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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	8 pp. D, 6/16/00 NLSF95-001/1 #96	2/19/82	P1
2. report	p. 3 only of a report (1 pp.) R 5/22/99 NLSF 95-001 #97	n.d.	P1
3. report	p. 2 only of a report (1 pp.) P 1/24/99 NLSF95-001 #98	n.d.	P1
4. report	p. 2 only of a report (1 pp.) R 5/22/99 NLSF 95-001 #99	n.d.	P1
5. cable	190802Z Jan 82 (1 pp.) P 5/22/99 NLSF 95-001 #100	1/19/82	P1
6. cable	5 pp. D, 6/16/00 NLSF95-001/1 #101	1/25/82	P1
7. report	p. 4 only of a report (1 pp.) P, 6/16/00 NLSF95-001/1 #102	n.d.	P1
8. cable	182100Z Jan 82 (1 pp.) D 1/24/99 NLSF95-001 #103	1/18/82	P1
9. cable	10 pp. D, 6/16/00 NLSF95-001/1 #104	12/29/81	P1
10. issue paper	1 pp.	n.d.	P1 P5
11. issue paper	copy of #10. (1 pp.)	n.d.	P1 P5 <i>PS</i>
12. report	4 pp. R, 7/30/99 NLSF99-059 #4	n.d.	P1 P5 <i>F99-059 CAS 7/16/99</i>
13. report	3 pp. from a report R 5/22/99 NLSF 95-001 #105	n.d.	P1
14. cable	251023Z Nov 81 (3 pp.) P 5/22/99 NLSF 95-001 #106	11/25/81	P1 P6
COLLECTION: Childress, Richard: Files			CAS
FILE FOLDER: Vietnam - May 1980 - 1982 [4 of 4] Box 92402			6/20/96

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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272-0338
SEA - Center of Mil
History.

Military Strength Trends in Vietnam Prior to 1965

Aug 1950-Oct 1950. MAAG Indochina established with authorized strength of 65 personnel. All in Saigon, but were responsible for Laos and Cambodia as well.

Jan 1951. MAAG Indochina authorized 128 spaces.

July 1954. MAAG Indochina authorized 342 spaces.

Oct 1955. MAAG Vietnam established focusing solely on Vietnam.

Apr 12, 1956. PD approved authorizing MAAG Vietnam 342 spaces. In addition, 350 spaces authorized for a Temporary Equipment Team in country, plus 48 "transit spaces". Total of 740 spaces under MAAG.

Apr 19, 1960. Authorized strength of 685. (Should not be interpreted as a reduction, but effort to satisfy the International Control Commission.)

Spring 1961. MAAG Vietnam authorized 785 spaces and first contingent of 400 Special Forces (SF) arrived for total of 1185 spaces. SF under control of CIA until mid-1963.)

Dec 1961. Decision to ignore Geneva limits, MAAG Vietnam authorized 3200 spaces.

Feb 1962. MACV established - MAAG subordinated.

Dec 1962. Authorized 9000 spaces.

Nov 1963. Authorized 16000 spaces.

May 1964. MAAG disestablished. All advisors under direct control of MACV.

End December 1964. Authorized 23000 spaces.

Mar 8, 1965. Two Marine Battalion Landing Teams deployed to Da Nang. (First commitment of ground combat forces.)

Recapitulation

October 1950	--	65
January 1951	--	128
July 1954	--	342
April 1956	--	740
April 1960	--	685
April 1961	--	1185
December 1961	--	3200
December 1962	--	9000
November 1963	--	16000
End December 1964	--	23000
March 1965	--	First First Grand Combat Unit arrives.

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AUTHORIZED MILITARY STRENGTH IN VIETNAM PRIOR TO 1965

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JAN 1951	-	MAAG Indochina	-	128 spaces
JUL 1954	-	MAAG Indochina	-	342 spaces
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APR 1956	-	MAAG Vietnam	-	740
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	-	Special Forces	-	400
				<hr/>
		TOTAL		1185

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9
File
Viet Nam

2. JAPAN: WATCHING VIETNAM FROM A DISTANCE

Despite its support for ASEAN's efforts against Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea, Japan is attempting to keep its lines open to Hanoi. Japanese officials hope to quell domestic demands that Japan make a positive gesture toward Vietnam and to establish a policy that is somewhat independent of the US and ASEAN positions. Tokyo is not likely, however, to shift its stance significantly in the short run.

* * *

When Vietnam invaded Kampuchea, Japan abandoned its earlier attempt to pursue a balanced policy toward Vietnam and ASEAN, condemned the invasion, and froze all economic assistance to Vietnam. The Japanese hoped that this would convince the ASEAN countries that Tokyo was sincere about improving relations with them. Tokyo also regarded its backing of ASEAN's effort to bring Vietnam to an international conference on Kampuchea as important.

The Japanese have recently concluded, however, that the situation is at an impasse because of Vietnam's intransigence, China's determination to back the Kampuchean resistance, and divisions within ASEAN itself. The Japanese argue that the deterioration in Vietnam's economy has not caused Hanoi to soften its foreign policy or to compromise on Kampuchea. They believe that measures aimed at punishing Vietnam economically and politically will only push Vietnam more firmly into the Soviet camp.

Tokyo apparently has now decided that a dialogue with Hanoi, a rescheduling of Vietnamese debt payments, and the provision of humanitarian aid might induce Hanoi to soften its hard-line stand. During a visit to Japan last fall by a Vietnamese parliamentary delegation, a Diet group chaired by Yoshio Sakurachi (who has since become Foreign Minister) advocated resuming Japanese aid to Vietnam. Subsequently, Japan decided to grant about \$130,000 worth of medical supplies to a hospital in Ho Chi Minh City.

Tokyo has since withheld the hospital aid because of international criticism, but probably will soon go ahead to satisfy Japanese domestic demands that Tokyo be more evenhanded. Tokyo is unlikely, however, to resume official aid to Vietnam until both ASEAN and the US indicate that they have no objections to such a move.

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File
Viet Nam

2. SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM UNDER REVIEW

The Soviets may have been reviewing their military assistance and the nature of their security relationship with Vietnam since last summer. Since the Chinese invasion of 1979, the USSR has provided Vietnam with huge amounts of military materiel, including many types of weapons more advanced than Vietnam previously had. But supplies, though still substantial, have been decreasing for the last three years, despite the continuing war in Kampuchea.

* * *

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

We do not expect any dramatic change in the level of military assistance to result from Marshal Ogarkov's recent visit, although the number of Soviet training and logistics specialists in Vietnam could increase if Hanoi were willing.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

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By Smf NARA, Date 1/26/99

*File
Vietnam*3. VIETNAM: LE DUAN RUMORED ILL AS SIGNS OF PARTY DISCORD MOUNT

The Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) is scheduled to meet "around" March. Evidence of disarray and disagreement has characterized preparations for the session. There are now reports that Le Duan, absent from public view since December 22, has been hospitalized. Recent Soviet behavior suggests that Moscow may be aware of some problem in the Hanoi leadership.

* * *

Preparations for the Fifth VCP Congress--postponed from early November to March--contrast sharply with the orderly activities preceding the last congress in December 1976. Lower level congresses have been held, and media reports tell of "heated debate" and of "hundreds of thousands" of policy recommendations to be forwarded to the Central Committee. This unprecedented impression of widespread disagreement may be a deliberate effort to provide a safety valve for discontent.

Official reports of the pre-Congress meetings virtually ignore foreign policy issues. There is no mention of relations with the USSR and Soviet concern on this score is reflected by a recent Moscow broadcast to Vietnam. Other sources suggest that aspects of Hanoi's dependence on Moscow may be at issue, and Hanoi may have decided that, unlike domestic policy, the subject is too sensitive to air.

The necessity of selecting a new Central Committee and Politburo for the forthcoming Congress undoubtedly has raised the difficult problem of promoting potential successors to the aging leadership. The succession process would be further complicated if Le Duan is seriously ill. The most recent photos of Le Duan and his failure, for the first time in a decade, to make the customary Tet visits to the countryside add weight to reports of his illness.

Domestic controversy revolves most clearly around internal economic policies--generally over the "pragmatic" course closely identified with Le Duan. Opponents apparently claim that these measures encourage individualism to the detriment of socialization and future production goals. It is difficult to identify the opposition, but speculation has focussed on Truong Chinh--ranking second behind Le Duan and long considered the party's leading conservative. Thus far, those favoring Le Duan's approach appear to have the upper hand or at least control of the media. It may not auger well for the future of his policies, however, if Le Duan has been unable to attend the final preparatory plenum.

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- 2 -

*File
Vietnam*

2. SOVIET-VIETNAMESE STRAINS: OGARKOV TO THE RESCUE

There is mounting evidence of strains in relations between the USSR and Vietnam. Perhaps because they are sensitive to differences within the Vietnamese leadership about the country's heavy dependence on Moscow, the Soviets are carefully hedging their bets on competing Vietnamese leaders. Moscow has also recently expressed forceful backing for Hanoi's military effort in Kampuchea. Chief of Staff Ogarkov's recent visit to Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos further dramatizes that support--for the benefit of China and Thailand, as well as Vietnam.

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A Soviet foreign ministry expert on Southeast Asia recently expressed to an Indian diplomat his surprise over Hanoi's sudden ouster of Kampuchean Party First Secretary Pen Sovan, a move he attributed to Vietnamese suspicion that Sovan harbored pro-Soviet sympathies. The official bemoaned Vietnamese selfishness and stubbornness--a view he claimed was shared by some top Soviet leaders--but concluded that Moscow would probably have to accept the present state of affairs unless it could influence developments inside Vietnam.

Moscow's perennial difficulties with Hanoi are currently compounded by divisions within the Vietnamese leadership that have surfaced during efforts to reach a consensus before the Fifth Vietnamese Party Congress, now scheduled for March. The primary focus of intra-Vietnamese disagreements is domestic, but there is some evidence that certain party officials are questioning Le Duan's policy of heavy dependence on the USSR to counter the Chinese. This may help explain why Moscow recently conferred identical Orders of Lenin on both its established ally, First Secretary Le Duan, and on the lower-ranking Truong Chinh, who is Le Duan's likeliest challenger.

Moscow has in any case redoubled its demonstrations of loyalty to the Vietnamese alliance. The chairman of the Vietnamese state planning organization was in Moscow in late January to discuss "further economic cooperation." Soviet media are now giving more prominence to the USSR's extensive military aid to Vietnam. Moscow has also strongly reiterated its endorsement of the Vietnamese military effort in Kampuchea, highlighting Kampuchean statements that defense was that country's first priority. The visit earlier this month of Marshal Ogarkov, the highest-ranking Soviet military officer to visit Vietnam since 1974, underscores Soviet backing for Vietnam's Kampuchean venture.

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Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01
ACTION EA-12

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INFO	OCT-00	ADS-00	INR-10	SS-10	CIAE-00	DODE-00	H-01
	<u>NSC-05</u>	NSAE-00	HA-06	L-03	PM-09	PA-01	ICAE-00
	SP-02	SPRS-02	/061 W				

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9089
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

File
Vietnam

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIJING 00633

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 - 01/08/02 (TAYLOR, JOHN J.) OR-P
TAGS: VN, PEPR, CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE MFA OFFICIAL DISCUSSES LE DUC THO

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OVER RECENT LUNCH WITH EMBOFF, MFA [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] SAID THAT POLITBURO MEMBER LE DUC THO
IS PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN'S "RIGHT HAND MAN." ACCORDING
TO [REDACTED] LE HEADS AN OFFICE WITHIN THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST
PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHICH CONTAINS THREE SECTIONS
CHARGED WITH OVERSEEING IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICIES IN
KAMPUCHEA, LAOS, AND SOUTH VIETNAM. ASKED WHY AN OFFICE
WAS NEEDED FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, [REDACTED] GRINNED AND STATED
THAT CAPITALISM HAS NOT BEEN ELIMINATED IN THE SOUTH. [REDACTED]
STATED THAT LE IS ALSO OVERSEEING PERSONNEL AFFAIRS WITHIN
THE PARTY AND IS THEREFORE IN A POWERFUL POSITION WITH
RESPECT TO APPOINTMENTS AND TRANSFERS.

3. [REDACTED] ALSO MENTIONED THAT GENERAL VAN TIEN DUNG SPENDS
A GOOD DEAL OF TIME IN THE SOUTH AND IN KAMPUCHEA,
PERSONALLY SUPERVISING OPERATIONS IN KAMPUCHEA.
HUMMEL

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By [Signature], NARA, Date 5/28/99

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4. VIETNAM: STRESSING SELF-RELIANCE DESPITE LIMITED
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Vietnam's official economic report for 1981 indicates fair improvement in agriculture--the food target of 15 million metric tons (mmt) was reached--but below-target advances in industry and exports. No significant improvement in 1982 is expected. The report's stress on self-reliance reflects Hanoi's dismay over the quantity of Soviet aid as well as resistance to Moscow's efforts to exercise greater supervision over the use of its aid by placing advisers in key economic ministries.

* * *

Although localized shortages persisted, the food situation eased slightly. Rising output in the north boosted overall food production by 4 percent. The increase was spurred by production incentives and good weather, conditions also needed to meet the 1982 target of 16 mmt. The report's surprising neglect of the recent decision to push collectivization in the Mekong delta suggests contention over the issue or at least some awareness that changes in this key area could sabotage potential gains in 1982.

Industrial output rose 2.3 percent after an 11 percent decline in 1980, and is slated for a 5 percent increase in 1982. Continuing poor management and shortages of energy, raw materials, and foreign exchange make attainment of the 5 percent unlikely.

Progress has been particularly disappointing in the energy sector. Vietnam has claimed that it will sink its first offshore oil well (with Soviet assistance) in 1982 and start exporting next year. So far, however, no wells drilled by Western companies have proved.

[REDACTED]

Exports grew substantially last year, but not enough to meet Hanoi's hard currency requirements. As a result, Vietnam missed payments on over \$300 million worth of Japanese contracts and loans, and cancelled all new contracts with Japan. France's \$37 million credit package will support some increases in imports in 1982, but prospects for trade and developmental aid from other Western countries show no signs of improving.

Vietnam's debt to the Soviet bloc and declining terms of trade require steady increases in exports which cannot but affect exports for hard currencies. To fulfill all its debt-service obligations, Hanoi has called for an incredibly high 45 percent increase in total exports in 1982.

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A DIPLOMATIC CHALLENGE AND OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN

The Vietnamese occupation of Kamphuchea, attempts by ASEAN and China to cope with it, Soviet support of the Vietnamese, Chinese/Thai support for the ousted regime of Democratic Kamphuchea (DK), and the abject fear and loathing with which the Khmer people regard the DK present a formidable challenge to American diplomacy.

The geopolitical challenge is to contribute to a resolution of the Kamphuchean question in such a manner as to reduce Soviet opportunities for expanded influence in Vietnam/Southeast Asia in tandem with reduction of the Vietnamese military presence in Kamphuchea while maintaining ASEAN unity and sound US-ASEAN and US-China relations. The moral challenge is to ensure that the US contribution be as consistent as feasible with American values. Such flagrant affronts to American humanitarian and religious values as provision of political support to the Khmer Rouge (DK), e.g., by voting to reseat the DK in the UN, not only undercut efforts by non-DK patriots to organize resistance to the Vietnamese, but may undermine the belief by both Americans and non-Americans that the United States represents something special in moral terms. The failure of current US policy to grapple effectively with either the geopolitical or the moral challenge demands a new departure by President Reagan marked by both greater sophistication with enhanced prospects of preserving significant US interests and increased adherence to America's traditional role as a moral beacon. (The pragmatic aspect of the latter is apparent when one contemplates the historical fate of nations which lose faith in the traditions and myths which constitute the moral fiber of a political culture).

Current US policy concerning the Vietnamese occupation of Kamphuchea is essentially acquiescence in China's strategy to force Vietnam out of Kamphuchea by bleeding Vietnam through the mechanism of providing logistical support for the DK through Thailand. The US actively supports the land bridge of humanitarian food deliveries which also provides a cover for support to the DK. Another main feature of US policy is support for Thailand in particular and ASEAN in general through active humanitarian relief, refugee relief, and security assistance programs. In fact, denials to the contrary, the US has been fairly activist in its efforts to dissuade ASEAN countries from seeking accommodation with Vietnam or accepting Vietnamese control over Kamphuchea. Such activism has been "necessary" because some countries, e.g., Indonesia and Malaysia, apparently perceive China as a greater long range threat than Vietnam or the USSR. They have at times appeared willing to accept Vietnam's control of Kamphuchea in the context of a formula that would limit both Chinese and Soviet influence in the region.

Notwithstanding some benefits derived from current US policy, e.g., enhanced relations with China, the current approach has little hope of achieving either of two significant common goals: Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Kamphuchea, limitation of increasing Soviet military access to Vietnamese facilities. The principle factors militating against achievement of these objectives through a political settlement are: Chinese/DK/ASEAN/US inability to defeat the Soviet supported Vietnamese militarily or to force them to relinquish political control over Kamphuchea; ASEAN, Chinese and US actions and rhetoric provide incentive for the Vietnamese to fight on at any cost (including greater dependence on the USSR), and no real incentive is provided to cease fighting; and finally, focus on the unattainable objective of Khmer self-determination tends to negate efforts to bring about Vietnamese troop withdrawal and limit Soviet influence in Vietnam.

There is little evidence to indicate that protracted bleeding of Vietnam in Kamphuchea will drive the Vietnamese out. Notwithstanding popular disenchantment with the Hanoi regime and economic privation, analysts who believe that the Vietnamese will cave in if the pressure is sustained, tend to place inordinate focus on urban privation and the views of people fleeing Vietnam. They tend to ignore the many factors that contribute to Vietnamese resiliency, e.g., the preponderance of rural people who are by design better off than their urban cousins. Moreover, a safety valve exists for the regime in that those who become too desperate tend to plot escape or immigration rather than revolution. The perceived threat from China is a unifying factor as well as a source of disenchantment. The efficacy of population controls cannot be discounted in a Communist police state. There is no evidence that the Soviets are going to reduce support for Vietnam to the point of incapacitating their first effective client in Southeast Asia. China can hardly risk the military destruction of a Soviet treaty partner. The lesson administered by Beijing to Vietnam failed to dissuade the Vietnamese from what they see as defense of vital security interests in Kamphuchea and it resulted in SRV acquisition of more sophisticated Soviet hardware.

US behavior (e.g., breaking off normalization talks preceding normalization with China, voting for retention of Khmer Rouge credentials in the UN while calling for Vietnamese troop withdrawal while failing to address neutralization of the Khmer Rouge), leaves the Vietnamese little reason to believe US assurances that USG opposes a return of the Pol Pot government or that USG seeks a political settlement in Kamphuchea that will respect the legitimate security concerns of all concerned to include Vietnam. Whether or not the US colluded with China as the SRV accuses, the US has joined the Chinese/ASEAN chorus calling for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kamphuchea and a UN supervised election. These demands are embodied in an ASEAN sponsored UN resolution which fails to address the practical, overriding problem of how to protect the Khmer people from the genocidal Khmer Rouge (DK forces). The practical effect of implementing this resolution with its proscription of all foreign intervention in Kamphuchean affairs, and its failure to establish an international army to disarm the Khmer Rouge would be to deliver the Khmer people back into the clutches of their Khmer Rouge assassins and torturers. This point has been made by Sihanouk (TAB A) and other Khmer patriots who yearn to see their country free of the Vietnamese if a way can be found in which the Khmer Rouge play no role. US officials when queried on the problem of the Khmer Rouge have replied that this is a detail that must be worked out within an international conference that should be convened to implement the UN resolution. However, there is little reason for the Vietnamese or anyone else to believe that an international conference can find the solution to neutralization of the Khmer Rouge since to date no plan or even a concept to defang the Khmer Rouge has ever been espoused by the US, ASEAN or China. More fundamentally, the Vietnamese have no basis on which to believe that the US, ASEAN or China have any intent to address the threat that a China supported Khmer Rouge poses to Vietnam and to the survival of the Khmer people. Thus, it is unlikely that the Vietnamese will participate in any formula which they believe (with reason) would permit the return of the Khmer Rouge. In any event, many analysts recognize that no settlement is possible without the disappearance of the Khmer Rouge and a pragmatic response to Vietnam's effective predominance in the area (TAB B - The Third Indochina War, Foreign Affairs, April, 1980, Turley & Race).

Given the slender probability that the UN will sponsor an international army to serve as a fence between Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge forces, it seems more realistic for the Chinese and the Thais to cut off supplies to the Khmer Rouge and deny them safe havens in return for withdrawal of all or most of the Vietnamese forces from Kamphuchea. Hanoi would probably agree to such a trade-off since they will

believe that greatly reduced Vietnamese forces or perhaps Republic of Kamphuchea (PRK or Heng Samrin) forces can cope with an isolated Khmer Rouge force. Moreover, the Vietnamese will believe that they can maintain political control through the many "advisors" they maintain in PRK ministries. Time phasing and modalities will of course have to be worked out.

To work out such a formula would require a US effort to bring China, Vietnam, ASEAN countries and other concerned parties together to realize some common interests through a pragmatic agreement. With so many conflicting interests, finding the common ground is difficult, but some interests that pertain to various parties may be: Vietnam's desire to limit its dependence on the Soviet Union and reduce costs in Kamphuchea; Chinese desire to reduce Soviet influence in Vietnam and stabilize the region so as to facilitate its development plans; Soviet need to cut costs in its support of Vietnam and enhance its relations with ASEAN; ASEAN interest in limiting super power involvement in the region; and US interests in avoiding an escalating conflict that could result in being forced to choose between a politically unacceptable level of involvement in Southeast Asia or abandoning (once again) an ally (Thailand).

Furthermore, the US has good reason to pursue its own bilateral interests at some distance from those of China's while proceeding cautiously to maintain or enhance US-China relations. The US should expect that a modernized China will be increasingly assertive in pursuit of its own interests. China's goal is to achieve sufficient strength to permit her to pursue policies independent of either the US or the USSR, or at least to be able to pursue specific objectives with one or the other. After acquisition of sufficient strength, China is likely to seek a number of accommodations with the USSR, some at the expense of the United States. As one analyst put it: the trick is to use China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the near-term, but avoid sacrifice of our interests and/or our allies into the future. Thus, the US should not hold its bilateral relations with Vietnam or ASEAN countries hostage to an inordinate concern for Beijing's sensitivities. Despite the fears of some, the PRC would certainly not sacrifice the strategic benefits of the US linkage for the inheritors of Pol Pot. Similar imperatives brought about US-PRC normalization at Taiwan's expense. As Doctor Nguyen Manh Hung, in his article The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict: Power Play Among Communist Neighbors writing in Asian Survey, November 1979, framed part of the problem: "If Vietnam becomes completely dependent on the USSR, the Sino-Soviet conflict will spread into Southeast Asia with unforeseeable consequences for the whole region. Multipolarity is better for Southeast Asia than a rigid power alignment between the Soviet Union, the Indochinese states, and possibly India on the one hand through a series of 25-year friendship treaties, and China, Japan, and possibly the United States on the other." Professor Hung observes that Vietnam as a client of the Soviet Union would serve no one's interest, except that of the USSR. Moreover, should Vietnam be forced into such a client status, this unhappy result would be a function of Chinese policy and American timidity as much as by any choice of the Hanoi leadership.

One of the most adverse effects on US interests of protracted pursuit of the current US approach of manipulating/pressuring ASEAN into a pro-China anti-Vietnam stance on Kamphuchea will be serious splits within ASEAN as different countries pursue their own interests as they perceive them. As Soviet/Vietnamese endurance becomes more apparent, and some countries feel increased concern about China's long range intentions vis-a-vis Chinese minorities (now causing problems in Indonesia), some will no longer be willing to follow the lead of China, the US, or Singapore. Hanoi understands this very well and is one of the reasons that the Vietnamese feel (correctly) that time is on their side. The very fact that so much US activism has been necessary to keep ASEAN "in line" bodes ill for the efficacy of the policy. The Vietnamese in Kamphuchea are not acting inconsistently with their culture, history or situation. Their policy appears to have been made

in Hanoi, not in Moscow, although supported by the latter. The Thai current hardline, by contrast, is atypical of their historical behavior, and of dubious necessity given their situation. It has a made in Beijing and serviced in Washington flavor and is unlikely to survive inordinate stress such as will ensue from a protracted conflict. It is important to remember that not only Vietnam but Thailand was a victim of the brutal attacks by the DK along their eastern border -- thus their "support" of the DK is hardly enduring.

A pragmatic settlement based on shared interests among diverse parties to the conflict requires positive incentives for Vietnam, e.g., genuine recognition of Vietnam's security interests in Kamphuchea, normalization of relations with the US, improved relations with China (including cessation of support for the Khmer Rouge and a troop pull back from the Sino-Vietnamese border); and the prospect for improved economic relations with noncommunist countries, especially Japan and ASEAN.

Much of the official USG rhetoric (in-house) is subjective in its anti-Vietnamese bias to the point that it appears to be more self deception than a conscious attempt at psychological operations aimed at any specific target audience. For example, many officials seem to believe (against overwhelming evidence to the contrary) that Vietnamese tanks rolled into Phnom Penh in December 1978 primarily to realize Ho Chi Minh's dream of an Indochinese federation. It was in fact a belated, defensive response to escalating Khmer Rouge operations against Vietnam. This is not to say that Vietnam's effort has not become a colonialist adventure and that Hanoi does not now seek to speed up the formation of a federation or some kind of dominant relationship. Strong evidence (Vietnamese post-war behavior - TAB C) suggests that Hanoi's priorities after the war were consolidation of the Communist police state, economic development (the Wall Street Journal printed the liberal, by Communist standards, investment code published soon after the war); and establishment of diplomatic relations with many counties, to include the US. After repeated Khmer Rouge attacks against Vietnam filled hospitals to overflowing and caused the evacuation of entire villages, the Vietnamese proposed a peace plan and negotiations. Hanoi's overtures were summarily rejected. Hanoi tried to intimidate the Khmer Rouge with limited cross border operations, to no avail. Perhaps at this point Hanoi would have been amenable to international assistance in reaching a truly neutral Kamphuchea, and thereby putting completion of the Indochinese Federation even further on the back burner than it already had been. However, having received no assistance from the West and finding Pol Pot's Kamphuchea determined to continue its punishing attacks against Vietnam, Hanoi toppled the DK regime. Now it is unrealistic to expect that Hanoi would be amenable to a truly neutral Kamphuchea. Vietnam now sees colonization of Kamphuchea as an essential measure to meet the Chinese/Khmer Rouge threat by preventing the return of the Khmer Rouge to power. Thus, Hanoi would be most unlikely to accept Sihanouk in a leadership position as he could lead Kamphuchea towards neutralism and thus challenge the verdict that Hanoi has imposed by force of arms at great sacrifice. Some officials are skeptical about Hanoi's perception of a threat from China, and believe that their utterances on this subject are mere propaganda. To so believe is to be ignorant of the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, especially from 1960 when Vietnam refused to align with China against the Soviet Union on to many bitter experiences. To realistically understand the threat as perceived by the Vietnamese, one need only conjecture as to probable American reactions if Mexican nationalists, in a fanatic zeal to right historical "wrongs" staged raids and attacks on southern Texas, especially if Mexico were supported by the USSR in its incursions. Yet, USG seems to expect Hanoi to entrust its Kamphuchean interests to an international community that showed little concern for its problems with the Khmer Rouge, either before or after the SRV toppled Pol Pot.

Another sign that psychological factors obscure clear analysis and thereby impede effective defense of significant US interests is the propensity of some US officials to dichotomize the situation in Kamphuchea as simply a struggle between Vietnamese colonialists and a Kamphuchean resistance composed of diverse elements. Such a simplistic picture is possible only for non-Khmer people separated from the Pol Pot horrors by a safe distance. A policy imperative to ignore reality also contributes to denial of the obvious. Actually, many patriotic, anti-Vietnamese Khmer are very clear (as is Sihanouk) that Khmer Rouge institutionalized torture and mass murder is a greater evil than is Vietnamese colonialism.

The Department of State report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979 (TAB D) charges the Pol Pot regime with widespread systematic torture and executions. It does not so charge the Heng Samrin government, but it does charge both the PRK/Vietnamese and the DK of putting military operations ahead of humanitarian considerations, by practicing food denial and other inhumanities. The same report then states that "acceptance of the Vietnamese was short-lived" - true to a point, but then implies erroneously that the Khmer see no meaningful difference between the PRK and the DK. Actually, most evidence suggests that although the initial gratitude and relief at being liberated from the DK soured to some extent as suffering from the invasion and continued fighting became more pronounced, people still dread the return of the DK terror to the extent that most acquiesce in Vietnamese control rather than cooperate in any way with the Khmer Rouge if they have a choice. This is the reality underlying DK inability to recruit, ape Mao's "fish in the sea" or gain acceptance for DK leadership in an anti-Vietnamese resistance.

The unwillingness of many Khmer patriots to cooperate with the DK is because such collusion would compromise them with their countrymen and should the DK ever again win power it would devour its allies. Thus, the UN vote to seat the DK was dysfunctional in that it undercut non-DK patriots' potential anti-Vietnamese activities, and it signaled Hanoi that it has no choice except to fight on against a US/ASEAN/Chinese axis. Sihanouk has expressed how discouraging it is to a non-DK anti-colonialist to know that according to the UN the Kamphuchean government, administration, army and police are all to remain in the hands of the Khmer Rouge butchers, leaving the people no protection other than the Vietnamese army. Faced with this dilemma, Sihanouk and others who love their countrymen prefer to leave them under Vietnamese colonialism where at least they can live, perhaps to fight again another day. If the UN had voted a resolution that undercut the DK and the Vietnamese, Sihanouk and others would be ready to cooperate.

Ambassador Vanden Heuvel's address on the situation in Kamphuchea delivered before the UN General Assembly in October, 1980 is worthy of examination because as a statement of US policy it epitomizes the subjective analysis and the dubious logic of the policy it seeks to explain. For example the statement blames the Vietnamese, not the Khmer Rouge for the dislocation and hardship suffered by the civilian population as the result of the continued fighting. The Vietnamese are castigated for pursuing their objectives by force of arms, but no such mention is made of the Khmer Rouge doing the same, nor is there any appreciation that to date only Vietnamese arms prevent the return of another Khmer Rouge holocaust. Hanoi is castigated for hindrance of relief operations, but of course there were no relief operations at all under the Khmer Rouge. No thought is given to the fact that Khmer Rouge aggression precipitated the Vietnamese invasion. Nor is there any hint of the fact that Chinese/Thai support for the Khmer Rouge disguised through humanitarian aid (e.g., the land bridge) gives the DK its ability to continue

its violence and insures a continued Vietnamese military presence. Hanoi is branded as a heretofore ardent supporter of the DK, a phrase which hardly seems apt to one familiar with the history of strained relations between the two Communist parties. Perhaps the most fatuous allegation is that Hanoi is denying Kamphuchea's right of self-determination as if the Khmer Rouge would permit self-determination. The statement accuses Hanoi of being unwilling to address the central issues, i.e., the invasion and occupation of Kamphuchea and the people's right to self-determination. Yet, the UN, by being unwilling to address the central issue of neutralization of the Khmer Rouge insures Vietnamese unwillingness to withdraw military forces.

There is little valid reason for the US not to pursue normalization of relations with Vietnam as part of a package leading to Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Kamphuchea. The reasons given to the Vietnamese for the US breaking off normalization talks after the SRV dropped its demands for economic assistance are of dubious utility in furthering US interests in Southeast Asia. The reasons given: SRV preparation to invade Kamphuchea, SRV treaty with the USSR, and the growing number of refugees all seem spurious. Hanoi's perception of diplomatic isolation probably exacerbated all three relationships. Continued US/ASEAN/Chinese pressure to force Vietnam into making unilateral concessions in Kamphuchea will probably result in Hanoi accepting an ever tightening relationship with the USSR, as it has in the past. For Hanoi, this is a lesser evil than risking a hostile, Chinese supported Kamphuchea on its border. (At this point a neutral Kamphuchea would be an unacceptable risk to Hanoi). Failure to normalize relations merely gives the US even less influence in Hanoi than it potentially could have. More, rather than less influence would enhance US capability to pursue a number of special (e.g., POW/MIA question) and common (troop withdrawal from Kamphuchea) interests with Vietnam.

A point to be stressed is that no peace package for Kamphuchea can include any role for the Khmer Rouge. In this the Vietnamese colonialists and the Khmer people would be united. This basic dynamic cannot be altered by cosmetic changes in the Khmer Rouge leadership or by their pious declarations of change. They not only employed the hideous forms of terror perviously mentioned, but they pushed their society back to to the stone age by destruction of urban life, disestablishment of the currency system, Theravada Buddhist worship, and other civilized amenities such as family life, formal education and medical treatment.

This ghastly regime, sponsor of another 20th century holocaust was toppled, not by its suffering people, and not by liberal democratic countries, but by the Vietnamese Army sent by a Hanoi that itself felt threatened. Before the Vietnamese army marched in, Khmer refugees in the United States were the most hapless of the Indochinese refugees. They wondered how Americans could be so engrossed in television's depiction of a 40 year old holocaust, while the on-going holocaust in Kamphuchea merited little press attention and even less comment from a "human rights" administration.

Khmer people, both overseas and inside Kamphuchea are fully aware that notwithstanding the many demerits of Vietnamese occupation, the Heng Samrin regime has brought an end to the Khmer Rouge terror and reestablished civilization, i.e., family living, religious practice, postal and transportation systems and introduced a currency. Relief organizations are at least functioning, and medical services are improving. World Vision, a nonprofit Christian organization, has opened its pediatrics hospital in Phnom Penh. It had been finished in 1975, but the Khmer Rouge converted it to a torture and death chamber for intellectuals. It cost \$1.1 million to revamp; the walls and floor were stained with blood. The point in mentioning some of the specific comparisons in a paper primarily concerned with finding a more effective strategy is to show clearly the poverty of any approach that depends of maintaining support for the Khmer Rouge. Not only is such support probably going to

end in failure, but gives all concerned the worst of two images, by appearing to be weak and cruel.

Support for the Khmer Rouge invites a cynical view of US foreign policy, i.e., that perhaps it is not just in the Communist countries that the end justifies the means.

By fostering, rather than opposing, already existing trends toward accomodation within ASEAN and attempting to sell the Chinese on a more effective path toward their goal of reduced opportunities for Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia, the Administration can chart a new course leading to the withdrawal of most Vietnamese troops, thus reducing the threat to Thailand and the probability of grievous splits within ASEAN. By fostering acceptance of defacto Vietnamese control over Kamphuchea, at least in the short or mid-term, and the destruction of the Khmer Rouge in return for Vietnamese troop withdrawal, the President can set the stage for the limitation of Soviet influence in Vietnam. President Reagan, with his reputation of having a realistic perception of the Soviet threat should be well positioned to change course without Thailand feeling abandoned or China feeling betrayed. Nevertheless, the changes recommended here must be presented with consummate sophistication.

An effective, pragmatic response to Vietnam's security concerns can signal Hanoi that the moderate policies it pursued before it invaded Kamphuchea can still bring the benefits it was then seeking and encourage the multipolarity that will best serve US and ASEAN interests in the long pull.

President Reagan has an opportunity not only to more effectively align US policy with regional trends, but he can demonstrate to the American people that he he can match geopolitical and human rights considerations where appropriate. He can show that he has a firm understanding of and commitment to human rights in keeping with America's cherished traditions. He will have demonstrated a refreshing sense of perspective, e.g., that while we may or may not approve a sale of helicopters to Argentina, the United States stands in solid, implacable opposition to the world's Hitlers, Stalins, Pol Pots, et al.

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Vietnamese Ambitions in Southeast Asia and the Threat They Pose

The Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea manifests both Vietnam's immediate political goals and longer term strategic, and ideologically derived objectives in Southeast Asia. As an immediate goal, Hanoi seeks consolidation of its political control of Kampuchea. Such control is crucial to realization of the longer term goals of domination and international acceptance of that domination of Kampuchea, of exercising greater influence throughout Southeast Asia, and, in the longer term, of expanding its "socialist" ideological and revolutionary influence in league with the Soviet Union. Consolidation of Vietnamese control in Kampuchea is common to all these objectives.

Historical Background

The SRV's ambition to dominate Indochina is rooted in traditional expansionist Vietnamese attitudes far older than the Vietnamese communist movement. Throughout their history the Vietnamese have continuously expanded their area of control, moving in stages from the Red River Delta to central Vietnam and the Mekong Delta. In the process they annihilated the Champa kingdom of present day central Vietnam and conquered Saigon and the south from the ancestors of the present day Kampucheans.

The French colonizers halted this process of expansion, but they used Vietnamese administrators to run the colonial governments in Laos and Kampuchea, reinforcing the Vietnamese's notions of superiority and the other people's resentment against the Vietnamese. This history is well-known to all Indochinese today.

Since the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) by Ho Chi Minh in 1931, Hanoi has sought more explicitly to dominate politically all of Indochina. The original manifesto of the ICP called for an Indochina Federation. The ICP was divided into three national parties in 1951 and since that time Vietnamese have contended vigorously that the idea of an Indochina Federation was no longer a Vietnamese goal. They have repeatedly denied that their invasion of Kampuchea was designed to establish such a Federation. But evidence suggests strongly that Hanoi occupies Kampuchea not only out of security concerns, but more fundamentally to realize the political goal of domination of all Indochina. There is ample evidence that Hanoi attempted to exert political control over Kampuchea prior to the 1978 invasion. Indeed, a struggle for control of the Khmer communist party, between nationalistic (Pol Pot) and pro-Vietnamese factions, occurred continuously from 1972-73 on. Coup attempts and other subversion in Kampuchea initiated at least with Vietnamese connivance occurred frequently during the post-75 period of Pol Pot rule.

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The attacks by Pol Pot forces against Vietnam on the Kampuchea-Vietnamese border which occurred from 1975 on, finally provoked the Vietnamese into resorting to overt military means to realize their political goal through a limited incursion into eastern Kampuchea in December 1977 and full scale invasion in December 1978. Hanoi's current unwillingness even to discuss the internal situation in Kampuchea is further evidence that the Vietnamese now regard Kampuchea as under their exclusive domain. Although Hanoi has said that it will withdraw its troops from Kampuchea when the threat from China is ended, Hanoi has described the Chinese threat as having lasted for more than a thousand years. The continued presence of over 40,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos four years after the Pathet Lao took control of Laos also illustrates Vietnamese intentions in Indochina.

In addition to its nationalist expansionist ambitions, Hanoi's motives in the region derive from its revolutionary zeal and dedication to spreading revolutionary Marxist-Leninism or "socialism." In the latter role, Hanoi serves as a surrogate of the Soviet Union, without whose massive military and economic backing Vietnam would be incapable of sustaining even its current efforts in Kampuchea and Laos.

The Threat of Vietnamese Ambitions

Vietnamese objectives endanger a variety of interests in Southeast Asia, including those of the Khmer people and nation, Thailand, ASEAN, and our own regional and strategic interests.

To the Khmer

Vietnamese ambitions pose an immediate threat to the Khmer people and nation. The Vietnamese invasion saved the Khmer from the brutal regime of Pol Pot, but the future of the Khmer people remains insecure under Vietnamese domination. While we see no evidence as yet that Vietnam intends to colonize either of its Indochina neighbors, Hanoi appears convinced that it can consolidate its control over Kampuchea and maintain political control thereafter. Hanoi's objectives are open-ended in time; there is no deadline for success or failure. If control is consolidated, Hanoi could phase out most if not all of its troops from Kampuchea and exercise control through civilian Vietnamese advisors in Kampuchea. As this occurred, Hanoi would anticipate international acquiescence in its fait accompli in Kampuchea and Vietnamese leadership of an Indochinese bloc. Hanoi's treatment of its own population, its economic policies, its political system, combined with knowledge of Vietnamese historical ambitions, much greater Vietnamese aggressiveness and Vietnamese numerical superiority raises serious question about Kampuchea's future under Vietnamese domination.

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To Thailand

Vietnam poses both an immediate and a long term threat to Thailand with which the U.S. has a treaty commitment under the Manila Pact. 60-70,000 Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Kampuchean border pose a continuing direct threat to Thailand as well as to the concentrations of Khmer along the border. Incursions by Vietnamese troops into Thailand such as during the June 23-24 Vietnamese incursion at Mak Mun could occur at any time. In response to the June incursion, the U.S. provided a small but significant airlift of military supplies to help out Thai actual and psychological needs. Vietnamese troops regularly conduct surveillance patrols on Thai territory. We would not expect the Vietnamese to undertake in the near future a major sustained invasion of Thailand because of concern about possible Chinese reaction, questions about how the U.S. might react, and because the Vietnamese are already overextended.

Consolidation of Vietnamese control of Kampuchea would permit Hanoi to exercise influence in Thailand because of its enhanced position in the region and through direct or indirect military intimidation, such as at present. Vietnam would almost certainly also attempt either to gain control of the current communist insurgency in Thailand, now oriented toward China, or to organize a pro-Vietnamese, pro-Soviet insurgency in Thailand. Hanoi could also seek the eventual establishment of a liberation movement in northeast Thailand, with its close ethnic and cultural links with Laos, as the prelude to setting up an independent state or merger with Laos.

To the Region

The Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea alarmed the other nations of Southeast Asia and has served thus far as the catalyst for greater political cooperation among the ASEAN states.

The evolution of the Vietnamese role in the region cannot be calculated with precision since, whatever the final outcome in Kampuchea, Hanoi will be competing with other power centers for influence in Southeast Asia, including with China, the Soviets, Indonesia, Japan, and even the U.S. Moreover, Vietnamese nationalism or Soviet actions or other unforeseen developments in the region could also affect the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. The following in effect tend toward the more unfavorable end of the spectrum of possibilities, but all are plausible.

Control of all Indochina by Hanoi could be a prelude to expansion of Vietnamese influence elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Likely to remain the pre-eminent military power in Southeast Asia, Hanoi would also be able to use its extended territorial base and

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prestige to exert influence, intimidate, or attempt to undermine the stability of other countries of the region. Support for insurgencies and meddling in racial and religious difficulties in the various ASEEAN countries would be feasible. The moderate ASEAN organization, with its market economies and more open societies, could also be threatened.

Through its massive support for Vietnam, the Soviet Union has already achieved an important access to Vietnam for military and intelligence purposes, and, thereby, gained a strategic foothold in southeast Asia.

Expanded Vietnamese power would mean further expansion of Soviet influence in the region, a development with strategic implications for the U.S. as well as the region. We could expect a greater willingness on the part of ASEAN to accommodate Vietnamese and Soviet interests, if Vietnamese ambitions are not checked in Kampuchea. In exchange for continuing Soviet economic and military support for Vietnam, the Soviets will obtain continued access to Vietnamese facilities for strategic military use and intelligence gathering. Vietnam would serve as surrogate for extension of Soviet influence throughout Southeast Asia, in the Cuban pattern.

Without massive Soviet support, Vietnam poses only a limited regional threat; with Soviet support, Vietnam becomes a major force for instability and subversion in the region and a willing vehicle for expansion of Soviet power at U.S. and our friends' expense, in an area, with substantial human and natural resources, sea lanes which are crucial to Japan, other friends and to our own global interests.

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met with Foreign Minister Sitthi on November 24, 1980. We discussed a wide range of topics. I told him the whole world is very impressed with Thailand's humanitarianism by providing refuge for so many people when political pressures are so great. He said they will try to continue their policies but it is no secret that domestic political considerations made the course they have been following very difficult.

I explained we understood that last year we in the U.S. were great on advice to the Thais. After a year of tremendous refugee problems with Haitians and Cubans, we are a little more humble. We also discussed whether he thought the Vietnamese would withdraw from Kampuchea. He was not very optimistic. The arming of the People's Republic of China was also discussed. He felt China would not try to take over all of Southeast Asia if they had better arms. He did feel China would invade Vietnam again if Vietnam invaded Thailand and Thailand is happy to have that threat hanging over the head of the Vietnamese army heavily entrenched on their border.

I also spent a lot of time with the American military in Thailand and several Generals of Thailand's Supreme Command. The Thais are worried that Vietnam is trying to discredit them and give the world a reason to withdraw their humanitarian support for the refugees. They see a pattern of increased propaganda: accusing the Thais of ripping off the international aid, abusing the refugees, and harboring pirates. If the world withdraws its humanitarian aid for the refugees, Thailand will be left with a tremendous economic and political burden.

Another concern was the constraints the U.S. put on their military missions in 1977 through the Foreign Security Assistance Act. The 1977 Act forbids the U.S. military from helping plan for emergencies in other countries. This was felt to be a very serious problem. If the Thais don't know what they can count on for support from their friends

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They might waste their own money buying items the U.S. would provide.

Dollars are too precious to waste. But the most serious criticism from the Thai military is that if Thailand must wait until an emergency occurs, such as the June 23, 1980, invasion by Vietnam, to ask the U.S. for support, by the time the U.S. acts it might be too late. Prior planning, prohibited by the 1977 law would prevent this haphazard response.

They would also like to have higher limits on their foreign military sales credits. The plea was made for the U.S. Redeye defense system. They have made an urgent request that Redeye be sent to Thailand because they have no air defense on the Kampuchean/Thailand frontier. They said that if the request is granted it will communicate to the Vietnamese that the U.S. cares about Thailand's security, and this will have a great affect on Thai morale. Most importantly, the Redeye will provide the air defense needed at the border.

They all said the U.S. should be very concerned about its international regional commitments. If they are strong and viable, the U.S. global stragedy will be much stronger and our nuclear posture will be helped also. The "grassroots" of a good military are in the regional plans. They felt we needed to have stronger regional military planning in Southeast Asia.

The Thai military forces are small for a country of over 40 million people. There are around 200,000 in the combined Army, Navy, and Air Force. They are now trying to build up reserves and have about 500,000 people in them.

We talked about the 1970's when the U.S. Military Mission in Thailand had over 1,000 people and many bases. But when Vietnam and Cambodia fell, the U.S. withdrew almost overnight. They said we now have 51 people in our military mission in Thailand. And the Thais did not understand the sudden abrupt withdrawal, especially since they have been loyal allies.

e have been helping them with M-48 tanks, low anti-tank missiles, the dragon and vulcan systems, C-130's, F-5E's, T-37's, AIM-9P's, and other military hardware under Foreign Military Sales Credits. They feel that considering who some of their neighbors are, they will need more help.

I was also told the cutbacks in military training for allies hurt. Our military representatives felt the training Thais received in the U.S. could not have a price tag put on it. It was a fantastic aid to communication and understanding. They were very concerned about the effect the cutbacks will have on the next generation of Thai military officials.

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E.O. 12065: RDS-4 11/25/91 (LEVIN, BURTON) CR-M
TAGS: PINT, PORG, PINR, SHUM, SREF, VH
SUBJECT: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN VIETNAM

REF: BANGKOK 32473

1. (U) ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: A ROMAN CATHOLIC PRIEST [REDACTED] DESCRIBED THE CHURCH IN NORTHERN VIETNAM AS SURVIVING AND PERHAPS EVEN GROWING SOMEWHAT, EVEN THOUGH THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT CLOSELY MONITORS AND IMPOSES HARSH RESTRICTIONS ON THE CATHOLIC ORGANIZATION. IN THE HAIPHONG DIOCESE, ONLY THE HAIPHONG CATHEDRAL IS PERMITTED TO HOLD DAILY MASSES; OTHER CHURCHES CAN HOLD ONLY ONE MASS A WEEK ON SUNDAY. PRIESTS ALSO MUST OBTAIN PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE APPROVAL TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THEIR PARISH. ADHERENCE TO GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN THE NORTH IS ENFORCED THROUGH A NETWORK OF PRIESTS, ONE IN EACH DIOCESE, WHO WORK WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S MASS ORGANIZATION FOR CATHOLICS. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO PERMIT A SMALL NUMBER OF MEN TO ENTER THE PRIESTHOOD. THOSE WHO CANNOT OBTAIN GOVERNMENT APPROVAL OFTEN GO UNDERGROUND, HOLDING MASSES IN PRIVATE HOMES. THE PRIEST ALSO COMMENTED ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH AND PERSONALITIES, IDENTIFYING ARCHBISHOP NGUYEN KIM DIEN IN HUE AS THE ONLY CHURCH FIGURE WHO IS SOMEWHAT RESISTANT TO GOVERNMENT PRESSURE. END SUMMARY.
3. IN A DISCUSSION WITH A CONGENOFF, FATHER [REDACTED] WHO ARRIVED IN HONG KONG ON A REFUGEE BOAT FROM HAIPHONG IN OCTOBER, COMMENTED ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN VIETNAM AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT. FATHER [REDACTED] SAID THERE ARE SEVERAL WAYS IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CHURCH. THE NUMBER OF MASSES A

CHURCH CAN HOLD IS FIRMLY CONTROLLED. IN THE HAIPHONG DIOCESE CHURCHES ARE PERMITTED TO HOLD ONLY ONE MASS PER WEEK. ONLY THE HAIPHONG CATHEDRAL, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS PERMITTED TO HOLD TWO MASSES ON SUNDAY (AT 0600-0730 AND 1820-2000) AS WELL AS A DAILY MORNING MASS ON WEEKDAYS (0530-0615). ANOTHER RESTRICTION WHICH LIMITS THE WORK OF THE CHURCH IS THE TIGHT CONTROL ON TRAVEL OF PRIESTS. [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE WAS NOT PERMITTED TO VISIT ANY OTHER PRIESTS IN HAIPHONG PROVINCE WITHOUT FORMAL PERMISSION FROM THE PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICE (PSS).

4. AS ONE OF THE MEANS OF ENSURING THAT GOVERNMENT POLICIES ON RELIGION ARE FOLLOWED, [REDACTED] ONE PRIEST IN EACH DIOCESE IS A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC MASS ORGANIZATION, THE NATIONAL LIAISON COMMITTEE OF PATRIOTIC AND PEACE-LOVING CATHOLICS. IN HAIPHONG FATHER PHAM QUANG PHUOC REPRESENTS THE CATHOLIC MASS ORGANIZATION AND RECEIVES A GOVERNMENT SALARY AND RATION FOR HIS WORK AS WELL AS HIS CHURCH BENEFITS.

5. FATHER [REDACTED] SAID PHYSICAL HARASSMENT OF PRIESTS WAS NOT A PROBLEM. HE RECALLED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE HAD BEEN ONE CASE IN WHICH A PSS OFFICER HAD ATTEMPTED TO BLACKMAIL A PRIEST [REDACTED] AND THE PRIEST HAD BEEN KILLED UNDER MYSTERIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. (COMMENT: FATHER [REDACTED] BELIEVED THE CASE WAS NOT A MATTER OF GOVERNMENT POLICY BUT RATHER ILLUSTRATED MORE ABOUT THE CORRUPTION WITHIN THE PSS.) FATHER [REDACTED] SAID HE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE CHURCH AND COULD LIVE ON THE DONATIONS OF PARISHIONERS. ONLY PRIESTS IN RURAL AREAS HAD TO PERFORM OUTSIDE LABOR TO SUPPORT THEMSELVES. NOR DOES THE GOVERNMENT INTERFERE OR HARASS CATHOLIC FOLLOWERS WHO WISH TO ATTEND MASS (OTHER THAN BY LIMITING

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FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8217
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY RANGOON
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THE NUMBER OF MASSES THAT CAN BE HELD). WEEKDAY MASSES AT THE CATHEDRAL ARE ATTENDED BY AN AVERAGE OF 20-30 PEOPLE, WHILE ABOUT 2,000 PEOPLE ATTEND THE SUNDAY MASSES. FATHER [REDACTED] COMMENTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PSS DID KEEP CAREFUL LISTS OF CATHOLICS AND PAID MORE ATTENTION TO THEIR ACTIVITIES. IN GENERAL, HE SAID, GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES TOWARDS CATHOLICS HAD RELAXED SOMEWHAT OVER THE PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS AND IN FACT THE NUMBER OF CATHOLICS WAS AT LEAST HOLDING STEADY IN THE NORTH AND EVEN POSSIBLY INCREASING SLIGHTLY. YOUNGER PEOPLE WHO WERE DISCOURAGED FROM BECOMING PRACTICING CATHOLICS AND ENTERING THE PRIESTHOOD WERE FINDING IT SOMEWHAT LESS DIFFICULT THAN THEY DID SEVERAL YEARS AGO.

6. NONETHELESS, FATHER [REDACTED] SAID, IT IS STILL DIFFICULT TO BECOME A PRIEST. THE GOVERNMENT MUST FORMALLY APPROVE EACH PRIEST BEFORE HE CAN TAKE UP HIS DUTIES. SINCE FEW ARE APPROVED BY THE GOVERNMENT, MANY ORDAINED PRIESTS WHO ARE NOT RECOGNIZED GO UNDERGROUND, SECRETLY HOLDING MASSES IN PRIVATE HOMES. [REDACTED]

OF THIRTY-FIVE MEN WHO STUDIED THREE YEARS TO BECOME PRIESTS, THE GOVERNMENT ONLY ACCEPTED FIVE. MANY OF THE THIRTY WHO WERE REJECTED BY THE GOVERNMENT WENT UNDERGROUND AND SOME TEN WERE SUBSEQUENTLY ARRESTED BY AUTHORITIES AND IMPRISONED, SOME RECEIVING SENTENCES AS HIGH AS TWELVE YEARS.

7. THERE WAS NO ORGANIZED RESISTANCE OR DISSIDENCE BY CATHOLICS IN THE HAIPHONG DIOCESE, ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] CATHOLICS ARE TOO CLOSELY MONITORED AND RESTRICTED TO ENGAGE IN ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY. THE EXISTENCE OF UNDERGROUND PRIESTS IS THE ONLY MANIFESTATION OF RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT POLICIES. THE PRIESTS, HOWEVER, PERFORM ONLY RELIGIOUS DUTIES AND STAY AWAY FROM POLITICS, [REDACTED] SAID.

8. WITH REGARD TO THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH, FATHER [REDACTED] SAID THAT ARCHBISHOP NGUYEN VAN BINH HEADS THE SOUTHERN ARCHDIOCESE; ARCHBISHOP NGUYEN KIM DIEN PRESIDED IN HUE OVER THE CENTRAL ARCHDIOCESE; AND CARDINAL TRINH VAN CAN WAS BOTH HEAD OF THE NORTHERN ARCHDIOCESE AS WELL

AS HEAD OF THE CHURCH IN VIETNAM. UNDER CARDINAL CAN, IN THE NORTHERN ARCHDIOCESE, ARE TEN BISHOPS AND FIVE DEPUTY BISHOPS. ALL OF THE NORTHERN BISHOPS ARE FORMALLY RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE BISHOP OF LANG SON, BISHOP PHAM DU. ACCORDING TO FATHER [REDACTED] THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS PHAM DU A "REACTIONARY" BUT SINCE HE HAS LONG BEEN OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS A PRIEST, THE GOVERNMENT IS UNABLE TO TAKE ANY ACTION AGAINST HIM EVEN THOUGH HIS RISE TO BISHOP WAS NOT SANCTIONED BY GOVERNMENT. FATHER [REDACTED] SAID HE KNEW LITTLE ABOUT THE CHURCH IN THE CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN ARCHDIOCESES BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD THAT ARCHBISHOP BINH WAS CONSIDERED TO BE "RATHER FRIENDLY" TOWARD THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES. CARDINAL CAN, WHO [REDACTED] SAID WAS IN HIS EARLY 60S, WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A QUIET AND HUMBLE MAN WHO DID NOT PRESENT A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT. ARCHBISHOP DIEN IN HUE, HOWEVER, HAD A REPUTATION OF BEING MORE STUBBORN AND WAS WILLING TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT ON ITS POLICIES TOWARD CATHOLICS. (COMMENT: A JOURNALIST WHO HAS LONG EXPERIENCE COVERING INDOCHINA TOLD A CONGENOFF THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM SOURCES IN SAIGON THAT DIEN IS IN FACT VERY OUTSPOKEN AND THAT HE HAS CIRCULATED WRITTEN CRITICISM OF THE GOVERNMENT TO OTHER CATHOLIC PRIESTS.)

9. THE HAIPHONG DIOCESE CONSISTS OF THREE PROVINCES; HAIPHONG, QUANG NINH AND HAI HUNG. BISHOP NGUYEN TUNG CUONG, IN HIS EARLY 60S, HAS BEEN AT THE HAIPHONG CATHEDRAL, WHERE CUONG WAS THE ONLY OTHER PRIEST, SINCE 1978. HE HAD SIX PRIESTS UNDER HIM UNTIL FATHER THINH'S DEPARTURE. BISHOP CUONG GETS ALONG REASONABLY WELL WITH GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES AND DOES NOT CHALLENGE THEIR POLICIES. HE HAS ONLY INFREQUENT PERSONAL CONTACT WITH

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CARDINAL CAN IN HANOI, VISITING THE CITY PERHAPS ONLY
ONCE OR TWICE A YEAR.

10. ASKED ABOUT THE STATUS OF THE BUDDHIST CHURCH IN
HAIPHONG, [REDACTED] SAID THERE WAS NO CONTACT BETWEEN THE
CATHOLIC HIERARCHY IN THE CITY AND THE BUDDHIST
ESTABLISHMENT. HIS IMPRESSION, HOWEVER, WAS THAT THE
GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE BUDDHISTS WAS
RELATIVELY RELAXED. IN PART, HE SAID, THIS WAS BECAUSE
THE BUDDHIST CHURCH WAS LOOSELY ORGANIZED AND THEREFORE
LESS OF A POTENTIAL THREAT THAN THE HIGHLY STRUCTURED
CATHOLIC ORGANIZATION.

11. COMMENTING ON HIS OWN REASONS FOR FLEEING VIETNAM,
FATHER [REDACTED] SAID THE AUTHORITIES HAD DISCOVERED HIS ROLE
IN ARRANGING REFUGEE DEPARTURES. HE SAID HE SERVED AS A
MIDDLEMAN HELPING URBAN RESIDENTS LINK UP WITH CATHOLIC
FISHERMEN WILLING TO PILOT THEIR BOATS TO HONG KONG.
SECURITY OFFICIALS DETAINED THE PRIEST IN JUNE FOR FOUR
DAYS AND HE WAS TIPPED OFF IN SEPTEMBER THAT HE WAS ABOUT
TO BE MOVED OUT OF THE CITY.

12. COMMENT: FATHER [REDACTED] COMMENTS PROVIDE A PICTURE
OF A CAREFUL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE NORTH WHICH ENABLES THE CHURCH TO AT
LEAST HOLD ITS OWN IN THE SOCIETY AS LONG AS IT AVOIDS
CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT POLICIES. [REDACTED] REMARKS ARE
LARGELY CONSISTENT WITH THE COMMENTS OF THE WESTERN
DIPLOMAT CITED IN REFTEL WITH ONLY SOME MINOR DIFFERENCES
(E.G., [REDACTED] SAID PRIESTS IN URBAN AREAS WERE NOT
REQUIRED TO WORK OUTSIDE THE CHURCH). IN HIS REMARKS
[REDACTED] GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING ONLY VAGUELY INFORMED
OF RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS OUTSIDE HIS PROVINCE. THE
GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF RESTRICTING TRAVEL AND COMMUNICA-
TIONS BETWEEN PRIESTS IS APPARENTLY EFFECTIVE.
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