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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
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Withdrawer

JN 2/20/2019

File Folder USSR 1983-1984 (1)

FOIA

~~E17-038~~ F1738

Box Number 6

SNYDER

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
227457 PAPER	THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS	20	12/28/1981	B1
227460 CABLE	US NATO 00561	6	1/27/1982	B1
227461 MEMCON	AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN AND DIRECTOR ROSTOW	3	4/1/1982	B1
227467 TALKING POINTS	FOR DOBRYNIN LUNCH	1	ND	B1
227483 DISTRIBUTION LIST		1	ND	B3
PAR 2/20/2019 NLR-170-6-38-7-8				

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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FILE!

SOVIET UNION

Please give clearance or comments
on the draft text to David Hertzberg,
INR/SEE, 632-9120, by Wednesday,
January 20.



SOVIET AFFAIRS NOTE

IV

United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. ..
January 13, 1981

Expulsion of Soviet Representatives From Foreign Countries

The expulsion of Soviet representatives from foreign countries has been a regularly recurring phenomenon since the days of Lenin, explicable in large part by Moscow's modus operandi with other states. According to available information, twenty-seven Soviet officials were expelled worldwide in 1981, including one charged by Danish authorities with passing money to local peace and anti-nuclear groups and others from Malaysia, Egypt and the United Kingdom. In 1980, by comparison, some one-hundred sixteen Soviet officials were expelled from Spain, Canada, New Zealand and at least six other countries, one-hundred of them from Pakistan when the government there undertook to reduce the size of the local Soviet presence.

While the majority of Soviets expelled from foreign countries are usually charged with espionage (the surreptitious or clandestine acquisition of secret information), an increasing number have been sent away in recent years because of involvement in "active measures". (covert and sometimes overt influence operations intended to affect third nations' policies). The espionage may be of a political, military or industrial nature; it may also include the attempted penetration of foreign intelligence and security services. "Active measures" operations, on the other hand, have been found to include: the funding of labor and student unrest; agitation against an established government; clandestine contact with and support of indigenous terrorist and/or separatist groups; propaganda, deception and disinformation activities; and political influence operations.

Appended to the list of those expelled in 1980-81 is a sampling of the major expulsion cases from the 1970-79 period. The most notable of that decade included the one hundred and five Soviet intelligence operatives from the United Kingdom and nine from Belgium in 1971, sixty from Bolivia in 1972, five from the PRC in 1974 and eleven from Canada in 1978. Since many countries prefer to avoid publicity in such cases, the total number of persona non grata actions, forced terminations of assignments and deportations of Soviet officials is, however, believed to be substantially higher than the lists indicate.

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Expulsion of Soviet Diplomatic, Military and Civilian Personnel from Foreign Countries, January - December 1981

AFRICA

Equitorial Guinea

April 28, 1981: Soviet Embassy in Malabo was asked to reduce the size of its staff from 195 to an unspecified number, according to Madrid radio. The Equitorial Guinean Military Council also asked the USSR to cease using the fishing base to which it had access at the Guinean port of Luba.

Liberia

March 18, 1981: Aven Muzyken, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, was expelled for engaging in acts "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to Monrovia radio.

April 2, 1981: Valentin Petrov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, was expelled for engaging in acts "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the April 1 issue of the Liberian Daily Observer.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

Malaysia

July 13, 1981: First Secretary Gennadiy Stepanov, Second Secretary Vladislav Romanov, and engineer/interpreter Zardat Khamidulin, all with the Soviet Embassy in Kuala Lumpur, were expelled for espionage shortly after the arrest of Sidek Ghouse, political secretary to the Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, on charges of spying for the USSR. The police reportedly seized an assortment of Soviet-supplied espionage equipment including a portable radio transmitter, supplied to Romanov (who was said to have recruited Sidek), which was used to summon Sidek for meetings with him. (Romanov was identified as the KGB "resident" in Kuala Lumpur.)

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Denmark

October 1981: Denmark expelled Vladimir Merkulov, a KGB case officer working under the guise of Soviet Embassy second secretary in Copenhagen, on espionage-related charges. According to Danish press accounts, Markulov inter alia arranged through a local KGB agent-of-influence to have some 150 Danish artists sign an "appeal" calling for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone and supplied funds to have the appeal placed as an advertisement in a number of local newspapers. He also allegedly maintained clandestine contact

with the Copenhagen-based Committee for Cooperation for Peace and Security, an umbrella organization of approximately 50 smaller peace-related associations and groups, with well-established ties to the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council.

Italy

January 7, 1981: Anatoliy Zazulin, an employee of the Soviet Embassy's Commercial Section in Rome, was expelled on charges of espionage.

The Netherlands

April 15, 1981: Vadim Leonov, TASS correspondent to the Hague, was asked to leave the Netherlands on undisclosed charges.

Norway

April 1, 1981: Timor Besedin, Georgiy Petrov, and Yevgeniy Mironenko, all with the Soviet trade mission in Oslo, were declared persona non grata and expelled from Norway, reportedly on charges of industrial espionage. (In retaliation, two Norwegian diplomats who had previously served in Moscow were declared persona non grata by the Soviet Foreign Ministry and prohibited from entering the USSR in the future.)

Spain

March 6, 1981: Vladimir Yefremenko, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled for espionage. He was charged with trying to obtain information about and from the Spanish Defense Intelligence Center as well as about the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago (MPAIAC). Novosti journalist Yuriy Goloviatenko was also implicated with him, according to press reports, and left the country hurriedly when his role was disclosed.

March 27, 1981: Yuriy Bychkov, Soviet director of Sovhispan (the joint Soviet-Spanish fishing company), was expelled on charges of political involvement and espionage activities in the Canary Islands.

UK

August 4, 1981: Second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in London, Viktor Lazin, was declared persona non grata by the British Government for engaging in activities "incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the London Guardian. Lazin's expulsion reduced the number of Soviet diplomats in London to 46, the same number of British diplomats currently posted in Moscow. (In accordance with an aide-memoire delivered to the Soviets when the British expelled 105 Soviet diplomats en masse in 1971 on charges of espionage, the USSR will not be permitted to replace Lazin.)

MIDDLE EAST

Egypt

September 15, 1981: Egypt expelled Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Polyakov, six other Soviet Embassy personnel, and two Soviet correspondents on charges of plotting to foment sectarian strife in the country. A statement issued by the government accused Moscow of recruiting agents in Egypt and exploiting religious strife as well as "influencing the spread and escalation of sectarian strife," in coordination with leftist elements in Egypt and unnamed hostile Arab countries.

SOUTH ASIA

Bangladesh

August 1981: Aleksei Zolotukhin and Vadim Lazarev, both third secretaries with the Soviet Embassy in Dacca, were declared persona non grata by the Bangladesh Government for assaulting a local security official during an incident at Dacca airport in which Soviet Embassy officials attempted to smuggle sensitive electronic equipment into Bangladesh.

Pakistan

June 1981: Vladlen Baykov, Pravda correspondent in Pakistan, was expelled on charges of engaging in "illegal," and possibly espionage-related activities.

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Expulsion of Soviet Diplomatic, Military and Civilian Personnel
from Foreign Countries, January - December 1980.

AFRICA

Equitorial Guinea

February 1980: Yuriy Kiselev, consular officer at the Soviet Embassy in Malabo, was expelled from Equitorial Guinea on charges of espionage. He had allegedly tried to purchase information concerning the Equitorial Guinean armed forces.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

New Zealand

January 24, 1980: Vsevolod Sofinskiy, Soviet Ambassador to Wellington, was declared persona non grata and subsequently expelled for having supplied Soviet funds to the pro-Moscow Socialist Unity Party (SUP) of New Zealand. The Auckland Star, on January 25, reported that New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) electronic monitoring had caught Ambassador Sofinsky transferring thousands of dollars to the SUP, in what was only one of a regular series of fund transfers.

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Canada

January 21, 1980: Igor Bardeyev (military, naval, and air attache), Eduard Aleksanyan (assistant military attache), and Vladimir Sokolov (chauffeur to the military attache's office) of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa were expelled on charges of espionage. After the Soviet Foreign Ministry retaliated by expelling a Canadian diplomat from Moscow, the Canadians on February 7 expelled Vitaliy Trofimov, a clerk in the Soviet Embassy's Commercial Section.

France

February 9, 1980: Commercial officer Gennadiy Travkov, third ranking official at the Soviet consulate general in Marseilles with the rank of consul, was expelled on charges of espionage. Travkov was caught in the act of photographing documents described by French officials as having "important French national defense value." Four unidentified French citizens believed to be contacts who supplied the Soviets with sensitive material related to air and naval defense matters were also arrested, according to local press reports.

February 28, 1980: Vyacheslav Frolov, public affairs officer at the Soviet consulate general in Marseilles, was expelled on undisclosed charges. Press accounts speculated that he was involved in the Travkov affair.

Italy

May 1980: Andrey Kinyapin, employee of the Soviet commercial office in Turin, was declared persona non grata and expelled by Italian authorities on undisclosed charges. Local Italian press reports speculated that Kinyapin was involved in clandestine activities.

Portugal

August 20, 1980: Albert Matveyev (Minister-Counselor), Yuriy Semenychev (Counselor), Vladimir Konyayev (assistant naval attache), Aleksandr Kulagin (employee, Military Attache Office), all with the Soviet Embassy in Lisbon, were declared persona non grata and expelled from Portugal on charges of "interference in internal Portugese affairs," in accordance with Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention, according to an official Portuguese MFA note. Lisbon domestic radio speculated that the four Soviets were involved in "agrarian reform" espionage. Semenychev was identified as the KGB "resident" in Portugal.

Spain

February 14, 1980: Oleg Suranov, director of Aeroflot in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage. He was alleged to have maintained contact with the Fatherland and Liberty Basque separatist organization (ETA) and other "ultra-leftist" terrorist groups in Spain.

February 16, 1980: Anatoliy Krasilnikov, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage. According to Spanish press reports, Krasilnikov maintained contacts with the Movement for the Self-Determination and Independence of the Canary Archipelago (MPAIAC) and other "illegal extraparamilitary organizations," and had been apprehended with incriminating information on his person.

SOUTH ASIA

Iran

June 30, 1980: First Secretary Vladimir Golovanov of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran was expelled on charges of espionage. According to Iranian domestic radio, he had been caught handing "espionage documents" to a foreign resident of Iran.

August 18, 1980: The USSR was instructed to close one of two Soviet consular offices in Iran and reduce its diplomatic staff in Tehran after Iranian Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh at a July 2 press conference accused the Soviets of conducting espionage activities in Iran. The Soviet consulate in Isfahan was subsequently closed and the staff in Tehran cut back.

Pakistan

August-September 1980: Alleged espionage activities and violations of the rules governing the dissemination of propaganda in Pakistan reportedly led to the departure of approximately 100 Soviet diplomats and staff members from Pakistan.

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Expulsion of Soviet Diplomatic, Military and Civilian Personnel
from Foreign Countries, January 1970 - December 1979

AFRICA

Liberia

April 1979: Vladimir Poperechniy (first secretary), Mikhail Timoshkin (Soviet Ambassador's secretary), and Igor Trekhlebov (chauffeur), all with the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, were expelled on charges of maintaining contact with members of the Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) which had organized demonstrations against food price increases, April 14, 1979. The three Soviets were allegedly seen at PAL headquarters on the eve of the riot and were believed to have played a role in organizing the demonstrations.

Sudan

August 2, 1971: Sudanese officials expelled Mikhail Orlov, Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Khartoum on charges of coup-plotting against the Nimeiry regime. Shortly thereafter, roughly 200 Soviet military advisors were expelled from the country. Within the next five years, all Soviet economic and technical support personnel were gradually withdrawn from Sudan, although diplomatic relations were maintained.

Tunisia

September 23, 1973: Two unidentified Soviet diplomats were declared persona non grata and subsequently expelled by Tunisian authorities on charges of "manipulation aimed at Tunisia and a neighboring country," according to La Presse de Tunisie. Also implicated in the same espionage-related activity was an unidentified Novosti journalist and a number of Tunisian government officials.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

PRC

January 19, 1974: PRC Vice Foreign Minister declared persona non grata First Secretary V. Marchenko and his wife, Third Secretary U. Semenov and his wife, as well as A. Kolosov, an interpreter in the military attache's office, all with the Soviet Embassy in Peking, on charges of espionage. According to the protest note delivered to the Soviet Ambassador, the five were caught in the outskirts of Peking with a Chinese national, Li Hung-Shu, as they were handing over a radio transmitter and receiver, communications timetables, means of secret writing and forged border passes as well as receiving intelligence and "counterrevolutionary documents." The entire operation was said to have been filmed by Chinese security and militia officers, according to the Chinese press.

EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

Belgium

October 1971: Nine unidentified Soviet intelligence officers were expelled on espionage charges.

Canada

January 1974: Pravda correspondent Konstantin Geyvandov expelled from Canada on espionage-related charges.

December 10, 1976: Assistant Air Attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa Vladimir Vassiliev was declared persona non grata by Canada for "activities incompatible with his diplomatic status," according to the Toronto Globe and Mail.

July 1977: Valery Smirnov, assistant military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, expelled on espionage-related charges.

February 9, 1978: Canada expelled Nikolai Talanov (embassy counselor); Igor Vartanyan (Soviet Embassy first secretary in charge of sports and cultural affairs); Vladimir Suvorov (second secretary); Oleg Reztsov (embassy attache); Vera Reztsov (embassy library employee); Anatoly Mikhalin (Soviet trade officer in Ottawa); Vadim Borishpolets (Ottawa consular attache); Vladimir Oshkaderov (Russian translator at the International Civil Aviation Organization headquarters in Montreal); Yevgeny Kablov, (embassy clerk); Gennadi Ivashavich (embassy third secretary) and Pyotr Lellenurm (embassy second secretary) - all on charges of plotting to penetrate the security apparatus of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). In addition, two Soviet officials who had already returned to Moscow, Voldemar Veber and Andrei Krysin, were barred from returning to Canada. According to Canadian officials, the Soviets had offered a member of the RCMP "unlimited" funds for information on Canadian intelligence methods, and had actually paid \$30,500 over a period of nearly a year of material deliberately supplied by the Canadians. The operation concentrated on uncovering RCMP methods used in surveillance of Soviet representatives in Canada.

France

October 16, 1976: French officials announced the expulsion of Mikhail Solovyev, a member of the Soviet Embassy Commercial Section in Paris. French counterespionage agents arrested Solovyev, who was wearing a wig and dark glasses, at the Notre Dame de la Gare Church, after he was handed a dossier allegedly containing plans for a secret new French jet engine.

July 1, 1978: Colonel Viktor Penkov, assistant military attache at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was arrested and subsequently expelled on espionage charges.

Italy

February 13, 1970: Italy ordered the expulsion of Vladimir Aleksandrov, a Soviet Embassy employee, and Lolli Zamoisky, an Izvestiya correspondent, on charges of espionage. The two Soviets were said to have received secret military information from an unidentified Italian non-commissioned officer who had been arrested the previous week.

The Netherlands

May 6, 1970: Second Secretary Boris Netrebskiy and Vladimir Sharovarov, both with the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, were expelled on charges of espionage. Following a car accident in which the two were involved, Dutch police found among their personal belongings in the car a map with Dutch military installations marked out on it.

April 7, 1972: First Secretary A. Lobanov, Third Secretary A.N. Illarionov, and Attache M. Makarov, all with the Soviet Embassy in Copenhagen, expelled on charges of espionage.

July 1975: A.A. Kiselev, military attache with the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, expelled on charges of espionage and collecting Dutch military secrets.

March 30, 1978: According to local newspapers, S. Cheryayev of the Soviet Trade Mission and I. Lopukhov, Director of the Soviet Intourist office in Amsterdam were expelled on charges of espionage. A. Poleshchuk, a Soviet electronics specialist, employed in The Netherlands by the Soviet state companies Mashniborintorg and Elecktronorg, was declared persona non grata and denied future entry into the country. The three were suspected of trying to obtain secret information about the F-16 aircraft and electronic and military aviation as well as information related to production and research in Dutch military industry. Two days later, Dutch security officials expelled G. Burmistrov, member of the Soviet Trade Mission in Amsterdam, and V. Khlystov, managing director of the mixed Dutch-Soviet company Elorg BV, on similar espionage-related charges.

Norway

September 19, 1970: Valeriy Mesropov, Soviet engineer and identified KGB operative attached to the Norwegian firm Koneisto Norge A/S, was expelled on charges of espionage.

April 11, 1973: Third Secretary Yuriy Polyushkin and attache Valeriy Yerofeyev, both attached to the Soviet Embassy in Oslo and identified as KGB operatives, expelled on espionage charges.

January 28, 1977: A. Printsipalov, third secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Oslo, as well as an unidentified embassy chauffeur, were declared persona non grata by Norwegian authorities and expelled for their involvement in

political espionage activities. In a separate incident, Aleksandr Dementev, Igor Izachtirinsky and Eugenia Klimanov, all with the Soviet Embassy's Commercial Section, were expelled on charges of espionage. Also implicated and charged with espionage against Norway was Evgenya Zotin, a TASS correspondent.

February 7, 1977: Gennadiy Titov, Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Oslo and identified KGB officer, expelled on charges of espionage.

Spain

March 1977: Yuriy Pivovarov, member of the Soviet commercial mission in Madrid for two years, was expelled on charges of espionage (the first expulsion of a Soviet from Spain since the Spanish Civil War, according to Diario 16). Pivovarov was believed to have been the GRU "rezident" in Madrid.

July 4, 1977: Gennadiy Sveshnikov, director of the Spanish Soviet maritime company INTRAMAR, was expelled on charges of espionage. Believed to have been a GRU intelligence officer, Sveshnikov was arrested by agents of the Spanish High General Staff in Aranjuez when he tried to discard a packet of documents allegedly concerning Spanish national security affairs, according to Diario 16.

April 1978: Yuriy Ysayev, commercial officer with the Soviet Embassy in Madrid, was expelled on charges of espionage.

May 1978: Yuriy Popov, identified only as a Soviet "engineer" was expelled from Spain on charges of industrial espionage.

Switzerland

February 12, 1970: Aleksei Sterlikov (first secretary) and Nikolai Savin (second secretary), both with the Soviet Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, expelled on charges of espionage. According to Swiss officials, the two Soviets were contacts of Marcel Buttex, a Swiss spy suspect who had been arrested one week earlier. Buttex established "letter drops" for Soviet agents in Switzerland and in West Germany, according to these same officials.

August 22, 1976: Swiss officials expelled Eugene Bogomolov, second secretary at the Soviet Embassy in Bern, on charges of political espionage.

June 6, 1978: Vladimir Bukreyev, Soviet ILO official in Geneva, expelled from Switzerland on espionage charges.

June 26, 1978: Gregori Myagkov, Soviet ILO official in Geneva and KGB operative, expelled from Switzerland on unspecified "intelligence-related activities."

UK

June 22, 1971: Lev N. Sherstnev (first secretary) and Valery S. Chusovitin (third secretary), both with the Soviet Embassy in London, were expelled from Great Britain on charges of engaging in "intelligence operations" against the United Kingdom. (Shortly thereafter, Moscow ordered the expulsion of two British diplomats in Moscow in retaliation.)

September 24, 1971: Britain expelled 90 Soviet diplomatic and other representatives on espionage charges and barred the return of 15 others who were temporarily out of the country. The names of the 105 Soviet intelligence operatives had been provided one month earlier to British counterintelligence officers by a ranking KGB defector, who also provided information on the planned infiltration into England of Soviet agents for the purpose of sabotage; other documents provided by the defector detailed Soviet plans for infiltrating segments of the Royal British Navy.

Yugoslavia

March 6, 1976: An unidentified Soviet citizen, described only as a woman in her early thirties, was arrested in Yugoslavia on charges of espionage and acting as a contact between the Soviet consulate general in Zagreb and pro-Soviet dissident political groups whose activities were directly linked to anti-Tito emigres living in the USSR and Czechoslovakia. Her arrest coincided with the sudden departure from Zagreb of Soviet Consul General Yuri Sepelev, who was ostensibly reassigned to Moscow.

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina

November 7, 1970: Yuri Yabov and Yuri Mamontov, administrative aides in the Commercial Section of the Soviet Embassy in Buenos Aires, were expelled by Argentine authorities for "activities incompatible with their function as members of a foreign diplomatic mission." The two Soviets had been arrested two days earlier in a police raid on a meeting in suburban Belgrano.

Bolivia

April 10, 1972: Sixty Soviet diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in La Paz were expelled on charges of financing leftist rebel movements in the country. According to press reports, only four or five Soviets were permitted to remain in La Paz.

Costa Rica

August 19, 1979: Costa Rican President Carazo declared Soviet First Secretary Yuriy Chernysh and Second Secretary Aleksandr Mordovyets persona non grata on charges of inappropriate involvement with local labor unions during an August 1979 general strike

in Costa Rica over labor and community issues.

Ecuador

July 6, 1971: Three unidentified Soviet diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in Quito were expelled "for reasons of state and of internal order," according to the Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry. Press accounts speculated that the diplomats were involved in fomenting labor strikes and conflicts.

Mexico

March 21-22, 1971: The Soviet Charge d'Affaires, Dmitri Diakonov, and four other unidentified diplomats working at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City were expelled for engaging in "subversive activities." Their expulsion from Mexico was believed to be related to the arrest two days earlier of 20 persons described as members of a revolutionary group trained in guerrilla tactics in North Korea. The 20 had attended the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University in Moscow before going on to Pyongyang. Diakonov had already been expelled from Argentina in 1959 and from Brazil in 1963.

SOUTH ASIA

India

February 1975: Soviet assistant military advisor Major Kanvasky and one other unidentified Soviet official were expelled on espionage charges.

February 1979: Two unidentified KGB officers allegedly posing as Soviet diplomats were expelled on espionage charges.

Sri Lanka

September 3, 1977: Envar Kapba, secretary of the Georgian Republic Trade Union Council, and Konstantin Tuzikov, an official of the Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, were declared persona non grata and expelled by Sri Lankan authorities for "interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka." Both were in Colombo to attend the Ceylon Workers Congress.

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227457 PAPER

20 12/28/1981 B1

THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE USE OF FORCE
IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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227460 CABLE

6 1/27/1982 B1

US NATO 00561

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227467 TALKING POINTS

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B1

FOR DOBRYNIN LUNCH

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USSTART
USINF
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/12/88 (ZIMMERMANN, WARREN) OR-M
TAGS: MNUC, PARM
SUBJECT: USTINOV ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

REFS: A) MOSCOW 2687, B) MOSCOW 5281

1. (C) SUMMARY: DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV, IN THE
MIDST OF A LONG HARRANGUE IN PRAVDA ON U.S. MILITARY
AND ARMS CONTROL POLICIES, HAS MADE AN IMPORTANT
STATEMENT ON SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY. IN A
DEFENSIVE BUT STRIDENT TONE, USTINOV ASSERTS THAT THE
NEW SOVIET DECLARED POLICY ON NO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS DOES NOT SIGNIFY A CHANGE IN SOVIET NUCLEAR
DOCTRINE. HE SAYS THE USSR WILL NOT ALLOW AN AGGRESSOR
TO CARRY OUT A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE, AND THUS HE
APPEARS TO ASSERT A LAUNCH ON WARNING POLICY. USTINOV

INTIMATES THAT DEFENSE SPENDING WILL HAVE TO INCREASE.
FINALLY, HE ARGUES THAT AN AGGRESSOR SHOULD NOT BE
TEMPTED TO PREEMPT. USTINOV HERE MAY BE CALLING
FOR STEPS TO ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY OF SOVIET
STRATEGIC FORCES. THE APPEARANCE IN PRINT OF THESE
REMARKS BY USTINOV RAISES A QUESTION WHETHER THE NEW
SOVIET INITIATIVE ON NO FIRST USE HAS REKINDLED AN
INTERNAL STRATEGIC DEBATE. END SUMMARY.

2. (LOU) MINISTER OF DEFENSE DMITRI USTINOV, IN A FULL-
PAGE PRAVDA ARTICLE JULY 12, DELIVERED A LONG HARRANGUE
AGAINST U.S. MILITARY AND ARMS CONTROL POLICY, AND HE
DEFENDED THE SOVIET POLICY ON NO FIRST USE IN THE CONTEXT
OF SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY. SEPTEL SUMMARIZES THE CRITICISM
OF U.S. POLICY; THIS TELEGRAM DISCUSSES THE MORE IMPORTANT
USTINOV COMMENTS ON STRATEGIC POLICY.

DEFENSE OF NO FIRST USE

3. (LOU) EARLY IN HIS ARTICLE USTINOV NOTES THE
"UNIVERSAL CHARACTER" OF THE NEW SOVIET NO FIRST USE
PLEDGE. HE NOTED THAT EARLIER THE USSR HAD EXPRESSED
ITS READINESS NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST
THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH RENOUNCE THE PRODUCTION AND
ACQUISITION OF SUCH WEAPONS AND DO NOT HAVE THEM ON
THEIR TERRITORIES. "NOW OUR PLEDGE NOT TO BE THE
FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS REFERS TO ALL STATES OF
THE WORLD WITHOUT EXCLUSION."

4. (LOU) IN SECTION III OF THE ARTICLE USTINOV
DEFENDS THE SOVIET DECISION TO BROADEN THE PLEDGE. THE
MAIN POINTS OF HIS ARGUMENT ARE:

- IN LIGHT OF THE GROWING AGGRESSIVENESS OF U.S.
- AND NATO POLICY IT WAS NOT EASY FOR THE USSR
- SIMPLY TO TAKE UPON ITSELF A UNILATERAL OBLIGATION
- NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
- IT IS QUITE NATURAL FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE, OUR
- FRIENDS, AND PROGRESSIVE FORCES OF THE WORLD
- TO ASK THE QUESTION: WAS THE RIGHT MOMENT CHOSEN
- FOR SUCH A STEP, AND BY TAKING A UNILATERAL
- OBLIGATION ARE WE EXPOSING TO EXCESSIVE DANGER
- OUR PEOPLE, OUR COUNTRY, AND THE CAUSE OF
- SOCIALISM AND PROGRESS IN ALL THE WORLD?

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- IF AN AGGRESSOR USES NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST, HE
- WILL BRING ON OUR PEOPLE UNMEASURABLE DISASTER.
- THE AGGRESSOR MUST KNOW ALSO, HOWEVER, THAT THE
- ADVANTAGE OF THE PREEMPTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
- WILL NOT BRING HIM VICTORY.
- GIVEN THE STATE OF MODERN DETECTION SYSTEMS THE
- U.S. CANNOT DELIVER A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE
- AGAINST THE READY SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES.
- THE AGGRESSOR WILL NOT ESCAPE AN ALL-SHATTERING
- RETALIATORY BLOW.
- L. I. BREZHNEV HAS WARNED THAT, "ONLY SOMEONE
- WHO HAS DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE CAN BEGIN A
- NUCLEAR WAR IN THE HOPE OF WINNING IT."

SOVIET DOCTRINE AND PREPAREDNESS

5. (LOU) USTINOV ALSO IN SECTION III GOES ON TO
ELABORATE ON SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND PREPAREDNESS:

- TAKING UPON OURSELVES THE UNILATERAL OBLIGATION
- NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST, WE OF COURSE
- WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THERE ARE IN THE
- WORLD AGGRESSIVE FORCES, READY IN THE NAME OF
- THEIR NARROW SELFISH GOALS TO PUT AT RISK THE
- VITAL INTERESTS OF MANKIND.
- THUS OUR STATE IN THE FUTURE WILL BUILD ITS OWN
- POLICY AND SUPPORT THE DEFENSE CAPACITY IN KEEPING
- WITH HOW THE U.S. CONDUCTS ITSELF, WHETHER IT
- WILL LISTEN TO THE VOICE OF REASON, TO PEOPLE'S
- HOPES AND DEMANDS, WHETHER IT WILL FOLLOW OUR
- GOOD EXAMPLE, OR WHETHER IT WILL CONTINUE ON THE
- PATH OF ESCALATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND HEIGHTENING
- OF TENSION.
- KNOWING THE HABITS AND CHARACTER OF AGGRESSIVE
- FORCES, THE USSR WILL MAINTAIN A HIGH VIGILANCE
- AND STANDING MILITARY READINESS OF ITS ARMED
- FORCES ON THE LEVEL OF MODERN DEMANDS.
- OUR DEFENSIVE MILITARY DOCTRINE WILL NOT CARRY A
- PASSIVE CHARACTER.
- IN CASE OF AGGRESSION OUR ARMED FORCES TOGETHER
- WITH THE FRATERNAL SOCIALIST ARMIES WILL DEFEND
- SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS WITHOUT ANY HESITATION
- WITH ALL DECISIVENESS, WITH THE USE OF ALL DEFENSIVE
- AND ECONOMIC POWER OF OUR STATES.
- TOGETHER WITH ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION
- OBJECTIVELY COMES THE SHARP DEMANDS FOR FURTHER
- INCREASES IN THE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS OF OUR
- ARMY, THEIR TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, THE PERFECTION
- OF ADMINISTRATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE
- STRENGTHENING OF MORAL-POLITICAL TRAINING.

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-- IT IS NECESSARY, IN ORDER THAT THE INFLUENCE OF
- THE FACTOR OF SURPRISE BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM,
- THAT THE AGGRESSOR NOT BE TEMPTED TO PREEMPT IN
- THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

COMMENT

6. (C) USTINOV'S ARGUMENT CONTAINS FOUR IMPORTANT POINTS:

-- A) RETALIATORY POLICY

USTINOV APPARENTLY FEELS COMPELLED TO DEFEND THE CHANGE
IN DECLARED POLICY ON NO FIRST USE BY ASSERTING THAT
SOVIET NUCLEAR DOCTRINE HAS NOT CHANGED. NUCLEAR
"AGGRESSION" WOULD TRIGGER MASSIVE RETALIATION.

-- B) DISARMING FIRST STRIKE

USTINOV APPEARS TO SAY THE USSR WILL LAUNCH ON WARNING
RATHER THAN LET AN AGGRESSOR HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO
CONDUCT A DISARMING FIRST STRIKE. THIS MAY BE THE
~~MOST EXPLICIT SOVIET THREAT TO DATE TO LAUNCH ON
WARNING.~~

-- C) DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS

SOVIET DEFENSE SPENDING AND PREPAREDNESS WILL BE
AUGMENTED, USTINOV IMPLIES, TO ENABLE THE USSR TO
CARRY OUT THESE AND OTHER DEFENSE POLICIES NEEDED TO
MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE U.S. AND NATO. THIS
PROBABLY IS INTENDED AS A WARNING THAT THE USSR
WILL FURTHER MODERNIZE ITS STRATEGIC FORCES IF THE
U.S. STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IS FULLY
IMPLEMENTED.

-- D) DETERRING PREEMPTION

IN ARGUING THAT THE AGGRESSOR SHOULD NOT BE TEMPED
TO DELIVER A PREEMPTIVE BLOW, USTINOV MAY HAVE TWO
PURPOSES: 1) TO REINFORCE THE LAUNCH ON WARNING
THREAT, AND 2) TO CALL FOR ENHANCING THE SURVIVABILITY
OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, SUCH AS BY REDUCING
RELIANCE ON FIXED LAND-BASED ICBMS. IN FEBRUARY
CHIEF OF STAFF OGARKOV STRUCK THE LATTER CHORD WHEN
HE WARNED OF THE DANGER OF A U.S. SURPRISE NUCLEAR
ATTACK AND CALLED FOR SURVIVABLE FORCES CAPABLE OF
RIDING OUT THE ATTACK AND DESTROYING THE ENEMY (REF A).
SUBSEQUENTLY OTHER SIGNS EMERGED WHICH INDICATE THAT

THE SOVIETS ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE
VULNERABILITY OF THEIR ICBMS, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE
MX AND TRIDENT D-5 MISSILES WILL BE DEPLOYED (REF B).
POINTS C) AND D), TAKEN TOGETHER, RAISE A QUESTION
WHETHER USTINOV IS INTIMATING THAT SOVIET SPENDING ON
STRATEGIC FORCES WILL HAVE TO INCREASE TO ENABLE THE
SOVIETS TO MAKE THEIR FORCES MORE SURVIVABLE AND
ENDURING.

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7. (C) THE APPEARANCE IN PRINT OF USTINOV'S DEFENSE OF SOVIET NO FIRST USE POLICY, COMBINED WITH HIS WARNING TO THE U.S. AND CALL FOR AUGMENTED SOVIET STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES, MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT AN INTERNAL SOVIET STRATEGIC DEBATE HAS ERUPTED WITH FULL FORCE. FOR OVER A YEAR NOW INDICATIONS HAVE SURFACED PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT SUCH A DEBATE HAS BEEN TAKING PLACE. IN MAY 1981 LT. GENERAL PAVEL ZHILIN, WRITING IN "KOMMUNIST," IMPLICITLY ASSERTED A NUCLEAR WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE. HIS PRESENTATION WAS MORE EXPLICIT THAN PRIOR REMARKS BY MARSHAL OGARKOV, AND THEY DIFFER SHARPLY FROM THE CONSISTENT LINE TAKEN BY BREZHNEV AND USTINOV THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS UNLIKELY TO REMAIN LIMITED AND ITS CONSEQUENCES WILL BE CATASTROPHIC (REF A). USTINOV'S LATEST ARTICLE SUGGESTS THAT BREZHNEV'S NO FIRST USE INITIATIVE HAS REKINDLED AN INTERNAL STRATEGIC DEBATE WHICH MAY PIT MILITARY OFFICERS AGAINST BREZHNEV AND CERTAIN OTHERS IN THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. HARTMAN

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USSR - Forced Labor Blair
from Paula 14

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Dear Mr. Chairman:

Conference Report No. 97-891 dated September 29 accompanying H.R. 6956 directed the Secretary to undertake an investigation into allegations that forced labor is being employed, and human rights violated, by the Soviet authorities in the construction of the Trans-Siberian gas pipeline.

There is clear evidence that the Soviet Union has used -- and continues to use -- forced labor on a massive scale. This includes the use of political prisoners. We have information from a variety of sources which confirms that the Soviets routinely employ a portion of their 4 million forced laborers, the world's largest forced labor population, as unskilled workers on domestic pipeline construction. It cannot yet be conclusively established whether such labor is being used specifically on the export pipeline project, but a number of reports suggest that forced labor has been used in some of the site preparation and other preliminary work on the export pipeline including clearing the forests, leveling right-of-way, building roads, and constructing living quarters.

There is, in fact, a long history to the use of forced labor in the Soviet Union. This has included the use of forced labor -- including thousands of political prisoners -- on numerous large-scale development projects. The Baikal-Amur rail line, the Bielomorsk and Volga-Don canals, the Moscow subway, and the Kama River truck plant are a few of the better known Soviet projects built with forced labor. Among the groups that Soviet authorities traditionally press into forced labor are political prisoners and prisoners of conscience convicted for "anti-Soviet agitation" or under broadly-worded "hooliganism" and "parasitism" laws. For nearly thirty years, complaints have been registered in the International Labor Organization, and in other international bodies, against the use of such laws to punish and exploit political and religious dissidents in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet authorities not only have failed to provide responses satisfactory to the ILO on any of these complaints, but also have attacked the ILO supervisory machinery itself. By its continuing refusal to cooperate with the ILO authorities, the USSR has, in effect, assumed the burden of proof with regard to the numerous and grave charges of forced labor lodged against it. We believe it is incumbent upon the Soviet authorities to open all of their labor camps and large-scale labor brigades to independent international investigation.

The Honorable

Jamie L. Whitten, Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations,
House of Representatives

We welcome Congressional interest in this question. Forced labor in the USSR is a broad human rights issue which has long been of deep concern to the Administration, as expressed most recently in our official statement of September 22. Decency compels us to express distress at the Soviet Union's exploitation of forced labor. For those who believe in the promotion of world peace through law, it is crucial that the international community investigate and seek remedial action when confronted with serious charges of violations of international agreements. Obviously, the closed nature of Soviet society renders difficult the discovery of hard facts and irrefutable evidence. But be assured that we will continue diligently to conduct this investigation. We also are pursuing this issue vigorously through the ILO.

As our preliminary report, I am transmitting under this cover a copy of the Administration's statement of September 22 and a packet of reports and documents which will provide for you the status of our efforts up to now. This packet includes a historical summary of Soviet forced labor questions before the ILO; a study entitled "The Soviet Forced Labor System," which includes maps and graphics of the pipeline network and forced labor camps; documentation and testimony from hearings sponsored by the Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights; and a summary of actions by other governments and international labor bodies. Intelligence information pertinent to the issue will be made available through the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.

Sincerely

Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosure:

Preliminary report

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September 22, 1982

PRESS STATEMENT

Forced Labor in the USSR

We have received a growing number of reports that the USSR has used a large number of prisoners -- including, thousands of political prisoners -- to work on massive labor projects. According to at least one such report, for example, at least 100,000 such forced laborers are being used on the heavy infrastructure work of clearing swamps, cutting timber and building access roads for the Yamal gas pipeline. These forced laborers reportedly include religious dissidents and other prisoners of conscience.

These reports have come from a wide variety of individuals and organizations, in Europe, Asia and the US. The sources include human rights organizations; labor organizations; laborers who have managed to emigrate from the Soviet Union after working under these conditions; and letters reaching Asia and the West from the USSR.

We are not claiming to have evidence resembling a "smoking gun." Given the closed nature of Soviet society and the official control of the Soviet media, moreover, there may never be a "smoking gun." But the information being released by this wide range of knowledgeable individuals and organizations spanning three continents, some with first hand experience of these labor conditions, goes into considerable detail and deserves serious examination.

Reliable estimates place the total number of forced laborers in the Soviet Union today at approximately 4 million. Further, it is well established that the Soviet Union has a history of using forced labor on a mass scale -- including political prisoners -- on major projects, particularly in Siberia -- where the official press has acknowledged that it is difficult to persuade Soviet workers to go there voluntarily. To cite only two examples, some 250,000 forced laborers are believed to have perished during the 1930's while working on the construction of the Bielomorsk Canal. And in the 1970's thousands of forced laborers were reported to be building the Baikal-Amur railway extension in Southeastern Siberia.

As regards foreign laborers, the official Soviet media itself has admitted that several thousand Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian laborers have been imported into the USSR and has intimated that many thousands more are likely to be imported in the near future. Information on the nature of this

program is fragmentary. We do not know whether or not the Vietnamese laborers are working on the Siberian pipeline. But we are very concerned about indications that Vietnamese may be coerced into working in the USSR and Eastern Europe and that a portion of the salary paid to them might be deducted to offset Vietnam's debts to the host country. In addition, we have received reports that the Soviet authorities are placing limitations on the ability of these workers to communicate with their families and friends outside the USSR. We believe it is important that international attention be given to this situation, given the obvious possibility of exploitation of these workers.

The Soviet Government could contribute to establishing the truth about these very serious charges by permitting an objective examination of labor conditions on its various Siberian projects, and the conditions in which Soviet political prisoners live and work. We would welcome such an independent international investigation, but the prospects for obtaining this are probably not bright. For example, charges of use of forced labor have been made in the past against the USSR in the International Labor Organization (ILO). However the Soviet authorities have consistently refused to allow an ILO mission to visit the USSR to investigate these charges.

Because of the seriousness of these charges, and the massive human rights violations which they imply, we believe the international community has a responsibility to investigate them. The USG, for its part, is thoroughly examining the information being brought to bear on this issue, and we understand that several other governments have indicated similar intentions. As our examination proceeds, we will -- wherever possible -- make our findings available to the public. We hope that other governments and private organizations will do the same.

716A

October, 1982



The International Labor Organization:
FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET UNION

For close to thirty years the Soviet Union has been under more or less constant pressure from the International Labor Organization (ILO) to bring its law and practice into line with international treaties on forced labor. (See attached chronology.) The ILO is the only UN agency with tripartite representation (i.e., governments, workers and employers). At times, ILO pressure has taken the form of outright censure of Soviet policies. Today, the primary points of contention in the ILO are Soviet laws concerning persons "leading a parasitic way of life" and those concerning membership on collective farms (kolkhoz). These laws are viewed by the ILO as legislative mechanisms for sustaining and legitimizing a system of forced or compulsory labor.

UN Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor

The first time forced labor in the Soviet Union was raised as a serious issue came in 1948 when the AF of L proposed that the ILO initiate a survey of forced labor in all member countries. However, since the USSR had been expelled from the ILO in December 1939 following its invasion of Finland, but was a member of the fledgling UN, responsibility for the survey was partly assumed by ECOSOC. The survey was finally conducted in 1952 by an independent Commission of Inquiry (appointed jointly by the ILO and ECOSOC), and completed in 1953.

Generally, the Commission found little evidence of forced labor in non-communist countries. But the Commission left no doubt that in both law and practice the Soviet Union employs forced labor for the interests of the national economy and as a means of political coercion:

"Given the general aims of Soviet penal legislation, its definitions of crime in general and of political offenses in particular, the restrictions it imposes on the rights of the defense in cases involving political offenses, the extensive powers of punishment it accords to purely administrative authorities in respect of persons considered to constitute a danger to society, and the purpose of political re-education it assigns to penalties of corrective labour served in camps, in colonies, in exile and even at the normal

place of work, this legislation constitutes the basis of a system of forced labor employed as a means of political coercion or punishment for holding or expressing political views and it is evident from the many testimonies examined by the Committee that this legislation is in fact employed in such a way."

"Soviet legislation makes provision for various measures which involve compulsion to work or place restrictions on the freedom of employment; these measures seem to be applied on a large scale in the interests of the national economy, and considered as a whole, they lead, in the Committee's view, to a system of forced or compulsory labour constituting an important element in the economy of the country."

(Italics added. Source: Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour, Geneva (1953), p.98)

The report was adopted first by ECOSOC in 1954, and later by the ILO in 1956, two years after the USSR renewed ILO membership. Needless to say, the Soviet bloc vehemently opposed adoption of the Commission's conclusions. Perhaps in an effort to strengthen its denial of the Commission's conclusions, that same year (1956) the USSR ratified ILO Convention 29 concerning Abolition of Forced Labor. Convention 29 was formulated by the ILO in 1930, and is primarily aimed at the abolition of forced labor in colonial territories. (See attached summary of Convention 29 for definition of forced labor.)

ILO Regular Supervision

While ratification may have been important to improve its political image, this step brought the USSR under the purview of ILO regular supervisory machinery. As a signatory, the USSR became legally bound to report annually (now biennially) on its implementation of Convention 29.

The ILO's regular supervisory process is composed of two steps: the first is a legal review of government reports by a 19-member independent Committee of Experts (COE), the second a more political review by a Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CACR). While the COE currently has two members from the Soviet bloc (USSR and Poland), it has gained a solid reputation of objectivity and impartiality which rests on the fact that its members are highly respected international lawyers and jurists who, in theory, act independently of their governments.

Every year, in March, the COE issues an analysis of how well member States are living up to their treaty obligations. This report is then passed to the CACR which meets during, and is part of, the annual ILO June Conference. Here, governments are called on -- mainly by the workers and employers groups -- to explain discrepancies between the Convention and their law and practice. Depending on whether or not the workers and employers groups are satisfied with government explanations, the case can be "adjourned" until the next review session or it can be highlighted in the CACR's report on a so-called "special list."

ILO Censure of Soviet Forced Labor

Fifteen years after ratification, in 1971, the Committee of Experts issued its first public report on the USSR's application of Convention 29. Its report explained the ILO's long silence: since 1962 the Experts had been sending direct requests to the Soviet government for information on compulsory labor of persons "evading socially useful work and leading an anti-social, parasitic way of life." Since the information received from the Soviet government had been unsatisfactory, repeated requests were made over a period of ten years.

Nevertheless, the 1971 report marked a renewed ILO interest in public examination of Soviet forced labor policies. While the Experts' report did not lead to a full-blown discussion at the 1971 ILO Conference, in subsequent years the ILO did highlight in the "special list" and "special paragraphs" of the CACR report the continuing Soviet failure to uphold Convention 29. Such censure of Soviet policies by the ILO Conference is the most forceful means available to the ILO to bring pressure to bear on the government.

In its 1971 report the Experts concluded that under a "Ukase" (decree) of 1961, as amended in 1965 and again in 1970, compulsory labor could be ordered by an administrative body (the Executive Committee of a Soviet of Working People's Deputies), non-compliance being punishable by imprisonment or corrective labor. Since labor is exacted under a menace of penalty, not performed voluntarily, the Experts view Soviet law as contravening Convention 29.

The next year, in 1972 the COE noted that the new Labor Code of the RSFSR adopted in 1971 no longer contained a provision permitting the call-up of labor for "carrying out important state work." However, the Experts reiterated their call for the abolition of compulsory labor involving so-called "parasites."

In 1974, for the first time, no report had been received from the Soviet government. Nevertheless, the COE issued a report that took public issue with (a) the obligations imposed on collective farms with regard to planning of agricultural production, (b) the restrictions preventing termination of membership on a collective farm, and (c) anti-parasite legislation.

What happened at the 1974 ILO Conference broke a long, tacit moratorium on public denunciation of the Soviet Union. The CACR, working from the Experts' report, formally took up the issue of forced labor in the Soviet Union, resulting in a protracted and heated debate. The Soviet government representative adamantly refused to admit any of the Experts' findings or to accept the need for any remedial action. In an historic decision, the CACR decided by vote to impose the most severe form of censure on the USSR for violating Convention 29: criterion 7 of the "special list." 1/

When the CACR report came up for adoption in the plenary Conference, quorum was not reached, due primarily to a configuration of political issues bringing together the Soviet and Arab blocs. This lack of formal endorsement, however, did not nullify or abort the supervisory process. The Soviet government was still required to report the next year on its progress toward upholding forced labor standards.

The ILO continued to apply pressure on the Soviet Union, particularly in 1976 and 1977 when the CACR criticized the USSR in a special paragraph of its report for not respecting Convention 29. In 1977 there was a repeat of the 1974 events, with the CACR report not being adopted due to the lack of a quorum.

Since 1977, the ILO has not formally censured the USSR on the forced labor issue. But almost every year at the June Conference the CACR continues to examine, question and probe the Soviet delegation for admissions, concessions, promises. Despite this pressure the Soviet response remains unsatisfactory.

1/ The "special list", developed in 1964, included seven criteria, arranged into two separate groups. The first six concerned the supply of reports and information to the Experts and ILO Conference, not matters of substance. The seventh criterion, listed under a separate heading "Application of Ratified Conventions", was applied to governments that had demonstrated a "continued failure to implement fully the Conventions concerned." The "special paragraph" was considered to be a somewhat less severe form of censure. The "special list" system was revised in 1980.

Current Issues: Persons "Leading a Parasitic Way of Life"

The history of this aspect of the Soviet forced labor issue has been marked by a total reluctance on the part of the Soviet government to concede that its legislation infringes Convention 29. When in 1975 earlier anti-parasite legislation was repealed, following pressure from the Experts and Conference Committee, it was immediately replaced by Section 209 of the Penal Code of the RSFSR to which the COE has taken exception ever since. Specifically, under current legislation a "parasite" is defined as someone living off unearned income, unemployed, earning money through illegal means, or evading socially useful labor.

In their current observations, the Experts cover familiar ground: the Soviet government persistently claims that Section 209, and Ordinances of 1973 and 1976 which also define vagrancy, can be applied only to gamblers and fortune-tellers. However, the Experts argue that these laws do not specify "only" gamblers and fortune-tellers, and can therefore be applied to any physically capable person who is unemployed.

The use of Section 209 (whether actual or potential) is viewed by the Experts as a means of directly or indirectly compelling all citizens to work. The Experts argue that if the Penal Code provision is indeed aimed at illegal income from fortune-telling or gambling, then it should be amended to reflect this fact.

The Conference Committee has often taken the issue one step further, discussing how legislation has been applied in practice. A frequent example submitted by the CACR is that of dissidents who are fired, unable to find employment within their allowed district of employment due to "troublemaker" status, then arrested several months later for leading a "parasitic way of life". The charge may involve imprisonment, exile, or detainment in a corrective labor camp. In other words, CACR discussions lead one to the conclusion that Soviet legislation on parasites plays a central role in administrative control of dissidents and of those refused Soviet exit permission.

Recently, in 1980 when the Soviet government was under extreme pressure from the CACR, the Soviet representative unexpectedly agreed that the legislation on parasitism should be clarified, and he stated that new formulations could be

expected before the next Conference. Indeed, he claimed that discussions and consultations with the ILO Secretariat were already underway. However, subsequent Soviet positions at the 1981 and 1982 Conferences revealed that no new legislation would be forthcoming.

Termination of membership on collective farms

Although the Soviet position has appeared to be somewhat less rigid in regard to this issue, its implications in terms of Soviet agriculture are far-reaching.

As in the case of "parasites", the Soviet legal position is straightforward: members of a collective farm cannot presently leave it unless its management committee and general meeting consent. This inhibition of freedom of movement is tightened further by a requirement that collective farmers cannot take up other employment unless they produce their work books which must be maintained by the farm management. This too is a restriction on the choice of work.

The CACR has frequently pointed out the problems with this legislation. If management denies a request to leave the farm or refuses to hand over the workbook, the worker is either forced to stay on the farm or risk unemployment and subsequent arrest for leading a "parasitic" way of life. The ILO Experts have repeatedly asked the Soviet government to amend its legislation so that workers on farms may terminate their membership, or employment, by simply giving management sufficient notice of their intention to leave.

Five times in recent years the Soviet government has promised that the problem was being solved. In 1977 the government stated that "measures (to) put the legislation formally into line with (Convention 29)" would be taken "before the next session of the Committee of Experts and maybe even earlier." In 1978, the government indicated that "consultations which were under way...(with the ILO were) well advanced and that it could be hoped that they would lead to a solution in the near future." Again in 1979, its report referred to these consultations, prompting the COE to express hope that "the government will soon be able to indicate the solution adopted."

In 1980, the USSR representative claimed that his government understood the COE's point of view, adding that: "consultations were under way aiming not at the establishment

of the right to leave a collective farm but at clearly spelling it out. It was therefore not a question of substance but of formulation." In other words, the Soviet government appeared to be claiming that legislation already granted the right to leave a collective farm, but just needed to be further clarified.

Finally, in 1982 the Soviet government reiterated that consultations are being held with the Soviet employer and trade union organizations concerned. In addition, it pointed to a decree adopted on March 4, 1982 concerning timely consideration of a member's request to leave a farm as evidence of Soviet compliance with Convention 29. However, a question was raised by the US worker delegate about Order No. 597 adopted by the Central Committee of the Council of Ministers on July 10, 1980 and which amended the model rules for collective farms. This issue remains unresolved and further discussion can be expected at the 1984 Conference.

Limitations on ILO Supervision of Soviet Forced Labor

The means available to the ILO to exert pressure on the Soviet Union, despite the efforts noted above, is necessarily limited. Convention 29 is by no means the only, or most important treaty formulated by the ILO on forced labor. Indeed, in 1957 the ILO adopted a Convention (No. 105 concerning the abolition of forced labor) which is in many ways more applicable to the modern state, and certainly more relevant to the use of forced labor in the Soviet Union.

Convention 105 prohibits a government from employing forced labor for purposes of: political coercion or discipline; economic development; racial, social, national or religious discrimination; labor discipline; or punishment for having participated in strikes. This Convention, however, cannot be applied to the USSR because the USSR it is not a signatory state. Consequently, the ILO is only able to pursue the issue of Soviet forced labor under the provisions of Convention 29, which is not as relevant or powerful an instrument as would be Convention 105.