

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

## Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC:  
Agency File  
**Folder Title:** Secretary Weinberger Weekly  
Report (04/29/1983-05/14/1983)  
**Box:** RAC Box 7

---

To see more digitized collections visit:  
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:  
<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

*Last Updated: 6/6/2024*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

**Withdrawer**

RBW 5/13/2013

**File Folder** SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT  
(04/29/1983-05/14/1983)

**FOIA**

M453

**Box Number** 7

SHIFRINSON

97

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
159288	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159289] <b>R 1/26/2016 M453/6</b>	5	4/29/1983	B1
159289	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES <b>R 1/26/2016 M453/6</b>	5	4/29/1983	B1
159290	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES <b>PAR 12/15/2022 M453/6</b>	8	5/6/1983	B1
159593	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES	5	5/13/1983	B1
159594	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159593]	5	5/13/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Pres Saw*

*rw* ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

April 29, 1983

*5/20/13*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report.

Attached is Secretary Weinberger's Weekly Report  
for Friday, April 29, 1983.

cc; The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

2

~~SECRET~~

159288



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

April 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

DECLASSIFIED

NLRN 11453/6 #159288

BY EW NARA DATE 11/26/16

Legislative Affairs: Our major efforts on Capitol Hill this week focused on obtaining approval of the FY 1983 Supplemental Appropriation, which contains urgently needed funds for the PERSHING II missile and other important NATO related items. I renewed our request for prompt action on these vital issues at a hearing on Wednesday before Joe Addabbo's House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Except for Chairman Addabbo, a majority of the subcommittee appears willing to act favorably on our request to begin PERSHING II production based on the success thus far (7 successes out of 9 tests) half way through the test program. I will continue to push for quick action on this matter in a hearing next Wednesday before Ted Stevens' Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

I also continued this week to discuss our defense program with key House and Senate groups. On Monday I had a private lunch with Senator Nancy Kassebaum, who, as a member of the Senate Budget Committee, has had continuing misgivings over defense spending levels. I explained that we have already made significant progress in bringing savings and efficiencies into the Defense program. She fully understands and agrees that we are facing an uncontrolled Soviet buildup, which requires action, but so far she has not voted our way on many of these matters.

On Wednesday, I attended a luncheon at the Capitol with the Republican Roundtable, an informal group of 30 House moderates co-chaired by Tom Tauke and Olympia Snowe. We discussed the need for continuing the Defense rebuilding program that the Congress has approved the past two years. I also sought support from this key group for the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on the MX missile and urged them to realize the dangers in an easily misunderstood freeze resolution and to vote against it.

We completed a series of briefings this week on the MX program for Congressional staff members. We are continuing individual briefings for key members of Congress whose support will be necessary to ensure favorable Congressional endorsement of the entire strategic modernization proposal.

CLASSIFIED BY SecDef

DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr.

X25303

3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Next week will be a key week for that program. Resolutions to release FY 1983 MX funds have been introduced in both the House and Senate. Both Appropriations Committees have until June 3 to act on the resolution, and both will begin action next week.

Next Tuesday I will testify before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to present our recommendations on modernizing our ICBM force. In the Senate, Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield, who will oppose MX funding, has scheduled consideration of the MX issue in the full committee rather than in the Defense Subcommittee. I am scheduled to testify before the full committee on Thursday morning with Brent Scowcroft and General Vessey. (U)

FY 1983 Supplemental Funding and PERSHING II: While we are exerting every effort to get Congressional approval of the FY 1983 Defense Supplemental, with the knowledge that a decision may not be quickly forthcoming (and, indeed, may be delayed until August 1), we have examined carefully actions that we might take to sustain the PERSHING II program and meet the currently planned European IOC. These include reprogramming funds from other Army missile programs. In the meantime, we will continue to work with the White House and NSC staffs and State to gain Congressional passage of the supplemental. The reprogramming is not an attractive step to take, but it is essential in order to avoid termination of the PERSHING II program, with its attendant termination and restart costs, and its possible impact on NATO perceptions of our commitment to the 1979 NATO dual-track decision.

If the PERSHING II funds are not approved by the Congress, it will cost us \$150 million in termination costs and about \$40 million to restart the production line later for a missile we know we'll need.

We can avoid these costs by reprogramming now from other Army accounts and then restoring those other Army accounts after the supplemental is adopted. We have good support for this supplemental even from some Democrats. (C)

Air Force C-5B Program: You may have seen media reports Monday and Tuesday alleging significant cost overruns in the C-5B air transport program. Contrary to these reports, the Air Force Cost Analysis Information Group (AF CAIG) report, upon which the news reports were based, says there is not a cost overrun on the C-5B firm fixed-price contract, nor does it predict an overrun in the future.

The confusion resulted from erroneous interpretation of the independent cost analysis. The report notes that the contractor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

may not realize the total amount of profits originally anticipated. However, the program only started in December 1982, and any such forecast six years in the future would be based on early and obviously incomplete guesses. Furthermore, even if the program should cost more than Lockheed anticipates, the taxpayers will not pay it; it simply will mean Lockheed gets less profit because we have a fixed-price contract. Thus, this is simply a clear example of the contractor assuming the risk under a firm fixed-price contract. There is ample time in the contract for Lockheed to apply aggressive cost control management to protect their profit. I believe the contract is a good contract for both Lockheed and the Air Force, and we will make every effort to avoid changes that would add to the cost. We issued a press release on Tuesday to set the record straight and have been in contact with all major Congressional Committees and interested members to ensure that they are aware of the facts.

The unusual point about this is that the Los Angeles Times, which ran the usual "overrun" story, ran a complete correction and apology the next day. (U)

Lease of United Kingdom HAWK Aircraft: I am pleased to report that the UK has agreed to lease to us 12 HAWK aircraft, cost free, for use by the Navy in their Naval Flight Officer training program for a period of five years. The lease is contingent upon the HAWK VTX Program going ahead as we currently plan. (C)

Visit with Secretary General Luns: I met with Secretary General Luns on Tuesday after his meeting with you. He asked me to pass to you that he deeply appreciated your meeting with him. We agreed on the importance of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments proceeding on schedule in the absence of an agreement at Geneva. Secretary General Luns stressed Chancellor Kohl's determination to proceed despite considerable political difficulties. Looking toward the June NATO Ministerial Meetings, the Secretary General said it would be desirable for Defense Ministers to make clear their interest in more than improved defense and INF deployments. He suggested a Ministerial statement stressing the Alliance's desire for "peace promoting" steps, for example more East-West exchanges. I mentioned the possible dangers involved in some "East-West exchanges." In this regard I agreed to brief Ministers at the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Meeting on the four confidence-building measures we recently proposed to the Soviets to improve the control of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises. I also asked for time to brief Ministers on your initiative for ballistic missile defense, and both of these items will be on the agenda for the June meetings in Brussels. Finally, I advocated a somewhat more forthcoming NATO stance toward Spain-in-NATO questions and suggested that we encourage Spanish Defense Minister Serra to attend the DPC Ministerial. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

4

Deputy Secretary Thayer's Far East Visit: On Sunday, Paul Thayer returned from his visit to U.S. forces and facilities in the Far East, and you may be interested in some of the impressions he gained during the trip.

Two items weigh most heavily on the minds of our military commanders in the Western Pacific--sustainability and quality of life for our forces with better facilities. They know, of course, that we are emphasizing readiness and sustainability and that ammunition and spare parts are in the production and delivery pipelines, but their needs require that we keep up our efforts as set forth in our proposed budgets. U.S. military construction or host nation support actions are the key to providing the quality of life improvements that are needed. Ongoing facilities improvement efforts in Korea are impressive and will ease the longstanding needs of our military community there when finished.

In Japan, our forces are gaining in strength and proficiency and they get along well with their Japanese counterparts. The Government of Japan is supportive of U.S. forces and is spending significant host nation support funds on housing and other key facilities. It is important to note, however, that funds for host nation support may come at the expense of funds for Japanese defense force improvements, both of which are needed. This is a difficult problem for the Japanese, and we will be working with them in future planning efforts.

Although Paul did not bring up the imminent Philippines base review process during his calls on President Marcos or Defense Minister Enrile, other Philippine officials raised the issue in informal conversations. Without exception, they seemed relaxed about the review and suggested that we may be able to complete the process in a very short time.

The message everywhere was that "we are on the right track, we have turned the corner, and what we need is either here or on the way, but we must continue and follow through or we will be back where we started." (S)

Shelter for the Homeless: The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, Captain Jeryl D. Funderburk, has produced a notable success in the Department's shelter for the homeless program. Late last month, he executed a three month, renewable license with the City of Corpus Christi's Metro Ministries for four, unfurnished, one-bedroom units in what were formerly family quarters. Metro Ministries provides transportation, bedding, liability insurance, and screens potential occupants prior to assignment. The majority of occupants have been transient families with one or two children with the length of stay ranging from one to three nights. I am optimistic that we will have more successes like this, and I believe this clearly indicates that relying on local initiative can work.

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

5

Unfortunately, however, a great many other localities have had our offer pending for several weeks and have either not acted on it, or have rejected it. It may be that the homeless problem is not as severe as earlier represented. (U)

Savings in Consulting and Related Services and Periodicals, Pamphlets, and Audiovisual Products: On Monday I sent a letter to Dave Stockman enclosing a report of Department obligations for these services and products that showed our actual costs for FY 1981 and FY 1982 and estimates for FY 1983 and FY 1984. The report reflected estimated costs for FY 1984 audiovisual services have been cut back to the same level as in FY 1982, and consulting and related services estimated costs for FY 1984 have been maintained without increases from FY 1983, plus price growth. These estimated costs are lower than those sent to the Congress with the original budget. At the same time, I issued guidance to the Department to stay within the estimates I sent to Dave.

I took these actions in an effort to contribute further to reduction in costs and in support of your initiatives to reduce these types of programs throughout the federal government. We will monitor progress in the ensuing months to ensure that the FY 1984 estimates I sent to Dave are not exceeded. (U)

*Lap.*

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~





~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

159289

April 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

DECLASSIFIED

NLR M453/6 #159289

BY RW NARA DATE 1/26/16

Legislative Affairs: Our major efforts on Capitol Hill this week focused on obtaining approval of the FY 1983 Supplemental Appropriation, which contains urgently needed funds for the PERSHING II missile and other important NATO related items. I renewed our request for prompt action on these vital issues at a hearing on Wednesday before Joe Addabbo's House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. Except for Chairman Addabbo, a majority of the subcommittee appears willing to act favorably on our request to begin PERSHING II production based on the success thus far (7 successes out of 9 tests) half way through the test program. I will continue to push for quick action on this matter in a hearing next Wednesday before Ted Stevens' Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

I also continued this week to discuss our defense program with key House and Senate groups. On Monday I had a private lunch with Senator Nancy Kassebaum, who, as a member of the Senate Budget Committee, has had continuing misgivings over defense spending levels. I explained that we have already made significant progress in bringing savings and efficiencies into the Defense program. She fully understands and agrees that we are facing an uncontrolled Soviet buildup, which requires action, but so far she has not voted our way on many of these matters.

On Wednesday, I attended a luncheon at the Capitol with the Republican Roundtable, an informal group of 30 House moderates co-chaired by Tom Tauke and Olympia Snowe. We discussed the need for continuing the Defense rebuilding program that the Congress has approved the past two years. I also sought support from this key group for the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on the MX missile and urged them to realize the dangers in an easily misunderstood freeze resolution and to vote against it.

We completed a series of briefings this week on the MX program for Congressional staff members. We are continuing individual briefings for key members of Congress whose support will be necessary to ensure favorable Congressional endorsement of the entire strategic modernization proposal.

CLASSIFIED BY SecDef

DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr.

X25303

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4

2

Next week will be a key week for that program. Resolutions to release FY 1983 MX funds have been introduced in both the House and Senate. Both Appropriations Committees have until June 3 to act on the resolution, and both will begin action next week.

Next Tuesday I will testify before the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee to present our recommendations on modernizing our ICBM force. In the Senate, Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark Hatfield, who will oppose MX funding, has scheduled consideration of the MX issue in the full committee rather than in the Defense Subcommittee. I am scheduled to testify before the full committee on Thursday morning with Brent Scowcroft and General Vessey. (U)

FY 1983 Supplemental Funding and PERSHING II: While we are exerting every effort to get Congressional approval of the FY 1983 Defense Supplemental, with the knowledge that a decision may not be quickly forthcoming (and, indeed, may be delayed until August 1), we have examined carefully actions that we might take to sustain the PERSHING II program and meet the currently planned European IOC. These include reprogramming funds from other Army missile programs. In the meantime, we will continue to work with the White House and NSC staffs and State to gain Congressional passage of the supplemental. The reprogramming is not an attractive step to take, but it is essential in order to avoid termination of the PERSHING II program, with its attendant termination and restart costs, and its possible impact on NATO perceptions of our commitment to the 1979 NATO dual-track decision.

If the PERSHING II funds are not approved by the Congress, it will cost us \$150 million in termination costs and about \$40 million to restart the production line later for a missile we know we'll need.

We can avoid these costs by reprogramming now from other Army accounts and then restoring those other Army accounts after the supplemental is adopted. We have good support for this supplemental even from some Democrats. (C)

Air Force C-5B Program: You may have seen media reports Monday and Tuesday alleging significant cost overruns in the C-5B air transport program. Contrary to these reports, the Air Force Cost Analysis Information Group (AF CAIG) report, upon which the news reports were based, says there is not a cost overrun on the C-5B firm fixed-price contract, nor does it predict an overrun in the future.

The confusion resulted from erroneous interpretation of the independent cost analysis. The report notes that the contractor

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

may not realize the total amount of profits originally anticipated. However, the program only started in December 1982, and any such forecast six years in the future would be based on early and obviously incomplete guesses. Furthermore, even if the program should cost more than Lockheed anticipates, the taxpayers will not pay it; it simply will mean Lockheed gets less profit because we have a fixed-price contract. Thus, this is simply a clear example of the contractor assuming the risk under a firm fixed-price contract. There is ample time in the contract for Lockheed to apply aggressive cost control management to protect their profit. I believe the contract is a good contract for both Lockheed and the Air Force, and we will make every effort to avoid changes that would add to the cost. We issued a press release on Tuesday to set the record straight and have been in contact with all major Congressional Committees and interested members to ensure that they are aware of the facts.

The unusual point about this is that the Los Angeles Times, which ran the usual "overrun" story, ran a complete correction and apology the next day. (U)

Lease of United Kingdom HAWK Aircraft: I am pleased to report that the UK has agreed to lease to us 12 HAWK aircraft, cost free, for use by the Navy in their Naval Flight Officer training program for a period of five years. The lease is contingent upon the HAWK VTX Program going ahead as we currently plan. (C)

Visit with Secretary General Luns: I met with Secretary General Luns on Tuesday after his meeting with you. He asked me to pass to you that he deeply appreciated your meeting with him. We agreed on the importance of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments proceeding on schedule in the absence of an agreement at Geneva. Secretary General Luns stressed Chancellor Kohl's determination to proceed despite considerable political difficulties. Looking toward the June NATO Ministerial Meetings, the Secretary General said it would be desirable for Defense Ministers to make clear their interest in more than improved defense and INF deployments. He suggested a Ministerial statement stressing the Alliance's desire for "peace promoting" steps, for example more East-West exchanges. I mentioned the possible dangers involved in some "East-West exchanges." In this regard I agreed to brief Ministers at the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) Meeting on the four confidence-building measures we recently proposed to the Soviets to improve the control of nuclear weapons, particularly during crises. I also asked for time to brief Ministers on your initiative for ballistic missile defense, and both of these items will be on the agenda for the June meetings in Brussels. Finally, I advocated a somewhat more forthcoming NATO stance toward Spain-in-NATO questions and suggested that we encourage Spanish Defense Minister Serra to attend the DPC Ministerial. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

10

4

Deputy Secretary Thayer's Far East Visit: On Sunday, Paul Thayer returned from his visit to U.S. forces and facilities in the Far East, and you may be interested in some of the impressions he gained during the trip.

Two items weigh most heavily on the minds of our military commanders in the Western Pacific--sustainability and quality of life for our forces with better facilities. They know, of course, that we are emphasizing readiness and sustainability and that ammunition and spare parts are in the production and delivery pipelines, but their needs require that we keep up our efforts as set forth in our proposed budgets. U.S. military construction or host nation support actions are the key to providing the quality of life improvements that are needed. Ongoing facilities improvement efforts in Korea are impressive and will ease the longstanding needs of our military community there when finished.

In Japan, our forces are gaining in strength and proficiency and they get along well with their Japanese counterparts. The Government of Japan is supportive of U.S. forces and is spending significant host nation support funds on housing and other key facilities. It is important to note, however, that funds for host nation support may come at the expense of funds for Japanese defense force improvements, both of which are needed. This is a difficult problem for the Japanese, and we will be working with them in future planning efforts.

Although Paul did not bring up the imminent Philippines base review process during his calls on President Marcos or Defense Minister Enrile, other Philippine officials raised the issue in informal conversations. Without exception, they seemed relaxed about the review and suggested that we may be able to complete the process in a very short time.

The message everywhere was that "we are on the right track, we have turned the corner, and what we need is either here or on the way, but we must continue and follow through or we will be back where we started." (S)

Shelter for the Homeless: The Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, Captain Jeryl D. Funderburk, has produced a notable success in the Department's shelter for the homeless program. Late last month, he executed a three month, renewable license with the City of Corpus Christi's Metro Ministries for four, unfurnished, one-bedroom units in what were formerly family quarters. Metro Ministries provides transportation, bedding, liability insurance, and screens potential occupants prior to assignment. The majority of occupants have been transient families with one or two children with the length of stay ranging from one to three nights. I am optimistic that we will have more successes like this, and I believe this clearly indicates that relying on local initiative can work.

~~SECRET~~



~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

5

Unfortunately, however, a great many other localities have had our offer pending for several weeks and have either not acted on it, or have rejected it. It may be that the homeless problem is not as severe as earlier represented. (U)

Savings in Consulting and Related Services and Periodicals, Pamphlets, and Audiovisual Products: On Monday I sent a letter to Dave Stockman enclosing a report of Department obligations for these services and products that showed our actual costs for FY 1981 and FY 1982 and estimates for FY 1983 and FY 1984. The report reflected estimated costs for FY 1984 audiovisual services have been cut back to the same level as in FY 1982, and consulting and related services estimated costs for FY 1984 have been maintained without increases from FY 1983, plus price growth. These estimated costs are lower than those sent to the Congress with the original budget. At the same time, I issued guidance to the Department to stay within the estimates I sent to Dave.

I took these actions in an effort to contribute further to reduction in costs and in support of your initiatives to reduce these types of programs throughout the federal government. We will monitor progress in the ensuing months to ensure that the FY 1984 estimates I sent to Dave are not exceeded. (U)

*Saps.*

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~





~~TOP SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

15929D

83 MAY 7. A 1: 01.

May 6, 1983


WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

3.3(b)(5)(6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLR 1453/6 #15929D  
BY RLJ NARA DATE 12/15/83



COPY NO. 1

X25395

SEC DEF CONTR No. 010 000 010 010 010 010 010 010 010 010


~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY SEC DEF  
DECLASSIFY ON OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

2


17  
3.3(b)(5)



Also, the Committee, guessing that Defense would be allowed a 6% increase over last year, cut 10 1/2 billion from our request in a preliminary vote. They did not reject the B-1, MX, or other large items. They did reduce a number of items that will reduce our readiness. The Senate Committee has yet to act on our bill. (U)

Defense Programs in Central America: This is to summarize ongoing Department efforts in Central America.

3.3(b)(6)



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

1X  
3.3(b)(1)(b)  
6.2d

Visit with Republic of Korea (ROK) Foreign Minister Lee Bum Suk:  
On Monday I met with Foreign Minister Lee at the Pentagon and we reviewed the security situation in the Northeast Asia Region, ROK concerns about a possible North Korean provocation, South Korean needs for increases in Foreign Military Sales credits and improved repayment terms, and the need for U.S. assistance in maintaining a viable ROK production base. The Minister

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

4

believes the crucial period for deterring North Korean aggression is from the present through FY 1988. He bases this on ROK expectations that the North will cause an incident intended to discredit the ROK Government before the October 1983 Inter-parliamentary Union meeting, the 1986 Asian Games, or the 1988 Olympics. I reassured Minister Lee of our commitment to the security of the ROK and told him that we would continue to work with them to develop appropriate responses to possible aggression from the North. We agreed that the 15th Security Consultative Meeting and Paul Thayer's recent visit to Korea had placed the U.S./ROK security relationship on a sounder basis. I believe the meeting was useful and that Minister Lee was pleased with our discussions. (S)

B-1B Strategic Bomber Program Status: I reviewed the progress of the B-1B bomber program this week. All phases of work are on schedule, with many slightly ahead. In addition, the contractors are \$30.4 million under estimated cost for this point in the program. Much of this is the result of good management techniques by the Air Force, which is performing their own systems integration management system. Basically, this involves blending and coordinating the efforts and progress of individual contractors to integrate development efforts, resolving potential difficulties as, and even before, they develop and thereby prevent costly redesigns later on, and making each system or part available for assembly in a coordinated manner. Boeing had offered to do this for \$200 million. We remain confident that we can achieve the 100 aircraft buy within a \$20.5 billion program cost. Of course, Congressional approval of multiyear procurement would give us much more confidence, and we will continue to work toward such approval this year. In the meantime, the Air Force is attempting to minimize the impact of a possible failure to gain Congressional approval through pursuit of an Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) concept. This means buying components in most economic quantities even though some may not be required until later. (U)

Establishment of Small Missile Office: As a follow-up to your endorsement of the Scowcroft Commission recommendations, on Tuesday we announced the opening of a Small Missile Program Office at Norton Air Force Base, California. The office will manage the small, single-warhead ICBM program and study basing options for the missile, including both mobile and silo systems.

In making the announcement, we described the envisioned ICBM as a three-stage missile of about 15 tons, about 38 feet in length, 42 inches in diameter, and designed to deliver a payload of approximately 1,100 pounds over 6,000 nautical miles. We pointed out the employment flexibility that would accrue from deploying the missile, as well as the more stable strategic situation that could occur if both the Soviets and the U.S. developed similar-sized forces of small, single-warhead ICBMs. (U)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

5

Air Launched and Advanced Cruise Missiles: We recently announced that we will procure no more than 240 of the current generation Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM-B) in FY 1984. This action will ensure an orderly transition from the ALCM-B to the Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM) program, which is progressing smoothly. The ACM will be much less observable by radar.

The ACM will be developed under a firm fixed-price contract that will include "not to exceed" cost options for the first two production lots. The ACM program resulted from our July 1982 assessment of the requirements for a next generation cruise missile. This strategic cruise missile "roadmap" reviewed emerging technologies in light of threat projections through the 1990s and determined that it would be feasible to develop an ACM that will capitalize on significant advancements in cruise missile technology, while providing a logical and timely upgrade to the ALCM force.

The ACM will join the current generation ALCM-B in a mix of about 3,000 strategic ALCMs deployed on B-52 and B-1 aircraft. The ACM will have improved range, accuracy, survivability, and targeting flexibility. (U)

Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention: Defense has had an extensive drug and alcohol abuse prevention program since the early 1970s, when we used urinalysis extensively to identify users and gave less than honorable discharges based largely on these tests. However, court decisions in the mid-1970s prohibited the use of urinalysis results for disciplinary purposes and eroded our authority to identify drug abusers through inspections and to take disciplinary action for off-base, off-duty abuse. In spite of these constraints, we continued to pursue an aggressive abuse prevention program and, in 1978, we launched a concentrated drive against several drugs that were being widely abused, especially opiates. As a result, we had progressively lower rates of abuse. Our worldwide survey in 1980 showed a significant decrease from the 1974 survey throughout the Department in use of all drugs except alcohol and marijuana, which remained at the same levels.

In the 1980-81 period a series of court decisions removed several of the legal constraints and allowed use of urine test results for disciplinary purposes, if collected under conditions protecting constitutional rights. Other court decisions broadened our authority to use evidence obtained off-base, during off-duty hours. About the same time, our Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) developed a technique to detect marijuana in the system by urinalysis that was endorsed by a panel of nationally known chemists as sufficiently accurate to use as legal evidence in the courts. In light of these developments, I issued revised policy guidance to implement tough drug prevention programs, especially regarding marijuana use.

UNCLASSIFIED



~~SECRET~~

6

The Navy and Marine Corps implemented their programs in December 1981, with disciplinary actions based on urinalysis results beginning in February 1982.

We conducted our third worldwide survey in 1982, when our new policy had less than a year to make an impact. Overall, the survey revealed that use of marijuana during the previous 30 days by junior enlisted persons (the high-risk group) fell from 37% in 1980 to 22% in 1982. By individual Service, an even more dramatic reduction occurred for the Navy and Marine Corps (Navy: 47% in 1980 to 17.4% in 1982; Marine Corps: 47% in 1980 to 20.8% in 1982). Even though the Army and Air Force had not fully implemented their programs when the survey was conducted, they still had respective reductions of 40% in 1980 to 31.3% in 1982 and 20% in 1980 to 14.8% in 1982. Based on these results, we are convinced the drug abuse problem can be reduced significantly, and we intend to do that.

The one drug that presents the most serious problem--alcohol--remains at a high level of abuse and probably will be the most difficult of our prevention efforts. Since it is a legal drug, we are limited to punitive action only when its use is in violation of law or regulations. We began a drive against Drunk Driving in December and have other actions underway to reduce alcohol abuse across the board. (U)

FLEETEX 83-1 Results: In my April 8 Weekly Report, I said I would report the results of this Northern Pacific exercise to you when it was completed. The exercise ended April 18 and, having received the post exercise reports, we can now provide those results.

In addition to the three aircraft carrier battle groups (ENTERPRISE, MIDWAY, and CORAL SEA), there were two USCG cutters, a Canadian destroyer squadron, and U.S. Air Force strategic, tactical and support aircraft involved in the exercise. Naval operations ranged from the Sea of Japan to a point in the mid-Pacific 750 nautical miles north of Midway Island, and along the Aleutian and Kuril Island chains. A total of 43 ships, 300 aircraft, and more than 23,000 personnel took part in the exercise, which simulated a limited war in the Northern Pacific region involving a threat by the Soviets to ground forces in the Aleutians. The mission of the three-carrier battle force, in coordination with Air Force elements, was to establish air, surface, and subsurface superiority in advance of the arrival of a simulated amphibious force.

Although Soviet reaction to the exercise was significantly less than we anticipated (because of the scope of the exercise), all Soviet aircraft reacting to the exercise were intercepted well in advance of the surface force. We were pleased with the coordination achieved between Navy and Air Force early warning assets (Navy E-2C/Air Force AWACS) and their ability to control

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

7

each others fighters (Navy F-4s/F-14s from the carriers and Air Force F-15s operating from Shemya Island) to intercept Soviet reconnaissance planes.

FLEETEX 83-1 underscored to our Asian allies, as well as to the Soviets, the U.S. and Canadian resolve to defend the Northern Pacific region. It also enhanced our Pacific Fleet's capability to operate in environmentally challenging northern latitudes. Finally, the extensive Air Force participation in FLEETEX 83-1 proved to be a major step forward in our efforts to foster increased Navy/Air Force cooperation in sea lane defense. (S)

U.S.-Danish Defense Policy Consultations: In April we conducted the first set of U.S.-Danish defense policy consultations. The two most active sessions during the consultations were on the Danish defense budget and discussions on Greenland.

On the defense budget, we pointed out our continuing disappointment over the low level of Danish defense spending, the discouraging implications for Danish force modernization and readiness, and the possibility that the breaking of the 1981 political agreement covering 1982-84 defense spending will jeopardize future agreements. The Danish Defense Minister will soon begin negotiations among the principal political parties for a post-1984 agreement on defense spending. Without question the Danish delegation will carry back and convey a strong impression of our views and the obstacles that disappointing Allied behavior poses for public and Congressional support for the U.S. role in NATO.

With respect to Greenland, we discussed our Defense Early Warning (DEW) Line and Ballistic Missile Early Warning System modernization plans, and the proposed North Atlantic Defense System program with its Greenland and Faeroes radar site requirements. U.S. military activities in Greenland have recently been targeted by the Danish peace movement and its left-wing political supporters, creating some public controversy that, so far, the Danish government has handled well. The Danes are now as well-informed as they can be about our plans for existing and future military facilities on Greenland and the Faeroes, and we expect their prompt approval for the new sites required for DEW Line modernization.

I believe both sides were pleased with this initial session. The consultations treated all the major issues forthrightly and productively and enabled us to inject our views into the Danish defense planning system. (S)

Memorial for Military Nurses: In observation of National Nurses Day, we are holding a memorial service this afternoon at Arlington National Cemetery. The service will be conducted by the Army, Navy and Air Force Nurse Corps and will pay special tribute to nine military nurses (8 Army and 1 Air Force) who died in Vietnam. (U)

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED

8

Southwest PAVE PAWS System: We recently announced selection of a proposed site near Goodfellow Air Force Base at San Angelo, Texas, for the Southwest PAVE PAWS Phased Array Warning System radar. This system will provide radar coverage over a broad ocean area south of the United States to give tactical warning and attack assessment of sea-launched ballistic missiles launched against the continental United States. It will have a corollary mission and capability to track the position and velocity of earth-orbiting satellites. The environmental impact analysis for this installation showed there would be no significant adverse impact on the environment at the proposed site. (U)

*Says*

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Attached is Cap Weinberger's weekly report dated May 13, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA RW, DATE 5/20/13

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

### Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

### Withdrawer

RB 5/13/2013  
W

### File Folder

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT (04/29/1983-05/14/1983)

### FOIA

M453  
SHIFRINSON

### Box Number

7

97

ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
159593	MEMO	5	5/13/1983	B1
	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES			

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



24  
~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

MODE

PAGES 6

IMMEDIATE

DACOM # 45

RELEASER WHC

PRIORITY

DEX #     

DTG 141302Z MAY 83

ROUTINE

TTY #     

RR

FROM/LOCATION/

1. THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. DAVID FISCHER FOR THE PRESIDENT/CAMP DAVID

RECEIVED

2.     

3.     

4.     

1983 MAY 14 A 9 19

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

CAMP DAVID

1.     

2.     

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

THE WEINBERGER WEEKLY REPORT

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

RU  
5/20/13

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Weekly Report of Defense Activities

Attached is Cap Weinberger's weekly report dated May 13, 1983.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006  
BY: KARA RW DATE 5/20/20

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

### Collection Name

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: AGENCY FILE

### Withdrawer

RB 5/13/2013  
W

### File Folder

SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S WEEKLY REPORT (04/29/1983-05/14/1983)

### FOIA

M453  
SHIFRINSON

### Box Number

7

97

ID	Document Type	No of pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
	Document Description			
159594	MEMO	5	5/13/1983	B1
	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. WEEKLY REPORT OF DEFENSE ACTIVITIES [COPY OF DOC. 159593]			

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.