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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	232326Z Jul 82 re Vietnamese troop strength (1 pp. partial) <i>PARC- 1/9/06 95-001/1 #77</i>	7/23/82	P1 <i>31, 33</i>
2. cable	081000Z Jul 82 (2 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #78 NLSF 95-001</i>	7/8/82	P1
3. cable	072347Z Jul 82 (2 pp.)	7/7/82	P1 P5
4. report	p. 4 only of report (1 pp.)	7/8/82	P1
5. report	2 pp. only of a report re Kampuchea: the Old Shell Game (2 pp. partial)	7/16/82	P1
6. cable	2 pp. <i>D, 6/16/00 NLSF 95-001/1 #81</i>	7/15/82	P1
7. cable	071122Z Jul 82 (5 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #82 NLSF 95-001</i>	7/7/82	P1
8. cable	3 pp. <i>D, 6/16/00 NLSF 95-001/1 #83</i>	7/2/82	P1
9. article	re Vietnam After Le Duan (3 pp.)	6/9/82	P1
10. cable	282359Z Apr 82 (2 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #85 NLSF 95-001</i>	4/28/82	P1
11. cable	131138Z Apr 82 (6 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #86 NLSF 95-001</i>	4/13/82	P1
12. cable	6 pp. <i>D, 6/16/00 NLSF 95-001/1 #87</i>	3/27/82	P1
13. cable	120130Z Mar 82 (2 pp.) <i>D 5/28/99 #88 NLSF 95-001</i>	3/12/82	P1
14. cable	050838Z Mar 82 re Vietnamese workers for Siberia (2 pp. partial) <i>P 5/28/99 #89 NLSF 95-001</i>	3/5/82	P1
15. cable	2 pp. <i>D, 6/16/00 NLSF 95-001/1 #90</i>	3/4/82	P1
16. cable	040957Z Mar 82 (3 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #91 NLSF 95-001</i>	3/4/82	P1
COLLECTION: Childress, Richard: Files			cas
FILE FOLDER: Vietnam - May 1980 - 1982 [3 of 4] Box 92402			6/21/96

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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17. cable	081207Z Mar 82 (3 pp.) <i>R 5/28/98 #92 NLSF 95-001</i>	3/8/82	P1
18. cable	061757Z Mar 82 (1 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #93 NLSF 95-001</i>	3/6/82	P1
19. cable	270547Z Feb 82 (2 pp.) <i>R 5/28/99 #94 NLSF 95-001</i>	2/27/82	P1
20. report	p. 2 only from a report (1 pp.) <i>R; 6/16/00 NLSF 95-001/1 #95</i>	n.d.	P1
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FILE FOLDER: Vietnam - May 1980 - 1982 [3 of 4] Box 92402			6/21/96

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DIADIN 204-4A (AS OF: 1710 EDT 23 JUL 82)
SUBJ: DIA DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE NOTICE (DIN) (U)
)
KAMPUCHEA: VIETNAMESE TROOP STRENGTH. (U)
)

1. [REDACTED] VIETNAM IS BEGINNING TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT ITS "PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL" OF TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA, BUT PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM (PAVN) FIELD ACTIVITY CONTINUES TO SUGGEST THAT, IN THE AGGREGATE, AT LEAST AS MANY TROOPS WILL REMAIN IN KAMPUCHEA AS THERE WERE PRIOR TO THE "WITHDRAWAL."

2. [REDACTED] TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN CO THACH'S SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIP, ON 17 JULY THE HANOI MEDIA RELEASED A STATEMENT THAT "A NUMBER OF UNITS OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S ARMY HAVE LEFT FOR HOME AFTER FULFILLING THEIR INTERNATIONAL DUTY IN KAMPUCHEA." THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY A STATEMENT ON THE 21ST THAT SOME RETURNING TROOPS HAD BEEN WELCOMED IN HO CHI MINH CITY THE PREVIOUS DAY.

3. [REDACTED] DESPITE THE PUBLIC PROCLAMATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL, TROOP ROTATIONS SINCE JUNE SUGGEST THAT BY THE END OF THE WET SEASON, AROUND OCTOBER, THERE WILL BE AT LEAST AS MANY AND POSSIBLY MORE PAVN TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA THAN WHEN THE WET SEASON BEGAN.

[REDACTED] THIS TENDS TO CONFIRM EARLIER REPORTS CONCERNING THE MOVEMENT OF A SIMILAR NUMBER OF TROOPS INTO THE COUNTRY DURING THE SAME TIME. SHOULD THESE ROTATIONS RESULT IN AN EQUAL OR GREATER PAVN STRENGTH IN KAMPUCHEA BY THE END OF THE WET SEASON, THE COMING DRY SEASON COULD BE ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE SINCE THE INITIAL VIETNAMESE INVASION IN LATE DECEMBER 1978.

(REVW 23 JUL 82)

BT

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B1

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NLS FOI-001/1 *77

By CIS

, NARA, Date 1/8/04

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PAGE 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 6726
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AMEMBASSY MANILA 0674
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1937
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5674

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EXDIS
EO12065: GDS 7/8/88 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, VM, CB
SUBJ: VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL FOR PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF PAVN
- TROOPS AND CONVENING OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
- SOUTHEAST ASIA
REF: STATE 188151

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. REFTEL ARRIVED AFTER MY MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI, WHICH TOOK PLACE AT 8:30 A.M. LOCAL TIME JULY 8. AS FORESHADOWED IN BANGKOK 36540, I GAVE THE FOREIGN MINISTER A DETAILED READOUT OF MY MEETING WITH THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THE PREVIOUS DAY. SITTHI ASKED WHETHER THE USG PLANNED TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT. I REPLIED I DID NOT KNOW (AS NOTED BELOW, HOWEVER, I AM ADVISING HIM OF OUR PUBLIC POSITION PER REFTEL). SITTHI SAID HE HOPED ANY U. S. PUBLIC STATEMENT WOULD NOT REJECT THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND BECAUSE THAT WOULD BE GRIST FOR VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA MILL CHARGES THAT THE USG IS NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN A POLITICAL SOLUTION. SITTHI OBSERVED THAT THE FORMATION OF A KHMER COALITION GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED A SETBACK FOR HANOI AND THAT THE LATEST VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL AT THE INDOCHINESE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN HO CHI MINH CITY WAS DESIGNED TO RETURN THE INITIATIVE TO VIETNAM. SINCE THE UNITED STATES POLICY HAS STRESSED SUPPORT OF ASEAN, SITTHI THOUGHT THAT THE U. S. SHOULD MAKE NO EARLY SUBSTANTIVE OR DETAILED RESPONSE TO THE VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL, BUT SHOULD LEAVE THE LEAD IN THE HANDS OF ASEAN.
3. HE SAID THAT IF HE OR NSC SECRETARY GENERAL PROSONG WERE ASKED ABOUT THE LATEST HANOI OFFER, THEY WOULD TAKE THE LINE THAT THE RTG NEEDS MORE TIME TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL SINCE SO FAR RTG HAS NOT YET RECEIVED FULL TEXT. FURTHERMORE, THE RTG SHOULD CONSULT WITH OTHER ASEAN MEMBERS BEFORE GIVING A FORMAL REPLY. FINALLY, THE THAI AND OTHER ASEAN NATIONS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY LIKE TO RECEIVE ELABORATION FROM VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER THACH DURING HIS UPCOMING TRAVELS IN THE REGION BEFORE THE VIETNAMESE OFFER CAN BE FULLY ASSESSED.

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BY h, NARA, DATE 5/2/95

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4. SITTHI NOTED THAT HE HAS NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HANOI'S OFFER AND THAT ASEAN'S AIM MUST REMAIN THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF HANOI'S FORCES FROM CAMBODIA, NOT MERELY A PARTIAL PULLOUT. HE ALSO NOTED THAT THE SPOKESMAN OF THE THAI SUPREME COMMAND, LT. GENERAL SOM, HAD ALREADY LABELLED HANOI'S DECLARATION AS JUST A "TRICK TO MISLEAD THE WORLD ABOUT ITS REAL DESIGN ON KAMPUCHEA."

5. COMMENT: SINCE REFTEL ARRIVED AFTER MY MEETING, I AM CONVEYING THE ANALYTICAL POINTS AND THE PUBLIC GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPH FIVE TO SITTHI IN THE COURSE OF THE DAY.
DEAN
BT

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File
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 36540

EXDIS
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 07/07/02 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, VM, CB
SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE ON TROOP
- WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA AND AN INTERNATIONAL
- CONFERENCE
REF: STATE 186978 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(C)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY: THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR CALLED ON AMBAS-
SADOR DEAN JULY 7 ON INSTRUCTIONS TO PRESENT DETAILS
OF DRAFT PROPOSALS WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER THACH HAS
TAKEN TO THE INDOCHINESE FOREIGN MINISTERS'
CONFERENCE NOW UNDER WAY IN HO CHI MINH CITY.
(VERBATIM NOTES ARE IN PARA 8 BELOW.) THE
PROPOSALS CONTAIN TWO ELEMENTS: A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL
OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA TO BEGIN LATER
IN JULY AND THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL CON-
FERENCE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA TO WHICH THE ASEAN
COUNTRIES, THE THREE INDOCHINA COUNTRIES, BURMA, THE
USSR, CHINA, FRANCE, THE U.K., INDIA, AND THE
UNITED STATES WOULD BE INVITED. THE U.N. SYG
COULD ALSO ATTEND IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY OR, IF THE
U.N. DERECOGNIZES THE DK, IN AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY.
THE SRV PROPOSES THAT ASEAN AND INDOCHINA WOULD ARRANGE
THE MODALITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.
ALTHOUGH PRESENTING THE PAPER IN CONFIDENCE, THE
VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THESE PROPOSALS MAY
BE MADE PUBLIC IN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE
COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THEIR MEETING JULY 7. THE
VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT RAISED THESE PROPOSALS WITH THE
THAI. FOREIGN MINISTER THACH PLANS TO MAKE A TOUR

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BY JK, NARA, DATE 5/28/99

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THROUGH BURMA AND SOME ASEAN STATES BETWEEN MID-JULY AND MID-AUGUST. HE WILL TRANSIT BANGKOK AND TALK TO THE THAI BRIEFLY AT THAT TIME BEFORE RETURNING AT THE END OF HIS TRAVELS FOR FURTHER TALKS HERE. END SUMMARY.

3. VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HOANG BAO SON CALLED ON THE AMBASSADOR JULY 7 ON INSTRUCTIONS. HE ORALLY PRESENTED DETAILS OF PROPOSALS (TEXT GIVEN PARA 8 BELOW) ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF PAVN TROOPS FROM CAMBODIA AND AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA WHICH HE SAID FOREIGN MINISTER THACH WILL BE MAKING TO HIS INDOCHINESE COLLEAGUES IN HO CHI MINH CITY JULY 6 AND 7. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE PROPOSALS MAY APPEAR IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING TO BE RELEASED THE EVENING OF JULY 7.

4. WITH REFTEL GUIDANCE IN MIND, THE AMBASSADOR ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO WHETHER THE PROPOSED TROOP WITHDRAWALS HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. SON SAID THIS WAS NOT THE CASE BUT THAT THE WITHDRAWALS WOULD OCCUR "IN JULY". HE ALSO INDICATED THAT VIETNAM HAS DECIDED TO "SPEED UP" THE PACE OF THE BILATERAL THAI-VIETNAMESE TALKS THAT HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE IN BANGKOK, WHICH HANOI FEELS ARE STALEMATED OVER VIETNAMESE INSISTENCE ON AN END TO THAI SUPPORT FOR THE KHMER RESISTANCE AND THAI INSISTENCE ON VIETNAMESE WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA. THUS, VIETNAM WILL TAKE THE FIRST STEP ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IN THE HOPE THAT THAILAND WILL THEN MAKE A RESPONSE.

5. AMBASSADOR SON NOTED THAT AS FAR AS TIMING FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS CONCERNED, THE SRV NEEDED PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS TO LEARN THAI AND ASEAN VIEWS. HE SAID THAT HANOI HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY

PROPOSED A CONFERENCE WITH PARTICIPATION ALONG THESE LINES. SON DESCRIBED FOREIGN MINISTER THACH'S UPCOMING TRAVELS AS BEGINNING WITH A TRANSIT OF BANGKOK WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A BRIEF MEETING WITH THAI OFFICIALS. THACH WOULD RETURN TO BANGKOK FOR A VISIT AT THE END OF HIS TRIP. AMBASSADOR SON WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT ON TIMING BUT NOTED THAT HE HAS EXTENDED HIS TOUR HERE UNTIL AUGUST 13, AND THE VISIT WOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE THAT DATE.
BT

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EXDIS

6. AMBASSADOR DEAN PROMISED TO FORWARD THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSALS TO WASHINGTON. HE EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT COMPLETE VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL IS NECESSARY TO BRING ABOUT A SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA.

7. I PLAN TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI OF THIS VIETNAMESE PROPOSAL IN MY MEETING WITH HIM JULY 8.

8. FOLLOWING ARE VERBATIM NOTES FROM THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR'S DEMARCHE AND FROM HIS OWN AMPLIFICATION ON THE DEMARCHE.

BEGIN TRANSCRIPT: I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU ABOUT SOME PEACE INITIATIVES WHICH ARE BEING CONSIDERED BY THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN HO CHI MINH CITY.

1. WITHDRAWAL OF A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA

- THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA RESULTS FROM AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN VIETNAM AND KAMPUCHEA AND IS AIMED AT DEALING WITH THE THREAT FROM CHINA. KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM WILL AGREE ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS ONCE THE THREAT FROM CHINA IS REMOVED.

- THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA IN NO WAY THREATENS THAILAND'S SECURITY. KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM AGREE TO WITHDRAW A NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA IN THE EVENT THAT KHMER ROUGE TROOPS AND TROOPS OF OTHER KHMER REACTIONARIES ARE DISARMED, ARE DENIED SUPPLY IN WEAPONS, FOOD FROM THAILAND, AND ARE NOT ALLOWED TO USE THAI TERRITORY TO OPPOSE THE

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- KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE.
- -AS A TOKEN OF THEIR GOODWILL KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM
- HAVE AGREED TO TAKE THE FIRST MOVE IN THEIR RELATIONS
- WITH THAILAND: THEY HAVE DECIDED TO WITHDRAW A NUMBER
- OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA IN JULY 1982.
-
- -TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SITUATION RELATIVE TO
- SECURITY AND STABILITY ON THE THAI-KAMPUCHEA BORDER AND
- THE RESPONSE OF THAILAND, KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM MAY
- CONSIDER ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN
- THE FORTHCOMING PERIOD. IF THE WITHDRAWAL IS TAKEN
- ADVANTAGE OF IN ORDER TO INCREASE ACTIVITY PREJUDICIAL
- TO KAMPUCHEA, THEN KAMPUCHEA AND VIETNAM WILL CONSULT
- EACH OTHER TO DECIDE APPROPRIATE MEASURES.
-
- 2. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA
- -THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA MUST BE SETTLED
- THROUGH DISCUSSIONS BY THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES;
- THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES AND
- COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REGION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY
- THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES WITH THE LATTER.
- -IT IS PROPOSED TO HOLD AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
- ON SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE COUN-
- TRIES OF INDOCHINA, THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND BURMA, AND
- SIX BIG COUNTRIES OUTSIDE THE REGION; NAMELY, THE
- SOVIET UNION, FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED
- KINGDOM, INDIA AND CHINA. INDIA AND CHINA HAVE COMMON
- BORDERS AND AGE-OLD RELATIONS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA.
- ALL THE ABOVE-MENTIONED SIX COUNTRIES PARTICIPATED
- IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES ON INDOCHINA: THE
- GENEVA CONFERENCES OF '54 AND '61-62; AND THE 1973
- PARIS CONFERENCE.
- -THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL WILL BE
- INVITED TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY.
- IF THE UNITED NATIONS DERECOGNIZES THE KHMER ROUGE, THE
- UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERAL WILL ATTEND IN THE
- CAPACITY OF AN OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED
- NATIONS.
- -VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA ARE PREPARED TO
- DISCUSS AND REACH AGREEMENT WITH ASEAN COUNTRIES ON
- QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE CONFERENCE (TIME, VENUE,
- COMPOSITION, AGENDA, PROCEDURE OF THE CONFERENCE.)

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EXDIS

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- AMBASSADOR SON'S REMARKS:

- -THE ABOVE POINTS ARE DRAFT PROPOSALS. AT THE
- MEETING OF THE THREE FOREIGN MINISTERS, THEY WILL TAKE
- INTO ACCOUNT THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION
- IN ORDER TO FURTHER CONSIDER AND MAKE DECISIONS, AND
- THIS WILL BE REFLECTED IN THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENT THAT
- WILL BE MADE PUBLIC AT THE END OF THE MEETING.

- -I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU ADVANCE INFORMATION ON
- THESE DRAFT PROPOSALS. WE ARE SURE THAT THE PEACE
- INITIATIVES OF THIS CONFERENCE OF THE THREE FOREIGN
- MINISTERS OF LAOS, KAMPUCHEA, AND VIETNAM WILL GIVE A
- CLEARER PICTURE OF THE JUST STAND, THE GOODWILL AND
- THE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE OF THE THREE COUNTRIES OF
- INDOCHINA, WHICH ARE IN KEEPING WITH THE LEGITIMATE
- INTERESTS OF EACH COUNTRY IN THE REGION AND OF OTHER
- COUNTRIES CONCERNED, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES; AND
- ARE BENEFICIAL TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

END TRANSCRIPT.

DEAN

BT

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EXDIS MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12065: GDS-4/28/88 (O'DONOHUE, DANIEL A.)
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, PORO, WFP, US, VM
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE BY VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR

REF: BANGKOK 22999

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE IS COMMENDED FOR HANDLING OF DEMARCHE BY
VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE BEST TO
RESPOND PROMPTLY AND TO BRIEF THE RTG ON THIS EXCHANGE.
FOLLOWING ARE TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH SRV
AMBASSADOR:

-- THE US DELEGATION TO THE CFA HAS MADE CLEAR OUR POSI-
TION ON THE PROPOSED WFP PROJECT FOR VIETNAM. THE UNITED
STATES OPPOSES THIS PROJECT BECAUSE WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT
MERITS WFP SUPPORT. THE WFP SHOULD CONCENTRATE ITS
RESOURCES ON LOW-INCOME FOOD DEFICIT COUNTRIES, WITH
PRIORITY GIVEN TO THOSE RECIPIENT COUNTRIES WHOSE AGRI-
CULTURAL POLICIES ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT, AS SHOWN BY THE
COUNTRY'S OWN ALLOCATION OF ITS CAPITAL AND HUMAN RE-
SOURCE. VIETNAM HAS NOT SHOWN EVIDENCE OF A COMMITMENT
TO ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY SUPPORT FOR
THE DAU TIENG PROJECT.

---WE BELIEVE THAT IN GENERAL IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRI-
ATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO PROVIDE DEVEL-
OPMENTAL AID TO VIETNAM AT A TIME WHEN VIETNAM IS
SQUANDERING ITS OWN SCARCE RESOURCES ON MILITARY AD-
VENTURES, IN VIOLATION OF REPEATED UNGA DECLARATIONS.
THE GREAT MAJORITY OF DONOR COUNTRIES AGREE WITH THAT
POSITION.

-- WE REGARD YOUR GOVERNMENT'S MISALLOCATION OF RE-
SOURCE AS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS.

-- AS MR. ARMITAGE EXPLAINED DURING HIS VISIT, THE
UNITED STATES DOES NOT OPPOSE THE SENDING OF GENUINE
HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. MR. ARMITAGE
POINTED OUT THAT THE USG HAS SPECIFICALLY PERMITTED
FAMILIES IN AMERICA TO SEND GIFT PARCELS TO FAMILIES

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BY h, NARA, DATE 5/28/99

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IN VIETNAM, AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH HAS PROVIDED THE
VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WITH A VERY CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY
OF HUMANITARIAN AID.

-- AS MR. ARMITAGE NOTED DURING HIS VISIT, OUR TWO
COUNTRIES HAVE AGREED THAT ACCOUNTING FOR MIAS IS A
HUMANITARIAN ISSUE WHICH WE MUST DEAL WITH ON ITS OWN
MERITS WITHOUT LINKING IT TO ANY OTHER ISSUES.

-- RATHER THAN INTRODUCE THESE EXTRANEEOUS ISSUES TO
OUR DISCUSSION OF THE MIA PROBLEM, WE URGE YOU TO ACT
QUICKLY ON THE AGREEMENTS MADE DURING MR. ARMITAGE'S
VISIT ON STEPS TOWARD A FULL ACCOUNTING FOR MIAS. -

3. FOR USUN: YOU MAY DRAW ON THE ABOVE TALKING POINTS
TO REPLY TO ANY DEMARCHE BY SRV MISSION TO-THE UN.
IF THE VIETNAMESE DO NOT REFER TO THE MIA ISSUE, YOU
SHOULD MODIFY TALKING POINTS TO OMIT REFERENCES TO THAT
SUBJECT AND THE ARMITAGE MISSION. HAIG
BT

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 20, 1982

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MEMORANDUM

TO: ICA/EA - Mr. Cliff Forster
NSC - Mr. Don Gregg

FROM: EA - Thomas P. Shoesmith, Acting

SUBJECT: Joe Papp's Proposed Cultural Exchange with Vietnam

The Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) has informed us that they have proposed to Hanoi a second trip to Vietnam in mid-May. The VVA is requesting Hanoi's permission to include in the delegation Mike Wallace, who allegedly has expressed interest in filming the trip for Sixty Minutes, and producer Joe Papp, who will explore arranging cultural exchanges with the Vietnamese.

At the VVA's request, we have scheduled a meeting for DAS O'Donohue with Papp on Tuesday, April 27. We have warned the VVA that we are not enthusiastic about the cultural exchange idea.

The VVA is aware that a private organization has organized scientific exchanges with Vietnam since 1978. The previous administration permitted that program to begin at a time of thaw in our relations with Hanoi, and the Reagan administration has continued to allow visits here by a few Vietnamese scientists who are not working on sensitive areas. We also have turned down requests to expand the program (e.g. student exchange) which could create the mistaken impression of gradual normalization of relations and would be inconsistent with our other actions toward Vietnam. That concern is even greater in the case of cultural exchange, which would be a more public phenomenon.

We plan to tell Mr. Papp that we would not be prepared to issue visas to Vietnamese artists to perform in this country. We will explain the foreign policy considerations behind this decision. In the case of American artists visiting Vietnam, there would be no restrictions on non-commercial visits.

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-2-

If anyone connected with the VVA or Mr. Papp approaches your offices to discuss this cultural exchange proposal we would appreciate it if you could refer him to us.

cc: EA/P:JMenard

Drafted: EA/VLK:RFBurghardt:jy
(Wang 0106V)
Clearances: EA:FZBrown *FZ*
L/EA:TFortune (subs) *TF*

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CINCPAC FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISOR
E.O. 12065: GDS 4/12/88 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PARM, IO, UR, SOPN, PEPR
SUBJ: CW USE BRIEFING TEAM: THAILAND VISIT: REPORT NO. 4

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE CONVEYS THE INTERAGENCY
CBW BRIEFING TEAM'S REPORT ON ITS VISIT TO THAILAND
APRIL 6-11, DURING WHICH IT PROVIDED INFORMATION

ON THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USG'S
INVESTIGATION OF CBW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
AFGHANISTAN TO A WIDE RANGE OF THAI GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS, TO THE LOCAL AND FOREIGN PRESS CORPS
AND TO MEDICAL PROFESSIONALS WORKING IN REFUGEE
CAMPS ALONG THE LAO AND KHMER BORDERS. THE TEAM
ALSO MET WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND US MISSION
OFFICERS, WITH MILITARY ATTACHES AND DIPLOMATS OF
FRIENDLY EMBASSIES AND WITH LAO AND KHMER
NATIONALIST LEADERS. FOUR TEAM MEMBERS VISITED
BAN VI NAY (HMONG) REFUGEE CAMP WHERE TECHNICAL
MEMBERS BRIEFED CAMP MEDICAL OFFICERS WHOM THEY
FOUND RECEPTIVE AND ANXIOUS TO ASSIST. THE TEAM
ALSO ASSISTED IN MOVEMENT OF AN ALLEGED HMONG
CBW VICTIM TO A BANGKOK HOSPITAL FOR
EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT. THE TEAM VISITED
THE THAI-KHMER BORDER WHERE SOME MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS REMAIN SKEPTICAL ABOUT CBW USE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA. MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE TEAM'S
VISIT WAS RELATIVELY HEAVY AND POSITIVE IN TONE
ALTHOUGH ONE BRIEFING SESSION WITH THE FOREIGN
PRESS CORPS INCLUDED CRITICISM OF THE
ADEQUACY OF USG INVESTIGATION EFFORTS. END
SUMMARY.

3. EMBASSY BRIEFING:

UPON ARRIVAL, TEAM MET WITH AMBASSADOR DEAN AND
DCM ROY FOR OVER AN HOUR. AMBASSADOR ADVISED TEAM THAT
HE HAD BEEN DEFERRING LOCAL INQUIRIES ON CW ISSUES TO
AWAIT TEAM'S ARRIVAL AND THAT WE COULD EXPECT
CONSIDERABLE INTEREST. (FYI: LOCAL MEDIA PUBLISHED
ON CW ISSUES ALMOST EVERY DAY OF OUR STAY.)

4. DINNER/BRIEFING FOR MILITARY ATTACHES AND THAI
MILITARY:

TEAM BRIEFED FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES AND SENIOR THAI

MILITARY OFFICERS AT DINNER HOSTED BY LTC LANE.
FRUITFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH ATTENDEES REVEALED HIGH
LOCAL INTEREST AND SUPPORT FOR SAMPLE COLLECTION
AND ANALYSIS PROGRAM. THEY STRESSED NEED FOR
TRAINING THEIR PERSONNEL IN ALL DEFENSIVE ASPECTS
OF CW. PARTICULAR INTEREST WAS EXPRESSED IN
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BY N, NARA, DATE 5/20/99

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DEVELOPING INDIGENOUS CAPABILITY TO DETECT AND

ANALYZE CW MATERIAL. DR. GREEN WAS CONTACTED BY FRENCH

MILITARY AND ASKED TO RECEIVE SOME VERY

SENSITIVE INFORMATION CONCERNING A RECENT ATTACK IN

KAMPUCHEA INVESTIGATED BY FRENCH MEDICAL PERSONNEL.

DETAILS TO BE SENT SEPTEL.

5. PUBLIC AFFAIRS:

-- THAI MEDIA: TEAM MEMBERS CELEC AND KIEHL

PROVIDED BACKGROUND BRIEFING FOR THAI MEDIA WHILE

REMAINDER OF TEAM VISITED BAN VI NAY CAMP.

ATTENDING BACKGROUNDER AT ICA FACILITY WERE:

PICHAJ VASANASONG, INFLUENTIAL RADIO COMMENTATOR;

KASEM ATACHASAI, ASSISTANT EDITOR AND FOREIGN

NEWS EDITOR OF THE MOST RESPECTED THAI LANGUAGE

NEWSPAPER, "SIAM RATH", (SIAM RATH PLANS TO

SERIALIZE SEAGRAVE'S "YELLOW RAIN" SOON); JAMNAN

HEMARAT OF ADVANCE MEDIA AND A REGULAR CONTRIBUTOR

TO "SIAM RATH"; ATTAVIBOON SRISUVARANAND,

FOREIGN NEWS EDITOR OF THE NEWSPAPER "MATUPOOM";

PUMAREE SUMONDIS, REPORTER FOR THE PRO-GOVERNMENT

"BANGKOK POST" -- THE LARGEST CIRCULATION

ENGLISH LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER -- AND ALAN DAWSON,

INFLUENTIAL "BANGKOK POST" COLUMNIST; PAUL

JASVINDER OF THE INDEPENDENT "NATION REVIEW";

AMPOR SAMOSOARN OF RADIO THAILAND; ANUVAT

AMUNUAYPOLITHAK, THAI NEWS AGENCY; SANGOB

CHANTACHOTE AND PUNNEE RATANACHAIRIT OF THE MASS

CIRCULATION NEWSPAPER "BAN MUANG". QUESTIONING

REFLECTED DEEP THAI PRESS INTEREST AND

FAMILIARITY REGARDING CW USE IN LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA

AS WELL AS MOTIVATIONS FOR CW USE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

MEDIA APPEARS INFORMED AND LARGELY SYMPATHETIC

TO EVIDENCE BUT SOME SKEPTICISM WAS DISPLAYED REGARDING

US MOTIVATIONS FOR PRESENTING THE ISSUE. LOCAL MEDIA

ALSO SEEMED PUZZLED BY LACK OF WORLD-WIDE INTEREST

IN THE ISSUE.

-- FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS CLUB OF THAILAND (FCCT):

TEAM MEMBERS CROCKER, CELEC, STETTNER AND KIEHL HELD AN

HOURLY-ON-THE-RECORD PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWED BY

AN OFF-THE-RECORD LUNCH WITH MEMBERS OF THE FCCT.

ATTENDEES AT SESSIONS INCLUDED MOST OF THE MAJOR

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL MEDIA REPRESENTED IN

BANGKOK. THE FORTY-PLUS JOURNALISTS INCLUDED

REPRESENTATIVES FROM: AP, REUTER, AFP, NCNA (XIN-HUA),

MALAYSIAN NEWS AGENCY, NEW YORK TIMES, LONDON

TIMES, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, L.A. TIMES, INTERNATIONAL

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SINGAPORE STRAITS-TIMES, SIDNEY MORNING HERALD,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC
REVIEW, SOLDIER OF FORTUNE MAGAZINE, NBC, ABC,
AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY, VOA AND WILLIAM
SHAWCROSS (AUTHOR OF "SIDESHOW"). MAJORITY OF THE
MEDIA DISPLAYED LITTLE OR NO SKEPTICISM OF
EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN MARCH 22 STATE DEPARTMENT
REPORT AND ASKED QUESTIONS CLARIFYING POINTS
IN REPORT, ON FUTURE STEPS BY US, U.N. EXPERTS
GROUPS OR OTHERS TO COLLECT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE OF CB USE,

AND ON IMPLICATIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL. OTHER
QUESTIONERS WANTED TO KNOW WHY THE US HAD PRESENTED
NO "HARD EVIDENCE" IN THE FORM OF ORDINANCE OR
CORPSES OF VICTIMS (NBC); WHY, IF THIS ISSUE IS
SO IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL IMPLICATIONS,
THE US IS NOT MAKING MORE OF AN EFFORT ON THE
CW USE ISSUE AND DEVOTING MORE USG RESOURCES TO
COLLECTION (N.Y. TIMES). IN OFF-THE-RECORD
CONVERSATIONS, MEDIA ADMITTED THEY ARE PERSONALLY
CONVINCED OF CW USE BUT BELIEVE US CASE WOULD
BE MORE PERSUASIVE TO "HONEST SKEPTICS" IF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE WERE PRODUCED AND GREATER US RESOURCE
COMMITMENT WERE UNDERTAKEN.
TWO POINTS RAISED DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH
SEEMED OF GREATEST INTEREST TO THE MEDIA WERE THE
TEAM'S REPORT OF SEVENTY NEW VICTIMS AT BAN VINAI
AND US DISAPPOINTMENT WITH SOVIET NATIONAL UN
UNDERSECRETARY USTINOV'S ROLE IN THE U.N. INVESTIGATION.
-- ICA BANGKOK: ICA BANGKOK WILL REPORT ON LOCAL
MEDIA PLAY OF ABOVE EVENTS THROUGH NORMAL MEDIA
REACTION CHANNELS WITH INFO TO CW USE BRIEFING
TEAM ENROUTE. REQUEST ALL OTHER ADDRESSEES INFO
CW USE TEAM ON YOUR MEDIA REACTION REPORTING FROM
THESE BANGKOK EVENTS.

6. BRIEFING FOR ALLIED DIPLOMATS:

ON APRIL 7, TEAM MEMBERS CELEC, KIEHL AND McDONALD
MET WITH MEMBERS OF ALLIED EMBASSIES HERE. PRESENT
WERE HARALD NEPLE, NORWAY; MICHEL LUMMAUX, FRANCE;
KEN GRAHAM, NEW ZEALAND; J.E. BUCKLEY, AUSTRALIA;
AND DAVID KORTH, CANADA. AMEMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICERS
EDMUND MCWILLIAMS AND EMILY HODGES ALSO ATTENDED.

7. BRIEFINGS AT MFA, SUPREME COMMAND AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

FORMAL BRIEFINGS WERE HELD AT THE THAI MFA, NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC) AND SUPREME COMMAND. THE
MFA BRIEFING, ALTHOUGH FOCUSED ON ISSUES, INVOLVED
A SURPRISING NUMBER OF TECHNICAL QUESTIONS FROM
THE STAFF. ALL APPEARED TOTALLY PERSUADED BY US
BT

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ENTIRELY ON MATTERS OF MILITARY MEDICINE AND THE NEED FOR MULTIPLE THAI-US COOPERATIVE VENTURES IN THE COMING YEAR. AN ACCURATE SUMMARY OF THE MEETING FROM THE THAI POINT OF VIEW APPEARED IN BANGKOK PRESS THE FOLLOWING DAY IN THE FORM OF AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL SAIYUD. THE BRIEFING FOR NSC SEC GEN PRASONG SUNSIRI AND STAFF DEALT MAINLY WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT WAYS TO CONVINCE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY OF THE REALITY AND IMPORTANCE OF CW ATTACKS NEAR THAI TERRITORY. Q AND A PERIOD ALSO INCLUDED NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO MEDICAL AND COLLECTIVE PROTECTION MEASURES WITH EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR INCREASED COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE AND SHARING OF DATA WITH THE USG.

8. APRIL 7 LUNCH:

TEAM MEMBER CELEC JOINED MAJOR GENERAL WOO OF THE PRC FOR LUNCH. BY THE NATURE OF GEN. WOO'S QUESTIONS, HE WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT CW AGENTS WERE IN USE AND WHAT PROTECTIVE MEASURES COULD BE TAKEN. SEVERAL TIMES IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, WOO RETURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF PROTECTING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY LOOKING FOR AN INEXPENSIVE (I.E. ANTIDOTE) PROTECTIVE DEVICE THAT COULD BE USED FOR A LARGE CIVILIAN POPULATION RATHER THAN THE MORE CONVENTIONAL MASK, GLOVES, OVERGARMENT AND BOOTS. GEN. WOO CONFIRMED THAT VISAS FOR THE PRC HAD BEEN APPROVED AND WOULD BE GRANTED IN BANGKOK.

9. TRIP TO BAN VI NAY REFUGEE CAMP:

-- TEAM MEMBERS CROCKER, GREEN AND STETTNER ACCOMPANIED LT. COL. LANE AND DR. TOWNSEND TO THE BAN VI NAY HONG REFUGEE CAMP. A COURTESY CALL WAS PAID ON THE GOVERNOR OF THE PROVINCE. A FORMAL MEETING WAS HELD WITH COL. VANG NENG, GENERAL VANG PAO'S PERSONNEL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CAMP. HE APPEARED PLEASED THAT THE US GOVERNMENT WAS RELAYING THEIR STORY TO THE WORLD. HE ARRANGED FOR THE TEAM TO INTERVIEW A NUMBER OF CW VICTIMS. COL. VANG NENG HAS WORKED IN THE CAMP FOR FIVE YEARS AND HAS PROVIDED BT

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CASE. SEVERAL SUBSEQUENT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD IN THE FOLLOWING DAYS BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL TEAM MEMBERS AND STAFF. SUPREME COMMANDER GENERAL SAIYUD KOEDPHOL WAS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT STEPS CAN BE TAKEN BY THAILAND AND OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES TO BRING CW ISSUES TO HIGHER INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) IT WILL SEE THE CW ISSUE RAISED AS SEVERAL PERSONNEL QUERIED STETTNER ON US AGENDA FOR SSOD. DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING AT SUPREME COMMAND FOCUSED

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VALUABLE ASSISTANCE TO THE US EMBASSY. WE RECOMMEND

THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO BRINGING HIM TO

THE US, WHERE HE COULD ALSO TESTIFY BEFORE CONGRESS

AND HOLD PRESS CONFERENCES.

-- DR. GREEN BRIEFED THE WORLD VISION FOUNDATION

STAFF AT THE CAMP, WHICH IS HEADED BY NEW ZEALAND'S

DR. BURKE AND WHICH INCLUDES DEREK BIRD, A UK DOCTOR,

AND MEDICAL PERSONNEL FROM THE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE STAFF WENT OUT OF THEIR WAY TO SET UP MEDICAL

INTERVIEWS IN THE SHORT TIME AVAILABLE. BURKE AND

BIRD ARE BOTH CONVINCED THAT LETHAL CW AGENTS HAVE

BEEN USED. BURKE ASKED THAT HIS MESSAGE BE PASSED

TO WELLINGTON. BIRD SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER

RECEIVED A RESPONSE FROM THE UK EMBASSY IN BANGKOK

REGARDING HIS CONCERN ABOUT CW USE. A FINNISH

HEALTH WORKER REPORTED THAT SEVENTY GAS VICTIMS

HAD JUST ARRIVED FROM LAOS, BUT THAT THEY WERE

TOO UNDERSTAFFED TO CONDUCT INTERVIEWS WITH ALL OF THEM.

DR. GREEN EXAMINED THREE PATIENTS WITH SIGNS OF

PROBABLE CHEMICAL INJURY.

-- SEVERAL TEAM MEMBERS HAVE BEEN SPENDING

SOME TIME CONSIDERING THIS ISSUE. THE MANPOWER

REQUIRED TO PROPERLY SCREEN AND INTERVIEW ALLEGED

VICTIMS IS CLEARLY BEYOND THE PRESENT MISSION

STAFFING, AND SUPERFICIAL INTERVIEWS COULD BE

COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. AT THIS TIME, IT SEEMS TO

THE TEAM THAT VICTIMS WITH SIGNS AND SYMPTOMS OF

CHEMICAL INJURY AT THE ORIGINAL TIME OF CONTACT

SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY CAMP PHYSICIANS FIRST. IF A

DETERMINATION IS MADE THAT NO OTHER MEDICALLY

LIKELY CAUSES EXIST EXCEPT CHEMICAL INJURY AND THE

PATIENT RELATES A CW STORY, THE PATIENT SHOULD BE

REFERRED TO DR. TOWNSEND FOR DETERMINATION AS TO THE

ADVISABILITY OF TRANSFER TO A SUITABLE

BANGKOK HOSPITAL. SUCH A CASE WAS PROCESSED BY

DRS. TOWNSEND AND GREEN AND A PATIENT HAS BEEN

ADMITTED TO BANGKOK'S SIRIRAJ HOSPITAL (APRIL 7).

-- DRS. GREEN, WATSON AND TOWNSEND HELD EXTENSIVE

AND DETAILED CLINICAL MEDICAL DISCUSSIONS WITH

15 MEMBERS OF THE STAFF AT SIRIRAJ HOSPITAL ON

METHODOLOGY AND HANDLING OF CHEMICALLY INJURED

PATIENTS. DR. WATSON, HERE AS AT ALL MEDICAL

FACILITIES VISITED, LEFT DETAILED DOCUMENTATION

ON DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS, LAB WORK-UP AND

TREATMENT PROTOCOLS. DRS. TOWNSEND, GREEN AND

WATSON MADE A GRAND ROUNDS CALL ON THE CW PATIENT

WITH THE HOSPITAL CHIEF-OF-STAFF. EMBASSY

WILL REPORT PATIENT'S STATUS SEPTEL.

10. VISIT TO THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER:

-- ON APRIL 10, THE TEAM SPLIT INTO MEDICAL

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PACKAGE OF MATERIALS ON DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT. ASHAD BEEN BERVED IN PAKISTAN, VOLAG PHYSICIANS ARE WILLING TO DEAL WITH SUBJECT WHEN THEY DO NOT HAVE TO INITIATE CONTACTS WITH THE USG. THE CRITICAL ROLE OF DR. TOWNSEND IN PROVIDING A BRIDGE TO PERMIT PASSAGE OF MEDICAL DATA FROM VOLAGS TO US IS OBVIOUS. AFTER THE BRIEFINGS OF CAMP MEDICAL STAFF, IT IS NOW MORE LIKELY THAT REFERRALS OF CHEMICAL INJURY WILL OCCUR.

-- THE MILITARY SUB-GROUP VISITED THE SAME CAMPS AND RECEIVED UPDATES ON THE LOGISTICS, FOOD AND CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATIONS. AT NONG CHAN, ABOUT 1000 NEWLY ARRIVED REFUGEES RESPONDING TO A SIHANOUK PLOY TO SHOW POLITICAL STRENGTH DEMONSTRATED FOR THE TEAM IN ATTEMPT TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR ADDITIONAL FOOD. DR. GREEN LATER VISITED THE AREA TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF MALNUTRITION (SIGNIFICANT) AMONG THE CHILDREN.

11. APRIL 9 MEETING AT EMBASSY:

THE TEAM MET WITH SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE MISSION, EMBASSY OFFICERS DIRECTLY INVOLVED WITH REFUGEE AFFAIRS AND THE FIRST SECRETARY FROM VIENTIANE. DISCUSSIONS INVOLVED VERY POINTED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF EVIDENCE, RELIABILITY OF REFUGEE REPORTING, WAYS TO MAXIMIZE INTERVIEWING, NEED FOR EITHER INCREASING RESOURCES OR SHARPENING COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS. ALL SEEMED TO THINK THIS SESSION WAS AMONG THE MOST VALUABLE OF THE TRIP IN THAT A GOOD DEAL OF FACTUAL INFORMATION WAS SHARED, MISCONCEPTIONS WERE CLEARED UP AND NEW REQUIREMENTS WERE LEVIED.

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AND MILITARY SUB-GROUPS TO MAXIMIZE EXPOSURE. THE

MEDICAL MEMBERS, LED BY DR. TOWNSEND, VISITED THE

HOSPITALS, SAW PATIENTS AND BRIEFED THE STAFFS

AT KHAO I DANG, NONG SAMET AND NONG CHAN. FOREIGN

MEDICAL STAFF GENERALLY RECEIVED MEMBERS WITH

THINLY VEILED SUSPICION AT FIRST, BUT BY END OF

BRIEFINGS HAD CLEARLY BECOME PERSUADED AS TO THE GOOD

INTENTIONS OF THE USG, LARGELY BY VERY DIRECT AND

HONEST CONVERSATION IN WHICH TEAM MEMBERS "SET

THE RECORD STRAIGHT" ABOUT EXAGGERATED PRESS

ACCOUNTS, AND AFTER DR. WATSON HAD PRESENTED HER

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 3/5/02 (THAYER, HARRY E.T.) OR-M

TAGS: SHUM, SREF, PINS, VM, UR, BU, CZ, GE, SN

SUBJ: (U) VIETNAMESE WORKERS FOR SIBERIA

REFS: A. STATE 54433 (NOTAL), B. MANILA 4193 (NOTAL)

- C. KUALA LUMPUR 1147

1. SUMMARY: GOS' SOURCES SAY THAT APPROXIMATELY 5,000 VIETNAMESE WORKERS ARE ALREADY IN SIBERIA, MOST OF THEM INVOLUNTARILY, MOST COMING FROM REEDUCATION CAMPS, AND THAT SIXTY PERCENT OF THEIR WAGES IS BEING RETAINED BY THE USSR TO REPAY SOVIET LOANS. WE CANNOT EVALUATE THIS INFORMATION OR THE SOURCES. THE GOS HAS ASKED FOR FEEDBACK FROM THE USG ON THIS ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO US ON MARCH 5 BY A MID-LEVEL MFA OFFICIAL WHO FOLLOWS THIS ISSUE, WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

TO
HELP THE DEPARTMENT IN USING THIS INFORMATION, WE HAVE MADE UNCLASSIFIED WHATEVER THE GOS GOT FROM OVERT SOURCES. WE ARE NOT ABLE TO EVALUATE ANY OF THIS INFORMATION OR THE SOURCES.

3. SIBERIA

A. ARE VIETNAMESE ALREADY THERE?

YES. APPROXIMATELY 5,000, ACCORDING TO INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE GOS

OUR BRIEFER EMPHASIZED IMMEDIATELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOS HAS RECEIVED WIDELY-VARYING FIGURES. NO MATTER WHAT THE FIGURES, HOWEVER, THE GOS' INFORMATION INDICATES THAT "MOST" VIETNAMESE WORKERS ARE BEING SENT TO SIBERIA.

B. (U) DO THE SOVIETS ADMIT IT?

OUR BRIEFER CITED A PUBLIC SPEECH GIVEN LAST YEAR BY SOVIET CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV IN WHICH BREZHNEV REPORTEDLY SAID THAT "THE USSR NEEDS 400,000 ADDITIONAL WORKERS TO DEVELOP NEW OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN WESTERN SIBERIA." THOSE "ADDITIONAL WORKERS" WERE UNIDENTIFIED, BUT AT LEAST A PORTION OF THEM COULD BE VIETNAMESE.

C. (U) IS IT INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE?

YES, ACCORDING TO MINH KY DANG, SECRETARY FOR VIETNAMESE REFUGEES IN THE NETHERLANDS, WHO REPORTEDLY TOLD THE PRESS THAT EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM INDICATED THAT MOST OF THE VIETNAMESE INVOLVED "ARE DETAINEES FROM REEDUCATION CAMPS." NO, HANOI OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD REPORTERS; "IT'S VOLUNTARY."

D. WHAT DO HANOI OFFICIALS SAY IN PRIVATE?

ACCORDING TO

THE VIETNAMESE CHARGE THERE DENIED THAT WORKERS WERE BEING SENT TO THE USSR AS SLAVE LABOR, DENIED THAT THE WORKERS WERE BEING SENT TO REPAY LOANS FROM THE USSR, AND STATED THAT THEY WERE BEING SENT TO GAIN INDUSTRIAL EXPERTISE, WHICH WAS BADLY NEEDED IN VIETNAM.

E. WHAT KINDS OF PROJECTS ARE THE VIETNAMESE WORKING ON? THE GOS DOES NOT HAVE THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, BUT SPECULATES THAT OIL AND GAS PROJECTS WOULD BE A LOGICAL ANSWER IN LIGHT OF WHAT IS KNOWN ABOUT WHAT IS IN SIBERIA AND ABOUT VIETNAM'S HOPES TO FUND ITS FUTURE ECONOMIC RECOVERY WITH MONEY FROM OFFSHORE OIL.

4. ELSEWHERE AND HOW MANY?

A. EASTERN EUROPEAN SOURCES TOLD GOS OFFICIALS THAT THERE WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY 500,000 VIETNAMESE WORKERS IN EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN 1981 AND 1985, MOSTLY UNSKILLED, AND MOSTLY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EAST GERMANY. BT

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B. (U) PHILLIP DEVILLIERS, A FRENCH SCHOLAR, SAID PUBLICLY LAST YEAR THAT APPROXIMATELY 50,000 VIETNAMESE WORKERS "WERE BEING SENT" TO THE USSR, EAST GERMANY, AND BULGARIA.

C. (U) A VIETNAMESE EMBASSY SPOKESMAN IN BANGKOK SAID PUBLICLY LAST YEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE WORKERS GOING ABROAD COULD REACH 100,000 BY THE END OF THE CURRENT FIVE-YEAR PLAN (I.E., THE END OF 1986).

D. (U) SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL (FNU) DRUKOV TOLD SINGAPOREAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT AT PRESENT THERE ARE ONLY A "FEW THOUSAND" VIETNAMESE IN THE USSR, SKILLED AND UNSKILLED.

E. (U) SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL (FNU) ZHILYAEV TOLD SINGAPOREAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS THAT THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE IN THE USSR WOULD NOT EXCEED 20,000 IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS (I.E., BY THE END OF 1986).

F. (U) [REDACTED]

VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER NGUYEN CO THACH HAD MET RECENTLY WITH WORLD FOOD PROGRAM DIRECTOR LINNART. THACH ALLEGEDLY TOLD LINNART THAT THERE WERE 250,000 VIETNAMESE WORKERS ALREADY WORKING IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE, AND THAT SIXTY PERCENT OF THEIR WAGES WAS BEING RETAINED BY THE USSR.

5. (U) WHEN DID THIS BEGIN?

ACCORDING TO GOS INFORMATION, THE FIRST TIME THIS ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED AT A COMECON MEETING WAS IN PRAGUE IN 1980. THE "CONSENSUS" OF GOS SOURCES IS THAT THE PROGRAM WAS BEGUN AS A WAY FOR THE SRV TO REPAY SOVIET LOANS. THE GOS HAS NO CONCRETE EVIDENCE, BUT TENDS TO BELIEVE ITS SOURCES, AND SUSPECTS THIS WAS ORIGINALLY A SOVIET IDEA, BUT ONE THAT THE VIETNAMESE COULD GO ALONG WITH BECAUSE OF HIGH UNEMPLOYMENT, THE NEED TO TRAIN UNSKILLED AND SKILLED WORKERS, THE NEED (HANOI THINKS) TO DEVELOP A RESERVOIR OF OIL INDUSTRY WORKERS, AND HIGH NUMBER OF PEOPLE STILL IN REEDUCATION CAMPS.

6. (U) VISAS FOR ONE MILLION VIETNAMESE?

THE HIGHEST FIGURE THE GOS HAS RECEIVED ON THIS ISSUE IS ONE MILLION VIETNAMESE WORKERS EVENTUALLY TO BE WORKING IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE GOS BRIEFER NOTED THAT IN JULY, 1981, VIETNAM AND THE USSR SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON "THE MOVEMENT OF CITIZENS" BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE GOS SPECULATES THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS DESIGNED TO WAIVE NORMAL VISA REQUIREMENTS AND TO CUT RED TAPE.

7. (U) AT THE END OF THIS THIRTY-MINUTE BRIEFING, OUR MFA COLLEAGUE CONCLUDED BY STATING FOR THE RECORD THAT THE GOS WOULD APPRECIATE FEEDBACK FROM THE USG ON THIS ISSUE. SPECIFICALLY, THE GOS WOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE FOLLOWING:

A. WHAT OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REPORTS CAN THE USG CONFIRM?

B. WHAT IS THE LATEST USG ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT OF LEVERAGE THAT THE USSR HAS WITH THE SRV?

C. WHAT IS THE LATEST USG ASSESSMENT ON HOW THE USSR HAS USED THAT LEVERAGE? FOR EXAMPLE, DID THE USSR HAVE TO PRESSURE THE SRV TO GAIN ACCESS TO DANANG AND CAM RANH BAY FACILITIES, OR WAS ACCESS GRANTED WITHOUT PRESSURE BEING EXERTED? IS THE USSR USING ITS LEVERAGE TO INFLUENCE VIETNAM'S CAMBODIA POLICY? IF SO, IN WHAT WAY?

8. (U) COMMENT: EMBOFF EMPHASIZED THAT HE COULD MAKE NO PROMISE ABOUT WHAT, IF ANYTHING, HE WOULD HAVE TO SHARE LATER, ESPECIALLY SINCE OUR OWN REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REFLECTED OUR LACK OF DATA. END COMMENT.

9. (U) ACTION REQUESTED: ANYTHING WE CAN SHARE WITH THE GOS WILL HELP US TO CONTINUE THE TWO-WAY INFORMATION FLOW. THAYER

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REFS: A. STATE 53777, B. BANGKOK 12708, C. STATE 48304

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2. SUMMARY: ON MARCH 3 AMBASSADOR CONVEYED TO THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR THE POINTS (REF C) EXPRESSING U. S. CONCERN AT PAVN ACTIONS NEAR THE THAI BORDER AND LOSS OF LIFE AMONG THAI VILLAGERS; NOTING THE U. S. SECURITY TREATY COMMITMENT TO THAILAND; AND REASSERTING THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA. THE VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THE DEMARCHE TO HANOI. HE OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THAI-VIETNAMESE TALKS ON KHMER ROUGE ACTIVITIES IN FAMILIAR, ALTHOUGH NON-POLEMICAL, TERMS, INCLUDING REFERENCE TO A SOLUTION THROUGH THE VIENTIANE COMMUNIQUE. HE DENIED THAT VIETNAM THREATENED THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THAILAND. THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFLY REBUTTED, CITING THE NEED FOR FOREIGN TROOPS TO LEAVE CAMBODIA SO THE KHMER COULD FREELY DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. BOTH SIDES NOTED THEIR INTENT TO KEEP MENTION OF THE DEMARCHE AND ITS SUBSTANCE OUT OF THE PRESS.
END SUMMARY.

3. ON MARCH 3 THE AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY POLOFF CARNEY, CALLED ON VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HOANG BAO SON. COUNSELLOR LUU DOAN HUYNH AND THIRD SECRETARY/ INTERPRETER HOANG THI NIHN ATTENDED. AFTER EXCHANGING COURTESIES ON THIS, THE FIRST, MEETING BETWEEN THE TWO, AMBASSADOR DEAN VERBALLY PRESENTED THE POINTS IN THE DEMARCHE AND LEFT A "NON-PAPER" DRAWN FROM REF C.

4. IN REPLY AMBASSADOR SON PRESENTED A FAMILIAR REVIEW OF VIETNAMESE CONTACTS WITH FORMER PRIME MINISTER KRIANGSAK AND PRIME MINISTER PREM DESIGNED TO END THE THREAT TO SECURITY IN KAMPUCHEA FROM THE POL POT "REMNANTS" (MUCH ALONG THE LINES OF HIS PRESENTATION A YEAR AGO -- 81 BANGKOK 15653, 13/20/81). HE ASSERTED THAT VIETNAM HAD CHOSEN TO LET THAILAND

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TAKE MEASURES THAT WOULD CUT OFF SUPPLIES TO THE KHMER ROUGE. THE ALTERNATIVE, PAVN DESTRUCTION OF POL POT FORCES, WOULD REQUIRE ACTION CLOSE TO THE BORDER AND MIGHT CREATE "MISUNDERSTANDING" WITH THE THAI. VIETNAM HAD MADE THIS CHOICE BECAUSE IT WISHED TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH THAILAND. HE ADVISED THE UNITED STATES AS THAILAND'S FRIEND TO URGE THE THAI TO CREATE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE FORCES FROM CAMBODIA AND REFERRED TO THE VIENTIANE COMMUNIQUE'S PROPOSALS FOR STABILIZING THE BORDER. SON SAID IT WAS WRONG TO SAY THAT VIETNAM THREATENED THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF THAILAND. RATHER, VIETNAM HAD ITSELF BEEN THE VICTIM OF MANY YEARS OF FOREIGN AGGRESSION AND WOULD NEVER VIOLATE THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF OTHER NATIONS. IN THE ONLY DEPARTURE FROM STANDARD LANGUAGE, SON STRONGLY EMPHASIZED VIETNAM'S DESIRE TO BRING ITS TROOPS HOME TO BEGIN THE EFFORT TO REBUILD THEIR COUNTRY. HE ALSO REITERATED VIETNAM'S GOOD INTENTIONS IN CAMBODIA AND LAOS, SUGGESTING THAT THOSE WHO SEE HANOI IN A COLONIZING ROLE THERE ARE JUDGING VIETNAM IN TERMS OF THEIR OWN PREVIOUS ACTIONS.

5. AMBASSADOR DEAN BRIEFLY REBUTTED WITH LOW KEY FIRMNESS. HE EMPHASIZED THAT A SOLUTION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAI SECURITY AS WELL AS VIETNAMESE SECURITY AND CAMBODIAN WELL-BEING TOO. HE AGREED THAT NO SOLUTION SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE, AND EMPHASIZED THAT THE KHMER MUST FREELY DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE, WHICH THEY CANNOT DO WITH FOREIGN TROOPS PRESENT.

6. SON SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THE DEMARCHE TO HANOI AND LET US KNOW IF A REPLY IS FORTHCOMING. AMBASSADOR DEAN EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD KEEP THE FACT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING CONFIDENTIAL

AND SUGGESTED THAT NEITHER VIETNAMESE NOR US INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY REPORTS APPEARING IN THE PUBLIC REALM. AMBASSADOR SON REPLIED THAT VIETNAM ALWAYS ABIDED BY THIS PRINCIPLE.

7. COMMENT: SON WAS CORDIAL AND GENERALLY AVOIDED POLEMICS, SHOWING EMOTION ONLY WHEN HE MENTIONED VIETNAM'S NEED TO REBUILD. THE VIETNAMESE WERE APPARENTLY EAGER TO REESTABLISH CONTACT HERE AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL SINCE, IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER SUCH OCCASIONS, THEY
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DID NOT ASK IN ADVANCE FOR THE SUBJECT OF THE MEETING.
WE ASSUME THAT HE WILL PROVIDE A FORMAL RESPONSE TO
OUR DEMARCHE IN DUE COURSE AFTER HE HAS REPORTED TO
HANOI.

8. WE PLAN TO BRIEF FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI ON THE
MEETING.
DEAN
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POLAD FOR ADMIRAL LONG ONLY
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 03/08/02 (DEAN, JOHN G.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, MOPS, VM, US, XC
SUBJECT: VIETNAMESE REPLY TO U.S. DEMARCHE ON MILITARY
- ACTION
REF: BANGKOK 14229

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. ON MARCH 8 VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR SON PROVIDED A STANDARD SRV RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE (REFTEL) ON RECENT BORDER MILITARY ACTION. HANOI REAFFIRMED THAT VIETNAMESE FORCES IN CAMBODIA DO NOT RPT NOT THREATEN THAILAND AND REITERATED VIETNAMESE RESPECT FOR THAI INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. DRAWN FROM THE RECENT VIENTIANE COMMUNIQUE, THE VIETNAMESE POSITION ADDED ONLY ONE NEW ELEMENT, A WILLINGNESS TO "EXCHANGE VIEWS, IN A SPIRIT OF GOODWILL, WITH THE UNITED STATES ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN." END SUMMARY.

3. VIETNAMESE AMBASSADOR HOANG BAO SON, COUNSELOR LUU DOAN HUYNH AND INTERPRETER MRS. HOANG THI NINH CALLED ON AMBASSADOR MARCH 8 TO DELIVER HANOI'S VIEW THAT OUR DEMARCHE OF MARCH 3 EVIDENCED A MISTAKEN AMERICAN VIEW OF REGIONAL REALITIES. FSO CARNEY TOOK NOTES. AMBASSADOR SON'S PRESENTATION WAS LOW-KEY AND HIS MANNER PLEASANT. HE HANDLED THE DEMARCHE AS IF IT WERE A MATTER OF ROUTINE. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO KEEP THE FACT AND SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES OUT OF THE MEDIA AND PROMISED TO CONSULT IF THIS POLICY SHOULD CHANGE.

4. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SRV'S NON-PAPER:
BEGIN TEXT:

- THE CONTENTS OF THE MARCH 3, 1982 MESSAGE OF THE UNITED STATES IS NOT IN KEEPING WITH THE REAL SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA.
- THE CAUSE OF THE UNSTABLE SITUATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA LIES IN CHINA'S COLLUSION WITH THE UNITED STATES IN CARRYING OUT A HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA. WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE ACQUIESCENCE OF THAILAND, CHINA CONTINUES TO NURTURE AND GIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE POL POT REMNANTS WHO, FROM THAILAND'S TERRITORY, HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE TERRITORY OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA, THUS CREATING INSTABILITY ALONG THE THAI-KAMPUCHEAN BORDER.
- BY PLAYING THE CHINESE CARD AGAINST THE THREE

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COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA, THE UNITED STATES ONLY ENCOURAGES CHINA TO CAUSE CONFRONTATION BETWEEN INDOCHINA AND ASEAN, TO UNDERMINE THE TENDENCY FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THESE TWO GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, THUS SERVING THE EXPANSIONIST AND HEGEMONISTIC POLICY OF CHINA IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. THIS POLICY IS NOT ONLY HARMFUL TO THE THREE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA BUT IS ALSO DETRIMENTAL TO PEACE, STABILITY AND THE VERY INTERESTS OF THE USA IN THE REGION.

- VIETNAM HAS ON MANY OCCASIONS DECLARED ITS RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THAILAND AND ITS DESIRE TO PROMOTE GOOD - NEIGHBOURLY AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THAILAND FOR THE BENEFIT OF EACH COUNTRY AND FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. THE PRESENCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN KAMPUCHEA RESULTS FROM AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA AIMED AT DEALING WITH THE THREAT FROM CHINA. SUCH A PRESENCE IN NO WAY THREATENS THE SECURITY OF THAILAND. VIETNAM, KAMPUCHEA AND LAOS ARE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO UNILATERAL, BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL COMMITMENTS IN REGARD TO THE RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THAILAND.

- VIETNAM WELCOMES ANY INITIATIVE FROM WHATEVER QUARTERS AIMED AT CONTRIBUTING TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA AS WELL AS STABILIZING THE SITUATION ALONG THE KAMPUCHEAN-THAI BORDER ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES. IF THE UNITED STATES IS TRULY CONCERNED ABOUT PEACE AND STABILITY IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, IT SHOULD GIVE UP ITS POLICY OF COLLUSION WITH CHINA AGAINST THE THREE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA, ENCOURAGE THE TENDENCY FOR DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA, AND ENCOURAGE THE THAI GOVERNMENT, TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF

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POLAD FOR ADMIRAL LONG ONLY
KAMPUCHEA, AND BY THE THREE COUNTRIES OF INDOCHINA AS
CLEARLY STATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE OF THE THREE FOREIGN
MINISTERS OF VIETNAM, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA ON FEBRUARY 17,
1982.

- VIETNAM IS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS, IN A SPIRIT
OF GOODWILL, WITH THE UNITED STATES ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL
CONCERN. END TEXT.

5. COMMENT: THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT AMONG THE BOILERPLATE
IS AN EXPRESSION OF WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH THE U.S. TO
DISCUSS MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

6. THE AMBASSADOR SAW FOREIGN MINISTER SITTHI LATER
THE SAME DAY AND BRIEFED HIM ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THESE
EXCHANGES.
DEAN
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FOR AMBASSADOR ARMACOST
E.O. 12065: RDS-1-3/5/02 (O'DONOHUE, DANIEL A.)
TAGS: PEPR, PM, VM, US
SUBJECT: USG VIETNAM/KAMPUCHEA POLICY: TALKING POINTS
FOR USE WIT; GOP OFFICIALS

REF: A. STATE 53434, B. STATE 50920

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOLLOWING ARE CURRENT TALKING POINTS ON OUR VIETNAM/
KAMPUCHEA POLICY FOR YOUR USE, AS APPROPRIATE, IN YOUR
DISCUSSIONS WITH GOP OFFICIALS: (REFTELS CONTAIN ADDI-
TIONAL POINTS ON "INDOCHINA FORMINS' MTG" AND ARMITAGE
MISSION TO HANOI.)

-- HE CONTINUED VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA IS THE
MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA--THREATENING
OUR ASEAN FRIENDS, SHARPENING SINO-VIETNAMESE TENSIONS TO
THE POINT OF WAR, AND ALLOWING THE SOVIETS TO BARTER THEIR
SUPPORT FOR HANOI INTO ACCESS TO AIR AND NAVAL BASES IN
VIETNAM.

--OUR SOUTHEAST ASIA POLICY IS ROOTED IN SUPPORT FOR ASEAN,
WHICH HAS THE LEAD IN DEALING WITH THE KAMPUCHEA PROBLEM.

--WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH ASEAN AND OTHER FRIENDS TO
SUSTAIN PRES-
SURES ON VIETNAM TO INDUCE HANOI TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES
FROM KAMPUCHEA AND NEGOTIATE A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH
RESTORES KHMER INDEPENDENCE.

--WE ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN EFFORTS TO FORM A
COALITION, BUT BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED NEGOTIATIONS AMONG
GROUPS RESISTING THE VIETNAMESE ARE DESIRABLE. OBVIOUSLY
FORMATION OF A COALITION WOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN THE DK
SEAT IN THE UN AND HELP MAINTAIN EUROPEAN AND OTHER
SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGY.

--E HAVE NO IMPLACABLE HOSTILITY TOWARD HANOI; WE WOULD
PREFER A CONSTRUCTIVE COURSE IN THE REGION, AS WOULD ASEAN.
HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE, WITH ASEAN, THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE ONLY
IF VIETNAM CHANGES ITS POLICIES AND AGREES TO WITHDRAW ITS
FORCES FROM KAMPUCHEA AND NEGOTIATE A COMPREHENSIVE POLIT-
ICAL SETTLEMENT ON THE LINES OUTLINED IN THE ASEAN-
SPONSORED UNGA RESOLUTIONS AND THE DECLARATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KAMPUCHEA.

--HANOI'S DIPLOMATIC ISOLATION IN THE UN, INABILITY TO
MEET ITS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS, AND ECONOMIC
DIFFICULTIES AT HOME, INDICATE THAT THE ASEAN/WESTERN
STRATEGY IS HAVING A SERIOUS IMPACT. ANY LESSENING OF THE
PRESSURE ON VIETNAM AT THIS POINT WOULD ONLY ENCOURAGE
VIETNAM TO PROLONG ITS OCCUPATION OF KAMPUCHEA AND THUS
PERPETUATE REGIONAL INSTABILITY.

--HE UNITED STATES WILL NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH
VIETNAM AS LONG AS VIETNAM CONTINUES TO OCCUPY KAMPUCHEA.

--DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
SRV WE DO DISCUSS WITH THE VIETNAMESE HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
SUCH AS THE ORDERLY DEPARTURE PROGRAM AND ACCOUNTING FOR
AMERICANS MISSING IN ACTION IN THE VIETNAM WAR.

--SENDING THE POW/MIA MISSION LED BY DASD ARMITAGE TO
HANOI, FEBRUARY 23-24 DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE IN OUR
POLICY AND SHOULD NOT BE INTERPRETED AS ANY LESSENING OF
USG SUPPORT FOR CONTINUED PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY TO RESOLVE THE KAMPUCHEAN SITUATION. THE MANDATE
OF THE MISSION WAS STRICTLY LIMITED TO POW/MIA MATTERS.

--THE VIETNAMESE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE VERY LIMITED
PROPOSALS OUR TEAM MADE FOR CONTINUING TECHNICAL DISCUS-
SIONS BETWEEN OUR SPECIALISTS ON POW/MIA MATTERS. THEIR
AGREEMENT MAY REFLECT A DESIRE NOT TO APPEAR TOTALLY IN-
TRANSIGENT ON MIA ACCOUNTING, BUT IT DID SERVE TO REFUTE
EARLIER INDICATIONS THAT THE SRV WOULD NO LONGER DEAL WITH
THE USG ON POW/MIA MATTERS.

--THE VIETNAMESE REAFFIRMED THE POSITION THAT THEY HOLD
NO LIVE AMERICAN POWS.

--THE TALKS WERE LARGELY NON-POLEMICAL AND SERIOUS. THE
VIETNAMESE SOUNDED A CONCILIATORY NOTE TOWARD THAILAND.

--THE TALKS WERE USEFUL TO US IN IMPRESSING UPON THE SRV
THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING TO RESOLVE THE MIA ISSUE.

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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 02/27/02 (DEAN, JOHN GUNTHER) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, OVIP (ARMITAGE, RICHARD), ASEAN, VM, CB, TH
SUBJ: DASD ARMITAGE MEETING WITH THAI NSC SEC GEN
- PRASONG

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DASD ARMITAGE, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM, HAD A PARTICULARLY CORDIAL HALF HOUR MEETING WITH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SEC GEN PRASONG SUNSIRI ON 25 FEBRUARY. ARMITAGE BRIEFLY DESCRIBED THE RESULTS AND ATMOSPHERICS OF HIS HANOI VISIT. WHILE THE SRV LEADERSHIP HAD COMMENTED ALMOST RITUALLY THAT CHINESE/THAI COOPERATION COULD NOT SUCCEED IN BLEEDING VIETNAM WHITE, HE SAID, THEY HAD SPENT MORE TIME EMPHASIZING VIETNAM'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS TOWARD THAILAND. PRASONG COMMENTED THAT THEY APPEARED TO BE SAYING NOTHING NEW ALONG THIS LINE. HE ASKED ABOUT OTHER TOPICS THE VIETNAMESE HAD RAISED, AND MR. ARMITAGE REPLIED THAT THE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN VERY NARROWLY FOCUSED ON THE POW/MIA QUESTION.

3. PRASONG THEN OUTLINED HIS OWN VIEWS ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY SITUATION. HE SAID VIETNAM ALONE HAS NO MEANING; CHINA CAN DEAL WITH IT AT ANY TIME. THE REAL THREAT IS THE SOVIET UNION, AND IN THE LONG RUN THE SOVIETS MAY TAKE CONTROL NOT ONLY OF INDOCHINA BUT OF ALL SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE SAID HE CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE SUPERPOWERS DON'T TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE EXPANDING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, THERE IS NO KAMPUCHEAN NAVY, AND YET THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING A MAJOR NAVAL PORT AT REAM NEAR KAMPONG SOM. THE US MUST THINK ABOUT THE SOVIET DIMENSION IF AND WHEN IT DECIDES TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE SRV.

4. SECONDLY, PRASONG WENT ON, HE IS CONCERNED THAT VIETNAM MAY INITIATE A MAJOR BORDER INCURSION FROM

KAMPUCHEA INTO THAILAND. VIETNAM MAY WANT TO FOCUS THE WORLD'S ATTENTION ON A CONFLICT BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THAILAND IN ORDER TO MAKE IT FORGET THAT VIETNAM HAS INVADDED AND OCCUPIED KAMPUCHEA. VIETNAM WANTS TO CONVINCE THE ASEAN STATES THAT THE REAL CONFLICT IS BETWEEN THAILAND AND VIETNAM. PRASONG ADDED THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE WAY THE THAI FOREIGN MINISTRY "SHOUTS" ABOUT VIETNAMESE INCURSIONS, SINCE THIS APPROACH MERELY SERVES THE SRV'S PURPOSES. THE MINISTRY SHOULD CERTAINLY COMPLAIN TO THE UN, HE SAID, BUT IT SHOULD NOT BE SO LOUD ABOUT IT PUBLICLY. COMMENT: SUPREME COMMAND HAS BEEN THE MOST VOCAL PROTESTOR OF VIETNAMESE BORDER INCIDENTS, ALTHOUGH MFA HAS PERIODICALLY "SHOUTED" LOUDLY AS WELL. END COMMENT.

5. ARMITAGE SAID IT APPEARED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE ENGAGING IN A "SECOND PEACE OFFENSIVE" TOWARD ASEAN. THE FIRST ONE IN EARLY 1980 WAS OBVIOUSLY INTENDED TO SPLIT ASEAN. THE JUNE 1980 INCURSION, HOWEVER, DESTROYED ITS EFFECT AND HAD REUNITED ASEAN. ARMITAGE ASKED PRASONG IF HE THOUGHT VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS WERE STILL TO SPLIT ASEAN. PRASONG REPLIED THAT HE FELT THE VIETNAMESE GOAL NOW IS TO EXACERBATE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THAILAND, AND FOR THAT REASON A MAJOR PAVN INCURSION INTO THAILAND IS POSSIBLE. THEY MAY WANT TO USE THE VIENTIANE OR HO CHI MINH CITY (INDOCHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER) DECLARATIONS. YET THEY CANNOT, HE SAID, RESOLVE THE KAMPUCHEAN PROBLEM WITHOUT INCLUDING THE PRC. ALL CONCERNED PARTIES SHOULD SIT DOWN AND TALK: ASEAN, THE INDOCHINA STATES, THE PRC AND THE SOVIETS. ALL THESE PARTIES MUST AGREE TO A SOLUTION IF IT IS TO BE A LASTING ONE.

6. PRASONG CONTENDED THAT THE ONLY WAY TO RESOLVE THE INDOCHINA SITUATION IS TO SEPARATE THE VIETNAMESE AND THE SOVIETS. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE VIETNAMESE TO STAND APART FROM THE SOVIETS, AND IF THEY REFUSE WE SHOULD LET THEM SUFFER. IF VIETNAM RECEIVES NO ASSISTANCE EXCEPT FROM THE SOVIET BLOC, CONFLICTS WILL INEVITABLY EXPAND. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEM BY ISOLATING VIETNAM UNTIL IT VOLUNTARILY MOVES AWAY FROM THE BT

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SOVIETS. ARMITAGE SAID HE AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH.
IN ALL OF VIETNAM'S HISTORY, HE NOTED, NO NATION HAD
EVER HAD A SUCCESSFUL LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE VIETNAMESE.

7. PRASONG ASKED ARMITAGE WHAT HE THOUGHT OF THE
EFFORTS TO FORM A COALITION OF KAMPUCHEAN ANTI-
VIETNAMESE RESISTANCE GROUPS. ARMITAGE REPLIED THAT HE
THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR ASEAN NOT TO LOSE
THE APPEARANCE OF CONTINUED PROGRESS IN FORMING A
COALITION, AND THAT AT THE MOMENT THE SUBSTANCE IS
NOT AS IMPORTANT AS THE APPEARANCE. HE ADDED THAT
SON SANN HAD MADE A GOOD IMPRESSION WHEN HE VISITED
THE UNITED STATES. PRASONG SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HELP SON
SANN IN THE LONG RUN, BUT IF HE IS HELPED TOO SOON HE
MIGHT FIGHT THE KHMER ROUGE AND THEREBY WORSEN THE
COALITION SITUATION. IN ORDER TO RETAIN THE DK
SEAT IN THE UN IT IS NECESSARY TO KEEP ALL
OF THE GROUPS ALIVE, BUT WE MUST NOT SUPPORT THEM TO
THE EXTENT THAT THEY CAN FIGHT AMONG THEMSELVES. THAT
KIND OF SUPPORT, HE CONCLUDED, WOULD BE TO VIETNAM'S
ADVANTAGE. MR. ARMITAGE SAID HE DEEPLY APPRECIATED
PRASONG'S VERY THOUGHTFUL OPINIONS AND WOULD TAKE
CLOSE NOTE OF WHAT HE HAD SAID.
DEAN
BT

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