rios Montt, to remove the Guatemalan president appears to have failed. Sisniega and Gordillo appeared on Guatemalan television last night virtually urging Rios' overthrow. However, a majority of the Army seems to have concluded that an attempt to remove Rios would split the armed forces. The government issued a "state of alarm" which will allow it to selectively restrict normal activities. (At the same time, it announced that the electoral tribunal will be inaugurated tomorrow as scheduled.) The price for the Army's backing of Rios may well be a lessening of the president's rhetoric against the politicians, the Church, and the private sector. (SECRET)

2. British Orders Imperil Antitrust Investigation. Effective June 27, the U.K. invoked the Protection of Trading Interests Act with respect to the application of U.S. antitrust laws to international air services under the U.S.-U.K. bilateral aviation agreement. The British orders prohibit U.K. airlines (both in the U.S. and elsewhere) and persons in Britain from complying with U.S. antitrust laws or efforts to enforce them. The orders create serious doubt that the Justice Department's antitrust investigation of North Atlantic Air Transport can proceed pursuant to the informal U.S.-U.K. understanding reached last month. U.S. and U.K. officials have been meeting in Washington since June 27 on this issue, and there is some indication that the U.K. will adjust its orders so the Justice Department investigation can proceed. (SECRET)

3. Poland Update. Embassy Warsaw reports that commemorations of the Poznan uprising in 1956 and the Radom uprising of 1976 have just passed without incident. The police dispersed those wanting to assemble but used no violence. These were the first anniversaries observed since the Papal visit, and the restraint shown by the police may be a harbinger of the government's intentions this summer. On a related issue, Embassy Rome reports that the Pope's personal secretary has dismissed press reports that Lech Walesa was asked by the Pope to step down as Solidarity leader. (CONFIDENTIAL)

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BY

DECLASSIFIED  
NLR 10453/5 #156975  
RW  
NARA DATE 7/20/16



~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 30, 1983

*Handwritten initials*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary Dam's Evening Report

Attached is Acting Secretary Kenneth Dam's Evening Report for Wednesday, June 29, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *rw*, DATE *4/3/13*

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting *KWD*

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BY

NLRR M453/5 #156976  
RW NARA DATE 7/20/16