

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File

Folder Title:

Iraq (01/20/1981-12/31/1983) (1 of 4)

Box: Box 37

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: Iraq Vol 1 1/20/81 - 12/31/83 [1 of 4] Box 91352

Date: June 16, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	151129z 1 p.	3/15/83	P1
2. cable	081026z 1 p.	3/8/83	P1
3. cable	231121z 2 p.	1/23/83	P1
4. cable	181151z 1 p.	11/18/82	P1
5. cable	111411z 1 p.	11/11/82	P1
6. cable	111410z 1 p.	11/11/82	P1
7. cable	111328z 1 p.	11/11/82	P1
8. cable	311147z 1 p.	10/31/82	P1
9. cable	121247z 1 p.	10/12/82	P1
10. cable	070131z 5 p.	10/7/82	P1
11. cable	071013z 1 p.	10/7/82	P1
12. cable	201628z 1 p.	8/20/82	P1
13. cable	301122z 1 p.	8/30/82	P1
14. cable	110940z 1 p.	8/11/82	P1
15. cable	201015z 1 p.	7/20/82	P1
16. cable	100920z 2 p.	6/10/82	P1
17. cable	100430z 1 p.	6/10/82	P1
18. cable	061235z 2 p.	6/6/82	P1
19. cable	311114z 1 p.	5/31/82	P1
20. cable	301245z 3 p.	5/30/82	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: RECORDS
COUNTRY FILE

Archivist: cas/cas

File Folder: Iraq Vol 1 1/20/81 - 12/31/83 [1 of 4] Box 91352

Date: June 16, 1998

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
21. cable	271145z 1 p. <i>R 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #302</i>	5/27/82	P1
22. cable	261111z 1 p. <i>R " " #303</i>	5/26/82	P1
23. cable	251555z 1 p. <i>R " " #304</i>	5/25/82	P1
24. cable	191036z 4 p. <i>R " " #305</i>	5/19/82	P1
25. cable	051025z 2 p. <i>A " " #306</i>	4/5/82	P1
26. cable	020745z 4 p. <i>R " " #307</i>	4/2/82	P1
27. cable	120900z 2 p. <i>R " " #308</i>	3/12/82	P1
28. cable	230852z 2 p. <i>R " " #309</i>	2/23/82	P1
29. cable	011115z 2 p. <i>P 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #310</i>	2/01/82	P1 , <i>B1, B6</i>
30. cable	311150z 2 p. <i>R 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #311</i>	1/31/82	P1
31. cable	011115z 2 p. (same text as item #29) <i>P 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #312</i>	2/01/82	P1 , <i>B1, B6</i>
32. cable	211115z 2 p. <i>R 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #313</i>	1/21/82	P1
33. cable	171225z 4 p. <i>P 2/4/05 NLSF96-127/1 #314</i>	1/17/82	P1 , <i>B1, B6</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 0707 0336Z DTG: 151129Z MAR 83 PSN: 011960
SIT982 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 074/1204Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOBT EOB

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTTCKLIST-----EPORTED BY PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #0707 0741140

O R 151129Z MAR 83

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4891

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4595

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2851

USELO RIYADH 0422

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1500

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3161

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2945

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0910

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3109

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0707

E.O. 12356: DECL: AODR

TAGS: KREC, PTER, PREL, IZ, IR, US

SUBJ: MEETING AT FOREIGN MINISTRY WITH AL-SAHHAF

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 15, I SPENT AN HOUR AT THE MINISTRY WITH HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, MOHAMMAD SA'ID AL-SAHHAF, WHO RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE NON-ALIGNED CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI. IRAQI REACTION TO THE CONFERENCE WILL BE REPORTED AFTER MY MEETING TOMORROW WITH UNDER SECRETARY ISMET KITTANI WHO WAS ALSO THERE.

3. IN OUR REVIEW OF U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS, I BROUGHT SAHHAF UP-TO-DATE ON PROBLEMS WE HAVE ENCOUNTERED RE THE ADMITTANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR USINT'S USE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CAUTIONING HIM THAT IF THIS MATTER IS NOT RESOLVED SATISFACTORILY IT WOULD SPILL OVER INTO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

4. I THEN REFERRED TO THE CONTINUED PROBLEM FACING THOSE WHO WISH TO STRENGTHEN U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS POSED BY THE PRESENCE OF ABU NIDAL AND HIS GROUP IN BAGHDAD. ALTHOUGH THIS GROUP HAS BEEN INACTIVE FOR A NUMBER OF MONTHS THE ARGOV TRAIL IN LONDON GENERATED RE-NEWED INTEREST IN ABU NIDAL'S WHEREABOUTS AND ACTIVITIES AND THIS WOULD CENTER ON IRAQ AS LONG AS HE RECEIVES IRAQI SUPPORT. SAHHAF REFERRED TO THE ASSURANCES GIVEN ME BY FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ DURING OUR MEETING DECEMBER 29, WHEN HE SAID THAT "IRAQ WILL NOT PERMIT TERRORIST ACTS TO BE CONDUCTED FROM IRAQI TERRITORY." I OBSERVED THAT ANY TERRORIST ACTIVITIES CARRIED

OUT BY THE ABU NIDAL GROUP, EVEN IF ORGANIZED FROM ELSEWHERE, WOULD REFLECT BADLY ON IRAQ AS LONG AS HIS OPERATIONAL H.Q. REMAINS IN BAGHDAD.

5. ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, SAHHAF SAID ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, AHMED TALEB IBRAHIMI, MET WITH BOTH THE IRAQI AND IRANIAN REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW DELHI BUT HAD NOT FOUND ANY CHANGE IN THE IRANIAN POSITION. THEREFORE MATTERS STOOD AS THEY HAD BEFORE THE CONFERENCE. SOME OTHER MISSIONS AT NEW DELHI THOUGHT THEY DETECTED INTEREST ON THE PART OF IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VELAYATI AND PRIME MINISTER MUSAVI-KHAMENEI IN FINDING A WAY TO END THE WAR. HOWEVER, IT WAS THE IRAQI ASSESSMENT THAT RAFSANJANI AND THE HARD LINERS WERE USING THE WAR AS A MEANS OF STRENGTHENING THEIR INTERNAL POSITION AND THEY STILL HAVE KHOMEINI'S SUPPORT.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0707 0336Z DTG: 151129Z MAR 83 PSN: 011960

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NIS. F 74-127/1 *282

BY Amf, . . .

2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 0629 97251 DTG: 081026Z MAR 83 PSN: 001912
SIT127 DATE 03/25/83 TOR: 067/1226Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SITPKEMP

EOB: //TK//

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLISTISE ON FURTHER DISSEM-ION)Y PRESS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE

DE RUEHAD #0629 0671047

R 081026Z MAR 83

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4857

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0629

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IZ, US

SUBJECT: CONTINUED IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

REF: STATE 59244

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I BELIEVE WE CAN AND SHOULD KEEP UP THE HEAT IN BAGHDAD ON THE TERRORISM ISSUE. WHEN DEPUTY PM AND FOREIGN MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ RETURNS FROM THE NEW DELHI SUMMIT, I WILL ASK TO SEE HIM TO REVIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. TERRORISM WILL BE ON THE AGENDA AS A PROBLEM IN OUR BI-LATERAL RELATIONS. IT WILL BE EASY ENOUGH TO PICK UP FROM OUR LAST CONVERSATION, DECEMBER 29, AT WHICH TIME TARIQ AZIZ SAID HE WOULD STUDY OUR DEMARCHE ON TERRORISM (THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO HIM) AND IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD HAVE SOMETHING POSITIVE TO TELL US.

3. THUS FAR OUR CAMPAIGN TO PERSUADE IRAQ TO MOVE AGAINST TERRORISM HAS CENTERED ON OUR SUGGESTION THAT THEY CURB THE ACTIVITIES OF THE ABU NIDAL AND 15 MAY GROUPS. WE HAVE NOT ASKED THEM SPECIFICALLY TO SEVER THEIR LINKS WITH THESE GROUPS, AND IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO DO SO AT OUR BEHEST GIVEN THEIR "PRINCIPLED ARAB STAND" ON HOSPITALITY FOR PALESTINIANS. HOWEVER, IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE THAT FOR SOME OTHER REASON THEY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MIGHT SEVER RELATIONS WITH ONE OR ANOTHER GROUP.

4. WHILE PRESSING FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STOP DIRECT OR INDIRECT IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, OUR CAMPAIGN WILL BE MORE ACCEPTABLE AND HAVE BETTER PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS IF WE LEAVE THE MEANS TO THEM. IN FACT THERE IS A DANGER THAT BY PRESSING TOO HARD FOR A SPECIFIC ACTION ON THEIR PART, WE MIGHT MAKE IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO COMPLY SINCE THEY WILL NOT WANT TO BE SEEN, OR SEE THEMSELVES, "SELLING OUT PALESTINIANS" UNDER U.S. PRESSURE.

5. IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH MINISTER OF STATE HAMMADI ON FEBRUARY 14, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT TERRORISM DID NOT PROMOTE REGIONAL STABILITY, AND HE ADDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE ON THE TERRORISM

ISSUE. THIS HAS PROBABLY LED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT TO CONCLUDE THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE CURRENT INACTIVITY OF THE ABU NIDAL AND 15 MAY GROUPS RESPONSIVE TO U.S. CONCERNS. HENCE, UNLESS THERE IS A NEW DEVELOPMENT INVOLVING IRAQ WITH TERRORISM, THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND A DECISION BY THE U.S. TO PUT IRAQ BACK ON THE TERRORISM LIST.

6. DEPT MAY WISH TO PASS THIS MESSAGE TO OTHER REFTEL ADDRESSEES.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0629 97251 DTG: 081026Z MAR 83 PSN: 001912

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-1271L #283

BY amf

2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 0199 0250 DTG: 231121Z JAN 83 PSN: 012485
SITS33 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 023/1434Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHAD #0199/01 0231125

P R 231121Z JAN 83

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4666

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4499

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3073

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3106

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2825

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1467

USELO RIYADH 0382

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1173

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 199

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PRES, IZ, IR

SUBJ: STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN AND HIS REGIME

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENOIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN SPITE OF FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND IN FACE OF IRANIAN PREPARATIONS FOR A NEW OFFENSIVE, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE BA'ATHI REGIME APPEAR STRONGER AND MORE FIRMLY IN CONTROL THAN THEY DID 6 MONTHS AGO. BY IRAQI STANDARDS, THEY HAVE TAKEN SOME DARING FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES WITH OVERTURES TO THE SOVIETS, THE FRENCH, BRITISH AND EVEN THE US. SADDAM HAS MADE PUBLIC SOME REALISTIC STATEMENTS ACKNOWLEDGING ISRAEL'S PLACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SUPPORTING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. SADDAM WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN ALL DIRECTIONS TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MAINTAIN HIS HOLD ON IRAQ. BARRING AN UNEXPECTED IRANIAN TRIUMPH ON THE BATTLEFIELD, HIS SHORT - MID-TERM PROSPECTS APPEAR GOOD. END SUMMARY.

3. IN PREPARATION FOR WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I SUBMIT BELOW A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE PROSPECTS FOR SADDAM HUSSEIN AND IRAQ IN THE THIRD YEAR OF THE WAR WITH IRAN.

4; IRONICALLY, WHILE IRAQ'S FINANCIAL POSITION HAS DETERIORATED SERIOUSLY SINCE THE SUMMER OF 1982, SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE BA'ATHI REGIME APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN STRENGTHENED DURING THAT PERIOD. RENEWED CONFIDENCE AND DETERMINATION BEGAN WITH IRAQ'S DEFEAT OF IRAN'S MILITARY PUSH TOWARD BASRA IN JULY. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY SOUL SEARCHING AS SADDAM AND HIS INNER CIRCLE FACED A WAR OF ATTRITUION AND DWINDLING FINANCIAL

RESOURCES. THEIR NUMBER ONE OBJECTIVE WAS THEN, AND REMAINS, THE RETENTION OF POWER IN IRAQ, AND THEY WERE AND ARE WILLING TO GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTH TO ENSURE THIS.

5. THE LEADERSHIP HAS BEEN ACTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT. KNOWING THAT THEY NEED CONTINUED ARMS SUPPORT FROM THE SOVIET UNION, THEY SENT TWO TOP MEMBERS OF THE INNER CIRCLE, TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN AND TARIQ AZIZ, TO MOSCOW IN EARLY DECEMBER. THEY RETURNED RELATIVELY SATISFIED. WISHING TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF WESTERN EUROPE, THEY SENT TARIQ AZIZ TO PARIS IN JANUARY WHERE HE WAS WELL RECEIVED AND WAS PROMISED CREDITS. THEY THEN LET THE BRITISH KNOW THAT FIRST DEPUTY PM TAHA YASSIN RAMADHAN WAS READY FOR A VISIT TO LONDON WHICH IS NOW SCHEDULED FOR MARCH, AS FOR THE U.S., TARIQ AZIZ HAS TOLD US FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT WASHINGTON. MEANWHILE SADDAM ENGAGED THE SAUDIS IN HIS EFFORT TO REOPEN THE SYRIAN OIL PIPELINE OR, FAILING THIS, TO LOCK IN SAUDI FINANCIAL SUPPORT. IT APPEARS THAO HE AND THE SAUDIS HAVE SETTLED ON THE LATTER.

6. TO GIVE POSITIVE SUBSTANCE TO IRAQ'S OPENING TO THE WEST, SADDAM MADE PUBLIC THE FULL TRANSCRIPT OF A DISCUSSION HE HAD IN AUGUST WITH CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, IN WHICH HE MADE A NUMBER OF REALISTIC STATEMENTS, NOTABLY ONE REJECTING THE IDEA OF ELIMINATING ISRAEL, AND ANOTHER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUPPORTING A PEACE SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD PROVIDE SECURITY FOR BOTH ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE; THIS WAS BEFORE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE, BUT SINCE THEN IRAQIS HAVE OMITTED A NUMBER OF POSITIVE SIGNALS SUPPORTING A NEGOTIATION BY KING HUSSEIN AND THE PLO. ISRAELIS AND OTHERS MIGHT HAVE GOOD REASON TO QUESTION THE SINCERITY OF THIS POLICY SWITCH UNDER THE PRESSURE OF WAR, BUT SADDAM AND OTHERS SAY THEY HAVE LEARNED A NUMBER OF USEFUL

USINT BAGHDAD 0199 0250 DTG: 231121Z JAN 83 PSN: 012485

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #284

BY anf, E 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 0199 0250 DTG: 231121Z JAN 83 PSN: 012486
SIT531 DATE 01/24/83 TOR: 023/1436Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLSMCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHAD #0199/02 0231135

P R 231121Z JAN 83

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4667

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4500

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3074

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3107

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2826

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1468

USELO RIYADH 0383

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1174

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BAGHDAD 0199

EXDIS

LESSONS FROM THEIR WARTIME EXPERIENCES AND THESE SHOULD
CARRY INTO THE POST-WAR ERA AND TEMPER IRAQI
BELLIGERENCE AND ADVENTURISM.

7. SIX MONTHS AGO IT APPEARED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN
AND THE BA'ATH PARTY HAD REACHED AN UNEASY MODUS
VIVENDI WHICH WOULD PERMIT THEM TO SHARE POWER AND
DECISION MAKING. SINCE THEN SADDAM HAS CONSOLIDATED
HIS OWN PREEMINENT POSITION, WORKING CLOSELY WITH
A FEW TRUSTED MEMBERS OF THE LEADERSHIP INCLUDING HIS
HALF BROTHER BARZAN, HEAD OF THE SECURITY APPARATUS.
AT THIS POINT, THE PARTY NEEDS SADDAM AS MUCH AS
SADDAM NEEDS THE PARTY. HENCE, THERE HAS BEEN NO
CHALLENGE TO HIS LEADERSHIP, WHICH SEEMS INCREASINGLY
ARBITRARY AS IN HIS PRONOUNCEMENTS ON MILITARY STRATEGY
AND REVELATIONS RE HARD-HEADED POLICIES. WITH THE ARMY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OCCUPIED AT THE FRONT SADDAM STANDS SUPREME AND APPARENTLY
CONFIDENT THAT HE CAN HOLD ON UNTIL THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL
CHANGE IN IRAN. TO DO THIS, HOWEVER, HE MUST SHORE UP
THE MORALE OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND CIVIL POPULATION
AND CONTINUE HIS DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE TO WIN FRIENDS
ABROAD AND CUT OFF SUPPORT FOR IRAN.

8. AS SADDAM BRACES HIMSELF FOR THE NEXT IRANIAN
OFFENSIVE AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION THAT IS LIKELY TO
FOLLOW, HE WILL BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO ENSURE
HIS HOLD ON POWER. TO BEGIN WITH, HE WILL HAVE TO APPEAR TO
SATISFY MINIMAL SOVIET DEMANDS. THIS MAY EXPLAIN RECENT
OVERTURES TO KURDISH AND COMMUNIST OPPOSITION GROUPS.
HE COULD EVEN RECONSTITUTE A NATIONAL FRONT COALITION
AND BRING IN A COMMUNIST MINISTER OR TWO. IT IS
RUMORED THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO TURN OVER THE IRRIGA-

TION MINISTRY TO A COMMUNIST BUT BALKED WHEN HE WAS ASKED
ALSO FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT (WHICH DEALS WITH KURDISTAN)
AS WELL. IT IS BELIEVED THAT JALAL TALABANI OF THE
UNIFIED PARTY OF KURDISTAN OR ONE OF HIS DEPUTIES WAS
RECENTLY IN BAGHDAD NEGOTIATING WITH THE AUTHORITIES.
DEALS WITH THE KURDS AND COMMUNISTS HAVE NOT YET BEEN
STRUCK BUT THE EFFORT WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE.

9. AT THE SAME TIME, SADDAM WILL SEEK TO STRENGTHEN
HIS TIES WITH WESTERN EUROPE, BEGINNING WITH FRANCE WHERE
HE HAS OBTAINED LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS ON CREDIT.
THOUGH HIS STRATEGY IS TO TRY TO AVOID AN EMBRACE BY
EITHER OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, HE RECOGNIZES THAT HIS
RELATIONS LACK SYMMETRY. HENCE, HE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK
IMPROVED TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES WHICH MIGHT RE-
QUIRE HIM TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTRAIN ABU NIDHAL AND THE
15 MAY TERRORISTS. HE WOULD THEN ASK THE US TO PERSUADE
ISRAEL TO CURTAIL ITS MILITARY SUPPORT OF IRAN. DURING
THE PAST FEW DAYS IN SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS, TAHA
YASSIN RAMADHAN AND TARIQ AZIZ BOTH COMPLAINED TO LORD
GEORGE BROWN ABOUT US ACQUIESCENCE IN ISRAEL'S
PRO-IRAN POLICY WHICH THEY FEAR IS THE U.S. POLICY AS WELL.

10. AS LONG AS THE WAR LASTS, THE FUTURE REMAINS
HOSTAGE TO UNPREDICTABLE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE FIGHTING
FRONTS. TARIQ AZIZ HAS EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE IN
IRAQ'S ABILITY TO HOLD THE LINE BUT THEN ADDED THAT
"WARS ARE UNPREDICTABLE". THIS CAUTION MIGHT BE DESIGNED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN PART TO WARN ARAB FRIENDS THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE TAKEN
FOR GRANTED. THE IRAQIS HAVE NOTED WITH IRONY THAT THE
GULF STATES BECAME LESS INTERESTED IN MAKING PAYMENTS
TO IRAQ AFTER THE DEFEAT OF THE IRANISANS NEAR BASRA
LAST JULY. IN SPITE OF IRAQ'S FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES AND
WEARINESS OF THE HOME FRONT, IRAQ'S REGIME AND ITS
MILITARY FORCES NOW APPEAR STRONGER THAN EVER AND
SADDAM HUSSEIN MORE DETERMINED THEN EVER TO HAND ON
TO THE END.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0199 0250 DTG: 231121Z JAN 83 PSN: 012486

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3675 DTG: 181151Z NOV 82 PSN: 013157
SITL04 DATE 11/22/82 TOR: 3.2/1740Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED D STR BUTION:

SIT: CMLS 508

ECB:

WHR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #3875 3221205

O R 181151Z NOV 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE W L FDC IMMEDIATE 4380

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4386

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1328

MBASSY DAMASCUS 3038

IE BACSY SLAMABAD 0218

IE BACSY JDDA 2754

MEASBY LONDON 1413

IE BACSY LAMAIT 1811

OLC R LACH 0333

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 3675

EDIS

E O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: FEPP, IZ, SA

SUBJ: DISCUSSION WITH UNDERSECRETARY AT FOREIGN MINISTRY INCLUDES
QUESTION OF SAUDI FINANCING OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR

REF: A) BAGHDAD 3605, B) RIYADH 2035, C) STATE 320814

1. ~~SECRET~~. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BAGHDAD VISIT OF IRAQ DESK OFFICER RICCIARDONE PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO SEE UNDER SECRETARY ABDUL-MALIK AL-YASSIN WHO WAS PRESENT AT NOV 10 MEETING OF NSC/NEA DIRECTOR KEMP WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ. DRAWING ON GUIDANCE FROM STATE REFTEL, WE REVIEWED US POLICY TOWARD GULF WAR STRESSING OUR NEUTRALITY, DETERMINATION NOT TO PROVIDE ARMS TO EITHER SIDE, AND SUPPORT FOR PEACE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND MEDIATION EFFORTS. WE OBSERVED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RECENT INTERVIEW WITH AMERICAN JOURNALISTS INDICATED THAT THERE WERE STILL SOME DOUBTS IN IRAQI MINDS RE US INTENTIONS AND POLICIES. IT IS COULD NOT BE THE CASE SINCE THE RECORD WAS CLEAR THAT WE WERE DOING NOTHING RE THE WAR WITH WHICH THE IRAQIS SHOULD TAKE ISSUE.

3. YASSIN REPLIED THAT OUR CDS WERE FEASIBLE BUT THE FACTS CONTINUE TO CONTRADICT IRAQI CLAIMS, PARTICULARLY RE US MILITARY SUPPLIES REACHING IRAN. AFTER THE USUAL RECLAIMS ON THIS SUBJECT, INCLUDING CIRCULATION THAT THE IRAQIS HAVE NEVER PRODUCED ANY EVIDENCE THAT COULD BE A BASIS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS, THE CONVERSATION TURNED TO PEACE EFFORTS.

IT WAS EXPECTED THAT THE ALGERIANS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS POSSIBLY AFTER THE END OF THE CURRENT MILITARY PHASE. HE THOUGHT THAT AT SOME TIME THE UN WITH US SUPPORT MIGHT PLAY A COORDINATING ROLE IN THE MEDIATION. HOWEVER, HE ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE WHEN WE ASKED WHETHER IRAQ HAD ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AT THIS TIME.

5. RE SAUDI AID TO IRAQ, I OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT OUR POLICY TO DISCUSS WITH THE SAUDIS OR OTHER GULF STATES THEIR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO ARAB STATES. WITHIN OUR POLICY OF STRICT NEUTRALITY WE WOULD NOT IN ANY CASE EXPRESS AN OPINION EITHER FOR OR AGAINST ANY SUCH PAYMENTS. WE HAD, HOWEVER, NOTED TARIQ AZIZ' BELIEF THAT THE US MIGHT IN SOME WAY BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ALLEGED FAILURE OF THE SAUDIS TO MAKE PAYMENT. WE HAD THEREFORE MADE SOME QUERIES TO ESTABLISH THE FACTS AND WERE TOLD THAT PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE AND WERE CONTINUING. WE ALSO NOTED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN, IN HIS INTERVIEW WITH THE AMERICAN JOURNALISTS, HAD SAID HE WAS SATISFIED WITH SUPPORT FROM ARAB STATES. WE WANTED IT TO BE CLEAR TO THE IRAQIS THAT WE WERE NOT TAKING A POSITION ON THIS ISSUE EITHER WAY AND THAT WE WOULD NOT TRY TO INFLUENCE ANY ARAB STATE NOT TO SUPPORT IRAQ FINANCIALLY.

6. YASSIN, NOT SURPRISINGLY, REPLIED THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND TARIQ AZIZ WERE CORRECT FROM THEIR OWN POINTS OF VIEW AND WITHIN DIFFERENT TIME CONTEXTS. TARIQ AZIZ WAS REFERRING TO A SPECIFIC PERIOD DURING WHICH PAYMENTS

USINT BAGHDAD 3875 DTG: 181151Z NOV 82 PSN: 013157
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED, WHILE THE PRESIDENT WAS REFERRING TO HIS OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH ARAB SUPPORT. I REITERATED OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT PAYMENTS HAD BEEN MADE AND WERE CONTINUING TO BE MADE. YASSIN DID NOT REFUTE THIS (HE WAS PROBABLY NOT INFORMED OR EMPOWERED TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE) BUT SAID HE WOULD PASS ON OUR OBSERVATIONS TO TARIQ AZIZ.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3875

DTG: 181151Z NOV 82 PSN: 013157

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #285

BY smf, DATE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3804 DTG: 111411Z NOV 82 PSN: 001736
SIT659 DATE 11/17/82 TOR: 315/1524Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3804 3151430
O 111411Z NOV 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4346

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 4367
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1147
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 215
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3026
AMEMBASSY JIBDA PRIORITY 2747
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 2791
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1402
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3804

EXDIS
ISLAMABAD FOR NSC/NEA KEMP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OTRA, PEPR, PINT, IZ, IR, JO, SA, PLO, XF
SUBJECT: NSC/NEA DIRECTOR KEMP'S DISCUSSION OF ME PEACE EFFORTS
WITH TARIQ AZIZ

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EVENING NOV 10, NSC/NEA DIRECTOR GEOFFREY KEMP AND I HAD A TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM AND MEMBER OF THE RCC TARIQ AZIZ. SUBSTANCE IS REPORTED IN THIS AND SEPTELS. KEMP OPENED WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE US POSITION RE THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, IRAQ-US RELATIONS AND PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. HE REFERRED TO OUR NEUTRAL POSITION IN THE WAR, OUR DESIRE NOT TO SEE IRAN INVADE IRAQI TERRITORY, AND OUR SUPPORT FOR PEACE INITIATIVES.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AFTER THE WAR THE US WISHES TO DEVELOP MORE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND EVENTUALLY ALSO WITH IRAN, THOUGH NOW WE HAVE LITTLE CONTACT WITH IRAN. ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE, THE US IS NOW CONCENTRATING ON THE SHORT-TERM GOAL OF REMOVING FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. MEANWHILE, THE PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY PALESTINE. WE UNDERSTAND KING HUSSEIN'S DELICATE POSITION AND DO NOT WISH TO PUSH HIM TOO HARD. NEVERTHELESS THERE IS SOME URGENCY BECAUSE OF CHANGES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE ON THE WEST BANK.

3. TARIQ AZIZ FIRST DISCUSSED AT LENGTH IRAQI CONCERNS ABOUT THE GULF WAR (SEPTEL). AFTERWARD DR. KEMP AGAIN REFERRED TO THE MIDDLE EAST, NOTING THAT THIS WAS AN AREA IN WHICH THE US AND IRAQ COULD WORK MORE CLOSELY. HE ASKED WHETHER IRAQ LOOKED FAVORABLY ON KING HUSSEIN'S EFFORTS WITH THE PLO. WE HOPED IRAQ WOULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE WHICH WOULD INFLUENCE US ATTITUDES

TOWARD IRAQ.

4. IN REPLY, TARIQ AZIZ REVIEWED PAST IRAQI POLICIES. IRAQ HAD STARTED TO DEVELOP GOOD RELATIONS WITH JORDAN AS EARLY AS 1978 AND IN THE SAME YEAR SETTLED ITS DIFFERENCES WITH YASSIR ARAFAT. IRAQ CONTINUES TO OPPOSE EXTREMIST ELEMENTS IN THE PALESTINIAN MOVEMENT BECAUSE THEY ARE IRRESPONSIBLE. SOME OF THESE PALESTINIAN FACTIONS ARE IRRATIONAL AND HAVE BECOME THE PAWNS OF OTHERS. ARAFAT, HOWEVER, IS REALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC.

5. TARIQ AZIZ SAID IRAQ HAD DEVELOPED GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND MOROCCO AND, UNTIL CAMP DAVID, WITH SADAT. HOWEVER, BY GOING TO JERUSALEM AND REFUSING TO TALK TO THE DELEGATION FROM THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT (OF WHICH TARIQ AZIZ WAS A MEMBER), SADAT ISOLATED HIMSELF. IRAQ VIEWED THE LEBANON AS A MESS OUT OF WHICH MANY IRAQIS, INCLUDING THEIR EMBASSYS, HAD BEEN VICTIMS. IRAQ DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT CAN BE SETTLED UNTIL THERE IS A SOLUTION THAT SATISFIES "EVERYONE'S NORMAL AMBITIONS." IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE AN ARAB CONSENSUS. IRAQ WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS. BY NOT OBJECTING, IRAQ IS IN FACT FACILITATING THESE EFFORTS. IRAQ SUPPORTS BOTH KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT AND MAINTAINS EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH KING HASSAN AND SAUDI ARABIA. AT THE SAME TIME IRAQ HAS TRIED TO DEVELOP BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND WESTERN EUROPE.

6. TARIQ AZIZ SAID IRAQ HAS DIFFERENCES ON SOME POINTS OF THE REAGAN PLAN. IRAQ BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TALK TO THE PLO. EVEN THE WEST BANKERS WHO WANT A SETTLEMENT ARE WITH THE PLO

USINT BAGHDAD 3804 DTG: 111411Z NOV 82 PSN: 001736
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THOUGH THEY RESPECT KING HUSSEIN. THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE LOOK TO ARAFAT AS THEIR REPRESENTATIVE. IN REPLY TO KEMP'S QUESTION WHETHER IRAQ WOULD SUPPORT YASSIR ARAFAT IF HE TOOK DECISIONS THAT MIGHT NOT BE POPULAR WITH SOME FACTIONS, TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED, "YES, WE SUPPORT HIM COMPLETELY AND ALSO KING HUSSEIN." HE WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE FURTHER STEPS. HE WAS HAPPY TO HEAR THAT THE U.S. DID NOT INTEND TO PUSH KING HUSSEIN TOO HARD. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT HE NOT BE ASKED TO DO MORE THAN HE COULD REASONABLY DO. KING HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT SHOULD WORK TOGETHER. IN THE LONG RUN THEY WILL REACH AN AGREEMENT.

7. THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION CONCLUDED WITH DR. KEMP NOTING THAT THE U.S. IS PUSHING ONLY BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE MATTER. WHEN HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. AND IRAQ COULD PURSUE THE DIALOGUE, TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT HIS DOOR WAS ALWAYS OPEN TO AMERICAN VISITORS AND HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING SENATE STAFFDEL MONTGOMERY/FORD LATER THIS MONTH.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3804

DTG: 111411Z NOV 82 PSN: 001736

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1-286

BY smf,

2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3603 DTG: 111410Z NOV 82 PSN: 001695
SIT213 DATE 11/18/82 TOR: 315/1442Z

PARTICULARLY BY THE US CONGRESS.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT 001

5. COMMENT: THE ABOVE WAS NOT A FULL DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE SINCE KEMP WAS OBLIGED TO LEAVE FOR THE AIRPORT, AND LIMIT THE MEETING TO TWO HOURS. HOWEVER THIS REMINDER CAN BE FOLLOWED UP BY MONTGOMERY AND FORD.
EAGLETON

WATS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

S T: PC MCF JP
ECB: //CHEROKEE//
WHSR COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEM

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

USINT BAGHDAD 3603

DTG: 111410Z NOV 82 PSN: 001695

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3603 3151421
O 111410Z NOV 82
FM US NT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4345

NFO WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4366
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1320
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2746
AMEMBASSY HAWAII 4790
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1401
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1440
AMEMBASSY ROME 66
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 3025
AMEMBASSY ISLAM-BAD 214
BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 3603
ROGER CHANNEL
ISLAMABAD FOR NSC/NEA KEMP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PTER, PINR, IZ, US, XF
SUBJECT: EXCHANGE WITH TARIQ AZIZ RE ABU NIDHAL

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT END OF DIRECTOR NSC/NEA GEOFFREY KEMP'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY FM TARIQ AZIZ NOVEMBER 10, I REFERRED TO OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM AND ABU NIDHAL. TARIQ AZIZ PICKED UP WHAT WAS APPARENTLY A COPY OF THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN'S NOV 8 EXCHANGE ON THE SUBJECT OF ABU NIDHAL AND SAID HE WONDERED WHY THE US GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING SUCH A BIG THING OF THIS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ABU NIDHAL WAS NOT IMPORTANT.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-127/1 #287

BY Amf, DATE 2/4/05

3. I REPLIED THAT HIS ILLUSTRATES PART OF THE PROBLEM. IT WAS NOT THE USG THAT RAISED THE QUESTION BUT RATHER A US MEDIA REPRESENTATIVE. THERE WAS INTENSE INTEREST AND CONCERN AMONG MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC, AND THE USG COULD NOT IGNORE IT. WE HAD APPROACHED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT IN ORDER TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S VIEWS, HOPING THAT THIS WOULD MAKE IT EASIER FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM.

4. TARIQ AZIZ AGAIN SAID THAT THIS SUBJECT WAS BEING BLOWN OUT OF PROPORTION BY THE AMERICAN MEDIA JUST AS THEY GAVE TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO QADHAFI. DR. KEMP OBSERVED THAT WHEN TARIQ AZIZ SEES SENATE STAFFERS MONTGOMERY AND FORD LATER THIS MONTH, THEY WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE HIM THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE BRIEFING ON HOW THIS ISSUE IS BEING HANDLED.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3802
SIT642 DATE 11/17/82

DTG: 111328Z NOV 82 PSN: 001931
TOR: 315/1749Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3802 3151332
O 111328Z NOV 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4344

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 4365
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 2745
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 2789
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1400
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3024
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 213
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NIC F96-127/1 #288

BY anf , : anf , : anf 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3802
EXDIS
ISLAMABAD FOR NSC, NEA KEMP
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, MILI, IZ, IN
SUBJECT: TARIQ AZIZ COMMENTS ON CURRENT FIGHTING ON THE FRONTIER

1. CONFIDENTIAL. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING NSC NEA DIRECTOR KEMP'S CONVERSATION WITH DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ EVENING NOV 10, WE ASKED FOR AN ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION ON THE FRONT. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD RETURNED FROM HIS TWO-DAY TOUR OF THE FRONT WITH THE RECOMMENDATION THAT FOR THE TIME BEING IRAQ SHOULD NOT MAKE A MAJOR ATTEMPT TO DRIVE THE IRANIANS OUT OF A STRIP OF IRAQI TERRITORY ABOUT FIVE KILOMETERS DEEP AND 15 TO 20 KILOMETERS LONG ON THE FRONTIER. THIS WAS BECAUSE SUCH AN IRAQI EFFORT WOULD MERELY CAUSE THE IRANIANS TO COMMIT LARGER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FORCES TO THE BATTLE AND THIS WOULD NOT BE IN IRAQ'S INTEREST. HE ADDED THAT IRAQI FORCES HAD THE IRANIANS "SURROUNDED" (PRESUMABLY MEANING ON THREE SIDES) AND IRAQ WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT THE SITUATION.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3802

DTG: 111328Z NOV 82 PSN: 001931

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3656 DTG: 311147Z OCT 82 PSN: 041814
SITS11 DATE 11/05/82 TOR: 304/1307Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3656 3041215
O 311147Z OCT 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4281

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 4342
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 2729
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3006
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 2772
AMEMBASSY MANAMA PRIORITY 977
AMEMBASSY DOHA 925
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 1312
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT PRIORITY 979
USLO RIYADH PRIORITY 320
AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN PRIORITY 359
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1137
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 3000
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 781
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 877
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 835
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 325
SECDEF, WASHDC-USDP PRIORITY
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3656

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WAS CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OCT 31 BY UNDER-SECRETARY ABDUL-MALAK AL-YASSIN WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, ISSAM ABDUL-GHANI MAHBOUB. YASSIN SAID THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A REPORT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THEY HAD SEEN IN THE WESTERN MEDIA AND HAD BEEN CARRIED BY RADIO ISRAEL ON OCT 27 THAT THE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE" HAD RECOMMENDED THE STOCKPILING OF US ARMS AND SUPPLIED IN ISRAEL FOR USE BY THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE FOR OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE GULF. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD ISSUED A STATEMENT IN THIS REGARD OCT 30. YASSIN SAID THE IRAQIS DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE" WAS CONNECTED WITH THE CONGRESS OR WHAT IT REPRESENTED BUT THEY THOUGHT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS MIGHT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF US POLICYMAKERS. IF SO THIS WOULD MEAN THAT THE USG MIGHT ACT ON THESE RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. YASSIN SAID THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WANTED US TO KNOW THAT SUCH ACTION WOULD ENDANGER PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA. IT WOULD INDICATE TO THE ARABS THAT ISRAEL, WHO MIGHT USE THE ARMS, WAS BEING ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE ITS AGGRESSIVE POLICY. FURTHER-

MORE, IF ONE NATION STOCKPILED SUCH ITEMS IN THE AREA ANOTHER (MEANING THE USSR) MIGHT TAKE SIMILAR ACTION THUS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DANGER. YASSIN SAID THIS REPORT SEEMS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER INDICATIONS OF US POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ WAS NEVERTHELESS CONCERNED AND WOULD APPRECIATE HAVING A CLARIFICATION OF THE US POSITION. HE THOUGHT A PUBLIC CLARIFICATION MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN REDUCING ANXIETIES.

4. I REPLIED THAT I HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO SEE A REFERENCE TO THE IRAQI STATEMENT ON LAST NIGHT'S TELEVISION. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREFERABLE IF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD OBTAINED ITS CLARIFICATION FIRST BEFORE LAUNCHING A PUBLIC ATTACK ON AN ISSUE THAT SEEMED TO HAVE LITTLE SUBSTANCE OR IMPORTANCE. I PROMISED TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM WASHINGTON BUT EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL VIEW THAT THE "AMERICAN-ISRAELI COMMITTEE" DID NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF US POLICYMAKERS AND DID NOT SEEM CONSISTENT WITH OTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S MAJOR EFFORT NOW WAS TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

5. YASSIN SAID HE WAS RELIEVED BY MY "EXPLANATION" AND WOULD AWAIT FURTHER CLARIFICATION.

6. OCT 31, AL THAWRA, CARRIED THE ITEM AS FOLLOWS:
HEADLINE: OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN COMMENTS ON US-ZIONIST ANNOUNCEMENT
US ARMS AND MUNITIONS DEPOT IN "ISRAEL"--INTERFERENCE IN THE
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE REGION AND A THREAT TO ITS PEACE.
TEXT: AN OFFICIAL MFA SPOKESMAN COMMENTED ON THE ANNOUNCEMENT

USINT BAGHDAD 3656 DTG: 311147Z OCT 82 PSN: 041814
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MADE IN WASHINGTON ON 27 OCTOBER BY THE AMERICAN (ISRAELI) COMMITTEE WHICH INVITED THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION TO STORE MILITARY MATERIAL, PROVISIONS AND FUEL IN ISRAEL IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN BE USED BY US FORCES IN THE EVENT OF A WAR IN THE GULF OR EUROPE. THE SPOKESMAN VOICED IRAQ'S REJECTION OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, CONSIDERING IT CLEAR U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE REGION'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHICH RAISES THE POSSIBILITY OF THE REGION BECOMING INVOLVED IN THE SUPER-POWER STRUGGLE AND A BATTLEFIELD SERVING US POLITICAL INTERESTS.
.... IN THE WASHINGTON STATEMENT ISRAEL SHOULD BE CHOSEN AS THE MILITARY STAGING AREA BECAUSE OF ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION, ITS POLITICAL POSITION AND ITS TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SEES IN THIS ANOTHER US STEP TOWARD SUPPORTING ISRAEL AND TO SUPPLY IT WITH ALL MEANS (WEAPONS) WITH WHICH IT THREATENS THE PEACE OF THE REGION. IT WAS ADDED THAT THIS IS IMPORTANT PROOF THAT ISRAEL'S MILITARY AND NON-MILITARY APPARATUS COULD NOT DO WHAT IT DOES WITHOUT UNRESTRAINED US SUPPORT WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
(THE SAME THEMES ARE REPEATED.)
END TEXT.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3656

DTG: 311147Z OCT 82 PSN: 041814

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 289

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3444 DTG: 121247Z OCT 82 PSN: 013503
SIT782 DATE 10/14/82 TOR: 285/1406Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3444 2851320
O 121247Z OCT 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4186

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 822
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 560
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1125
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 031
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2974
..3.7-6 '833- 2704
USLO RIYADH 311
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 2744
AMEMBASSY DOHA 917
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 969
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1298
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 972
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 773
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 865
AMEMBASSY RABAT 523
AMEMBASSY SANAA 530
AMEMBASSY BONN 393
AMEMBASSY ROME 555
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 886
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 208
AMEMBASSY VIENNA 114
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 084
USMISSION GENEVA 197
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1216
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 3444

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: UNGA, IS, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY DEMARCHE RE CHALLENGE TO ISRAELI
CREDENTIALS AT 37TH GA
REF: A) STATE 286001 B) STATE 285990

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON OCT 12, WESTERN EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN CHIEFS
OF MISSION WERE CALLED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY TO MEET WITH
ACTING HEAD OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, ISSAM
MAHBOUB. PRESUMABLY OTHER REGIONAL GROUPS WERE CALLED IN FOR
MEETINGS WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS.

3. READING FROM NOTES MAHBOUB OBSERVED THAT ISRAEL HAD CON-
TINUOUSLY DEFIED THE UN CHARTER AND RESOLUTIONS. THE ARAB AND

ISLAMIC GROUPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS HAVE AGREED TO EXERT
EFFORTS WITH MEMBER STATES TO AMEND THE REPORT OF THE CREDEN-
TIALS COMMITTEE SO AS TO REJECT THE CREDENTIALS OF ISRAEL OF THE
37TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE THEN READ A NUMBER OF
POINTS (ALSO HANDED OUT IN ARABIC) WHICH HE SAID FORMED THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL BASIS OF THE ARAB-ISLAMIC POSITION.
-- CREDENTIALS OF THE ISRAELI DELEGATION ARE ISSUED FROM
JERUSALEM WHICH IS NOT RECOGNIZED BY THE UN AS THE CAPITAL OF
ISRAEL.
-- ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM IS CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND UN RESOLUTIONS.
-- THE ISRAELI DELEGATION CANNOT REPRESENT THE PEOPLE OF
JERUSALEM.
-- THE ANNEXATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IS CONTRARY TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UN RESOLUTIONS.
-- THE UN DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THAT THE ISRAELI DELEGATION
REPRESENTS THE PEOPLE OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.
-- THE UNGA HAS ADOPTED A RESOLUTION ESTABLISHING THAT ISRAEL
IS NOT A PEACE-LOVING MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION AND DOES NOT
FOLLOW PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER.
-- ISRAEL IS IN CONTRAVENTION OF TWO BASIC CONDITIONS OF ITS
ACCEPTANCE AS A UN MEMBER BY RESOLUTION 273 OF MAY 1949 WHICH
REFERS TO RESOLUTION 194 CALLING FOR THE RETURN OF PALESTINIANS
TO THEIR HOMES OR COMPENSATION AND RESOLUTION 181
ESTABLISHING PARTITION.
-- ISRAEL HAS REFUSED TO IMPLEMENT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLU-
TIONS RE THE PALESTINE ISSUE COUNTER TO ARTICLE 5 WHICH CALLS
ON MEMBER STATES TO ACCEPT AND IMPLEMENT SUCH RESOLUTIONS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- ISRAEL HAS ALSO REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY
RESOLUTIONS.
-- ISRAEL HAS NOT IMPLEMENTED RESOLUTION 509 OF JUNE 6, 1982
CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON.
-- ISRAEL HAS COMMITTED GENOCIDE AGAINST LEBANON CIVILIANS
AND PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON.

4. MAHBOUB REQUESTED THE SUPPORT OF THE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED
BY THE MEETING. HE OFFERED TO TAKE QUESTIONS, BUT THE LARGE
GATHERING DID NOT PERMIT ANY REAL DISCUSSION. ONE AMBASSADOR
ASKED WHETHER ALL ARAB COUNTRIES SUPPORTED THE POSITION HE HAD
OUTLINED. MAHBOUB REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE BUT NOTED THAT
THIS WAS WITHIN THE TRADITION OF CONSENSUS. IN RESPONSE TO MY
QUERY HOW IRAQ DEALT WITH THE LEGAL PROBLEM THAT ARTICLES
5 AND 6 OF THE CHARTER PROVIDE THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MAY
SUSPEND THE MEMBERS STATE ONLY ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, MAHBOUB SAID THIS WAS A "TECHNICALITY"
WHICH WOULD BE DEALT WITH BY THE TWO GROUPS (ARAB AND ISLAMIC)
AT THE UN.

5. COMMENT: THE IRAQI DEMARCHE WAS RELATIVELY LOW-LEVEL AND
PRO FORMA AND WAS NOT PRESENTED AS IF THEY EXPECTED TO SWING
ANY VOTES THEIR WAY FROM WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3444

DTG: 121247Z OCT 82 PSN: 013503

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-12711 #290

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY anf, NARA, TE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

HCE790
UTS5955
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHDT #2767/01 2800138
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 070131Z OCT 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7071
RUFHAD/USINT BAGHDAD
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-127/1 *291BY anf,DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTU 13070
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P), UNGA, PEPR, PINT, IZ, US,
UN, PTER, XF, IS, PLD, JOSUBJECT: (U) SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN
- MINISTER HAMMADI, OCTOBER 5, 1982-MEMCON1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY MET FOR OVER AN HOUR
OCTOBER 5 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY VELINTES, AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK AND IRAQI
PERMPREP RIYAD AL KAISY. IRAQ DESK OFFICER RICCIARDONE
TOOK NOTES. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE GULF WAR,
THE US MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE AND IRAQI LINKS TO
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. THE IRAQIS SEE THE PRESENT
OFFENSIVE AS THE "LAST BATTLE" BEFORE A STATE OF
NO-WAR, NO-PEACE SETS IN. THEY BELIEVE KHOMEINI WILL
FACE A DILEMMA AFTER THE WAR: HE MUST EITHER APPLY
ISLAMIC PRECEPTS WHICH WILL FAIL IN REBUILDING HIS
COUNTRY OR HE MUST ABANDON THE IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF
HIS REVOLUTION. HAMMADI ASKED THAT WE ACT TO STOP
ISRAEL'S ALLEGED CONTINUING SUPPLY OF MILITARY
EQUIPMENT TO IRAN BUT WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE
OF THE ISRAELI-IRANIAN LINK. HAMMADI PRESSED FOR US
FOLLOW-UP ACTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE. THE
SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR ARAB
ACTION: ALL PARTIES MUST SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS THE
CONFLICT WITH THE OTHERS AND NOT MERELY FORMULATE
POSITIONS INDEPENDENTLY. IRAQ CATEGORICALLY DENIED
SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BUT SAID THAT IT
COULD NOT REFUSE TRANSIT OR RESIDENCE PRIVILEGES TO
PALESTINIANS. BOTH SIDES LOOKED FOR CONTINUED
IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

SIT: MCF

FOR:

WHSR COMMENTS:-----CHECKLIST-----

ZFF(6)

RECALLED/

0000

006180

CSN:HCE 0790

1

280/03:52Z

070131Z OCT 82

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3. IRAN-IRAQ GULF WAR: HAMMADI SAID THAT THE PRESENT IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IS THE "LAST BATTLE". AFTER THIS THE WAR WILL BE PRACTICALLY OVER -- NO MAJOR MILITARY ACTIONS WILL FOLLOW -- BUT NO DE JUKE SETTLEMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE AS LONG AS KHOMEINI IS ALIVE OR IN POWER. A STATE OF NO-WAR, NO-PEACE THUS WILL PREVAIL. KHOMEINI WILL FACE A FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA. HE MUST ATTEMPT TO APPLY ISLAMIC PRECEPTS TO REBUILDING IRAN'S ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, YET IT IS "RIDICULOUS" TO BELIEVE THESE FOURTEEN CENTURY-OLD PRECEPTS CAN WORK IN A MODERN COUNTRY. BUT IF HE ABANDONS ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM FOR A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH, HE WILL HAVE ABANDONED THE UNIFYING IDEOLOGICAL BASIS OF HIS REVOLUTION. DIVISIONS ARE INCREASING IN NUMBER AND IN DEPTH IN IRAN: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HAS NOT MERELY HALTED BUT HAS REVERSED. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT A PROLONGED PERIOD OF INTERNAL INSTABILITY IN IRAN IS LIKELY. AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK NOTED THAT WE SHARE IRAQ'S ANALYSIS OF THE DYNAMICS OF THE IRANIAN REGIME, WHICH HAMMADI HAD PRESENTED IN HIS SPEECH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL OCTOBER 4.

4. HAMMADI SAID THAT IRAQ HAS INFORMATION THAT ISRAEL IS CONTINUING TO SUPPLY IRAN WITH MILITARY EQUIPMENT. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WE HAD RECEIVED ISRAELI ASSURANCES THAT THEY WERE NOT SENDING EQUIPMENT SUBJECT TO US CONTROLS. THE SECRETARY ASKED FOR ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ MIGHT SUPPLY THAT WOULD ENABLE US TO TAKE FURTHER ACTION WITH THE ISRAELIS. WE CANNOT ACT ON RUMOR, WHICH ANYONE CAN SPREAD TO STIR UP TROUBLE. HAMMADI SAID THAT THE IRAQI INFORMATION IS "A FEELING WHICH IS BASED ON BITS AND PIECES OF SECOND-HAND INFORMATION; IRAQ IS NOT IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE THE KIND OF SOLID EVIDENCE THE SECRETARY REQUESTED. HE THEN ASKED FOR MORE US ATTENTION TO OTHER THIRD COUNTRY AND BLACK MARKET TRANSFERS OF US MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO PREVENT THIRD COUNTRIES, INCLUDING ISRAEL, OR OTHER INTERMEDIARIES FROM SUPPLYING MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO EITHER SIDE.

5. HAMMADI ASKED FOR THE US READING OF THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE GULF WAR. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT TWICE IN RECENT DAYS WITH GROMYKO AND THAT THE SOVIETS MAINTAINED THAT THEY TOO WERE NEUTRAL IN THE WAR AND WANTED A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BASED ON EACH SIDE'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. THE SECRETARY NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR ACTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY CONSISTENT WITH THEIR STATED POSITION. HE HAD TOLD GROMYKO THAT THE US DOES NOT FIND CONSTRUCTIVE MOSCOW'S POLICY OF SELLING ARMS

006180

CSN:HCE 0790

2

280/03:52Z

070131Z OCT 82

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TO BOTH SIDES. AS TO OUR OWN RELATIONS WITH IRAN, WE
AND ALL COUNTRIES MUST RECOGNIZE IRAN'S GEOGRAPHIC
IMPORTANCE AND THE NEED IN THE LONG RUN TO ESTABLISH
BETTER RELATIONS SOMEHOW. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE UNSTABLE
SITUATION IN IRAN AND CONTINUING US OUTRAGE AT THE
BT

#2767

NNNN

006180

CSN:HCE 0790

3

3

280/03:52Z

070131Z OCT 82

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2767 DTG: 070131Z OCT 82 PSN: 006186
SIT896 DATE 10/14/82 TOR: 280/0354Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHDT #2767/02 2800000
O 070131Z OCT 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7072
USINT BAGHDAD
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 13070
NODIS

IRANIAN HOSTAGE-TAKING, OUR RELATIONS REMAIN STRAINED AND ARE NOT PROGRESSING. OUR MAIN INTERESTS FOR NOW ARE TO SEE THE WAR END AND TO SEE IRAN REMAIN INDEPENDENT. WE SEE IRAN'S THREAT EXTENDING BEYOND IRAQ TO THE ENTIRE GULF. IN ANSWER TO HAMMADI'S QUESTION, THE SECRETARY SAID WE HAVE DISCUSSED THIS THREAT WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND OTHERS IN THE GULF.

6. US PEACE INITIATIVE: HAMMADI ASKED WHAT ACTIONS THE US WOULD TAKE TO FOLLOW UP THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT AND THE SECRETARY'S LETTER TO HAMMADI ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. IT WAS THE UNANIMOUS VIEW OF THE ARABS THAT THE US INITIATIVE NEGLECTED IMPORTANT POINTS. BY REFUSING TO SANCTION A PALESTINIAN STATE, THE US "CLOSED THE DOOR" ON A SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEXT MOVE IS UP TO THE ARABS: IT IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR ALL SIDES TO CONTINUE STATING THEIR INDEPENDENTLY-FORMULATED POSITIONS; THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE ARABS TO FACE THE REALITY OF ISRAEL AND TO SIT DOWN AND NEGOTIATE WITH IT. THE ARABS WERE "CLOSING THE DOOR" BY INSISTING ON A FULL-FLEDGED INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE IN THE TINY TERRITORIES OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ISRAELI

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE LIFTED FROM THESE AREAS, AND THE PALESTINIANS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD MUST HAVE A PLACE TO CONSIDER "HOME" EVEN IF SOME OF THEM REMAIN ESTABLISHED ELSEWHERE. WE BELIEVE OUR PROPOSAL FOR PALESTINIAN FEDERATION WITH JORDAN COULD MEET THESE NEEDS.

7. HAMMADI ASKED HOW THE US FORESAW A RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE OUTSIDE THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE HAVE NO FIRM VIEW OF HOW THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION CAN BE SOLVED AND THAT WE SEEK HELP WITH THE ANSWERS FROM OUR ARAB FRIENDS. HAMMADI SAID THE ARABS BELIEVE THE PALESTINIANS SHOULD GO BACK TO THEIR HOMES. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THE ARABS MUST FACE THE FACT THAT THEIR HOMES NO LONGER EXISTED IN ISRAEL. HAMMADI

QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS SITUATION WAS FAIR. THE SECRETARY REPLIED WHAT IS FAIR IS A QUESTION, BUT IT IS A FACT THAT ISRAEL EXISTS AND IS WHERE THE PALESTINIANS' HOMES ONCE WERE.

IT IS TIME FOR THE ARABS TO ACCEPT THAT REALITY. THE US DOES NOT KNOW THE ANSWER BUT WE DO NOT THINK IT IS MERELY TO "JUST LET THE PALESTINIANS GO HOME". THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF THIS HAPPENING, AND NO REALISM IN SUCH A SIMPLE ANSWER. WE MUST FACE THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES OF HOW TO HELP PEOPLE LIVE THEIR LIVES. FOR EXAMPLE, WHATEVER THE MERITS OR DRAWBACKS OF THE LARGER ISSUES, MANY PALESTINIANS NOW HAVE NO ROOFS. THE US IS WORKING AND PROVIDING FUNDS IN LEBANON AT LEAST TO GIVE THEM A PLACE TO BE. WE HOPE THE ARABS WILL TAKE SIMILAR APPROACHES. HAMMADI ASKED WHY ISRAEL WILL NOT ACCEPT A RETURN OF PALESTINIANS TO THEIR LANDS, SINCE IT IS PREPARED "WITH US MONEY" TO SETTLE AN ADDITIONAL ONE-HALF MILLION OR MORE JEWS FROM ALL OVER THE WORLD. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT IT IS NOT AT ALL CLEAR HOW MANY PALESTINIANS WISH TO RETURN. VELIOTES POINTED OUT THAT THOSE WHO DO NOT RETURN WILL MAKE CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION BUT THE ARABS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT 800,000 JEWS IN ISRAEL FROM THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SIMILARLY WILL CLAIM COMPENSATION.

8. HAMMADI SAID THAT THE PALESTINIANS ARE UNABLE TO TAKE STEPS OR EVEN TO SPEAK OUT AND STATE THEIR VIEWS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNAMBIGUOUSLY BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES OF "LAYING THEIR CARDS ON THE TABLE." THE MORE THE US CLARIFIES ITS VIEWS AND WHAT ACTIONS IT WILL TAKE, THE MORE THE PALESTINIANS WILL BE FORTHRIGHT IN THEIR POSITIONS. IRAQ HAS URGED THE PALESTINIANS TO SPEAK OUT CLEARLY. HAMMADI URGED THE US TO SPEAK WITH THE PLO "INDIRECTLY OR DIRECTLY" SO THAT THEY WILL BE MORE OPEN AND LESS AMBIGUOUS IN THEIR POSITIONS. THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED THE IRAQI POINT THAT THE PALESTINIANS WILL BE UNABLE TO MAKE HARD CHOICES IF THEY DON'T KNOW WHAT THEIR OPTIONS ARE.

9. HAMMADI ASKED HOW THE U.S. BELIEVED JERUSALEM WAS TO BE KEPT UNDIVIDED. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THE US POSITION THAT THE EAST JERUSALEM RESIDENTS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A SELF GOVERNING AUTHORITY

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USDEL SECRETARY IN 2767 DTG: 071515Z OCT 82 PSN: 006189
SIT895 DATE 10/14/82 TOR: 280/0355Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHDT #2767/03 2800140
O 071515Z OCT 82 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN NEW YORK

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7073
USINT BAGHDAD
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 SECTO 13070
NODIS

IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. ACCESS AND CONTROL TO RELIGIOUS SITES ARE TREMENDOUSLY IMPORTANT. THE FINAL STATUS CANNOT BE DETERMINED BY UNILATERAL ACTIONS BUT ONLY BY NEGOTIATIONS. THE US DOES NOT HAVE A CLEAR, DETAILED ANSWER, BELIEVING THIS MUST BE WORKED OUT BY THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE. THESE PEOPLE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT A BETTER ANSWER IS NEEDED TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE MORE GENERALLY THAN THE SITUATION WHICH PERSISTS TODAY WHICH MAKES FOR SO MUCH DEATH AND DESTRUCTION. IN THE END, THE MIDDLE EAST IS NOT WHERE WE LIVE, IT'S WHERE THE ARABS LIVE. THE US IS WILLING TO HELP BUT THE LOCAL PEOPLES MUST SIT DOWN TOGETHER TO FIND THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS.

10. TERRORISM: THE SECRETARY STATED THAT TERRORISM IS A MAJOR CONCERN. JUST AS ARMED MIGHT WILL NOT SOLVE THE ISRAELI'S PROBLEMS, TERRORISM WILL NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEMS OF THE PALESTINIANS. HAMMADI NOTED THE US' SEVERAL QUERIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ VIA THE US INTERESTS SECTION, AND CATEGORICALLY DENIED IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. HE ADMITTED THAT ABU NIDHAL "WHO HAS PRACTICED TERRORISM AND WHO HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RESIDED IN IRAQ SOMETIMES GOES TO IRAQ."
BUT THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH HIM AT ALL--WE DON'T TELL HIM WHAT TO DO OR WHAT NOT TO DO. WE DO NOT DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITIES WITH HIM. HE IS NOT LIVING IN IRAQ." IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THE GOI TO TELL A PALESTINIAN LEADER NOT TO COME TO IRAQ. THE GOI COULD NOT PREVENT A VISIT BY ANY PALESTINIAN; FOR EXAMPLE, IT DID NOT EXCLUDE GEORGE HABBASH, WHO IS NOT IN HARMONY WITH IRAQI POLICIES. IRAQ IS ITSELF A VICTIM OF TERRORISM AND CONDEMNS IT. THE SECRETARY URGED IRAQ TO CONSIDER BEING LESS THAN PASSIVE IN ITS TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN TERRORISTS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE GOI POINT OUT TO THESE TERRORISTS THE HARM THAT THEY DO TO THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE BY ASSOCIATING IT WITH TERRORISM IN THE EYES OF THE WORLD. HAMMADI REPLIED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATEMENTS MADE AT

MANY ARAB SUMMITS, THE GOI CANNOT INTERFERE IN INTERNAL PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS.

11. BILATERAL RELATIONS: HAMMADI NOTED WITH PLEASURE THE IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND HOPED FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS. THE SECRETARY STATED HIS PLEASURE IN THE CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN OUR RELATIONS.

12. VELIOTES EXPRESSED HIS CONDOLENCES ON THE DEATH OF FORMER IRAQI PRESIDENT AL-BAKR.
SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 3371 DTG: 071013Z OCT 82 PSN: 006709
SIT948 DATE 10/12/82 TOR: 280/1216Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #3371 2801023
O 071013Z OCT 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4150
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 818
BT

SECRET BAGHDAD 3371
NODIS
USUN PASS TO SECDEL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.), UNGA, PEPR, PINT, IZ, US
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 5 MEETING WITH IRAQI FOREIGN
MINISTER HAMMADI: NEXT STEPS.
REF: SECTO 13070

1. ~~SECRET~~. ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FROM BAGHDAD PERSPECTIVE WE CAN ONLY BE PLEASED WITH THE POSITIVE TENOR OF THE SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH HAMMADI. MUCH OF SUBSTANCE WAS COVERED AND A GOOD RAPPORT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. WE SHOULD NOW LOOK TOWARD NEXT STEPS IN OUR DIALOGUE WITH IRAQ.

3. IT IS RECALLED THAT THE SECRETARY'S UNGA MEETING WITH HAMMADI WAS PRESENTED TO THE IRAQIS AS AN INITIAL REACTION TO THEIR SUGGESTION THROUGH VARIOUS CHANNELS THAT HIGHER LEVEL US-IRAQ DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE. AT THAT TIME THEY APPARENTLY HAD IN MIND A VISIT TO THE US BY DEPUTY PM AND RCC MEMBER TARIQ AZIZ. IT IS ONLY BY GETTING TO TARIQ AZIZ THAT WE REACH THE INNER LEADERSHIP IN IRAQ WHERE THERE IS SUCH A LEGACY OF DISTRUST AND CONFUSION RE U.S. ATTITUDES AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POLICIES.

4. WHEN WE WENT BACK TO THE IRAQIS WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT WE BEGIN WITH THE HAMMADI MEETING IN NEW YORK, THEY PROBABLY ASSUMED THAT IF THE MEETING PRODUCED A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE IT WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS. HAVING BEEN INSTRUCTED TO BRING SEVERAL MATTERS TO THE ATTENTION OF TARIQ AZIZ, I DISCUSSED AN APPOINTMENT WITH THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WHO SUGGESTED WE WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH HAMMADI IN NEW YORK. MY MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ WOULD THEREFORE BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR US TO LET HIM KNOW THAT IF HE SHOULD BE IN WASHINGTON (HE HAD PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED BEING INVITED TO ADDRESS A PRIVATE ORGANIZATION THERE), HE WOULD BE RECEIVED BY A HIGH LEVEL OF THE USG.

5. I RECOMMEND THAT THIS LEVEL BE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WITH A COURTESY CALL ON THE VICE PRESIDENT. THE LATTER SHOULD TAKE CARE OF IRAQI PROTOCOL SENSITIVITIES. WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE IRAQIS THE IMPRESSION WE ARE PUSHING THE RELATIONSHIP TOO FAST. IN THE PROCESS OF SETTING A DATE FOR A TARIQ AZIZ VISIT, WE COULD INDICATE THAT THERE IS NO URGENCY IN THE MATTER. HE WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THE SAME WAY. NEVERTHELESS, IF WE DO NOT MOVE BEYOND THE UN MEETING, WE RISK REINFORCING SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SUSPICIONS RECENTLY EXPRESSED TO KING HUSSEIN THAT WE ARE NOT SERIOUS ABOUT IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. THERE IS MUCH TO BE GAINED AT THIS DELICATE STATE IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH POSITIVE GESTURES. AN INDICATION THAT WE WOULD RECEIVE TARIQ AZIZ WOULD BE A CONVINCING ONE.

6. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT THIS MESSAGE AND REFTEL TO AMMAN.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 3371

DTG: 071013Z OCT 82 PSN: 006709

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

N'S F96-127/1 #292

BY Smf, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2812 DTG: 201628Z AUG 82 PSN: 054004
SIT139 DATE 08/20/82 TOR: 232/1652Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

USINT BAGHDAD 2812

DTG: 201628Z AUG 82 PSN: 054004

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG KEMP EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: REDTAG

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #2812 2321631
O 20:678Z AUG 82 ZFF RUEHC RUOMBE ONLY
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3908

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0013
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2641
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2906
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 3938
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4106
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0300
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1314
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1097
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0547
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1379
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 1807
USM JS ON GENEVA IMMEDIATE 191
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #293

BY Amf, N/ RA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 2812

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PLO, IZ

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: YASSIN ON IRAQI POSITION RE PLO EVACUEES

REF: STATE 234205

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FINALLY GOT THROUGH TO UNDERSECRETARY AL YASSIN WHO CHECKED WITH HIGHER AUTHORITIES AND GOT BACK WITH THE MESSAGE THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH THE PLO RE NUMBERS AND TIMING OF ARRIVAL OF PLO EVACUEES. HENCE HE COULD NOT ANSWER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MY QUESTION RE HOW MANY OF 400 WERE COMING TO IRAQ AND HOW MANY OTHERS MIGHT BE ACCEPTED.

3. IT IS NOW UP TO THE PLO TO CONTACT THE IRAQIS RE NUMBERS AND TIMING. AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP IS STILL PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO TAKE A REASONABLE NUMBER OF EVACUEES, BUT WE HAVE NEVER HEARD FROM THEM HERE THAT THEY WOULD TAKE ALL LEFTOVERS.
EAGLETON

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2913 DTG: 301122Z AUG 82 PSN: 010878
SITS91 DATE 08/31/82 TOR: 242/1431Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #2913 2421135

O P 301122Z AUG 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3963

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 4234

AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2948

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1327

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 2654

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2913

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OREP, PEPR, IZ

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETER MAZEN ZAHAWI

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION, AUG 29, SADDAM HUSSEIN'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE INTERPRETER, MAZEN ZAHAWI, MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS: CODEL SOLARZ' VISIT: SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS VERY FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ. ZAHAWI NOTED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS THAT AN AMERICAN OFFICIAL HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY AN IRAQI PRESIDENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT OTHER SENIOR AMERICAN OFFICIALS AND CONGRESSMEN WOULD BE WELCOME IN BAGHDAD AND WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED. SADDAM HUSSEIN FELT THAT SOLARZ HAD PUT HIM ON THE SPOT WITH A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS, BUT HE ENJOYED AND APPRECIATED THE FRANK EXCHANGE. ZAHAWI SAID THAT MY FAILURE TO GAIN ADMISSION TO THE MEETING WAS CAUSED BY MISTAKEN SIGNALS NOT BY DESIGN. THE TWO CONGRESSIONAL STAFFERS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND I HAD BECOME SEPARATED FROM SOLARZ AND NAIM HADDAD AND HENCE THE MEETING WAS ALREADY UNDERWAY WHEN WE ARRIVED. (I MENTION THIS BECAUSE WE AND OTHER LOCALLY HAD INTERPRETED THE IRAQI FAILURE TO INVITE ME INTO THE MEETING AS AN INDICATION OF IRAQI RELUCTANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS).

3. IRAQI IRAN WAR: ZAHAWI INDICATED THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP SEES A GLIMMER OF HOPE RE THE POSSIBILITY THAT IRAN MIGHT TURN TO A PEACE PROCESS RATHER THAN TRY TO CARRY THE WAR INTO IRAQ. THIS SEEMS TO BE BASED ON THE DELAY OF THE EXPECTED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE, THE PROVEN SUPERIORITY OF IRAQI AIRPOWER, AND THE REMOVAL OF AN IRRITANT WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE BAGHDAD NON-ALIGNED MEETING.

4. US-IRAQ RELATIONS: ZAHAWI NOTED THAT THE PREVIOUS

WEEK HAD BEEN "AMERICAN WEEK IN BAGHDAD" WITH CHRISTINE HELMS' (BROOKINGS) MEETING SADDAM HUSSEIN, FOLLOWED BY CODEL SOLARZ' WELL-PUBLICIZED VISIT. (TODAY'S AL THAWRA CARRIES A HALF PAGE INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTINE HELMS). ZAHAWI REITERATED IRAQ'S DESIRE TO RENEW DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES "AS SOON AS THE WAR IS OVER." IT WAS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT HE REFERRED TO HOPE THAT A SETTLEMENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE SOON. MEANWHILE HE NOTED IRAQ'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS AND RECALLED THAT IF SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT, HE WOULD HAVE GONE TO NEW YORK AND WOULD HAVE WELCOMED AN INVITATION TO WASHINGTON TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

5. THE ARAB SUMMIT: ZAHAWI SAID THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO ATTEND AN ARAB SUMMIT IN MOROCCO WILL DEPEND ON THE WAR SITUATION HERE AND ON THE RESULTS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS PREPARATORY MEETING AND THE AGENDA ADOPTED. HE INDICATED THAT NO IRAQI POSITION RE THE FAHD PLAN HAD YET BEEN ADOPTED. HE IMPLIED THAT IF THE PLO SUPPORTS THE PLAN, SO WOULD IRAQ, OR AT THE LEAST IRAQ WOULD NOT OPPOSE IT. EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 2913

DTG: 301122Z AUG 82 PSN: 010878

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #294

BY anf,

ITE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2713 DTG: 110940Z AUG 82 PSN: 041257
S17991 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 223/1013Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHIS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RDTG KEMP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #2713 2230945

O 110940Z AUG 82 ZFF4 (MSG ON SVC BY WHCC)

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3856

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 0540

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0006

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1089

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4187

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2894

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2630

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2930

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2713

JERUSALEM FOR HABIB

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, LE, IS, XF, PLO, SY, IZ

SUBJ: HABIB MISSION: IRAQI POSITION RE ACCEPTANCE OF PLO
EVACUEES

REF: STATE 223317

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER REFTEL I CALLED ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIK AZIZ MORNING AUG 11 TO SEEK CLARIFICATION OF IRAQ'S POSITION RE ACCEPTING PLO EVACUEES. I REVIEWED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR POSITION AS OBTAINED FROM PLO SOURCES.

3. TARIK AZIZ REPLIED WITHOUT HESITATING THAT THERE HAD NEVER BEEN ANY OFFICIAL REQUEST BY THE PLO OR ANYONE ELSE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO THE IRAQI GOVPCCKGJXF23: 8 43&-43, MY DEMARCHE WAS THE FIRST SUCH APPROACH. THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD STUDY THE QUESTION AND GIVE US A REPLY.

4. I RETURNED TO THE QUESTION SEVERAL TIMES PROBING FOR POSSIBLE CONTACTS WITH IRAQ THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE BASIS FOR PLO EXPECTATIONS. TARIK AZIZ ONLY RE-AFFIRMED THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP HAD NOT YET EITHER STUDIED OR MADE A DECISION ON THE QUESTION. HE SPECULATED THAT PERHAPS THE PLO OR OTHERS WERE BASING THEIR BELIEF ON THE FACT THAT IRAQ'S TRADITIONAL POLICY HAS BEEN TO ADMIT ANY ARABS WHO SEEK SANCTUARY. HOWEVER, HE ADDED, PLO EVACUEES WOULD CONSTITUTE A POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE STUDIED AND DECIDED ON A POLITICAL BASIS. I EMPHASIZED THE URGENT NATURE OF OUR APPROACH, GIVEN THE FACT THAT PLANS FOR THE

EVACUATION WERE BEING FINALIZED. TARIK AZIZ SAID HE WOULD GIVE US A REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

5. COMMENT: WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY SERIOUS INITIATIVE IN THIS REGARD OR ADOPTION OF A POSITION BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT COULD OCCUR WITHOUT TARIK AZIZ BEING AWARE OF IT. HE IS THE CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR OF THE PRESIDENT AND MORE OF AN INSIDER THAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI. THERE WAS NOTHING IN HIS REPLY TO SUGGEST THAT IRAQ WOULD TURN DOWN A REQUEST FROM THE PLO. HE CONFIRMED THAT THERE IS A PLO REPRESENTATIVE HERE WHO IS IN TOUCH WITH THE PLO LEADERSHIP, THOUGH HE DID NOT KNOW HOW RAPIDLY THEY COULD COMMUNICATE. IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL THAT THE PLO MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST TO THE IRAQIS. EVEN IF TARIK AZIZ GIVES US A POSITIVE REPLY, IT IS BOUND TO BE BASED ON THE CONDITION THAT THE PLO ITSELF DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP AND OFFICIALLY REQUEST THAT THEIR EVACUEES BE RECEIVED HERE. END COMMENT.
MINIMIZE BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS CONSIDERED.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 2713

DTG: 110940Z AUG 82 PSN: 041257

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 295

BY smf, 4, DATE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2427 DTG: 201015Z JUL 82 PSN: 011373
SIT820 DATE 07/23/82 TOR: 201/1147Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP VP PUBS SIT KEMP OLLY EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #2427 2011028
O 201015Z JUL 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3710

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1268
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1360
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 782
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2902
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2861
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 001
AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4135
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2593
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 2632
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 720
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 727
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0780
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1240
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0877
AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0912
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0926
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0272
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0832
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 2427

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/20/88 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, IZ, LE
SUBJ: SPECULATION RE IRAQI WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE PALESTINIANS
FROM BEIRUT

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

2. NOTHING HAS BEEN SAID IN THE IRAQI MEDIA OR BY ANY
IRAQI OFFICIAL AS FAR AS WE KNOW TO INDICATE THAT IRAQ
HAS OFFERED OR WOULD BE WILLING TO PROVIDE REFUGE FOR ALL
OR PART OF PALESTINIANS WHO ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE LEBANON.
HOWEVER, ON JULY 19, WESTERN PRESS REPRESENTATIVES
GATHERED IN BAGHDAD, INCLUDING CBS AND NBC, WERE ACTIVELY
TRACKING DOWN REPORTS, APPARENTLY BASED ON AN AL-NAHAR
ITEM OUT OF BEIRUT, TO THE EFFECT THAT IRAQ HAD AGREED
TO RECEIVE THE PALESTINIANS. AT LEAST ONE OF THEM, THE
CBS REPRESENTATIVE, OBTAINED A CATEGORICAL DENIAL OF
THE STORY FROM A MID LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE IRAQI NEWS
AGENCY. THE PRESS REPS HOWEVER ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT
THIS IS THE FINAL WORD. THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT
PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL HOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE
WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ
AZIZ HAS DEFINITELY SCHEDULED A PRESS CONFERENCE FOR THIS

EVENING.

3. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE AMERICAN PRESS REPS ARE
SPECULATING THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN WILL ANNOUNCE IRAQ'S
WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE THE PALESTINIANS, WE HAVE NO
INDICATIONS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. THE TRADITIONAL IRAQI
POSITION HAS BEEN THAT PALESTINIANS ARE WELCOME IN IRAQ.
HOWEVER, THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR LEAVING LEBANON
WOULD INVOLVE CONSIDERATIONS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE
WEIGHED CAREFULLY BY THE IRAQIS WHO HAVE NOT BEEN AC-
TIVELY INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT LEBANON SITUATION.
THERE ARE ALSO REASONS WHY THE PALESTINIANS WOULD NOT
CONSIDER IRAQ, AT WAR WITH IRAN AND HOSTILE TO SYRIA,
A SUITABLE SITE FOR RELOCATING THEIR POLITICAL
OR MILITARY RESOURCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, GIVEN IRAQ'S
TOTAL PREOCCUPATION WITH THE THREAT FROM IRAN AND THE
CURRENT BATTLE IN THE BASRA AREA, IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE
THAT SADDAM MIGHT MAKE A GESTURE IF HE THOUGHT IT WOULD
ENHANCE HIS STATURE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND POSSIBLY
STRENGTHEN HIS POSITION IN CONFRONTING IRAN.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 2427

DTG: 201015Z JUL 82 PSN: 011373

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NIS F96-1227/1 # 296

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2008 DTG: 100920Z JUN 82 PSN: 011580
SIT751 DATE 06/11/82 TOR: 161/1910Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #2008/01 1610930

O 100920Z JUN 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3485

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4039

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0805

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1060

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3561

AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0879

AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0847

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1205

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 083

AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0474

AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2553

USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0240

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2865

AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0684

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0691

AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0451

COM DEASTFOR IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1213

AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1323

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1176

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0756

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0315

AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0055

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 2008
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 6/10/88 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, PORQ, MILI, MOPS, IZ, IR, LE

SUBJ: IRAQ CALLS FOR CEASEFIRE AND ARIBTRATION

REF: STATE 159039 (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I WAS SUMMONED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY THIS MORNING, JUNE 10, TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SA'ADUN HAMMADI. THE MINISTER WISHED TO BRIEF ME ON IRAQ'S CALL FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE AND CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILE ACTS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN. SEVERED PHONE LINES HAD PREVENTED AN EARLIER BRIEFING, PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE RCC.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT, FOLLOWING KING HUSSEIN'S BRIEF VISIT TO BAGHDAD YESTERDAY, IRAQI PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN CONVENED

A MEETING OF THE REGIONAL ARAB BA'ATH SOCIALIST PARTY (ABSP) AND THE NATIONAL COMMAND OF THE ABSP (IE, FOR ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL) TO DISCUSS THE OIC MEDIATION PROPOSALS AND THE LEBANON CRISIS. AT 0130 THIS MORNING THE RCC ISSUED A STATEMENT ON THE OIC APPEAL. CELEBRATORY GUNFIRE WAS HEARD AS NEWS OF THE STATEMENT SPREAD.

4. ACCORDING TO HAMMADI, THE IRAQI INITIATIVE, IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE APPEAL BY THE OIC, COMPRISES THREE ELEMENTS: A) THAT THE WAR BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ MUST BE ENDED AND BY PEACEFUL MEANS, B) THAT THE SITUATION IN LEBANON IS DANGEROUS AND COMPLICATED, AND C) THAT IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF IRAQ TO MEET THE CHALLENGES POSED BY THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. THE INITIATIVE CALLS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND, IF ACCEPTED BY IRAN, THE IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF IRAQI FORCES FROM IRANIAN TERRITORY, TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN TWO WEEKS. IRAQ WOULD THEN BE WILLING TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS TO RESOLVE ALL THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES THAT LED TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR - INCLUDING THE STATUS OF THE SHATT AL-ARAB, THE ISLANDS IN THE GULF, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND, HE CONFIRMED, ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO TEHRAN. THESE NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE CONDUCTED BILATERALLY, OR UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE OIC. SHOULD THE IRANISANS PREFER, MEDIATION BY THE NAM OR THE UNSC WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. HAMMADI STRESSED THAT IRAQ'S MOVE WAS SERIOUS AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SINCERE AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED BY ANY PARTY AS A PROPAGANDA PLAY OR SIMPLY FOR DOMESTIC IRAQI CONSUMPTION. IN THAT REGARD, HE HAD BRIEFED THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA AND WOULD BE SPEAKING WITH THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR LATER. HE WAS NOT SEEKING ANY DIRECT ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNSC PERMREPS, BUT DID WANT THEIR GOVERNMENTS TO BE AWARE OF IRAQ'S DESIRE AND ACTIVE

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #297

BY smf, NA 1A, DATE 2/4/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 2008 DTG:100920Z JUN 82 PSN: 011581
SIT750 DATE 06/11/82 TOR: 161/1911Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP NORT KEMP PUBS SIT
EOB: KEMP,LILY,PIPE,LORD
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #2008/02 1610935

O 100920Z JUN 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3486

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4040
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0806
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1061
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 3562
AMEMBASSY MANAM IMMEDIATE 0880
AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0848
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 1206
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 0894
AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0475
AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 2554
USLO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0241
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2866
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0685
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0692
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0452
COMIDEASFOR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1214
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1324
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1177
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0757
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0316
AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0056
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 020F 02 BAGHDAD 2008

EXDIS

EFFORTS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END QUICKLY AND PEACE-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FULLY. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, HE INDICATED THERE WERE NO IMMEDIATE PLANS TO BRIEF EITHER ISLAMIC OR ARAB AMBASSADORS. TEHRAN WAS BEING INFORMED OF IRAQ'S INITIATIVE VIA THE MEDIA.

6. HAMMADI WOULD NOT DISCUSS WHAT EFFORTS IRAQ WAS CONSIDERING RE LEBANON, BUT REFERRED BACK TO EARLIER STATEMENTS ON THE NEED TO PRESENT A UNITED ARAB OR ISLAMIC FRONT IN THE FACE OF THE ISRAELI INVASION. I TOOK THE OCCASION TO BRIEF THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON OUR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO END THE CURRENT CRISIS AND TO EFFECT AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES WITHIN LEBANON AND ACROSS THE LEBANESE BORDER. HAMMADI NODDED BUT MADE NO COMMENT. HE DID NOT RAISE OUR VETO OF THE LAST SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON LEBANON. (THE LOCAL PRESS HAS NOT YET MADE ANY

DIRECT COMMENT ON OUR VETO, BUT IS REPLAYING COMMENTS AND CRITICISMS FROM OTHER PRESS AGENCIES.)

7. I THANKED THE FOREIGN MINISTER FOR HIS BRIEFING AND REITERATED OUR BELIEF THAT IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES IN THE REGION THAT THE WAR END SOON AND WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ALL EFFORTS TO THAT END.

8. COMMENT: SADDAM IS OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO USE THE LEBANON CRISIS AS A WAY OF GETTING OUT OF THE QUAGMIRE OF HIS WAR WITH IRAN, POSSIBLY FORESTALLING AN ANTICIPATED IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE NORTHERN SECTOR OF THE FRONT, AND IS ALSO CALLING IRAN'S BLUFF AS THE DEFENDER OF ISLAM. INTERESTINGLY, THE CALL FOR PAN-ARAB AND ISLAMIC UNITY DOES NOT EXTEND TO SYRIA. LOCAL MEDIA CONTINUES TO ATTACK ASSAD HEAVILY.

9. FURTHER COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE STATEMENT WAS ISSUED BY THE RCC ON BEHALF OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE HEADS OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES (ALL UNNAMED). IT WAS PROBABLY THE CONSPICUOUS ABSENCE OF PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN THAT LED TO PRESS SPECULATION THAT HE HAD BEEN TOPPLED IN A RCC/MILITARY COUP. MORE LIKELY, IN OUR VIEW, SADDAM'S IMPRIMATURE OF THE STATEMENT WAS DELIBERATELY DELETED AS A PALLIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE TEHRAN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE NEW PLEACE OVERATURE. AS A SIDE NOTE, THE RECEPTION DESK AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS GRACED THIS MORNING WITH A GREATER-THAN-LIFE SIZE POSTER OF THE PRESIDENT IN FULL MILITARY DRESS.

USINT BAGHDAD 2008 DTG:100920Z JUN 82 PSN: 011581
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BODINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1995 DTG: 100430Z JUN 82 PSN: 010274
SIT779 DATE 06/11/82 TOR: 161/0510Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT KEMP TEIC NORT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1995 1610443
O 100430Z JUN 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3473

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1995
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 6/09/02 (BODINE, BARBARA K.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, IZ
SUBJECT: PRESS REPORTS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S OUSTER
REF: STATE 159039

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE SEEN NOR HEARD NOTHING TO CONFIRM UNATTRIBUTED PRESS REPORTS THAT SADDAM HAS BEEN OVERTHROWN BY THE RCC AND MILITARY, OR OTHERS. BAGHDAD STREETS THIS MORNING WERE NORMAL, OUR GUARDS WERE IN PLACE AND VISA APPLICANTS LINED UP OUTSIDE WERE OF AVERAGE NUMBER. SADDAM WAS SEEN ON TV LAST NIGHT GREETING KING HUSSEIN. SPORATIC GUNFIRE WAS HEARD BY SOME MEMBERS OF THE STAFF LAST EVENING BUT IT IS THOUGH TO BE IN RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE WITH IRAN. OTHER AGENCIES WITHIN USINT REPORT THAT ALL SEEMS NORMAL AT THE PALACE. IF THERE HAS BEEN A COUP, IT HAS BEEN QUIET, PRESUMABLY BLOODLESS AND HAS NOT REACHED THE IRAQI PUBLIC YET.

3. WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP YOU INFORMED OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PICKED UP.
BODINE

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E 96-127/1#298

BY SMF,

E 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1951 DTG: 061235Z JUN 82 PSN: 004505
SIT369 DATE 06/12/82 TOR: 157/1841Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1951 1571255
O 061235Z JUN 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3451

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 166
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1202
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1312
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 151
AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 015
AMEMBASSY LOME 007
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 019
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4023
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2857
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2543
USLO RIYADH 233
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3545
AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1195
AMEMBASSY DOHA 638
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 869
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 884
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1054
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 500
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 100
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 817
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 683
AMEMBASSY BONN 370
AMEMBASSY RABAT 445
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1168
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 676
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 309
USMISSION USJN NEW YORK 751

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1951
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 6/6/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, BMIL1, IR, US, OTRA, APER, IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ-IRAN: CONVERSATION WITH TARIQ AZIZ JUNE 6
REFS: A) STATE 154130 (NOTAL) B) STATE 155123 (NOTAL)
C) STATE 153676 (NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING MEETING WITH DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ JUNE 6, HE
SAID THAT IN MY ABSENCE ON LEAVE, HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO
MEET WITH DPO BODINE IF HIGH LEVEL WAS NECESSARY,
OTHERWISE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD IN FOREIGN MINISTRY

WITH UNDER SECRETARY SAMURAI (WHO WAS PRESENT).

3. AFTER DISCUSSING CASE OF AMERICAN KIDNAPPED BY
KURDS (SEPTTEL), I GAVE AZIZ OUR ASSESSMENT RE IRANIAN
SUPPLY OF SOVIET 130 MM GUNS WHICH COULD HIT BASRAH
AREA FROM ABADAN AND KHORRAMSHAHR. HE ACKNOWLEDGED
AWARENESS OF SUCH CAPABILITY. IN ANSWER TO QUESTION
OF HOW IRAQIS JUDGED THEIR POLICY OF RETALIA-
TORY AIR AND ARTILLERY STRIKES INSIDE IRAN, HE SAID
THAT IF IRANIANS CONTINUED TO SHELL BASRAH, IRAQ
COULD RETURN STRIKE WITH STRIKE. YESTERDAY'S AIR
ATTACK IN ILAM WAS EFFECTIVE, HE SAID. IRAQ WOULD BE
WILLING TO STOP SHELLING AND BOMBING IF THE IRANIANS
WOULD STOP.

4. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD BEEN SHELLING
ABADAN FOR MANY MONTHS, HE ARGUED THAT THIS WAS A
MILITARY THEATER OF OPERATION, NOT A CIVILIAN TARGET.
IRAQ DID NOT SHELL IRANIANS FROM WITHIN THE CITY OF
BASRAH, WHICH WAS A CIVILIAN TARGET, WHEREAS THE IRANIANS DID
FIRE FROM ABADAN. IRAQ WOULD PREFER THAT
BOTH SIDES STOP IN ORDER TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE FOR
PEACE.

5. IN RESPONSE TO QUERIES RE VARIOUS PEACE EFFORTS,
AZIZ NOTED THAT A MINISTERIAL GROUP OF THE OIC WOULD
BE VISITING BAGHDAD LATER IN THE DAY AND THEN EITHER
IT OR ANOTHER DIC GROUP WOULD GO ON TO TEHRAN. THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

GROUP REPORTEDLY HAD SOME "NEW IDEAS." AZIZ THEN
EMPHASIZED THAT IRAQ STILL BELIEVED THE UNSC AND THE
UN SECRETARY GENERAL, SUBHOSTED BY PALME AND
CORDONEZ, HAD THE MOST IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY. IRAQI
SOUNDINGS INDICATED WIDESPREAD SUPPORT FOR UNSC
ACTION. THE UK, FRENCH AND THE USSR WERE READY TO
COOPERATE. CHINA WOULD NOT BLOCK IT. SPAIN WAS IN
FAVOR JAPAN SURPRISINGLY HAD NOT YET
ANSWERED BUT HE ASSUMED THAT THEY WOULD COOPERATE.

6. IRAQ STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL
SHOULD ADDRESS THE SUBJECT IN THE NEAR FUTURE RATHER
THAN PUT IT OFF FOR LONG TERM STUDY. IRAQ ALSO FELT
THAT ALL EFFORTS BY GROUPS OR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES SHOULD
CONTINUE SIMULTANEOUSLY RATHER THAN AWAIT THE OUTCOME
OF ONE OR ANOTHER.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-127/1 #299

BY amf, 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1951 DTG: 061235Z JUN 82 PSN: 004586
SIT368 DATE 06/12/82 TOR: 157/1843Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #1951/02 1571319

O 061235Z JUN 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3452

INFO AMEMBASSY MADRID 167

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1203

AMEMBASSY PARIS 1313

AMEMBASSY TOKYO 152

AMEMBASSY GEORGETOWN 016

AMEMBASSY LOME 008

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 020

AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4024

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2858

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2544

USLO RIYADH 234

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3546

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1196

AMEMBASSY DOHA 839

AMEMBASSY MANAMA 870

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 885

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1055

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 501

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 181

AMEMBASSY ANKARA 818

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 684

AMEMBASSY BONN 371

AMEMBASSY RABAT 446

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1169

AMEMBASSY TUNIS 677

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 310

USM SSION USUN NEW YORK 752

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1951
EXDIS

7. TARIQ AZIZ ASKED SPECIFICALLY FOR THE US ASSESSMENT OF WHEN IT WOULD BE A GOOD TIME TO START WORKING TOWARD A RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE WOULD APPRECIATE AS PRECISE AN ANSWER AS IS POSSIBLE. ANOTHER QUESTION HE HAD WAS WHETHER THE COMING GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETING ON DISARMAMENT WOULD INTERFERE WITH EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR OR PERHAPS FACILITATE THEM THROUGH THE PRESENCE IN NEW YORK OF A NUMBER OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. (DEPARTMENT'S REPLY COULD BE TO SAMURAI OR TO TARIQ AZIZ IF THERE IS SUFFICIENT MATERIAL TO GO TO THAT LEVEL.)

8. SINCE AZIZ HAD MENTIONED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, I ASKED WHETHER IN HIS RECENT VISIT TO MOSCOW HE HAD OBTAINED THE SOVIET ANALYSIS OF THE PROSPECTS FOR WAR AND PEACE. HE REPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT PROVIDE SUCH AN ANALYSIS BUT THEY HAD STATED THEIR POSITION THAT THE CONFLICT SHOULD BE ENDED AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND THEY HAD PROMISED THAT THEIR UN REPRESENTATIVE WOULD COOPERATE WITH THE IRAQI REPRESENTATIVE IN NEW YORK. WHEN I NOTED THAT SOME DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN A SOVIET STATEMENT WARNING AGAINST AN IRANIAN INVASION OF IRAQ, AZIZ INDICATED THAT HE KNEW OF NO PUBLIC STATEMENT. HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE DOING PRIVATELY.

9. I BRIEFED AZIZ ON OUR EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN FORCES CONFRONTING EACH OTHER IN LEBANON AND OBTAIN RESPECT FOR THE CEASE FIRE. HE REPLIED THAT IRAQ WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THIS MATTER. HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS PART OF AN ISRAELI EFFORT ON BEHALF OF IRAN TO DISTRACT THE PARTIES FROM EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE IRAQ-IRANIAN CONFLICT. MY SUGGESTION THAT PERHAPS THERE WERE OTHER REASONS FOR THE TIMING OF ISRAEL'S ACTION PROBABLY DID NOT SWAY AZIZ FROM HIS CONSPIRATORIAL THEORY.

10. COMMENT: IT APPEARED FROM TARIQ AZIZ'S REPORT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON IRAQI SOUNDINGS RE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION THAT A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WERE TELLING IRAQ WHAT IRAQ WISHES TO HEAR AND ARE NOT SHARING THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF EARLY SC ACTION. IRONICALLY, SOME OF THE EUROPEANS WHO HAVE BEEN LEAST ENTHUSIASTIC HAVE APPARENTLY BEEN REGISTERED BY THE IRAQIS AS BEING MORE FAVORABLE TO SC ACTION THAN THE US. I TOLD AZIZ WE REMAIN READY TO SUPPORT SC OR OTHER ACTION THAT HAS SOME PROSPECT OF ENDING THE WAR BUT WE WOULD WANT TO KEEP A LOW PROFILE. HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A WISE APPROACH.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1951

DTG: 061235Z JUN 82 PSN: 004586

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1895 DTG: 311114Z MAY 82 PSN: 051866
SIT718 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 151/1544Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT PUBS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #1895 1511120

O R 311114Z MAY 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3425

INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0680

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1189

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2380

AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0052

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2852

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2829

AMEMBASSY DOHA 0832

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2540

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3537

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1190

AMEMBASSY MADRID 0163

AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0863

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1163

AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0879

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0306

AMEMBASSY PARIS 1304

USLO RIYADH 0230

AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0148

AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0672

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0748

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1895

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/31/82 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, PORO, MILI, IZ, IR, JO/US

SUBJ: IRAQ-IRAN MEDIATION: JORDANIAN UNSC INITIATIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REF: A) AMMAN 04694, B) BAGHDAD 1876, C) BAGHDAD 1864

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE ARE PUZZLED BY JORDANIAN INITIATIVE CALLING FOR URGENT UNSC ACTION ON THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR. FROM AMMAN REFTEL, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS INITIATIVE WAS COORDINATED WITH IRAQI EMISSARY BARZAN TAKRITI (SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HALF BROTHER). THIS MOVE IS TACTICALLY QUITE DIFFERENT FROM IRAQ'S RECOMMENDED APPROACH TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS PRESENTED TO US BY DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ INDICATED THAT IRAQ WAS EXPLORING HOW THE ISSUE MIGHT BEST BE RAISED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. HE SAID IRAQ PREFERRED THAT A FORMAL APPROACH TO THE SC BE MADE BY A COUNTRY NOT TOO CLOSELY IDENTIFIED WITH IRAQ. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT IRAQ WANTED SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION THAT WAS WELL

PREPARED AND WOULD DEAL WITH THE ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT RATHER THAN SIMPLY CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS. HE TOLD US MAY 30 THAT IRAQ ENVISAGED A COUNCIL MEETING AFTER 10 OR 15 DAYS OF CONSULTATIONS AND PREPARATIONS. THE FRENCH AND BRITISH AMBASSADOR RECEIVED SIMILAR APPROACHES.

4. THE NEXT TIME WE ARE IN CONTACT WITH A RESPONSIBLE LEVEL OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WE WILL SEEK CLARIFICATION. MEANWHILE, IT APPEARS THAT IRAQI (AND JORDANIAN) TACTICS HAVE CHANGED IN FAVOR OF AN EARLY SC MEETING THAT WILL NOT BE WELL PREPARED. OUR GUESS IS THAT THE IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS FEAR AN EARLY IRANIAN INCURSION INTO IRAQ AND A HOPE IT MIGHT BE DELAYED OR ABANDONED IF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DEALING WITH THE ISSUE.

5. THERE IS ANOTHER PUZZLING ELEMENT IN CURRENT IRAQI CONDUCT. THE IRAQIS PUBLICLY CLAIM THAT IRAN HAS BEEN INTENSIVELY SHELLING THE BASRA REGION. THE THREATENED RETALIATION INSIDE IRAN AND CARRIED THIS OUT WITH RAIDS ON THE OIL REFINERY AT TABRIZ AND OIL INSTALLATIONS AT KHARG ISLAND MAY 30. REFTEL HAS KING HUSSEIN JUSTIFYING THIS AS A RESPONSE TO HEAVY SHELLING OF BASRA. TARIQ AZIZ, HOWEVER, ON MAY 30 TOLD US THAT SHELLING OF BASRA WAS ON ROUGHTLY THE SAME LEVEL AS HAD BEEN EXPERIENCED FOR THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS. RECENT VISITORS TO BASRA BEAR THIS OUT. IT SEEMS, THEREFORE, THAT AN

USINT BAGHDAD 1895 DTG: 311114Z MAY 82 PSN: 051866
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXAGGERATED REPORT ON DAMAGE TO BASRA (AND PENJWEN IN THE NORTH) HAS BEEN USED TO JUSTIFY RAIDS ON IRANIAN OIL INSTALLATIONS FAR REMOVED FROM THE FRONTIER. WE DO NOT YET HAVE LOCAL REACTION TO THIS IRAQI POLICY OF STRIKING TWO BLOWS FOR ONE, AS A RECENT COMMUNIQUE PUT IT. HOWEVER, IRAQI'S WHO WELCOME THIS DISPLAY OF IRAQI MILITARY CAPABILITY WILL PROBABLY BE OUTNUMBERED BY THOSE WHO WOULD PREFER A DIMINUTION RATHER THAN AN ESCALATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITY OF ALL KINDS.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1895

DTG: 311114Z MAY 82 PSN: 051866

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #300

BY amf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG: 301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051526
SIT723 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 151/0810Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1876/01 1501255
O R 301245Z MAY 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3419

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4002
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2849
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1186
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0440
USMISSION USUN EW YORK 0745
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 1876

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/30/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PORG, MILI, IZ, IR, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ RE IRAQ-IRAN WAR
REF: A) STATE 148952, B) BAGHDAD 1877

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ LISTENED INTENTLY TO POINTS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS (REFTEL A) BEGINNING WITH A REVIEW OF THE SECRETARY'S MAY 26 SPEECH AND CONTINUING WITH OUTLINE OF OUR FINDINGS THUS FAR IN CONSULTATIONS RE A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THE NAM, THE OIC AND INDIVIDUAL STATES IN HELPING END THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR. HE SEEMED PLEASED WITH US DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND URGED A CONTINUED EFFECTIVE BUT LOW PROFILE US ROLE. IRAQ'S PREFERENCE APPEARS TO BE AN ISLAMIC INITIATIVE THAT WOULD MERGE WITH A UNSC RESOLUTION AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF UN EXPERIENCE AND MACHINERY. IRAQ ALSO WELCOMES ANY OTHER HELPFUL EFFORTS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INCLUDING THOSE OF INDIA AND ALGERIA.

3. OUR ABILITY TO OBTAIN AN APPOINTMENT WITH TARIQ AZIZ ON ONE HOUR NOTICE AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE SUBJECT OF US-IRAQI CONSULTATIONS INDICATE THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WISHES TO MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE USG AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPS. WE HOPE TO KEEP THIS CHANNEL OPEN WITH UPDATES FROM THE DEPARTMENT THAT CAN BE PASSED TO THE IRAQIS WHILE WE ELICIT THEIR VIEWS AND INTENTIONS. END SUMMARY.

4. FOLLOWING RECEIPT OF INSTRUCTIONS (REF A), USINT CHIEF EAGLETON SOUGHT (AND RECEIVED WITHIN ONE HOUR) APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY PM TARIQ AZIZ TO CONVEY PRELIMINARY USG RESPONSE TO HIS EARLIER DEMARCHE. EAGLETON, ACCOMPANIED BY NEA/ARN DIRECTOR HOWELL MET

FOR FORTY-FIVE MINUTES MAY 30 WITH TARIQ AZIZ WHO WAS JOINED BY MFA UNDERSECRETARY SAMARRA'I AS NOTETAKER.

5. BEGINNING WITH USG PREFERENCE AT THIS TIME TO CONTINUE EXCHANGES WITH GOI IN BAGHDAD RATHER THAN AT UN, EAGLETON FOLLOWED CLOSELY TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL IN PRESENTING PRELIMINARY USG VIEWS TO TARIQ AZIZ. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE US ENVISAGED THESE EXCHANGES AND CONTINUING "AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS" OF THE GOI AND TARIQ AZIZ, ACCEPTING OUR PREFERENCE FOR BAGHDAD, RESPONDED THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP REMAINS READY TO DISCUSS MATTERS HERE OR IN ANY OTHER LOCATION.

6. IN ABSENCE OF FULL TEXT OF SECRETARY'S MAY 26 SPEECH (WHICH WE HAVE REQUESTED BE REPEATED TO BAGHDAD), EAGLETON DREW UPON EXTRACTS AND FURTHER COMMENT BY DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AT MAY 27 BRIEFING, LEAVING RELEVANT PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPT WITH SAMARRA'I. HE MENTIONED THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME MISQUOTING OF THE SECRETARY IN THE PAKISTANI PRESS WHERE HE WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE REFERRED TO CONTACTS WITH PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH A WIDE RANGE OF GOVERNMENTS, EAGLETON SAID, INCLUDING PAKISTAN AND TURKEY, BUT HAVE NOT ANNOUNCED THE LOCATION OF USCH CONTACTS PUBLICLY BECAUSE WE ARE CONSCIOUS, GIVEN THE PREDICTABLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE OF IRAN, OF THE COMPLICATIONS TO ANY EFFORTS THAT CAN RESULT FROM AN APPARENT US ROLE. CONTINUING HIS PRESENTATION, EAGLETON SAID THAT WE HAVE

USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG: 301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051526
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOUND MIXED REACTIONS TO THE ADVISABILITY OF A UNSC INITIATIVE OR, FOR THAT MATTER, THE PROMISE OF OIC OR NAM EFFORTS AT THIS TIME. US CONSULTATIONS ARE CONTINUING, HE CONCLUDED.

USINT BAGHDAD 1876

DTG: 301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051526

DEC

NLS F96-127/1 #301
By Amf 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG:301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051527
SIT722 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 151/0812Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1876/02 1501315
O R 301245Z MAY 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3420

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4003
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2850
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1187
AMEMBASSY RABAT 0441
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0746
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 BAGHDAD 1876
EXDIS

7. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THE GOI HAS NOT YET RECEIVED REACTIONS FROM OTHER PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UNSC, TARIQ AZIZ SAID HE DID NOT FIND THE USG RESPONSE TO BE CLEAR. EAGLETON AGAIN WENT OVER THE POINTS, STRESSING THAT, WHILE WE HAVE NOT FOUND A CLEAR CONSENSUS, OUR CONSULTATIONS ARE CONTINUING WITH A VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS AND WE ARE ENCOURAGING A POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL EFFORT TO EFFECT A CEASEFIRE AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT. HOWELL ADDED THAT THE US MUST PROCEED WITH SOME CARE BECAUSE, WHILE SEEKING TO PROMOTE THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE END TO THE CONFLICT, THE US DOES NOT WISH ITS ACTIONS OR ASSOCIATION WITH ANY PROMISING MEDIATION EFFORT TO EVOKE A NEGATIVE IRANIAN REFLECT. EAGLETON ASKED WHAT THE RESULTS OF IRAQ'S CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN.

8. TARIQ AZIZ CONCEDED THAT IRAQ ALSO IS CONTINUING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO TAKE SOUNDINGS AND SHOULD KNOW THE RESULTS IN SEVERAL DAYS. HE OBSERVED THAT IRAQ HAD NOT SOUGHT FOR THE US TO TAKE AN IDENTIFIABLE US INITIATIVE BUT DID APPRECIATE THE ROLE THE US CAN PLAY IN ENCOURAGING A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR UNSC CONSIDERATION. IRAQ NEEDS US COOPERATION, HE SAID, TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT SUCCEED. SPEAKING "PERSONALLY," HE MUSED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT US-SOVIET EFFORT AND SAID IRAQ WOULD NOT OBJECT TO SUCH A VENTURE, ALTHOUGH HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT IRAQ DOES NOT NOW KNOW WHAT MOSCOW'S ATTITUDE AND POSITION ARE. RETURNING TO IRAQ'S DIPLOMATIC SOUNDINGS, TARIQ AZIZ ASKED WHETHER HE COULD ASSUME THE US WOULD COOPERATE IF IRAQ DETERMINES THAT THERE ARE FAVORABLE PROSPECTS FOR UNSC ACTION. EAGLETON DECLINED TO RESPOND CATEGORICALLY, SAYING THAT IN PRINCIPLE HE BELIEVED THE US WILL WORK WITH A PROMISING CONSENSUS,

ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WISH TO MAKE OUR OWN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANY PROPOSED UNSC ACTION SINCE OUR OBJECTIVE, AND WE ASSUME IRAQ'S AS WELL, IS TO PRODUCE RESULTS IN TERMS OF ENDING THE CONFLICT. HOWELL POINTED OUT THAT CONTINUING US CONSULTATIONS ON THE QUESTION COULD HAVE THE RESULT OF BUILDING TOWARD A CONSENSUS IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY ON WAYS TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

9. EAGLETON INQUIRED, AS INSTRUCTED, AS TO WHY, IF IRAQ SEEKS AN END TO THE CONFLICT, IT IS CONTINUING TO SHELL KHORAMSHAHR. TARIQ AZIZ'S REPLY AND SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF MILITARY SITUATION BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.

10. EAGLETON ASKED FOR IRAQ'S VIEW OF PAST NAM EFFORTS AND FUTURE PROEJCTS. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT BOTH THE NAM AND THE OIC HAD MADE MANY ATTEMPTS BUT AL HAD BEEN BLOCKED BY IRAN. THE SITUATION NOW IS DIFFERENT AND IRAQ DOES NOT KNOW WHAT INITIATIVES WILL BE FORTHCOMING. HE NOTED THAT THE OIC GROUP WILL BE MEETING IN EARLY JUNE AND THAT CHIARMAN TOURE HAS TOLD THE IRAQIS, WITHOUT ELABORATION, THAT HE HAS SOME NEW IDEAS.

11. REGARDING EFFORTS SUCH AS THOSE UNDERTAKEN BY THE NAM AND OIC, TARIQ AZIZ NOTED THAT THERE IS A "REALITY" IN A CONFLICT SUCH AS THAT BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN WHICH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PLACES LIMITS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INFORMAL MEDIATORS. NEITHER THE NAM NOR THE OIC HAVE AVAILABLE TO THEM THE "INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY" AND EXPERTISE NEEDED TO CREATE AND DEPLOY AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OR OBSERVER FORCES. HE SAID THAT IRAQ HAD FREQUENTLY DISCUSSED WITH THEM SUCH PRACTICAL QUESTIONS BUT WITHOUT SATISFACTORY REPLIES. THE US HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING ABLE TO UNDERTAKE SUCH PROJECTS IN A MATTER OF DAYS, ONCE A DECISION IS TAKEN.

USINT BAGHDAD 1876

DTG:301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051527

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG:301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051529
SIT721 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 151/0814Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WMLR JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #1876/03 150133Z

O R 301245Z MAY 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3421

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 4004

AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2851

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1188

AMEMBASSY RABAT 0442

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0747

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 BAGHDAD 1876

EXDIS

12. IRAQ, HE CONTINUED, DOES NOT REGARD THE UNSC EFFORT AS COUNTER TO THE EFFORT OF THE OIC BUT AS COMPLEMENTARY. THE OIC CAN BE HELPFUL IN CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE, PARTICULARLY IN IRAN, THAT WILL MAKE UNSC ACTION MORE PROMISING. RETURNING TO THE US ROLE, HE SAID IRAQ BELIEVES CONTACTS RE THE UNSC SHOULD CONTINUE. ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING THE SUPPORT OF AS MANY KEY COUNTRIES AS POSSIBLE, HE SAID THAT MANY OF THEM DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE FACTS AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE SITUATION AS WELL AS IRAQ OR THE US. IRAQ, THEREFORE, HOPES THE US WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE IN THE EXPLORATORY PROCESS BECAUSE IRAQ SEES SUCH US COOPERATION AS NOT ONLY DESIRABLE BUT ESSENTIAL. IF IRAN DID NOT HAVE SUCH COMPLEXES ABOUT THE US, IRAQ WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO AN OPEN US INITIATIVE BUT, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT UNDERSTANDS THAT A HIGH US PROFILE IS TO BE AVOIDED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

13. IN RESPONSE TO EAGLETON'S QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF A VARIETY OF ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL PLAYERS, TARIQ AZIZ HAD THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:
--UNDER SECRETARY SAMMARA'I HAD MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EC 10 EARLIER MAY 30 TO THANK THEM FOR THEIR STATEMENT AND TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS. (IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION WITH [REDACTED] WE LEARNED SAMMARA'I HAD INDEED EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE EC STATEMENT BUT DISCOURAGED ANY EUROPEAN INITIATIVE OUTSIDE THE UNSC FRAMEWORK).
--TARIQ AZIZ DID NOT QUIBBLE WITH THE SUGGESTION THAT THE CUBANS MAY HAVE INTERESTS OF THEIR OWN IN HOW THE NAM EFFORTS IS PLAYED, BUT CONCEDED THAT IRAQ DOES NOT NOW KNOW WHAT THEY ARE UP TO.
--IRAQ HAS HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM THE INDIANS.
--THE ALGERIANS TOLD THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR DAY

BEFORE YESTERDAY THAT THEY INTEND TO CONTINUE THEIR MEDIATION EFFORTS BUT "NOT AT THE SAME LEVEL" AS PREVIOUSLY. TARIQ AZIZ FELT THAT THE DEATH OF THE ALGERIAN FORMIN WAS STILL HAVING ITS EFFECT ON THE ALGERIAN POLICY.

14. HOWELL ASKED, GIVEN TARIQ AZIZ'S DESCRIPTION OF THE EARLY JUNE OIC MEETING AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE THE CLIMATE FAVORABLY, WHAT KIND OF TIME FRAME THE IRAQIS HAVE IN MIND FOR UNSC CONSIDERATION. TARIQ AZIZ REPLIED THAT IRAQ CONSIDERS EARLY UNSC ACTION NECESSARY BUT DID NOT BELIEVE IT APPROPRIATE AT THE MOMENT. IRAQ FEELS THERE SHOULD BE A UNSC MEETING NOT LATER THAN 10 TO 15 DAYS FROM NOW. RESPONDING TO HOWELL'S PROBING OF WHETHER IRAQ SEEKS AN EARLY UNSC MEETING OR ONE THAT HAS BEEN WELL PREPARED, TARIQ AZIZ SAID THAT IT SHOULD BE PROCEEDED BY FULL CONSULTATIONS AND CAREFUL PREPARATIONS. OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS, THERE WILL BE OIC ACTIVITY, A MEETING OF THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AND POSSIBLY AN ARAB SUMMIT. WHEN QUESTIONED HE SAID IRAQ PREFERS AN ARAB SUMMIT, BUT FELT CONFIDENT THAT AT LEAST A MEETING OF ARAB FORMINS WOULD TAKE PLACE. ALL OF THESE ACTIVITIES, THE IRAQIS SAY, WILL BE PREPARATORY TO UNSC DEBATE. HE PROMISED TO KEEP US INFORMED THROUGH USINT OF IRAQ'S VIEWS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE PREPARATIONS. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT IRAQ BELIEVES THAT, SHOULD A UNSC MEETING BE CONVENED, IRAN WILL ATTEND. HE CONCEDED THAT IRAN TODAY IS MORE ORGANIZED AND BEHAVING MORE LIKE A STATE THAN AT ANY TIME IN

USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG:301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051529
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE LAST TWO YEARS. IRAQ THEREFORE EXPECTS THAT, WHATEVER THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT THE UN, LEADERS IN TEHRAN WILL BE REPRESENTED AT THE UNSC TO PRESENT IRAN'S CASE.

15. COMMENT: THIS MEETING WITH TARIQ AZIZ, ASIDE FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE GIVE-AND-TAKE INVOLVED, WAS NOTEWORTHY IN TWO OTHER RESPECTS. THE FIRST WAS THE RAPIDITY WITH WHICH HE AGREED TO RECEIVE EAGLETON AND THE SECOND WAS THAT THE PREVIOUS PRACTICE OF CHANGING CARS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS DISPENSED WITH IN FAVOR OF DIRECT-USINT ACCESS TO TARIQ AZIZ'S OFFICE. THE GOI CLEARLY IS INTERESTED IN DIRECT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACTS AT THIS MOMENT AND IS PREPARED TO RELAX SOME OF ITS CUSTOMARY ALOOFNESS TO ACHIEVE IT. AS WE WERE LEAVING, TARIQ AZIZ POINTEDLY NOTED HOW QUICKLY AN APPOINTMENT HAD BEEN ARRANGED. NOW THAT THE CHANNEL IS WARM, WE HOPE THE DEPARTMENT CAN GIVE US REGULAR OPPORTUNITIES TO EXERCISE IT EITHER IN CONVEYING US POSITIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OR IN ELICITING IRAQI ASSESSMENTS AND INTENTIONS. END COMMENT.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1876 DTG:301245Z MAY 82 PSN: 051529

FOIA(b) (1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1865 DTG: 271145Z MAY 82 PSN: 046524
SIT630 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 147/1355Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1865 1471134
O 271145Z MKT 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3411

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1865

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS 1 AND 4, 5/27/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US
SUBJECT: QUERIES FROM TARIQ AZIZ RE A US EMISSARY TO BAGHDAD
REF: BAGHDAD 1864

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS I WAS LEAVING TARIQ AZIZ'S OFFICE (REFTTEL), HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO ASK WHETHER I HAD ANY INFORMATION ON WHEN A US EMISSARY WOULD BE COMING TO BAGHDAD. HE INDICATED THAT HIS QUESTION WAS BASED ON INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT. I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO TELL HIM, OTHER THAN THAT IT HAD BEEN OUR THOUGHT FOR SOME TIME THAT A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL WOULD VISIT BAGHDAD. HE NODDED AND SAID HE COULD CONFIRM THAT SUCH A PERSON WOULD BE WELCOME.
EAGLETON

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-127/1 #302

BY snf, 1A, TE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1855 DTG: 261111Z MAY 82 PSN: 044823
SIT638 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 146/1317Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1855 1461117
O 261111Z MAY 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3406

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1855

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS-1 5/26/02 (BODINE, BARBARA K.)

TAGS: PEPR, IZ, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER TARIQ AZIZ

REF: A) BAGHDAD 1841 B) BAGHDAD 1853

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT. }

2. MFA PROTOCOL DEPARTMENT CALLED USINT LATE AFTERNOON MAY 26 TO SAY THAT CHIEF USINT, AND ARN DIRECTOR AND DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE HOWELL AND MACK, HAVE AN "URGENT" MEETING WITH IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL TARIQ AZIZ AT 10:30 A.M. THURSDAY, MAY 27.

3. PROTOCOL WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE DETAILS ON SUBJECT OF MEETING BUT REPEATEDLY STRESSED ITS URGENCY. IT IS POSSIBLE THE MESSAGE FROM THE LEADERSHIP THE LEADERSHIP THAT PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETER ZAHAWI PROMISED TO CONVEY PRIOR TO MACK'S DEPARTURE WILL INSTEAD BE CONVEYED THROUGH THE MORE FORMAL AND AUTHORITY-TATIVE CHANNEL OF THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER.

4. REQUEST THAT DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE BE SENT NIACT IMMEDIATE TO ENSURE RECEIPT PRIOR TO EARLY MORNING MEETING.
EAGLETON

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1#303

BY Amf, n, E 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 USINT BAGHDAD 1841 DTG: 251555Z MAY 82 PSN: 043604
SIT644 DATE 06/03/82 TOR: 145/1820Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #1841 1451600

O 251555Z MAY 82 ZFF4

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3400

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1841

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 25/05/82 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, MILI, MOPS, IZ, IR

SUBJ: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETER EXPRESSES CONCERN AND ASKS
US POSITION RE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN WAR.

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S INTERPRETER, MAZEN ZAHAWI, CAME TO LUNCH AT RESIDENCE MAY 25 WITH ARN DIRECTOR HOWELL AND DIRECTOR DESIGNATE MACK. (CONVERSATION COVERED WIDE RANGE OF AREA ISSUES BUT CENTERED ON NEW SITUATION CREATED BY IRAN'S RECOVERY OF KHORAMSHAHR AND STRONG MILITARY POSITION POISED ON IRAQI FRONTIER. ZAHAWI HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN TASKED BY THE PRESIDENCY TO OBTAIN INFO RE THE US ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MILITARY SHIFT IN FAVOR OF IRAN AND AN INDICATION OF WHAT THE US WOULD DO TO FACE THE NEW SITUATION.

3. RE THE US ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR WE DREW ON US POLICY STATEMENTS EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER THE WAR'S CONTINUATION AND SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE PROSPECT OF A MILITANT, REVOLUTIONARY IRAN ENTERING IRAQI TERRITORY AND THREATENING THE SECURITY OF STATES IN THE GULF. HOWEVER WE DECLINED TO PREDICT WHAT STEPS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE USG MIGHT TAKE UNDER VARIOUS CONTINGENCIES AS THE SITUATION DEVELOPED. THIS REPLY SEEMED PARTIALLY TO SATISFY ZAHAWI THOUGH HE KEPT PRESSING FOR MORE, ARGUING THAT THE U.S. MUST PROTECT ITS INTERESTS IN THE AREA. AT ONE POINT, HE SOUGHT TO ELICIT A RESPONSE TO HIS QUERY BY INQUIRING WHAT THE USG MIGHT ASK AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR ITS SUPPORT; WE REFUSED TO BE DRAWN IN.

4. IN THE CONTEXT OF DISCUSSING THE ABOVE AND US-IRAQI BILATERAL RELATIONS, ZAHAWI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD "THROUGH SPECIAL CHANNELS" THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES WOULD BE VISITING IRAQ IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY DETAILS. WE REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN VELIOTES INTENTION TO FIT IRAQ INTO A TRIP TO THE AREA. THIS POSSIBILITY HAD BEEN RAISED WITH FONMIN HAMMADI IN FEBRUARY WHEN WE HAD BEEN OFFICIAL INFORMED THAT VELIOTES WOULD BE WELCOME. ZAHAWI SAID A VISIT BY VELIOTES

WOULD INDEED BE WELCOME.

5. RE THE NON-ALIGNED SUMMIT, ZAHAWI SAID IRAQ WAS DETERMINED TO BRING THE NAM BACK INTO A TRULY NON-ALIGNED POSITION AFTER 3 YEARS OF CUBAN CUSTODIANSHIP. PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD REPRESENT THE NON-ALIGNED AT THE UNGA THIS FALL AND HE WONDERED WHETHER A MEETING BETWEEN SADDAM AND PRESIDENT REAGAN MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. WE REPLIED THAT IT WAS PREMATURE TO DISCUSS SUCH SCHEDULING, IT WAS RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE (THEN PRESIDENT OF THE NON-ALIGNED) TO WASHINGTON AT THE INVITATION OF PRESIDENT NIXON IN 1973.

6. RE IRAQ'S MILITARY SETBACKS, ZAHAWI HELD TO THE STANDARD LINE THAT LIVES WOULD NOT BE SACRIFICED MERELY TO HOLD IRANIAN TERRITORY WHICH WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO BE EVACUATED IN ANY CASE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED HOWEVER THAT IRAQ HAD WANTED TO KEEP THE BATTLELINES INSIDE IRAN SO AS TO PROTECT CITIES AND FACILITIES ON THE IRAQI SIDE OF THE FRONTIER. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT IRAQ HAD KEPT ITS ARMED FORCES INTACT BUT HE DID NOT ACCOMPANY THIS WITH THE USUAL ASSURANCES THAT THE IRANISANS COULD BE PREVENTED FROM ADVANCING FURTHER. HE DID HOWEVER SAY THAT IRAQ WOULD BE PREPARED TO SACRIFICE THE NECESSARY LIVES TO DEFEND IRAQI SOIL.

7. ZAHAWI WILL BE COMING TO THE RESIDENCE BEFORE MACK'S DEPARTURE EVENING MAY 27 TO DISCUSS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS. HE SAID HE WOULD CONVEY ANY THOUGHTS THAT THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP MIGHT HAVE FOR THE USG AT THAT TIME.

USINT BAGHDAD 1841 DTG: 251555Z MAY 82 PSN: 043604
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. SUGGEST DEPT REPEAT TO AMMAN.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1841

DTG: 251555Z MAY 82 PSN: 043604

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 304

BY *anf*, NANA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1786
SIT024 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 191036Z MAY 82 PSN: 035101
TOR: 139/1613Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1786/01 1391148
O 191036Z MAY 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3372

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1172
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3974
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 793
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2831
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2811
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2524
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3515
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1169
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 848
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1156
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 865
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #305

BY smf, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1786
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 2 5/19/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MILI, MOPS, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: APPROACHING CHANGE IN IRAQ

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: WITH THE BATTLE FOR KHORAMSHAHR EXPECTED ANY TIME, OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA ARE INCREASINGLY UNEASY RE THE FATE OF IRAQI REGIME AND THEIR OWN SECURITY INTERESTS. IN THE SHORT TERM, WE ARE NOT YET READY TO WRITE OFF SADDAM HUSSEIN. HOWEVER, IRAN IS INCREASINGLY CASTING HIM AS THE PRIMARY IMPEDIMENT TO PEACE. OF IRAQ'S POTENTIAL ALLIES ONLY EGYPT WOULD BE ABLE TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TO IRAQ'S DEFENSE, AND EGYPTIAN INTERVENTION WOULD BE RISKY. WE CANNOT PREDICT WHEN SADDAM MIGHT FALL BUT, WITHOUT ASSUMING AN EARLY CHANGE, WE SHOULD BEGIN TO CONSIDER HOW WE AND OUR AREA FRIENDS MIGHT BE ABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS ONCE A PROCESS OF CHANGE EITHER WITHIN THE BA'ATH LEADERSHIP OR IN THE BASIC POWER STRUCTURE IS UNDERWAY. IT IS STILL TOO EARLY TO DISCUSS THE FALL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN WITH OUR AREA FRIENDS. MEANWHILE, HOWEVER, WE SHOULD, MAKE CLEAR OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AREA STATES, OUR CONCERN RE ANY EXTENSION OF THE WAR AND OUR DESIRE FOR AN END TO THE FIGHTING. END SUMMARY.

3. ATTENTION IN BAGHDAD IS NOW FOCUSED ON THE COMING BATTLE OF KHORAMSHAHR AND THE QUESTION WHETHER IRANIAN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1786

DTG: 191036Z MAY 82 PSN: 035101

FORCES WILL CROSS THE IRAQI FRONTIER. FOR WANT OF A BETTER STRATEGY, THE IRAQI INTENTION IS STILL TO HOLD BACK THE IRANIANS WHILE AWAITING POLITICAL CHANGE INSIDE IRAN OR PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE THAT WILL BRING IRAN TO THE PEACE TABLE. TIME, HOWEVER, IS RUNNING OUT AND THE IRAQIS AND THE REST OF US MUST FACE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE IRANIANS MAY RECOVER KHORAMSHAHR, THUS INFLECTING A HEAVY BLOW ON SADDAM HUSSEIN'S PRESTIGE, AND ALSO THAT IRANIAN FORCES MIGHT ENTER IRAQ.

4. FROM OUR READING OF OFFICIAL IRANIAN STATEMENTS AND REPORTING OF SOME DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES FROM THEIR EMBASSIES IN TEHRAN, IT IS INCREASINGLY APPARENT THAT THE IRANIANS INTEND TO CONTINUE THE WAR UNTIL SADDAM HUSSEIN FALLS. THE NEARLY UNANIMOUS OPINION OF OUR REGIONAL FRIENDS AND EUROPEAN ALLIES HAS BEEN THAT A CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP IN IRAQ WOULD REPRESENT A SETBACK FOR US AND WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS HERE. EVEN THOSE WHO SHARE OUR LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR MUCH OF WHAT SADDAM HUSSEIN STANDS FOR ARE CONCERNED AS THEY LOOK AT AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE WITHOUT SADDAM. SOME OF OUR REGIONAL ALLIES ARE CONSULTING EACH OTHER AND CALLING ON US TO JOIN THEM IN DOING SOMETHING TO SAVE INEQ (AND THE GULF) FROM THE IRANIAN MENACE.

5. WITH JORDAN TIED UP WATCHING SYRIA, ONLY EGYPT COULD CONCEIVABLY BRING IN SUFFICIENT FORCE TO BOLSTER IRAQI MORALE AND ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO IRAQ'S DEFENSIVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CAPABILITIES. THIS WOULD BE A RISKY MOVE FOR EGYPT GIVEN THE LOGISTIC PROBLEMS AND THE LIKELY LACK OF ENTHUSIASM EGYPTIAN TROOPS WOULD HAVE FOR DYING IN DEFENSE OF BASRA OR AMARA. WE ASSUME THAT A SERIOUS CALL FOR ARAB REINFORCEMENTS WOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE IRANIANS CROSS THE FRONTIER, BY WHICH TIME IRAQ'S MILITARY POSITION COULD BE EVEN LESS BRILLIANT THAN IT IS NOW. WE CONCLUDE THAT IT IS ESSENTIALLY UP TO IRAQ TO DEFEND ITS OWN TERRITORY, THOUGH TOKEN MILITARY SUPPORT AND MORAL BACKING FROM OUTSIDE COULD BE OF SOME HELP. IF THE IRAQIS CAN DEFEAT OR DELAY AN IRANIAN ATTEMPT TO TAKE KHORANSHAHR OR IF THE IRANIANS DECIDE FOR POLITICAL REASONS TO STOP AT THE FRONTIER, SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL TIME. HOWEVER, IF THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP HOLDS TOGETHER AND CONTINUES TO PROSECUTE THE WAR SUCCESSFULLY, RESPONSIBILITY FOR IRAQ'S DILEMMA WILL CENTER ON SADDAM. ALTHOUGH MANY IRAQIS WOULD REACT WITH DEFIANCE TO IRAN'S CALL FOR HIS OUSTER, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER THE ARMY AND PARTY MIGHT SEE HIS REMOVAL AS THE ONLY WAY TO PRESERVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND "SAVE IRAQ".

USINT BAGHDAD 1786

DTG: 191036Z MAY 82 PSN: 035101

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1786
SIT023 DATE 05/24/82

DTG: 191036Z MAY 82 PSN: 036126
TOR: 140/0802Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS KEMP
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1786/02 1391239 CCY AD127423 STU0518 - AA
O 191036Z MAY 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3373

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1173
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3975
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 794
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2832
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2812
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2525
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3516
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1170
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 849
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1157
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 866
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #305

BY _____, NARA, DATE _____

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1786
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

6. WE ASSUME THAT OUR NEUTRAL POLICY WILL BE MAINTAINED. IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO BE COMPLETELY PASSIVE TOWARDS DEVELOPMENTS WHICH AFFECT THE VITAL SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA. FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE IRAQIS INVOKE THE ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE CLAUSE AFTER AN IRANIAN INVASION WE MIGHT HAVE TO TAKE A POSITION ON THE USE OF US-ORIGIN MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY ARAB FORCES THAT MIGHT BE SENT IN TO HELP IRAQ DEFEND ITS TERRITORY. WE WILL ALSO BE CALLED UPON, AND FIND IT IN OUR INTEREST, TO REITERATE AT A HIGH LEVEL OUR CONCERN FOR THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF IRAQ/IRAN AND THE GULF STATES AND MAKE VISIBLE EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO THE CONFLICT.

7. MEANWHILE, WE SHOULD BEGIN TO FACE REALISTICALLY THE IRANIAN LINKAGE OF THE END OF THE WAR WITH THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD NOT PREMATURELY RAISE THIS SUBJECT WITH KING HUSSEIN OR OTHERS SINCE IT WOULD MERELY UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND PROBABLY GET BACK TO SADDAM WHO IS STILL VERY MUCH IN CHARGE HERE AND MAY BE FOR SOME TIME TO COME. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, FOR OUR OWN PLANNING PURPOSES, BEGIN TO CONSIDER HOW WE MIGHT BEST PROTECT OUR REGIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND HELP BRING ABOUT THE BEST POSSIBLE OUTCOME DURING A PROCESS OF CHANGE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1786

DTG: 191036Z MAY 82 PSN: 036126

8. IN SUCH A PERIOD IRAQI OPPOSITION FIGURES MIGHT CONTACT US SEEKING OUR VIEWS AND POSSIBLY SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ASSEMBLE A COALITION OF PERSONALITIES AND PARTIES WHO COULD MAKE PEACE WITH IRAN AND WHOSE FUTURE POLICIES FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WOULD BE NOW WORSE THAN THOSE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT GROUPS HOSTILE TO OUR INTERESTS AND PREPARED TO ACCEPT COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT WOULD GAIN THE UPPER HAND. DURING A POSER STRUGGLE THERE IS LITTLE THAT WE COULD DO DIRECTLY TO AFFECT THE OUTCOME EXCEPT GIVE MORALE SUPPORT TO ONE OR THE OTHER FACTIONS. HOWEVER, THE SAUDIS AND TO A LESSER EXTENT THE KUWAITIS WITH THEIR MONEY, AND THE JORDANIANS WITH THEIR CONTACTS, MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLES. THESE ARE QUESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE.

9. ANOTHER AND MORE LIKELY SCENARIO FOR AN INITIAL CHANGE WOULD INVOLVE A BA'ATH PARTY MOVE AGAINST SADDAM AND HIS IMMEDIATE ENTOURAGE (TAHA YASIN RAMADHAN AND TARIQ AZIZ) IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER BA'ATH FACTION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE NA'IM HADDAD AND INTERIOR MINISTER SA'DUN SHAKIR, PERHAPS WITH EX-PRESIDENT AHMAD HASSAN AL-BAKR OR SOMEONE ELSE AS FIGUREHEAD. THE BA'ATH PARTY APPARATUS IS STILL BY FAR THE STRONGEST POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN IRAQ AND IT RETAINS A TIGHT GRIP ON SECURITY SERVICES. IT WOULD BE EASIER TO CHANGE BA'ATHI LEADERSHIP THAN TO

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SUPPRESS THE PARTY AND CREATE A NEW POWER STRUCTURE. WHETHER OR NOT A CHANGE IN BA'ATHI LEADERSHIP WOULD SATISFY IRANIAN REQUIREMENTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT REMAINS TO BE SEEN; BUT SINCE BOTH IRAQ AND IRAN HAVE CAST THE IRAQI REGIME IN THE PERSON OF SADDAM HUSSEIN, HIS REMOVAL MIGHT WELL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR PEACE. AT THE SAME TIME IT MIGHT PUT IN POWER A FACTION WHICH HAS HERETOFORE BEEN SUSPICIOUS OF INCREASED TIES WITH THE WEST AND WOULD BE INCLINED TO TURN TO THE SOVIET UNION FOR SUPPORT. IT IS POSSIBLE, OF COURSE, THAT AS IN THE CASE OF SADDAM, FINANCIAL AND REGIONAL POLITICAL NEEDS WOULD PUSH A NEW BA'ATHI LEADERSHIP TOWARD COLLABORATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN, AND THE ARAB MODERATES. THE FUTURE IS REplete WITH QUESTION MARKS.

10. FOR THE TIME BEING, WE DO NOT RECOMMEND ANY SPECIFIC ACTION BY THE USG TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE CHANGE IN IRAQI LEADERSHIP. IT IS ENOUGH TO BE ALERT TO THAT POSSIBILITY. WE DO, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE USG SUPPORTING THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES IN THE REGION, OPPOSING ANY EXTENSION OF THE SCOPE OF THE WAR, AND CALLING FOR AN EARLY NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. WE ALSO RECOMMEND CONTINUED CONSULTATION WITH OUR FRIENDS IN THE AREA AND PARTICULARLY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT SO AS TO BE ABLE TO ASSESS THEIR LIKELY REACTIONS TO ANY FURTHER DETERIORATION OF IRAQ'S MILITARY POSITION.
EAGLETON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1062
SIT635 DATE 04/15/82

DTG: 051025Z APR 82 PSN: 025717
TOR: 095/1237Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP MR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1062 0951030
O 051025Z APR 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3141

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 1062

NODIS

E. O. 12065: RDS 1,2 4/5/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: NEXT STEPS WITH IRAQ
REF: STATE 84986

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FOLLOWING IRAQI REVERSES ON THE SHUSH-DEZFUL FRONT WE WILL WANT TO DO WHAT WE CAN IN BAGHDAD AND ELSEWHERE TO LOOK AFTER OUR INTERESTS. OUR NEUTRAL STAND REMAINS VALID, THOUGH IT DOES LITTLE TOWARD TEMPERING IRANIAN HOSTILITY. IRAN'S BATTLE STATEMENTS STILL CLAIM THEY ARE STRIKING THE GREAT SATAN, WHILE WESTERN JOURNALISTS WHO RECENTLY VISITED IRANIAN FRONT LINES WERE GREETED BY SHOUTS OF "DEATH TO AMERICA." THE SOVIETS ARE INCREASINGLY CULTIVATING THEIR PROSPECTS IN IRAN. BLOC DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD SEEMS SATISFIED WITH RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND SPEAK OF 25,000 IRAQI CAUSALTIES.

3. THE IRAQIS NOW FEEL A NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS AND SUPPORT. THEY DO NOT EXPECT MUCH FROM THE U. S. BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WE HAVE SOME INFLUENCE WITH THEIR ARAB FRIENDS AND WITH THEIR ENEMY, ISRAEL. THEY TEND TO EXAGGERATE THE ROLE WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO PLAY IN BRINGING THE WAR TO AN END. AS LONG AS WE MAINTAIN OUR SELF-IMPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR EITHER SIDE, OUR LEVERAGE WILL REMAIN LIMITED.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HOWEVER, WE SHOULD BE ALERT FOR OPPORTUNITIES WHICH THE SITUATION MAY PROVIDE.

4. DESPITE RECENT REVERSES, THE IRAQI ARMY IS STILL LARGELY INTACT AND, ALONG WITH THE AIR FORCE, BETTER EQUIPPED THAN THE IRANIANS. HOWEVER, IRAQ'S DEFENSIVE STRATEGY HAS PROVEN FAULTY. DEPRESSED IRAQI MORALE COULD, IN A FUTURE ENGAGEMENT ON THE SHUSH-DEZFUL SCALE, RESULT IN IRANIAN ADVANCES INTO TERRAIN NEAR THE BORDER THAT IRAQ CANNOT AFFORD TO LOSE.

5. WHAT IRAQ NEEDS NOW AS MUCH AS EQUIPMENT IS A BOOST FOR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY MORALE. AN EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN INTEREST IN THE FATE OF IRAQ COULD BE HELPFUL IN THIS REGARD. THEY WOULD ALSO WELCOME A HIGHER-PROFILE U. S. EFFORT TO PUT INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES TO END THE WAR. STATEMENTS BY THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN AND IN VOLIOTES' CONGRESSIONAL

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F86-127/1 #306

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1062

DTG: 051025Z APR 82 PSN: 025717

TESTIMONY HAVE BEEN HELPFUL HERE. MORE OF THE SAME AT A HIGHER LEVEL WOULD BE EVEN MORE SO.

6. WHEN I LAST ASKED OUR USUAL CONTACT AT THE FOREI, .8,8546, AL-SAHHAF, WHAT WE COULD DO TO HELP END THE WAR, HE IMMEDIATELY REPLIED THAT WE SHOULD ADVISE THE ISRAELIS TO END THEIR SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN. ISRAEL'S SUPPORT OF IRAN APPEARS TO US SHORT-SIGHTED GIVEN THE FANATICAL DETERMINATION OF THE SHIA MILITANTS ULTIMATELY TO CARRY THE WAR TO ISRAEL. IF THE ISRAELIS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH USEFUL RELATIONSHIPS IN IRAN THEIR POLICY SEEMS VEN MORE MISGUIDED. THE SECRETARY'S UNDERTAKING, IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH ABU-GHAZALA (LAST PARA REFTEL), TO TAKE A STRONG POSITION WITH ISRAEL ON THE QUESTION OF MILITARY SUPPLIES TO IRAN COULD USEFULLY BE FOLLOWED UP HERE.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS: I SUGGEST AN ORAL MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY TO IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD:

- 1) REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND WELL-BEING OF IRAQ (AND IRAN);
- 2) EMPHASIZE OUR DESIRE TO DE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO HELP THE WAR TO A SPEEDY END AND ASK FOR IRAQI SUGGESTIONS IN THIE REGARD;
- 3) STATE THAT WE WILL BE (OR HAVE BEEN) IN TOUCH WITH ISRAEL TO MAKE CLEAR OUR BELIEF THAT SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S WAR EFFORT PROLONGS THE WAR AND ENDANGERS THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE U.S. AND ITS ARAB FRIENDS AS WELL AS ISRAEL.
- 4) TELL HIM THAT ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES WILL VISIT BAGHDAD DURING HIS NEXT TRIP TO THE AREA (WITH A TIME FRAME, IF POSSIBLE).

USINT BAGHDAD 1062

DTG: 051025Z APR 82 PSN: 025717

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

8. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO CAIRO, AMMAN, JIDDA, TEL AVIV, AND KUWAIT.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1062

DTG: 051025Z APR 82 PSN: 025717

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1041
SIT113 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022090
TOR: 092/1031Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1041 0920822
O 020745Z APR 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3132

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1138
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3817
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2338
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2685
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2727
AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN 340
AMEMBASSY DOHA 802
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2469
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3430
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1107
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 825
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 831
AMEMBASSY SANAA 451
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1005
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 620
COMIDEASTFOR
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 649
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 759
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 162
AMEMBASSY BONN 355
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 492
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 167
AMEMBASSY MADRID 157
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1267
AMEMBASSY RABAT 411
AMEMBASSY ROME 519
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 723

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1041
E.O. 12065: RDS 1,2 4/1/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MPOS, MILI, IZ, IR, US
SUBJECT: INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTS OF IRANIAN MILITARY
SUCCESS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: OUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT IS THAT SADDAM
HUSSEIN WILL SURVIVE HIS MOST RECENT MILITARY SETBACK
WITH HIS POPULARITY AND HOLD ON POWER LARGELY INTACT.
KHOMEINI RATHER THAN SADDAM IS SEEN HERE AS THE PERSON
BLOCKING THE PEACE THAT ALL IRAQIS LONG FOR. THE BA'ATHI
ESTABLISHMENT WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN BY REMOVING

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 #307

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1041

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022090

SADDAM SINCE ANY OTHER BA'ATHI OR SUNNI LEADER WOULD FACE THE SAME IRANIAN AMBITION TO INSTALL AN ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY REGIME IN THIS COUNTRY. WE ANTICIPATE THAT IRAQ WILL MAINTAIN ITS BASICALLY DEFENSIVE POSTURE AND TRY TO BUILD UP PRESSURE ON IRAN TO NEGOTIATE. IRAQ WILL EXPECT INCREASED MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM ARAB PERIENDS WHO HAVE PRESUMABLY BEEN SHAKEN BY RECENT EVENTS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN MILITARY OPERATION IN THE SHUSH-DEZFUL SECTOR HAS NOW ENDED AND IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE A BREATHING SPACE BEFORE IRAN IS ABLE TO LAUNCH ANOTHER MAJOR OFFENSIVE. WE DO NOT YET HAVE MUCH IN THE WAY OF INTELLIGENCE OR OFFICIAL CONTACTS FROM WHICH TO JUDGE THE MOOD OF IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP. THIS ASSESSMENT IS THEREFORE HIGHLY TENTATIVE.

4. IRAQ'S LEADERS MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY SOBERED BY IRAN'S ABILITY TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL OFFENSIVE WHEN AND WHERE IRAQI FORCES WERE PRESUMABLY THOROUGHLY PREPARED. THE IRAQI PUBLIC IS STILL NOT WELL INFORMED ON THE MILITARY SITUATION. SOME PERHAPS BELIEVE IRAQI CLAIMS THAT THEY GAVE THE IRANIANS A SEVERE BEATING BEFORE WITHDRAWING TO BETTER POSITIONS. OTHERS PERHAPS EXAGGERATE THE SCOPE OF THE IRANIAN VICTORY AND HAVE ADOPTED DEFEATIST MENTALITIES. THE OVERALL PUBLIC REACTION APPEARS TO BE A DEEPENING DEPRESSION, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF HEAVY CASUALTIES THE PAST TEN DAYS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BUT EVEN MORE BECAUSE THEY SEE NO END TO THE WAR.

5. ALTHOUGH THIS IS "SADDAM'S QADISSIYAH" MOST IRAQIS DO NOT SEEM TO PLACE THE BLAME FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR ON HIS SHOULDERS. INSTEAD, THEY FATALISTICALLY OBSERVE THAT AS LONG AS IRAN'S LEADERS FIND THE WAR IN THEIR INTEREST IRAQ CAN DO NOTHING TO END IT.

USINT BAGHDAD 1041

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022090

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1041
SIT112 DATE 04/06/82

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022102
TOR: 092/1029Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #1041 0920845
O 020745Z APR 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3133

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1139
AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3818
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2339
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2686
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2728
AMEMBASSY DHAHRAN 341
AMEMBASSY DOHA 803
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2470
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3431
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1108
AMEMBASSY MANAMA 826
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 832
AMEMBASSY SANAA 452
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1006
AMEMBASSY TUNIS 621
COMIDEASTFOR
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 650
AMEMBASSY ANKARA 760
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 163
AMEMBASSY BONN 356
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 493
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 168
AMEMBASSY MADRID 158
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1268
AMEMBASSY RABAT 412
AMEMBASSY ROME 520
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 724

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 1041

6. IN SPITE OF IRAQI REVERSES THE WAR IS STILL
ESSENTIALLY AT A STALEMATE. IRAN WILL PROBABLY PREPARE
FOR ANOTHER OFFENSIVE OPERATION PERHAPS IN A DIFFERENT SECTOR;
BUT AS LONG AS IRAQ CAN KEEP IRANIAN FORCES ON
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER AND ORDINARY IRANIAN
ARTILLERY OUT OF RANGE OF BASRA AND OTHER IRAQI TOWNS
IT WILL APPEAR TO MANY IRAQIS THAT IRAQ STILL HAS THE
UPPER HAND. IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THEREFORE THAT THE
IRAQI LEADERSHIP WILL CONTEMPLATE ANY MAJOR OFFENSIVE
ACTION OF ITS OWN. THERE IS NO DESIRE TO SHED MORE
BLOOD TO OCCUPY ADDITIONAL UNESSENTIAL PIECES OF IRANIAN
REAL ESTATE. SHOULD THE IRANIANS MOVE FAR ENOUGH

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 1041

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022102

FORWARD TO THREATEN IRAQI CITIES, A SERIOUS IRAQI COUNTER OFFENSIVE TO DISLODGE THEM WOULD PROBABLY BE REQUIRED. AS THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THE RECENT IRANIAN OFFENSIVE WEAR OFF AND PROVIDED THERE IS NO EARLY IRANIAN FOLLOW-UP OFFENSIVE, IRAQI MORALE WILL PROBABLY REVERT TO SOMETHING LIKE IT WAS PREVIOUSLY ACCOMPANIED BY AN EVEN STRONGER DESIRE TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO END THE WAR QUICKLY.

6. WE DO NOT SENSE A FEELING HERE THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN IS AN IMPEDIMENT TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS. IRANIAN INVECTIVE HAS BEEN CENTERED ON HIS PERSON, BUT IRAN'S LEADERS HAVE SAID NOTHING TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE REMOVAL OF SADDAM IN ITSELF WOULD BRING THE WAR TO AN END. INSTEAD, IRANIAN AMBITIONS ARE SEEN HERE AS NOTHING LESS THAN REMOVAL OF THE SECULAR IRAQI REGIME AND ITS REPLACEMENT BY A SHIA DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. GIVEN THAT PROSPECT, VIRTUALLY ALL SUNNI ARABS (WHO HAVE TRADITIONALLY RULED IRAQ) AND A GOOD MANY EDUCATE

AND MODERNIST SHIAS AS WELL WOULD RALLY AROUND THE PERSON OR GROUP CONSIDERED BEST ABLE TO THWART THE PLANS OF IRAN'S MULLAHS. UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, SADDAM HUSSEIN STILL SEEMS TO BE THE BEST BET FOR THOSE WHO WISH TO MAINTAIN A SECULAR STATE. WE CAN CONCEIVE OF SCENARIOS IN WHICH THE SUNNI ESTABLISHMENT MIGHT WANT TO DUMP SADDAM,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROBABLY IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER BA'ATHI WHO THEY MIGHT THINK COULD BETTER DEFEND THEIR INTERESTS. HOWEVER, THE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A SCENARIO ARE NOT YET WITH US. THE FAILURE OF IRAN'S LEADERS TO TAKE IMAGINATIVE STEPS, REQUIRING FLEXIBILITY AND COMPROMISE, WHICH WOULD ISOLATE SADDAM AS THE BARRIER TO PEACE HAS MADE IT EASIER FOR HIM TO MAINTAIN HIS GRIP.

7. WE NOW ANTICIPATE THAT, UNDER COVER OF THE USUAL BLUSTER DESIGNED TO PROJECT IRAQ'S MILITARY STRENGTH, IRAQ WILL REDOUBLE ITS EFFORTS AND INCREASE ITS PRESSURES ON THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO TRY TO FORCE IRAN TO THE PEACE TABLE, OR AT LEAST TO ISOLATE IRAN AS TOTALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR. MEANWHILE IRAQ'S ARAB FRIENDS, WHO HAVE BEEN SOBERED BY RECENT EVENTS, WILL BE EXPECTED TO PAY THEIR DUES EITHER IN MANPOWER OR CASH.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 1041

DTG: 020745Z APR 82 PSN: 022102

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0727
SIT160 DATE 03/17/82

DTG: 120900Z MAR 82 PSN: 051048
TOR: 071/1051Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0727 0710905
O 120900Z MAR 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3035

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3765
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0235
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1082
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0005
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0988
BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0727

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/12/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: MASS, PEPR, MMOL, JO, KS, US

SUBJ: COMMENTS ON THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS AND KING HUSSEIN'S
ROLE

REF: AMMAN 02139

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN BAGHDAD WE HAVE BEEN COMFORTABLE WITH FIRM US POLICY OF NEUTRALITY AND REFUSAL TO APPROVE TRANSFER OF CONTROLLED MILITARY ITEMS TO EITHER IRAQ OR IRAN. HOWEVER, BEFORE GIVING A NEGATIVE REPLY TO KING HUSSEIN'S MOST RECENT QUERY ON BEHALF OF IRAQ, I SUGGEST THAT A LIMITED VARIANCE IN OUR POLICY BE CONSIDERED. IT IS TRUE THAT THE BRITISH ARE DOING WELL IN IRAQ BY PERMITTING, OR ACQUIESCING IN, SELECTED EXCEPTIONS TO THEIR NON-ARMS TRANSFER POLICY, INCLUDING THE REFURBISHING OF CHIEFTAIN TANKS. THE SOVIETS, OF COURSE, WHILE ALSO PROCLAIMING A NEUTRAL AND NO ARMS POLICY, ARE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SELLING TO BOTH SIDES AND SEEM TO BE ENHANCING THEIR INFLUENCE IN TEHRAN. KING HUSSEIN MAY BE RIGHT IN ARGUING THAT HIS IS THE TIME FOR A NEW LOOK AT US-IRAQI RELATIONS AS PART OF THE EFFORT TO BRING IRAQ INTO THE MODERATE ARAB ORBIT.

3. SUGGEST WE GO BACK TO KING HUSSEIN WITH THE MESSAGE THAT WITH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND IRAQ, WE WOULD CONSIDER ALLOWING SOME THIRD COUNTRY (NOT DIRECT) TRANSFERS OF US-LICENSED EQUIPMENT ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. WE WOULD BEGIN WITH THE KOREAN HOWITZERS. IT IS NOT LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD AGREE TO THIS PROPOSAL SINCE IT WOULD VIOLATE THEIR "PRINCIPLED POSITION" THAT THE US SHOULD MAKE SOME ALTERATION IN ITS MIDDLE EAST POLICY BEFORE DIPLOMATIC TIES CAN BE RENEWED. HOWEVER, OUR OFFER WOULD PUT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF DENYING

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-127/1 # 308

BY Amf, IA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0727

DTG: 120900Z MAR 82 PSN: 051048

IRAQ CERTAIN THINGS THAT THEY WANT ON THEIR OWN BACKS. IT WOULD ALSO TO A LARGE EXTENT GET KING HUSSEIN OFF THE HOOK. IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A SYMMETRICAL POLICY WE COULD TAKE THE POSITION THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE SAME KIND OF TREATMENT FOR IRAN SHOULD US-IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC RELATITIONS BE RENEWED.

4. THE CONDUIT FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL SHOULD BE KING HUSSEIN WITH NO INPUT FROM USINT, BAGHDAD, AT LEAST AT THE FIRST STAGE.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0727

DTG: 120900Z MAR 82 PSN: 051048

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0506
SIT400 DATE 02/24/82

DTG: 230852Z FEB 82 PSN: 026851
TOR: 054/1222Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF JP WHLR SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD *0506 0540910
O R 230852Z FEB 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

D CLASSIFIED / RELEASED

F96-127/1 #309

B' amf.

ITE 2/4/85

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2953

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3720
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1068
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 980
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 0506
EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS1 2/23/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FEBRUARY 22 I WAS RECEIVED BY FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI WHO WAS WEARING THE OLIVE DRAB UNIFORM THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED BY TOP GOVERNMENT AND BA'ATH PARTY LEADERS SINCE DECEMBER. HAMMADI WAS RELAXED AND NON-CONTENTIOUS EVEN WHEN EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT U. S. MILITARY SUPPLIES REACHING IRAN. ALTHOUGH HE HAD OPPORTUNITIES TO COMPLAIN ABOUT RECENT U. S. POSITIONS RE THE ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE HE DID NOT DO SO, THUS CONFIRMING THAT THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER EVERYTHING ELSE AT THE PRESENT TIME.

3. I SHARED WITH HAMMADI SOME IMPRESSIONS FROM WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS INCLUDING SATISFACTION WITH THE MODEST IMPROVEMENT IN US/IRAQI POLITICAL CONTACTS AND COMMERCIAL

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELATIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT AS A STEP IN THE PROCESS OF UPGRADING OUR DIALOGUE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY VELIOTES WAS PREPARED TO VISIT BAGHDAD IN CONNECTION WITH A TRIP TO THE AREA WHICH MIGHT OCCUR IN EARLY MARCH. AS SOON AS WE HAD IRAQ'S AGREEMENT, WE WOULD PROVIDE SUGGESTED DATES. HAMMADI SAID HE WOULD REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. IN BRIEFING RE MY CONSULTATIONS, I REFERRED TO THE CONTINUED DESIRE OF THE USG TO DO WHAT IT COULD TO HELP BRING THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR TO AN END. NOTING THAT WE HAD NO LEVERAGE IN TEHRAN, AND LITTLE IN BAGHDAD FOR THAT MATTER, OUR EFFORTS WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE SUPPORTING THE INITIATIVES OF OTHERS. WE HAD ALREADY MADE SOME PRELIMINARY CONTACTS, AND HAD KEPT IN TOUCH WITH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL IN SUPPORT OF THE PALME MISSION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0506

DTG: 230852Z FEB 82 PSN: 026851

5. HAMMADI SEEMED PLEASED WITH THIS INDICATION OF U.S. INTEREST IN ENDING THE WAR. HE SAID PALME WAS EXPECTED IN THE AREA FEBRUARY 24 THOUGH HE DID NOT REMEMBER WHETHER BAGHDAD OR TEHRAN WOULD COME FIRST. HE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH RECENT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE CRUSHING OF AN IRANIAN COUNTER OFFENSIVE IN THE BOSTAN AREA. NEVERTHELESS, HE THOUGHT IRAN MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER SETBACKS BEFORE BEING READY TO NEGOTIATE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

6. AFTER MY REAFFIRMATION OF OUR INTENTION TO REMAIN NEUTRAL IN THE IRAQ/IRAN CONFLICT AND NOT SUPPLY EITHER SIDE WITH WEAPONS, HAMMADI REFERRED TO A RECENT REPORT THAT AN IRANIAN DELEGATION HAD BEEN IN WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS ARMS PURCHASES. I REPLIED THAT THE ONLY U.S. CONTACT WITH IRANIAN OFFICIALS I WAS AWARE OF INVOLVED CLAIMS AGAINST IRAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE HOSTAGE RELEASE AGREEMENT AND THAT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE THERE HAD BEEN NO RECENT U.S./IRANIAN DISCUSSION OF ARMS. (WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON WHAT WE CAN SAY IN THIS REGARD.)

7. HAMMADI SEEMED PARTIALLY SATISFIED BUT THEN REFERRED TO CONTINUED ISRAELI SUPPLIES REACHING IRAN. IN REPLY TO MY SUGGESTION THAT IRAQ WAS PERHAPS EXAGGERATING THE IMPORTANCE OF ISRAEL AS A SOURCE OF IRANIAN ARMS, HAMMADI CLAIMED THE AMOUNTS INVOLVED WERE SIGNIFICANT. I TOLD HIM WE CONTINUED TO OPPOSE

USINT BAGHDAD 0506
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 230852Z FEB 82 PSN: 026851

THE TRANSFER OF FMS-CONTROLLED ITEMS TO IRAN BUT NOTED THAT ISRAEL HAD OTHER ITEMS AVAILABLE THAT WERE NOT CONTROLLED. FURTHERMORE, IRAQI TELEVISION COVERAGE OF CAPTURED WEAPONS HAD DISPLAYED MORE SOVIET THAN AMERICAN MATERIEL. HAMMADI REPLIED THAT NORTH KOREA WAS IRAN'S MAJOR SOURCE OF SUCH WEAPONS. IRAQ HAD REPORTS THAT SOME SOVIET WEAPONS WERE BEING RECEIVED DIRECT FROM THE USSR BUT THEY HAD NO FIRM INFORMATION IN THIS REGARD.

8. IN CLOSING, I OBSERVED THAT THERE WERE NO PRESSURES IN WASHINGTON FOR RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH IRAQ THOUGH SOME DECISIONS, SUCH AS OUR FUTURE PARTICIPATION IN A DIPLOMATIC ENCLAVE, WERE IN ABEYANCE BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT RELATIONS. MEANWHILE, WE WERE BUILDING ON THE SATISFACTORY STATUS AND INCREASED ACCESS OF OUR INTERESTS SECTIONS. HAMMADI INDICATED THAT IRAQ TOO WISHED TO PROCEED IN THIS MANNER.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0506

DTG: 230852Z FEB 82 PSN: 026851

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0271
SIT946 DATE 02/16/82

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218
TOR: 032/1255Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0271 0321130
O 011115Z FEB 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-12711 #310

By anj, NARA, Date 2/4/05

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 0271
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/1/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR

SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI [REDACTED]

REF: A) BAGHDAD 115, B) STATE 16616

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. NEARLY TWO WEEKS HAVING PASSED SINCE [REDACTED] LUNCH MEETING WITH USINT POLOFF MCGILL WITHOUT ANY FOLLOW-UP, I TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON BY PHONING [REDACTED] JANUARY 31 AND SUGGESTED A DRINK AT THE RESIDENCE. HE READILY ACCEPTED. I ASKED MCGILL TO BE PRESENT SO THAT [REDACTED] WOULD NOT HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE HE WAS DEALING WITH SEPARATE U.S. GOVERNMENTS AND POLICIES.

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

3. THE CONVERSATION OPENED WITH [REDACTED] ASKING "WHY THE U.S. HAD OBJECTED TO KING HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR A VOLUNTEER BRIGADE TO SUPPORT IRAQ AGAINST IRAN". THIS LED TO QUESTIONING RE WHAT HE HAD HEARD ON THE VOA. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ARAB LANGUAGE PROGRAM HAD SAID THE U.S. WAS AGAINST THE KING'S DECISION BECAUSE IT MIGHT WIDEN THE WAR. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN OUR DESIRE NOT TO SEE A WIDENED WAR, BUT WE HAD NEITHER CRITICIZED NOR APPROVED THE KING'S DECISION.

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. IN INTRODUCING THE PURPOSE OF MY INVITATION, I REFERRED TO [REDACTED] "APPROACH TO POLOFF MCGILL ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN IRAQI OFFICIALS". [REDACTED] DENIED THAT HE HAD MADE AN APPROACH ON BEHALF OF ANYONE, CLAIMING THAT HE SIMPLY WANTED TO INFORM HIMSELF RE U.S. THINKING AND POLICIES. I REPLIED THAT, HOWEVER HE WISHED TO DESCRIBE THE PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, IT HAD BEEN REPORTED TO WASHINGTON AND OUR POSITION WAS THAT A DIALOGUE WITH RESPONSIBLE IRAQI OFFICIALS WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL BUT WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE DIRECT CONTACT AT WHATEVER LEVEL AND WITH WHATEVER DEGREE OF CONFIDENTIALITY THEY DESIRED.

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

5. AS THE CONVERSATION PROGRESSED, [REDACTED] MADE SEVERAL REMARKS WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS INITIAL CLAIM THAT HIS CONTACT WITH MCGILL HAD BEEN SOLELY ON HIS OWN

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0271

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218

INITIATIVE. TO GIVE [REDACTED] AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVEAL ANY NEW IRAQI THINKING, I REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR WAS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST. [REDACTED] SAID HE THOUGHT THE U.S. AND USSR WERE COLLABORATING ON ZONES OF INFLUENCE, BUT THE U.S. PROBABLY HAD LESS TO GAIN FROM THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR THAN THE USSR. I NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED ALL PEACE INITIATIVES AND WAS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS RE FURTHER EFFORTS WE MIGHT MAKE. [REDACTED] SEEMED INTERESTED AND RECALLED THAT "THEY TOLD ME THAT EVEN SAVING ONE IRAQI LIFE WOULD BE WORTH MY EFFORT" (AGAIN, CONTRADICTING HIS EARLIER CLAIM TO BE ACTING ON HIS OWN).

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

6. AS THE CONVERSATION ENDED [REDACTED] SAID THAT WHAT WE HAD TOLD HIM HAD CHANGED HIS BASIC VIEWS. HE WOULD NOT ELABORATE BUT IMPLIED THAT IT WAS A POSITIVE CHANGE OF SOME TYPE. HE SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FEBRUARY 5. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WOULD BE CHECKING WITH IS CONTACTS AND HAVE SOME MESSAGE FOR US AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A DIRECT DIALOGUE.

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

7. COMMENT: [REDACTED] CURIOUS DENIAL THAT HE HAD MADE AN APPROACH ON BEHALF OF ANYONE SOUNDED AS IF HE WERE TALKING INTO A MICROPHONE. INDEED, HE MAY HAVE BEEN CARRYING A RECORDING DEVICE WITH HIM OR ASSUMED THE RESIDENCE WAS BUGGED. HOWEVER, IN PARTS OF THE CONVERSATION HE WAS RATHER INDISCREET, SO WE

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CAN REACH NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION IN THAT REGARD. IT DOES SEEM LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT HIS EARLIER APPROACH TO MCGILL WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN AN INFORMATION GATHERING OPERATION RATHER THAN A MESSAGE FROM THE LEADERSHIP. THIS IS REMINISCENT OF AN APPROACH BY [REDACTED] IN DECEMBER 1980 AFTER WHICH HE BACKTRACKED AND CLAIMED HE WAS MERELY SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE THE MUKHABARAT WITH HIS ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN THINKING. THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE MUKHABARAT IS NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

[REDACTED] PERHAPS [REDACTED] WILL GET BACK TO ME BEFORE MY DEPARTURE WITH SOMETHING THAT WILL HELP CLARIFY THE SITUATION. IN ANY CASE I BELIEVE IT WAS USEFUL FOR [REDACTED] AND THOSE WHO ORIGINALLY SENT HIM TO HAVE OUR VIEWS ON HOW TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE IF THEY WANT ONE.

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

8. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMMAN. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DOWNGRADING THIS SERIES TO EXDIS IF DEPARTMENT WISHES. EAGLETON

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

USINT BAGHDAD 0271

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0246
SIT477 DATE 02/02/82

DTG: 311150Z JAN 82 PSN: 053475
TOR: 031/1652Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0246 0311210
O 311150Z JAN 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2868

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3680
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 2309
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 2659
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2670
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 228
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2430
AMEMBASSY LONDON 1060
TEL AVIV 973
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F94-127/1 #311

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0246

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/31/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, JO, US, IZ, IR
SUBJECT: HUSSEIN'S INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF IRAQ
REF: A) STATE 25488 B) AMMAN 826

1. ~~(SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AGREE WITH AMBASSADOR VIET'S SUGGESTION THAT WE NOT OVER-REACT TO KING HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS FOR IRAQ. BOTH THE IRAQIS AND JORDANIANS MUST SEE THE KING'S INITIATIVE AS LARGELY SYMBOLIC. IT HAS, OF COURSE, RECEIVED MUCH COVERAGE AND PRAISE FROM THE IRAQI MEDIA. SADDAM HUSSEIN HAS BEEN SEEKING GREATER ARAB COMMITMENT TO THE EASTERN FRONT. NOW THAT THE KING HAS RESPONDED WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT CONCEIVABLE THAT SADDAM COULD BE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PERSUADED EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY TO SAY THAT NO VOLUNTEERS ARE NEEDED. CERTAINLY SUCH A SUGGESTION FROM THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE WELL RECEIVED. WE HAVE NOT YET DEVELOPED THE KIND OF DIALOGUE WITH SADDAM THAT WOULD EVEN MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO RAISE THE SUBJECT.

3. THE PRESS GUIDANCE LOOKS GOOD TO US AND IT IS NATURAL FOR US TO REITERATE OUR OBJECTION TO THE TRANSFER OF US-CONTROLLED DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO IRAQ. BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO LINK OUR EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN ABOUT A WIDER WAR WITH A HIGHER PROFILE EFFORT TO END THE CONFLICT. WE ARE ALREADY TAKING SOME INITIATIVES IN THIS DIRECTION, AND SENATOR PERCY'S CONVERSATIONS IN KUWAIT AND DAMASCUS MAY BE SEEN AS A U.S. CONTRIBUTION. THIS IS THE TIME FOR US TO BE SEEN TO BE ACTIVE ON THE PEACE FRONT EVEN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0246

DTG: 311150Z JAN 82 PSN: 053475

THOUGH WE HAVE NO LEVERAGE WHERE IT IS NEEDED IN TEHRAN.
THE IRAQIS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS
FIND IT IN THEIR SEPARATE BUT PARALLEL INTERESTS TO
PROLONG THE WAR. IT SHOULD BE EASY FOR US TO DEMONSTRATE
THIS IS NOT THE CASE WITH THE U. S.
EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0246

DTG: 311150Z JAN 82 PSN: 053475

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0271
SIT474 DATE 02/02/82

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218
TOR: 032/1255Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF NAN JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0271 0321130
O 011115Z FEB 82
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2813

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BAGHDAD 0271
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 2/1/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: CONVERSATION WITH IRAQI [REDACTED]
REF: A) BAGHDAD 115, B) STATE 16616

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. NEARLY TWO WEEKS HAVING PASSED SINCE [REDACTED] LUNCH MEETING WITH USINT POLOFF MCGILL WITHOUT ANY FOLLOW-UP, I TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO CLARIFY OUR POSITION BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR WASHINGTON BY PHONING [REDACTED] JANUARY 31 AND SUGGESTED A DRINK AT THE RESIDENCE. HE READILY ACCEPTED. I ASKED MCGILL TO BE PRESENT SO THAT [REDACTED] WOULD NOT HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE HE WAS DEALING WITH SEPARATE U.S. GOVERNMENTS AND POLICIES.

3. THE CONVERSATION OPENED WITH [REDACTED] ASKING "WHY THE U.S. HAD OBJECTED TO KING HUSSEIN'S CALL FOR A VOLUNTEER BRIGADE TO SUPPORT IRAQ AGAINST IRAN". THIS LED TO QUESTIONING RE WHAT HE HAD HEARD ON THE VOA. HE MAINTAINED THAT THE ARAB LANGUAGE PROGRAM HAD SAID THE U.S. WAS AGAINST THE KING'S DECISION BECAUSE IT MIGHT WIDEN THE WAR. I REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN OUR DESIRE NOT TO SEE A WIDENED WAR, BUT WE HAD NEITHER CRITICIZED NOR APPROVED THE KING'S DECISION.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. IN INTRODUCING THE PURPOSE OF MY INVITATION, I REFERRED TO [REDACTED] "APPROACH TO POLOFF MCGILL ON BEHALF OF CERTAIN IRAQI OFFICIALS". [REDACTED] DENIED THAT HE HAD MADE AN APPROACH ON BEHALF OF ANYONE, CLAIMING THAT HE SIMPLY WANTED TO INFORM HIMSELF RE U.S. THINKING AND POLICIES. I REPLIED THAT, HOWEVER HE WISHED TO DESCRIBE THE PREVIOUS CONVERSATION, IT HAD BEEN REPORTED TO WASHINGTON AND OUR POSITION WAS THAT A DIALOGUE WITH RESPONSIBLE IRAQI OFFICIALS WOULD BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL BUT WOULD HAVE TO INVOLVE DIRECT CONTACT AT WHATEVER LEVEL AND WITH WHATEVER DEGREE OF CONFIDENTIALITY THEY DESIRED.

5. AS THE CONVERSATION PROGRESSED, [REDACTED] MADE SEVERAL REMARKS WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH HIS INITIAL CLAIM THAT HIS CONTACT WITH MCGILL HAD BEEN SOLELY ON HIS OWN

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLC E96-127/1 #312

By smf, NARA, Date 2/4/05

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0271

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218

INITIATIVE. TO GIVE [REDACTED] AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVEAL ANY NEW IRAQI THINKING, I REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR WAS NOT IN THE U.S. INTEREST. [REDACTED] SAID HE THOUGHT THE U.S. AND USSR WERE COLLABORATING ON ZONES OF INFLUENCE, BUT THE U.S. PROBABLY HAD LESS TO GAIN FROM THE PROLONGATION OF THE WAR THAN THE USSR. I NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED ALL PEACE INITIATIVES AND WAS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS RE FURTHER EFFORTS WE MIGHT MAKE. [REDACTED] SEEMED INTERESTED AND RECALLED THAT "THEY TOLD ME THAT EVEN SAVING ONE IRAQI LIFE WOULD BE WORTH MY EFFORT" (AGAIN, CONTRADICTING HIS EARLIER CLAIM TO BE ACTING ON HIS OWN).

FOIA(b) (1) +
(b) (6)

FOIA(b) (1) +
(b) (6)

6. AS THE CONVERSATION ENDED [REDACTED] SAID THAT WHAT WE HAD TOLD HIM HAD CHANGED HIS BASIC VIEWS. HE WOULD NOT ELABORATE BUT IMPLIED THAT IT WAS A POSITIVE CHANGE OF SOME TYPE. HE SAID HE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FEBRUARY 5. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE WOULD BE CHECKING WITH IS CONTACTS AND HAVE SOME MESSAGE FOR US AS TO WHETHER THEY WERE INTERESTED IN A DIRECT DIALOGUE.

7. COMMENT: [REDACTED] CURIOUS DENIAL THAT HE HAD MADE AN APPROACH ON BEHALF OF ANYONE SOUNDED AS IF HE WERE TALKING INTO A MICROPHONE. INDEED, HE MAY HAVE BEEN CARRYING A RECORDING DEVICE WITH HIM OR ASSUMED THE RESIDENCE WAS BUGGED. HOWEVER, IN PARTS OF THE CONVERSATION HE WAS RATHER INDISCREET, SO WE

FOIA(b) (1) +
(b) (6)

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CAN REACH NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION IN THAT REGARD. IT DOES SEEM LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT HIS EARLIER APPROACH TO MCGILL WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE BEEN AN INFORMATION GATHERING OPERATION RATHER THAN A MESSAGE FROM THE LEADERSHIP. THIS IS REMINISCENT OF AN APPROACH BY [REDACTED] IN DECEMBER 1980 AFTER WHICH HE BACKTRACKED AND CLAIMED HE WAS MERELY SUPPOSED TO PROVIDE THE MUKHABARAT WITH HIS ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN THINKING. THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT THE MUKHABARAT IS NOT YET READY FOR DIRECT CONTACT WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

FOIA(b) (1) +
(b) (6)

[REDACTED] PERHAPS [REDACTED] WILL GET BACK TO ME BEFORE MY DEPARTURE WITH SOMETHING THAT WILL HELP CLARIFY THE SITUATION. IN ANY CASE I BELIEVE IT WAS USEFUL FOR [REDACTED] AND THOSE WHO ORIGINALLY SENT HIM TO HAVE OUR VIEWS ON HOW TO CONDUCT A DIALOGUE IF THEY WANT ONE.

FOIA(b) (1) +
(b) (6)

8. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO AMMAN. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DOWNGRADING THIS SERIES TO EXDIS IF DEPARTMENT WISHES. EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0271

DTG: 011115Z FEB 82 PSN: 054218

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0159
SIT739 DATE 01/25/82

DIG: 211115Z JAN 82 PSN: 039977
TOR: 021/1212Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHAD #0159 0211130

O 211115Z JAN 82

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2816

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3641

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2651

AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2413

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 3327

AMEMBASSY LONDON 1047

AMEMBASSY ROME 493

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4970

BT

~~SECRET~~ BAGHDAD 0159

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/21/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, IZ

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAMMADI

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. AT OPENING OF A MEETING JANUARY 21 WITH IRAQ FOREIGN MINISTER SA'ADUN HAMMADI, HE REFERRED TO MY EARLY FEBRUARY CONSULATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND ASKED WHETHER I HAD ANY MESSAGE FOR HIM IN THAT REGARD. I REPLIED THAT MY REQUEST TO SEE HIM WAS PRIMARILY TO HAVE HIS VIEWS AND ANY MESSAGE HE MIGHT WISH ME TO TAKE TO WASHINGTON. I ADDED THAT WE WERE SATISFIED WITH PROGRESS IN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS AND HAD NO SERIOUS COMPLAINTS ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THOUGH PERHAPS MORE COULD BE DONE TO UPGRADE THE DIALOGUE AND REMOVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. HAMMADI SAID HE TOO WAS SATISFIED WITH OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS. HOWEVER, HIS GOVERNMENT WAS STILL CONCERNED THAT US ARMS WERE GETTING THROUGH TO IRAN. THEY FELT THAT IF THE US GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY WANTED TO PREVENT IRAN FROM RECEIVING US ARMS VIA ISRAEL AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, THE US COULD DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED ITALY AND THE UK, HINTING THAT THE US WAS "CLOSING AN EYE" TO TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING US-LICENSED ARMS FROM THOSE COUNTRIES. HE NOTED THAT WE HAD ASKED FOR DETAILS, BUT SAID HE COULD ONLY TELL US THAT IRAQ'S MILITARY PERSONNEL AT THE FRONT WERE AWARE THAT IRAN WAS USING US-ORIGIN MATERIEL.

4. I REPLIED THAT A BLACK MARKET OBVIOUSLY EXISTED IN SOME ITEMS BUT WE HAD MADE IT CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT HE CITED THAT WE DID NOT AUTHORIZE THE TRANSFER

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F96-122/1 # 313

BY smf

1A, DATE 2/4/05

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0159

DTG: 211115Z JAN 82 PSN: 039977

OF US-LICENSED ITEMS TO EITHER OF THE BELLIGERENTS. THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN ISOLATED CASES INVOLVING ITEMS ALREADY MANUFACTURED AND PAID FOR BUT HELD UP DURING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS WHICH HAD THEN GONE TO IRAN. HOWEVER, WE DID NOT HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY OF US-ORIGIN OR LICENSED ITEMS WERE REACHING IRAN.

5. HAMMADI THEN ASKED: "ARE YOU DOING ANYTHING TO END THE WAR?" I REPLIED THAT OUR ARMS EMBARGO WAS PROBABLY THE BEST CONTRIBUTION WE COULD MAKE. WE HAD NO REAL LEVERAGE WITH THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT. WE HAD MADE KNOWN OUR SUPPORT FOR PEACE MISSIONS, PARTICULARLY THE UN AND ISLAMIC MEDIATIONS. I ASKED WHAT FURTHER SUGGESTIONS HAMMADI MIGHT HAVE. HE REPLIED VAGUELY TO THE EFFECT THAT WHEN THE US WANTS SOMETHING TO BE DONE IT HAS WAYS OF ACHIEVING IT. IN THE SAME CONTEXT, HE MENTIONED KHOMEINI AS BEING AN IMPEDIMENT TO A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. THE HINT SEEMED TO BE THAT THE US SHOULD DO SOMETHING TO HELP BRING ABOUT CONDITIONS IN IRAN THAT WOULD LEAD TO NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, HAMMADI WAS, PROBABLY INTENTIONALLY, VAGUE IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS OF IRANIAN WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

6. HAMMADI REITERATED IRAQ'S WILLINGNESS TO RECEIVE AMERICAN PRIVATE VISITORS AND TO MEET AT A HIGH LEVEL WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHEN OPPORTUNITIES OCCUR. HE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAID THE PROGRAM FOR CHASE MANHATTAN BANK CHAIRMAN WILLARD BUTCHER (IN BAGHDAD FEB 1-2) WAS BEING STUDIED AND HE WAS SURE THE VISIT WOULD BE USEFUL. IN CLOSING, HE SAID HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE MY IMPRESSIONS UPON MY RETURN FROM WASHINGTON. EAGLETON.

USINT BAGHDAD 0159

DTG: 211115Z JAN 82 PSN: 039977

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0115
SIT969 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035025
TOR: 017/1453Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0115 0171230
O 171225Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2795

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0115
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/17/02 (EAGLETON, WILLIAM L.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, IZ, IR
SUBJ: AN INDIRECT APPROACH FROM IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: AN IRAQI [REDACTED] HAS APPROACHED US ON BEHALF OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP (SADDAM HUSSEIN'S HALF-BROTHER - HEAD OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE) RE OUR VIEWS OF SEVERAL ASPECTS OF THE IRAQ/IRAN WAR. THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT IRAQ DESPERATELY WISHES TO END THE WAR AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW WE MIGHT BE HELPFUL. IRAQ IS APPARENTLY CONSIDERING A UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL BUT FEARS THE IRANIS WOULD NOT STOP AT THE FRONTIER. THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAQ, UPON WHICH OUR POLOFF WAS ABLE TO BUILD. POLOFF ALSO REITERATED OUR ARMS EMBARGO POLICY AND OUR OPPOSITION TO THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN. [REDACTED] IS TO REPORT TO HIS PRINCIPALS AND GET BACK TO US FOR A FURTHER EXCHANGE. AT THAT TIME WE WILL TRY TO GET THE DIALOGUE INTO MORE DIRECT AND NORMAL CHANNELS. WE WILL WANT TO HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE TO DISCUSS AND WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S INPUT. THIS CONTACT MIGHT BE A ONE-TIME PROBE, OR IT COULD OPEN A USEFUL CHANNEL TO IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP.
END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. BACKGROUND: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] VISITED BAGHDAD IN NOVEMBER, HE INTRODUCED ME TO [REDACTED] WHOM HE HAD KNOWN HERE IN THE MID-70'S. [REDACTED] ATTENDED A RECEPTION AT THE RESIDENCE AT THAT TIME AND A CHRISTMAS RECEPTION DECEMBER 23. AT THE LATTER, HE MET OUR POLITICAL OFFICER, GENE MCGILL, AND INVITED HIM AND ME, WITH WIVES, TO DINNER AT THE [REDACTED] JANUARY 13 (AN UNUSUAL EVENT IN BAGHDAD). AS WE WERE LEAVING [REDACTED] HE ASKED MCGILL TO HAVE LUNCH WITH HIM THERE ON JANUARY 16. [REDACTED] IS GREGARIOUS, FRIENDLY, IMPULSIVE AND A MAVERICK. HE LIKES TO TELL OF HIS EARLY MEMBERSHIP IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-127/1 #314

By any, NARA, Date 2/4/05

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0115

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035025

HE BROKE WITH THE LATTER SEVERAL YEARS AGO. HE IS A CRITIC OF THE BA'ATH REGIME BUT MAINTAINS CONTACT WITH SOME INFLUENTIAL FIGURES INCLUDING

HE DOES NOT SHY AWAY FROM FOREIGNERS THOUGH HE TELLS OF HAVING BEEN ARRESTED BRIEFLY SEVERAL YEARS AGO FOR SUCH ASSOCIATIONS. HE CLAIMS HE JUSTIFIED HIS CONTACTS AND SAW NO REASON NOT TO CONTINUE THEM.

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

4. FOLLOWING A BRIEF WARMUP CONVERSATION IN THE LUNCH ROOM OF THE [REDACTED] QUICKLY CAME TO THE POINT, REVEALING THAT HE HAD BEEN APPROACHED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF IRAQ'S LEADERSHIP (LATER IDENTIFIED AS BEING IN THE EMPLOY OF BARZAN IBRAHIM, DIRECTOR OF GENERAL INTELLIGENCE, "MUKHABARAT") TO EXPLOIT HIS KNOWN SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH USINT IN ORDER TO ENGAGE IN A SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION WITH POLITICAL OFFICER GENE MCGILL. IN TARGETING POLOFF, [REDACTED] WAS TOLD THE FORMER IS A PERSON OF "DEPTH" WITH WHOM IRAQIS COULD TALK MEANINGFULLY ON THE SUBJECT OF THE WAR. WE ASSUME THIS CHOICE WAS MADE DUE TO POLOFF'S GENERAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MILITARY AS WELL AS POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT USINT. ALTHOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE [REDACTED] GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS MAY THINK POLOFF HAS "OTHER" MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES THEY MADE NO SUCH SUGGESTIONS TO [REDACTED] WHEN ENLISTING HIS SERVICES. APPEALING TO [REDACTED] PATRIOTISM THE IRAQI OFFICIALS FIRST REQUESTED THAT HE SOLICIT U. S. VIEWS ON MEANS TO END THE

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1)+
(b)(6)

USINT BAGHDAD 0115
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035025

IRAQ/IRAN WAR WHICH THEY ADMITTED TO [REDACTED] "MUST END AT ANY COST."

5. IN RESPONSE POLOFF OBSERVED THAT AN ESTABLISHED CHANNEL FOR REGULARIZED, HIGH LEVEL EXCHANGES BETWEEN USINT AND SENIOR LEVELS OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP WOULD FACILITATE THE DISCUSSION OF SUCH SERIOUS MATTERS AS THE CURRENT WAR AND THAT SUCH A DIALOGUE WOULD SURELY BE IN IRAQ'S OWN INTEREST. ON THE WAR ITSELF POLOFF REPEATED USG ADHERENCE TO STRICT NEUTRALITY INCLUDING OUR ARMS EMBARGO. HAD OTHER ARMS SUPPLIERS FOLLOWED THE SAME RESTRAINT THE WAR MIGHT HAVE ENDED ALREADY. HE CITED AS AN EXAMPLE: THE SOVIET UNION, IRAQ'S TRADITIONAL FRIEND, ARM OF BOTH BELLIGERENTS, IS A DELIBERATE POLICY DESIGNED TO SERVE MOSCOW'S HOPES OF EXPANDING ITS INFLUENCE IN BOTH COUNTRIES. POLOFF NOTED OBSERVATIONS BY DIPLOMATS IN BAGHDAD THAT SOVIET AND EAST BLOC EMBASSIES ARE CIRCULATING THE VIEW THAT PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSSEIN'S DAYS IN POWER ARE NUMBERED. [REDACTED] SAID HIS INTERLOCUTORS WERE INTERESTED IN KNOWING IF THE SOVIET UNION WAS DEPENDING ON, OR WORKING THROUGH, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAQ (CPI) IN ITS DESIGNS TO OUST THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] HAD BEEN TOLD BY THEM THAT IRAQI AUTHORITIES ARE ALARMED BY THE SIGNIFICANT UPSWING IN CPI DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN NORTHER IRAQ.

FOIA(b)(1)
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1)
(b)(6)

6. [REDACTED] WAS ASKED TO GAIN POLOFF'S VIEWS ON LIKELY SUCCESS OF A UNILATERAL IRAQI WITHDRAWAL FROM IRAN.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0115
SIT968 DATE 01/18/82

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035028
TOR: 017/1455Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC,NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHAD #0115 0171253
O 171225Z JAN 82 ZFF4
FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2796

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0115
NODIS

HE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT SUCH A PLAN IS UNDER DEBATE AMONG POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS, THE FORMER BEING CONFIDENT THAT SADDAM COULD SURVIVE THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT, THE LATTER CONCERNED THAT THE IRANIANS WOULD EXPLOIT A WITHDRAWAL TO CARRY THE WAR INTO IRAQ IN AN ALL-OUT PUNITIVE ACTION. POLOFF DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ANY MIRACLE SOLUTIONS BUT EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL VIEW THAT IRAQ'S MILITARY POSITION WILL PROBABLY NOT IMPROVE OVER TIME.

7. [REDACTED] WAS ALSO ASKED TO SEEK REASSURANCE THAT US IS NOT SUPPLYING IRAN DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY AND TO PROBE RE WHICH SIDE THE U.S. WOULD FAVOR IN THE POST WAR PERIOD. POLOFF URGED [REDACTED] TO EMPHASIZE OUR DENIAL OF THESE ILLOGICAL CHARGES AND REPEATED USINT'S REQUEST FOR EVIDENCE IRAQI AUTHORITIES MAY HAVE. POLOFF THEN NOTED THAT US HAS NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND UNLESS THERE IS A RADICAL CHANGE IN IRANIAN ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE U.S. NORMAL RELATIONS, NOT TO SPEAK OF WARM TIES, ARE UNLIKELY. ON THE OTHER HAND, USINT HOPES IRAQ WILL FOLLOW A MODERATE POST-WAR ROLE IN REGIONAL POLITICS AND, WITH JORDAN, MAY JOIN IN MOVEMENTS TOWARD DEFUSING AREA TENSIONS. WITH WASHINGTON'S BLESSINGS U.S. PRIVATE INDUSTRY IS EXPECTED TO PURSUE OPPORTUNITIES TO ASSIST IN POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THROUGHOUT IRAQ. AGAIN, A REGULAR DIALOGUE WITH IRAQI LEADERS WAS IDENTIFIED AS A MEANS TO BUILD MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONS.

8. [REDACTED] FINAL QUERY DEALT WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS COULD AGREE BETWEEN THEMSELVES TO END THE WAR, A PROSPECT [REDACTED] INTERLOCUTORS WOULD WELCOME AND ARE CONVINCED IS WORKABLE. (IT IS A POPULAR ASSUMPTION HERE THAT THE US AND USSR COULD END THE WAR IF "THEY WANTED TO.") [REDACTED] WAS ASKED TO ELICIT UPDATED VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE PARTITIONING OF IRAN WITH AZERBAIJAN COMING INTO THE SOVIET ORBIT WHILE THE WEST (I.E. US) TAKES OVER DOMINANT INFLUENCES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN IRAN. POLOFF NOTED THAT WE ARE NOT EVEN CONSIDERING SUCH A SCHEME AND HAVE FREQUENTLY STATED OUR FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION TO THE DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN

FOIA(b)(1) &
(b)(6)

FOIA(b)(1) &
(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 USINT BAGHDAD 0115

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035028

INTO SMALL AND WEAK UNITS THAT WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO THEIR NORTHERN NEIGHBOR. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE LUNCH [REDACTED] SAID HE WOULD BRIEF HIS GOVERNMENT INTER-LOCUTORS THE FOLLOWING DAY AND WOULD RECONTACT POLOFF WITH THEIR REACTIONS.

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

9. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

-- ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE [REDACTED] ACCURATELY CONVEYED A PROBE ON THE PART OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP (VIA MUKHABARAT), WE ARE ONCE AGAIN UP AGAINST IRAQI RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS SERIOUS MATTERS OF THIS TYPE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS. THIS IS PART OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL NATURE OF THE REGIME AND THE MENTALITY OF ITS LEADERS WHO HARBOR DEEP SUSPICIONS OF THE UNITED STATES COMBINED WITH ADMIRATION FOR CERTAIN ASPECTS OF OUR WAY OF LIFE. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS PROBE IS A ONE-TIME OPERATION FROM WHICH THE IRAQIS WILL, AS IN THE PAST, PULL BACK LEAVING NO TRACES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE MIGHT BE A FOLLOW-UP WHICH WE COULD EXPLOIT TO DEVELOP A POLITICAL DIALOGUE [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

WE, THEREFORE, WISH TO BE IN A POSITION TO DEAL WITH THE NEXT STAGE IF THERE IS ONE.

FOIA(b)(1)

-- IT SEEMS TO ME ESSENTIAL THAT AT THE NEXT CONTACT OR AT LEAST BY THE ONE FOLLOWING WE SHOULD INSIST THAT OUR REPRESENTATIVE SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH A RESPONSIBLE IRAQI OFFICIAL RATHER THAN THROUGH A MIDDLEMAN. WE MUST AT THE OUTSET DEMONSTRATE TO THE IRAQIS THAT THEY ARE DEALING WITH ONE U.S. GOVERNMENT, THOUGH WE CAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

USE VARIOUS OFFICIAL CHANNELS TO MAINTAIN CONTACT. THEREFORE, IF [REDACTED] CONTACTS MCGILL TO REQUEST ANOTHER MEETING, MCGILL WILL SUGGEST THAT I SHOULD BE PRESENT. AT THAT MEETING WE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIVE U.S. REACTION TO THE FIRST PROBE BUT WOULD TRY TO GAUGE WHERE THE IRAQIS BELIEVE THE MATTER STANDS AND SUGGEST A MEETING WITH [REDACTED] CONTACTS TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT MEANS OF EXCHANGING VIEWS.

FOIA(b)(1) +
(b)(6)

-- AT THAT POINT THE IRAQIS MIGHT DRAW BACK INTO THEIR SHELL. IF, HOWEVER, THEY AGREE TO A DIRECT MEETING, WE SHOULD HAVE SOME SUBSTANCE TO DISCUSS WITH THEM. FOR THIS WE HAVE SUFFICIENT MATERIAL FOR A FIRST MEETING INCLUDING OUR STRICT NEUTRALITY AND ARMS EMBARGO, OUR OPPOSITION TO DISMEMBERMENT OF IRAN, OUR INABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE PRESENT IRANIAN LEADERSHIP AND OUR CONCERN RE SOVIET INTENTIONS IN IRAQ AND IRAN AND THE GROWING STRENGTH OF THE TUDEH PARTY.

-- WHEN I RETURN FROM WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS I SHOULD HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL VIEWS AND IMPRESSIONS TO CONVEY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. IF, HOWEVER, A DIRECT CONTACT OCCURS BEFORE I LEAVE BAGHDAD, THE DEPARTMENT MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTEREST TO GIVE THE IRAQIS A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION AS WE SEE IT. THE IRAQIS ARE NO DOUBT AWARE OF MOST OF WHAT WE WOULD TELL THEM, BUT THE VOLUNTEERING OF SOME INFORMATION AT THIS TIME WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONFIDENCE-BUILDING GESTURE AND SHOULD ENCOURAGE THEM TO THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT THE VALUE OF AN EXPANDED POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

10. SUGGEST DEPARTMENT PASS TO AMMAN. EAGLETON

USINT BAGHDAD 0115

DTG: 171225Z JAN 82 PSN: 035028

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~