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THE ROOM IN

THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM

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PREFACE

To enable observers of the Soviet Union to better assess the reports of use of forced labor in the USSR, especially reports of its use on the gas export pipeline to Western Europe, this study has been prepared on the overall system of forced labor in the Soviet Union. Various aspects of the system as outlined in Soviet official documents, such as the The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Criminal Code, are examined in the light the accounts by former prisoners and other emigres that have been published in Western news media about the realities of the system. The report has been prepared from a broad array of documents, scholarly studies, and other source materials relating to the subject of the Soviet penal system in general and forced labor in particular.

THE SOVIET FORCED LABOR SYSTEM

The Soviet penal system is remarkable for its huge size and its systematic employment of labor. The labor camps so vividly described by Solzhenitsyn are only one element of a system that also includes prisons as well as a growing cadre of forced labor without confinement. The Soviets have an ideological commitment to the rehabilitative role of labor in the social adjustment of the individual, and accordingly refer to the forced labor camps as "correctional" labor colonies.*

Correctional labor colonies were first established in 1919 on the Solovetskiy Islands in the White Sea, but until Stalin assumed power the system grew rather slowly. Stalin's forced labor system reached a peak of perhaps 15 million persons in 1947. After Stalin's death liberal reforms reduced the camp population, and in 1957 P.I. Kudryavtsev, Deputy Procurator General of the Soviet Union, asserted that the number had been reduced to about 800,000 to 900,000, 1 to 2 percent politicals. Toward the end of the Khrushchev era, criminal penalties were toughened, and the camp system began to expand again. Although many of the old camps in Siberia and the Far East were abandoned, others were built closer to population centers.

In addition, an extensive system of forced labor without confinement had its inception in the early 1960s and has grown rapidly in scope since then; the number of non-confined forced laborers now more than equals the number of those confined, and it is continuing to rise. Given the worsening labor shortage in parts of the Soviet Union, this relatively efficient, flexible method of deriving some economic benefit from an increasing crime rate is

^{*}The term forced labor camps is used in this report as a general appellation for correctional labor colonies, educational labor colonies, and correctional labor colony settlements; the specific terms will be used when particular types of facilities are being discussed.

likely to continue to grow.

In the Soviet Union nine out of every 10 persons convicted of crimes (see Appendix 1) more serious than misdemeanors receive sentences that include forced labor. About half of these sentences also include confinement.

Although approximately half of all criminals sentenced to confinement are paroled from confinement, they continue in the forced labor system until they finish their terms.

How Many Forced Laborers?

We currently estimate that some 4 million Soviet citizens—about 1.5 percent of the population—are now serving sentences of forced labor.

- -- About 2 million of these are confined, 85 percent in forced labor camps--of which there are over 1,100--and the remainder in prisons.
- Approximately 1.5 million, convicted of crimes for which they could have received sentences of confinement, have been sentenced instead to probation with "compulsory involvement in labor." Most of them are working at construction jobs far from their homes.
- -- About 500,000 have been paroled from confinement but remain obligated to perform forced labor for the remainder of their terms. Many of them also are working at construction sites.
- -- In addition an undetermined number are sentenced to "correctional tasks" without confinement; they are working at their own jobs for reduced pay or in more menial jobs for low pay while continuing to live at home.

Among these forced laborers are dissidents (political prisoners) whose numbers may reach as high as 10,000, the figure claimed by Sakharov and Amnesty International. A former Soviet official reports that Ministry of



Internal Affairs (MVD) records listed 10,358 political prisoners at the beginning of 1977. Aleksandr Ginsburg, a prominent political dissident, estimated that there were 5,000 political prisoners in 1979.

Forced Labor With Confinement

The Correctional Labor Code of the RSFSR establishes four basic types of confinement facilities: correctional labor colonies, educational labor colonies (for juveniles), colony settlements, and prisons. Each type of facility is differentiated by the amount of freedom and privileges granted to the prisoners; the degree of supervision, regimentation, and restraint to which they are subjected; the difficulty of their labor; and the conditions under which they must live and work. The regimes (see Appendix 2) in effect at prisons are the most harsh; the ones in effect at correctional labor colonies and educational labor colonies somewhat less harsh; and the regime at colony settlements is the mildest in the system.

The gravity of the offender's crime and whether or not he is a recidivist determines in which of the following facilities incarceration will occur.

• Correctional labor colonies constitute the bulk of the traditional Soviet confinement system where convicts are closely guarded, supervised, and regimented. Labor colonies are enclosed by as many as six or seven fences and walls with towers on each corner manned by armed guards (Figure 1). A typical one-story wooden barracks houses a detachment of 140 to 160 prisoners divided into two sections. The legal minimum living area per prisoner (2.0 square meters in prisons; 2.5 square meters in camps) is not much larger than an American-style twin bed.

- Educational labor colonies are correctional institutions for juvenile criminals aged 14 through 17. Inmates of educational labor colonies are usually transferred to correctional labor colonies when they reach age 18. Those who have less than two years of a sentence remaining and who seem well on the way to rehabilitation however, may be allowed to remain at the educational labor colony.
- Correctional labor colony settlements are milder forms of confinement that were introduced in 1977. Often referred to by prisoners as the "fifth regime", these colony settlements are located in areas where new industries are being built and at other construction sites. Many regular camps—especially in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the Far East, and the Far North—have associated colony settlements. Colony settlements are the least onerous facilities in the penal system and the only ones in which the sexes are not segregated. For instance, prisoners must observe a curfew and perform the labor designated for them, but they may wear ordinary clothing, and few restrictions are placed on their private behavior or their privileges.
- Soviet prisons are urban facilities, most of which have been expanded and reconstructed since Czarist times, and present the harshest confinement in the system. All major cities have at least one large prison. Major prisons number about 300 and house some 300,000 inmates at any one time. Prisons are differentiated by primary function; four types may be distinguished: penitentiaries, transit prisons, investigatory prisons and psychiatric prisons (see Appendix 3).

Payment of Prisoners

Soviet law stipulates that inmates in prisons and labor colonies are to be paid at least the minimum wage for their work. Since inmates are not

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permitted to keep money in their possession (a rule constantly abused), wages are credited to the prisoners' accounts. Theoretically, after deductions for their upkeep have been made, the balance is credited to their accounts and paid to them when they depart; however, many prisoners reportedly have no money when they are released.

Prisoners are allowed as much as 5 rubles monthly in credit at the prison or colony commissary on what are termed "food items and basic necessities." Soap, tooth powder, envelopes, postage stamps, tobacco, cigarettes, black bread, margarine, candy, jam and canned fish are typical commissary items, but reportedly many of these are frequently unavailable. There are no restrictions placed on the amount of money a prisoner may spend on books, educational supplies, and stationery. The number of letters prisoners may send and receive and the number of packages and parcels they may receive are closely regulated.

Incentives and Penalties

The Correctional Labor Code specifies incentives that "may be employed to encourage convicts' good behavior and honest attitude toward work and training." These incentives include the granting of additional privileges—perhaps permission to spend an extra couple of rubles in the commissary. More significant measures entail transfer of prison inmates to labor colonies, or transfer of inmates of labor colonies of other than special regime to colony settlements. Such transfers may not take place until at least half the sentence has been served.

The Correctional Labor Code also specifies penalties that "may be applied to convicts for violating the requirements of the regime." Not surprisingly, most of the penalties are mirror images of the incentives: a warning or reprimand, withdrawal of privileges, and transfer to harsher confinement

conditions. For major infractions, inmates of both labor camps and prisons may be put in "punitive isolation." First offenders are sentenced for as long as 15 days to a punishment isolation cell, better known as the shizo, or cooler.

Working Conditions

The RSFSR Correctional Labor Code provides guidelines on the general work conditions of prisoners, while specific conditions are established by the prison and colony administrators. Work is compulsory, and those who do not work receive a reduced food ration and no pay. Inmates are required to work eight hours per day, six days a week. Prisoners who must travel to work sites, such as those in logging or construction areas, "donate" this extra time to the state. Most camps work two shifts, from 0800 to 1700 and from 1700 to 0100.

According to many former prisoners from many different camps, violations of good safety and health practices are common throughout the system, even though the Correctional Labor Code stipulates that "convicts' work is organized so as to observe labor protection rules and industrial safety measures as established by labor law." At a sawmilling camp in Riga, for example, serious accidents were reported to occur frequently. Prisoners in this camp work without helmets, gloves, or safety goggles.

Forced Labor Without Confinement

Persons sentenced to forced labor without confinement fall in two categories: those assigned to correctional <u>tasks</u> without confinement, an administrative penalty that amounts to little more than a fine, and those sentenced to correctional labor without confinement. The latter comprises two

sub-categories: parolees (also known as khimiki*) and probationers with compulsory labor.

The penalty of correctional tasks without confinement is meted out to offenders whose crimes are deemed not serious enough to justify sentences of confinement. The compulsory tasks may be performed either at the offender's regular workplace or at some other nearby place so that he may continue to live at home. The offender's pay is docked as much as 20 percent, and the time spent performing correctional tasks (maximum sentence: one year) may not count towards his job seniority. The number of Soviet citizens who receive such sentences annually is difficult to estimate but could number about a half million, judging from fragmentary information.

In 1964 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decreed that certain prisoners then under confinement could be released—in effect, paroled—from penal institutions and sent to construction sites to work out the balance of their sentences without confinement. Article 44 of the Criminal Code was amended to establish eligibility requirements for this program. Those not eligible include prisoners undergoing compulsory treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal disease; foreign prisoners, and prisoners "who systematically or maliciously" violate the terms of their confinement. All others were eligible—those confined for the most serious offenses (intentional homicide, crimes against the state) after serving three-quarters of their time, and those serving for lesser offenses after lesser amounts of time (See Appendix 4).

^{*}When the parole program started, most parolees were sent to construction sites of the chemical industry, which was then undergoing a major expansion. The prisoners therefore referred to the program as khimiya—chemistry—and to the parolees (and, later, also to the probationers) as khimiki—chemists. The term khimiya remains in use to this day.

The MVD serves as a clearing house—a kind of employment agency—keeping track on the one hand of requests from other ministries for forced laborers, and on the other of eligible prisoners who might be paroled to fulfill these requirements. Periodically (perhaps two or three times a year), groups of eligible prisoners are freed from confinement in what are called "amnesties" and sent in guarded batches to the forced labor sites. Until recently, prisoners convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state had little chance of being granted parole. However, demands for forced laborers have become so insistent that even some political prisoners are being allowed to take part in the program. Overall, roughly one—half of all persons under confinement are now being paroled before the end of their terms and are serving an average of two years at compulsory labor without confinement. Approximately 500,000 parolees are currently performing forced labor under this system.

In 1970, another decree of the Supreme Soviet authorized courts to issue sentences of "probation with compulsory labor" as an alternative to "confinement with compulsory involvement in labor." In such sentences, the confinement portion is suspended but the labor portion remains. The new decree greatly widened the scope of the program of forced labor without confinement, for now the entire sentence could be so served. The stated intent of the decree was to allow courts more latitude in determining the sentence when they decided that an offender could be reformed without confinement. Perhaps not coincidentally, however, treating offenders in this way permits the state to extract maximum economic benefit from their labor at minimum cost.

Estimating the number of persons serving sentences of probation with compulsory involvement in labor is difficult. In 1973 the Chief Justice of

the Lithuania Supreme Court commented that nearly 20 percent of the court sentences issued in Lithuania fell into this category and that this percentage was rising. A Ukrainian court lawyer until 1979 estimated at least 30 percent of all criminal court cases received sentences to compulsory labor. Recent information suggests that this has risen to about half of current sentences. Assuming this is correct, and that the average sentence is 3 to 4 years, there are now 1.4 million to 1.8 million persons on probation with compulsory involvement in labor.

Persons sentenced to correctional tasks without confinement never leave home and suffer minimal disruption in their lives, but the parolees and probationers sentenced to correctional labor without confinement may be sent to large construction sites far from their homes. When assigned to work outside their immediate home areas, parolees are usually transported to their assigned work sites in guarded groups on trains, and if they travel long distances, they spend several periods in transit prisons en route. Probationers are usually permitted to make their own travel arrangements and travel to their assigned work sites unescorted.

At the work sites the forced laborers live in barracks similar to those in correctional labor colonies. The facilities are not guarded, but the convicts must observe a daily curfew, normally at 2200 hours. As a rule a laborer's special skills will be utilized as much as possible at the work site, but there are reports that some laborers are required to perform heavy manual labor regardless of their skills. They are paid the Soviet minimum wage for such labor and after paying for room and board (no more than 50 percent) are allowed to keep or spend the rest of their money as they wish. They are permitted to eat wherever they wish. It is not unusual for such convicts, especially probationers, to be granted permission to leave the work

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site to visit relatives, conduct personal business, or even to take vacations.

The time spent at forced labor without confinement counts toward fulfillment of the confinement sentence at the rate of one day for one day. But if the parolee or probationer violates the terms of his sentence or commits a new crime at his work site, he is sent back to the penal institution from whence he came (or would have gone, in the case of a probationer) and forfeits all of the time spent outside confinement. Authorities apparently try to avoid applying this drastic punishment to convicts nearing the ends of their sentences.

Role of Forced Labor in the Economy

Forced laborers engage in nearly all forms of economic activity. They constitute about 3 percent of the total Soviet labor force, which now is estimated at 147 million. In the 1980s, labor force growth will be less than half of what it was in the 1970s. Forced labor is thus likely to become a more important means of relieving serious manpower shortages, particularly in inhospitable areas, and there is likely to be much greater use of forced laborers who are not confined. Unconfined forced labor provides a flexible and inexpensive source of labor for hazardous or unhealthy duty or for work in remote locations.

Most inmates of prisons, correctional labor colonies, and colony settlements work full time in a broad variety of economic activities, including manufacturing, construction, logging and wood processing, mining, producing building materials, and agriculture (Map 2).

Construction. Under Stalin, forced labor was used heavily in the development of remote areas of the Far North, Siberia, and the Far East. Cities such as as Noril'sk, Vorkuta, Magnitogorsk, and Magadan were built

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largely by forced labor. Major construction projects such as the Baltic-White Sea and Volga-Don Canals, as well as parts of the Trans-Siberian and Kotlas-Vorkuta Railroads, relied heavily upon forced labor.

In recent years, more than 100 camps, or approximately 10 percent of the total, have been associated with construction activities. Construction camps are scattered throughout the USSR, most of them in or near cities. The heaviest concentrations are in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The immates usually work at sites throughout the cities in which the camps are located; hence they are more visible to the general populace than those in other kinds of camps. One source reported watching 40 trucks, each loaded with 40 prisoners, drive off daily from the labor colony at Nizhnekamsk to nearby sites where a petrochemical complex, a large automotive repair facility, and a concrete products plant were under construction. In many large cities apartment houses, hotels, hospitals, government office buildings, and the like have been built by convict labor.

The practice of using forced labor for the clearing and construction work for entire new towns continues. Examples include Shevchenko, a showplace city on the Caspian Sea containing a nuclear-powered desalination plant, and Navoi, a petrochemical city in Central Asia near a large deposit of natural gas. Both cities still contain major concentrations of forced labor.

Forced laborers on probation or parole from confinement are being employed at a multitude of major construction projects throughout the country. Especially large concentrations of them, numbering in the thousands, have been used in construction of the huge Kama River truck plant (the world's largest) and the Baykal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railroad. Parolees and probationers are also employed in industrial production and other economic activities, including pipeline construction.

Pipeline Construction. Forced labor has been used as an integral part of pipeline construction work crews in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the central RSFSR. The forced laborers in pipeline construction have come largely from parolees and probationers, and have been used in unskilled jobs such as clearing forests, draining swamps, and preparing roads. Forced labor crews are usually removed before skilled workers arrive, minimizing contact between the groups. In some areas, however, unconfined forced laborers have worked directly with free workers doing low-skilled jobs. Parolees are usually released to a specific work site, for example, a construction site for a compressor station, where they must remain until completion of their assignment. They often live in trailers or barracks similar to those of other workers. If local labor is not available, construction authorities may appeal to the oblast executive committee and the local organs of the MVD to assign paroled prisoners to a work site. Paroled prisoners and probationers are not generally employed in laying pipe, which requires mobile crews. They reportedly are used in the construction and repair of gas compressor stations, service roads, and workers' housing. Many of these unconfined forced laborers are young people who have been convicted of petty crimes and are serving relatively light sentences.

Siberian Gas Export Pipeline

In view of the past use of unconfined forced laborers and the current shortage of labor, it seems that some forced labor would be used along the export pipeline route for compressor station and auxiliary construction unless the Soviets depart from their usual practice because of the exposure in the Western media. There are about 100 heavily secured forced labor camps close to the proposed route, all of which existed before the start of construction of the export pipeline. Prisoners in the camps are engaged in a variety of

activities, but they could be tapped for pipeline construction work if needed. However, it is more likely that forced laborers will come from the ranks of parolees and probationers.

Manufacturing. Well over half of the USSR's forced labor camps and numerous large prisons contain some type of manufacturing facility. These institutions associated with manufacturing are most heavily concentrated in the western USSR, especially in the Ukraine. Industrial camps tend to be larger and more complex than the other types, and there is a great diversity of manufacturing activities, for example:

- 17 camps in the Mordovskaya ASSR Complex produce a variety of manufactures including metal products, clothing, clocks, automotive parts, furniture, and souvenirs;
- 12 Latvian camps produce metal goods, wooden furniture and souvenirs, clothing, footwear, and electrical equipment;
- eight camps in Lithuania produce electrical sockets and plugs, home appliances, clothing, plastic and rubber products, and furniture;
- in a Siberian camp near Ulan-Ude, 1,500 prisoners produce furniture, glass, and clothing.

Typically, the prisoner work force at a manufacturing camp is supplemented by free laborers, some of them former prisoners, who may account for as much as 15 percent of the total. Most of this latter group serve as foremen, technicians, engineers, and quality control experts.

Logging and Other Activities. About 350 camps are engaged in logging, sawmilling, and related activities. These operations are concentrated in the Urals, the Northwest, the Volga-Vyatka, and the Siberian economic regions. Most logging camps are by nature temporary and crude in construction; they are abandoned as surrounding areas are depleted of trees. In the past, abandoned

logging camps were usually replaced by new ones elsewhere. Now, however, the use of forced labor in logging and wood processing seems to be declining, and relatively few new camps of this type are being constructed.

Approximately 50 camps are associated with mineral extraction, far fewer than in former years when forced labor was extensively used in mining, especially in the Kolyma Basin, where gold mining and some lead and coal mining were carried on by prisoners. Coal mining was also pursued in Kazakhstan and in the Russian North at Vorkuta and on Novaya Zemlya. Today coal is still mined by forced laborers at Vorkuta and Karaganda as is uranium at Zheltyye Vody in the Ukraine, gold at Zarafshan in Central Asia, iron ore at Rudnyy, and bauxite at Arkalyk—the last two in Kazakhstan. At Vasalemma, Estonia, prisoners work a large limestone deposit.

Camps producing construction materials have in recent years increased slightly, to about 60, and are scattered throughout the USSR. Camps in this category engage primarily in producing bricks and blocks used in the construction industry.

Agricultural camps number about 20 and play a small and decreasing role in the Soviet forced labor system. Conditions in agricultural camps are less severe than in other camps: the work is less strenuous, and agricultural camps are located in more hospitable regions of the USSR, such as the North Caucasus.

APPENDIX 1

Crime and Sentencing

Crime is a major problem in the Soviet Union, and it appears to be getting worse. These conclusions are supported by many sources—diplomats, businessmen, tourists, emigre accounts published in the West, and even Soviet journals and news media. The most prevalent crimes are hooliganism and theft of state and personal property. Juvenile crime is reaching serious proportions. Alcoholism has reached epidemic proportions and is blamed for much crime, especially the violent forms. The murder rate (in 1976, 6 per 100,000 people) is below that in the US, but much higher than in Western Europe. The crime rate is generally higher in urban areas than in rural areas, with the exception of several of the largest cities such as Moscow and leningrad, where ex-convicts are denied residence permits. It is highest of all in the remote cities of Siberia and the Far North, where many convicts have been forced to resettle after completing terms of forced labor.

Crimes that are categorized as "especially dangerous crimes against the state" are considered among the most serious in the USSR; they include treason, terrorism, sabotage, and anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda—the last an offense with which political dissidents are often charged. Persons convicted of such crimes receive some of the harshest punishment the penal system offers. Legal punishments range from a public expression of censure or a small fine to death by shooting. The death penalty is authorized for some 25 crimes, including a number of economic offenses. Several hundred executions are carried out annually.

Some of the most comprehensive data were provided by a former official of

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the Procurator's office in Moscow who has published in the West what appear to be official records on criminal convictions in the USSR: in 1976, Soviet courts sentenced 976,000 persons for serious crimes, and another 1,684,355 lesser crimes and misdemeaners were handled administratively or by comrades courts (see table below).

TABLE
USSR Criminal Convictions, 1976

Serious Crimes - Tried by Peoples' Courts N	o. Sentenced	Percent
Hooliganism	235,215	24.1
Crimes against persons	168,013	17.2
Theft of state and public property	156,451	16.0
Crimes against personal property	151,934	15.6
Motor vehicle crimes	97,388	10.0
Economic crimes	43,653	4.5
Crimes against administrative order	38,445	3.9
Malfeasance in office	37,669	3.9
Crimes against justice	13,892	1.4
Other serious crimes	33,430	3.4
Total serious crimes	976,090	100.0

Minor Crimes (petty larceny, moonshining, poaching,

petty hooliganism, and others) Handled administratively 879,265 Reviewed by comrades' courts 805,070 Total minor crimes 1,684,335

TOTAL CRIMES 2,660,425

Source: The official described in the previous paragraph.

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APPENDIX 2

Regimes in Effect in Labor Colonies and Prisons

Correctional Labor Colonies

Correctional labor colonies are by far the dominant form of incarceration in the USSR. Four confinement regimes are in effect at correctional labor colonies; in order of increasing severity they are defined as the general, intensified, strict, and special regimes.

- general regime: for adult male first offenders who have been sentenced to confinement for three years or less for premeditated felonies or for more than five years for crimes of negligence; and for all adult female offenders except especially dangerous recidivists, women whose death sentences have been commuted, and those who have committed especially dangerous crimes against the state;
- intensified regime: for adult male first offenders who have been sentenced to terms of confinement for more than three years for premeditated felonies;
- strict regime: for men and women who have committed especially dangerous crimes against the state, men who have previously served sentences of confinement (recidivists), especially dangerous female recidivists, and women whose death sentences have been commuted;
- special regime: for especially dangerous male recidivists and men whose death sentences have been commuted.

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Educational Labor Colonies

These colonies are correctional institutions for juvenile criminals aged
14 through 17. Only two regimes are in effect.

- general regime: for male first offenders who have been sentenced to confinement for three years or less and all females;
- intensified regime: for males who have previously served sentences of confinement and first offenders who have been sentenced to confinement for more than three years.

Prisons

Persons temporarily confined in investigatory and transit prisons live under a light regime akin to the mildest of the regimes in effect at correctional labor colonies. But criminals serving sentences of confinement in penitentiaries live under much harsher conditions.

- general regime: inmates live in communal cells from which they are released only to work or to exercise outside, the latter activity limited to one hour a day. Privileges are very limited.
- strict regime: inmates also live in communal cells (in special cases, in individual cells), but their privileges are more restricted than under general regime. Prisoners under the strict regime are kept separate from prisoners under general regime.



APPENDIX 3

Types of Prisons

Prisons in the Soviet Union are differentiated by primary function; four types may be distinguished:

- -- Penitentiaries serve primarily as places of incarceration for criminals and political prisoners specifically sentenced to terms of confinement in prison—an exceptional punishment which may be assigned by the courts only to persons convicted of especially dangerous crimes against the state or certain other grave crimes, and to persons serving in correctional labor colonies who maliciously violate camp rules. Examples of such prisons are the ones at Vladimir and Chistopol, both associated with male political prisoners. The central prison for women is in Minsk. Prisoners are required to perform labor full time in industrial facilities in the prison complex.
- Transit prisons where prisoners are organized into groups for shipment to their destinations are located at regional transportation hubs such as Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, and Irkutsk. The Correctional Labor Code limits to 10 days the time a person sentenced to forced labor without confinement or to exile may be held in any transit prison, but a trip from the European USSR to the remote regions of Siberia or the Far East may entail several sojourns in transit prisons. According to some former prisoners the huge facility at Sverdlovsk (which is also a penitentiary) can hold thousands of prisoners when, as is common, it is filled beyond legal capacity.

- -- Investigatory prisons are used to incarcerate suspects awaiting trial on serious charges and other persons already sentenced to confinement in correctional labor colonies who are needed to testify as witnesses at upcoming trials. Lefortovo Prison in Moscow is an example of such a prison; the regime in an investigatory prison is less harsh than that at other prisons.
- Psychiatric prisons, otherwise known as "special psychiatric hospitals" (SPHs), are used to hold and treat persons who have been declared criminally insane. (They are to be distinguished from "ordinary psychiatric hospitals"—OPHs—run by the Ministry of Health.) Some SPHs have been repeatedly associated with maltreatment of dissidents.



APPENDIX 4

Eligibility for Parole

In 1964 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decreed that certain prisoners then under confinement could be released—in effect, paroled—from penal institutions and sent to construction sites to work out the balance of their sentences without confinement. Article 44 of the Criminal Code was amended to establish eligibility requirements for this program.

- -- Not eligible: prisoners undergoing compulsory treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal disease; foreign prisoners, and prisoners "who systematically or maliciously" violate the terms of their confinement.
- -- Eligible after serving three-quarters of the confinement sentence:

 especially dangerous recidivists; prisoners convicted of especially

 dangerous crimes against the state; prisoners convicted of intentional


 homicide under aggravating circumstances; prisoners whose death


 sentences have been commuted.
- -- Eligible after serving two-thirds of their confinement sentences:

 prisoners convicted of certain serious crimes (especially if committed under aggravating circumstances) including counterfeiting, currency speculation, embezzlement, taking or giving bribes, banditry, robbery, endangering the life of a policeman, disrupting a penal institution, hijacking, rape, drug trafficking, and particularly malicious hooliganism.
- -- Eligible after serving half of their sentences: prisoners, other than those listed above, sentenced to confinement for more than 10 years.

N

-- Eligible after serving one-third of their sentences: prisoners, other than those listed above sentenced to confinement for not more than 10 years.





MAP :




Figure 1

DTG: 120302Z NOV 82 PSN: 002645 TOR: 316/0837Z CSN: HCE395

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E OB:

OP IMMED DE RUEHC #836Ø 316Ø3Ø8 O 120302Z NOV 82 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE ØØØØ AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE ØØØØ AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE ØØØØ AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE ØØØØ

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE ØØØØ AMCONSUL LENINGRAD IMMEDIATE ØØØØ

SECRET STATE 318360

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PPDC, PEPR, UR, US, NATO
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON DEATH OF BREZHNEV

ISLAMABAD FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER. TOPOL

- (SECRET ENTIRE TEXT).
- EMBASSIES (WITH EXCEPTION OF ISLAMABAD) SHOULD DELIVER IMMEDIATELY TEXT OF FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO HEAD OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT ADDING APPRORIATE SALUTATION AND CLOSE. NATO POSTS SHOULD INCLUDE PARAGRAPH ON NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING. THIS PARAGRAPH SHOULD BE DELETED FROM LETTERS TO JAPANESE AND ANZUS LEADERS.
- 3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR.

THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT LEONID BREZHNEV BRINGS TO A CLOSE AN EVENTFUL EIGHTEEN-YEAR PERIOD IN SOVIET HISTORY. WHETHER HIS DEPARTURE WILL OPEN A PERIOD QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT IN IMPORTANT RESPECTS REMAINS TO BE SEEN. IN THE NEAR TERM WE EXPECT LITTLE CHANGE IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR, EITHER AS REGARDS THE SOVIET UNION'S RELATIONS WITH OTHERS, OR THE INTERNAL ORDERING OF ITS OWN SOCIETY.

OVER THE LONG TERM, HOWEVER, THERE MAY BE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET UNION OF A SORT WHICH COULD PRESENT THE WEST WITH NEW OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS NEW CHALLENGES. THE DIRECTION OF SUCH CHANGE CAN BE INFLUENCED, FOR BETTER OR WORSE, BY THE MANNER IN WHICH WE WESTERN LEADERS CONDUCT OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE COMING MONTHS. AT THIS IMPORTANT JUNCTURE, THEREFORE, I WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU MY THOUGHTS ON THE PATH AHEAD.

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AND ONLY NLFR 748-23-31-4-4 MARA DATE 2/20/2019 (Dup)

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DTG: 120302Z NOV 82 PSN: 002645

OUR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN PREMISED UPON THE PRINCIPLE THAT ONE MUST HOLD THAT GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS ACTIONS, AND BASE ONE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH IT ON THE REALITIES OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR. THIS MEANS WE MUST STAND READY TO IMPROVE THESE RELATIONS, AND ADD NEW CONTENT TO THEM, WHEN SOVIET ACTIONS SO MERIT, JUST AS WE HAVE SOUGHT TO EXPRESS IN RECENT YEARS THROUGH A COOLING OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, DISAPPROVAL OF SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND, AND INDOCHINA. AS THE CURRENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP LOOKS INTO THE FUTURE, AND A NEW GENERATION OF LEADERS EMERGES TO TAKE ITS PLACE, IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST WILL DEPEND UPON THE WAY THEY CONDUCT SOVIET POLICY.

UNDER CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, I BELIEVE WE, AS WESTERN LEADERS, SHOULD, IN OUR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRONOUNCEMENTS DIRECTED AT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, AFFIRM THE OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD STRESS THAT SUCH IMPROVEMENT MUST REQUIRE SOLID EVIDENCE OF SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY ACCEPTED STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. I HAVE SENT A MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN KUZNETSOV IN THIS SPIRIT. SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS WRITTEN IN A SIMILAR VEIN TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH WILL LEAD OUR DELEGATION TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV'S FUNERAL, AND COMMUNICATE THE SAME MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

CONTINUITY WILL MARK THE NATURE OF OUR CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. WE WILL CONTINUE ALL THE DISCUSSIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WE

HAVE PRESENTLY UNDER WAY, INCLUDING THOSE BEING CONDUCTED IN GENEVA, VIENNA, AND MADRID. WE WILL BE ALERT TO ANY POSSIBILITY OF FORWARD PROGRESS AND WILL MAINTAIN OUR REGULAR CONTACTS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON. SECRETARY SHULTZ WILL BE READY TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO FOR ANOTHER IN-DEPTH EXCHANGE WHEN MUTUALLY CONVENIENT.

I THINK IT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME THAT WESTERN CONDUCT TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BE MARKED BY UNITY OF PURPOSE. IT WOULD BE TRAGIC INDEED IF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WERE TO PERCEIVE DIVISIONS IN THE WEST, EITHER AS REGARDS OUR WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO POSITIVE STEPS FROM MOSCOW OR WAVERING IN OUR INSISTENCE THAT THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP BE BASED UPON SOVIET ADHERENCE TO THE NORMS OF RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. I HOPE, THEREFORE, THAT IN THE DAYS AHEAD OUR GOVERNMENTS CAN MAINTAIN AN INTENSIVE EXCHANGE AS REGARDS DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, ANALYSES OF THEIR POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES, AND INTENTIONS REGARDING OUR RESPECTIVE POLICY STATEMENTS.

THE MEETING OF NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS NEXT MONTH OFFERS AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR AN AUTHORITATIVE EXCHANGE OF WESTERN VIEWS ON THE FUTURE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USSR, AND ITS IMPACT ON WESTERN POLICIES. IT WILL ALSO PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SEND THE SORT OF POSITIVE, FIRM, AND CONCERTED MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WHICH I TRUST WILL MARK ALL OUR ACTIONS THROUGHOUT THIS IMPORTANT PERIOD.

IN THE DAYS AHEAD, WE WILL BE FOLLOWING EVENTS IN MOSCOW AND ELSEWHERE CLOSELY. WE SHALL SHARE OUR

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PAGE Ø3 OF Ø3 SECSTATE WASHDC 836Ø

DTG: 120302Z NOV 82 PSN: 002645

INFORMATION AND PERCEPTIONS WITH YOU AND WILL VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR DOING THE SAME WITH US. I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT THE APPROACH OF A UNITED WEST DURING THIS PERIOD WILL HAVE UPON THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP THE EFFECT WE ALL DESIRE.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. SHULTZ

RECEIVED 18 NOV 82 10

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 17 NOV 82



KEYWORDS: USSR

JM FILIMSSP"

ANDROPOV, YURIY V

BUSH, G

SUBJEC!	r: I	MEMCON	OF	BUSH	-	ANDROPOV	MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE: 19 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

PIPES

BLAIR

COMMENTS

REF# 8235485

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

82 HF 17 P10: 22

SECRET

SITUATION

November 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz 4

Subject:

Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

Enclosed is the memorandum of the Vice President's November 15 meeting with Andropov, which the Vice President has approved.

Attachment: As stated

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

NARA, Date 2[27/20]9



Drafted: EUR/SOV:RECombs,Jr.

11/17/82:ext 29559

Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr.

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Restrictions

B1

227619 **MEMCON**

11/15/1982

REPORT OF BUSH-ANDROPOV MEETING

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SYSTEM II 90926

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

USSR

A10: 21

November 18, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT:

Memorandum of Conversation of Bush-Andropov

Meeting

Attached (Tab A) is the memorandum of conversation of the Bush-Andropov meeting in Moscow last Monday, November 15, and a synoposis for the President (Tab I).

Dennis Blair concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve	Disapprove
---------	------------

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to the President

Tab A Memcon of the Vice President's meeting with Yuriy Andropov (forwarded by Secretary Shultz)

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CLARK TO RR RE: PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH **ANDROPOV**

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

82 17 17 PHO: 22

SECRET

SITUATION ACTE

November 17, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

George P. Shultz

Subject:

Report of Bush-Andropov Meeting

Enclosed is the memorandum of the Vice President's November 15 meeting with Andropov, which the Vice President has approved.

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6 11/15/1982 B1

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REPORT OF BUSH-ANDROPOV MEETING [DUP OF 227619]

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TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

JN 2/22/2019

DOCDATE 17 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

ANDROPOV, YURIY V

BUSH, G

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF BUSH - ANDROPOV MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 19 NOV 82 STATUS S FILES

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