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**SERIES:** II: SYSTEM II

**Folder Title:** 8590697 – Application of Force re TWA  
Hijacking / Lebanon

**Box:** 216

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SYSTEM I FILES (RAC) **Withdrawer**  
CAS 3/29/2016  
**File Folder** 8590697 **FOIA**  
M481  
**Box Number** O'NEIL  
2

| ID     | Doc Type | Document Description  | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|--------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 174336 | MEMO     | FORTIER/COVEY/NORTH TO MCFARLANE<br>RE TWA HIJACKING<br><i>R 6/24/2019 M481/1</i> | 3           | 6/20/1985 | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records  
System File  
**File Folder:** 8590697

**Archivist:** mjd  
**Date:** 4/29/99

| DOCUMENT<br>NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE  | DATE    | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|--|---------|-------------|
| 1. memo<br>(8590697)     | Fortier/Covey/North to Robert McFarlane re: TWA<br>Hijacking: Application of Force, 3p | 6/20/85 | P1/F1<br>P5 |

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8590697

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM FORTIER

msn  
4/28/97

RECEIVED 20 JUN 85 15

DOC DATE 20 JUN 85

20 JUN 85

20 JUN 85

TO MCFARLANE

COVEY

NORTH

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

LEBANON

HIJACKING

SUBJECT: APPLICATION OF FORCE RE TWA HIJACKING

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( B / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

85 JUN 20 13:01

June 20, 1985

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~EYES ONLYACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DONALD FORTIER  
JOCK COVEY  
OLIVER NORTH

SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking: Application of Force

Issue

A viable, credible option for the application of force in response to the TWA hijacking.

Background and Discussion

It is easy to argue for retaliation once the hostages are either free or hurt. This case we can review later. The question is whether there is some application of force which would contribute to their release.

- o Search/rescue in the Beirut suburbs is appallingly dangerous, both to the troops and to the hostages.
- o Cratering the runway would make us look frustrated and impotent, and might irretrievably harden attitudes there.
- o An assault on a related target -- say the Sheikh Abdullah barracks or an AMAL installation -- would seem to make more sense. But if we don't hurt a lot of people, it will be like cratering the runway. And if we do, it will surely bring into play the Shia's phenomenal capacity for vendetta.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR m4811 #174336  
BY RW NARA DATE 6/24/19

We cannot effectively confront Shia violence head-on in the short term. It is a long-term problem that will have to be dealt with by containment -- chiefly by choking off support from those who use the Shia. This crisis may provide an opportunity to begin the process of containing Shia violence.

At this point, we see AMAL as having assumed responsibility and look to Syria to use its influence. We should consider moving up the chain, casting Syria as responsible, and looking to the Soviets to exert influence. To do so, we would over the next day or two:

- Stop appealing to Barri. Cast him as increasingly irrelevant.
- Tell Assad in a series of two or three increasingly exasperated messages that we can no longer persuade ourselves that Syria could not rapidly resolve this problem if it wished, and that we now consider it the responsible party.
- Make the same turn publicly, laying out in an increasingly angry way why we have to regard them as accountable.
- Make the same turn in increasingly urgent messages to the Soviets, making it clear we do not want a U.S.-Soviet confrontation but may be headed for one via the irresponsible behavior of their client.
- Once the stage is set, hit a Syrian installation in the Bekaa in a dramatic, decisive way. Make it clear that this is only the first step, unless Syria resolves the situation very quickly. Make it clear we will hit Syria itself if any harm comes to the hostages. Make it clear we are now talking of all the hostages, not just the TWA passengers/crew.

This would play out at a great enough distance from the scene of the hostage drama that it would be Barri and the hijackers who would begin to feel impotent.

We believe this course of action could lead to a resolution of the present crisis, highlight Syria's broader role in international terrorism, begin the long process of containing Shia violence, and give the American public what it obviously wants without simply lashing out blindly.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

RECOMMENDATION

That we move ASAP to a concrete program, including timeline, draft messages, and possible targets.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~