

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:
Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988
Folder Title:
Jews and Politics (5 of 5)
Box: Box 15

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Present Tense



**Thousands of
Ethiopian Jews
are now in
Israel. How are
they doing?**

**Culture
Shock**

*By Matthew
Nesvisky*

*Gene R. La Rocque
offers a new approach
to Soviet-American
relations.*

*Larry Cohler asks,
Do we care only
about Israel?*

*Jim Castelli on Pat
Robertson's quest for
the Presidency.*

*Walter Ruby examines
the "Nicaragua and the
Jews" controversy.*

SCHOCKEN JUDAICA




Power and Powerlessness in Jewish History

DAVID BIALE

Biale traces the political history of the Jews, from the destruction of the Second Temple by the Romans in 70 A.D. to the creation of the State of Israel.... The author, a professor of Jewish History, has written a relevant and studious book that should interest readers of Jewish history or anyone interested in Israel's place in the world."—*Booklist*

Hardcover \$18.95



Now These Are the Names

A New English Rendition of the Book of Exodus. Translated with Commentary and Notes By EVERETT FOX

The Book of Exodus, the second book of the Bible, recounts the great epic of Israel's liberation from Egyptian bondage, the wilderness wanderings, and the giving of the Law at Sinai. This translation brings the English-speaking reader closer to the literary style and force of the Hebrew Bible.

Hardcover \$16.95

A Simple Story

S. Y. AGNON

Translated and with an Afterword by Hillel Halkin
1986 Kenneth B. Smilen Award for Translation

"This wonderfully complex novel keeps the mind restlessly alert, contemplating in shifting, perspectives the human figures and social institutions it so persuasively represents."
—Robert Alter, *The New York Times Book Review*

Hardcover \$14.95 Paperback \$8.95

The Miracle of Intervale Avenue

The Story of a Jewish Congregation in the South Bronx
JACK KUGELMASS

There is life where we least expect it: In the heart of the South Bronx and too, in old age.... "This is a special book—both scholarly and fun to read."—*The New York Times Book Review*

Hardcover \$17.95

Masterworks of Modern Jewish Writing Series

Allrightniks Row The Making of a Professional Jew

BY SAMUEL ORNITZ

ISBN 0-910129-46-0 Paper \$9.95

A biting satire on the price of success in Jewish society. "An extraordinary book, vigorous and vivid and racy, alive on every page."—*The New York Times*

The Chosen People

BY SIDNEY L. NYBURG

ISBN 0-910129-47-9 Paper \$9.95

Jewish life in Baltimore at the turn-of-the-century. "...A brilliant piece of work...From first to last, the book is exceptionally interesting. Detailed as it is, it never drags."
—*The New York Times*

From Plotzk to Boston

BY MARY ANTIN

ISBN 0-910129-45-2 Paper \$6.95

A dramatic depiction of the American Jewish immigrant experience. The author "produces true literature. Her work evidences a genial talent for enjoyment and warm humanity."—*Israel Zangwill*

I am a Woman - And a Jew

BY LEAH MORTON

ISBN 0-910129-56-8 Paper \$9.95

"Rarely has the psychology of women been disclosed with greater intimacy or a surer touch."—*Literary Review*

By the Waters of Manhattan

BY CHARLES REZNIKOFF

ISBN 0-910129-55-X Paper \$9.95

"Mr. Reznikoff gives one an exact and vivid picture of Jewish life in old Russia. He is intelligent and sensitive."—*The New York Times Book Review*

SCHOCKEN BOOKS 62 COOPER SQUARE NEW YORK NY 10003

Contents

6

Fear and Hatred of the Soviet Union
by *Gene R. La Rocque*

12

Culture Shock
by *Matthew Nesvisky*

20

Taking Sides
by *Larry Cohler*

25

What Makes Pat Run?
by *Jim Castelli*

30

Nicaragua and Its Jews
by *Walter Ruby*

36

The Immigrant—A Story
by *David Unger*

37

Poetry by Jay Rogoff
Driving in Fog

38

Campus Crusade
by *Edwin Black*

43

Endpapers

Politics, Books and the Arts

Susan Jacoby, Wolf Blitzer, Arthur
Hertzberg, Elizabeth Kolbert, Muriel
Moulton, J. Robert Moskin, Sal A.
Westrich, Barbara Weinstein, David E.
Fishman, Roberta Kalechofsky,
Leonard Bushkoff and Gerald Jonas



Arthur Leipzig

Present Tense (ISSN-0092-4091) is published quarterly by the American Jewish Committee at 165 East 56th Street, New York, New York 10022. It was established by a grant from the Bergreen Institute of Foreign Policy Studies & Publications. Single Copy is \$4.50; \$14.00 a year, 2 years \$24.00, 3 years \$36.00. American Jewish Committee members, \$7.00 per year. Add \$6.00 per year for foreign subscriptions via surface mail and \$24.00 per year for air mail. Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and additional mailing offices. Copyright © 1986 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions. All unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts*; *America: History and Life*; *Access: The Supplementary Index to Periodicals*; *Index to Jewish Periodicals*; *The Middle East: Abstracts and Index* and *The Magazine Index*. Poetry published in this journal is abstracted and indexed in the *Annual Index to Poetry in Periodicals*. Publication No. 990960. Postmaster send address corrections to *Present Tense*, 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

Letters

Non Sequitur

William Bole's "Who Helped Nazis Escape to America?" [Summer 1986] is a credible article and not at variance with other pieces that I've read on the same subject. To buttress a point, on a recent trip to South America, I met many Jewish refugees who had emigrated there after WW II only because they were refused admittance to the United States while, on the other hand, apparently, many Nazis were not.

However, Bole utterly destroys an otherwise good report by the gratuitous and completely irrelevant insertion that "[the] public . . . is today far more interested in executing black teenagers on death row than in deporting those who committed genocide." (Doesn't Bole have a similar concern for whites on death row?)

Unquestionably, those who committed genocide must be ferreted out and sent back to where they committed their crimes. But why raise the non sequitur of how we can have black teenagers on death row while we have Nazis in our midst? Those black teenagers were tried in American courts of law for the heinous crimes of murder and rape, and had proper recourse to the numerous appeal mechanisms that our legal system provides. Their presence on death row has nothing to do with the Nazis, except that they may have committed the same type of a crime.

Isidore Cross
Waterbury, Connecticut

For Many, No More Room

The article "Who Helped Nazis Escape to America?" was certainly most important in revealing a regretful happening in our history. I personally feel the greatest horror of the war was the United States refusal to accept the passengers on the St. Louis, which arrived in Florida and whose passengers were sent back to certain death, not to mention the neglect by our media in reporting the Holocaust. And there was hardly a

ripple in this country, certainly nothing akin to the concern for the so-called illegal immigrants, who are violating our laws and thereby reducing America to the overpopulated and impoverished state of a developing Third World entity.

In the same issue, "Running an Underground Railroad," by Adam Simms, compares the sanctuary movement with the slave underground railway. However, the people leaving Central and South America are hardly akin to slaves.

In 1985 1.8 million illegals were apprehended, probably one-third to one-half of the actual number of those attempting to enter the United States. This year they are coming across at a rate that is 40 percent higher than last year. And those returned to Guatemala and El Salvador were not politically persecuted as the sanctuary movement claims. They came here for economic reasons, which alone make sense, except that our open frontiers of yesteryear no longer can support the influx. There is no "West" to go to.

Only 15 percent of the illegals go into agriculture. They are not performing jobs Americans would not perform, as is popularly reported. They go into services and light and heavy industries. With 10 million of our own unemployed, how can the sanctuary movement have the temerity to suggest that more unemployed and unemployables will enhance our society? In New York City alone, one-third of the 600,000 low-cost-housing apartments are now occupied by illegals. Sanctuary movement members are not giving up their apartments, but instead are shipping these illegals to other areas where they take up apartments formerly reserved for our needy citizens.

Uncle Sam has been a benefactor to the helpless of the world for many generations, when he had the means, the area and the opportunity, and when there wasn't competition coming from Japan, West Germany and, politically, from the Soviets.

Today, as the world gets smaller, we have to hold on to some of what

EDITOR

Murray Polner

MANAGING EDITOR

Iris Goldman

ART DIRECTOR

Ira Teichberg

ART ASSOCIATE

Judy Tirsch

POETRY EDITOR

M. L. Rosenthal

LITERARY EDITOR

Leonard Kriegel

BUSINESS & ADVERTISING MANAGER

Gwen Lawlor

CIRCULATION & PROMOTION

Harry W. Hochman

Marion J. Gruber

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS

Chaim Berman

William Bole

Hanna F. Desser

Maurice Friedberg

Robert I. Friedman

Estelle Gilson

Irving Louis Horowitz

Gerald Jonas

Hesh Kestin

Hugh Nissenson

Victor Perera

Jack Riemer

Sylvia Rothchild

Naomi Shepherd

Adam Simms

Steve Zipperstein

ADVISORY BOARD

E. Robert Goodkind, *Chairman*

Mimi Alperin

Alan Batkin

Arthur D. Berliss, Jr.

Balfour Brickner

Warren Cavior

Sholom Comay

Henry J. Everett

Betty Friedan

Bertram H. Gold

Jerome Goldstein

Stanley Goldstein

David Hirschhorn

Selma Hirsh

Charlotte G. Holstein

Seymour P. Lachman

Frank R. Lautenberg

Richard Maass

Melvin Merians

J. Robert Moskine

Leo Nevas

Manfred Ohrenstein

Alan D. Pesky

Robert S. Rifkind

John Slawson

Leonard Sloane

Kenneth B. Smilen

Sanford Solender

Robert Stein

R. Peter Straus

Andrew H. Tisch

Elie Wiesel

Statement Of Purpose

In sponsoring *Present Tense*, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal that will broaden American Jewry's understanding of the condition of world Jewry. The magazine will publish popular articles and reportage, expressing a wide diversity of opinion on the situation of Jews in countries around the world, the special problems of Israel, the relationships among Jewish communities, and those issues and events in the United States and abroad which affect Jewish life and institutions.

The opinions and views expressed by the contributors and editors of *Present Tense* are their own and do not necessarily express the viewpoint and position of the American Jewish Committee. The sponsorship of *Present Tense* by the Committee is in furtherance of its objectives to promote Jewish life and culture, protect Jewish security and advance human rights.

President

we have. We certainly still have room for political refugees and for people who are friendly to us, and for refugees from the Evil Empire and its counterparts. But the days of largesse, such as they were, are fewer and fewer. Lady Liberty may have to turn her back on a world she never envisaged.

Jerome Greenblatt
Laguna Hills, California

Adam Simms replies:

Had the passengers of the St. Louis jumped ship and entered the United States illegally after the Government denied them entry as refugees would Jerome Greenblatt have advocated their expulsion and forcible return to Germany? Would he have joined in the cries of outrage raised by many Americans that, given the climate of the times, the St. Louis's passengers really wanted to enter the country for "economic reasons" and would take jobs away from American citizens?

No. I suspect that had a sanctuary movement existed then, Greenblatt might have supported it, even if he might not have opened his home (or encouraged his synagogue to offer its premises) as a shelter for these "il-legals."

As I reported, most of the Central Americans aided by the sanctuary movement enter the United States without presenting themselves to Immigration officials to formally request asylum because they know the odds are overwhelming that their applications will be rejected on the narrowest of grounds—despite the fact that our current refugee laws call for generous treatment of asylum requests.

In handing down sentences at the conclusion of the Tucson sanctuary trial, Federal District Court Judge Earl Carroll cited evidence introduced during the proceedings that Immigration officers had summarily ripped up and thrown away asylum applications, thereby denying applicants any chance—as called for under the 1980 Refugee Act—to a fair hearing and investigation into whether their claims had merit. Such action is chillingly reminiscent of the short shrift granted the St. Louis passengers' request for asylum.

None of the Tucson trial's defendants denied that the refugee claimants they had helped entered the

country through unofficial channels. In view of that, perhaps the fact that Judge Carroll handed down suspended sentences, rather than the maximum 25 years in prison and \$18,000 fines he might have imposed for aiding and abetting the illegal entry of aliens, can be considered a form of belated atonement for one of the most shameful episodes in American refugee history.

Oops, Oops

In your Summer 1986 issue ["Eastern Europe—A photo essay"] you identify Yale Strom as a "klezmer musician." Since "klezmer" means musician in Yiddish you are saying that Strom is a "musician musician."

Martin A. Sherman
Colts Neck, New Jersey

Alive and Well

There may not be many Jews left in Romania, especially in the Molda-

vian part of the country where "Hasidism took root and the Yiddish theater was born" [Jennifer Moses's "The Age of Rosen," Summer 1986], but I don't believe for one minute that *Yiddishkeit* is gone as Moses would have us believe.

I recently had the experience of spending a wonderful evening in Leningrad enjoying the folk music of Moldavian musicians, and the sounds of the Jews were everywhere in that music. The shtetl and the 30,000 Jews of the Moldavian town of Falticeni live on the music, which was alive and thriving that evening in Leningrad, whether the Soviet Government liked it or not.

Norma Ehrlich
Los Angeles, California

Proscribed

The interesting article, "Becoming Brazilian," by Gloria Charnes [Summer 1986] was preceded by the quotation: "The old Marranos were

BUYING A HOME IN A NEW CITY?

BRIDGES THE GAP!

GULD & ASSOCIATES, INC. is the **1st** real estate relocation company to offer a service that specializes in the interests of Jewish families buying a home.

Our real estate agents, in over 850 cities, can answer all your questions regarding their Jewish community. This service is provided at no charge to you!

**GULD &
ASSOCIATES, INC.**

Call us today
1-800-233-GULD
(In N.C. call collect: 919-782-4730)

Nationwide Residential Relocation Services
2500 Blue Ridge Rd./Suite 321
Raleigh, North Carolina 27607

MEMBER
 **EMPLOYEE
RELOCATION
COUNCIL**

nothing on the outside and Jewish inside. Now we have Jews on the outside and nothing inside."

This struck me because of the use of the term "Marranos." I too used to use that term—referring to Jews who retained knowledge of their Jewish origins while pretending to be Catholic—until one day I met someone who told me that his ancestors had been Jews in the 15th century but that the generations of his family since then have been Catholic. He begged me not to use the expression "Marrano" saying, "It means pigs and worse. It's what the *others* used [to say] about families like mine. We reject it utterly."

And indeed, although the word Marrano does not appear in my Portuguese-English dictionary, it is in my Portuguese-Portuguese dictionary, where it is defined as a deprecatory term for Moors and Jews, "perhaps because they do not eat pork." The dictionary also gives the definition: "*Imundo, excomungado,*" which mean "filthy," "slimy" and "excommunicated" or "damned." Marrano also means a young pig, in dialect.

The Spanish dictionary defines "marrano": "hog; dirty or unprincipled person." I think we would be well advised to forgo the use of the term "Marranos."

Arthur J. Morgan
New York, N.Y.

Vegetarianism

I was very pleased to see Susan L. Fowler's comprehensive review of Peter Singer's "In Defense of Animals" in the Summer 1986 issue. It made me think what a shame it is that, with Judaism's powerful teachings on compassion for animals, we

have become so dependent on non-Jews for writings and actions related to animal rights.

Even more distressing is the failure of the Jewish community to recognize how meat-centered diets violate basic Jewish teachings. For example: While Judaism emphasizes compassion for animals, they are raised for food today under cruel conditions, in crowded cells where they are denied fresh air, sunlight, exercise and any emotional stimulation. While Judaism stresses that we be diligent in preserving our health, flesh-centered diets have been linked to heart disease, several forms of cancer and other illnesses.

While Judaism mandates that we share our bread with hungry people, over 80 percent of grain grown in the United States is fed to animals destined for slaughter, as millions die annually due to hunger and its effects. And while Judaism teaches that "the earth is the Lord's" and we are partners with God in preserving the world and seeing that the earth's resources are properly used, flesh-centered diets waste food and other resources and result in extensive air, land and water pollution.

It is time that the Jewish community faces the moral issues related to the many negative effects of meat-centered diets. I would deeply appreciate a response to the following question: In view of the strong Jewish mandate to be compassionate to animals, preserve our health, help feed the hungry, protect the environment and conserve resources—and the very negative effects flesh-centered diets have in each of these areas—how can Jews justify not becoming vegetarians?

Richard H. Schwartz
Associate Professor
The College of Staten Island
Staten Island, New York

Anticlerical

The "civil war" that Lesley Hazelton ominously predicts ["Jerusalem, Jerusalem," Spring 1986] is actually the latest skirmish in a protracted battle that broke out in 18th-century Europe between traditional religious elements and often virulently anti-religious groups of *maskilim* and secular nationalists. The war was not always gentlemanly: vide accounts of

Joseph Perl, the Galician reformer, setting the state police on Hasidic prayer groups, or the relentless anticlerical invective in almost any Eastern European Jewish newspaper for decades in the 19th century.

This struggle never took hold in pluralistic America. It flourished in prestate Palestine. The more secular forces were, of course, far better prepared to marshal political and financial clout in advancing their agenda. Many in the secular camp saw the old *yishuv* as an encrustation of the past that had no place in their vision of the new, and fought openly and mercilessly to see to its destruction.

The Orthodox cannot be faulted for failing to arrange for a collective lapse of memory concerning what others have tried to do to them. For the most part, all they wanted was to preserve the climate in their neighborhoods that they had enjoyed while the ancestors of the interlopers were still rubbing noses with the Poles.

The majority still want only this. Their suspicion of their non-Orthodox fellow citizens has grown, fed in part by the tendencies of Israelis toward polarities and intolerance of the views of others. Elements have been radicalized. All responsible leaders have underscored that violence against people or property is not acceptable, even as a final resort, and is indeed contrary to both the spirit and letter of Jewish law. A minority has chosen to ignore those warnings. I will not in any way try to mitigate the seriousness of their crimes against other Jews and against Judaism itself. I will point out that the callousness has not been one-sided. I remember seeing young toughs in their vehicles trying to bypass police barricades on a tranquil *Shabbat* evening, just to harass the residents of an observant neighborhood. And decorating bus shelters in such areas with sexually provocative advertising is as neighborly a thing to do as organizing an Amos-and-Andy festival in Harlem.

The American experience has taught us a few things about how to radicalize minorities. One proven way is to deny the validity of their own cultural experience. Another is to treat them as an infrahuman species. The Orthodox of Jerusalem have been subjected to both. Against the very record of history, Mayor Teddy Kollek has stated that Jerusalem owes nothing to the Orthodox,

TSA'AR BA'ALEI CHAYIM

Compassion for animals. It's a basic principle of Judaism. Unlike humans, animals can't help themselves. Animals in Israel need our help. Show you care. Join CHAI, P.O. Box 3341, Alexandria, VA. 22303. (703) 820-1742.

because the Orthodox have never contributed anything to Jerusalem. And Hazleton sees nothing more in the eyes of ultra-Orthodox children than "fervent righteousness," and assumes the tired and anti-Jewish stance of collective guilt in even joking (I hope) about running over some anonymous person because he looks Orthodox. And in her best apodictic manner, she mourns the taking of Jerusalem by "them" from "us."

Yitzchok Adlerstein
Assistant Professor of Jewish Studies
Yeshiva University of Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California

Lesley Hazleton replies:

How comfortable it is to sit in Los Angeles and defend thuggery in Jerusalem. And how irresponsible. The ultra-Orthodox could be presented as a persecuted minority in Israel only due to the effect of the most wonderfully rose-colored spectacles.

Reality, as it often does, presents a different picture.

First, there is no clear separation of church and state in Israel as there is in the United States, and the "church" is consequently a powerful political force—out of all proportion to the number of those it represents. Second, I do not understand how "the climate" in Orthodox neighborhoods is furthered by burning bus shelters in secular neighborhoods all over Israel.

Third, claims by the ultra-Orthodox that the attack on Israel on Yom Kippur 1973 was "God's vengeance on the Jewish state for performing autopsies," or that a bus crash that killed several children last year was a similar punishment for allowing women to serve in the army, have not exactly endeared the ultra-Orthodox to other Israelis, neither secular nor religious. Fourth, ultra-Orthodox leaders have *not* taken a stand against violence against people or property, "even as a final resort."



Now, where are my rose-colored spectacles . . . ?

Missing

I enjoy reading Present Tense very much, but I've noticed that Hesh Kestin's column has been missing for the past two issues. I hope this is not a permanent change; his column was often the first thing I turned to when my magazine arrived. I thoroughly enjoyed his thoughtful articles and lovely writing style, even when I didn't agree with everything he said. (I especially enjoyed the article about smoking on the bus.) I will be disappointed if he's truly no longer writing for Present Tense.

Maureen Goldstein
Wheaton, Maryland

Editor's note: Hesh Kestin, a contributing editor, plans to resume his column.



JUST IN TIME FOR CHANUKAH!

ATLAS OF THE JEWISH WORLD NICHOLAS DE LANGE

"Just in time for Chanukah is the 'Atlas of the Jewish World,' a big, glossy volume whose outward beauty is an asset to any coffee table, but whose information also makes it an excellent introductory volume to Jewish history. There have been many accounts of Jewish history, but none that I know which have done it so graphically and compellingly in a single volume....It is pleasant to report that the Atlas really has something for everyone."—*Washington Jewish Week*

"The work is a tremendous undertaking and one highly recommended for all 'buffs' of Jew-

ish history, life and knowledge."—*Jewish Civic Press*

"Prof. Nicholas de Lange, University of Cambridge lecturer in rabbinics, renders a notable service with his *Atlas of the Jewish World*.... Replete with maps and chronological data, with scores of colorful photographs, it is illustratively enriching."—*The Jewish News*

175 full color photographs, 140 in black and white. 59 maps. Glossary. Gazetteer. Bibliography. Chronology. Index. 240 pp. 9 1/2 x 12. \$35.00 hardbound.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JEWISH HISTORY Edited by JOSEPH ALPHER

"In this new volume, every aspect of Jewish historical experience is described....Even students of Jewish history will find illustrations here that they are unfamiliar with....The facts and figures of Jewish history are neatly laid out in this work which makes a real contribution to its subject."—*The Jerusalem Post Magazine*

"This handsome volume, produced by Israeli scholars and historians, covers the long history of the Jews as a people, beginning some five thousand years before the Christian era and

coming down to 1984....The scholarship is impressive."—*John Barkham Reviews*

"Beautifully illustrated with eight to 12 illustrations, photos, maps and diagrams per topic, and also including a synchronic chart, this book offers a glowing portrait of Jewish history, society, faith, and culture by 30 of Israel's most distinguished scholars."—*Buffalo Jewish Review*

Over 500 full-color illustrations. 288 pp. 8 3/4 x 11 1/2. \$35.00 hardbound.


IN A RUSH TO ORDER? CALL: 1-800-322-8755. (In NY, HI, and AK: 212-683-2244). Individual orders must be prepaid. N.Y. residents please add sales tax. Major credit cards accepted.

☒ **FACTS ON FILE, INC.** 460 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016

Fear and Hatred of the Soviet Union

Are there alternatives?

By Gene R. La Rocque



Jack Tom

The Nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one Nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. The Nation, prompted by ill will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the Government, contrary to the best calculations of policy.

—George Washington
Farewell Address, 1796

The belief that the Soviet Union is "The Enemy" has become deeply ingrained in American life. In political debate and in military policy, it is assumed that the U.S.S.R. is our terrible and implacable foe, always opposed to American interests and values.

This view of the Soviet Union is based on certain unpleasant realities. The Soviet Union is the second most powerful nation on the planet and is America's main international competitor. It is also the only country that can destroy the United States with nuclear weapons. (And incidents such as the Soviet destruction of a Korean airliner in 1983 and the detention this year of American journalist Nicholas S. Daniloff only serve to reinforce American fear and suspicion of Russia.)

While the United States needs to maintain a strong defense to cope with the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries, our response to the Soviet Union has become far too militarized. Because we have developed an unrealistic and emotionally charged view of the Soviets, our Government often does not respond effectively to real dangers that arise in the world. We often see a Soviet danger where one does not exist, or where the Soviet role is minor. The United States also reacts in an overly military manner in situations where there are no easy military answers and where diplomacy would serve us better.

It is in our national interest to re-think our relationship with the Soviet

Union. The existence of nuclear weapons has changed the traditional role of warfare in settling international differences. We cannot afford the luxury of "an habitual hatred" that could result in mutual suicide. By better understanding the complicated and changing Soviet reality, by going beyond standard stereotypes of "The Enemy," we can have a more effective foreign and military policy that will better serve the American people. As American citizens it is our primary responsibility to work within our democratic system to help our country best promote its own interests. Our ability to change *other* countries' policies is quite limited. Most importantly, we can improve our chances of stopping and reversing the arms buildup and averting a nuclear war.

We need first of all to confront the fact of our deep and ingrained fear and hatred of the Soviet Union. The idea of the Soviet Union as "The Enemy" has fundamentally shaped our role in the world for generations. American hostility to the Soviet Union goes back to the Russian Revolution of 1917, but the modern Cold War began in the late 1940s, when the alliance that linked the two nations in World War II crumbled. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe helped to accelerate mutual suspicion and fear.

One of the most authoritative statements of United States policy toward the U.S.S.R. was N.S.C.-68, a document prepared in 1950 by the National Security Council for President Truman. N.S.C.-68, though officially secret, set the tone for United States policy in the years that followed. Its spirit is very close to the spirit of the Reagan Administration. It regards the Soviet Union as fanatical and expansionist, and sets the goals of rolling back Soviet power and "fostering a fundamental change in the Soviet system."

N.S.C.-68, by explicitly stating that no accommodation could be reached with the Soviets unless they changed their system, set the United States on an inflexible Cold War path. The document called for "dynamic steps to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control" through "covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and

psychological warfare with a view of fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries."

America's Cold War policy was clearly based on the enemy syndrome: The Soviet Union was a terrible, totalitarian state; it could not change unless forced to by outside pressure. The only sensible United States approach to such a regime, it seemed, was to oppose it by all possible means.

After Stalin's death in 1953, though, came the more flexible regimes of Khrushchev and Brezhnev. As the United States engaged in arms control agreements, scientific cooperation, trade and other joint projects with the Soviet Union, the enmity eased. Some American leaders and citizens came to believe that the two

full fusion of the workers and peasants of all nations of the world into a single, worldwide Soviet Republic.' This goal remains unchanged." Weinberger here has taken the early ideal of the Russian Revolution ("Workers of the world, unite!") and treated it as a contemporary Soviet foreign policy goal.

Rigidity of thinking among many Americans is reflected in the attitude that the Soviets never really change their policy or come up with anything new. In the 1970s, when the Soviets, in a remarkable policy change, allowed the emigration of large numbers of Jews to the West, the main United States response was to charge that the change did not go far enough. In fact, Congress denied "most-favored-nation" trading status to the Soviets on the ground that Soviet em-

While the United States needs to maintain a strong defense, its response to the Soviet Union has become far too militarized.

nations could coexist in peace and even have beneficial relations.

With the breakdown of détente in the late 1970s, and especially with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, American fear of the Soviet Union intensified again. President Reagan and his appointees revived Cold War imagery, and once again the rollback and eventual destruction of the Soviet system became official United States goals.

Reagan described the Soviet Union as "the focus of evil in the modern world," and he apparently believes that the Soviets are the cause of all our international troubles. In 1980 he said, "Let us not delude ourselves. The Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren't engaged in this game of dominoes, there wouldn't be any hot spots in the world."

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argues that Soviet foreign policy remains essentially unchanged since Lenin. In his fiscal 1987 budget report to Congress he commented: "Soviet ambitions are global. Lenin wrote: 'We aim at the firm union and

igration policy was still too restrictive. The Soviets subsequently dramatically cut emigration of Jews — which peaked at over 50,000 in 1979 — to about 1,000 per year.

Similarly, when "The Enemy" engages in a unilateral military concession, the instinctive response of American conservatives is to assert that it must be a trick to lull the United States into a false sense of safety. The Reagan Administration's dismissal of the long Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing is a good example. Moreover, the American media, including movies and television, have found it profitable to paint the Soviets as pure villains, even in commercials.

American news media also tend to focus almost exclusively on the negative aspects of Soviet society. As Dusko Doder, former Moscow correspondent for The Washington Post, put it, "Let's face it. Americans really aren't interested in Russia. They think of Russia as a military power and not much else. The average guy just wants to hear how bad it is; that makes him feel good. It's the negative

stories that get the front-page play." And as far back as 1920 Walter Lippmann observed: "In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see."

The idea that the Soviets are "The Enemy" has become part of America's political culture, part of our general view of the world. Even though the reasons for hating the Soviets have changed through the postwar years, the feeling of enmity never goes away. During the McCarthy period, for example, the major United States fear was "serious espionage, subversion and sabotage, particularly by concerted and well-directed Communist activity," as the N.S.C. said in 1948. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were fears of Soviet space triumphs and military might, and of control of

to protect their security in the absence of a sense of danger. And every time we create the impression we and the Soviets are cooperating and moderating the competition, we diminish that sense of apprehension." He is correct, of course.

Public opinion polls conducted over the post-World War II period show that the American people distrust and dislike the Soviet Government, and the Soviet people as well. A New York Times poll last year showed that Americans saw the Soviets as hardworking, unpatriotic and unemotional. One striking finding showed that 46 percent of those polled thought that Americans love their children more than Russians love theirs. (My own visits to the Soviet Union have convinced me that Soviet citizens love their own off-

the Soviets, but we are so completely convinced that they are heartless, monolithic, aggressive and deceitful that we don't see how we can achieve it.

When we consider the possibility of better American-Soviet relations, it is worth remembering the history of our relations with China. Throughout the 1950s and 60s, "Red China" was considered an aggressive Communist dictatorship even worse than the Soviet Union. Indeed, the fear of China was one of many reasons given by the Johnson and Nixon Administrations for the war in Vietnam. But in the early 1970s relations improved markedly, despite the Maoist Cultural Revolution. United States ties with China in the 1980s are marked by extensive cooperation and little military tension. If it can happen once, it can happen again.

The United States and the Soviet Union do not need to be locked in eternal enmity. A number of circumstances support this belief:

- Our two countries have never battled each other, and do not have any reason to wage war with each other now. We have no territorial disputes and no sharp economic disputes on trade or investment. There is nothing either side wants that is worth going to war over. Some would argue that the United States and the U.S.S.R. are natural rivals because of their size, power and influence, quite apart from conflicting ideologies. Rivals we may be, but enemies we are not.

- The Soviet Union seriously wants peace and fears war. A 1980 report prepared by the United States International Communications Agency (renamed the United States Information Agency), in summing up a survey of Soviet attitudes, states: "Soviets talk about the possibility of war with visceral emotion. While clearly they will continue to probe American strength and resolve, direct confrontation appears to be an unthinkable thought." The report continues, "Soviets say that world peace ultimately depends on the U.S. and the Soviet Union working together." Despite United States unwillingness to recognize the U.S.S.R. as a political equal, "Soviets still speak of the U.S. as a potential, if erratic, 'partner' in resolving the

Recognition that the Soviets are not responsible for all the world's hot spots would produce a less interventionist approach to the Third World.

anti-Vietnam War and civil rights dissenters. Though the reasons may change, the Soviet Union remains "The Enemy."

To be sure, Soviet military power and the history of Soviet misbehavior at home and abroad make it necessary for the United States to exercise vigilance and to maintain a strong military establishment. But the excessive American nuclear buildup and the wasteful military spending of recent years may be partially driven by other factors.

It may be that it is useful to some important political and economic interests in the United States to keep enmity toward the Soviets running high. Big military budgets and defense contractors' weapons schemes are certainly easier to sell to the public and to Congress when they are seen as countering a Soviet threat. As quoted by Newsday, Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and an important Administration spokesman, explained the usefulness of the Soviets-as-Enemy idea in February 1983: "Democracies will not sacrifice

spring every bit as much as we love ours.)

Recent polls show that a majority of the American people have accepted a very pessimistic view of Soviet-American relations. Depending on the wording of the question, between 48 and 72 percent of those polled think that the Soviets will cheat on arms control agreements, though Americans still favor arms control negotiations by a large margin. A 1985 Harris survey showed that 63 percent agreed with the statement: "As long as the Communists are in control in Moscow, it will be almost impossible to find ways to ease the world's fears of a nuclear war." Only 31 percent disagreed.

However, at the same time there seems to be a yearning for a different relationship with the Soviet Union. In late 1983, 96 percent of those polled said they wanted an easing of tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R.—but only 39 percent thought it would happen in their lifetime.

Instinctively we know that we would like a better relationship with

problems of world peace," the report says.

Visitors to the Soviet Union uniformly comment on how deeply the losses of World War II affected the Soviet people, and how the Soviets seem determined to avoid another major war. The Soviets now enjoy peace and relative prosperity; they don't want to risk either for foreign gains.

- The world is not bipolar. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the two great world powers. With different political, economic and social systems, frictions developed. The conflict was exacerbated by each side's grandiose view of its role in the world. Each country was convinced it had the best political, economic and social system and each set about to spread it to all corners of the globe.

More recently, both countries have begun to learn that the world is in fact more multipolar than bipolar. Increasingly, even small nations want to be free to chart their own course and not follow in the wake of a superpower. The Soviet Union "lost China" not to United States imperialism but to a unique brand of Chinese national Communism. Similarly, the United States "lost" Iran not to Soviet-inspired Marxism, but to Shiite Moslem fundamentalism.

It is difficult for either the United States or the U.S.S.R. to admit that its allies or client-states want to leave the alliance. It is far easier, psychologically and politically, to blame "The Enemy" for any defections.

- The United States and the Soviet Union have cooperated in important ways, and still do. The alliance of World War II, the Apollo-Soyuz astronaut program of 1975 and the economically useful grain trade are evidence that our two nations can work together. Of the 190 agreements that currently link the United States and the U.S.S.R., the most important are the arms control agreements, which have imposed some restraints on nuclear competition and have thus helped reduce the risk of nuclear war.

- Both countries are resource-rich. The Soviet Union is huge; the United States is also, especially if we remember that access to Canada, our largest trading partner, is unlikely to be interrupted. Because of this wealth, struggles over less developed coun-

tries should not be seen as life-or-death matters for the superpowers. With the richest areas, Western Europe and Japan, stable since World War II, most Soviet-American struggles have occurred in the Third World, e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Angola, Afghanistan, the Middle East. Involvement in these countries drains resources from the closely allied major power, and, certainly in the case of the Soviets, provides little prospect of reliable, long-term advantage. The Soviets have had many "losses" in the Third World (e.g. Indonesia, Egypt, the Sudan, Somalia, Ghana) and have been unable to sustain influence over long periods of time.

- Ideology is playing an ever-decreasing role in Soviet foreign policy. Early American Cold War documents, such as N.S.C.-68, show that the Soviet Union seemed especially frightening because the Soviets and allied Communist parties around the world appeared fanatical and hostile to American values. But the Soviet Union has gradually become less ideological and more like a traditional nation-state. Indeed, it has come a long way from the days when one could talk in simple fashion about a single-minded Soviet drive for world domination. Soviet foreign policy today is more accurately described in terms of the promotion of Soviet national interests than in terms of Marxist-Leninist slogans. Marshall Shulman, head of the Harriman Institute of Advanced Russian Studies at Columbia University and former senior adviser on Soviet affairs to the State Department, refers to "the pragmatic nation-state responses to the external environment which have been dominant in Soviet foreign policy for many years."


The normalization process may well be hastened under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, whose main goal is to reform the economy. In order to accomplish this, Gorbachev needs peaceful international conditions, both to increase access to foreign technology and to decrease military expenditures. Gorbachev has undertaken tentative initiatives to improve relations with Israel, Japan, China and other countries. Whether these initial steps will bear fruit remains to be seen, but Gorbachev's willingness to move away from traditional Soviet hard-line policies is impressive.

Soviet leaders remain committed to the idea of the superiority of "socialism" and undoubtedly seek the expansion of their system around the world. Accumulated experiences, however, have taught them a number of lessons that have seriously tempered revolutionary enthusiasm. The Soviet experience with independent Communist states has been far from a success story. Even Defense Secretary Weinberger commented in his 1987 budget report, "Geopolitically, it has been quipped that the Soviet Union is the only nation to be entirely surrounded by hostile Communist countries." In addition, pressing economic problems in the Soviet Union have made extensive involvements in Eastern Europe and the Third World increasingly difficult to sustain.

Consequently, the Soviets have become more pragmatic and realistic in their relations with Third World countries. Soviet policy is characterized by diversity rather than by a single, unified policy toward the Third World. More emphasis is put on economic and trade policies that will benefit the Soviet Union. At least some Soviet analysts have evidenced greater sophistication about Third World problems and solutions. There is less optimism about the prospects for revolution and socialism and greater recognition that most countries are firmly embedded in the Western economic system. Increasingly, the Soviet Union recognizes that these countries must adapt to this fact if they are to progress. States such as Mozambique, Nicaragua and Cuba have begun to seek Western economic assistance and even the involvement of Western multinational corporations; thus the Soviet role can rarely be judged a primary determinant of events in such countries. In addition, as turmoil in the Third World is increasingly characterized by conflict between Third World nations, there have been fewer causes such as anticolonialism to unite the Third World with the Soviet Union against the West.

The Soviets, for these reasons and others, have moderated their behavior in the Third World in recent years. For example, they have generally been unwilling to take on new, large-scale burdens such as Nicaragua and seem to be searching for ways to resolve the war in Afghanistan. They are unwilling to abandon "commit-

Outstanding New Titles from B'NAI B'RITH BOOKS



BEN-GURION: Builder of Israel

ROBERT ST. JOHN

This unique biography of David Ben-Gurion is a "family" book. Published to coincide with the centennial of the birth of the man whom many think of as "the George Washington of Israel," this book captures the sweeping history of modern Zionism, the founding of the State of Israel, and the drama of Ben-Gurion's life in a way that can easily be read by children but will also fascinate and educate adults. Thirty-two pages of photographs further enhance this modern classic that every family will treasure. It will prove to be an inspiration to readers of all ages.

256 pages #0-910250-11-1 \$14.95


TORAH TODAY

A Renewed Encounter With Scripture

PINCHAS H. PELI

Torah Today is an inspirational and instructive book based on Professor Peli's widely read and universally acclaimed columns in *The Jerusalem Post*. The fifty-four essays contained here comment upon the entire yearly cycle of Torah reading. They follow and emulate traditional Midrash, first as a specific genre, and also in the way Midrash responds to the ever-renewed timely encounter with Torah. A unique and extensive guide to topics and values further enhances this work. Rabbi Peli has written *Torah Today* in an easy-to-read style that will make it most welcome to all members of the family as well as in the studies of rabbis, ministers, and teachers.

224 pages #0-910250-12-X \$19.95




"IF ONLY MY PEOPLE..."

SIR IMMANUEL JAKOBOVITS

The Chief Rabbi of the British Commonwealth and one of the leading rabbis of this century, Rabbi Jakobovits challenges many of the official views of the new leadership of the Israeli government. He speaks out firmly in defense of Palestinian rights and the willingness to sacrifice territory for peace, against the political policies that led to the war in Lebanon, and against religious messianism. Jakobovits also proves outspoken on the volatile issues of the "Who is a Jew?" controversy, the interference of religion into party politics, and the Soviet Jewry campaign. His arguments and explanations are essential reading for all who are concerned with these issues.

280 pages #0-910250-10-3 \$17.95



Available at your favorite bookseller or directly from:

B'NAI B'RITH BOOKS

111 Claybrook Drive
Silver Spring, Maryland 20902
(301) 593-8650

ments" already entered into, such as in Cuba, but there seems to be increased recognition that over the long term, Soviet world influence will be dependent on major economic and social advances at home. Indeed, Soviet economic backwardness relative to the West is the Achilles heel of Soviet world influence. Soviet leader Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have frequently cited a statement by Lenin that the Soviet Union exerts its main influence on world development with its economic policy.

In any event, the Third World does not rank high among Soviet priorities. More important are domestic political stability, national security and the condition of the economy. There is even some evidence that the Soviets have become more concerned about the dangers of war and obstacles to constructive relations with the West that can result from Third World entanglements.

The Soviets seem to recognize now that Third World problems are not simply a grand opportunity to undermine the West. At least some Soviet scholars have emphasized the existence of common world problems such as hunger, population growth and damage to the environment that override traditional Marxist-Leninist categories and require concerted efforts at international cooperation by states with different social and economic systems. Gorbachev himself commented at the Geneva summit meeting last November: "I am convinced that a new policy is needed for the present stage of international relations, which are interlinked and are characterized by a great interlinkage between states, interdependence. . . . In all countries, in the developed capitalist, in socialist countries, in the developing world, there are ecological problems. They can be more successfully resolved on the basis of cooperation and mutual understanding."

None of these factors means that competition in the Third World between the West and the Soviet Union has ended. Both sides remain fundamentally suspicious and antagonistic. However, new opportunities are arising to lessen tensions between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in the Third World. The two countries have resumed a dialogue on a number of issues that began during the Carter Administration. In the

past year, Government officials have held talks on regional issues involving the Middle East, southern Africa, Afghanistan, Central America and the Caribbean and East Asia.

A new United States policy based on a realistic view of the Soviet Union rather than on the idea of "The Enemy" would produce a less tense Soviet-American relationship, a reduced risk of nuclear war and an easing of the arms competition. The new policy would be based on the fundamental reality that great powers seek influence in the world. Americans should, therefore, no longer be shocked when the Soviet Union acts accordingly.

Such a perspective would encourage a more clear-sighted pursuit of United States objectives. We would understand that Soviet and American goals may often conflict, but that the Soviets are not responsible for every setback to United States interests such as in Lebanon or in Vietnam. We would dispense with a double standard of international behavior under which what is acceptable for us is not acceptable for them.

A new, realistic policy would recognize that the U.S.S.R. is an equal and legitimate power in the world. (Equality does *not* require that we abandon commitment to our own values.) The Soviets thought they had such recognition during détente, and they resent United States efforts to deny them legitimacy, such as freezing them out of negotiations on the Middle East. A new United States policy would also recognize that the Soviets have real fears about us despite our proclamation of good intentions.

A new United States policy would combine cooperation and competition, while recognizing the limits of both. Our two nations do have different values and interests. For example, the Soviets need to go much further in abandoning their traditional secretiveness, which has been a major cause of Western suspicion of the Soviet Union.

With alarming regularity, incidents occur in Soviet-American relations that serve to reinforce mutual differences and antagonism. The underlying suspicion among the peoples of both nations—fanned, on occasion, to emotional peaks—has continually limited or destroyed possibilities for

sustained improvement in relations. Events such as the U-2 affair in 1960, as well as the previously mentioned Korean airliner and Daniloff incidents, have played a major role in blocking progress. Clarification of the complex and confusing facts of such matters often takes place long after the damage has been done.

Our differences cannot be ignored, but they must not be exaggerated. The United States and the U.S.S.R. have many shared interests—in arms limitation, trade, scientific cooperation and, above all, avoiding nuclear war. The Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl serves as a powerful reminder that environmental cooperation can benefit the world beyond our two societies. We may also hope that the evolution of Soviet domestic policy in a more humane direction will be facilitated by a relaxation of international tensions.

A new United States policy, if reciprocated, would encourage substantial lessening of military tensions. The probability of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban and reductions in nuclear arsenals would vastly increase if we could seriously explore what appears now to be a genuine Soviet commitment to arms control.

In addition, a reduction in tensions would allow a change in the nuclear postures of both states. It would facilitate adoption of a policy limiting the role of nuclear weapons to retaliation only. It would promote abandonment of attempts to try to prepare to fight and win a nuclear war. A policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, if adopted by both sides, would reduce the risk that armed conflict in Europe or elsewhere would escalate to nuclear holocaust. Pressures to build—at extraordinary cost—a "Star Wars" shield against the "Evil Empire" would diminish.

Recognition by American leaders that the Soviet Union is not responsible for all the hot spots in the world would also enable us to adopt a less interventionist approach to change in the Third World. At present, there is a strong tendency by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to choose sides in any local or civil war, turning every conflict into an East-West struggle. The example of the Iran-Iraq war, however, shows that it is possible for both powers to exercise restraint, even in the oil-rich Persian

Gulf.

It will not be easy to shift from the current policy of hostility to a policy that combines limited cooperation and competition. Generations of enmity are hard to forget.

Americans like to feel that their nation's role in the world is special, that we are fighting "to make the world safe for democracy." Currently, many Americans see our country as the "leader of the Free World" against the Communist "Evil Empire." If we drop this image of the Soviets, then the image of our own foreign policy as a moral crusade will suffer, and we may have to accept the idea that the United States is a great power, pursuing its own interests as great powers have throughout history. It will be difficult to change our perspective on the Soviet Union, but the potential payoffs of such realism make it extremely desirable for the well-being and security of the United States. □

Gene R. La Rocque, retired Rear Admiral, United States Navy, is director of the Center for Defense Information, a nonpartisan research organization based in Washington, D.C.

**MY EUROPEAN
HERITAGE:
LIFE AMONG
GREAT MEN
OF LETTERS**
by Brigitte B. Fischer

The story of one of the world's most distinguished publishers, S. Fischer Verlag.

"Of particular interest are the many letters between Fischer and an amazing array of famous writers, including Thomas Mann, Herman Hesse, Thornton Wilder and Boris Pasternak—warm personal letters, often long and rich in intellectual content."

Publishers Weekly

*At your local bookstore
or order from
Branden Publishing Co.
17 Station Street Box 843
Brookline Village, Ma. 02147
(617/734-2045)*

\$18.95—Please send \$1.50
for handling and \$.25
for each additional copy.

Culture Shock

Thousands of Ethiopian Jews are now in Israel. How are they doing?

By Matthew Nesvisky

Operation Moses, the dramatic airlift of around 8,000 Ethiopian Jews from circumstances of dire distress to Israel in the winter of 1984-85, seemed the most buoyant news to come out of Israel since the Entebbe rescue mission nearly a decade before. The question today is: How well is Israel absorbing this latest wave of immigrants? The report card is mixed: Not very smoothly, but many Ethiopian Jews are doing better than expected.

Israel not only has considerable experience in receiving immigrants; it has done so in the past under far more difficult conditions than it does today. In the early 1950s, for example, Jews from Islamic countries flooded into Israel often at the rate of 2,000 per week. This so strained the social and financial resources of the country that the authorities seriously considered holding up the flow. In the end, Zionist principles kept the gates open. But the courtyard inside the gates was roughly paved.

It is axiomatic in Israel that no immigrants, whether from lands of distress or lands of plenty, have an easy absorption into the country. And because Israel is still such a diverse and fractious society it is almost impossible to tell when an immigrant has fully blended into the dominant cul-

ture—if indeed there is a dominant culture and if indeed it is all that desirable to become a part of it. Beyond that, though Israel has acquired considerable experience in receiving immigrants, it is not clear that it necessarily applies what it has learned.

The country maintains a notoriously large bureaucratic apparatus for the absorption of immigrants. Virtually all of the Ethiopians I've spoken with have only the highest praise for the language teachers, social workers, community workers, counselors and even the clerks who were involved in their absorption process. Yet if they are worthy of praise, it is due more to their individual character and dedication than to Government policy and planning.

In May of this year, for example, Israel's independent State Comptroller issued a scathing report on the Government's reception of the Ethiopians airlifted during Operation Moses. The report points out that while preparations for the airlift were kept from the public, the rescue was a long time in the making and was hardly secret within the Government. Indeed, a year before the operation, the Jewish Agency had urged that a task force be set up to prepare for the special social, cultural and economic problems anticipated by the Ethiopian immigration. Such a task force,



Ethiopian children at home in Carmiel, a development town near Haifa.



Present Tense/13 near Haifa.



Staff and students of Haifa's Leo Baeck School, along with other Reform Jews, demonstrating in Jerusalem with Ethiopian Jews outside the seat of the Chief Ethiopian immigrants to Israel.



Israel Sun

the State Comptroller wrote, was never established. In addition, a comprehensive plan for receiving the immigrants was not ordered by the Prime Minister until half a year *after* the airlift. The plan was given top priority and was to be presented to the Cabinet within three months. Six months later the Cabinet was still waiting.

Nor should the Government have been entirely ignorant of the characteristics of the Ethiopian Jewish population. It must be remembered that fully half of the 15,000 Ethiopians living in Israel today arrived before Operation Moses. Some of them came to the country as early as 1972, and many are well established in terms of jobs and education. Yet little study of their experience as immigrants was carried out. Furthermore,

together or to scatter them throughout the population. To aliyah professionals, this was an old debate: Is togetherness for the sake of mutual support preferable to dispersal, which should facilitate acclimatization and absorption?

When the Government first suggested housing the Ethiopians in groups, liberal-minded Israelis, such as Yael Rom, head of the Public Council for Ethiopian Jewry, objected to the creation of black ghettos. The ministries then backtracked and said Ethiopians would be housed individually throughout the country, wherever flats were available. Critics then charged that the Ethiopians were being told to sink or swim in the sea of the general population. The Government promptly backtracked again, suggesting that the absorption

“Here we were, a people dreaming of returning to Zion . . . And no sooner do we arrive than we are told our Jewishness is in doubt. . .”

many of these veteran immigrants were eager to assist the new arrivals; in many cases they were not just fellow Ethiopians but relatives. But for a long while their goodwill and valuable knowledge went largely ignored.

“There was no shortage of goodwill anywhere,” says one official involved with the Ethiopians who prefers to remain anonymous. “People were falling over themselves to ‘help’ the Ethiopians—not just in the Government and the Jewish Agency, but the American groups and Israeli volunteers as well. Yet the Absorption Ministry people and all the other immigration bureaucrats, who hadn’t had a heck of a lot to do recently anyway, apparently figured they knew better than anyone else—including the Ethiopians—about how to handle this wave of newcomers.”

The State Comptroller was especially critical of the Housing and Education Ministries for being slow to respond to Operation Moses. The main dispute that developed concerning housing the Ethiopians focused on whether it was better to keep them

centers be turned into permanent settlements.

No one, it seems, ever thought of asking the Ethiopians how they felt about the matter. The same two points were made by virtually every immigrant I spoke with. “We’re used to living with each other and being involved with each other and helping each other,” said David Masha, newly settled in Ma’ale Adummim outside Jerusalem, in a typical response. “That’s the way we like it. Outside of that, we just want to live where there’s work available.”

Last June, Absorption Minister Ya’acov Tsur finally announced that the newcomers may live wherever they choose. To date Ethiopians have been housed in about 50 communities throughout Israel, generally with the choice of living in blocks of flats with other Ethiopians or not, as the individual family wishes. Most have chosen to live close to other Ethiopians.

“Anyone familiar with the Ethiopians could have predicted that,” according to Dr. Steven Kaplan, head of the African Studies Unit at the Hebrew University’s Truman Institute

and coordinator of research on the community at Jerusalem's Ben-Zvi Institute. "Ethiopian Jews are a classic example of a community built around the extended family. Their tradition is strictly that of mutual support from within the family. They're accustomed to solving problems in that manner. So for the short run—meaning as long as they have adjustment problems related to settling in—it's reasonable to keep them together. Anyone could have told the authorities that scattering the immigrants would only exacerbate their problems. Experts here knew that. But the authorities weren't prepared to listen."

Kaplan similarly faults the authorities for failing to prepare properly for the educational needs of the new immigrants. "The authorities were very proud of sending several dozen young people who came with Operation Moses to preparatory courses for the universities," he told me. "But in almost all instances that proved to be a total loss."

He continued: "Then the authorities came running to the experts to find out what kind of educational background the Ethiopians had, what kind of learning experience, examination traditions and so on. In fact this information was readily available, both in terms of studies done in Ethiopia and with the thousands of Ethiopians here prior to 1984. Now they're getting their act together. From what I understand, the Ethiopians are faring much better now at the universities. The proper approaches are being used, and they're getting the proper assistance."

Another problem centered on the practice of placing large numbers of Ethiopian children in Youth Aliyah educational villages. These children have generally been very well received and integrated. But Stephen Donshik, a United Israel Appeal official charged with evaluating the progress of the Operation Moses immigrants, wonders whether the integration of the Youth Aliyah children has perhaps been too good.

"The children identified with Israeli culture at a faster rate than did their parents," he observed. "The children returned home once every three weeks for the weekend, and the parents and children began experiencing some difficulty in communi-

cating with each other." Some children, Donshik added, began to opt out of their weekends at home.

Nothing new in that, absorption officials replied; they had seen the family-tension phenomenon among new immigrants from every land. But it was time the authorities started using such experience to relieve matters. Today, Donshik reports, officials have belatedly begun addressing the problem seriously.

In addition, Steven Kaplan pointed out that "this community—and I mean specifically the Ethiopians to arrive with Operation Moses—was to a large extent marked by familial problems. Ever since the [1974] revolution [overthrowing Emperor Haile Selassie], Ethiopian society in general has been in flux. Generational tensions were likely not uncommon among the Jews there. A great many of them then lost relatives during the trek to the camps [before] they departed for Israel. A great many of them still have relatives there who, they're hoping against hope, may still get out. Perhaps as many as 40 percent of the families that made it here are headed today by one parent.

"This is all a very traumatizing background," Kaplan continued. "So I think we have to be very careful about blaming the Israeli educational services for disrupting family life. We have to consider the degree of family problems the Ethiopians brought with them."

Conflicts also developed over the character of education provided to the Ethiopians. Secularist Israelis charged that almost all of the Ethiopians were being directed to the religious school system. (Israel maintains separate religious and secular educational streams.) Critics claimed that the yeshivot, which in recent years have been aggressively recruiting new students, were slapping skullcaps on youngsters' heads and preparing them for an essentially European style of Jewish life and study completely foreign to their own traditions. The kibbutz movements, which were slow to respond to the influx of Ethiopians, complained that the political-religious establishment was laying exclusive claim to this latest wave of immigrants in order to strengthen its own camp.

The Ethiopians themselves take a different view. One of the most

thoughtful spokespersons for the community whom I met is a 39-year-old activist and writer; because of concerns for relatives still in Ethiopia, he prefers not to have his name published. "Avraham" had firm views on the matter of religious education in Israel for Ethiopians.

"On the one hand," he said, "you must bear in mind that the Ethiopians are a deeply religious community. It's our religion, after all, that gave us our identity and preserved us throughout the generations. No Ethiopian would light a fire or ride on the Sabbath—we still find it hard to understand that Jews do that here. At the same time, we recognize that we've been cut off from the mainstream of Judaism. And believe me, we're eager to rejoin it, pleased beyond words to have the opportunity to do so.

"I'll go further," Avraham said. "We are a people who cherish our traditions. But I think we're even willing to forgo some of our Jewish traditions, if necessary, and to adopt ones that are new to us. Because we recognize it's a new reality for us now. And if it's a choice between our children receiving a secular Israeli education or a religious education—it's no choice. Non-Jewish practices are what would alienate our children from their parents, nothing else. I'm not inclined toward yeshiva study myself, but I think it's excellent that many of our people are increasing their Jewish knowledge that way."

Avraham does not wear a skullcap, but he observes the Sabbath and the laws of kashrut at home and sends his children to a state religious school. In short, he is a happy example of the typically tradition-minded if not overly observant Israeli. Because of the volatile questions that have been raised about the authenticity of the Jewish Ethiopians, however, not all of Avraham's fellow Ethiopians have found such a comfortable Jewish identity in the Jewish state.

Are the Ethiopian immigrants Jews? This is the question that has most troubled their absorption; this is the obstacle that, with the exception of a tiny number of Karaites and some Indian Jews, no group of immigrants has ever had to face before.

"You can't imagine the shock this was to us," an otherwise mild-tempered Avraham said with sudden passion. "Here we were, a people dreaming of returning to Zion for

centuries—and keeping the faith all that time. And no sooner do we arrive than we are told our Jewishness is in doubt, that we have to undergo a conversion ceremony. It is too incredible.”

David Masha's eyes instantly filled with tears at the mention of the subject. “I know we were cut off from other Jews. I know we didn't have the Talmud. But to say that we aren't of the Jewish people? I cannot understand this thing. No, I know in my heart it is not because we are black. We are made welcome here. But I cannot understand the rabbis.”

Masha may be forgiven his confusion. One chief rabbi ruled that the Ethiopians were unquestionably Jews, while another later insisted on token conversion by immersion in a *mikveh* “to confirm their reentry into the Jewish mainstream.” Here a municipal rabbinical council permits the Ethiopians' *kes*, or priest, to perform a marriage ceremony, and in another locale the authorities insist that only a state-sanctioned rabbi may so officiate. The Interior Ministry will issue identity cards to new Ethiopian immigrants that state they are Jews but the same ministry later may not issue them marriage or birth certificates. The Israel Defense Forces may raise no question about an Ethiopian immigrant qualifying for the draft. But the Lubavitcher Hasidim may have to be taken to court before that immigrant's child is accepted at a Lubavitcher kindergarten.

“I am outraged by all of this,” said Rahamim David, an Ethiopian carpenter and community worker from Safad who also serves as a sergeant in the army reserves. “The issue didn't come up when I made aliyah 10 years ago. It seems we were all Jewish then. No, it was only after the big numbers appeared with Operation Moses. Suddenly the Ethiopian Jews weren't Jewish enough. Did the Israelis suddenly find they had too many Ethiopians on their hands? Can't they make up their minds if we're Jews or not? Well, it sounds like the rabbis have a problem. The damage this charge has done to us I can't explain to you. It has split the community very, very badly.”

Ethiopians who shared Rahamim David's outrage decided to make the issue everyone's problem. In the summer of 1985 they held a sit-down strike for several weeks outside the

offices of the Chief Rabbinate in Jerusalem. Scores of immigrants established an encampment on the sidewalks and vowed not to move until the rabbis dropped what the Ethiopians called the “demeaning and insulting demand” that they undergo the token conversion ceremony.

The strike gained a lot of publicity and left few if any happy. Ethiopians such as Rabbi Yosef Hadana, who advocated following the rabbinate's dictates to assure the community's inclusion within normative Judaism, were particularly unhappy that the pickets had acted without consulting the community's *kesim*, the very priests whom they were ostensibly defending against state rabbinical authority. “The strike,” Hadana told me, “was an uprising by the young against the elders—something that was unthinkable in days gone by. I grieve for the character of our people. This has been very damaging.”

Adiso Masala, one of the strike leaders, maintained that if any splits were created among the Ethiopians, the fault lay with Israel's Chief Rab-

binate. “They are the ones who insist on deciding who is Jewish and who isn't,” he said. “Rabbi Eli Ben-Dehan, who is an assistant to the Chief Sephardic Rabbi, says that among the Operation Moses immigrants are hundreds of Christians. He has no basis for this. And in any case, no one is in a better position to decide who is Jewish than our own leaders.”

“I'll tell you something further,” Masala continued. “The rabbinate really resented the support we got in the demonstration from American Reform and Conservative Jews. Israel's Orthodox rabbis don't want anybody challenging their authority. They're afraid that if they accept the Ethiopians as Jews without their ‘conversion’ process, they'll be pressured to accept Reform and Conservative conversions. And they're not about to do that. The whole thing is power and politics.”

Some did feel that representatives of Israel's unrecognized Reform and Conservative movements, as well as members of civil rights organizations, were out on the streets with the strikers at least partly because they welcome any opportunity to challenge

Robert Jay Lifton

THE NAZI DOCTORS

Medical Killing
and the
Psychology of Genocide

“A monumental achievement.”*

The Nazi Doctors

Medical Killing and the
Psychology of Genocide

ROBERT JAY LIFTON

Here is the renowned psychiatrist's most powerful and important book — a brilliant analysis of the crucial role that doctors played in Nazi genocide. “An awesome account of the ultimate transgression of the Hippocratic Oath; a formidable contribution to the Holocaust studies. Dr. Lifton has documented, with unprecedented scope, those bioracist theories and practices of 20th century Germany which turned a community of healers into one of mass murderers.” —FRANCINE DU PLESSIX GRAY* “A unique contribution to the Holocaust literature . . . Must reading for all those who want to understand the mind of the physician-perpetrator. The three chapters about Dr. B., Josef Mengele, and Eduard Wirths are masterpieces of probing and analysis. The book as a whole stands without competition in the English language.” —RAUL HILBERG, author of *The Destruction of the European Jews* \$19.95

now in paperback

Exodus and Revolution

MICHAEL WALZER

“A rewarding book — elegantly written, subtly argued, full of stimulating suggestions.” —JOHN GROSS, *New York Times* cloth, \$15.95 paper, \$6.95

Basic Books, Inc.

10 East 53rd St., New York, NY 10022 Call toll free: (800) 638-3030

Israel's Orthodox establishment. True or not, it is generally agreed that the strike lost the Ethiopians a measure of sympathy from the Israeli public. On the other hand, some Israelis wryly remarked that the lengthy demonstration showed that the newcomers were becoming real Israelis. Still, even while most Israelis are not Orthodox themselves, they accept the Chief Rabbinate as the sole arbiter on matters of marriage, divorce and conversion—in short, on who is a Jew.

"The Chief Rabbinate didn't want this confrontation," said Steven Kaplan, "and in the end, they will remain the ones empowered to rule on Jewish identity. After what they've gone through to get here, most Ethiopians will not be satisfied with some auxiliary status in the Jewish nation, like Karaites or Samaritans. So it's a problem that they, not the Chief Rabbinate, have to come to grips with."

The Ethiopians seem to have come to the same realization. After 32 days of demonstrating, the strikers won

agreement from the rabbinate that only those Ethiopians whose Jewish lineage might be in doubt would be required to undergo ritual immersion, and even then only after consultation with the kesim. This did much to relieve the community, where rumor had spread that Ethiopian children in summer camps were refusing to enter swimming pools for fear of being "baptized" by agents of the rabbinate.

Strike leaders later sought a court injunction against the Chief Rabbinate, claiming it had reneged on the agreement. But by this time everyone seemed tired of confrontation. The court urged the parties to sit down with each other and deal with the immersion issue case by case, and indeed, this is what has been happening for nearly a year now.

Some division from the strike remains within the Ethiopian community, however, as was evident last summer when various leaders refused to appear with one another at the dedication of a forest memorializing

those who died on the journey to the camps prior to the Operation Moses airlift. But most Ethiopians seem to feel that quiet negotiation is solving the Jewish identification question.

"I was very angry with the Orthodox authorities," said Avraham, "but I thought the strike was wrong. Now it seems there are compromises on both sides. We've seen weddings performed by rabbis and weddings performed by kesim—and weddings with both officiating. This is a family problem, and we're working it out within the family. My only complaint about the Israeli is that he doesn't know enough about our community. But that's understandable. Look, there was a lot of misunderstanding on both sides. Misunderstanding, but not bad will. I think as we learn more about each other, everything is going to work out."

Rahamim David agreed. "Ritual immersion before a wedding was widely practiced by Jews in Ethiopia," he said. "I and the other Ethiopians I'm in contact with believe this is something we certainly can live with. As long as it's not going to be required automatically of every Ethiopian Jew, then we won't feel discriminated against."

Miriam Gool Cohen, an Ethiopian teacher-trainee from Ma'ale Adumim, said: "We saw that the confrontation with the rabbinate divided the Ethiopian community, and we also saw that was the last thing we needed. Each individual makes his own way into Israeli society, but we don't want that to be at the expense of our identity as Ethiopian Jews, because we're proud of our heritage. We came here as a distressed community, but not a shamed community. It's good that the authorities are learning that."

Most of the problems attending the absorption of the Ethiopian community of immigrants into Israel have been the sort faced by every previous wave of immigrants. The state has taken in thousands of unskilled workers before; finding employment remains a function of job training (in which considerable efforts are now being invested both by Government and non-Government agencies) and of the overall economy (which is at least stabilizing today after a period of rampant inflation and industrial shakeout). The generational tensions are apparently inevitable, as all im-



Documentary Photo Aids

IN EVIDENCE

POEMS OF THE LIBERATION OF NAZI CONCENTRATION CAMPS

by Barbara Helfgott Hyett

In the spring of 1945, American GIs were among the liberators of the Nazi concentration camps. Barbara Helfgott Hyett heard poems in the eyewitness testimony of these soldiers. She has shaped the words of thirty speakers into a single narrative, a single voice.

"The very 'unliterariness' of these lines only heightens their effect. Of several recent poetry volumes devoted to the Holocaust, this is by far the most worthy as history."—*Booklist*

\$15.95 cloth, \$8.95 paper

Available at your bookseller or call toll free 800-638-3030
(Maryland residents phone 301-824-7300)



University of Pittsburgh Press
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

migrant youngsters learn Hebrew and "become Israeli" much faster than their elders. Housing for the Ethiopians even in the dustiest little development town is infinitely better than in the tent cities of the early 1950s and, as the newcomers are quick to say, beyond the dreams of anything they left behind in Ethiopia.

The Ethiopians as a whole are in better shape physically than some earlier groups of immigrants. Medical professionals, who had braced themselves for vast numbers of Ethiopians suffering from malnutrition and exotic tropical diseases, were pleased to find these fears unfounded (bearing in mind that an estimated 3,000 Jews, presumably the most debilitated, died in Ethiopia in the years prior to Operation Moses).

In addition, the goodwill that greeted the Ethiopians from the Israeli public should not be underestimated as a factor in their absorption. Israelis were no less uplifted by the rescue operation than were American Jews. Beneath the burden of everyday problems, many ordinary Israelis—who were immigrants themselves or are the children of immigrants—maintain respect for the concept of aliyah as the *raison d'être* of the state.

Commenting on what he called the "wonderful open arms of the Israelis," Yona A'abbo, a new Ethiopian immigrant, told me at the Mevasseret Zion absorption center: "Israelis appreciated that we were in a life-and-death situation. They also knew we were longing to come to Israel and only to Israel. They knew that no matter what, we wouldn't be heard talking with nostalgia about the old country [as] I'm told even Russian immigrants sometimes do."

Miriam Gool Cohen said, "I was impressed at how quickly Israelis learned to drop the term 'Falasha' [an Ethiopian word that means 'outsider']. We never hear that now, and I think that shows Israeli sensitivity."

To be sure, Israelis were ready to shake their heads at the Ethiopians' "primitiveness." But they had held the same attitude toward the waves of immigrants from Morocco, Yemen, Kurdistan and Soviet Georgia. Some ethnic joking greets every group of immigrants, but the barbs fade as the newcomers learn the language, join the society, serve in the army and suffer the tax burden like

everyone else. In any event, jokes about primitiveness are just as often self-directed, as Israelis are well aware that in many respects they have yet to catch up with the West.

Steven Kaplan said, "If an Ethiopian has never seen a refrigerator before, how long does it take him to figure out what it's for or how to use it? About one minute. So perhaps he doesn't understand the physics of refrigeration. Do I? Do you? Plenty of people don't know how the internal-combustion engine works. But they drive cars."


Israelis are also much less prone to color prejudice than, say, Americans. With their own population originating in over 80 countries, Israelis have no illusions about what a Jew ideally should look like. Dark skin indeed is often considered exotically attractive. The public idolizes the numerous black Americans playing on Israeli basketball teams, and blacks frequently appear as models in advertisements.

This is not to suggest that Israelis are free of prejudice. They have

plenty—but on the whole they direct it toward Arabs. In the face of the overwhelming numbers of Arabs surrounding them, Israelis are grateful for any Jews who join their population.

With the nettlesome conversion issue now being quietly worked out, it seems that the worst is over for the absorption of the Ethiopians. Many older Ethiopians are still sustained by subsidies, but the job market for all Israelis is difficult at the moment. Meanwhile, the younger generation is showing signs of healthy adjustment. One 12-year-old Ethiopian is already a rising tennis star. Other young people are increasingly making their way in the army and at the universities. Above all, every Ethiopian Jew is quick to express how grateful he or she is to be a part of the nation. □

Matthew Nesvisky, an editor and feature writer at The Jerusalem Post, is a regular contributor to Present Tense.



Now in Paperback!

... the first do-it-yourself book on tracing Jewish ancestors... with a valuable list of family names and sources.

TIME MAGAZINE

- Guide to Jewish names and their origins
- Guide to Jewish-American roots
- Country-by-country guide to tracing ancestors abroad
- Guide to researching in Israel

\$12.95

Genealogical Publishing Co./1001 N. Calvert St./Baltimore, Md. 21202

Taking Sides

"We're becoming too much of a one-issue community."

By Larry Cohler

"conversion" as being very deep or sincere. For even if Helms were someday to come through with a vote favorable to Israel, many question whether this would justify helping him in view of everything else that he stands for.

As donations to few other political figures could, the PAC donations to Helms highlight for many a growing debate within the Jewish community: After Israel, what? And how narrowly or broadly shall American Jewish interests be defined?

Decades ago, Jewish identity by virtue of religious commitment gave way to a predominantly social and philanthropic identification as expressed through such organizations as the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (A.D.L.) and the various Jewish federations. Now, though the trends are far from clear, another historical shift may be occurring as these modes of Jewishness, particularly among the young, give way to Jewish identity through political identification with Israel from afar. This is the trend advocates such as Marc Talisman, chief lobbyist for the Council of Jewish Federations, allude to when they talk of "lack of understanding" among Jews of the still predominantly philanthropic Jewish communal effort.

In this new era, the PACs and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (A.I.P.A.C.), which lobbies for United States support of Israel, are the only institutional sectors of the community showing dynamic growth. Since 1981, A.I.P.A.C.'s membership has leaped from 8,000 to more than 41,000. Pro-Israeli PACs gave out more than \$3.6 million to various candidates in the 1982-84 election cycle, up from \$1.9 million in the 1980-82 cycle, according to the Wall Street Journal. And they are expected to far exceed that in the 1984-86 cycle.

Meanwhile, membership within some traditional Jewish-American organizations has been stagnating or declining in recent years. And while no hard national data are available on federations, a study of the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies this year by Penn & Schoen, a consulting firm, showed a declining base of contributors.

In the view of Professor Michael

Jesse Helms inspires an antipathy that is unique in the Jewish community; it transcends the Senator's history of votes against Israel and is unlikely to be dissipated by hints of change on that issue. Helms's shrill advocacy of prayer in the public schools, his continuing efforts to narrow the reach of the Civil Rights Act and his warm embrace of such figures as ex-Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, President Augusto Pinochet of Chile and the ultrarightist politician Roberto D'Aubuisson of El Salvador (who was denied a visa by the State Department because of his suspected links to death squads)—these and other positions instinctively strike many Jews as a menace to their essential interests and as an affront to their deepest values.

It was thus only natural that Jews and Jewish political action committees, or PACs, contributed heavily to Helms's opponent, ex-Governor James Hunt, during the 1984 Senate race in North Carolina—the most ex-

pensive Senate race in United States history.

To some Jews, therefore, it seemed anything *but* natural when two pro-Israeli PACs made contributions to retire Helms's huge campaign debt—a debt those PACs themselves had helped stoke through earlier contributions to Helms's opponent. In addition, it was surprising that the National Jewish Coalition—a Jewish Republican group—had cosponsored a dinner at which Helms was the featured speaker. On the podium last January, Helms expounded on his just-completed first trip to Israel and claimed a newfound affection for the state.

The contributions by the pro-Israeli PACs to Helms were modest: \$1,000 from the Hudson Valley Political Action Committee, based near New York City and one of the largest of the regional PACs, and \$250 from Garden PAC, a New York City-based Sephardic-community enterprise.

Few Jews, however, accept Helms's

Malbin, a PAC analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, the Jewish PACs provide a "sexy" outlet for Jewish giving, independent of the large Jewish bureaucracies. The political involvement they promise can attract Jews no longer drawn to synagogue or philanthropic affiliation.

As the leader of one large PAC told me, "Ten years ago, a politician who wanted to connect with the Jewish community would go to A.D.L. But today? A.D.L. can't give 'em a dime; they come to us."

Many dissent from this verdict, of course. Nathan Perlmutter, national director of the A.D.L., denounced that remark as "crass and vulgar boastfulness." He denied that politicians were consulting his group less these days.

At the same time, the performance of the so-called single-issue PACs has become controversial. An article by Robert Kuttner in *The New Republic* last May was a glaring case in point, as it warned of the practical consequences of single-issue politics in the 1986 Senate elections: With 18 incumbents running for reelection and only 9 Democrats, pro-Israeli PAC money, weighted heavily toward friendly incumbents, favors Republicans this election cycle.

But like all PACs, pro-Israeli ones maintain credibility with politicians good on their issue by remembering them at election time. Abandoning them for the first challenger that comes along who looks good on Israel—and perhaps better on some other issues Jews care about as well—would hurt the PACs' ability to attract needed votes from across the political spectrum for the fights that will inevitably occur in Congress over matters crucial to Israel's security.

The pro-Israeli PACs assert that the perceived tilt during this campaign toward conservative Republicans hostile to historical Jewish social concerns is as imperative as it is unintentional: Most senators today are supportive of Israel and most of those running for reelection this time around are Republicans. So Jewish PAC money in the Senate this cycle has favored Republican incumbents. In 1988, when most of those up for reelection will be supportive Democrats, it will be their turn to benefit from the bias toward friendly incumbents, the pro-Israeli PAC people predict.

In an interview, Kenneth Bialkin, immediate past president of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, supported PACs against their critics. But interestingly, he rejected protestations by those PACs of unbiased single-issue focus as an explanation for their Republican tilt.

In a response to Kuttner's article, which *The New Republic's* editors chose not to publish, Bialkin declared that "Jewish political interests are expanding, not contracting." But by this, he meant "expanding ideologically," not in terms of the range of Jewish concerns. A shift to the right among some Jews, claimed Bialkin, is moving them to financially back conservative Republicans on their overall merits, not merely because of their good record on the single issue of Israel.

Says Senator Rudy Boschwitz, "Among members of Congress, there's a certain expectation [Jews are] going to focus on Israel."

Jews no longer "Pavlovianly respond to liberal dogma," wrote Bialkin, but "more than ever before in our history assumptions and commitments are being evaluated and re-evaluated and a healthy diversity has developed in the community."

Certainly, on the receiving end of the lobbying process, conservative politicians underline the value of the single-issue approach.

"Among members of Congress, there's a certain expectation [Jews are] going to focus on Israel," said Senator Rudy Boschwitz, Republican of Minnesota, approvingly in an interview.

In Florida, conservative Republican Senator Paula Hawkins told the *Palm Beach Jewish World* last June that the first item on the Jewish agenda must be Israel and that the Jewish community must shorten its "laundry list."

Hawkins, who is staunchly pro-Israeli, is in a tough race for reelection against Democratic Governor Bob Graham. Many Jews are more comfortable with Graham's own longtime

support for Israel, his moderate liberalism (he is against United States support for the Nicaraguan rebels known as contras and was one of a number of Governors who opposed sending their National Guard units to Honduras) and his distance from the Christian fundamentalists Hawkins ardently courts. But Hawkins told the *Jewish World*, "If I had a 100 percent report card on Israel issues when I wasn't committed to that prior to being elected, it seems to me I'd be rewarded by the Jewish vote [despite being] for a 'moment of silence' in schools. . . . That's the kind of senator you need. A 'moment of silence' is a good trade-off."

Though many Jews are supporting Graham with individual contributions, most pro-Israeli PACs, following their pro-incumbent instincts, are backing Hawkins.

This is precisely the approach that single-issue advocates favor as a solution for Jews who wish to support a range of views. Said a conservative Jewish leader with long political experience: "A politician doesn't want to read a 20-page questionnaire; he wants to know what you want. You can't come in with a different thing every day; so there is a practical necessity to focus on one, or very few, issues. So if a Jew feels a need to say something about abortion, fine—he should give money to a pro-choice PAC."

Dr. Mendell Ganchrow, president of the Hudson Valley PAC, earnestly recommended individual contributions as a suitable compromise for Jews who feel torn by split political loyalties.

On the other side of the debate over whether Jews should adopt a multi-issue or single-issue approach, many are deeply disturbed by what they see as the bifurcation of a Jewish ethnic identity unique in its insistence on the indissoluble link between in-

terests and values. They deplore the whittling down of the Jewish lobbying agenda.

Hyman Bookbinder, the former longtime Washington lobbyist for the American Jewish Committee, led the charge in this debate, in which he is still participating.

"The fact is, on aid to Israel we've done so well, what is the difference between 84 percent and 85 percent?" he asks. "Do we really have to dirty ourselves to support Helms?"

Bookbinder is quick to stress that he recognizes the value of single-issue PACs in promoting United States support of Israel and says he supports them fully. But, he suggests, there are limits to the single-issue approach that, if crossed, could eventually even hurt Israel.

"If we get a reputation as having

reiterating the message he had given at the meeting. "In our relations with Congress, if a politician is O.K. on Israel, we don't care what they do about prayer in the public schools, the [United Nations] genocide treaty, even Soviet Jewry. Israel becomes the only issue.

"I don't yield to anyone in my stand for Israel. But still, I'm pretty much upset with the fact we appear to care about only one issue."

The Jewish communal leaders at the meeting universally rejected Metzenbaum's contention of shrinking Jewish concern, according to several who were there. But according to Henry Seigman, executive vice president of the American Jewish Congress, "They conceded there is a problem in the shaping of this perception. And in this, PACs are key

damental survival, there's very little emotional energy left for anything else."

Riskin, then spiritual leader of Manhattan's modern Orthodox Lincoln Square Synagogue and famed for drawing in young Jews alienated from the community, told his followers, "If I am a Jew living in a foreign host country, I don't have that much responsibility. The truth is, I can walk down Broadway, and I can see a bag lady, and I can see a drunk, and it's not correct. But it's normal and human, and I'm not justifying it, but I can say to myself, 'It's not my bag lady, it's not my drunk.' And to a certain extent, I can evade responsibility for those people."

By contrast, said Riskin, in Israel, by virtue of its Jewishness, those same kinds of people do become "my problem."

Riskin has since emigrated to Israel. But in the residential facility for homeless men set up by the Franciscan fathers in New York, the 20 percent who are Jewish may sometimes wonder why Catholic priests rather than rabbis such as Riskin attend to their needs.

The justification for Jewish involvement in such issues, however, goes beyond this to the heart of Riskin's central concern for Israel. Said Orthodox Rabbi Walter Wurzburger, a former president of the Synagogue Council of America: "Even on pragmatic grounds, if Jews are perceived as being only interested in Israel, they will be seen as simply another pressure group. There will be no need to take them seriously. But if I say a specific U.S. stand on Israel is damaging to American interests, and I'm known to have a track record of being deeply involved—as a Jew—in a wide range of American issues, my concern for American interests can't be dismissed as mere rhetoric."

As Henry Seigman noted, because of their high visibility, the pro-Israeli PACs are crucial in fostering perceptions of the Jewish community. Wurzburger goes further, warning that such perceptions could affect the PACs' own ability to succeed.

The most potent argument in favor of a multi-issue approach involves the identity of Jews as concerned with moral and ethical issues. Jews, by the unique nature of their identity, are a group peculiarly charged with the

Says Senator Howard Metzenbaum, "If a politician is O.K. on Israel, we don't care what they do about prayer in the public schools. . . ."

made a deal with the devil," he says, "then how long before we have a reputation as a group that will do anything for a vote? . . . Sure, if we can have another vote for Israel, that's fine, but without having to give up our stands on separation of church and state, domestic justice and other long-held community positions. Don't forget the great bulk of the pro-Israel votes over the last 20 years [came] from Democrats, and it would be dangerous if we took them for granted."

Some Democratic legislators active in the Jewish community feel the same way. At a private meeting between Jewish communal leaders and Jewish Senators last spring, they expressed their concern. Democratic Senators Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio, Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey and Carl Levin of Michigan told their coreligionists that in Congress today the perception is growing that Jews care for little other than Israel and Soviet Jews.

"We're becoming too much of a one-issue community," said Metzenbaum during an interview later,

because they give money for just one issue."

Whatever else Jews might do or say about the homeless, the arms race or other concerns, the PACs do not financially target candidates for defeat or back them toward victory because of their stands on anything other than Israel. And pitched Congressional battles over arms sales to Arab countries may make lobbying for Israel more visible than other activities, said Marc Talisman, chief lobbyist for the Council of Jewish Federations, which is concerned with a range of domestic social problems. But the future of the much broader Jewish agenda, he said, depends on "helping people understand that this [social] aspect is vital to Jewish survival."

This struggle over perception—not just that of non-Jews but of Jews as well—suffers a grievous blow when Jewish leaders step before a Jewish audience to say, as Rabbi Shlomo Riskin did two years ago (as reported in *Moment*, January/February 1984), "I don't say it with pride, I don't say it with joy, I don't say it with happiness, [but] if you're fighting for fun-

task of advocating both their interests and their values. As the Greeks do whenever Congress considers arms sales to Turkey, Jews rightfully mobilize in defense of their interests when Congress considers dangerous arms sales to Arab states. But who knows what the Greek-American stand is on the homeless, or the arms race, or the conflict in Central America? Who even thinks to ask?

Here, in a manner more analogous to the American Catholic Bishops or—though with more theological humility—fundamentalist groups such as the Moral Majority, Jews have been impelled to speak out on a wide range of issues not restricted to their own interests.

Just where do Jews stand today on the great issues of poverty and racism at home, and war and peace abroad? *As Jews*, do they even care about these issues unrelated to Israel and Soviet Jewry, and should they? How do they express their convictions on these concerns—*as Jews*—if in fact they do?

The most recent extensive survey of Jewish political attitudes lends little credence to assertions of a swing to the right within the American body politic, as implied by Kenneth Bialkin.

According to the 1984 survey of American Jews by the American Jewish Committee, Jews, along with the rest of the country, have moved somewhat to the right. This finding was recently supported by a Washington Post/ABC News analysis of five surveys of ethnic minorities. But the center of the Jewish political spectrum remains significantly left of the national center, with self-defined liberals outnumbering conservatives by more than three to two in the Jewish community.

The A.J.C. survey indicates that Jews remain markedly dovish and sympathetic to détente in relations with the Soviet Union, supportive of Government welfare programs—though highly critical of their efficacy—and overwhelmingly in favor of homosexual rights and Government aid to poor women wanting abortions, among other key issues. Most support affirmative action, including special minority-recruitment efforts, but not quotas. And Jewish Democrats outnumber Jewish Republicans by more than four to one.

But when the study assesses the po-

litical profile of those most heavily involved in Jewish social and religious life, another picture comes into view: While Jews may be somewhat disproportionately liberal, on most issues the more liberal are less involved in Jewish life. Those more involved indicate a markedly more conservative outlook.

To some extent, then, many of those heir to historically liberal Jewish social concerns on issues such as the homeless and the nuclear arms race may now exercise whatever activism they devote to these issues not as Jews, but simply as Americans. And, at least when it comes to political lobbying, there are voices in the community calling for more to do so.

In fact, in terms of sheer effort, most Jewish communal energy goes into unglamorous ministry to the poor, the sick, the unemployed and others in need. Merely by virtue of the vast national network of social agencies affiliated with local Jewish federations, the bulk of Jewish endeavor serves Jews and non-Jews, however fitfully, in the historic tradition of Jewish values.

Other projects, such as the recently formed American Jewish World Service, enlist American Jewish support to aid development in the Third World, where one billion people face extreme malnutrition.

And at the local level, many Jewish community relations councils as well as national Jewish organizations are engaged in productive coalitions with other minority groups.

Jews do not shrink from political lobbying on behalf of these values. But, as Marc Talisman admitted, for the vast majority of Jews not directly involved in these efforts, "translating this is a problem, because a lot of people have decided the best way they can be involved is Israel."

"Most of these 'Jewish values' are also secular, assimilated American values," said one Washington insider familiar with the thinking at A.I.P.A.C. "You don't need a Jewish pro-environmental group, a Jewish pro-affirmative action group. . . . Jews have different positions on everything under the sun, though most are probably liberal. But there is no need to act as liberals as Jews."


"If you're a committed Jew, almost everything you do, you do on some level as a Jew," explained M.J. Rosenberg, who has recently taken on

Authors... LOOKING FOR A PUBLISHER?

Learn how to have
your book published.

You are invited to send for a free illustrated guidebook which explains how your book can be published, promoted

and marketed. Whether your subject is fiction, non-fiction or poetry, scientific, scholarly, specialized, (even controversial) this handsome 40-page brochure will show you how to arrange for prompt publication.



Unpublished authors, especially, will find this booklet valuable and informative. For your free copy, write to: VANTAGE PRESS, Inc. Dept. B-36 516 W. 34 St., New York, N.Y. 10001

the retiring Hyman Bookbinder's post as Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee. Rosenberg worked as editor of A.I.P.A.C.'s Near East Report before taking his present post and has no problem with single-issue, pro-Israeli politics. But, he added, "Many Jews can't split themselves down the middle and say, 'I do this as an American and this as a Jew.'"

"For many, Jewishness is so ingrained in their American outlook, it's like saying 'I do this as a man and this as a human.'"

Asked about the charge that a multi-issue approach is doomed to ineffectiveness, Rosenberg replied, "How come Common Cause is so effective? It's one of the most effective lobbies in Washington. Then there is the women's lobby, and others, pushing 20-some bills at once—effectively."

Talisman, who earlier worked as a staff aide on Capitol Hill for 15 years, said, "We can chew gum and walk at the same time. . . . It starts from our own Torah and our rabbis' injunction to make our Jewishness live. If we "shtetlize" ourselves ideologically, we'll have done what our enemies accuse us of."

These multi-issue advocates readily accept that Israel, followed by Soviet Jewry and—to a slightly lesser degree—separation of church and state, are the only issues on which a genuine Jewish consensus exists, and as such they merit clear priority. But in contrast to the more militant single-issue proponents—strategists such as former Reagan White House aide and Jewish community liaison Marshall Breger—they are ready to let a hundred Jewish lobbying flowers bloom on issues where Jewish values are engaged but no consensus exists.

"I don't think there's a compelling need to present the Jewish community as monolithic on all these issues or to worry about Jews arguing different sides on them," said Henry

Seigman.

Nathan Perlmutter expressed the suspicion that calls for multi-issue advocacy represent merely a euphemistic appeal for reinstituting a liberal Jewish "orthodoxy." But he too welcomed specifically Jewish advocacy on a wide range of issues other than Israel, saying, "I don't think Jews for a nuclear freeze are any less Jewish; I may think they're mistaken, but not un-Jewish."

Indeed, a number of broad-agenda conservative Jewish groups have sprung up, such as Americans for a Safe Israel, which, despite its name, lobbies actively in favor of such issues as funding the contras in Nicaragua and the President's Strategic Defense Initiative, popularly called Star Wars.

"It cuts both ways," said Senator Metzenbaum.

Of late, a new national movement of multi-issue PACs has arisen among liberal Jews who are determined to back pro-Israeli candidates whom they can support on other issues as well. By moving directly into the

PAC game, rather than by merely lobbying, these Jews are running directly against the conventional wisdom that multi-issue giving fatally dilutes political impact. They are also prepared to buck the pro-incumbent rule and abandon a pro-Israeli right-winger when a pro-Israeli challenger with good liberal credentials comes along.

How successful they can be remains to be seen. It is clear Israel needs bipartisan votes from across the political spectrum, as without them there would be no hope of credibly threatening to override a Presidential veto when the Administration proposes Arab arms sales. In last summer's veto-override vote on arms to Saudi Arabia, the President managed to sustain his veto of a Senate resolution blocking the sale by one vote in the Senate. (Helms supported the President.)

Still, by providing an avenue for principled reinvolvement for those Jews affronted by single-issue narrowness, the liberal PACs could prove a valuable innovation. Without such attempts at reshaping what is currently the most visible Jewish communal activity, distorted perceptions of the community by Jews and non-Jews alike could ultimately reshape the reality.

In many ways, the "single-issue" controversy is merely the latest manifestation of the debate between Jewish parochialism and Jewish universalism. The success of the single-issue approach may seem unassailable today (but surely the decline of Arab oil influence has done at least as much to turn Congress into a bastion of pro-Israeli sentiment), yet more and more American Jews have begun to raise serious questions and to express strong doubts about the efficacy and the wisdom as well as the morality of being identified with but one issue—Israel. Jews are hardly monolithic in their political judgments and they have a vital stake in many other foreign and domestic matters. Without an appreciation of these other concerns, single-issue PACs will ultimately be shorn of their credibility and independence. □

Larry Cohler is Washington correspondent for the Long Island Jewish World and other Jewish newspapers.

Star Children

By Clara Asscher-Pinkhof
Translated by Terese Edelstein and Inez Smidt
Foreword by Harry James Cargas

Poignant vignettes of children responding to the trials of the Holocaust. With remarkable restraint, the stories capture the innocence of their responses and, at the same time, give human faces to the countless numbers who did not survive.

224 pages
ISBN 1845



\$17.50



The Testing of Hanna Senesh

By Ruth Whitman
With a Historical Background
by Livia Rothkirchen

Lyrical poems and prose passage recreate the last nine months of Hanna Senesh, executed at twenty-three for her efforts to liberate Hungary and save its large Jewish population from the Nazis.

116 pages
ISBN 1853
ISBN 1854

cloth, \$15.00
paper, \$ 7.50

Order from WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Leonard N. Simons Building
5959 Woodward Avenue
Detroit, Michigan 48202
(313) 577-4604



What Makes Pat Run?

Pat Robertson believes he has a divinely mandated political agenda.

By Jim Castelli

Representative Jack Kemp, the conservative New York Republican seeking to succeed Ronald Reagan in the White House, recently told reporters that the Reverend Marion G. (Pat) Robertson, president of the Christian Broadcasting Network, host until recently of "The 700 Club" and probable Kemp rival for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination, could bring new voters—evangelical Christians—into the party. Kemp said Robertson "is as welcome in our party as Jesse Jackson is in the Democratic Party." When reporters laughed, Kemp hastened to add that he meant no "disdain."

Reporters laughed because many Democratic leaders believe that Jackson led more people out of the party than into it. Pat Robertson threatens to provide the same service to the Republicans.

The similarities between the two men William Safire calls "poli-preachers" go beyond the fact that both are Baptist ministers and promise to bring new voters into their parties. Jackson and Robertson are also inherently divisive. Jackson offers a reverse discrimination that has held, for example, that voters in Newark should replace Representative Peter

W. Rodino Jr. with a black because the district is primarily black; Robertson draws lines between "Christians"—meaning only "born-again" Christians—and everyone else, declaring that "the Christians . . . maybe feel more strongly than others do" about "love of God, love of country and support for the traditional family."

But the differences between Robertson and Jackson are also significant. While Democratic leaders treated Jackson gingerly in 1984 and seem determined to keep him at a distance in the future, the Republicans are embracing Robertson with open arms. One reason is that, unlike Jackson, Robertson promises to fatten his party's treasury—Robertson claims to be "the third most prolific fund-raiser for the Republican Party," and he accepted an invitation from the party to speak on behalf of 16 Republican Senate candidates in 1986.

Robertson is also more extreme than Jackson—he is considerably farther to the right than Jackson is to the left. Robertson has the support of such people as New Right leader Paul Weyrich, who wants to "Christianize" America, and right-wingers Nelson Bunker Hunt and Joseph Coors. While Robertson is smoother and more moderate in demeanor

than other "televangelists," such as Jerry Falwell and Jimmy Swaggart, he is no more moderate in substance.

Pat Robertson's vision of what the United States should be would be unrecognizable to most Americans. In Pat Robertson's America there would be no separation of church and state; the Bill of Rights would not apply to the states, leaving them free to establish state religions; the Federal courts would be weakened and Supreme Court decisions would not be the law of the land, leaving the power of a Congressional majority unchecked; there would be no public schools, only a system of fundamentalist academies; the Social Security system would be run by private industry; the Federal Reserve Board would be abolished; the United States would actively support anti-Communist guerrillas anywhere in the world, and women would be second-class citizens.

Mainstream religious leaders have expressed alarm at Robertson's blend of politics and preaching. Rabbi David Saperstein, director of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations' Religious Action Center believes Robertson could control enough delegates at the 1988 Republican convention to influence the choice of a nominee and push the party platform far to the right. He says, "Robertson would like to make his religious agenda a political agenda. That would undermine 200 years of freedom."

The Reverend Charles Bergstrom, director of government affairs for the Lutheran Council in America, says, "It embarrasses and concerns me theologically for it even to be considered that what Robertson believes is the Gospel teaching on church-state relations. What troubles me most is his pride and arrogance, the notion of his being so special that God has to talk to him. Translating that arrogance into the Presidency would bring about a lessening of civil and human rights across the country."

Robertson, 56, began life with a silver spoon in his mouth. A signer of the Declaration of Independence and two United States Presidents (the Harrisons) are in his family tree, and his father was Senator Willis Robertson, Democrat of Virginia, a long-time chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. Robertson attended



The Reverend Pat Robertson, television evangelist-turned-politician, at a Chicago press conference.

New York Theological Seminary and Yale University Law School, but failed the New York State Bar Exam.

Robertson is a former Golden Gloves boxer and a Marine veteran, but his Marine service has recently come into question. Former Representative Pete McCloskey, Republican of California, who served with Robertson, says Lieutenant Robertson boasted that his father pulled strings to keep him out of combat duty during the Korean War. He adds that Robertson later served in Korea as a division liquor officer, in charge of procurement. McCloskey also says Robertson has not denied the story in the past, though he does deny it today. Early CBN bios of Robertson described him as a "combat veteran"; recent ones do not.

Robertson began a business career in New York, but in 1956 he had a "born-again" experience—accepting Jesus Christ as his personal savior—and became a Southern Baptist minister. (Since then, Robertson has moved into the more emotional charismatic movement, whose members speak in tongues and claim faith healings and inspirations from the Holy Spirit.) In 1959, Robertson bought a small television station in Virginia Beach, taking a business with \$3 in the bank and running it into a \$230-million-a-year empire that includes the Christian Broadcasting Network and CBN University. (In addition to religious programs, CBN runs a number of situation comedies and westerns from the 1950s. Those westerns, such as "The Rifleman," which caused concern about TV violence 30 years ago, led one group that monitors TV, the National Coalition on Television Violence, to brand CBN one of the most violent networks.)

Robertson is best known as host of "The 700 Club," a religious program that looks something like a fundamentalist "Tonight Show." (He recently quit the show as host—citing the demands of his political travels—but will appear as a commentator.) He has two cohosts, Danuta Sonderman and Ben Kinchlow, a former Black Muslim. On "The 700 Club," Robertson paints the picture of a beleaguered group of "Christians" beset on all sides by a massive "secular humanist" conspiracy bent on driving all vestiges of religion from public and private life and on creating an atheistic, Communistic society. Rob-

ertson is always a victim, a David waiting to take on Goliath.

About his Presidential aspirations, Robertson says he is waiting for God to tell him whether to run (and, as he announced in September, for a petition signed by three million supporters); that's not surprising, because for the past quarter century he has claimed to receive detailed instructions from God about his professional life. Not once has God told Robertson to do something other than what he wanted to do.

In his first book, "Shout It From the Rooftops" (1972), Robertson recounts telling the owner of a small TV station he wanted to buy, "God has sent me here to buy your television station. . . . God's figure is \$37,000, and the station has to be free from all debts and encumbrances." In

hardly move a nation. I know that's a strange thing for anybody to say, and there's hardly anyone else who would feel the same way, but it was very important to the faith of many people." Robertson said that if the hurricane had come ashore he would have dropped his campaign.

Robertson identified himself with God's will in a 1981 letter to People for the American Way. Robertson protested the organization's successful effort to get air time to challenge his statement on "The 700 Club" that Federal judges "exercise what amounts to a form of dictatorship." Robertson wrote: "Though I am a former Golden Gloves boxer, I dislike fights, I seldom fight, but when I do, I seldom lose. But regardless of my personal action, I want to warn you with all solemnity in the words

Pat Robertson believes "it was no coincidence that Reagan was elected President; it was the direct act of God."

"Secret Kingdom" (1982), Robertson writes that God told him in 1969 that the stock market was going to crash and said, "Only the securities of your Government will be safe." Robertson also says God told him to buy land for the site of his CBN headquarters and to buy an RCA transmitter.

And according to the Jackson, Mississippi, News on June 3, Robertson also believes that "it was no coincidence that Ronald Reagan was elected President; it was the direct act of God, and that Strom Thurmond became head of the United States Judiciary Committee and not Teddy Kennedy."

Robertson claims that, through prayer, he twice successfully turned hurricanes away from Virginia—the first, in the 1960s; the second, Hurricane Gloria, in September 1985. A "700 Club" reporter asked Robertson how important Hurricane Gloria was in the "crystallization process" involved in reaching a decision to run for President.

"It was extremely important," Robertson replied, "because I felt, interestingly enough, that if I couldn't move a hurricane, I could

of the old Negro spiritual, 'Your arms are too short to box with God.' The suppression of the voice of God's servant is a terrible thing! God himself will fight for me against you—and He will win!"

Robertson doesn't stop at identifying himself with God; he identifies his opponents with Satan: "The humanism that is being taught in our schools, media and intellectual circles will ultimately lead people to the Antichrist, because he will be the consummate figure of humanism." In one program in which he complained about those who criticize his Presidential campaign, Robertson said, "God's people have to realize that the enemy is the Father of Lies," a reference to Satan.

Most importantly, Robertson believes he has a divinely mandated political agenda: He supports the death penalty, he says, because it is not prohibited in the Bible; his solution for the budget deficit and the national debt is to follow the biblical injunction to hold a Jubilee Year and forgive debts. He notes, "The prophet Isaiah says we are supposed to lift the yoke of oppression," and concludes this means supporting anti-Comm-

nist guerrillas.

Robertson also refers to biblical prophecies about the Middle East, stemming from his belief in "Armageddon theology," a form of fundamentalism that holds that the Bible offers a detailed prophetic description of events—including war in the Middle East—that will lead to the Second Coming of Christ and the end of the world. Armageddon theology has long been the backbone of Robertson's religious belief system. He downplays one part of the theology emphasized by some fundamentalist leaders—the belief that all Jews will either convert or be killed during a seven-year "Tribulation." But he does say that "those who refuse to accept Christ will grow worse and worse in their wickedness. It will become increasingly difficult for the

choose." Robertson's bizarre interpretation of the law prompted The Philadelphia Inquirer to declare in an editorial in July that he had disqualified himself from the Presidency because "he could not truthfully abide by the oath requiring him to 'preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.'"

Robertson also said on "The 700 Club" on October 2, 1981, that "the ultimate solution" to the problem of humanism in the public schools "is that we have to work to get the state out of the business of educating kids at the primary and secondary levels, and get that education back in the hands of the parents where it belongs." And he has called the Federal Reserve Board "a very, very dangerous thing." He says the only solution to problems facing the Social Security

organization is the Freedom Council, a tax-exempt, nonprofit organization that must remain nonpartisan to retain its tax-exempt status.

The council, which claims 200,000 contributors, 40 full-time fieldworkers and organizers in at least 41 states, is actually Robertson's de facto campaign organization. Robertson, who founded the council in 1981, no longer has any formal connection with it, but his actual control is obvious:

- CBN contributes \$250,000 a month to the council, accounting for half of its budget.

- Robertson introduced a novel fund-raising technique at a May 16, 1986, dinner in Washington, D.C.: Contributions ranged from \$1,000 to \$25,000 (for host couples); because the limit on PAC contributions is \$5,000, large donors gave their first \$5,000 to the Committee for Freedom and the rest to the Freedom Council.

- The council's original president resigned and was replaced on an interim basis by Bob Slosser, president of CBN University.

- In the first half of 1986, the council arranged Robertson visits to at least 17 states and the District of Columbia.

- The council recruited thousands of candidates to run for delegate slots in Michigan, where on August 5 caucuses began the process of delegate selection for the 1988 Republican National Convention. The council also engineered the takeover of a number of Republican caucuses in Iowa and Nebraska and is gearing up to operate in New Hampshire and Florida.

Robertson continues to sign fund-raising letters for the council, including one that referred to the Michigan caucuses, declaring, "The Christians have won! . . . What a thrust for freedom! What a breakthrough for the Kingdom. . . . As believers become involved in this process, they will be able to turn the nation back to its traditional moral values." And yet, the Freedom Council now says it plans to shut down, claiming its activities were misinterpreted.

Two separate committees have been established to "draft" Robertson for the 1988 Republican Presidential nomination. Under Federal campaign law, there is no limit on the amount of money that can be raised and spent by a draft committee as

"The humanism that is being taught in our schools, media and intellectual circles will ultimately lead people to the Antichrist," says Robertson.

church and the world to coexist."

Armageddon theology may be responsible for the fact that Robertson places a low priority on seeking peace in the Middle East. In 1982 he said, "There's not going to be any peace until God's peace, what we call the Peace of Jerusalem, when the Prince of Peace brings peace to that troubled region. . . . And any peace initiatives are going to be frustrated, we're afraid, over those intervening few months and years."

Robertson's extremism contains a sustained assault on the most basic American institutions. He claims the Supreme Court has been wrong for the past 60 years in applying the Bill of Rights to the states. He calls Supreme Court justices "tyrants," "despots" and "an unelected oligarchy," and he told the editorial board of The Washington Post on June 27: "A Supreme Court ruling is not the law of the United States. . . . I am not bound by any case of any court to which I am not a party. . . . I don't think the Congress is subservient to the courts. . . . They can ignore a Supreme Court ruling if they so

system is "to turn the thing over to private industry."

Then, too, in Pat Robertson's ideal society women would be "submissive" and "subservient" to their husbands. The divorce rate is high, he says, because of "selfishness" on the part of women. On "The 700 Club" on January 18, 1983, for example, he said: "Unless the mothers, especially, in our society, are willing to give up the so-called immediate quest for self-identity, and are willing to submerge themselves, if you will, into the good of the family unit, and, ultimately, the good of all society, we're going to have terrible problems."

Robertson brings two strong logistical skills to his political life—he knows how to organize and he knows how to raise money. He is associated with a bewildering array of political organizations, some of which are pushing the letter of the law to the limit. He runs a political action committee, the Committee for Freedom, and has formed an "exploratory committee" for his Presidential campaign. But his most controversial

long as there is no coordination between the committee and the potential candidate. But both Robertson committees are run by former Freedom Council employees. (Robertson seems to run the political side of his life in the same way he runs the broadcasting and evangelistic side: CBN does not belong to the Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, an organization established by Billy Graham and others to provide accountability standards for evangelical groups; CBN does not meet the Better Business Bureau standards for charitable organizations.)

The first real test of Robertson's political abilities came in the Michigan caucuses. Experts disagree over just how well Robertson did in the complex and little understood process, but one thing is clear—he did well enough to weaken Jack Kemp's claim to be the conservative alternative to Vice President Bush and well enough to have earned the respect of his fellow candidates and party officials.

The specific outcome is open to differing interpretations. Robertson claims that the Freedom Council had the largest number of delegates in 12 of 18 Congressional districts; other figures show that Freedom Council delegates lost two-thirds of the races in which they had opposition. A Detroit Free Press poll of delegates selected found 45 percent supported Bush, 21 percent supported Robertson and 16 percent supported Kemp—the only three candidates to bother with the process.

A Wall Street Journal poll of Republican votes in Michigan taken on August 5 found that only 23 percent of born-again Christians supported Robertson for President, placing him second behind Bush, with 37 percent; about one in four were undecided. Significantly, the poll found that Robertson was the choice of only 1 percent of nonevangelical Christians, who made up about 70 percent of the sample. The same survey found that 45 percent of those polled had a negative impression of Robertson, while only 20 percent gave him a positive rating.

Moreover, a July 1986 Gallup poll found that three Republicans in 10 are born-again Christians and that 20 percent of them supported Robertson for the Presidency, but that only 3

percent of nonevangelical Republicans supported him. Overall, 9 percent of Republicans preferred Robertson—tying him with Kemp and Jeane Kirkpatrick, ranking him behind Bush, Robert Dole, Howard Baker and Alexander Haig.

These poll results make two things clear: First, Robertson has virtually no support among nonevangelicals; second, he has the support of less than one quarter of white evangelical Christians who call themselves Republicans—and almost half of white evangelicals are Democrats.

These figures suggest that the Republican Party is taking a large gamble by wooing Robertson and other religious right leaders. It is making the mistake of treating evangelical Christians as a monolithic voting bloc, which they are not, despite the fact that 80 percent of them voted for President Reagan in 1984. In treating evangelicals as monolithic, the Republicans are wooing their most extreme leaders. Robertson is not the only one. Kemp, who has tried to get political mileage out of attacking Robertson, is listed on the Congressional advisory board of Christian Voice, a militant religious right group that has been pushing his candidacy for two years. In fact, Kemp scored 100 percent in the group's voting-record evaluation. For his part, Vice President Bush has accepted the endorsement of Jerry Falwell, he has hired a liaison to evangelicals, and there are press reports that he is planning to make a tape explaining his religious beliefs for evangelicals.

The risk in all this is that in paying so much attention to Robertson and other fundamentalist leaders, the Republican Party will drive out the new voters who have been brought into the party by Ronald Reagan—the young, ethnic Catholics and some Jews. There are also signs that the mainstream Protestants who make up the traditional Republican base are being pushed to the outer limits of the party—and some may be ready to jump to the Democrats; Walter Mondale ran 15 points better among Episcopalians in 1984 than Jimmy Carter did in 1980.

The bigger risk lies with the damage that is done to the American social fabric when a political party bestows respectability on an extremist. One legacy of Jesse Jackson's campaign was the media attention

paid to Jackson supporter Louis Farrakhan, the Nation of Islam minister whose racism and anti-Semitism marred the 1984 Democratic campaign. And Farrakhan continues to command headlines today.

"The Constitution of the United States is a marvelous document for self-government by Christian people," Robertson said on "The 700 Club" on December 30, 1982. "But the minute you turn the document into the hands of non-Christian people and atheist people, they can use it to destroy the very foundations of our society. And that's what's happening."

These words are ominous enough coming from a man with the large evangelical following Pat Robertson has. But coming from a Presidential candidate given credibility by one of the major political parties they are far more dangerous. From a President they would be terrifying. □

Jim Castelli is the church-state policy director for People for the American Way, the lobbying group concerned with First Amendment and other issues, for which he wrote the report, "Pat Robertson, Extremist With a Baby Face."

A revealing account of Jewish life in early New York

GOING TO AMERICA GOING TO SCHOOL

The Jewish Immigrant Public School Encounter in Turn-of-the-Century New York City
Stephan F. Brumberg

Between 1881 and 1914, well over one and a half million Eastern European Jews emigrated to the U.S. and virtually all of them passed through or settled in New York City. This book tells the dramatic story of the immigrants and of the public school system that rose to the challenge of making them "Americans." *Going to America Going to School* includes oral histories from students and teachers and period photographs. A memorable and moving portrait.

1986 \$29.95 cloth

Praeger PUBLISHERS
A Division of Greenwood Press, Inc.
88 Post Road West P.O. Box 5007
Westport, CT 06881

Nicaragua and Its Jews

The debate over Nicaragua has been transformed somewhat improbably into a "Jewish issue." **By Walter Ruby**

Since May 1983, when Rabbi Morton Rosenthal, director of the Latin American affairs department of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, first went public with charges that the Sandinista Government of Nicaragua had committed flagrant acts of anti-Semitism and had "succeeded in driving the entire small Jewish community, numbering about 50, into exile," a bitter dispute has developed—both within the American Jewish community and in the larger American polity—over the issue of alleged Sandinista anti-Semitism.

A number of Jewish groups have vigorously disputed the A.D.L.'s contention that the Jews of Nicaragua were singled out by the Sandinista regime for ill-treatment primarily because of their Jewishness and were driven out of the country on that basis. Meanwhile, the Reagan Administration has repeatedly endorsed the A.D.L. charges, urging American Jews to back its controversial program to aid the Nicaraguan rebels, known as contras, and, as President Reagan said on July 23, 1983, at a meeting with Rosenthal and Nicaraguan Jewish émigrés at the White House, to "share the truth that Com-

munism in Central America means not only the loss of political freedom, but the loss of religious freedom as well." Predictably, the Administration's charges of anti-Semitism have been vigorously disputed by a variety of Jewish and non-Jewish opponents of its Central American policies.

Amid all the heat and smoke, the debate over Nicaragua has been transformed somewhat improbably into a "Jewish issue." As columnist Marvin Schick pointed out in Long Island Jewish World, the internal Jewish debate over Nicaragua—which he calls "bizarre," "absurd" and "ridiculous," part of the "unique Jewish tendency" to search for a "Jewish interest" in every controversy—is symptomatic of deeper fissures within the Jewish community. According to Schick, the dispute "highlights the liberal-neoconservative split within our ranks." Moreover, he says, aid to the contras is "a symbol, a surrogate" for supporting or opposing the Reagan Administration's foreign policies.

Even so, Nicaragua is also seen as a Jewish issue because of the prominent role played by Israel in supplying arms to Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle until only days before he was overthrown by the revolutionary Sandinista forces in



Managua's former synagogue, now the office of

the



the Sardinian Children's Association.

1979. According to a series of news reports in the years since, Israeli arms have found their way to the contra bases in Honduras and Costa Rica. Israel has also reportedly provided weapons to the Governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica.

Moreover, the A.D.L. and the Reagan Administration have sought to document the supposedly close fraternal ties of the Sandinista regime with the Palestine Liberation Organization and with Libya as evidence of its undeniably anti-Zionist and arguably anti-Semitic attitudes. Many Jewish liberals and centrists, on the other hand, have argued that Sandinista hostility toward Israel has to be placed in the context of the concrete military aid accorded by the Jewish state to the enemies of the Sandinista revolution.

There are, in fact, three distinctive ideological perspectives that can be discerned in the American Jewish community on the "Nicaragua and the Jews issue."

There are groups such as the A.D.L. and the National Jewish Coalition (a group financed by wealthy Jewish Republicans that supports Administration policy) that charge both that the Sandinistas carried out anti-Semitic acts in driving the Nicaraguan Jews into exile and that the Sandinistas represent an essentially negative phenomenon—a hard-line Marxist-Leninist regime closely allied to the Soviet Union and the P.L.O.

Taking an almost diametrically opposed position are groups such as New Jewish Agenda and individuals such as Rabbi Balfour Brickner of New York's Stephen Wise Free Synagogue. Both vigorously deny the charges of anti-Semitism against the Sandinistas—a position taken editorially by The New York Times—and express strong sympathy for the Sandinistas as an essentially progressive force that overthrew a corrupt and brutal dictator. They strongly criticize both American and Israeli policy in Central America as reactionary and shortsighted.

In between these camps is a third, somewhat more ambiguous, position upheld in varying degrees by a wide spectrum of Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish

Congress, the World Jewish Congress and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. They express strong distaste for the Sandinista regime and alarm over the close ties between the Sandinistas and the P.L.O. However, they dispute the A.D.L.'s charge of anti-Semitism, stressing that while the Sandinistas might be anti-Zionists, they did not single out the Jewish community for special persecution. Rather, according to this theory, the great majority of the Jews who fled Nicaragua during and immediately after the revolution of 1979 did so for the same reasons that approximately 40,000 other middle- and upper-class non-Jewish Nicaraguans left—because of the personal calculation that revolutionary Nicaragua would be an uncongenial place for businesspeople who prospered under the old regime.

Each of these perspectives, however, presents problems. For while economics may have been the primary motivating factor causing Jews to flee Nicaragua, it is highly likely that the Sandinistas did indeed single out a few members of the Jewish community as special targets in 1978 and 1979, a time when the Nicaraguan political and judicial system had almost completely broken down. During those chaotic days Nicaraguans of both the left and the right not only associated the local Jewish community with Israel—resented because of its military ties to Somoza—but also, together with other Latin Americans, were influenced by Roman Catholicism's traditional anti-Semitic dogma. In fact, the anti-Sandinista newspaper La Prensa (now shut down by the Government), in its October 7, 1984, edition, quoted staunchly anti-Sandinista Archbishop Miguel y Bravo as saying: "The Jews killed the Prophets and finally the Son of God."

The Nicaraguan Jewish community was never large. It consisted mainly of Polish and Eastern European Jews who arrived in the 1920s and 1930s, and of Holocaust survivors who came in the late 1940s. As did the small Jewish populations of other Latin American countries, Nicaragua's Jews gravitated toward business, and many became wealthy.

At its height in 1972, the Nicaraguan Jewish community had only about 150 members. That number dwindled dramatically in the after-

math of the 1972 earthquake, which killed more than 10,000 people and completely leveled downtown Managua. The shock of the earthquake, combined with the growing lawlessness and chaos of the last years of the Somoza regime, caused more and more Jews to emigrate. By 1978, the number of Jews left in the country had dropped to about 50.

Nevertheless, the construction in the mid-1970s of a new synagogue, replacing a structure destroyed in the earthquake, was, as the A.D.L. has pointed out, impressive evidence of the determination of the core of the community to remain rooted in Nicaragua. The community's leaders clearly failed to foresee how rapidly revolutionary fervor would rise, and how it would envelop the country and destroy the way of life of most well-to-do Nicaraguans.

Members of Nicaragua's former Jewish community, now mainly based in Miami, have testified that in the year preceding the revolution many of them received anonymous threatening telephone calls with such messages as "Death to the Jews," "Jews get out" and "Long live Sandino." (General César Augusto Sandino, a guerrilla leader from whom the Sandinistas took their name, fought United States occupation troops from 1927 until their withdrawal in 1933. A year later, he was killed by United States-supported dictator General Anastasio [Tacho] Somoza, father of Anastasio Somoza Debayle, and his revolutionary forces subsequently collapsed.) Then, on a Sabbath evening in the summer of 1978, the exiles contend, a Molotov cocktail was thrown at the synagogue, burning the front doors of the structure. The frightened worshipers were for a time prevented from leaving the building by armed men outside shouting pro-Sandinista slogans.

Virtually the entire Jewish community fled Managua in the summer of 1979, and the community closed the synagogue after taking the Torah scrolls to Miami. Jewish émigrés have claimed that Jewish community president Abraham Gorn left behind a caretaker, but that he was soon expelled by homeless squatters who moved into the building. Later, the Government confiscated the building, turning it over to the Sandinista Children's Association, which occupies it today. At first, the Govern-

ment claimed it had taken this action because the building had been abandoned and was in any case registered in the name of Gorn, who had in the meantime been labeled a Somocista, or Somoza supporter, and had had all his property seized. But after Rosenthal—who publicly took up the cause of the exiles in 1983—produced a deed testifying that the synagogue belonged to the Congregación Israelita de Nicaragua, the new Government acknowledged that the building belonged to the Jewish community and offered to return it.

In his September 1983 article, "Nicaragua Without Jews," in the ADL Bulletin, Rosenthal reported on the fate of the synagogue, saying, "The Sandinistas commandeered Managua's synagogue and today Sandinista propaganda posters cover the four Stars of David at the front entrance. The interior is adorned with anti-Zionist posters." Rosenthal did not cite the source for his report on the synagogue. (Indeed, neither Rosenthal nor any other A.D.L. official has visited Nicaragua since before the revolution despite frequent invitations by the Sandinista Government.)

In 1984 I accompanied a New Jewish Agenda mission to Managua investigating the allegations of anti-Semitism. A visit to the synagogue building revealed no anti-Zionist posters in evidence. The exterior of the building was painted with murals of children on camping expeditions, while the interior walls were covered with revolutionary posters bearing such slogans as "For the sake of the children—No to U.S. intervention."

The Sandinista official heading the Children's Association strongly denied that the Sandinistas had launched the 1978 attack on the synagogue, suggesting instead that the attackers had been members of Somoza's National Guard who had shouted Sandinista slogans in order to trick the Jews into believing their attackers had been leftists.

According to the N.J.A. report issued after the delegation returned to the United States, "Most of the people with whom we met believed that such an attack did occur. . . . Whether this attack was the work of Sandinista armed fighters (the F.S.L.N. has never claimed responsibility for this act) or, as is suggested by supporters of the Sandinistas, was

instead attributable to Somoza provocateurs is a matter which we could not satisfactorily resolve. Such an attack can only be deemed an attempt to instill terror within the Jewish community and must, of course, be condemned."

Looking back, it seems now that, together with the members of the N.J.A. delegation, I accepted too easily the Sandinistas' assurances that they had not ordered the attack. The delegation failed to probe more deeply into what had happened; any admission that the F.S.L.N., the Sandinista National Liberation Front, had been involved in the attack would have shattered its supposition that the Sandistas were not and had never been anti-Semitic. Some N.J.A. members who found the explanation of Somozan duplicity somewhat far-

Jewish community leader, was responsible for selling Israeli arms to Somoza, and informed Palacio that they intended to assassinate him. Palacio said he argued successfully that Gorn's life should be spared. He said that his Sandinista contacts then informed him that they planned to blow up a parked car belonging to one of the Jews worshipping inside the synagogue as a warning against collaboration with Somoza. But according to Palacio's account as it appeared in Jack Anderson's column in August 1985, "Caught up in the mob frenzy, a few of the rebels tossed Molotov cocktails at the synagogue, and the front entrance burst into flames. The Jews rushed to the exit, but they found the entrance blocked with automobiles. 'Death to the Jews,' shouted the guerrillas. 'What Hitler

Evidence of anti-Semitic actions should not serve to justify American Jewish support of President Reagan's efforts to destroy the Sandinista regime.

fetched theorized that, more likely, the attack had been carried out by one of the many left-wing gangs roaming the capital in those revolutionary days, acting in sympathy with, but independently of, the F.S.L.N.

One year later, in the summer of 1985, Rosenthal produced Mauricio Palacio, a one-time Sandinista sympathizer who claimed to have spied on the Nicaraguan Jewish community for the F.S.L.N. Palacio, a young native Indian, was adopted as a teenager by Jewish businessman Fred Luft after warding off looters at one of Luft's department stores in the aftermath of the earthquake. He told Rosenthal (and later Lucette Lagnado, an associate of columnist Jack Anderson's) that during the 1970s he came to sympathize with the Sandinistas, who encouraged him to spy on the Jewish community.

Palacio later became disillusioned with the Sandinistas, fled to the United States and became a born-again Christian. He told Lagnado that the Sandinistas became convinced that Abraham Gorn, the

started we will finish.' "

In a telephone interview from his Chicago home, Palacio pointed out that he had not been at the synagogue during the attack, so that the account of the slogans allegedly shouted had come from Nicaraguan Jews and not from himself. Otherwise, he confirmed the essence of the Anderson account. Palacio commented, "When I asked my contacts why they had attacked the building itself and not just one of the cars, they told me they were not trying to kill anyone, only to scare the people inside. I worked with middle-level people within the F.S.L.N., but I was told that the orders were actually coming from the very top, from two of the nine *comandantes* who run the F.S.L.N." Palacio said he did not know which of the *comandantes* had ordered the synagogue attack, and declined to name his immediate supervisors in the F.S.L.N., stressing that he still fears for his personal safety and that of his wife.

When Manuel Cordero, Deputy Chief of the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington, was asked to respond to

Palacio's charges, he did not repeat the response heard in Managua the year before (that Somocistas had carried out the attack in order to blame the F.S.L.N.). Instead, Cordero replied, "I don't think this action was the work of the F.S.L.N. At that time, a year before the revolution, there were a lot of groups running loose in Managua, and it was easy enough to make a bomb. Anyone could have said, 'The Zionists are shipping weapons to Somoza and should be stopped.' Even the F.S.L.N. did not know what all of its supporters were doing. There were many ultraleft groups, such as the Trotskyites, who carried out these kinds of crazy acts."

If one accepts the premise that either Sandinista forces or forces sympathetic to the Sandinistas attacked the Managua synagogue in an effort to send a message to Gorn and other Jews the Sandinistas considered hostile, then the contention by a number of the wealthiest and most prominent members of the Jewish community that they were subjected to a campaign of telephone threats and harassment to scare them into leaving the country also becomes more believable.

Cordero also said the F.S.L.N. had a policy against "carrying out attacks against isolated segments of the population." But he noted: "My understanding was that the synagogue's status was not resolved, and there was the belief that the building was somehow the property of Mr. Gorn. Since Israel was sending weapons to Somoza until the last days, one can see how it might have been possible for someone to confuse the synagogue with an Israeli building. . . . There was a problem of people's perceptions."

The connection in the minds of the Sandinistas between the synagogue and Abraham Gorn, and between Abraham Gorn and Israeli military sales to Somoza, had been made clear to the N.J.A. delegation by high Sandinista officials in 1984. Records in the Nicaraguan Ministry of Justice made available to the delegation allegedly showed substantial economic contracts between Somoza and Gorn, including a request in January 1979 that Gorn deliver supplies to the National Guard. Sandinista officials contended, without proof, that the supplies alluded to were Israeli weapons.

Nicaraguan Jewish exiles in Miami strongly deny, however, that anyone in the community was involved in any way in the arms trade between Israel and Nicaragua. According to Gorn's son, Isaac, who recently left his home in Miami to join his father in exile in Costa Rica, his father "was definitely not involved in the arms trade, nor was anyone else in the community. The Israelis had direct access to Somoza and his top people. They did not need Jewish intermediaries." He and other Jewish exiles in Miami later said that the supplies requested in January 1979 consisted of underwear and khaki uniforms—a probable explanation since Gorn owned the largest textile plant in Nicaragua.

Whatever the truth about the exact role played by Abraham Gorn (who was allowed to leave for exile in Costa Rica after serving a brief jail term and after seeing nearly his entire fortune—estimated at \$19 million—confiscated by the Sandinistas), it is noteworthy that as late as 1984, the Sandinistas were still claiming that Gorn had been involved in the arms trade.

During the N.J.A. visit to Managua, various F.S.L.N. officials repeated the contention that many or most of the exiled Jews had had close business or personal ties with Somoza, although the Nicaraguan Ministry of Justice had just ruled that only two members of the community, Abraham Gorn and Laslo Pataki, another wealthy industrialist, should be classified as Somocistas. Despite repeated requests by N.J.A. delegation members that the Nicaraguans offer a more precise definition of what constituted a Somocista collaborator, the Government never offered such a definition. Amid the turmoil of 1978 and 1979, clearly anyone with powerful enemies within the Sandinista leadership could be labeled a Somocista.

Testifying to the N.J.A. investigators about the atmosphere of fear and foreboding in the Jewish community in the late 1970s, one of the handful of Nicaraguan Jews left in the country said that during the months preceding the revolution of 1979, offensive slogans linking the Nicaraguan Jews to Israel had appeared on the synagogue wall. Another Nicaraguan Jew, an elderly businessman named Jaime Levy, told Larry Cohler of Long Island Jewish World that he had no doubt that Isaac Gorn's ac-

count of being threatened and called a "dirty Jew" by anonymous telephone callers could be true. Both Levy and the first source denied, however, that the Sandinistas had followed a conscious policy of anti-Semitism, and both claimed that they had not personally experienced any persecution or discrimination.

Given the amount of evidence that clear acts of victimizing Jews as Jews took place in 1978 and 1979, it seems surprising that the N.J.A. delegation could have come away with the conclusion that "the available facts do not support the charges of anti-Semitism." But the group was not alone in arriving at that conclusion. In fact, several strongly anti-Sandinista voices within Nicaragua, such as Marta Baltadano of the opposition Permanent Human Rights Commission (now defunct) and Roberto Cardenal, associate editor of *La Prensa*, said they did not believe that the Sandinistas had gone after the Nicaraguan Jews specifically as Jews. (Baltadano has since been forced out of Nicaragua because of her anti-Government stands.) Also reaching a similar conclusion, in 1983, was Anthony Quainton, then United States Ambassador to Nicaragua. He sent a cable to Washington in July of that year asserting that an investigation by the embassy failed "to demonstrate that the Sandinistas followed a policy of anti-Semitism or persecuted Jews because of their religion." Soon after, Quainton was removed as ambassador. The same week Quainton issued his findings, incidentally, Reagan met with Rosenthal and the Nicaraguan Jewish émigrés at the White House, strongly endorsing the A.D.L.'s charges.

Clearly, New Jewish Agenda, Baltadano, Cardenal and Quainton may have been correct to conclude that the economic threat was the primary factor that led the tiny Nicaraguan Jewish community to flee the country, together with tens of thousands of non-Jews. And there is reason to believe the N.J.A. was correct in the central thesis of its 1984 report on its mission to Nicaragua: "There is no policy of anti-Semitism or bias on the part of any official body." The handful of Jews remaining in Nicaragua today suffer no discrimination or ill-treatment, and the fact that a number of persons of Jewish ancestry occupy

high Government positions—such as Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United States, Carlos Tunnerman, and Minister of Tourism Herty Lewites—is evidence that the Sandinistas do not practice anti-Jewish racialism. Still, the failure to consider the anarchic atmosphere threatening Jews as Jews in Nicaragua in 1979 remains surprising. It may also be significant that Baltadano and Quainton made their studies within the country and did not meet with the majority of Nicaraguan Jews who had already fled.

The N.J.A. delegation, by contrast, did meet with three representatives of the exiled Nicaraguan Jews in Miami before flying to Nicaragua: Fred Luft, the one-time owner of a string of department stores; Kurt Preiss, who owned a tannery in the city of Granada, and Isaac Gorn, former heir to the Gorn empire, which included the textile plant, a huge farm, a baseball team and race horses.

The three Nicaraguans made no attempt to convince their visitors they had not done business with Somoza. According to Gorn, "The way the Sandinistas have singled out my father for dealing with Somoza is ridiculous. Everyone who was in business in Nicaragua—including Jews, Arabs and Chinese—had dealings with Somoza." Gorn noted that Somoza had direct control of about 40 percent of the Nicaraguan economy, and claimed that no one could run a successful business in Nicaragua without paying off Somoza.

Luft, a vigorous, expansive man of about 60, was even more blunt, and said that Sandinista charges of tax evasion against Abraham Gorn were "ridiculous." According to Luft, "Anyone who knows the first thing about Nicaragua knows that everyone with money in Managua was a tax evader. I was as much a tax evader as Gorn was. After all, this was Latin America, not the U.S. Why should I pay taxes, when I did not get anything in the way of services in return?"

Asked why the émigré community had not yet responded to a then year-old offer from the Nicaraguan Government to return the synagogue to the Jewish community (according to Paul Reichler, a Washington lawyer representing Nicaragua, the émigré Jews would not have to return to Managua as long as they appointed a

resident or nonresident agent in Managua to look after the matter), Luft said that he and others were concerned that the Government might impose a tax on the building.

The exiles made it clear that the main reason they had turned to the A.D.L. was to win restitution of property taken from them. According to Gorn, "My father and I work hard, and then someone comes along and says, 'All of these things are no longer yours.' Do I have to be ashamed of what is mine?"

In an interview in June, Reichler expressed exasperation with the negotiating tactics adopted by Rosenthal's office on behalf of the émigrés. He charged that the A.D.L. was not negotiating in good faith, but rather was "simply dragging its feet on this in order to discredit the Nicaraguan Government."

Reichler noted that the property of 17 Nicaraguan Jews had been confiscated under legislation that allows the Government to seize the property of Nicaraguans who have been outside the country for more than six months and are judged by the Government to have abandoned their property. As a special concession, Reichler said, the Nicaraguan Government decided two years ago that Nicaragua's courts would reconsider the cases of any Jewish émigrés who wished to have the confiscation of their property reconsidered. However, after the Nicaraguan Government rejected a \$3 million property claim by one Jew, Kurt Preiss, no other Jews have come forward with claims.

All the same, the Nicaraguan Jewish exiles in Miami do have something of a credibility problem due to their close ties to the contras and to the Reagan Administration. Edgar Chamorro, a one-time top official of the Miami-based, contra-led organization known as the F.D.N. (National Democratic Front) who later broke with the group, told me that early in the summer of 1983, he was at F.D.N. headquarters when a telephone call came from the Central Intelligence Agency urging the F.D.N. to find several Jewish exiles who would be willing to go to Washington to testify publicly about Sandinista anti-Semitism. According to Chamorro, the F.D.N. selected Isaac Gorn and Isaac Stavisky, who in fact appeared at the White House on July 23, 1983, together with President Reagan and

Morton Rosenthal of the A.D.L., to denounce the Sandinistas for anti-Semitism.

Then, too, Marta Sacassa, the spokesperson for the F.D.N., told me that many other Nicaraguan Jewish exiles have expressed support for the F.D.N., but have preferred not to take leadership positions in the organization.

What might be useful now, after three years of debate over the Jewish stake in Nicaragua, is a shift in the focus of the argument.

Though the evidence indicates that anti-Semitic actions were committed by some Sandinista supporters in 1978 and 1979, that should by no means serve as a justification for American Jews to support President Reagan's efforts to destroy the Sandinista regime. Is the United States—which supported the most brutal and corrupt forces in Nicaragua and throughout Latin America for more than 100 years—morally in a position to tell Nicaraguans how to run their country?

At the same time, Jewish liberals should give up trying to distinguish acceptable Sandinista anti-Zionism from plain old anti-Semitism. Moreover, Jewish liberals need to keep a line open to Managua to build its sensitivity toward Jewish issues and to lessen Nicaragua's dismayingly close relations with Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi and with the P.L.O.


Jewish conservatives need to concede, in the spirit of realism, that Nicaraguan paranoia might have a great deal to do with Israel's disastrous policy of providing weaponry to Somoza and later, reportedly, to the contras. The Jewish right could also perform the signal service of urging the Reagan Administration to end its insulting campaign to convince Jews to back aid to the contras because of the exile in Miami—whether voluntary or self-enforced—of a small group of Jews from Managua.

None of that seems too likely, however. The recriminations over the fate of the minuscule Jewish community of Nicaragua are likely to go on for quite a while. □

Walter Ruby is the New York correspondent of The Jerusalem Post and a staff writer for Long Island Jewish World. He has twice visited Nicaragua.

The Immigrant

A Story by David Unger



Jack Tom

I am holding the hand of a man who is my father. Since he can't drive, we're sitting on a green wooden bench waiting for a bus transfer. It's so hot the seat of my pants is wet. I'm afraid to tell Pop; he seems to be thinking about something. I look up at him; his mouth's open funny, like those children I've seen on the Jerry Lewis Cerebral Palsy Telethon. I know his teeth aren't real; I've seen them soaking in a glass of water by his bed.

Suddenly Pop starts stroking my hand. It's comforting, this petting, though his hands seem scaly, unlike Mom's. My father is an old man. He walks slowly, legs bowed, as if his knees hated each other; when he pushes up from a chair, he gasps for air, sighs. I like the stroking, begin to wiggle my fingers; then he stops his motion, pats my hand as if saying: "Now, now, everything will be all right."

I know something's wrong, but Mom and Pop never talk about it; the trouble stays in the air like the smell of fried onions.

I've been on these trips before, and I know the bus can take hours to come. I slip my hand out of Pop's grip, lean my chest against the back of the bus bench to watch some old men—not much older than Pop—pushing disks with bird's-foot prongs. They all wear hats with visors, thin, colorful sweaters (despite the heat) and white canvas shoes. If I close my eyes, I see my father slipping in among them and another man, younger, sitting next to me on the bench.

"You can wait for hours!" Pop says, seconds away from exploding.

"The bus isn't coming?" I wheeze out.

"No," he answers, slapping his leg. "We're not dogs. Waiting half an hour for the bus! I have to be at the DeLido in fifteen minutes."

My pants aren't as clammy, now that I'm on my knees. "What's the DeLido?"

"It's a hotel on the Beach."

"Are you going to work there?"

"*Hoffenilich*. They need a day clerk."

That scares me. Nine or ten times I've gone out with my father looking for work, and I've never thought of what would happen to me if he gets a job. Mom's a saleslady at Burdines; Henry and Louis are in school. I want

to be big, but I can't. I'm only five. "Who'll watch me?" I want to ask, but I don't want to appear little or be a pest. Oh boy, a way out: "Well, who'll take care of Henry and Louis after school?" There's a lump in my throat Pop can't see.

"Consuelo, of course."

"Oh yeah, Consuelo," I say giddily.

"She'll take care of you, too—if I get hired." His eyes crane over the curb, look frantically for a bus in between the passing cars, and move back down to his watch. "*¡Eso es!*" he slaps his knee again.

Sometimes I think I'm stupid I forget so much. Consuelo came with us from Guatemala. She's my *niñera*—nanny! See, Mom, I'm learning English! Consuelo speaks to me in Spanish, Pop in English or German; when I repeat something Pop has said, Mom gets mad at me because she thinks I'm going to begin first grade speaking German.

"What are we going to do, Pop?"

"About what?"

"You know. If the bus doesn't come."

"I don't know."

There are times I wish he'd say he knows. When he says "I don't know," I get scared because I think that I have to figure something out for him.

"We could take a taxi!"

"Do you think we have that kind of money?"

"Sure." I want him to say yes, but somehow he can't. He's looking sad, begun picking at the skin of his palms. He takes his brown coat off, folds it over his arm. His whole body is ticking.

"Consuelo can lend us the money. We'll pay her back later."

My father doesn't even answer. There are things I don't understand. Why the whispers? Why the heat? Where are the volcanoes? Who took my tricycle? Why can't Pop get a job? I remember Mom and Pop left us with Uncle Ezra, a long time passed, then we took a plane here. This is Hialeah! I was born in Guatemala. This isn't Guatemala. We lived in a restaurant. Where's Augusto the cook, the waiter Otto? Where are my friends the . . . I don't remember their names.

"Get up, son." A hand yanks at me.

"Why?" I ask, pulling down on my

pant legs.

"The bus," Pop sighs.

Now that it's coming, I have to pee. I squeeze my legs together as tight as I can. Turning around, I see the bus. I glance up at Pop; he should be smiling. Suddenly he drops my hand, throws his coat on the bench, steps off the curb, starts waving his arms crazily.

"Pop!" I yell, afraid a car is going to hit him.

The bus switches lanes, away from us. My eyes squint: there are people on the bus, but it doesn't slow down.

"Stop! Stop!"

My heart pounds. "I will not pee, I will not pee," I tell myself over and over.

The bus driver, sitting on a black throne and wearing sunglasses, waves at us, shakes his head.

My father comes back to me, arms down to his sides, shoulders hunched. Water runs down the many wrinkles on his face.

A voice calls from behind. I turn around. A man in a red sweater takes off his cap, dries his forehead with a handkerchief. "Hey mister," he calls out, "they moved the bus stop down two blocks last week."

Pop's frozen. "Why doesn't anyone tell me anything?" he shouts bitterly.

The man shrugs, goes back to his friends, taps the side of his head.

My father takes his coat from the bench, then puts me down on the sidewalk.

"We're going to be late, aren't we, Pop?"

He's already begun walking to the new bus stop. Pee overspreads my underwear; it'll dry in the heat. We'll be there soon, only a little while longer. □

David Unger is a writer and translator. He was born in Guatemala and presently lives in New York City.

Driving In Fog

*And now you're nothing and you're going nowhere.
Trees beckon you, struggling out of the vague
half-dawn and dissolving into the fog
behind you. The road emerges out of nowhere—
all ten yards of it—and runs straight nowhere,
the white lines stuttering, No dream, just nothing.
Wheel still feels firm in your hands, but your leg
has gone dead. What in hell are you doing here?*

*And now on the dim screen floats your lost
father, striding from a far land. Dim your brights.
Where's he gone? He sang that song you loved, you heard
it, yes. The same tree beckons. The same fencepost
flashes over and over, on each a blackbird
standing sentry in his red epaulets.*

—Jay Rogoff

Jay Rogoff is a widely published poet whose work has appeared in previous issues of Present Tense.

Campus Crusade

How effective are the Hillels?

By Edwin Black

grams, cultural and social gatherings, counseling for any Jew needing help, and often a voice when the campus requires a statement from the Jewish community.

For example, of the University of Iowa's 32,000 students, approximately 1,000 are Jewish. Far from home and family, these 1,000 know that somewhere in Iowa City they can find Jewish culture and substance. The address is Market and Dubuque Streets, a busy intersection at the doorstep to the campus. There, across from the Lutheran church and the Methodist Wesley Student Center stands a sleek, modern brick structure featuring a vaulted chapel and a Magen David on the door. Rabbi Jeffrey Portman, the part-time Hillel director, has worked hard to schedule religious services, big-name guest speakers, cultural events and other activities, making Hillel a center all Jews can relate to.

"We know that our students want more than a social center," explains program director Orna Raz. "They don't come here to find a mate, but to do something worthwhile or work for a cause." On a regular Friday night, only 15 students attend Hillel-sponsored services. But on the High Holidays, such as Rosh Hashanah, so many students participate—several hundred—that the Hillel must rent the ballroom in the Student Union. Their Israeli Independence Day party is open to the community and attracts over a hundred people, a good crowd by Iowa standards.

The University of Cincinnati's Hillel is so renowned for its art galleries and exhibitions that it is listed in American Automobile Association touring books as a travel attraction. In spring, its folk festival brings together about 5,000 of the area's 21,000 Jews. The Cincinnati Hillel even publishes its own gourmet kosher cookbook, "Cook Unto Others," now in its third printing and recently picked up by a national book club.

But Hillel service goes deeper than activities and programming. "For many of us [Hillel directors], we are virtually *the* Jewish family service to the campus," asserts Rabbi Abie Ingber, director of the University of Cincinnati Hillel. "We are the Israel action group, the Jewish cultural center, the B.J.E. [Bureau of Jewish Education], the C.R.C. [Community

The room above Kandy's barbershop in downstate Champaign, Illinois, was nothing fancy. But it was a beginning.

In 1923 Christian biblical scholar Edward Chauncey Baldwin asked his Jewish friends at the University of Illinois, "Why [do] you rabbis take so little interest in the spiritual instruction of the Jewish undergraduates?" He added, "Many of these students take courses from me. I am ashamed because they know so little about the Scriptures their own forebears created."

Champaign's part-time rabbi, Ben Frankel, took up the challenge. Working on a shoestring budget of a few hundred dollars, he rented that room above Kandy's barbershop and created a center for Jewish activities. Frankel toyed with several names for his center and whimsically decided on "Hillel," after the great sage and teacher of the Second Temple period.

It was the beginning of a movement. Frankel obtained his first real financial support from Chicago Jewry, including Julius Rosenwald, the Sears, Roebuck & Company magnate. However, a permanent sponsor was needed. As a recent graduate of Hebrew Union College, Frankel first

asked the Union of American Hebrew Congregations to adopt and fund the idea. But the Reform movement said no. B'nai B'rith was approached second, and it said yes.

The first Hillel Houses were established in the late 1920s at the Universities of Illinois, Wisconsin and Ohio. Others were later added at the rate of one each year.

With a mandate to serve all Jewish students regardless of their background or orientation, the concept of Judaic pluralism became fundamental to the movement. Quickly, the local Hillel became the umbrella group for all Jewish campus activities—Zionist, religious, cultural. The centers began to proliferate in the 1930s, when Jewish student activists demanded Hillels not only in small towns such as Champaign and Madison, Wisconsin, but in big cities as well. Hillels were soon added to campuses in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York. After World War II, with the vast increase in middle-class college students, Hillels undertook another major expansion. Today Hillels serve 450,000 students on some 400 campuses nationwide.

Hillel's Jewish activities include Sabbath and holiday services, Israel-related events, kosher food pro-



Student participating in University of Maryland Hillel observance of Yom Hashoah, Holocaust Remembrance Day.

Relations Council], the synagogue, the temple; we are even Mom and Dad."

For being all that, someone in the Jewish community might volunteer a "thank you." But instead, the Hillel movement has become American Jewry's communal orphan, unrecognized, underfinanced and today looking ahead to an uncertain future. Ironically, this comes at a time when the American Jewish community is depending upon the Hillel movement to sustain and often recapture the Jewishness of the generation it desperately does not want to lose.

How does Hillel reach out to that generation? "As long as parents send their kids to the best universities," asserts University of Michigan Hillel director Michael Brooks, "they must accept the fact that their children will

tions"? "They get a mixed report card," says 22-year-old Yosef Abramowitz, a senior in Jewish public policy at Boston University who is active in the Hillel movement. "It depends on the individual directors and how creative they are. Most importantly, Hillel has become relevant to the student of the 80s by opening up the political side."

Indeed, Hillel has felt the need to change in every decade since its inception in the 1920s. In this decade, the emphasis has been on the activism students want. For example:

- Hillel has sponsored the National Jewish Law Students Network at 90 law schools to bring together the coming generation of Jewish jurists.

- The Student Coalition for Soviet Jewry, also sponsored by Hillel, annually organizes the largest single

Affairs Committee, for some 1,300 students at such campuses as Yale, Brandeis, Ohio State, the University of Texas and Stanford. The seminars do not offer political preferences, but do urge the students to become active in the campaigns of whatever candidates they feel strongly about.

Moreover, if one were to measure the effectiveness of Hillel's programs in terms of solidarity with Israel, it should be noted that at the height of last spring's tourism-terrorism scare, Hillel actually increased the number of its Israeli-based programs, as well as the number of participants, even as members of the Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah and B'nai B'rith itself canceled travel plans to Israel.

True, there are some Hillels at conflict with their constituents. For example, in Chicago, University of Illinois Hillel members were so dissatisfied with management, they printed up phony agendas for an official Hillel meeting, calling for the replacement of a Hillel supervisor. But such situations are rare.

In truth, Hillel as an institution is effective, albeit that effectiveness is impossible to measure. Each individual has a different need, a different standard for success. For someone seeking religious enrichment, a Sabbath dinner each Friday may make for success. For someone in crisis over family problems, one telephone call that helped at a suicidal moment may make the difference between life and death. For someone eager to support Israel, joining a Hillel-sponsored pro-Israeli group with daily planning of activities will develop leadership.

Marc Klein, editor of the Northern California Jewish Bulletin, went to the Hillel his first Friday night at Penn State "because my parents told me to." Klein quickly lost interest because "I got the impression people there were more religious than myself." At first glance, it seems like Hillel failed Klein. But that first night changed his life. "That's the night I met Sandy," he recalls. They fell in love and have been happily married ever since.

"I rarely went to my Hillel—not because it wasn't any good, but because I didn't make the effort," confesses a Jewish organizational regional director, who prefers to remain anonymous. Recalling his grad-

The Hillel movement has become American Jewry's communal orphan, unrecognized, underfinanced and looking ahead to an uncertain future.

be in an environment that offers an array of attractive ideas. We knew that when we left the ghetto—and that's part of living in the modern world. At Hillel, we believe that Judaism can hold its own in that marketplace."

To compete, the University of Michigan Hillel, one of the nation's largest Hillels, offers a 10,000-circulation student newspaper, guest speakers such as Kurt Vonnegut and Elie Wiesel, emergency loans, apartment and job listings, separate weekly minyanim for Reform, Conservative and Orthodox students and a full schedule of events including National Student Solidarity Day for Soviet Jewry, of which the Michigan Hillel is the sponsor.

Says Brooks: "We know that you can't coerce allegiance to the Jewish community unless you keep the students indoors and turn off the TV. Instead, we maintain a Jewish presence that declares that Jewish life is alive and well, and is ready to connect with the student, when the student is ready."

How successful are those "connec-

demonstration in Washington, D.C., on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

- Recognizing that 50,000 Jews are employed as teachers and administrators by colleges throughout the United States, Hillel created Hillel Academic Associates to organize and engage them in advocacy projects, such as petitions, lobbying, protests and the like.

- Similar organization has been extended to students themselves via the Hillel Student Secretariat, which holds the only annual national student elections. The secretariat provides a leadership opportunity for Jewish students as they engage in political activism, from opposing apartheid to supporting Israel. An example of such activity is the booklet "Jews, Zionism and South Africa." Widely distributed by Jewish organizations, it debunks the myth of Israeli-South African collusion. The author of the booklet is secretariat member Yosef Abramowitz of Boston University.

- Hillel also runs annual regional political training seminars, cosponsored with the American Israel Public

uate days at Cornell in the mid-60s, he adds, "But I was familiar with that Hillel's work and that it left a positive influence on thousands and thousands of other Jewish students. I watched the director work with kids, meeting with them, listening to them, being flexible, exhibiting so many characteristics that undergrads appreciate." Even though he didn't attend the Hillel often, he recalls that the Cornell Hillel director was in fact "a major inspiration in my life."

Despite Hillel's importance to the Jewish community, the movement has found itself floundering. Confusion about Hillel's role is chiefly responsible for its orphan status. Prefaced by the name "B'nai B'rith," Hillels are somewhat misrepresented as a purely B'nai B'rith movement. Yet the Hillel Foundation is no monolithic suborganization such as B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League or the Zionist Organization of America. Hillel is rather a partnership of the Jewish community.

Originally, Hillel was indeed a purely B'nai B'rith entity. As one of America's "Big Three" Jewish organizations (along with the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Congress), B'nai B'rith could mobilize the dollars to guarantee the movement's independence. But Hillel's postwar expansion strained B'nai B'rith's declining economic resources. By the early 60s, it became clear that B'nai B'rith could no longer fund the operation by itself. Local federations operating under a recommendation by the Council of Jewish Federations began contributing more and more of Hillel's budget. Today, of Hillel's projected \$15.3 million budget for 1987, only \$3.5 million will be funded by B'nai B'rith International itself. The remaining 80 percent will be allocated by local federations, which donate more than \$7 million, and other community sources.

But which federation supports which Hillel is itself a problem. In the case of the University of Iowa Hillel Foundation's \$50,000 annual budget, B'nai B'rith defrays only the salary of part-time director Rabbi Jeffrey Portman and \$2,000 in operational expenses. An additional \$7,000 is contributed by four not-so-nearby and not-so-affluent federations: those of Des Moines, Sioux City, Cedar

Rapids and the Quad Cities. Portman's Hillel would simply be unable to function without special endowments that were created by several Iowan Jewish families.

However, most of the students served by Iowa City's Hillel are not from Iowa; they are from Chicago. Yet the Chicago federation makes no contribution to Portman's budget. "They [the Chicago federation] tell us they can't help because of 'reciprocity,'" explains Portman. Reciprocity works this way: when Iowa students go to Chicago, the Chicago federation takes care of them. So when Chicago students go to Iowa, Iowa is expected to take care of them. "But that is so unfair," asserts Portman, "because Iowa has so few federations and not very wealthy ones. Very few Jewish students from Iowa

the delivery and funding of services. But we aren't there."

However, when local federations do become involved, structural changes are inevitable as Hillel activity is melded to the specific needs of the federation. In Chicago, for instance, the federation has consigned the Hillel movement to the Jewish Community Centers. This integrates Hillel into a general youth services effort. The result, after some initial chaos, has thus far been positive. But federations around the country have certainly developed an awesome reputation for stubbornness and, not infrequently, communal tyranny. Therefore, critics charge, placing Hillels under direct federation control—even under joint control—could subvert the special intellectual, pluralistic and independent character of the

Staffers seek to dispel the myth that Hillel directors are "losers" who can't make it anywhere else in Jewish life.

go to college in Chicago. On the other hand, 500 to 600 Chicago students are out here."

Steven Nasatir, executive vice-president of the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago argues that a system whereby every local Jewish agency would bill distant federations a "head tax" or service fee "would create an impossible system of Jewish bookkeeping."

Nonetheless, the idea of extra-jurisdictional federation responsibility is not so easily dismissed. Such funding is exactly what was instituted in Illinois, where Hillel and the Chicago federation created a "combined program." In effect, the Chicago federation funds 80 percent of Hillel costs throughout Illinois, operating the foundations in a 50-50 partnership with B'nai B'rith. Similarly, all Florida federations have agreed to joint funding of all Hillels in that state. The Florida and Chicago models are being studied by Jewish agencies in several other states.

"Ideally," predicts Richard Marker, regional director of the Illinois Hillels, "a time will come when a coordinated effort between national and local communities will standardize

Hillel movement.

No better example of Hillel's vulnerability exists than the Breira episode of the late 1970s. The episode's roots lie in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, when the peace movement in Israel and America organized a major push for a modus vivendi with Palestinian nationalists. This was to include face-to-face negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, withdrawal from occupied lands and the creation of a Palestinian state—all in exchange for a lasting peace for Israel. Prominent in the Breira movement were dozens of Hillel directors and staff workers. Clearly, their traditional liberalism and campus orientation made them the natural wellspring of the Jewish peace movement. However, their highly publicized break with the official policies of both the Jewish organizational establishment and the Israeli Government provoked acrimony within the Jewish community.

Charges against Breira of "treason" were rampant. Critics seeking a wedge of attack focused on the fact that approximately half of Breira's leaders were Hillel staffers. In fact, Breira's chairman, outspoken peace

activist Rabbi Arnold Jacob Wolf, was then director of the Yale University Hillel. A consortium of Jewish interests, led by the Anti-Defamation League, held therefore that Hillel itself—and by extension B'nai B'rith International—had become identified with Breira and its disquieting program.

"Many people felt that Breira was anti-Israel or worse," recalls Philip Klutznick, a honorary past president of B'nai B'rith. "Critics said anyone belonging to Breira should be fired because they could not support an idea contrary to the policy of B'nai B'rith. It was just a witch-hunt."

To settle the matter, a commission, including Klutznick, was established by B'nai B'rith to "investigate." At issue was "the free exchange of ideas," as Klutznick recalls it. "What you express and don't express on the campus is not the same as passing a binding resolution of a political party." Ultimately, Hillel directors were exonerated as not having abused their positions. But they were firmly warned: Henceforth avoid any Hillel identification in Breira activities.

The Breira incident challenged the Hillel movement's commitment to pluralism—intellectual as well as denominational—like nothing before. "Hillel's independence was in part assured because of nonlocal control," comments Dr. Byron Sherwin, professor of Jewish ethics and philosophy at Spertus College of Judaica in Chicago. He claims "that independence would be less assured if a Breira-style incident occurred today with local federations making [local] Hillels' decisions."

The Breira episode is also considered by many to have been a turning point for Hillel staffers. Indeed, since then, the Association of Hillel and Jewish Campus Professionals has become far more active. At the top of a list of myths they seek to dispel is that Hillel directors are "losers" who can't make it anywhere else in Jewish life.

"A loser is a loser, and if you're good you're good," asserts association president Rabbi Abie Ingber of the University of Cincinnati Hillel. "There are some Hillel colleagues who couldn't make it at Hillel and ventured out into the congregational world, and vice versa. But Hillel is

not the end of the line. It is the first stop for many." Indeed, worker satisfaction may be gauged by the 27 directors who have taken sabbaticals in the past; all 27 are still in Hillel.

Integral to the new activism by Hillel staffers is their drive for recognition as a major force in communal life today. "Our colleagues don't give us sufficient credit," says Ingber. "Rabbinic colleagues in the field often fail to understand our major role in both safekeeping and strengthening the Jewish community. For example, a young student with strong Jewish values comes into the university environment; we must safekeep those values until he returns to the mainstream Jewish community."

"Or consider the individual who didn't have the benefit of a good Jewish home, or who had conflicts," says Ingber. "This person we must inspire, and give a childlike wonder of Jewish life, but with an adult view."

What type of recognition does Ingber expect? "There could be a more welcoming approach within the professional rabbinical associations such as the [Orthodox] Rabbinical Council of America," he asserts. "Or, for example, I am the only Hillel rabbi on Hebrew Union College's Rabbinic Board of Alumni Overseers, even though there are over 60 H.U.C. alumni in Hillel."

"The times they are a-changin,'" insists Ingber. "We want more political support from groups such as the [Reform] Central Conference of American Rabbis." Ingber is referring to staff association demands for collective bargaining. "If the C.C.A.R. is going to address such issues as patrilineal descent, our input may be there," says Ingber. "And we have things to talk to the [Conservative] Rabbinical Assembly about. Very few of our rabbis officiate at mixed marriages, but if we were more welcomed and the professional association reached out to us, there might be some exchange."

Yet Ingber denies that his group is offering to retreat from its ideals in exchange for bargaining support. He says, "If you have an honest dialogue, you are opening yourself up to hear what they have to say."

If Hillel staffers are changing, Hillel management may change as well. For more than 50 years, Hillel has been a B'nai B'rith creature. An in-

crease in federation partnerships may soon make B'nai B'rith auspices symbolic, as is the case today with the Anti-Defamation League. Some militant Hillel directors are even talking about secession, if additional funds for their union demands are not forthcoming. Secession is a far-fetched concept, but the fact that some Hillel directors themselves are arguing for it leads some to conclude that the Hillel movement is in trouble.

But those who worry about Hillel's future should relax. America's coming Jewish leaders are students in the Hillel system today. One day, when it comes time to make a vital decision, these men and women will simply look back and remember. Undoubtedly, they will make the correct decisions. That indeed will be the final measure of Hillel's effectiveness. □

Edwin Black is the author of "The Transfer Agreement: The Untold Story of the Secret Pact Between the Third Reich and Jewish Palestine" and writes a syndicated column for Jewish newspapers.

Judaism Beyond God A Radical New Way to Be Jewish Sherwin T. Wine

What is the essence of Jewish identity? Is belief in God necessary? Rabbi Wine explores a path for Jews who do not choose to sacrifice their integrity in their search for a meaningful Jewish identity.

Paper \$13.95

Once a Doctor, Always a Doctor The Memoirs of a German-Jewish Immigrant Physician Heinz Hartmann, M.D.

In this poignant memoir, Dr. Hartmann describes his coming to terms with persecution in Nazi Germany and his life in the New World, and the personal tragedies and joys of his long professional career in America.

Cloth \$18.95

PROMETHEUS BOOKS
700 E. Amherst St., Buffalo, NY 14215
Call toll free: 800-421-0351
In NYS: 716-837-2475

Endpapers

44

Susan Jacoby

46

Wolf Blitzer

48

Arthur Hertzberg

50

Desperation and Humor
by Elizabeth Kolbert

54

Arabs and Jews in Haifa
by Muriel Moulton

57

A Very Cruel Dilemma
by J. Robert Moskin

58

Last Visit to St. Privat
by Sal A. Westrich

Books

62

Good Guys/Bad Guys
NICARAGUA: REVOLUTION
IN THE FAMILY
by Shirley Christian
Reviewed by Barbara Weinstein

64

Russian and Jewish
THE JEWS OF ODESSA:
A CULTURAL HISTORY,
1794-1881
by Steven J. Zipperstein
Reviewed by David E. Fishman

65

Through Jewish Eyes
JUDAISM AND GLOBAL
SURVIVAL
by Richard Schwartz
Reviewed by Roberta Kalechofsky

66

Under Siege
PEACEKEEPERS AT WAR:
A MARINE'S ACCOUNT OF
THE BEIRUT CATASTROPHE
by Michael Petit
THE ROOT: THE MARINES IN
BEIRUT, AUGUST 1982-
FEBRUARY 1984
by Eric Hammel
Reviewed by Leonard Bushkoff

67

BROWSING
by Gerald Jonas

Nearly everyone I asked was able to put me in touch with someone who had been addicted to cocaine or amphetamines.

Susan Jacoby

They're at it again. The privacy invaders, that is. This time they want to fight drugs by making urine testing for heroin, cocaine and marijuana a condition of employment. President Reagan, proving that the divine right of kings is truly a dead doctrine, took the lead by turning his own specimen over to the urine police.

Unlike the rest of us, the President can be fairly certain that Bethesda Naval Hospital won't mix up his specimen with that of some less celebrated government employee required to prove "innocence" of drug use to his nosy employer. He'll never hear, "Oh, Mr. Reagan, we're so sorry you were impeached because you tested positive. That was a Mr. Robert Rogan's specimen. We didn't mean to ruin your life. But mistakes do happen. It's for the good of the cause, after all."

The possibility of laboratory and bureaucratic error is a perfectly sound reason for opposing proposals that would invade the privacy of our bodies in unprecedented fashion. But it is by no means the most important reason. Even if there were no chance of error, compulsory random drug testing would grievously violate the fundamental right of American citizens to be let alone unless they have given law enforcement authorities—not their bosses—probable cause to believe they have committed a crime.

Like most American adventures in unconstitutionality—the 1980s' revival of antipornography censorship measures comes immediately to mind—the push for drug testing has arisen in response to a serious, long-standing social problem that is now perceived as a crisis.

Three months ago, I would have



Jack Tom

quarreled with anyone who defined drug use as a "crisis." That was before a mainstream women's magazine asked me to do a special report on middle-class women who have gotten off illegal drugs and stayed clean. I thought it would be difficult to find interview subjects—that it would be as hard as finding people willing to identify themselves as former child abusers, thieves or sex criminals.

I was naive. Nearly everyone I asked, on both a social and a professional basis, was able to put me in touch with someone who had been addicted to cocaine or amphetamines (both legal and illegal). I spoke with social workers, nurses, stockbrokers, college professors, college students and housewives. I particularly remember one beautiful young woman, a medical student, who told me calmly about having kept her groom, the rabbi and 200 wedding guests waiting while she searched for a ladies' room to provide her with the

privacy to snort cocaine before the ceremony. She finally entered a treatment program when, as an intern, she realized that she had endangered a patient's life while she was high.

Shortly afterward, I read a newspaper account of the reactions of young suburbanites when New Jersey police impounded their cars after finding the powerful cocaine derivative "crack." The police had set up checkpoints to catch users who had just returned from meeting their crack connections in Manhattan. One striking feature of the story was that the young men and women were more concerned about losing the use of their cars than about facing felony charges. "I guess if they're going to lock up the cars, it'll make me think twice," said one man.

"Crisis" is not too strong a word to apply to the spread of psychically ruinous, potentially lethal drug use to a middle-class population that ought to have the greatest stake in playing

by society's rules. It is shaming to realize that I—like most Americans—was blind to this crisis as long as it seemed to be contained largely within poor black neighborhoods. As long as drugs did not touch those who resembled me in their economic, professional and social status. As long as the pushers and the users weren't my colleagues or next-door neighbors. . . .

The recognition of drug abuse as a growing middle-class phenomenon is what makes the idea of on-the-job drug testing so seductive. This is essentially a proposal for social rather than legal sanctions—and social sanctions impress only those who have something to lose. Such testing will obviously have no impact on the poor, the unemployed, the unschooled and the unhoused.

Some civil libertarians, in their understandable eagerness to squelch the new privacy invaders, argue that drug testing would have an equally negligible effect on the middle class. I think they are wrong. It is true that the threat of testing is not likely to stop someone who is already addicted, because the inability to act rationally in one's own best interests is the very essence of addiction. However, the threat of random testing would certainly discourage a good many nonusers from experimenting with drugs for the first time, in much the same fashion that the threat of income tax auditing discourages a good many would-be tax evaders.

There is little doubt that some—not all, but some—potential users would be deterred by the fear of being caught by their employers, of being forced to enter a rehabilitation program, of being labeled untrustworthy and of losing their jobs. But—and it is a crucial “but” for anyone who believes in the Bill of Rights—no gain in the battle against drugs can possibly be worth the immense cost to our traditional concepts of personal liberty.

This leaves the immensely troubling question of what can be done about the drug crisis without doing violence to civil liberties. An effective attack (to speak of “victory” over drugs, as conservatives generally do, is to indulge in useless hyperbole) must inevitably involve at least three elements: strengthened law enforcement; more effective treatment programs for people of every social class,

and a public education campaign focusing on the real dangers of drugs rather than pious moralizing.

The need for more effective prosecution and stiffer sentences for those who profit by the manufacture, sale and distribution of drugs is so obvious that it scarcely bears repeating. But law enforcement resources should be concentrated on pushers to the masses rather than on “pushers to the stars.”

In the autumn of 1985, the Reagan Administration spent an incredible amount of time and money parading a group of baseball stars at a show trial in Pittsburgh to convict one pusher. This seems to me a disgraceful misdirection of both public money and public relations. If a grown-up ball player (or stockbroker or doctor) wishes to risk his talent and his future by pouring junk into his body and mind, he is not a victim but a fool and/or a knave.

The Government would do better to concentrate its efforts on the pushers who supply my local junior and senior high schools. They are supplying the real victims—young people who aren't even able to imagine a desirable future. But, of course, you get more publicity for parading athletes through a courtroom than for drying up the supply of drugs in unfashionable neighborhood schools. The shame of it is that there are undoubtedly more drug users in the corridors of one large urban high school than in all of pro baseball or pro football.

Because drug abuse has spread to every level of society, public education—in schools, the workplace and every conceivable public and private forum—may be more important than any form of law enforcement (which, however punitive, can only reach a small proportion of the population). Both management and labor must be educated to recognize the signs of drug abuse in employees: frequent unexplained absences from work, a pattern of errors in an employee who had performed satisfactorily in the past, inexplicable outbursts of anger and sudden visible weight loss.

Such behavior bears a strong resemblance to the patterns of those who abuse the legal drug alcohol. Indeed, a great many drug users are also alcoholics.

Many of the women I interviewed made the interesting observation that

their employers had been far too tolerant of their erratic behavior. “I missed three important budget conferences three days running,” said a merchandising executive, “and my supervisor covered for me. If he'd asked me what was wrong and chewed me out, I'd have spilled my guts. But he didn't. All he said was, ‘We all go off the track sometimes and have to make allowances for each other.’ I don't see why any boss with common sense would have needed a test to tell him that something was very, very wrong.”

In every area of American life, the tendency to cover up rather than confront drug abuse exists in ironic juxtaposition with hysterical proposals to abrogate the right to privacy. Nowhere was this more evident than at the funeral of University of Maryland basketball star Len Bias, who died of a cocaine overdose while celebrating the prospect of a multimillion-dollar pro basketball contract.

The Reverend Jesse Jackson, who is of course black, and Bias's basketball coach, who is white, joined each other in mourning Bias as the victim of a cruel, pressure-filled society. Jackson, who has spoken out against drugs in the schools for years, made the mystifying statement that Bias's death would have been reported as a simple heart attack if he had been white. The coach said he loved Bias “like a son.” Some victim. Some son. Bias, like most of the women I interviewed, was a person with everything to live for and everything ahead of him. He threw it away. Because he thought he was exempt from the rules that apply to others. Because he thought he could “handle it.” Just like the white middle-class professionals I interviewed for my article. Dope is an equal opportunity destroyer of bodies and souls.

It is up to all of us—government and private institutions, business and labor, teachers and parents—to drive this message home to users and potential users. The effort must be made not by abandoning civil liberties but by using our brains to identify addicts, offering every user a second chance through treatment and rehabilitation and making it clear that society will not continue to foot the bill for third and fourth chances. The message should be: Blow your second chance and you lose your job. Maybe you lose your life. □

Since the Pollard affair, allegations of Israeli wrongdoing, no matter how outrageous, are news. Earlier, such charges would have been ignored.

Wolf Blitzer


Recently, there has been a virtual explosion of very serious and embarrassing accusations against Israel involving espionage, illegal technology transfers and arms smuggling. Combined, they have created a picture of an ungrateful and devious Israel involved in some sordid practices against its major ally.

The American-Israeli relationship has understandably been shaken by all this, although it seems to have an impressive resiliency that allows it to absorb these kinds of shocks.

Still, Israeli officials and their American supporters, extremely sensitive to the potential long-term consequences, are concerned. With each new incident, no matter how trivial, there is automatically some damage. Thus, Israel and its supporters are doing their best to explain and to cope with the incidents. No matter how strong the overall relationship, they suspect that support for Israel can eventually be chipped away, and they want to avoid that.

While acknowledging that there have, indeed, been some blunders, Israeli officials deny that Israel routinely spies on the United States or steals its weapons or technology. But these denials are meeting with mixed responses—as far as large elements of the United States Government and the public are concerned. With each allegation, more and more people become prepared to believe the worst about Israel. This is a natural reaction to the many incidents.

The Arabs and their friends, naturally, are having a field day in pointing to these alleged Israeli misdeeds. They are insisting that these incidents



are merely “the tip of the iceberg.” Israel, they warn, cannot be trusted. The United States, they add, must enact a new, get-tough policy toward Israel. In short, they are calling for an end to the “special relationship.”

Israel's adversaries are also dredging up all sorts of other dirty laundry involving Israel and its reported arms sales to South Africa, Iran and right-wing dictatorships in Latin America. Also being raised are such incidents as the Israeli sinking of the U.S.S. Liberty during the 1967 Six Day War and the Israeli-linked disappearance of uranium from a Pennsylvania processing firm in the 1960s. As a result, a defensive Israel is deeply embarrassed and put on the spot.

The most serious allegation, of

course, involves the Jonathan Jay Pollard spy scandal. Pollard, a former civilian intelligence analyst working for the United States Navy, has pleaded guilty to charges of spying for Israel. The Israeli Government maintains that Pollard was part of an unauthorized “rogue” operation. Israel has apologized to Washington, co-operated with United States officials in the investigation, disbanded the intelligence unit involved in the operation and promised that such an incident will never happen again.

But not all of the bad feelings against Israel have disappeared. This was partially because the head of the disbanded intelligence unit, former Mossad master spy Rafael Eitan, was given a cushy job as chairman of Is-

Jack Tom

rael Chemicals, the largest Government-owned concern in the country. In addition, Israel did not come forward on its own with the information that an Israeli Air Force colonel studying in the United States had served as Pollard's first contact. That officer, Aviem Sella, has since been named commander of the American-built and -financed Ramon airbase in the Negev Desert. He was one of the bright stars of the Air Force, having served as the lead pilot in the bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in June 1981. Until the Pollard case erupted, Sella was said to have had very good chances of winding up the Air Force Commander.

Israeli officials admit that they did not handle the Pollard affair well. Yet they continue to insist that it was hard actually to punish Eitan given his record of service to Israel's security. It was Eitan, after all, who had captured Adolf Eichmann on a Buenos Aires street. He is said to have accomplished other difficult security missions over the years as well. Further complicating the situation now is the fact that Eitan is very sick—nearly blind and deaf.

There has been a spate of other allegations against Israel in the months since Pollard unsuccessfully sought political asylum at the Israeli Embassy in Washington, and they have seriously complicated Israel's damage-control operation. Because of the Pollard affair, these other incidents have captured banner headlines and prime-time news coverage. Allegations of Israeli wrongdoing, no matter how outrageous, are now news. Earlier, similar charges would have been largely ignored. Israeli officials concede that this is a result of the Pollard affair.

In late August, an Israeli employee of the Israeli Defense Ministry's Purchasing Mission in New York was arrested—together with an American—on charges of trying to break into a building in Valley Stream, New York, housing technology-related businesses. Israeli officials said the arrested Israeli, Ronen Tidhar, 25 years old, was acting strictly on his own. They denied any involvement in the incident—pointing out that he was a low-level local employee, without diplomatic immunity—and promptly fired him.

Just prior to that incident, a suburban Chicago defense firm accused

Israeli Air Force personnel of trying to steal its plans for a supersophisticated aerial reconnaissance system. Israeli officials denied the charges, claiming that the Chicago company, Recon/Optical Inc., had failed to produce the reconnaissance cameras as part of the agreed contract price of \$40 million. Cost overruns resulted in a \$100 million price tag, which Israel refused to pay. This commercial dispute resulted in the allegations of theft, including charges produced by Recon that Israeli Air Force officers had attempted to steal some 50,000 pages of technical drawings and notes handwritten in Hebrew. In September, a Federal court dismissed the case.

This case was reported shortly after word leaked that Federal grand juries in Iowa and Pennsylvania were looking into allegations that Israeli officials assigned to the Defense Ministry's Purchasing Mission in New York had attempted to steal cluster-bomb technology and equipment, in violation of United States policy. Eight Israelis were served with subpoenas, requiring that they testify before the grand juries. Only hours before their scheduled appearances, the Justice Department reached an agreement with the Israeli Government and withdrew the subpoenas. In exchange, Israel, while continuing to deny any wrongdoing, promised to cooperate with the United States in the investigation.

Even so, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin called the allegations against Israel "fairly tales." He said these stories were "fabricated out of nowhere," adding: "I can't explain how there can be people in the U.S. who want to undermine relations between our two countries."

Last December, less than a month after Pollard was arrested, Customs Service agents raided three locations in New Jersey, Connecticut and Pennsylvania as a result of suspicions that Napco, Inc., a maker of sophisticated tank-cannon barrels, and several other companies were illegally transferring restricted military technology to Israel. Israel denied any wrongdoing, noting that it had received the required export licenses from Washington. Napco, Israeli officials said, apparently had been negligent in not obtaining all the necessary paperwork.

Even before Pollard was arrested,

a United States grand jury last year indicted a California businessman, Richard Kelly Smyth, for smuggling some 800 sophisticated switching timers—known as krytrons—to Israel over a three-year period. Although they have other uses, krytrons are necessary in the manufacture of atomic bombs, and for this reason the United States has always restricted their export. Prime Minister Shimon Peres strongly denied that Israel was involved in any plot to obtain the krytrons illegally and he and other Israeli officials noted that the devices could have been obtained in Europe. The Israelis insist that this incident, too, was a misunderstanding between Washington and Jerusalem. But in the meantime, Smyth has fled the United States, and his whereabouts are unknown.

There have been many other accusations against Israel as well, including the charge that a retired Israeli general was authorized by the Israeli Government to try to sell hundreds of millions of dollars worth of weapons, including jet fighters, to Iran. That general, Avraham Baram, together with two other Israelis and more than a dozen other suspects of various nationalities, was arrested and charged as the result of an elaborate United States "sting" operation. Israeli officials have argued that they had nothing to do with Baram and his associates, who were apparently trying to make "a quick buck." Defense Minister Rabin has suggested that the indicted Israelis merely wanted to collect the large "deposit" and run. United States officials doubt this.

In the meantime, the United States Government's star witness in the case, convicted Iranian arms salesman Cyrus Hishemi, died under mysterious circumstances in London. He had been cooperating with United States law-enforcement authorities in order to reduce his sentence, and had been the Government's point man in "stinging" the Israelis and the others. Some American officials say Hishemi may have died of leukemia. But others are skeptical, because he seemed to be healthy at the time of the investigation.

These incidents, especially the Pollard affair, have tended to shake the basically strong United States-Israeli relationship. Both sides are angry. The United States, to a large degree,

feels betrayed by Israel. And Israel feels that it has been wrongly accused, except in the Pollard case.

Morris Abram, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, reflected Israel's irritation when he issued a statement in early August following the Justice Department's decision to withdraw the subpoenas against the Israelis accused in the cluster-bomb case. After praising that decision, he said: "But we remain concerned by the series of leaks from the bowels of the bureaucracy in Washington that appear designed to weaken the close ties of affinity and alliance between Israel and America. One effect has been to intimidate U.S. companies doing business with Israel and to harass Israeli diplomatic and other personnel in the course of their normal duties."

Israeli officials have confirmed that several important defense-related deals, about to be signed, were abruptly canceled by nervous United States concerns in the wake of these highly publicized incidents. The Israelis are also aware, in the aftermath of the Pollard affair, of greater sensitivity among American Jews working in national security areas. Thus, there already has been serious damage. In late August, the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv issued a statement noting that the publicity in the United States news media was giving Israel a bad name. American defense contractors, normally anxious to work with Israel, were becoming wary of embarking on new deals. They feared they might become the target of some Federal investigation.

Abram, in his statement, seemed to pin the blame on lower-level officials in Washington "who apparently do not accept the policy of this Administration toward Israel and who appear determined to challenge it. They do so by leaks, by loose charges, by manipulating the media, as in the Napco case when TV camera crews accompanied Customs agents who showed up at a warehouse in upstate New York to investigate the possible 'illegal' acquisition by Israel of United States military technology."

Abram expressed full confidence that the accusations against Israel would "prove to be without foundation. But I am deeply concerned that the campaign of rumor, innuendo, leaks and similar tactics carried out

by unnamed sources in the bureaucracy is intended to jeopardize the positive attitude toward Israel that exists at the highest levels of our Government and among the American people generally. It is this challenge to policy and authority that concerns me, as it must all citizens."

It is, of course, natural that Customs and F.B.I. agents, Justice Department officials, local police officers and other law-enforcement personnel will attempt to investigate all allegations of criminal conduct against Israel thoroughly. In this post-Watergate era, these authorities want to avoid even the most remote taint of a cover-up. Their job is to investigate alleged crimes, and they are doing so against Israel.

At the political level, however, the United States Government, especially Secretary of State George Shultz, is clearly more sensitive to the "bigger picture"—namely, the overall United States-Israeli relationship. The State Department wants to make certain that the investigations do not overly upset these ties, which are seen as very important to both countries. Shultz and others have done their best to limit the damage. But some damage is inevitable, and Israelis are aware of this.

To a certain degree, the Israelis certainly have themselves to blame. The Pollard matter was an incredibly stupid blunder. It opened up a Pandora's box of trouble. Over the years, moreover, Israeli officials, concerned about the real security problems facing their country, have on occasion gone beyond the accepted limits in seeking more weaponry and technology from the United States. In the process, they have offended some American officials who now are going after them with a certain vengeance.

But Israel appears to have learned its lesson. By all accounts, Israeli officials have received instructions from Jerusalem from the highest level to clean up their act. In the coming weeks and months, there might be more allegations of Israeli wrongdoing. But they will almost certainly involve past incidents. Politically, Israeli officials nowadays simply can't afford to take any more chances. The risks do not justify the potential gains. □

Arthur Hertzberg

The greatest intellectual and spiritual disaster to have afflicted the Jewish people in the modern era is the rekindling of the belief that the messiah is about to come. This notion swept the Jewish world in the 17th century, but unfortunately, the self-proclaimed messiah, Shabbetai Zevi, did not deliver the redemption that he had promised. In a radically different form, messianism arose again a century later, as a secular dream. The Enlightenment taught the European intelligentsia the idea that society as a whole was perfectable. Jewish intellectuals began to hope, then, that they, and perhaps their people as a whole, could leave the ghetto and acquire some share in this new world.

Several forms of secular Zionism belong to this messianic tendency. Adherents believed that the Jewish religion belonged with the culture of the ghetto; the new Zionist nationalism was to achieve a freeing of the Jews from this narrow, outworn past. Orthodox religious believers have generally failed to understand that Zionist Jewish secularism is not simply the desire to live without the constraints of Jewish rituals. On the contrary, Zionist secularism was conceived, in theory, as a messianic faith. This secular messianism remains alive in Israel, though not in the diaspora. That is why nonbelieving Jews of the diaspora are so much more willing to be accommodating to religious believers than are the secularists in Israel.

On the religious side, the fire that was once kindled by Shabbetai Zevi is burning again in our own day. It began in an unlikely place, in the teachings of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, the first Ashkenazic chief rabbi of Palestine under the British Mandate. He was, of course, personally as far away from false messianism as East is from West. Nevertheless, the main thrust of his teachings was that we are at the beginning of the era of the messianic redemption of


If the messiah failed to appear at Auschwitz, it is beyond belief he has been saving himself to appear in Ma'ale Adummim.

the world and, of course, of the Jews. Once Rabbi Kook declared that he knew what time it was on the divine clock, the next step was clear: One was obliged to prepare, actively, for the events that were to come. Rabbi Kook opened a yeshivah to educate priests for the service of the Temple.

It was equally possible, in all logic, as his son, Rabbi Zvi Judah Kook, understood very well, to prepare settlers for the undivided land of Israel, and never mind any Government restrictions against such settlement or any problems with the Arabs that such endeavors might create. That is exactly what Zvi Judah Kook did; he trained and inspired the leaders of Gush Emunim, the ideologues who have forced settlement in the West Bank for annexationist purposes.

And it is possible for ultra-Orthodox Jews to burn down bus shelters in Israel today, not simply to protest against seminude women on advertising posters. For the whole stance of ultra-Orthodoxy has changed in this generation. The haredim, as the ultra-Orthodox are known in Israel, are no longer "passive"; they believe that they can change the world by force. True, these haredim are the descendants of those who opposed Rabbi Kook in his own lifetime. They are themselves not active messianists, as are the followers of the Rebbe of Lubavitch, but they belong to the activist atmosphere that increasingly pervades all factions of Orthodoxy, including the anti-Zionist elements. Theirs is the notion that this is a different time from the preceding 20 centuries of waiting for the messiah. Contrary to Dostoyevski's Karamazov, who proclaimed that if God is dead, "everything is permitted," the haredim insist that God is very much alive; therefore all is permitted.

Both the secularists and the religious continue, through some of their most significant spokespersons, to foster their differing messianic dreams. The religious have less and less doubt that they will inherit the land of Israel from the secularists, who, they sometimes admit, were the founders of the modern Zionist settlement. Had this not been foretold,



Jack Tom

in a very deep way, by Rabbi Kook himself?

The secularists' kind of messianism has been described recently in several articles in Ha'aretz by the Israeli newspaper's editor, Gershon Schocken. Schocken has called for an end of the ban of Ezra on intermarriage and for active absorption of the Arab minority in Israel. Schocken has said subsequently that he simply wants Jews in Israel to behave "normally," to open their family door to the Arab minority and thus end the majority-minority tensions. In my reading, Schocken's argument implies that this is the way for the Jews of Israel to achieve "normalcy" for themselves in the Middle East: by creating in Israel an indigenous native population and returning to the situation that existed before Ezra banned intermarriage some 25 centuries ago.

There seems even to be a hint of

permissiveness—again, in my reading—about the diaspora in Schocken's argument. If the Jews who live elsewhere than in Israel will actively intermarry, they will soon disappear into the larger society. By making an end to Ezra's ban in both Israel and the diaspora, the messianic dream of secular Zionism, the normalization of the Jewish people, will be achieved. Herzl and Nordau both once proclaimed this dream in these very terms: Let the Jews who want to be Jews go to Palestine; let the rest assimilate. The Jews will then no longer clutter up the world, harboring terrible guilt about Jewish continuity in the diaspora and about the Jewishness of the state of Israel.

I think the time has come to say to the messianists in the Jewish world, both secular and religious, that the messiah is not coming. If the secular messiah had been about to come, he

has had at least two centuries in which to give either democracy or socialism to the world—but the world seems no better than it used to be under the royal tyrannies of the Middle Ages. It is only different, perhaps even better, in some places, but only in degree. If the messiah of the Jewish religion had intended to make his appearance in the 20th century, he should have turned up in front of the main gate of Auschwitz. If he failed to appear there, it is beyond belief that he has been saving himself in order to appear in the parking lots of Efrat or Ma'ale Adummim.

Both the secular and the religious messianists, therefore, need to change their minds quite radically about what this century means in Jewish history. Even Zionism has to be understood not as “the beginning of the root of our redemption” but as another of the great holding acts that our people have devised with which to survive another century or so under new conditions. This is, of course, the basic insight of Ahad Ha’Am, the sober founder a century ago of cultural Zionism.

Once messianism is unlearned certain consequences must follow. The most important will be a change in the pervasive atmosphere, from pugnacity to sobriety. A people that is not about to be “redeemed,” or “normalized” has no choice but to behave with circumspection. That means that all the untidy accommodations among the various factions of the Jewish people must be maintained; such vexed questions as the relationship between the Jewish religion and Jewish secularism cannot be settled to the satisfaction of either side. A “victory” by one side, whether by the secularists or by the ultra-Orthodox, would lead to schism. In a non-Messianic era, we cannot afford a schism like the one with the Karaites more than a thousand years ago.

The Jewish people will remain an abnormal people. It will insist on remaining Jewish in Israel, even though it might seem more intelligent to secularists to settle into the region, as Gershom Schocken has asserted, as an old-new biologic blend. Even according to the most pessimistic projections, the majority of diaspora Jewry will maintain its Jewishness for the next several generations. The diaspora will not abandon, en masse, its Jewish emotions for the sake of

“normalization.” The fever of religious messianism will not last. It will receive a death blow when the messiah fails to appear, and the political preparations for his appearance receive their inevitable setbacks. Neither the Americans nor the Soviets are likely to oblige some of the melodramatic “believers” by starting a nuclear war of Gog and Magog.

Messianic dreamers of all kinds are doing violence to the survivalist capacity of the Jews of the world, in Israel and the diaspora. The time has come to accept two age-old insights: The House of Israel is not like all other peoples; the messiah will come not when we try to force his hand, or even when we think we are preparing for him, but only when we least expect him. The Jewish world needs less dreaming and more sobriety. □

Desperation and Humor

by Elizabeth Kolbert

Peggy Parnass writes, she says, in the hope of fostering a society where “one won’t need the thick skin that I don’t have.” How is it that a Jew orphaned by the Holocaust and tough enough to return to Germany after the war has never developed a protective hide? That a journalist devoted to the Sisyphean struggle for a just society still optimistically hopes for a better world? These questions belong to the profound paradox from which the work of Peggy Parnass, a prize-winning journalist based in Hamburg, derives so much of its power.

The author of two books (the most recent, published last year, is called “Kleine Radikale Minderheit,” or “Small Radical Minority”) and dozens of articles, many rather autobiographical, and a frequent speaker at political gatherings, Peggy Parnass is arguably the most famous woman in

Hamburg. But hers is no fame born of benign entertainment, for her work—much of it reported from the city’s courthouses—touches on some of the most sensitive issues in West Germany today, on militarism and intolerance, on injustice and anti-Semitism.

A slight woman with girlishly disheveled brown hair, strong features and a full mouth quick to smile, Peggy Parnass is to friends and acquaintances alike simply “Peggy.” I spoke to Peggy at her Hamburg apartment, which, with its deep green and wood-paneled walls, resembles a secluded forest clearing.

It is easy to understand why she does not speak willingly about her early years with her parents in Germany. Personal as well as public concerns, Peggy claims, compel her to avoid dwelling on the past. “Many people, when they talk about the past, want us to forget about the present, to make us look backward instead of forward,” she says.

Not so easy to comprehend is Peggy’s unwillingness to connect dates with events. Perhaps her exaggerated reluctance to reveal her age is rooted in the difficulties of growing old without ever having been a child. As she writes in her story “Kindheit” (“Childhood”), “It occurs to me that I never was a child. Perhaps I have become one in the meantime. Occasionally.”

Peggy was born in Hamburg in the early 1930s to a German mother and a Polish father. “Already before he was unwanted here as a Jew, he was stamped as an undesirable foreigner because he was a gambler,” Peggy writes of her father, who was 30 years her mother’s senior.

As a slim, blond child with an incongruously booming voice, Peggy already suspected she would make her way in the world with her stories. In “story ball,” a game of local invention, she was champion: For Peggy, the rules, which called for players to keep the ball in the air while recounting a story, were often set aside to allow for the completion of her tales.

The Germany of the late 1930s, however, was hardly conducive to games. “The Nazis were all around us,” she recalls. “Everywhere there were signs telling us what we weren’t allowed to do and we did it anyway. Once we sat on a park bench although

Peggy Parnass is arguably the most famous woman in Hamburg. Her work touches on militarism and intolerance, on injustice and anti-Semitism.

it was posted 'Für Juden Verboten!' And then we sat there as if our bottoms were baked onto it. Out of fear we couldn't stand up. And with Mutti [Mother] one day we went to get ice cream. Also forbidden. We were so scared we couldn't lick."

Then through the gloom of a late fall dawn came the "knocking like crazy" that signaled the police. The family was loaded together with other Jews onto an open cattle truck that drove slowly through the city. "Go stand at the edge—people should see what's happening here to children," Peggy's father said to her.

To the young Peggy, the adults they found kneeling and praying when they were unloaded at the gymnasium seemed foolish—why didn't they defend themselves? After all, the Jews far outnumbered the guards. After a time, Peggy's father instructed her to call a strange man "Papa" and to leave with him without a backward glance. "If only I had turned around once more," Peggy reproaches herself. She never saw her father again.

While Peggy's father was deported immediately, the rest of the family was allowed to return home. Through the maneuvers of Fritz Warburg, a Jewish banker who saved the lives of many of Hamburg's poor Jewish children, Peggy and her brother, Gert, were able to escape to Sweden.

Later, their mother, too, was deported and joined their father in Poland. Both died in Auschwitz. When Peggy informed the Swedish school director of her parents' death, his response was, "Well, be happy. Two Jews fewer." Hers was to turn to stone: "For 12 years I couldn't cry," she relates. "Not a tear."

"Mere chance" brought Peggy back to West Germany in the mid-1950s, she says. Returning to Sweden after a visit to London, she decided to pass through Hamburg to see the aunt and cousin who remained there, and she simply ended up staying. Peggy's aunt, an Auschwitz survivor who still lives in Hamburg today, is the subject of what Peggy calls her most



Peggy Parnass at a peace demonstration in Hamburg.

important story, "Meine Tante Flora." Tante Flora, a warm, elderly woman who paints at night when dreams of the concentration camp keep her from sleeping, is the vehicle Peggy uses to probe the still explosive issue of Jews in Germany today. If anti-Semitism is no longer a major force in German society, it is not for lack of artillery, but merely for lack of targets, the story points out. Standing in line at a Hamburg department store, Tante Flora overhears a salesgirl complaining about her wages. Feigning disbelief, another customer in line calls out, "Now wait a minute, isn't the Jew gone, the exploiter? He doesn't own this store anymore."

When Tante Flora asks the meaning of this remark, a third customer chimes in, "If you don't like it, why don't you just go to Israel?" She is ashamed to live in Germany, Tante Flora confesses.

Today, Peggy lives alone in a modest apartment whose walls sport dozens of photos of friends and relatives, laughing, brooding, protesting. Among these faces in black and white are those of the late playwright Peter Weiss and of Peggy's brother, who now lives in Israel with his wife and three daughters.

The apartment lies off a quiet courtyard in one of Hamburg's few ethnically diverse neighborhoods, the

Thomas Dawidelt

bustling St. Georg. Many of the residents in this enclave of artists and immigrants are Turkish guest workers, who, as outsiders, appear to play in contemporary Germany the role formerly allocated to the Jews. As unemployment in the country rises and the Turks encounter increasing hostility, even violence, the parallel becomes ever more striking. Peggy cautions, however, against allowing this similarity to lead to an uncritical view of the Turks. "Sometimes when I am automatically friendlier to a Turk than I'd be to a German, I suddenly ask myself if I am dealing with a Gray Wolf, a contemporary Turkish fascist," she explains.

Her early years in postwar Hamburg she describes as a period of tremendous vitality generated by a physically crippled people in search of a spiritual goal. These years, during which she studied "black," or illegally as an unregistered student, at the Universität-Hamburg, were a time of optimism for Peggy, for the war had left Germany vulnerable and uncharacteristically open to new ideas. Yet it was not the illusion that the Germans had "changed" that led her to remain in Hamburg; it was the brutal recognition that people with their hatreds, their prejudices and their willful blindness to evil are essentially the same all over the world. "I don't see a reason to leave Germany really, since I've realized there's just as much prejudice everywhere," she explains. "One of the most shocking experiences of my life was to go to Israel and realize that the German Jews look down on the Polish Jews, and that the German Jews and the Polish Jews look down on the Oriental Jews. I don't know where to escape to."

Yet while escape from prejudice and hatred, as Peggy points out, is impossible anywhere, life for the Jew in Germany holds its own particular horrors, of which no one is more keenly aware than she. One of her first major journalistic pieces was a story entitled "Jüdin in Deutschland" ("Jewess in Germany"), which she wrote for the well-known leftist magazine *Konkret* in 1965. "I am afraid in this country, of this country," she writes, "most afraid in crowds . . . with anyone over 35 simply the possibility that he could have participated makes me sick."

The topic of "Jewess in Germany" is one, Peggy is pained to discover, that disturbs German Jews as much as it disturbs other Germans. "Let it lie," the Jews implore her. "That can only hurt us." But the little girl who watched with amazement as her elders silently submitted to the abuse of the Nazis refuses now in her own adulthood to remain silent. This, though she knows that to be truly honest means she "must tread on the feet of [her] friends." She refuses, though she must inform her language students that she cannot be convinced of their belief that the sum of "six million is highly exaggerated; it was certainly hardly even four." She refuses, though she must tell her "enlightened" acquaintances that it is no compliment to be labeled the "exception" to their various anti-Semitic prejudices. "Me, often the only Jew whom they know, they call an 'exception.' What should one say? I am too weary to give each one a lecture."

In her contribution to the 1979 anthology entitled "Fremd im Eigenen Land" ("Strangers in Their Own Land"), Peggy once again focuses on the situation of the Jew in West Germany today. But this time she approaches the task as the latest recipient of the Joseph Drexel Prize for outstanding journalistic achievement, and while the basic themes remain the same, the prose has become bolder, more pointed. Now honesty brings with it the fear not only of stepping on toes, but also of finding that "the love of friends will prove too weak to bridge the gap in experience." For now it is the entire German left, in which Peggy has risen to prominence, that she must accuse of a thinly veiled anti-Semitism. "My leftist friends often make a theme of the Nazi period, often highlighting themselves as violent antifascists," Peggy writes. "At the same time, as they put it, they fight Zionists—in speech, in writing and, best of all, in deed. This gives me the feeling that only a dead Jew, like a dead Indian, is a good Jew."

At the same time that Peggy's Jewishness makes her an outsider on the German left, where pro-Palestinian sympathies run high, her liberal activism renders her unacceptable to Hamburg's 1,500-member Jewish community, which keeps a low profile. "You are always sitting between two stools," says a friend, describing

her predicament.

It was out of frustration with the German left, or more precisely with the German leftist press, that Peggy, whose original dream was to become an actress, stepped down from the stage and sat at the typewriter. In 1970, distressed by the coverage of the Nazi war criminal trials, Peggy found herself thrust into the role of journalist, a role she seems to play today with undiminished conviction. Calling upon them to do some "real work," Peggy exhorted her friends in the press corps to resist in their reporting the biases of the court itself. "Finally, someone suggested I do it myself," Peggy recounts. "She gave me the names of some people to contact where she worked, and I did. Right away."

"Since 1970, I have been writing trial stories," Peggy writes in a recent essay, "basically only because I could no longer stand to see how mass-murdering Nazis were being protected by the press." Her reports on the Nazi trials of the 1970s and early '80s are written in the voice of one who seems to see only two choices: either to be struck dumb with disbelief or to fight ceaselessly and constantly against the silence that signals complacency and surrender. It is a voice the Germans would prefer to ignore, even to silence.

More than once, Peggy has received telephone calls threatening to disrupt the many public appearances that she makes. And for every admirer she has won, she also has a detractor. Said one of her editors, "I often receive letters for Peggy saying things like, 'You Jewish sow, if you don't like it here in Germany, why don't you leave?'"

In 1972 Ludwig Hahn, under whose command 900,000 Warsaw Jews were killed and the ghetto was razed, came up for trial in Hamburg. Peggy describes the atmosphere in the courtroom: "Polite chat as if at an art opening—'So you know . . . ?' 'Did you know . . . ?' Unbearable. Monstrosity in well-groomed club style." The "club" atmosphere in the court reflects a deep-seated complicity between accused and accuser, Peggy points out. The Nazi's crimes were crimes against humanity, but they were not, after all, crimes against the law. Hahn, a trained jurist, "speaks of security and order through the Gestapo. And of the

Nazi Nuremberg laws, which one could not disobey." Thus, it is not a lawbreaker who stands before the court, but rather a lawyer, whose vocabulary and values are identical to those of the judges, his "colleagues."

In scores of cases, Peggy reveals, German judges and war criminals share not only a common legal background, but also a common Nazi past. Because they acted in accordance with the laws of the time, many judges of the Third Reich continued on the bench after the war was over. The question of who has the right to judge whom can acquire alarming urgency: On one side of the law stands the judge, a man who perhaps condemned hundreds to death on the ba-

sis of "racial crimes," and on the other side is a petty thief. "For years I have been collecting decisions that make it clear that to these judges property crimes weigh more than mass murder," Peggy writes in a 1977 article called "Judges and Other Sympathizers."

While Peggy's interest in the criminal justice system was sparked by the Nazi trials, it broadened quickly to encompass any court case that touches upon a central social issue or strikes the chord of universal human experience. To this day, she continues to keep a close watch on the Hamburg court docket and to attend those trials that attract her interest. Her trial reports, which usually ap-

pear in *Konkret*, are anything but the dry, legalistically worded tales one might expect to emerge from a courtroom. Instead, they are colorful stories that make no claim to distance and objectivity, but rather evoke immediacy, warmth, anger and, more often than not, humor. "Prozesse" ("Trials"), published in 1978 and winner of one of West Germany's major journalism awards, is a collection of Peggy's court stories from 1970 to 1978. Whether dealing with a mass murderer, such as Ludwig Hahn, or with a young girl, such as Fraulein S., accused of killing her newborn infant, or with a homosexual, such as Herr M., accused of seduction, each story challenges the

MONOTONY OF THE MONSTROUS

I hardly want to write anymore. My loathing of political trials grows. The temptation to throw everything out as well. And yet, I took up this career precisely because of such revolting trials—those taking place as well as those equally revolting not taking place—Nazi trials.

I collected verdicts. Cut them out for myself almost every day, in order to hold them against one another and to prove that in Germany simple criminality is punished more harshly than the most unbelievable Nazi deeds. Besides me, only a few seemed interested in this.

I borrowed an enormous stack of files from the Auschwitz trials. Really wanted to start something with this. But after I finished reading, first I lay for weeks sick in bed. It wasn't what took place at Auschwitz that threw me; the knowledge of Auschwitz had already fouled my childhood. I had suffered under that forever already. But that which took place at the trials actualized the German past. Witnesses who were treated like the accused. Accused who never ceased to inspire respect. Even if sentenced—for who among them serves?

It was for me always a problem to live in this country. But I tried to be fair, and not to burden everyone with what happened in the Nazi period. Certainly not those people of all different ages with whom I, even if in vain, fought against rearmament and the Emergency Powers Act. I made

it easy for myself, surrounded myself with a circle of friends like a wall. Yet the German justice made my protective wall crack. . . .

I began to call court reporters. In the hope of being able to accomplish something by making contact. I accomplished nothing. For the horror show of justice had already stopped ripping the pros [professional journalists] from their chairs some time ago.

From time to time I visited trials myself. And saw how much boredom and how little fury was awakened in the reporters and the audience. Formalities and mountains of files fill up flesh and blood. In the most gruesome way, everything always has its order. Only that seems important. If a witness cries, one is unpleasantly moved. Outbreaks of feeling announcing themselves are strangled in embryo.

I offered my friend Ulrike Meinhof my evidence and asked feuilleton writers ever more insistently finally to write what was really going on. Until Ines Stosch of the *Frankfurter Rundschau* urged me to write about the trials myself. That I did—immediately.

My optimism was enormous; my certainty of effecting something through unambiguous reports, great. My joy at each step forward as well. My spirit in the fight against long-outdated laws, which to be sure spoke against the lawgiver, but not the law-

breakers, never let up. . . .

My desperation and rage over the Nazi trials over and over again made me sick. I could not bear that almost always the few surviving victim-witnesses were defamed; the culprits, however, went free. In all these years, though, I wrote only about the living mass murderer Dr. Hahn and the dead Resistance fighter Fiete Schulze. That was exhausting enough. Fiete, according to the court, was again named a murderer. Hahn, as always, was allowed to go home. . . .

In any case, I have over the last years spent countless hours in court in vain, for I could not pass on to the public what I saw there. In most cases, anyway, I could only have described the feelings of my own impotence.

Not to forget: Victims become unimportant. It becomes ever easier not to identify with them, to sacrifice them to one's own fears. Everything becomes possible when injustice is anchored in the law. And when one follows unjust laws. In the end, only the monotony of the monstrous remains. No longer worth mentioning, just habit.

I hardly want to write anymore. But I will, because I don't want to let myself get out of practice.

—From "Das Ungeheuer ist Kein Thema" ("The Terrible Is No Theme"), 1976, collected in "Prozesse," 1984 edition.

reader to question the social values that the court reflects. "Prozesse" is a call to consider the law as it bears upon actual lives and to examine it critically as a human creation embodying human flaws. Above all, "Prozesse" is a humanitarian book, and a highly absorbing one at that. So far, it has sold over 50,000 copies.

But while the literary success of "Prozesse" is unquestionable, Peggy often feels convinced that her work has been without effect, that people, uneducable and unchangeable, remain no less capable today than they were 40 years ago of obeying thoughtlessly, even eagerly, the edicts of hatred. To test her suspicion that the lessons of the past have been wasted, Peggy asked several local merchants how they would respond if a law were passed barring all leftists from the grocery store, the movie theater, the bank. "Well, if that's the rule? After all, they must have made it for a reason," said the fruit man. "I wouldn't think it was good, but before they

closed my store . . .," answered another merchant. External forces may have changed, Peggy concludes, but not people.

Almost as powerful, though, as the current of desperation in her work, are the forces of humor and laughter. "I laugh more than others because I have a sense of situation comedy," Peggy once remarked in a television interview. Indeed, her sense of situation comedy lightens even her most alarming and tragic stories. The story of Ludwig Hahn's trial, for example, ends with an ironic description of Peggy's encounter with the Nazi general who commanded the Warsaw ghetto where her parents spent their last years. "I could have spared myself the awkward effort, made in the hope of further productive conversations, not to show Herr Hahn how sick he made me. For the next day, unfortunately, he could read with whom he had spoken in the morning paper. . . . And so I will never meet his dear family after all." As Peg-

gy points out to me, the Jewish sense of humor has always existed in spite of events, not as a result of them.

It is in the center of this paradox, with humor on the one side and horror on the other, that Peggy sits and writes, though the work, as she puts it, positively eats her up. "I don't know any longer if it is worth fighting," she sighs. "I only think it would be unacceptable not to fight, just to sit back and be pessimistic." Does she ever consider writing on subjects less socially significant, perhaps even trivial? "Even if I wrote about fashion, it would still be political," Peggy answers. "I am quite sure that wherever I live, I'd do exactly the same work. Even in Israel."

Elizabeth Kolbert is a reporter on the metropolitan staff of The New York Times.

"Jewish-Arab relations in Haifa were good in the past, but today it is surprising that the Arabs have not revolted."

Arabs and Jews in Haifa *by Muriel Moulton*

The Israeli port city of Haifa has a long history of amicable relations between its Arab and Jewish citizens. Participation by Arab community leaders in municipal decision-making, the appointment of Arabs to every level of city government and the success of Arab entrepreneurs in Haifa's commercial sector have fostered a feeling of complacent goodwill if not warm friendship between the two communities since the founding of the state.

Now, however, observers note a deterioration in that relationship. Overcrowded and decaying neighborhoods, a worsening economic situation and—most frequently mentioned—the racial provocations of Knesset Member Rabbi Meir Kahane are all cited as reasons for the erosion of the live-and-let-live attitude that had prevailed between Arabs and Jews in Haifa in the past. The new tension is still beneath the surface but becomes evident in conversations with ordinary citizens and leaders of both communities.

"I don't feel any tension," remarks Hannah, the Jewish proprietor of a coffeehouse on a busy street bordering Wadi Nisnas, Haifa's largest Arab neighborhood. "Haifa is not like Jerusalem where it's not safe to walk in the streets. Here there are mixed neighborhoods and Arabs and Jews live in the same buildings."

In her late 50s, Hannah is a pleasant person with a ready, warm smile. She came to Israel in 1948.

"From Cyprus," she explains. "And before that—Dachau." Of Haifa, she says, "It's the best place to live. A quiet city."

Hannah's coffeehouse is cozy. There are flowers on the tables. Outside, people stroll, run for buses or stop to consider the marzipan, the cheese rolls and the fluffy meringue kisses in the window. Some come in to buy, others to drink a cup of coffee. The faces of Hannah's customers are a potpourri of the city's population. She greets most of them by name.

"Here we don't have much terrorism," she says. "There is some, though. A bomb in the open-air market a few weeks ago and then one near the courthouse." She pauses, then adds: "That's new. We never had things like that before. In two months there were 10 explosions. People were injured. But still, it's not like in Jerusalem. In Jerusalem it's every day."

"In Haifa, for the Arabs, it's a Gar-

den of Eden and the older ones know it. Why should they make trouble? Only the younger ones don't appreciate it." By now a cloud has shadowed her eyes. Her smile is a little less sunny. "I don't agree with Kahane, to throw the Arabs out. Kahane is a disgrace. Israel is a tolerant country and Haifa is the most tolerant city, but how long should we be victims?" Imperceptibly, her voice has hardened, the gentleness ebbs away. "How much tolerance do we have to have? This is a Jewish state. Let the Arabs live here in peace, but they kill our children and murder our soldiers in our own land."

She's referring to a spate of recent murders in the Haifa area. They include the kidnapping and murder of hitchhiking soldiers and the bludgeoning to death of a 15-year-old boy and a 20-year-old woman in their Haifa neighborhoods. The crimes have been traced to Israeli Arabs from villages near the city. Until recently, virtually no Haifa-area Arabs had been accused of terrorist acts.

A few blocks away from Hannah's coffeehouse, on a narrow cobbled street in Wadi Nisnas, two young Arab men squat on the sidewalk surrounded by yards of fishnet. Extracting the fish one by one from the net and tossing them into buckets, they both declare that relations between Jews and Arabs in Haifa are good.

Yusif, 19 years old, says that he studies "with them in the vocational school" where he is learning to be a metalworker. "There is no problem between us. I have Jewish friends."

Passersby stop to examine the fish. Some haggle over the price. Ibrahim, 20, jokes with the prospective customers, goading them to buy. Quick and lively, he cadges a cigarette from a passerby and gets one for Yusif too. In between the selling, they are busy with their net, carefully picking the fish from the barbed folds.

"I only do this sometimes," Yusif says. "To help Ibrahim and to earn a little money. The rest of the time I study to learn a trade." He looks up from the net and, for the first time, his fingers are still. "But when I finish at the school, I'll have trouble getting a job. They'll tell me to come back when I finish the army. They know Arabs don't go to the army but many places only want to hire Jews."

Sitting cross-legged on the sidewalk, Ibrahim doesn't stop working.

Slender and intense, he squints against the sun. There is a sharp edge to his voice. "The Jews think they're better than the Arabs. They think they're the Chosen People. Why should I go to the university to study? I can't study the modern technological subjects because afterward I won't get a job. All the jobs in those subjects are in defense industries. They don't hire Arabs for jobs in defense industries."

"And my friend Yusif, he thinks he's smart to study metalworking. But they won't hire him. They only want us to do the dirty jobs that Jews don't want to do."

Yusif frowns and shakes his head. His voice is quieter than his friend's but there is a new urgency in his eyes. "All of that—we can manage with it," he says. "The jobs, the bad houses. It's just Kahane. If he continues, no one but God knows what will happen. He heats up the people—the Arabs. If he will be quiet there will be no problem. But they don't shut him up. We have no other place. We have to live here together with the Jews. So why don't they shut him up?"

The Jewish shopkeeper and the Arab fish peddlers share a common condemnation of Kahane's racist incitement. They both affirm, however reluctantly, that Jews and Arabs are destined to live together in the land. Except for a minuscule minority of extremists on both sides, these are commonly held views among Haifa's citizens. Paradoxically, however, instead of uniting in efforts to overcome the Kahanist provocations, each group seems to be succumbing to the incitement. Latent grievances and underlying tensions are exacerbated.

Hannah grieves for the Jews killed in their own land by Arabs. The acts arouse in her a fear and suspicion of her neighbors and customers. The despised Kahane expresses and validates those fears and suspicions.

Yusif and Ibrahim find it increasingly onerous to accept their ambiguous position as Arabs in a Jewish state—a state surrounded by overtly hostile Arab nations and under constant attack by Arab terrorists. Kahane's well-publicized depictions of Arabs as subhumans gives a new dimension to their sense of injury, providing a confirmation of their worst suspicions of the Jewish attitude to-

ward Arabs.

Arabs are, in fact, employed in every kind of work at every level in Haifa—except in defense industries, a major employer in this part of the country.

Tuvia Zuckerman, the city of Haifa's official spokesman, insists that "it's not true that Arabs in Haifa are limited to jobs that Jews don't want. In Haifa you will find Arab doctors and nurses in any hospital and in the local community clinics, and not only in the Arab neighborhoods. Go to Romema, up on the Carmel where not many Arabs live, and ask who is one of the favorite doctors in the clinic there. He's an Arab." In blue-collar trades, Zuckerman declares that "there is no basis to these charges of discrimination in employment. Jobs are harder to find now. That's true. There is more unemployment for everyone now, yes. The loss of jobs in Haifa is bad for Jews and bad for Arabs. But the amount of unemployment among Arabs is not out of proportion to their percentage of the population."

Commenting on the change in Arab attitudes toward Jews in Haifa, Salim Joubran, a widely respected and lifelong leader of Haifa's Arab community, warns that "Kahane is a danger to Israel more than he is a danger to the Arabs of Israel because he is driving our young people—not all of them, but some—to extremism. What he says to the Jews about Arabs incites the Arabs. The movement of our young people in Haifa toward the P.L.O. and toward the Communists is something new in this city. It never happened before."

Recipient in 1982 of the Haifa Prize for his work in improving Arab-Jewish relations, Joubran warns that "my generation can understand why we Arabs don't have full equality here in Israel. But young people don't understand. My generation knows that only peace will solve our problems. But for the youth it's hard to wait until peace will come. Now Kahane has given them a specific reason to react."

Asserting that "not enough is being done against Kahanism," Joubran stresses that "this question, next to defense, is the most important one the state now faces. There is in Israel a big Arab minority—17 percent. In Haifa we are nearly 10 percent of the population. This cannot be ignored."

Joubran, who is treasurer of Beit Hagefen, Haifa's Arab-Jewish Community Center, points out that "Haifa has historically been exceptional in the relations between Jews and Arabs, since the time of the Turks. Always, the leaders of both the Jews and the Arabs in Haifa have educated their people to live together in peace. Before the state was established there was an Arab mayor here and he had a Jewish deputy mayor. When the state was established, the mayor was a Jew and he appointed an Arab deputy mayor. That cooperation and consideration have made peace possible between us here in Haifa. But," he warns, "more must be done to stop the racism or I don't know what will be the consequences in the future."

Zahi Karkabi, the City Council's only Communist member and its only Arab, does not deny Joubran's allegation that Kahanism is radicalizing some among Haifa's Arab youth. But he insists that "the important change is in the attitudes of the Jews in Haifa, and this is the work of Kahane." He cites a University of Haifa study, published in February 1985, that showed that Jewish schoolchildren see Arabs as monsters. "This," he points out, "is a change. It was not like this 10 years ago."

Karkabi concedes that since the study was made shortly after the sodomy-murder of a local Jewish schoolboy by Haifa-area Arabs, its results may have been influenced by the shock resulting from that crime.

Another study conducted at about the same time reveals an increase in the level of intolerance and extremist attitudes among children from both communities. The poll, under the direction of Professor John Hofman, a lecturer in psychology and education at Haifa University, examined attitudes among 500 Arab and Jewish pupils at 10 Haifa-area high schools. "Analysis of the results indicated that external events influenced the attitudes of the students," Hofman reports. "A lot of things were happening in Israel at about that time and you could expect changes."

Although Karkabi agrees with most other observers that "relations between Jews and Arabs living in Haifa had always been good in the past," and that "most Jews and Arabs here want to live and work in peace," he maintains that the Arabs in Haifa

"are becoming more and more discontented."

A member of the national political committee of Rakah, the Israeli Communist Party, Karkabi declares that "the occupation of the territories [the West Bank and the Gaza Strip] is the real source of the moral and economic crisis here. So much is spent on arms that very little is left to spend on solving the problems of the people. I don't know what will happen, but some people say these two things together are a time bomb that will someday explode."

Professor Hubert Law-Yone of the architecture and city planning department of Haifa's Technion confirms that inadequate housing is a source of resentment among Haifa's Arab population. A specialist in community relations, he says the city is "very quickly approaching a dangerous point and something must be done. The physical conditions in which most of Haifa's Arabs live are a disgrace. Arabs live in the most run-down areas of the city. The Arab neighborhoods have simply been left to destroy themselves. The standard of housing, the population density and the quality of services are much below the general standards for Haifa."

Law-Yone concedes that Haifa's Arabs are free to live anywhere they choose in the city but that most prefer to remain in the old neighborhoods where their families have lived for generations.

"Relations between Jews and Arabs in Haifa were good in the past," he says, "but under existing conditions, it is surprising that the Arabs have not revolted. In Wadi Nisnas there are eight or nine people per room and more than 50 percent of the housing is considered not fit for habitation."

He points out that Wadi Nisnas was selected, along with two Jewish neighborhoods, for urban renewal under the Project Renewal program, run jointly by the Israeli Government and diaspora communities. But Law-Yone also notes that renewal in the two Jewish neighborhoods "at least got off the ground. They were twinned with communities abroad and work can begin. But for Wadi Nisnas, when the twin community in the U.S. found out they were paired with an Arab neighborhood, they refused it. And to this day, Wadi Nisnas

has received nothing and nothing has been done."

Zuckerman agrees that housing is "very bad" in the Arab quarters. "But," he says, "in this the city has very little power. New housing is not built because the municipality is not the Housing Ministry. The only thing we can do is press the Government to build new housing here and we do it all the time in every discussion with the Housing Minister."

Pointing out that Haifa is "the only city in Israel that put an Arab neighborhood in the Project Renewal program," Zuckerman also says that "Haifa's plan for renewing Wadi Nisnas has already been approved by the Government. But we still don't have a twin community for them. We don't have the money to do the renewal ourselves but we are going ahead with the plans and looking for a twin for them to help with the expenses."

Commenting on what the city can do to counteract Kahane's destructive effect on the relations between Jews and Arabs in Haifa, Zuckerman says, "We have to stand together against that racist. We have to prevent him from coming to Haifa, as we did the last time he tried to come here." Referring to an incident in December 1985, Zuckerman recalls that Mayor Arie Gurel joined thousands of Arabs and Jews in the streets of Wadi Nisnas to bar Kahane from entering the neighborhood where he said he would make a speech ordering the Arabs to get out of Haifa. "We have to deny him the chance to make propaganda for his ideas," Zuckerman says. "And we have to influence our Knesset members to pass the law against racism."

Zvi Israel, executive director of Beit Hagefen, notes that the Arabs in Haifa "have always been more willing to work together, to cooperate, to be moderate." He maintains that the underlying reason for the deterioration of the relationship between Jews and Arabs here is that "the Arabs, even in Haifa, don't feel [they are] and are not felt to be real citizens of Israel. They are not Zionists, but they can be good citizens. If we don't find a way for them to feel like real citizens of Israel, it will be like Lebanon. We will kill each other."

It is not clear whether the Arabs of Haifa are becoming more radical or are now only more openly expressing

their accumulated grievances. Nor is it clear whether the Jews of Haifa are becoming less tolerant or are now only more openly expressing their latent fears. It is clear, however, that the atmosphere in this formerly

placid city is changing; nerves are being rubbed raw. And if the resentments between Arabs and Jews in se-date Haifa are indeed edging toward violent eruptions, then the portents for the more volatile parts of the

country become truly frightening. □

Muriel Moulton is a writer living in Haifa.

Benvenisti believes the only course is to annex the territories and give the Arabs there the vote in Israeli elections.

A Very Cruel Dilemma *by J. Robert Moskin*

Israel is faced with a very cruel dilemma—being Jewish or being democratic,” says Meron Benvenisti, the controversial founder of the West Bank Data Project and former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem. He is concerned about how Jews and Arabs will live together and adds: “Because people will evade that dilemma, I feel that Israel may be moving inexorably toward a quasi-South African situation. But it will not be defined in political and philosophical terms as apartheid. It will always be perceived as a temporary situation, a military occupation. But for all intents and purposes, we have established a society based on inferiors and superiors.”

After years of studying the Jewish-Arab confrontation in Jerusalem, on the West Bank and in Gaza, Benvenisti believes that it is both irreversible and insolvable. For his views, he is attacked as a traitor by Israeli right-wingers, as a defeatist by left-wingers and as a defender of the oppressive status quo by Arabs.

Benvenisti, a large-chested, bespectacled man of 52 who was born in Jerusalem, says quietly that he sees himself as a realist and a humanist. He has recently written a book, “Conflicts and Contradictions” (Villard), to make clear how he relates to Israel’s founding generation and where

he stands as a man and as a thinker.

When Jerusalem was reunited after the Six Day War in 1967, Mayor Teddy Kollek put Benvenisti in charge of the newly won Arab sections. He worked closely with Kollek until they quarreled and parted unhappily in 1978. Before his municipal service, Benvenisti had been a scholar of the Crusader period of Middle Eastern history. He returned to academic life and earned a doctorate in public administration at Harvard University in 1982. He began the West Bank Data Project in 1979 with help from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. Now, he has just finished “The West Bank Handbook,” which is a West Bank “encyclopedia” with 250 entries from “absentee property” to “Zionism.” (It is being distributed in Israel by The Jerusalem Post and in the United States by Westview Press.)

Benvenisti began the West Bank project to research and analyze the forces set in motion when the Likud bloc came to power in 1977—forces that, he felt, even the new leadership did not understand. These forces resulted from the construction on the West Bank of roads, electrical grids and water supply networks and, most important, the spillover of suburbanites from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to the newly available West Bank countryside. “I had the feeling that the floodgates were being opened,” he recalls. “I felt very soon it would be irreversible.”

His studies have led him to believe that the option of territorial compromise between Jews and Arabs is no longer feasible. “I do not believe in the peace process,” he told me recently. “There is no peace process. This is all irrelevant to what I think can happen and cannot happen. I say

we are in the stage where the territory of Israel west of the River Jordan . . . cannot be changed.

“Until the failure of the Reagan initiative [to begin peace talks] after the war in Lebanon, I said it was five minutes to midnight. That was perhaps the last chance.” And while Jordan allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization to reopen offices in that country (which were closed once again earlier this year), the initiative failed, mainly, Benvenisti believes, “because Yasser Arafat failed to [go] back to Jordan in April 1983. . . . Since 1983, I think it is finished.”

Now, he believes the only course is to annex the occupied territories and to give the Arabs who live there the vote in Israeli elections. “I say apply to them the principles of the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which is based on total equality, and create an ethnic pluralistic society,” he says.

“If we fail to understand that absorbing the territories will destroy the Zionist myth, at least we have to live up to our liberal and democratic values,” he says. “If we accept that Israel will stay on the banks of the Jordan, 45 percent of the population ruled by a Jewish government will be non-Jewish, disenfranchised aliens—Arabs. We are going to institutionalize this tyranny of the majority based on inequality. Almost half the population has no vote. This is for me a nightmare.”

According to Benvenisti, this nightmare is already a reality, and the Jewish people must make a choice. “You cannot postpone it,” he maintains, “because by postponing it, we legitimize [the disenfranchisement]. Time will not wait for you. This is why Israeli youth are turning to Kahane—because Kahane gives them a

clear-cut answer." Rabbi Meir Kahane would expel all Arabs from the West Bank and Israel.

Benvenisti thinks both Arabs and Jews have missed opportunities to solve their conflict but that missing them was inevitable: "You know perfectly well what you should have done a year ago," he says. "You can never do it; it is always too late. That is part of the condition of the conflict."

He says the Arabs are equally responsible for what has happened. "They had their [opportunities], but they missed all of them and now they are going to miss the last one. . . . They still think in terms of destroying Israel."

He views the July summit meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Morocco's King Hassan II as without meaning. "Its purpose was the creation of atmosphere," he says. "Its significance is routine banality."

Looking at the options for the future, Benvenisti says, "I know that the Arabs won't accept a binational state. They should realize that that is the only chance they have. But they wouldn't agree and that is why they are doomed."

Because the Arabs would not accept a binational state, he predicts that the struggle will continue and "pretty soon it will be meaningless for the rest of the world—a marginal question. It won't affect the super-power relationships or even U.S. Government policies. It will be a local, indigenous and inter-Jewish and Arab conflict, slightly more important than Northern Ireland because Jews are scattered all over the world.

"This is one of the reasons why I want to keep it visible. I am afraid that if we are left alone, there will be no impact from the parties who recognize its devastating effect on Jewish life and Arab life—on the peoples of the Holy Land."

He warns American Jews: "The Jewish community in the United States doesn't understand how dangerous [the conflict] is for their identity. If Israel will really become a dual society, what will happen to Jewish-American attachment to the land of Israel? But how can they identify with a regime based on inequality? I don't have an answer. The American Jews must find an answer for themselves. It depends on how they perceive their own values.

"Very soon they will be faced with an Israel that they don't know. It is going to be a new Israel. Political culture based on Jewish humanistic values is on the wane in Israel. We are losing ground all the time."

Benvenisti does not expect war. "I think the era of major wars in the Middle East is over," he says. "There will be increased terrorism, increased retaliation, communal rioting, fighting, rock-throwing, stabbings. It is a violent environment."

Years ago, when he was the Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem, Benvenisti took me on a walk through the Old City of Jerusalem. He stopped and talked in Arabic with residents and shopkeepers. They hugged him, chattered with him warmly, invited us for coffee. Looking back now, he thinks that he bridged relations with the Arabs only on a personal level. He adds, "At the same time, we could shoot one another. It has happened."

Relating the Arab-Jewish conflict to his own history, he says, "We are responsible for this—the sons of the founding fathers. We are the only group who could have translated the dreams of the founding fathers into reality. We failed. We were dwarfed by our parents."

Ideally, Benvenisti believes partition to be Israel's only long-term solution. "The fact that the long-term solution will never be achieved is another matter," he says. "I don't believe that a plural society based on two so different peoples can live together in one polity. They will have to find a way to live under different governments.

"There are no good solutions, only bad solutions. The only viable approach today is to advocate equality. But that is a recipe for eternal strife—like Lebanon. The alternative to eternal strife is partition. Theoretically, the only long-term solution is that both sides will have their own expression of sovereignty. At the same time, I am telling you it will never happen." □

J. Robert Moskin was the foreign editor of Look magazine and is now a senior editor at World Press Review. He wrote "Among Lions," the story of the 1967 battle for Jerusalem, which received the National Book Award.

Last Visit to St. Privat by Sal A. Westrich

For Michel

It is Sunday afternoon and the streets of the village are empty. Everyone is home celebrating the day of rest with traditional Sabbath feasting. From the opened windows come sounds of domestic commotion: voices answering one another, dishes clanking, a dog being scolded, the sudden peal of laughter.

I am standing before a two-story house that I readily recognize, although I was 7 when I last lived in it, more than four decades ago. Perhaps my memory has been aided by its location, diagonally across from the town hall. Or perhaps there are places, as there are moments, that one never forgets.

The house is deserted and in disrepair. The knocker is still hanging although now covered with rust; a pane of glass above the doorway is missing; the second-floor shutter and window are ajar, revealing falling plaster, more missing glass panes and a large crack in the ceiling. Entering the village, I had noticed other houses in varying states of neglect. Apparently St. Privat des Près, a grain- and dairy-producing village of some 800 inhabitants, nestled in the Dordogne Valley, is experiencing the same decline that has affected much of rural France.

Not able to prod open the front door, I place my eye against the keyhole and can see through the dark corridor to the overgrown garden with its uneven steps leading up to the adjacent grazing field. I am not quite sure what to do next and so simply place myself before the house scrutinizing its every detail. Before long, I am no longer conscious of stones and shapes but of moments: my mother sitting on the garden steps watching my 2-year-old brother Michel, while chatting with Mme. Hersher, the other tenant, during an interlude in their longstanding feud; my father crushing a ripe tomato

I have returned to this village of my past only to find that it is even more alive than the village of the present.

against the doorpost and announcing that the dried seeds would be used in the following year's planting; Mlle. Cabirole, our elderly landlady, removing an old saber from the out-house where it was being kept—in compliance with a Government decree that all weapons be surrendered to the authorities.

Other memories return. Rather than blurring the past, time annihilates some parts of it while preserving other parts intact—fragments of experience stored in the inner mind that require but the proper stimulus to reach the conscious surface. I have returned to this village of my past only to find that it is even more alive than the village of the present.

I am about to go when a woman emerges from the adjacent house. She appears to be in her 70s, has white hair held in a bun—as I remember Mlle. Cabirole had worn hers—and is dressed in the somber colors favored by the Dordogne peasants. She begins to sweep the sidewalk but is obviously curious to know my intentions. I approach her and, after some small talk, introduce myself. "I lived in this house during the war," I tell her, "I was one of the Jews who had been in St. Privat." She does not seem surprised by this disclosure, but then, as she explains, she had not lived in St. Privat during the war but in Périgueux, some 50 kilometers away, in the Vichy zone. She informs me that she is Fernande Gotreau and confides with undisguised pride that the Resistance awarded her a medal after the war. This encourages me to raise a delicate issue and to allude to rumors I remember hearing as a child. "I have heard it said," I begin, "that there were collaborators in the village, that certain highly placed persons—"

"It is rather curious," she interrupts me, "but not more than a week ago a friend of mine said that she knew people"—she does not specify whether in St. Privat or elsewhere—"who could get the Germans to do their every bidding." She appears not to know any more about St. Privat during the war years.

Our conversation turns to subsequent events. She mentions the recent death of M. Valentin, mayor of St. Privat and one of its wartime councilmen: "He could have told you a great many things about the events that interest you, as he was very well informed." We talk about the departure of young people for the cities and the resulting abandonment of houses. "There is no work here," she explains. "The village is dying." And we also discuss the disappearance of the weekly village fairs where peasants and itinerant merchants would come to sell their produce and wares. (One of these merchants was Gustave Shapiro, a Romanian-born Jewish hero of the local Resistance who rescued a number of Jews, including myself, and who saved the ancient Torahs of the city of Bordeaux.)

We separate. I have not learned much more about St. Privat in its dark period. But one of Mme. Gotreau's comments has given rise to a perplexing thought. If St. Privat was so close to the safer Vichy zone—it was known as the "free" zone—why had the Jews of St. Privat not sought to flee there? Two years had elapsed since the fall of France, and mass arrests of Jews were known to have taken place. What then could have induced the little Jewish community—it numbered about 20—to remain in that part of France directly under the Gestapo's control?

Pondering these questions, I begin to walk up the main street in the direction of St. Privat's church. The road had been used by the invading Germans, a motorized convoy passing one day through the village. The sight of the soldiers sitting rigidly, and the enormity of the vehicles—the roar of the engines magnified in the rural stillness—had greatly impressed everyone. Could an enemy so powerful be defeated or even resisted? With the largest army in Europe, France had been crushed in a few weeks; would not Germany's remaining foes soon suffer the same fate? Such must have been the reasoning of the villagers, Gentile and Jew alike. Were these not compelling



Mary Erickson

Jean-François Signac, childhood friend of the author's.

enough reasons to remain in St. Privat? After all, what was the point of leaving if Germany was about to win the war? But practical considerations must have also played a part in their decision: The children would have to be uprooted; possessions would again have to be packed and transported; new lodgings would have to be found (and who would take Jews?). All this in a country half occupied by Germans! And was the perilous and exhausting move really necessary? Had they not managed to survive until then and might they not survive unharmed until the end? Thus, fatigue of body and soul may have yielded the most pernicious of all illusions: the belief that if they did nothing, they would somehow be spared. Instead of fleeing without heed of consequences, as Jews had fled earlier

persecutions and survived, the Jews of St. Privat decided to wait and hope for the best.

I have reached the uppermost part of the village and am standing in the churchyard. Nearby are the houses of the wartime mayor, M. Joyeux, and of M. Valentin. Adjacent to the church is the modernistic meeting hall, *la salle des réunions*. It was there that one day in October 1942 the Jews of St. Privat were gathered before being transported to Germany and their death.

As near as I can tell from interviews with villagers, this is what happened that day:

It was still night when Mme. Simone Bruneau, then a young girl living on the outskirts of St. Privat, heard a heavy vehicle approaching the village. The next morning her father, returning to the house, said, "They are taking Jews."

The arrests began at dawn. Mme. Jeanne Gotreau, wife of the baker and sister-in-law of Fernande Gotreau, recalls that her son was preparing to leave on a trip. It was still dark, and the kitchen light was on. This had attracted the attention of the officials—gendarmes from neighboring St. Aulaye and German soldiers—who entered her house. Outside, in the churchyard, she could see a vehicle waiting.

Everything had evidently been prearranged. There are no street addresses in St. Privat, yet the gendarmes knew the whereabouts of each Jewish household. The first to be seized were those who lived closest to *la salle des réunions*, where the authorities had established their headquarters. It was thus my parents' fate to have been among the first arrested. The destruction of households yielded as many agonies as there were victims. As the men were arrested first, followed by the women and children, they were the first to know the full horror of what was befalling them. In one part of the village, a man's lament filled neighboring houses: "My children!" was his repeated cry. Elsewhere, a young man delayed opening the door so that his mother and brother could escape through a rear window. Then he was arrested.

Mme. Berry was awakened by loud knocks on a neighbor's house. Later, she saw a woman on her knees plead-

ing to see her children for a last time. "I can still hear the poor woman's cries," Mme. Berry says. "I also have children and was fearful for their fate. That night I could not sleep."

Assembled in *la salle des réunions*, the victims were led onto the bus "like cattle," remembers Jeanne Gotreau. The final convulsions are recalled in fragments: terrified children crying; adults sobbing; arms outstretched, clinging; a dazed little girl holding a doll; an overcoat given to a Gentile neighbor—no doubt a desperate last gesture to offer safety to those being left behind.

For seven or eight Jewish children had escaped arrest. They were French citizens, and the decree ordering the deportations had excluded French citizens. However, five months later they, too, were seized. Someone in the village had decided that they should be sent to a "relocation center" and so, one night, they were taken away—all except for me. Inexplicably, I was permitted to remain. I have little recollection of this second deportation except for the memory of my brother being led out of our bedroom. He moved with the steady gait of a sleepwalker, possibly because he was still asleep.

For a month or two I lived with our landlady, Mlle. Cabirole. One day, M. Gustave Shapiro came through the village on his way to Ribérac (it was there, in the attic of the Hôtel de France, that the Torahs of Bordeaux were hidden). He learned of my existence and took me with him. I was given a fictitious name and identity and eventually placed with peasants. In 1944, after the liberation of southern France, I lived in the Jewish orphanage of Moissac, and in 1946 I came to America.

On this peaceful Sunday, I sit in St. Privat's ancient Romanesque church and listen to the priest recite mass before the assembled faithful, about 50 people, mostly elderly. I ask myself, Why am I here in this temple to an alien God? For a sign? A clue? The hidden meaning? I remember Mlle. Cabirole saying, "God works in inscrutable ways," and, referring to me, "He will be a priest, perhaps even a bishop."

Well, I have not chosen the sacerdotal life, being no less estranged from the Christian Son than from his Jewish Father. No, it is not the mys-

terious ways of God that have brought me back to St. Privat but the more mysterious ways of humankind. I look at the parishioners and cannot but wonder how they spent their lives knowing of the abominations perpetrated in their midst. And why had none come to the aid of their fellow humans in distress?

My gaze falls on a 1928 painting of the Crucifixion by Louis Jean Beaupays, a St. Privat painter. I study it closely. Jesus is hanging on the cross, his agonized gaze fixed heavenward. The gray sky is streaked by dark, threatening clouds. At his feet is the sorrowful but resigned figure of the Holy Mother, her hands folded in prayer; in the background, the diminutive village of St. Privat. This painting, with its forlorn vision of the human condition, seems to have captured the spirit of St. Privat: belief in the intrinsic frailty and helplessness of human beings ("What could we do? They had won the war," was the reason unfailingly given by the villagers for not having resisted the Germans); the force of evil confronting that of good and initially triumphing, the fall from grace creating a whirlwind of anguish in which Jesus himself had succumbed (a good Christian could therefore accept the destruction of the innocents, for had not Jesus, the incarnation of innocence, suffered that fate?); the consequent need to submit, to surrender one's earthly claims as the way to salvation, the residue of medieval anti-humanism, although without the accompanying belief in pietism and the otherworldly life. How could the Jews have hoped to receive help when the people of St. Privat had themselves abandoned the will to live, accepting the rule of the invaders or collaborating with them—the fullest measure of their self-contempt?

But then my thoughts return again to another painful question: Why, after all, had the victims not chosen the path of flight? Had the Jews of St. Privat really wanted to survive, or had they half-consciously conspired in their own destruction by placing their faith in this village of the dead? Only a journey into the recesses of the persecuted mind could answer the question.

As I leave the church, some villagers come toward me. I recognize Mme. Fernande Gotreau. The others

to whom I am introduced are Mme. Joyeux, widow of St. Privat's wartime mayor; Mlle. Roussie, the present owner of my old house (Mme. Gotreau, knowing of my desire to see it, has thoughtfully brought her along); and, to my surprise, a boyhood friend, Jean-François Signac. We make our way to the nearby café and talk about the past. I bring up the arrests, but except for Mme. Joyeux, no one remembers much. "The families were separated," she recalls. "The men were put on the bus; then later, the women and children. Everyone was crying; it was heart-rending." She adds a few words and then must depart, leaving Jean-François and me to exchange childhood memories. It is a remarkable moment: Two lives that began together in St. Privat—one that remained attached to the ancestral soil, the other transplanted across the ocean—have again converged. I look into his eyes, clear and steadfast with a shade of sadness, perhaps some disappointments, some private defeats. Our conversation is not intimate: There are thoughts that need not be spoken.

We separate. Mlle. Roussie has kindly agreed to take me to the house, and I follow her. We climb to the second floor. The interior is exactly as I remembered it: the bedroom opening into the kitchen, the window overlooking the street, the two chimneys. And yet everything has changed. In returning to St. Privat, I have entered my own inner chambers, depriving these outer ones of their memorial hold. The dead inhabitants have found other, less accessible quarters, and what is left is an embarrassing emptiness. Before departing, Mlle. Roussie takes me to the attic. "Take whatever you want," she says, pointing to the debris of discarded objects. I randomly pick up an earthenware plate and a baby's bottle—perhaps my little brother's.

A few days later, from nearby Ribérac, where I have been staying, I return to St. Privat for a last visit. I make a long turn around the village, trying to note everything: The gardens merging into the fields, the four crossroads guarded by iron crucifixes, the cemetery, the two-room schoolhouse, old dwellings and new ones. I have resolved to see Mme. Joyeux one more time. And I shall want to say good-bye to a few friends.

I find Mme. Joyeux in church help-

ing with the weekly cleaning. We walk to her house, but she warns me that she is expecting visitors and cannot talk for long. From the beginning, her answers are evasive. Was it the French police who had conducted the arrests? She is not sure but thinks it was the Germans. How did they know where the Jews lived? There were lists. But where did they get the lists, and how did the officials know the whereabouts of the houses? She does not know. What happened when the Jews were arrested, where were they taken, and had she heard the cries of the children? She cannot remember. I ask her about the role of her husband, who as mayor must have known of the impending action. She denies that her husband had played any role in the arrests.

Realizing that she will not talk directly about the events, I raise more general issues. How had the Germans acted in St. Privat? "They were quite correct and, until they began to take the Jews, we thought that they were behaving in a very proper way." Why did she think the Jews had remained in St. Privat and allowed themselves to be apprehended? "Apparently," she says, "the Jews did not realize that the Germans disliked them, and yet they knew of the arrests that were taking place in Poland. I cannot understand why they didn't draw any conclusions from this."

I leave Mme. Joyeux, perplexed by her reticence. Had the initial revelations been made because of the presence of other villagers and because she was ignorant of my intentions? Had the lapses of memory occurred because I had told her, at the beginning of the interview, that I intended to write an account of the Jews' last moments in St. Privat?

I am on my way to Fernande Gotreau when I encounter her sister-in-law, Jeanne Gotreau. Everyone by now knows what has brought me to St. Privat, and so our conversation quickly turns to the events of 1942. She tells me what she knows about the arrests, and adds that one of her sons had joined the Maquis, the guerrilla fighters in the French underground. Then she mentions the death of M. Valentin. "You know," she says, "that he committed suicide." I express surprise. "He had not been well for some time," she continues. "He was no longer eating. The doctor wanted to put him in a convalescent

home, but he did not want to go. He was deteriorating very quickly, had begun to stare into space."

We are still talking when Fernande Gotreau appears. She tells me that in the course of inquiries, she has found a number of people who knew my family, including someone who used to deliver milk to the house. Our conversation continues while we walk toward her house. "I have seen Mme. Joyeux," I tell her. "Yes, I know," she replies. "I met her in church and she said that she had spoken to you." She waits until we are inside the house, then continues: "She said that she told you that she couldn't remember anything, but of course, she could remember quite well. After all, she was the mayor's wife!"

"Do you think then," I ask, "that it was her husband who provided the Germans with the list of Jews and their whereabouts?" She makes a gesture as if to say, What do you think?

"After the war, he was removed from office by the Resistance, and shortly thereafter he hanged himself," she says. I am again taken by surprise. Two collaborating mayors who had died by their own hands! Can one really speak of God's inscrutability? I look at Mme. Gotreau and am reminded of my old friend, Jean-François. The two faces have the same intelligence and warmth, the eyes serene and an expression that is at the same time determined. Here is the other France, the France that did not submit and that still survives. We embrace, and I depart.

The fields of St. Privat are golden with the approaching harvest. The air is warm and heavy with the scent of ripe apples, pears and grapes. Nature is reaching another climax in the cycle of recurrence. It was on a day like this 43 years ago that the vehicle of death left the village and traveled on the road that I am now taking. The innocents could see for a last time nature's fulfilling promise. Before them was the abyss. □

Sal A. Westrich is a professor of history at Pratt Institute, in Brooklyn, New York. He has written a screenplay, "Flowers of Autumn," based on this memoir.

Books

Good Guys/Bad Guys

Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. Shirley Christian. New York: Vintage/Random House. 415 pp. Paper, \$8.95.

It is sobering to think that a large portion of the North American public gets all its information about Nicaragua from President Reagan's television speeches on behalf of aid to the "contras," Nicaraguan counter-revolutionaries—speeches full of exaggerations and misinformation. In light of this, a balanced, readable and informative book about the Nicaraguan revolution would never be more welcome than now. Shirley Christian, a noted journalist who won the 1981 Pulitzer Prize in International Reporting for her coverage of Central America for *The New York Times*, might well have written such a book. Instead she wrote "Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family," a book that is part hatchet job on Nicaragua's Sandinista ruling party and part valentine for that country's middle class. The subtitle apparently refers to the inbred and intimate nature of Nicaragua's political elite, left- and right-wing, with anti-Somoza liberals and conservatives depicted as solid, upright members of that family, and the Sandinistas as its black sheep. As with most works that adopt a good guy/bad guy perspective, Christian's book does little to clarify a complicated situation.

Christian is more interested in telling a story than in systematically developing a thesis, but her book does have an underlying argument that serves as the point of departure for all its subsequent conclusions. To put it succinctly, Christian believes that the key group in the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in 1979 was not the Sandinista National Liberation Front (F.S.L.N.), but the Nica-

raguan middle class, assisted by President Carter's mildly anti-Somoza policies and material support from neighboring Latin American nations. While both Nicaragua's neighbors and the United States favored a government headed by progressive members of the middle class, the Sandinistas managed to worm their way into power, according to Christian, by masking their Marxist-Leninist politics and faking commitment to political pluralism. Once in power, the Sandinistas gradually muscled out their middle-class allies and began to show their true political colors.

To strengthen her point about the leading role played by the middle class and its foreign backers, Christian narrates Somoza's overthrow as if it were little more than a palace coup in which the major decisions were being made, not on the streets of Managua or in the Nicaraguan countryside, but at the Latin American desk of the United States State Department or in the headquarters of General Omar Torrijos of Panama. When the Sandinistas appear, they are usually portrayed in the most unflattering light possible—and to accomplish this, Christian frequently resorts to the kind of snide ad hominem remarks that should make a serious journalist blush. For example, Christian is eager to inform us that the Sandinistas were nothing like the heroic guerrillas who appear in official portraits. She flippantly comments that the members of a Sandinista faction that included President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and his brother Humberto Ortega, now head of the army, were saved from extinction under the Somoza regime "by their preference for living abroad." At other points in the book Christian jeeringly refers to the Ortegas' limited combat experience. Yet according to her own account, Daniel Ortega spent seven years in Somoza's

prisons, Humberto Ortega suffered permanent damage to his arm in an attempt to free a fellow Sandinista from a Costa Rican jail and their younger brother Camilo died in a shoot-out with Somoza's National Guard. We are also told in no uncertain terms how uncharismatic the Ortegas and the other leading Sandinistas are, especially in contrast with various handsome and charming members of the Nicaraguan middle class.

The Ortega family can take consolation in the fact that they are hardly alone in having their contribution to the revolution so slighted. All who are not of the middle class (that is, the vast majority of Nicaragua's population) suffer a similar fate at her hands. One would have little idea from reading this book that the Nicaraguan revolution was a genuine mass insurrection with a remarkably high degree of participation in the fighting on the part of the general population, even though this often meant throwing stones at heavily armed National Guardsmen or being exposed to punitive bombings. There is little discussion of the damage Somoza inflicted in his final, futile attempt to stay in power, or of the social impact of a war in which tens of thousands were killed or wounded (90 percent of them civilians, according to the Red Cross figures that Christian cites).

Why does Christian give this dramatic and crucial aspect of the revolution such short shrift? In part it is a result of her research method, which involves many interviews with State Department officials, middle-class Nicaraguans and government officials from other Latin American countries. These provide us with interesting insights into the "international" aspects of Somoza's overthrow but tell us nothing about the revolution in the streets. To be sure,

Christian could not be expected to interview every person who was a temporary combatant in the revolution, but a few personal accounts from such participants would have enlivened and balanced an otherwise leaden and misleading chronicle of Somoza's downfall.

Balance, however, does not seem to be what Christian is after, and her most serious failures arise from her absolute determination to see the recent history of Nicaragua as a struggle between the perfidious Sandinistas and the heroic leaders of the progressive middle class. Such a historical construct automatically leaves out most Nicaraguans—workers and peasants—to whom Christian devotes only seven pages in a 415-page book. In the event of a civil war she believes that “the majority would go with the wind . . . just as they had in 1979 when they saw the underpinnings come out from under Somoza. When the shooting was over, they wanted to be able to proclaim loudly that they had supported the winner.”

Few comments could be more baseless or insulting. There was already mass participation in the fighting in 1978, when Somoza still appeared well-armed and deeply entrenched; television news reports gave vivid evidence of common people fighting in the face of aerial bombings, pitting raw courage and commitment against modern technology, especially in the city of León, Nicaragua's second largest urban center.

It is also important to note that while historical studies are still scarce, workers and peasants engaged in various forms of protest and resistance during the Somoza era, despite the fact that opposition to the regime brought them greater risk of violent repression than similar movements mounted by the middle class. Maybe Christian is correct in her observation that the Nicaraguan's “first priority was survival,” but that surely does not mean that the average Nicaraguan lacks ideals and goals. Moreover, the thousands of people who died or suffered severe wounds during the mass insurrection could hardly be described as interested only in survival or “going with the wind.”

Christian's contention that the Sandinistas downplayed their Marxist-Leninist politics prior to the revolution is undoubtedly accurate. Yet this

is hardly a case of grand deception. Like most other Latin American guerrilla groups, the F.S.L.N. had a Marxist orientation and had been strongly influenced by the Cuban experience. Only a fool could have been unaware of the fact that the leading Sandinistas were Marxist-Leninists; certainly President Carter knew it, and he repeatedly attempted to form a government to replace Somoza that would have excluded them and retained the National Guard.

Approaching the issue from the other side, the Sandinistas can reasonably claim that they have not followed a strictly Marxist-Leninist line. The F.S.L.N. has not adhered, as some had expected, to European-style democratic socialism, but it has coexisted with opposition parties, held an open presidential election and encouraged multinational corporations to remain in the country. The closing of the opposition newspaper *La Prensa*—which repeatedly called for increased United States aid for the contras—was certainly disturbing, but far from surprising. Nicaragua is a nation under siege, economically and militarily, and faces implacable opposition from the most powerful nation on earth; under such circumstances, argue the Sandinistas, support for the contras quickly becomes tantamount to treachery.

Nicaragua is not eager to become Cuba's clone, as Christian implies, but it has followed its neighbor's lead in several ways: by politicizing the army, by concentrating power in a political vanguard and by attacking (at least verbally) any criticism of the Government as disloyal. One might expect, therefore, that Christian would take time to consider the appeal of Marxism-Leninism and the Cuban experience for the Sandinistas in particular and for Latin American leftists in general. No such luck—Christian seems to attribute the Sandinistas' behavior to an ideological lockstep that afflicts all leftists. But if we survey the history of Latin America, it is difficult to find reasonable alternatives to the Sandinistas' political strategy. The Cuban revolution, whatever its failings, provides an example of a regime that has improved the basic material conditions of its people and survived middle-class opposition as well as foreign-backed invasion.

One wonders if Christian is joking when she criticizes the Sandinistas for politicizing the army. What would she suggest—that they form the first politically neutral armed forces in the history of Latin America? That they suffer the fate of revolutionaries (liberal-democratic, by the way) in Guatemala and Bolivia who saw their shaky efforts at reform demolished by military-backed, United States-funded counterrevolutions? Or perhaps she would suggest the Government of the late Salvador Allende as a model—Allende, it may be recalled, was the legally elected and thoroughly democratic Marxist President of Chile whose “nonpoliticized” armed forces (with much United States aid and encouragement) overturned his regime, murdered him along with thousands of other Chileans and condemned that country to a fascist regime. Perhaps history would not have repeated itself in Nicaragua, but the Sandinistas had ample reason to fear an “independent” military and to suspect that the middle class might turn violent once Sandinista policies began to threaten its economic interests.

Since Christian sees the Sandinista Government as lacking legitimacy, she devotes much time and space to demonstrating how unpopular the Sandinistas are. To this end, she selects her chapter topics carefully: market women, the Roman Catholic Church, the Miskito Indians—all well-known opponents of the Government. Nevertheless, the chapters devoted to the church and to the Miskitos are probably the best sections of the book, largely because Christian manages to avoid purely subjective commentary, to present conflicting points of view and to make criticisms without resorting to sensationalism. The conflict with the Miskitos, who live along Nicaragua's sparsely settled Atlantic Coast, demonstrates how badly served the Sandinistas have been by their Leninist background. Their insensitivity to the Miskitos' understandable demands for regional autonomy was the initial cause of an avoidable conflict that has helped swell the contras' ranks. As for the section on the church, it has the unique feature of opening with an anecdote that shows a Sandinista supporter (in this case, a radical priest) in a positive light.

In most chapters, however, Chris-

tian does not make even a token effort at balance. The reader will look in vain for a single anecdote that shows how someone's life has been improved by the revolution and its subsequent transformations. There is not a word from anyone who has been taught to read, or from a mother who can finally expect to get health care for her baby, or from a peasant who for the first time has some say in his daily work routine. To be sure, the prolonged economic crisis (caused by a combination of the United States cutoff in trade and credit, the contra war and the disorganization caused by Sandinista policies) has led to hardship for many Nicaraguans who had hoped for a rapid improvement in their economic status once Somoza was gone. But instead of supplying us with solid data on how the economic situation and quality of life of the average Nicaraguan today compare with conditions under Somoza, Christian provides us with a few anecdotes, all implying a worsening of the situation.

It might also be enlightening if the reader had some way to compare the current conditions of the Nicaraguan poor with those of the poor in other Latin American countries. Brazil, for example, which recently returned to being a "liberal democracy" after 20 years of military rule, is a bastion of capitalist enterprise that boasted the world's fastest economic growth rate in 1985. Yet, according to the Brazilian Government's own study, it has 43 million people (about one-third of the population) living in "absolute misery" and another 24 million living in "strict poverty." In light of such statistics, it is important to note that the Sandinista Government, while having a poor record in terms of economic development, has done better than most Latin American regimes in meeting the basic needs of the people, and under harsh and inauspicious circumstances.

Since Christian is determined to portray the Sandinistas as lacking significant popular support, the November 1984 elections might pose a problem for her analysis. These elections were criticized by some factions of the opposition, which felt they did not have sufficient time or freedom to campaign, but the actual voting showed no signs of fraud and the final tally gave the Sandinista presidential candidate, Daniel Ortega, 67 percent

of the vote. Christian could rightly point out that a 33 percent vote for the opposition was substantial, especially considering that the most popular opposition candidate withdrew from the race (in part at the behest of the United States Government, though you won't find that out from this book). But Christian is a journalist of considerable enterprise, and in a rare foray into the realm of statistics she proves herself a virtuoso. According to her calculations, nearly 50 percent of the eligible voters "denied their support" to the Sandinistas. How's that? Well, only 75 percent of the electorate went to the polls, a certain number of ballots were "defaced" (we are not told how many) and 33 percent of those who did vote cast their ballot for the opposition. Pretty clever, except that by the same reasoning Ronald Reagan, rather than having been reelected by a landslide in 1984, took power as a virtual dictator since some 70 percent of the United States voting population "denied" him their support.

The epilogue of "Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family" is nothing short of bizarre. Here Christian returns to an earlier theme: the vacillation of the Carter Administration and its role in "permitting" the Sandinistas to come to power. In Christian's opinion, Carter should have used force, if necessary, to eject Somoza from power and to install an acceptable regime, but instead he purportedly allowed other considerations to overwhelm his concern for the Nicaraguan people's "needs" and "dreams." Nor does Christian stop at the Carter Administration; she criticizes all recent presidents (and some not so recent, such as Herbert Hoover) for being too influenced by negative public opinion and for failing to implement a more interventionist policy. Given the various forms of direct and indirect intervention practiced by United States administrations (Marine occupations, Central Intelligence Agency-organized invasions, economic destabilization, etc.) over the last 50 years, one can only wonder what more Christian wants—outright colonization? In the many years I have spent in Latin America I have never met a single person, other than members of the extreme right, who expressed a desire for a *more* interventionist United States policy in the

region. But my acquaintances will have little to say in the matter—our current Government is much more eager to have someone like Shirley Christian interpret for it the "needs" and "dreams" of the Latin American people than to hear from those people themselves.

Barbara Weinstein

Barbara Weinstein is associate professor of Latin American history at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. She wrote "The Amazon Rubber Boom, 1850-1920" (Stanford University Press) and is currently working on a study of relations between industrialists and workers in 20th-century Brazil.

Russian and Jewish

The Jews of Odessa: A Cultural History, 1794-1881. Steven J. Zipperstein. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 212 pp. \$27.50.

One of the abiding misconceptions about Jewish life in Eastern Europe before the Holocaust is what one might call the myth of the three Ps—piety, poverty and persecution—as universal features of the Jews' existence. In popular culture, the paradigmatic Eastern European Jew is Tevye, a man deeply devoted to the tradition, who struggles to eke out a living and eventually survives a pogrom and is expelled from his village. Although we all realize that this paradigm is unfair and simplistic, it endures.

There is no better way to disabuse oneself of the myth of the three Ps than to read Steven Zipperstein's "The Jews of Odessa." Odessan Jews were famous for their religious laxity (hence the Yiddish proverb: "Seven miles around Odessa burn the fires of hell") and for their life of affluence and pleasure (hence the Yiddish expression for a comfortable, care-free life-style: "living like God in Odessa"). And as Zipperstein points out, both these characteristics were related to the rather open and accepting attitude that Odessa's authorities and Gentile inhabitants exhibited toward the local Jews for most of the century.

Odessa was, then, a most unstereotypical Jewish community. It

housed, for instance, the first modern Jewish school of note in Russia (founded in 1826), where German, Russian, the sciences and other secular disciplines were taught alongside Hebrew, the Bible and other Jewish religious texts. It was the home of the first modern synagogue in Russia (founded in 1841), where strict decorum was maintained, the *bimah* was moved to the forward part of the sanctuary, and the cantor sang new German-style compositions with a four-voice choir. And Odessa was the birthplace of the modern Jewish press in Hebrew, Yiddish and Russian, which emerged in the 1860s as the primary vehicle of expression for enlightened and Russified Jews.

Zipperstein, who teaches modern Jewish history at Oxford University, analyzes these cultural institutions, and the intellectuals who guided them, with clarity, sensitivity and insight. And going beyond cultural history in its narrower sense, he devotes much attention to the local conditions in Odessa that enabled the modern Jewish school, synagogue and press to arise and flourish. Why was the Odessan school an enduring success, while a similar school in the town of Uman closed after six months, and no others like it appeared in Russia until a decade and a half later? Why was Orthodox opposition to the new-style congregation so weak and ineffectual that the community's central synagogue actually adopted many of the same reforms shortly afterward? And how did it come to pass that thoroughly Russified Jewish intellectuals appeared in Odessa and issued the first Russian-language Jewish newspapers, whereas such intellectuals and newspapers appeared elsewhere in Russia only a generation later? In short, why was the cultural history of Odessan Jewry unique?

Zipperstein doesn't ask these questions explicitly, but they inform and underlie much of this book, and lead him to consider various aspects of the city's social and economic history.

Odessa was first settled by Jews at the end of the 18th century, relatively late in Jewish history. Its Jewish settlers were commercial adventurers and pioneers, and the community lacked a strong tradition of rabbinic leadership and internal social control. In the 1810s and 1820s, the community was invigorated by an influx of merchants and intellectuals from the

Austrian-ruled city of Brody, at that time the capital of the Jewish Enlightenment, or Haskalah. These migrants transplanted German-Jewish ideas of Enlightenment and synagogue reform to Odessa, and became the dominant force in Jewish communal life.

Against this background, Zipperstein draws attention to Odessa's materialist ethos as a major factor contributing to its modern cultural development. Life in this lively port city revolved around commerce, and the modern school was attractive to Jewish merchants because it taught skills and languages that were of practical utility in the Odessan marketplace. Odessan Jews studied Russian and mathematics, not because of an abstract commitment to Enlightenment but for practical gain. "Odessa had a wondrous effect on its Jews," wrote one Russian observer. "Here they quickly pursued an education, recognizing in it material profit and esteem."

Odessa's materialist spirit led to extensive Jewish-Gentile interaction in the economic sphere. This, coupled with the widespread recognition that the Jews played a valuable role in the local economy, contributed to the lessening of anti-Semitic sentiments among the Gentile population. And the subsequently freer social atmosphere led to the emergence of Russified Jews by the 1850s. One finds instances of Jews attending the local opera, Jewish youths enrolled in Russian gymnasiums and, eventually, Jewish physicians leading lives divorced from the Jewish community and its institutions. By the 1860s, Jewish intellectuals (writing in Russian!) were expressing concern about Odessa's disaffected and alienated Jewish youth.

This brief summary certainly does not do justice to Zipperstein's presentation, which is nuanced, complex and full of interesting portraits and characterizations. But if some of these summary statements sound a bit too "sociological," then that is due to the one flaw with which I would fault this book—the tendency to make broad and sweeping assertions without much evidence to back them up. When it comes to the nitty-gritty of Jewish-Gentile relations and Russification in Odessa, little material is available (or at least presented) to support some of Zipperstein's general conclusions.

Even so, "The Jews of Odessa" is an excellent study. It will serve future scholars as a model for the investigation of other urban Jewish communities, and succeeds in restoring Odessa to its unique place among the great cities of European Jewry.

David E. Fishman

David E. Fishman teaches Eastern European Jewish history and Yiddish literature at Brandeis University.

Through Jewish Eyes

Judaism and Global Survival.

Richard Schwartz. New York: Vantage Press. 179 pp. Paper, \$7.95.

Richard Schwartz is an associate professor of mathematics at the College of Staten Island in New York City. He is also, as he describes himself, a *ba'al teshuvah*, one who has "returned" to Judaism, and he has brought with him from this journey an energetic voice, balanced between criticism of modern Jewish practice and love of Jewish tradition. With his first book, "Judaism and Vegetarianism," published two years ago, he entered the Jewish world with the very much needed voice of the crusading critic.

The Jewish concepts of "Judaism and Global Survival" are similar to those of his first book. Among these are the belief that "the earth is the Lord's and all that dwell therein," meaning that we are stewards of the earth, not masters of it; the principle of compassion, or the injunction not to cause pain to any living creature; *ba'al tashchit*, which is the prohibition against destruction or waste of anything, "even a mustard seed," and the understanding that we are co-partners with God in redeeming and rebuilding the world.

Without question, four concepts such as these, were they enforced, would transform the world, but rare is the Jewish community that lives by them. How, then, do we enforce them on a global scale?—which is what Schwartz urges. He judges our performance on such questions as hunger, economic justice, Israel, population growth, equality, international relations, energy and human rights by the yardsticks of these four

as well as other, similar Jewish precepts. Needless to say, his method serves some arguments better than others.

Schwartz correctly perceives that economic capitalism is at times incompatible with Jewish concepts of justice and compassion, and it is interesting to read that the Rabbinical Assembly of America said so in 1934. For example, the idea of the Jubilee, the year in which ownership of property is dissolved every 50 years to return to God what is His and to allow for a redistribution of property, must be regarded as a splendid ideal of economic and political equality. But it is difficult to see how Jews, particularly in the diaspora, could enforce this ideal unless they opted out of the modern world. Nevertheless, as readers perceive the gap between precept and reality, it is to be feared that they may be comforted by the sentiments and precepts, rather than be dismayed by the gap. We like to hear that we think well and mean well, and are content with ignoring the problem of doing well.

And yet, many of Schwartz's arguments need to be heard. He is right in arguing that hunger is the world's worst health problem because it affects masses of people. It leaves a legacy of repercussions for generations to come in political and social instability, and for those who will be permanently mentally retarded because of vitamin and protein deficiencies in the first six months of life. We need to question health programs in the United States that are dedicated to expensive and extraordinary measures, such as organ transplants, when proper diet may help to prevent diseases, primarily heart and kidney malfunctions. We need to question a pharmacological industry that brutalizes animals in research to make superfluous medications for conditions—such as stroke, high blood pressure and colon cancer—that are frequently caused by superfluous eating.

Schwartz offers impressive figures about the wastefulness of life in the United States. Consumption, gluttony and built-in obsolescence are now so rampant that with only 5 percent of the world's population, we use about 35 percent of the world's resources and energy. Schwartz writes: "This gives the U.S. a population impact equal to over 11 billion Third

World people, well over twice the world's population"—which bears out Gandhi's observation that "There's enough food in the world to feed people; there's not enough to feed greed."

Redemption, Schwartz suggests, must begin with changing our lifestyles in such a manner as to reduce this wasteful consumption of resources. He cites the sumptuary laws enacted by rabbis in the Middle Ages as a model of instruction, and it would be salutary if modern rabbis expressed themselves on such subjects as diet and its relationship to disease as well as to global hunger, for it is distinctively Jewish to be concerned with the everyday, and to understand the interconnectedness between the everyday and matters of a global scale.

In quite another area, the author's observations on the possibility of a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, though he cannot exhaust the subject in this format, are worth consideration. It is important that he notes that Orthodox groups, such as Ox V'Shalom (Strength and Peace) and Netivot Shalom (Paths of Peace), are in favor of considering that possibility, and he quotes such religious authorities as Rabbi Joseph Soloveitchik, the leader of modern Orthodoxy in this country, who counsels that "the concept of '*pikuach nefesh*'—the duty to save lives—can override territorial considerations."

Everywhere Schwartz joins together two mighty streams of reading: the Jewish sources and contemporary material culled from news reports, analyses, governmental studies and books. It is germane to his style to be direct, pragmatic and practical, and he has included appendices with listings of social action groups and periodicals that discuss global issues. Thus he has joined tradition and information, and put action within the reach of every reader.

Roberta Kalechofsky

Roberta Kalechofsky, whose work has appeared in "The Enduring Legacy: Stories in the Biblical Tradition," has edited and published a haggadah for vegetarians, "Haggadah for the Liberated Lamb" (Micah Publications).

Under Siege

Peacekeepers at War: A Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe. *Michael Petit.*

Winchester, Massachusetts: Faber and Faber. 229 pp. \$17.95.

The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1982–February 1984. *Eric Hammel.* New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 448 pp. \$19.95.

This is the century of surprise attacks. What Frederick the Great and Napoleon occasionally managed to improvise on the battlefield has become commonplace, thanks to high-performance weapons and the predictable complacency of defenders dulled by years of quasi peace, quasi war. Witness Pearl Harbor; the Nazi blitzkriegs; the Israeli raids on Egypt's airfields in 1967, on Entebbe in 1976 and on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

Witness also the truck-bomb attack at Beirut airport by Iranian terrorists, in which 241 marines and Navy medics were massacred on October 23, 1983. Frederick contended that "a great general may sometimes be defeated but never surprised." If so, then greatness—not to mention simple competence—was singularly absent on that critical morning during the American military intervention in Lebanon, which, following on the Israeli invasion, lasted from August 1982 to February 1984.

That intervention was deeply flawed in every way, though the lack of documentation and full explanations by policymakers has prevented any comprehensive study thus far. Every assumption proved false: that Washington could settle a seven-year civil war while openly supporting a hated Maronite/Phalangist regime; that the Marines could help turn the Lebanese Army into an effective force, responsive to Government orders; that this American-sponsored revolution in the balance of forces would provoke no backlash; that the glamour of American power—and naval gunfire—would suffice to shield the 1,800 marines from trouble.

Such issues are largely ignored in these two books, which focus instead on the ordinary grunt at ease and on duty, in bunkers and on patrol, as he

cope with boredom, loneliness, the demands of noncoms and the frustrations of a siege for marines trained to maneuver, attack and win.

Michael Petit's "Peacekeepers at War" is autobiographical, the recollections of a college-trained corporal with literary inclinations who sought adventure and experience with the Marines after deciding against the French Foreign Legion, and who saw events from the inside, with a headquarters detail in Beirut from May to November in 1983. His account is artless, apolitical and poignant, an attempt at catharsis in describing the horrors of working among the powder-covered lumps—bodies and parts of bodies—that the collapsed airport building crushed beneath its concrete slabs. Of some 370 men within when the bomb exploded, 241 died instantly or soon thereafter; frantic rescuers found almost no survivors after the first hours; a week was needed to extricate the last bodies and the cleanup parties suffered enormous anguish in the process.

Petit is uncritical, sidestepping the question of how the terrorist kamikaze could ram his explosive-filled truck against the keystone of the Marine position, though such assaults were widely known in Lebanon: The United States Embassy had been attacked just six months before. Were the Marine commanders, blinded by their traditional can-do spirit and their obvious edge over the Lebanese irregulars, following Custer at the Little Bighorn by overestimating their power against "the savages"? Petit, unfortunately, offers no answer, though his headquarters position may well have given him the opportunity for insights.

Eric Hammel's "The Root" (Marine slang for Beirut) is more informative, but the author's unquestioning enthusiasm for the Marines and his foxhole view of events, with testimony by one marine after another, becomes repetitive and unreflective—until the bomb explodes. Then Hammel (a professional writer incorrectly described on the dust jacket as a "Marine historian") turns into a skilled disaster reporter, using his 200 interviews to paint a graphic picture of who suffered what, who rescued whom and who—often senior sergeants—emerged as leaders.

There are telling vignettes: "The

ground itself was crying," said one rescuer of the moans emanating from the shattered building; "Bodies by the gross," repeated one sergeant to himself as 144 bodies were loaded on a plane; "Captain, listen to me. The whole damn building is gone. It's leveled right down to the ground," a sergeant announced by radio to a skeptical superior.

These books do indeed offer some hints as to why the Marines were caught off-guard. Everything cannot be blamed on terrorist cleverness, or—as Hammel does—on restrictions imposed by Washington. The Marine presence had been accepted, even applauded, by many Lebanese Moslems for some nine months, until the political situation changed in April and May of 1983. Then the Marines' vision of themselves as "peacekeepers," evenhanded neutrals, was undercut by the pro-Gemayel American policy. It was, in fact, the Israelis who imposed a heavy-handed peace until their withdrawal from Beirut in late August. Then the Marines came under siege, ceasing their vulnerable patrols, hunkering down behind sandbags, cursing the "ragheads" and "camel jockeys," on whom they doubtless inflicted five or more casualties for each they suffered; heavy naval guns were employed from early September onward. The bomb attack simply climaxed nearly two months of intermittent war.

That action must be seen, not merely as terrorism, or even as anti-Americanism run wild, but in its broadest context: as part of the Third World counterattack that opened in 1945 against Western political and cultural domination. That counterattack has spawned its own ideologies—Maoism and Islamic fundamentalism—and its own military instruments: urban terrorism, sustained guerrilla warfare and light infantry thrusts. The results have appeared in the American withdrawal from Saigon in 1975, from Tehran in 1979 and from Beirut in 1984.

That the Reagan Administration should, overlooking all experience, have lost so many American lives in Lebanon while accomplishing so little suggests how right Santayana was in proclaiming that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

Leonard Bushkoff

Leonard Bushkoff has worked in the Historical Division of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is writing a book on the American involvement in Iran in the 1950s.

Browsing

The New Jewish Wedding. Anita Diamant. New York: Summit Books. 268 pp. Paper, \$7.95.

Some of the basic information in this lively and detailed guide to Jewish weddings may come as a surprise to the nonscholarly reader. The rabbi at a Jewish wedding does not "marry" the couple; the bride and bridegroom marry each other. The presence of a rabbi is not even required by Jewish law. Nor are such other familiar elements of traditional Eastern European Jewish weddings as the *huppah*, the seven blessings and the breaking of the glass. Even a *ketubbah* (which is not strictly speaking a marriage contract but rather a testament by two witnesses that the groom "acquired" his bride in exchange for something of value and that he recited the ritual formula of consecration) may be dispensed with, so long as Jewish witnesses testify in some manner that the couple is living together as man and wife.

"The New Jewish Wedding," however, does not recommend dispensing with any of these time-hallowed customs. Quite the contrary. Author Anita Diamant's purpose in distinguishing custom from halakhic requirement, fact from myth, is to reinvigorate the Jewish wedding by making clear how much of the ceremony is a matter of choice. She offers tips and encouragement for do-it-yourselfers on all levels: "For people with the time and inclination, making a *huppah* can be a very satisfying project." For non-Orthodox brides-to-be considering the traditional pre-wedding immersion in the *mikveh* (ritual bath), she has some practical advice: "Ask about the fee (usually due in cash) when you call to make an appointment. . . . The order of your ablutions is entirely up to you. Clean and trim finger- and toenails; clean ears, and floss and brush your teeth." For the experimentally minded, she mentions other options, including ritual immersion in swim-

ming pools and hot tubs. Alongside the text of the traditional Orthodox ketubah she reprints samples of documents that rabbis have written to reflect the needs and attitudes of contemporary couples.

The author's generous spirit and open-mindedness toward both the past and the present are exemplified in this paragraph about the fate of the ketubah after the wedding: "In Persia, women kept *ketubot* under their pillows, carefully folded inside silk envelopes. Many couples frame and hang their *ketubot* in special places in their homes. If you shared the same bed before marriage, hanging the ketubah over it affirms the change in your relationship."

Boston Boy. Nat Hentoff. New York: Alfred E. Knopf. 176 pp. \$15.95.

Nat Hentoff's Boston is not the scrubbed-up, forward-looking, yuppie-dominated city of today, but the minority-hating, self-hating Boston of the 1930s and 40s. In this city ("so admired by so many who have never lived there") the author learned to hate injustice and to love jazz. Readers familiar with Hentoff's extensive journalistic pieces on both these subjects may not be prepared for the beautifully cadenced sentences and vividly realized scenes of "Boston Boy," his luminous memoir about growing up Jewish in a mean town.

But Hentoff, who has also written fiction for adults and "young readers," brings to everything he touches a love of details accurately depicted and a respect for opinions fearlessly expressed (whether his own or someone else's) that are the memoirist's stock-in-trade. He is as frank about his admiration for Boston's corner-cutting Mayor James Michael Curley as he is about his alienation from his own parents, especially his mother. Not surprisingly, he is most eloquent about his discovery of jazz and of the black musicians who became his mentors in both art and life.

He recalls the exact moment when, walking on Boston's Washington Street at the age of 10, the "cry of yearning" in a jazz-influenced recording moved him to cry out loud in public, an unusual act for any "Boston boy, especially a Boston Jewish boy wandering outside the ghetto." And what did such music call to his mind? "The soul-shaking power of the *chazzan* and the spiraling risks of his improvising" that Hentoff knew from his neighborhood shul: "The *krechts* (a catch in the voice, a sob, a cry summoning centuries of ghosts of Jews) . . . a thunderstorm of fierce yearning that reverberates throughout the shul. And then, as if the universe had lost a beat, there is sudden silence—but no, there is a sound, a far distant sound, coming, my God, from deep inside the *chazzan*, an intimation of falsetto, a sadness so unbearably compressed that I wonder the *chazzan* does not explode . . ."

Reading a passage like this, one cannot help asking why a Boston Jewish boy who could feel the power in such music, whether performed by a *hazzan* or by Lester Young, rejected the former and embraced the latter. The answer lies in the complex history of Jewish assimilation in 20th-century America, and this in a sense is Hentoff's theme, although he resists the impulse to generalize, keeping the focus firmly on his personal history as he works his way up from the ghetto and out of his parents' world. The book ends with the author's move, at the age of 28, to New York City, which all his mentors assure him is "the big time." Hentoff manages to celebrate his roots without sentimentalizing them. What he remembers about the time and place that shaped him is often funny, always pointed and never mean-spirited.

The Rabbi of Casino Boulevard.

Allan Appel. New York: St. Martin's Press. 287 pp. \$16.95.

How serious is Allan Appel? You will have to decide for yourself after reading "The Rabbi of Casino Boulevard," his funny novel about a rabbi whose congregants spend their days gambling in the casino adjacent to the synagogue, which occupies the site of a former motel complete with a swimming pool where the rabbi is taught to swim by the beautiful Japanese-American who lives across the street and who, despite her love for the rabbi, insists on writing for a local scandal sheet a story about the belief shared by certain members of the congregation that the rabbi's mental and spiritual well-being on any given day determines how much they win or lose at the craps, poker and blackjack tables. As they say, only in California!

Appel's Woody-Allen-ish one-liners are bright and believable, and his plot keeps veering in unexpected directions, but what really surprises is his ability to create, in the midst of an apparently plastic world, sympathetic characters with more than *shtik* on their minds. The rabbi's forbidden love affair is rendered with delicacy and great conviction, and on one level or another, everyone in the book (including the Cadillac dealer who dabbles in Kabbalah) is searching for a link between the reality of modern America and the traditional Jewish imperatives. As the rabbi puts it in an imaginary reply to a peer-review committee that has threatened him with the loss of his pulpit: "Don't you see them—synagogues and school buildings without congregations and without students? Community centers without communities, a whole system growing emptier each year and dying on the vine with little harvest?"

If you equate seriousness with lack of humor, this is not a serious book. If you believe, with Appel and his rabbi, that laughter is a survival mechanism, you will probably agree with a line from one of the rabbi's sermons: "The Jewish approach, as Jack Kennedy said, is that God's work on earth must truly be our own."

Gerald Jonas

Gerald Jonas regularly reviews books for *Present Tense*.

PROTECT YOUR BACK ISSUES OF PRESENT TENSE

Keep your copies of *Present Tense* safe for future reference in these handsome and durable volume files, bound in maroon leatherette with gold embossing. Only \$7.95 each; 3 for \$21.95; 6 for \$39.95

Mail To: Jesse Jones Industries,
Dept. H & FW
499 East Erie Ave.,
Philadelphia, PA 19134

Please send _____ case(s) for *Present Tense*.

Enclosed is my check or money order for \$ _____.
Add \$1 per unit postage and handling.
Outside USA \$2.50 (U.S. funds only).

Print Name _____

Address (no P.O. Boxes) _____


City/State/Zip _____

Jesse Jones Industries also accepts
American Express, Visa, MasterCard and
Diners Club (for minimum orders of \$15.00).
To charge on your credit card call toll free
1-800-852-5000.

PA residents add 6% sales tax • SATISFACTION GUARANTEED

JOIN NOW!

A JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY MEMBERSHIP KEEPS GIVING AND GIVING



And we'll start by giving you
a *Free Book* when you join!

When you become a member of the Jewish Publication Society, you can look forward to a whole year of rewarding, enriching, entertaining and educational reading. From the Bible to contemporary Jewish thought and literature to award winning children's books. An annual membership entitles you to choose from our catalog of over 200 fine titles of Jewish interest, with corresponding book unit values. You can choose your books now or anytime during the membership year. We won't send you books unless you order them. As a member, you'll enjoy special savings as well as unique 'members only' publications.

And as an added incentive, we'll give you a free introductory gift. Choose from SHCHARANSKY, Hero of Our Time by Martin Gilbert, a dramatic biography which sheds new light on the Soviet system. Or TERRORISM, How the West Can Win, edited by Benjamin Netanyahu, a book that carefully explores terrorism, then details what we can do about it. Either of these timely publications can be yours if you join before December 31, 1986.

Join today and start enjoying a literary heritage that is rich with tradition—The Jewish Publication Society.

YES! I WANT TO JOIN THE JPS TRADITION! TODAY!

Name: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____

Phone (opt.): _____

Membership option: _____ Units for \$ _____

My check for \$ _____ is enclosed and made payable in US dollars to the Jewish Publication Society. Or charge my VISA or MASTERCARD (Please circle which), for \$ _____

Card # _____ Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

Please indicate which book you would like to receive as your free gift:

☐ SHCHARANSKY Hero of Our Time by Martin Gilbert, Hardcover, a \$24.95 retail value.

☐ TERRORISM How The West Can Win, edited by Benjamin Netanyahu, Hardcover, an \$18.95 value.

(Please add \$2.25 per order for shipping and handling.)

JPS Membership Categories

A	\$25	5 book units*	D	\$100	23 book units*
B	\$50	11 book units*	E	\$125	29 book units*
C	\$75	17 book units*	F	\$150	36 book units*

*Book units have a dollar value on a sliding scale. Titles in the catalog are assigned book unit values. Choose your membership category based upon the number of book units you wish to 'spend'.



The Jewish Publication Society

1930 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103
215-564-5925

A nonprofit educational institution devoted
to Jewish culture, established in 1888.



Bank Leumi wishes you a joyous
CHANUKAH

bank leumi בנק לאומי



Bank Leumi Le-Israel B.M.
Head Office:
24-32 Yehuda Halevi St.
Tel Aviv 65546
Tel: (03)632111
Telex: 33586 LEUMI IL

Bank Leumi
Trust Company of New York*
(24 branches)
579 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10017
Tel: (212)382-4000
Telex: ITT 420968 Finut
WUI 62856 Finyork
RCA 232772 Finyur

Regional Management
Western Hemisphere
342 Madison Ave.
Suite 1104
New York, NY 10173
Tel: (212)850-9500
Telex: 177639 BLRO

New York*
Los Angeles*
Encino*
Miami
Chicago*
Philadelphia*
Toronto

Montreal
London
Leeds
Paris
Marseilles
Strasbourg
Lyons

Zurich
Geneva
Frankfurt a/M
Milán
Antwerp
Montevideo
Punta del Este

Buenos Aires
São Paulo
Santiago, Chile
Mexico City
Panama City
Cayman Islands
Caracas

Curacao
Johannesburg
Hong Kong
Melbourne

*Member FDIC

With over 400 branches and offices worldwide

AJCONGRESS

Jews politics

THE POLITICAL FUTURE
OF
AMERICAN JEWS

by
Earl Raab
and
Seymour Martin Lipset

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS
15 East 84th Street, New York, N.Y. 10028

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Earl Raab, a communal relations specialist, is Executive Director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of San Francisco.

Seymour Martin Lipset, a political sociologist, is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AMERICAN JEWS

American Jews are a politically effective group, within certain limits, and are probably at the peak of their political influence. The question is whether that effectiveness is threatened by developing changes in American political life, in world affairs or in American Jewish circumstances. The auxiliary question is whether such changes call for adjustments in American Jewish strategy.

Preview of Factors

The factors to which Jewish political effectiveness is usually ascribed fall into several categories. There is the voting pattern of American Jews which has traditionally emphasized two factors: the Jewish *population concentration* in certain urban voting districts, compounded by the *high voting rate* of American Jews.

Those factors have been seen to give Jews a somewhat disproportionate mechanical leverage in political influence, but are usually associated with another set of factors, having to do with Jewish political activism. Such activism includes a *high level of financial contribution* to political campaigns; and a *high level of energy* — *involvement* in political life, in electoral campaigns, in the policy and strategy councils of aspirant politicians and of elected public officials.

A more complex and less invoked set of factors relates to the nature of that activism in the non-Jewish community. There is a *high level of integration* in business and community life in general, creating circles of access and influence which extend into the political arena; and coalition formation with other groups, which often critically multiplies the political effect of the Jews.

However, none of these factors would have sharp political point without some internal corporate factors: a certain *issue-intensiveness*, a *heavy communal consensus on a couple of high agenda items*; and a *Jewish organizational strength* through which these consensus positions are formally presented to policy makers. However, in addition to the overwhelming consensus on several prime issues of Jewish concern, there have been some other strong attitudinal tendencies among American Jews as a group — on subjects of social welfare, for example — which have shaped the strength of Jewish involvement in certain political coalitions. Partly as a result of these attitudinal patterns, American Jews have found their greatest political leverage within a coalition of the Democratic Party.

All these factors — patterns of voting, activism, integration and issue intensity — are interrelated and cumulative in effect. There is, however, one other large factor outside that system: objective conditions which affect the perceived *concordance of American values and Jewish values*. At best, Jewish political influence is marginal. There are — and have been — points beyond which a maximally effective Jewish effort could not prevail. Especially to the extent that it embraces a persuasive intellectual focus. Jewish political activity can help shape the concordance, and, to some extent, the objective conditions which affect it.

If those are the factors which have comprised American Jewish political influence, there are certain perceived changes taking place which would seem likely to affect them: Jewish demographic changes; financial and other electoral reform and changes in the American political process; changes in Jewish attitudes and institutions; and changes in objective circumstances.

Jewish Voting and Jewish Population Movement

While Jewish population statistics are inexact, there is convincing evidence that American Jews are both diminishing in proportion and dispersing outwards from inner cities and large cities.

The Jewish population percentage in America probably dropped from about 2.7 percent in 1970 to about 2.5 percent in 1980; and if median population projections hold up, that will drop further by 2000. But Jewish voting strength has never depended on sheer numbers, but rather on concentration and voting zeal. And the traditional rule of thumb has been to multiply Jewish voting age figures by a factor of two in general elections to arrive at the percentage of Jews in the voting population.

That 2-1 ratio varies, of course, and may usually range a bit lower. If, for example, 85 percent of the Jewish voting-age population votes at a time when 50 percent of the general voting-age population votes, the rate is 1.7.

There are 9 states (counting the District of Columbia as a state for presidential voting purposes) in which the Jews comprise 3 percent or more of the population, from 10.6 percent in New York to 3.2 percent in California. These states have 182 of the 270 electoral votes needed to elect a president. Applying the hypothetical ratio of 1:7 percent to those estimated populations, the Jewish voting percentages range from about 18 percent in New York to about 5 percent in California (Table 1).

In the 1980 and 1984 elections, at the most hypothetical, that range of Jewish voting strength did not provide the margin of Democratic victory anywhere, and could only have reversed the Republican victories in a couple of states if Jews had voted 90-10 Democratic.

All these factors — patterns of voting, activism, integration and issue intensity — are interrelated and cumulative in effect. There is, however, one other large factor outside that system: objective conditions which affect the perceived *concordance of American values and Jewish values*. At best, Jewish political influence is marginal. There are — and have been — points beyond which a maximally effective Jewish effort could not prevail. Especially to the extent that it embraces a persuasive intellectual focus. Jewish political activity can help shape the concordance, and, to some extent, the objective conditions which affect it.

If those are the factors which have comprised American Jewish political influence, there are certain perceived changes taking place which would seem likely to affect them: Jewish demographic changes; financial and other electoral reform and changes in the American political process; changes in Jewish attitudes and institutions; and changes in objective circumstances.

Jewish Voting and Jewish Population Movement

While Jewish population statistics are inexact, there is convincing evidence that American Jews are both diminishing in proportion and dispersing outwards from inner cities and large cities.

The Jewish population percentage in America probably dropped from about 2.7 percent in 1970 to about 2.5 percent in 1980; and if median population projections hold up, that will drop further by 2000. But Jewish voting strength has never depended on sheer numbers, but rather on concentration and voting zeal. And the traditional rule of thumb has been to multiply Jewish voting age figures by a factor of two in general elections to arrive at the percentage of Jews in the voting population.

That 2-1 ratio varies, of course, and may usually range a bit lower. If, for example, 85 percent of the Jewish voting-age population votes at a time when 50 percent of the general voting-age population votes, the rate is 1.7.

There are 9 states (counting the District of Columbia as a state for presidential voting purposes) in which the Jews comprise 3 percent or more of the population, from 10.6 percent in New York to 3.2 percent in California. These states have 182 of the 270 electoral votes needed to elect a president. Applying the hypothetical ratio of 1.7 percent to those estimated populations, the Jewish voting percentages range from about 18 percent in New York to about 5 percent in California (Table 1).

In the 1980 and 1984 elections, at the most hypothetical, that range of Jewish voting strength did not provide the margin of Democratic victory anywhere, and could only have reversed the Republican victories in a couple of states if Jews had voted 90-10 Democratic.

Emerging from such hypothetical exercises is the reality that the mechanical margin of Jewish votes is rarely going to make a critical difference. Sharpening that reality is the fact that the direction of Jewish voting has always corresponded to the direction of general voting (Table 1), so that, for example, a massive 90-10 differential in Jewish voting is not liable to occur unless there is also an unusually large differential in general Democratic Party voting. That reduces the practical significance of the Jewish voting differential.

There are qualifications. For example, the rule of thumb is to apply a factor of at least *three* to the Jewish voting population to find the proportion of Jewish voters in the Democratic Party primaries. These can more often become significant margins. However, the fact remains that, apart from Democratic Party primaries in certain key states, and the election of a few key Congressmen from a few districts dominated by heavy Jewish population, the Jewish voting population, per se, is rarely a decisive factor in American national politics.

Of course, political candidates in close races and in Jewish-populous states cannot afford to overlook the possibility of such a rare occurrence. In 1976 the Jewish voters did provide the margin by which Carter took New York; and New York did provide the electoral margin by which he took the presidency. But that has happened only once. And in the last 7 Congressional elections, only about 5 percent of the candidates were elected in Jewish-populous states with less than 55 percent of the vote — so the Jewish vote was not critical.

In short, while the marginal Jewish voting power has occasionally some significance, it does not in itself explain the influence of American Jews in politics — and, by the same token, the diffusion of Jewish population is not by itself a seriously negative factor in that influence.

In matter of fact, while population estimates between 1955 and 1982 show a significant drop in a couple of the key states (Table 1), the overall pattern does not threaten a radical collapse in state concentrations. More to the point is the estimate that the percentage of Jews in cities of a half million or more decreased from 84 percent to 72 percent during the 1980s. However, if the influence of the Jewish population depends more on political activism than on their numerical presence at the polls, then this kind of centrifugal dispersion can be a positive factor. In a sense, the spread of Jewish political activism away from the population centers follows the general spread of political power. For example, Baltimore's share of Maryland's presidential vote declined from 48 to 17 percent between 1940 and 1980. In that same period, New York City's share dropped from 51 to 31 percent. The Jewish movement from some of the major cities may actually be a productive dispersion.

Financial Contributions and Electoral Fund Reform

If the Jewish disproportion in general national elections is to be multiplied by a factor of about two, then the disproportion of Jewish financial contributions to national political campaigns must be multiplied by a factor of 15 to 20.

While there have been few reliable statistics on the subject — and some reluctance to gather any — the journalistic and anecdotal evidence is overwhelming that more than a majority of Democratic funds on a national level, and as much as a quarter of Republican funds have come from Jewish sources. In 1968, for example, 21 individuals advanced Hubert Humphrey \$100,000 or more for his campaign; 15 of them were Jews.

That kind of financial participation had been typical. The disproportionate level of Jewish voting reflected a strong sense of Jewish self-interest in public affairs and a relatively high middle-class educated level of activism. The disproportionate level of political contributions reflected those factors and more. Since the end of World War II, Jews comprised a relatively affluent group and markedly included a number of individuals and families who were affluent for the first time, a famously good class of “givers.”

There had long been a tradition of philanthropic giving, at least among Western Jews, dating back to the middle ages, to community needs shaped by adversity and legitimated by Jewish religious tradition. And Jewish political needs in this country have been perceived as a communal need, like philanthropy. But beyond that, political involvement has been a means by which many new-rich in America have been able to gain quick community recognition and general influence.

Political campaigning has, of course, become increasingly expensive, with the growth of the population and the advent of television. In 1976, for example, winning Congressmen spent about 63 million dollars, and in 1982 about 195 million dollars, an increase roughly twice the inflation factor. There is no automatic relationship between campaign spending and political victory; in the 1980 Congressional races, half of the top ten spenders won and half lost. Of the 9 Democrats who lost in that campaign, 7 had a spending advantage. However, spending on occasion does make the difference, and it is a firm article of belief among candidates that “money is the mother’s milk of politics.” Thus political contributors have had, if not control and if not patronage, at least heightened “access” to their candidates.

Financial contributions are a much more certain and bankable political item than Jewish voting margins in most cases; and Jewish political effectiveness has been less closely tied to voting margins than to the

access which has been gained by Jewish contributors to campaigns.

The question is whether electoral finance reform of recent years has undercut that source of effectiveness. The more-than-a-hundred-thousand-dollar contributions that were made through the early 1970s — the individual Jewish advances made to Humphrey went as high as \$390,000 — are no longer possible.

But so far, these restrictions on individual contributions do not seem to pose a crippling disability to Jewish political effectiveness. According to one expert on campaign financing, the role of the wealthy has not been diminished by the reforms. "The main effect," he said, "has been to exchange the big giver for the big solicitor" (Herbert Alexander, quoted in the Wall Street Journal, October 24, 1984, p. 1). Solicitation by the wealthy from the wealthy has been a particular Jewish tradition, and a skill sharpened in philanthropic campaigns. And such "bundling" of funds can still be raised in amounts significant enough to warrant "access." The legal limit of \$1000 per individual giver per election can be multiplied by the number of one's relatives, and by the channeling of donations to funds and committees other than the candidate's direct campaign.

The Political Action Committees are simply legal and convenient fund repositories for many political groups such as industrial associations — but for groups like the Jews, they are also very useful vessels for the kind of bundling and financial negotiation which are currently called for. There are over 30 PACs which are specifically geared to supporting Congressional candidates who are favorable to Israel. In the Congressional campaign of 1982, these PACs contributed a total of \$1.67 million, a little more than half going to Senatorial candidates. In the Congressional campaign of 1983-84, that amount probably doubled.

In short, while some Jewish "heavy hitters" have been hobbled insofar as their personal contributions are concerned, many Jews have maintained their "access" by dint of their fundraising activities — and the Jewish contributions have even more of a Jewish communal tinge than they had before. On that level, there is no indication that the electoral fiscal reforms have impeded Jewish effectiveness in politics.

However, there may be some clouds on the horizon, relating primarily to PACs. First of all, there is the question of whether PACs, becoming the prime contribution instrument of Jews, are so stringently one-issue in nature that they will distort or weaken the integrated position of American Jews in the political process. That question will be addressed later. More directly, there is the question of whether current methods will lead, in a kind of backlash effect, to electoral reform of a kind which could be more disabling to the Jewish pattern.

Some observers have described PACs as a scandal waiting to happen. Congressman Glickman, talking about the problem of PACs said "...study after study has shown a very high correlation between funds received and the way some key votes have been cast" (Congressional Record-House, July 8, 1981, H 4101). Most of these "high correlations" carrying the potential of scandal involve direct economic interest. Notoriously, in 1982, when the House Energy and Finance Committee voted to overturn a Federal Trade Commission regulation which the auto dealers opposed, 26 out of the 27 committee members had received contributions totalling \$84,000 from the National Auto Dealers Association, and all but one voted for the auto dealers' position. That kind of situation has been repeated again and again.

Of course, the "correlation" has been frequently rationalized by the statement that funds are given not to coerce a Congressman's opinion but to strengthen Congressmen who already have the "right" opinion. But that distinction is often enough suspect, certainly in the eyes of the citizenry. When Congressman Dan Glickman of Kansas asked another Congressman to join him in an action unfavorable to the auto dealers, he was told: "I'm committed. I got a \$10,000 check from the National Automobile Dealers Association. I can't change my vote now" (Brooks Jackson, Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1984).

Under current law, presidential candidates are eligible for substantial federal funding support and are limited in the amount they can spend. Congressional candidates do not get government funding support and are unlimited in expenditures.

Congressman Henry Reuss of Wisconsin said that "the corruption and the evil is not only in people seeming to sell access or in some cases even their vote; it lies in the preoccupation of legislators...who have to spend a large part of their lives panhandling, going around to all of these groups saying, 'I would just love to have a check from you.' That shouldn't be."

At the moment, there seems to be little political likelihood that Congress will move towards laws which make their campaigns predominantly dependent on government funding. If, however, "the corruption and evil" to which Congressman Reuss referred broke out by way of public scandal or public outrage at escalating campaign costs, then a movement towards public funding might become more feasible. In that case, it is more likely that the possibility of "access" by the Jewish community through the means of political contributions would be reduced.

Jewish Activism and Changes in the Political Process

Disproportionate voting is, of course, an index of political activism. Disproportionate financial contribution to campaigns is an instrument

as well as an index of political activism. But Jewish political activism extends beyond both phenomena and is bedded in an even larger field of social activism.

"Social activism" describes a high level of participation in the affairs of the general community. It can be measured in terms of disproportionate Jewish membership and leadership in most of the communal activities which are open to them: business and trade associations, professional associations, trade unions, student political organizations, artistic associations, general welfare associations — all of those groups which comprise the associational arena of American community life.

There are countless theories about this general Jewish activism. There is the obvious matter of educational level and middle class status and of the emerging-group syndrome, both of which may stimulate special desires for involvement and community recognition. However, there is also a theory that an additional factor exists among Jews: a prevalently high level of achievement drive, drawn presumably out of the Jewish life experience, but over and above the factors mentioned above. For example, one attempt to measure achievement drive and relate it to ethnicity found that for Protestants, for Italians, for Greeks, for Blacks, the lower socio-economic group in each group registered a significantly lower achievement drive than the middle class of that group. Only in the case of the Jews were those results reversed, the Jewish lower class registering a slightly higher score than the middle class. One social psychologist, after reviewing the evidence, wrote: "In short, there is very little doubt the average achievement (score) among Jews is higher than for the general population in the United States at this time" (McClelland).

Whatever the reasons, there is a demonstrably high level of Jewish participation in the various channels of American community life. This general social activism preceded political activism and is in aid of it. By dint of it, Jewish individuals have become "influentials" in the general community. As often as not, these influentials, as a consequence, have become political influentials. Further, this integrating process has created, by natural means, a great deal of *interfacing* between participant Jews and various other groups and circles of influence in the community.

That interfacing is the beginning of the *coalition* process.

This active integration of the Jews is at the heart of their political effectiveness. On one level, it is in itself a persuasive factor for many of the Jewish agenda items. On a top agenda item, American support of Israel, for example, this factor plays a substantial role. The basis of American support for Israel is the prevalent American perception that the support of Israel is important for American national interest.

The chief engine of that perception of Israeli importance to America is

the state of objective circumstances in the Middle East, within the framework of East-West problems — but that perception is buttressed by the image of Israel as Western, politically similar to and friendly to America. And that image is strengthened by the familiar and integrated social presence of the American Jews.

But beyond that, the integrated social presence of the Jews in America, providing its own kind of access to other groups, has created the basis for coalitions of effort. Thus, it has been naturally easy to gather allies in the non-Jewish community on Jewish issues such as anti-semitism, neo-nazism, Soviet Jewry or support for Israel.

However, there has been another significance to community coalition and coalition politics for the Jews. That significance is reflected in the distinction customarily made between “faction” and “coalition” in politics. In faction politics at its most extreme, an interest group pursues its own interest only, forms its own party, runs its own candidates, does not consider compromise or negotiation. In coalition politics, negotiation and compromise among interest groups is primary. The purpose is to find a common agenda.

Coalition politics has seemed a necessity for an orderly United States because of its heterogeneity. Early in its career, the American polity learned that stronger coalition politics seemed preferable not only in the matter of issues, but in the matter of selecting public officials. In the presidential campaign of 1824, none of the 5 candidates received anything near a majority from the electoral college. The nominating process itself developed by the 1840s was the national party convention. The parties became coalitions for purposes of both elections and issues. Various factions struggled within each party. And factional leaders within each party, even when they gained a certain dominance, usually understood that it was necessary to pursue the party coalition process *in order to win elections* across the country. Between 1940 and 1980 the only campaigns in which one candidate received less than 40 percent of the popular vote were in 1964 and 1972 when bitter factional debates took place in the Republican and Democratic Party respectively, and clearly factional candidates were nominated.

The Jews can reasonably feel threatened by a climate of factional politics in which deadly political extremism is bred. And in somewhat narrower terms, the Jews can multiply their own effectiveness only by coalitional methods — increasing their access, helping to make it clear that their interests are the interests of a broader community and multiplying their political power.

It is a matter of history that since the 1930s, when the Jews became a cogent political force, the Democratic Party has been the national party

in which the Jews have found and built their coalitional strength, because of compatibility of issue and temperament with some other Democratic Party factions, as well as because Jews were largely situated in centers of Democratic Party power. And some Jews have always been engaged in Republican Party politics, with some coalition effects, especially on local and regional levels, even though the main coalitional leverage of the Jews has been within the Democratic Party.

So this active participation within the general community and coalitional effort has been the dynamic core of Jewish political effectiveness. But the circumstances within which this political effectiveness has taken place may be changing drastically. One change may be taking place within the Jewish community itself: a tendency towards some withdrawal from the integrative and coalitional process. That phenomenon will be dealt with below.

But there are apparent changes within the political process itself which, including some "electoral reform," allegedly threaten that basic dynamic of effectiveness.

The Decline of the Parties

The changes which draw most attention revolve around the weakening of the political parties. However, the American political party has never been the kind of tight mechanism which political parties represent in much of Europe and in Israel. Among the founding fathers, there was a monumental distaste for political parties. Jefferson once said that if he could not go to heaven except with a political party, he would prefer not to go there at all. But there was always early attraction to coalitional politics, entailing the negotiation of differences among different constituencies.

That attraction plus sheer political necessity created the networks which constitute the major American political parties. James MacGregor Burns, who wrote of these networks as four parties — two Congressional parties, Republican and Democratic, and two presidential parties — described each Congressional party in these terms:

"It is not a tight, cohesive group of men, conspiring together in a secret chamber and pushing buttons on a nation-wide machine....It is a loose cluster of men sharing a common concept of the public interest...benefiting from and in turn protecting a set of rules and institutions that bolster their power....These men deal with one another by bargaining and accommodation rather than by direction and command."

The "presidential parties" are, of course, broader and more disciplined, but exist as a power only when a "party's" candidate is elected. The presidential networks are often different than the Congressional networks, but also often intersect.

Indeed, if there is too little intersection between the two networks, a president and his party's Congressional delegation, then it becomes more difficult for the president and the government to function. Sometimes, of course, there are inter-party coalitions, as in the frequent case of Republican conservatives and Democratic "Dixiecrats." But, by and large, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party each maintains its own identity, both because of certain prevalent ideological tendencies, and simply because individuals need the network in order to function effectively and protect their power.

These networks built their corporate strength on two foundations: patronage and control over the nomination of candidates. Both of those foundations have been crumbling as a result of electoral reform. Most recently, a party's ability to control nominations has been reduced by the growth of direct primary elections, and by reforms requiring "proportional representation" at nominating conventions. In short, an increase in direct democracy has eroded corporate party strength.

But, in reality, the weakening of the formal corporate entities known as "parties" will not mean the collapse of the political system in which the Jews flourish and exert influence, as long as the informal network arrangements known as parties continue in strength. The parties have been most important for Jewish political effectiveness because they have provided networks of "access" to policy-makers and their circles.

Jews, like others, have gained access to those networks not by connecting to a national party, or even a state party, but by connecting to the basically autonomous apparatus of a local candidate or office holder; and/or directly to the apparatus of a presidential candidate.

However, the apparatus or support system for any given political candidate does not just consist of influential and active individuals. It also includes symbolic representatives of the various constituencies which may be important to the candidate. Some constituent groups, such as trade associations, send money directly to the campaigns — and that presumably is important if they want their candidate elected — but "access" is limited if it consists only of checks in the mail and not of individuals who remain consistently close to the apparatus of the candidate and public official.

In the case of groups like Jews — a more inchoate class than dairy farmers or automobile dealers, with a more complex agenda — the role of involved individuals is even more crucial. Jewish community organizations do not generally support partisan candidates, partly for tax reasons but mainly for policy reasons. Most of these organizations will want some access, no matter which candidate wins. The connection is mainly through involved individuals who are also connected to those organizations.

Even the pro-Israel PACs have their main impact by introducing or backing up otherwise involved individuals.

These Jewish organizations do help to organize explicit issue-coalitions which then, through symbolic individuals, become an apparent part of a support system — and agenda — of a candidate or public official.

This whole plexus of relationships, from the bottom up rather than the top down, describes political parties in America better than the image of tight national or state structures — and describes the far-flung way in which the Jewish community makes its connections. The “deterioration” of the parties refers to some further weakening of national, state and regional party entities and functions, as against the autonomy of local offices.

If this deterioration proceeds to the point where the two party networks fail to function — or if factional politics begin to operate seriously outside these networks rather than within them — the Jewish political fortunes will surely suffer in America. And if Jewish access to these networks is seriously cut off by radical electoral reform which eliminates the importance of private campaign contributions, or insists on strict proportional representation at nominating points, then Jewish political fortunes will surely suffer.

But the fact is that the two major party networks continue to function as networks, despite all the shifting permutations, because they still serve a basic purpose in the mutual protection of power, and even in the mutual expression of certain prevailing political values.

All other things being equal, as long as those networks continue to function the hyper-activism of the Jews will leave Jewish political effectiveness relatively unimpaired by current political reform and changes.

The Democratic Party and the Jews

However, there is much discussion about one specific change in the nature of these party networks which might affect the nature of Jewish political effectiveness. The fact is that the main “Jewish connection” throughout the past half century has been with the Democratic Party network. And the issue-coalitions with which the Jews have been explicitly engaged (i.e., Blacks, labor unions, liberal Christian clergy) have largely been associated with the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party network has been relatively sympathetic with the Jewish political agenda over the years.

Furthermore, the Democratic Party Congressional network, with which the Jews have been primarily associated, has dominated the political scene, having been the major political party in the House over 90 percent of the time since World War II, and in the Senate over 75 percent of the time.

If the Democratic Party loses its dominance because of some "realignment" which may be taking place...or if the Democratic Party network becomes less sympathetic to the basic Jewish agenda, partly because of shifting issue-coalitions...and if the Jews fail to find the same strength of connections in the Republican Party network, there are obvious negative implications for Jewish political influence in the future.

The 1984 voting suggests that the Jews are not leaving the Democratic Party. Table 1 demonstrates that, according to the best estimates, including the redistribution of third-party votes according to probable major party options, the Jews returned to a "normal" "Democratic distance" of about 25 points between their presidential voting and that of the general population. The Jewish "Democratic distance" in Congressional voting has usually been even higher than in their presidential voting. And in recent years, about 6 out of 10 American Jews have continued to indicate that their party affiliation is "Democratic"; 1 out of 10, Republican; and about 3 out of 10, Independent. Depending on the survey, there may be seen some growth of Independent affiliation at the expense of the Democratic Party, but the Republican ratio has not changed significantly.

The question, at the moment, is not whether the Jews are leaving the Democratic Party, but whether the Democratic Party network is leaving the Jews and their agenda.

As Table 1 suggests, Jewish voting has been affected by the same political impulses as other Americans in voting for presidential candidates. But within those trends there has been a special dimension of loyalty to the Democratic Party. The political profile of the American Jew, statistically speaking, has something to do with that continuous loyalty.

Jews continue to score disproportionately high, among the white population, on matters of "economic liberalism;" that is, government intervention on behalf of the poor and disadvantaged. For example, the 1984 National Survey of American Jews found typically that Jews supported the goals and philosophy of such government programs as welfare and food stamps by a 75 to 17 ratio; government aid for abortions for poor women by an 81 to 13 ratio; and affirmative action without quotas by a 70 to 20 ratio. The Democratic Party is seen by the national population as the network which singly stands for such values.

There are indications that American Jewry has followed the rest of the population in becoming more "fiscally conservative." In one 1981 regional survey, where four out of five Jews called for more government spending for health care, half of them said that it is "proper to cut social spending" and two out of three supported a statutory limitation on government spending.

But, while fiscal attitudes may have shifted within the Jewish population, party loyalty has not, at least by the light of the 1984 election. There is another factor of "liberalism" which apparently has more saliency for the Jews.

That is the factor of "cultural liberalism," which might be more aptly called cultural tolerance, tolerance for differences. For the Jews these are, of course, issues of deep self-interest. Civil liberties comprise one category of such issues, but they are not really in contention in America today. Anti-semitism itself is another such category. And, while American Jews never relax their foreboding about the possibility of anti-semitism, it was not an issue that made an important difference in the selection of candidates in the election year.

An analysis was made of the reasons why 814 randomly selected Jewish voters in Northern California made their presidential choice (Table 2). Asked to pick the one or two issues out of eight which would make the most difference to them in their selection, only about 4 percent chose anti-semitism, among both Mondale and Reagan voters. The domestic issue which most concerned Mondale supporters, in twice the proportion of Reagan supporters, was "keeping church and state separate." This result was replicated in other surveys around the country. In the course of heated public discussion about religion and the state, the prominence of fundamentalists like the Rev. Jerry Falwell, and a publicized negative trend in court decisions, church-state separation became, among Jews, a code phrase for cultural tolerance.

This issue as it is embedded in the larger matter of cultural liberalism, is related also to the Democratic Party milieu in which Jews have grown up politically. Jews may have become more affluent but they still do not belong to the same social network as the middle and upper class white Protestants who form the backbone of the Republican Party. The church-state issue was not just another constitutional issue but the signal of a cultural climate important for the Jews, and it seemed clear that the Democratic Party still provided that climate better than the Republican Party.

However, while Mondale was an assurance on that score, there was still some foreboding expressed that the Democratic Party could "leave" the Jews in the future. On the matter of Israel the Jews seemed to make little distinction between the two parties (Table 2). But even a majority of the Mondale voters expressed the opinion that Jesse Jackson had too much influence on the Democratic Party.

While they were concerned about anti-semitism on his part, they were more concerned about his positions on Israel. There is a foreign policy faction represented by Jesse Jackson featuring non-interventionist or

third world foreign policy sentiments which could prove deleterious or even openly hostile to Israel's interests if it became dominant. The dominance could change the image of the Democratic Party as the home of cultural liberalism for the Jews, hard-core opposition to Israel being translated as a form of intolerance for American Jews.

Such a reversal of foreign policy by the Democratic Party is not likely. However, contention on this issue could disrupt Jewish relationships with other elements of the Democratic Party, especially at local levels.

The main "political association" which seemed to suffer as a result of the 1984 election was that of the Black community, which voted almost 9 to 1 in favor of Mondale. It is true that the Jewish population voted almost 2 to 1 in favor of Mondale, but there are a couple of significant differences. Although the Blacks represent about 8 percent of the voters, about twice that of the Jews, they are as disproportionately low in their political activism as the Jews are disproportionately high. They have not been in a position to be as activist in terms of campaign contributions — nor in terms of other electoral involvement. And, despite the Jewish vote at the polls, there was a renaissance of organized Jewish activism among the third of the Jews who did opt for Ronald Reagan. The Republican Party generally recognized the importance of that activism, as distinct from voting, and is not likely to turn its back on the Jewish community because of the voting numbers.

Also, the *primary* "Black agenda" consists of stands on economic issues which are largely incompatible with those of the Republican Party. The *primary* "Jewish agenda" is not so incompatible with the Republican Party agenda (e.g., support for Israel, support for Soviet Jews) — except apparently in certain church-state matters about which there is division within the Republican Party.

As a result, an increasingly dominant Republican Party on the American scene would seem to leave the Black community in a greater state of political disrepair than it would the Jews. Labor leadership would also be in trouble, of course, although union members in the country came close to splitting on presidential choice (54 percent for Mondale in the ABC exit poll). Some Hispanic leadership was found on the Republican side, and 44 percent of the Hispanic voters followed suit.

But there is no evidence to support the belief that the Republican Party is about to become nationally dominant, although there may be some "realignment" in certain Southern and Southwestern regions. The presidential voters, in the Los Angeles Times national exit poll, indicated that they had split their Congressional votes between Democrat and Republican candidates (46-47), and the results were in accord. Also, there has already emerged sharp contention within national Republican leadership

which suggests that their life after Reagan will not be as easy as the 1984 figures suggested.

However, for the Black community, there is also the question of how the contentions within the Democratic Party will be resolved. And there is the question of how the Black leadership itself will approach that political future. If, for example, the more dissident elements of the Jesse Jackson camp were to become dominant, complete with a "third world" foreign affairs approach, Democratic Party politics would become more contentious — and the Jewish community would be caught uncomfortably in that contention.

But Jesse Jackson was a spokesman for the Black community on the domestic agenda, not on the foreign policy agenda which he espoused. It would seem to be indicated for Jewish activists in the Democratic Party, in supporting the basic Black domestic agenda, to keep it separated from Jesse Jackson's foreign policy agenda. Under those conditions the Jewish/Black alliance in the Democratic Party circles could remain undisrupted.

The Jewish Community and a "Narrowing" Effect

The "Jewish community" refers generally to all those Jews who are connected to or influenced by the network of organized elements in Jewish life.

There has developed a kind of "politics-intoxication" among American Jews which tends to oversimplify the political process. In doing so, they tend to overlook the fact that the Jewish community is itself a *political* force, and that politics is more than electoral or lobbying activity.

"Politics" is *all* that activity which has to do with the making and administration of public policy. Jewish political activity is all that activity on public affairs in which Jews engage in some organized and purposeful concert. When they are so engaged, American Jews comprise a *political association*. De Toqueville described a *political association* in this manner: "the public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines, and the engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of those doctrines."

The Jewish community is a political association at those points where there is an organized consensus on certain issues of specified interest to the Jewish community and where there is an organized Jewish community network to promote that consensus.

Most cogently, the Jewish community has established itself as a political association in matters of self-defense — i.e., American support of Israel, support for beleaguered Jews abroad, international human rights generally, civil rights in its full scope, civil liberties, freedom of religion, church-state separation, protection for Jewish institutions.

The first function of that political association is to discover and shape consensual strategies on the doctrines to which there is natural assent in the bulk of the Jewish community. The second function is to promote the spread of those doctrines and strategies.

The political association represented by the Jews (and other ethnic/religious groups) differs significantly from that represented by the Automobile Dealers Association and other such business interest groups. Associations such as the automobile dealers tend to be equated with one or several specific organizations with relatively universal membership. The Jewish political association, a more complex social group with a more complex agenda, consists of a loose network of many organizations and connected individuals.

There is at least one other significant working difference. The objectives of the Jewish political association come closer to matters of redressing *citizenship* wrongs and addressing *citizenship* aspirations, as touched on directly by the Constitution, than do the profit-making objectives of a business interest group. It is largely for that reason that most of the activities of the Jewish political association are not as constrained by legal regulations as are those of a business interest group — although some of the specific lobbying and electoral activities which spin out of this Jewish political association are so regulated, especially when they relate to Israel.

But the point is that most of the combined elements of the organized Jewish community, as they address common public affairs of Jewish concern, constitute a political association and are engaged in political activity.

This Jewish political association is so defined because it is in a state of some deliberate organization directed towards common political objectives. The Jewish community is not a political association just because it has some statistically prevalent opinions on certain issues — such as those related to social welfare in general.

There are some political subjects outside the area of self-defense or of organized consensus on which there is a disproportionate weight of Jewish opinion. Jews are, for example, prevalently economic or social welfare liberals, as has been indicated above.

However, in this display of opinions on social welfare, Jews represent a disproportionate *supportive audience* rather than a political association. As a Jewish population, they are not primarily or consensually organized to promote doctrines and strategy on this subject, as they are on the subject of support for Israel or anti-semitism, for example.

It is true that some of the mechanism created by the Jewish political association in America *adds* to their working agenda objectives which

reflect the Jews as a supportive audience, such as social welfare liberalism. But it is also true that those objectives are most cogently and convincingly added, when they are conceived in aid of the primary agenda of the Jewish political association (e.g., poverty as a racial phenomenon related to bigotry, or lending itself to dangerous political extremism — or offering a value-compatible opportunity for coalition).

In other words, the Jewish political association in America is not a political party, meant to reflect all the prevailing political opinions of American Jews. As a *political association*, the Jews are primarily concerned with the flourishing survival of Jews and Jewish institutions, in ways that are acceptable to Jewish values. The organized network which comprises their political association is their instrument for that purpose. As a *supporting audience*, American Jews are deeply involved with many other political associations and movements, which have other primary objectives.

But this is precisely one of the strengths of the Jewish population in America — and, finally, one of the strengths of the Jewish political association itself. A political association can be better than the sum of its parts, depending on how well organized it is, but it is finally limited by the *aggregate influence* that can be wielded by its members. The aggregate influence of its members is the base on which rests the strength of the Jewish political association and Jewish political influence.

And that aggregate influence is based finally not so much on political activism relative to the “Jewish agenda,” but on Jewish activism in general American public life. In the 1981 National Survey of American Jews, only 8 percent said that they had been active in some political campaign, but 39 percent said that they had been active in a professional association, 36 percent in some community cultural group, 21 percent in some neighborhood organization. In addition, as many or more Jews had been involved in a business organization, a PTA, a feminist group, an environmental group, as had been involved in a political campaign. And most of those who had been active in political campaigns had been active first in one or more of the other community activities.

In other words, Jewish influentials develop out of integrated activism in general American life. To put it another way: the influence of individual Jews is not primarily created around issues of the Jewish agenda, which emerges from the Jewish *political association*; it is more often created around issues on which the Jews represent a *supportive audience*. The result, whether in creating Jewish influentials or productive relationships with other groups, is to give the Jewish political association its base of strength as it enters the political arena on its own agenda. In turn, the organized elements of the Jewish political association give these influential Jews an organizational base, a clear Jewish agenda and a consensual

message to bear.

In that formal political arena, electoral activity is a critical activity in solidifying access to public policy makers on the agenda of the Jewish political association. And "lobbying" is a critical activity as it assesses policy-making strategy, often under changing conditions, and helps to organize and inform policy-makers on the spot around that strategy.

In their various ways, the electoral activists and the lobbyists are connected to and essential to the Jewish political association, and relatively powerless without it; and the entire Jewish political association is only marginally more powerful than the aggregate influence of American Jewry and Jewish agencies, mainly gained through integrated activism on the general American public scene.

A Cautionary Note

As an antidote to intoxication, it is always worthwhile to note that the formal expressions of the Jewish political association, even if financial contributions are involved, will not be determinative if there are major countervailing factors.

There have been a few instructive signals on this matter, as it applies to American support of Israel. When the Carter Administration became party to a "Soviet-American communique" which promised to bring the Soviet Union into the forefront of Middle East negotiations, the American Jewish apparatus erupted into what was called a "firestorm" of protest. The proposal was dropped, and Abba Eban, for one, declared that the American Jewish protest had carried the day. Subsequently, at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the organized American Jewish apparatus again erupted in at least as rousing a "firestorm" of protest with respect to the AWACS sale to the Saudis. But the AWACS sale prevailed. All kinds of analysis can be applied, but the fact remains that it was a difference in circumstances, not a difference in Jewish effort, which distinguished the failure.

In 1983 the foreign aid bill, the largest portion of which was designated for Israel, was voted against by a significant number of Congressmen who were traditional supporters of Israel, and who had received substantial amounts of financial contribution from Jewish sources. It was not critical; the aid bill won, and the Congressmen in question who voted against it because of a Central American provision, typically said that they would have sought some other way of making sure that Israel received its funds. However, the American Jewish apparatus had fought for passage of the bill, which had a number of favorable provisions in it for Israel. And some of the larger contributors to the Congressmen in question were semi-privately outraged by the "delinquencies."

But the efforts of the Jewish political association, including its

electoral and lobbying activities, will not prevail against overwhelming American tendencies in an opposite direction. The basic American commitment to Israel, for example, had its wellspring in the middle 1960s — not on the basis of a post World War II sentiment for Jewish refugees; but on the basis of a growing perception of American self-interest in the integrity of Israel. That commitment, which has not changed radically since, was based primarily on objective conditions, before the Jewish political association seemed to acquire the influence it has today.

Of course, the Jewish political association has still had a critical marginal effect on certain important policy decisions — but the marginality itself suggests that the Jewish political endeavor must not become so narrow that it does not consider some of the larger issues which will bear on the Jewish agenda. In the matter of Israel, for example, America's general foreign policy, rather than sentiment on Israel itself, may eventually determine America's policy towards Israel. And a major divisiveness between haves and have-nots in America, rather than any specific constitutional sentiment, could eventually determine the state of America's civil liberties.

The Narrowing

Both with respect to the above cautionary note and with respect to the kind of integrated activism which has made the Jewish political association influential, observers have noted a trend of ominous “narrowing” within Jewish life.

There are two interconnected ways in which this narrowing has developed. There is a tendency towards one-issue politics. Note that the fastest-growing American Jewish organization by far has been the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC). And there are other tendencies towards self-ghettoization on the public affairs scene. Note how often non-Jewish public officials over the age of 50 frequently complain about the narrowing agenda they have perceived in the organized Jewish community.

There is evidence that the Jewish population at large has not become as self-ghettoized in public affairs as has the Jewish organizational apparatus. Its voting patterns on issues and candidates, as noted earlier, indicate a group pattern of broader concerns. Also, the general activism of Jews continues to manifest itself through the disproportionate number of individual Jews involved in a broader range of general community activities and associations. It is suggested that there is a certain growing *discontinuity* between the American Jewish population and the dominant sector at the organized Jewish apparatus.

More and more dominantly, the center of that apparatus has been the fundraising agencies of the Jewish community: the Council of Jewish

Federations and the local Federations. Their major efforts in fundraising were associated with Israel, culminating in a massive increase in 1967. These central fundraising mechanisms increasingly drew in the cream of affluent young Jewish leadership. The preoccupation of these mechanisms, and their leadership, with Israel was understandable. The leadership of AIPAC and the pro-Jewish PACs in America have been drawn from the same circles of leadership.

Of course, other developments were taking place on the American scene which promoted Jewish segregation. Much has been written about the way the interests of the Jews and some of its former group partners on the political scene seemed to separate. But the point is that the growing edge of the Jewish apparatus became increasingly and markedly one-issue in its approach to political life. A smaller and smaller proportion of young Jewish influentials in the apparatus became activist in general community life.

Even so, this trend towards self-ghettoization among these Jewish elites does not create a current disability for Jewish political effectiveness *as long as there are no serious political problems for Jewish issues*. The fact is that at the end of 1984, there are no such serious problems on the surface, despite all the foreboding which Jews are wise to have. American support of Israel is more secure than it has ever been, as this is written. American politicians are publicly committed to Israel, and the American public remains highly sympathetic towards Israel.

Anti-semitism is at its lowest level in the century. Even in those cities where anti-semitism has traditionally been spawned, the phenomenon is muted because of the sympathy towards Israel in those circles. And there has been no break in the strength of American civil liberties.

As has been indicated, there is much concern among Jews about the "Christian" talk that has surrounded church-state issues — and the legislation and the Supreme Court have been loosening the strictures against church-state separation that existed a decade ago. While this may be a matter for serious Jewish political attention, there is no indication that the American people or politicians will stand for much more than a cyclical over-adjustment to the strict constructionists of a decade ago.

As long as these circumstances prevail, the political power of the American Jews will not be seriously tested. Within a climate of strong American partisanship towards Israel, for example, a difference can be made in this case or that with one-issue activism.

But life for American Jews can get qualitatively stickier. American support for Israel is based on perceptions of American national interest which can change. Contemplate the possibilities of diminishing Israeli power in the Middle East, especially with accompanying economic problems;

diminishing American power in the Middle East; economic problems in America; a more non-interventionist American foreign policy. Under such conditions, it becomes clear that American Jewish political effectiveness will depend not on marginal political clout, nor on Israel-related activism, but on general Jewish influence in the political process. And such influence will not finally be just a matter of political mechanics; it will also be a matter of the perceptions and the values with which American Jews will impress on that process and on American policy makers.

None of this is meant to disparage one-issue organizations such as AIPAC and their efforts, which are important and effective in the present situation. But if a serious assessment is to be made of the possible needs of the future, then it must include the apparent decline within the heart of the organized Jewish community of non-ghettoized activism with which the Jews have most deeply affected the political process in America.

Summary and Remedies

Most of the developments on the American Jewish scene do not threaten Jewish political effectiveness in the foreseeable future — or at least they need not. But some of these developments may not be benign if certain characteristics of Jewish community and political life are not maintained and, in some cases, restored.

The chief remedial characteristic of Jewish public affairs activity is its *non-ghettoized activism* in American life.

Such an integrated activism can turn Jewish population dispersion into a positive factor by extending political effectiveness into new areas. As a deliberate policy, the organized Jewish community would do well to buttress this possibility by giving more support to new Jewish enclaves outside the traditional areas of Jewish concentration and fundraising.

Extreme measures of electoral reform, such as preponderant reliance on government funds for political campaigns, could certainly impede the political effectiveness of American Jews because of a direct effect on an important aspect of their activism. Such extreme measures will not be easily legislated by elected public officials. On the other hand, the Jewish community should be more actively and constructively interested in this area of public policy. Reforms that prevent abuse and scandal could also prevent the enactment of extreme measures down the road. However, the current reforms will not impede the political effectiveness of American Jews in the face of their continued activism.

(The effect of mandated proportional representation in political life has already received attention, but should be included in a larger context, i.e., as not just an abstract matter of “quotas,” but a matter affecting the quality of the political process. And the issue of the electoral college is

not a burning one, since the electoral college vote and the popular vote have come to coincide — but the electoral college has served to dramatize the activism of Jews in certain states, and as one American Jewish Congress official once commented: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."

The apparent weakening of those networks called political parties in America will also fail, in current circumstances, to undercut the political effectiveness of American Jews, as long as their activism is maintained and intensified. Indeed, the existence of relatively autonomous political campaign centers lends itself to more effective grass roots activism. However, there should be an active Jewish interest in strengthening the resultant networks.

Furthermore, the Jewish community should have an active interest in maintaining the strength and compatibility of that political network in which it has politically thrived: the Democratic Party, whose exact thrust and characteristics for the immediate future are problematic. But the effectiveness of Jewry on this score depends not only on general activism, but on specific emphasis on coalitional activity with other traditional constituencies of the Democratic Party network, at least in those areas where Jews are concentrated.

At the same time, it should be noted that, while the "Democratic difference" of the American Jews returned full force at the polls during this past election, there appeared to be a more organized activism by ideologically interested Jewish sectors within the Republican Party, at least at the Presidential level. The volatility of both party networks at this particular time suggests that this development could be a positive factor, as long as the common Jewish agenda, in its larger framework, is restored as a lively and fruitful dialogue within the Jewish community.

In sum, while the current developments on the American scene raise certain public policy concerns to which the organized Jewish community should give attention, the main threats to Jewish political effectiveness probably lie within the dynamics of that Jewish community itself. In ways that have been discussed, there is a tendency towards the self-ghettoization of Jewish public life. Connected to that trend is the tendency to develop "one-issue" organizations and mentalities. And connected to that trend also is the tendency to constrict — or at least not to provide the process for broadening — the kind of "Jewish discussion" of issues, relating to Israel or America, which is necessary to the complexities of this new era.

These internal factors appear to be the main threat to Jewish political effectiveness in the foreseeable future.

Table 1**Jewish Population & Voting Population**

	1955*		1982*		1982
	Jewish Population (1000's)	% of General Population	Jewish Population (1000's)	% of General Population	% of Voting Population (EST) - General Election
New York	2410	15.6	1872	10.6	18.0
New Jersey	280	5.3	435	5.9	10.0
District of Columbia	40	4.6	30	4.8	8.2
Florida	84	2.4	478	4.7	8.0
Maryland	91	3.5	196	4.6	7.8
Massachusetts	205	4.1	249	4.6	7.8
Pennsylvania	355	3.3	415	3.5	6.0
Connecticut	93	4.2	102	3.3	5.6
California	430	3.4	776	3.2	5.4

*Sources: American Jewish Yearbook

Table 2

The one issue or two “which makes the most important difference to me” in choosing between the two candidates*

	% Keeping Church- State Separate	% Supporting Israel	% Helping The Poor	% Helping The Economy	% Helping The Aged	% Achieving World Peace	% Strong U.S. Defense	% Fighting Anti- Semitism
REAGAN VOTERS (180)	18	26	1	54	2	32	30	4
MONDALE VOTERS (614)	37	20	12	21	7	57	2	4

*Survey sponsored by Northern California Jewish Bulletin.
Random samples from among 12,000 reader families.

Poll Finds Jews Are Tough Critics of Reagan

By E. J. DIONNE Jr.

American Jews remain one of the most Democratic groups in the American electorate and among the strongest critics of President Reagan, the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll has found.

The telephone poll of 1,449 adults, in which Jews were sampled at especially high rates, found that while other white Americans approved of Mr. Reagan's handling of his job by a margin of 53 percent to 37 percent, 61 percent of the Jews disapproved of the President's job performance and 29 percent approved.

The poll's margin of sampling error for all Americans was plus or minus three percentage points. For Jews it was plus or minus five points.

Reagan's Popularity Improves

Over all, the survey taken April 5-8 found that Mr. Reagan's approval rating had a clear positive balance. Forty-nine percent of the public approved his handling of his job and 40 percent disapproved. In a March 28-29 Times/CBS News Poll, 45 percent approved and 43 percent disapproved.

However, Vice President Bush suffered a decline in his rating. Thirty-one percent of all surveyed had an un-

favorable view of Mr. Bush and 28 percent had a favorable view. This was down significantly from February, when Mr. Bush was viewed favorably by 32 percent and unfavorably by 19 percent.

Since 1972, Jews, long a backbone of the Democratic Party, have showed a growing openness to Republican Presidential candidates. President Carter received just 45 percent of the Jewish vote in 1980, with Mr. Reagan getting 39 percent and an independent candidate, John B. Anderson, 15 percent. In 1984, however, Walter F. Mondale received 67 percent of the Jewish vote.

Now 54 percent of the Jews registered to vote said they expected to cast their ballots for the Democratic Presidential nominee in 1988; only 12 percent said they would pick the Republican; other whites split nearly evenly, with 31 percent saying they expected to vote for the Democrat and 30 percent inclining toward the Republican.

Jackson Viewed Unfavorably

But Jews, who were upset at expressions of anti-Semitism by the Rev. Jesse Jackson in his 1984 campaign for the Democratic nomination, continued to view him negatively; 54 percent had an unfavorable view of Mr. Jackson and 21 percent a favorable view.

Among other whites surveyed, 49 percent had a favorable view of Mr. Jackson and 41 percent an unfavorable

view. Blacks had an overwhelmingly favorable view of him.

Although many Jewish leaders have been critical of affirmative action programs, fearing they would lead to strict quotas, the survey found Jews sympathetic to giving preference in hiring or promotion to women, by 51 percent to 41 percent.

They were closely split, 48 percent to 45 percent, in favor of such programs for blacks. Jews were slightly more sympathetic than other whites to both forms of affirmative action, framed in terms of cases where there had been "job discrimination in the past."

Watch for the Style page.
It adds zest to your reading.
The New York Times

Ten Military Rockets Found In Crates Near Supermarket

HAVERHILL, Mass., April 11 (AP) — Ten armed, camouflage-painted military rockets were found in two wooden crates that sat unopened behind a supermarket for several weeks, the authorities said today.

The crates were found Friday by an employee of the De Moulas supermarket who was cleaning up behind the store, said Michael Lecourt, the store's manager. There was no immediate indication as to how the rockets got there or to whom they belonged.

The rockets were being stored at the state police barracks in Framingham, pending an investigation.

THE ESSENTIAL L

Poll Finds Jews Are Tough Critics of Reagan

By E. J. DIONNE Jr.

American Jews remain one of the most Democratic groups in the American electorate and among the strongest critics of President Reagan, the latest New York Times/CBS News Poll has found.

The telephone poll of 1,449 adults, in which Jews were sampled at especially high rates, found that while other white Americans approved of Mr. Reagan's handling of his job by a margin of 53 percent to 37 percent, 61 percent of the Jews disapproved of the President's job performance and 29 percent approved.

The poll's margin of sampling error for all Americans was plus or minus three percentage points. For Jews it was plus or minus five points.

Reagan's Popularity Improves

Over all, the survey taken April 5-8 found that Mr. Reagan's approval rating had a clear positive balance. Forty-nine percent of the public approved his handling of his job and 40 percent disapproved. In a March 28-29 Times/CBS News Poll, 45 percent approved and 43 percent disapproved.

However, Vice President Bush suffered a decline in his rating. Thirty-one percent of all surveyed had an un-

favorable view of Mr. Bush and 29 percent had a favorable view. This was down significantly from February, when Mr. Bush was viewed favorably by 32 percent and unfavorably by 19 percent.

Since 1972, Jews, long a backbone of the Democratic Party, have showed a growing openness to Republican Presidential candidates. President Carter received just 45 percent of the Jewish vote in 1980, with Mr. Reagan getting 39 percent and an independent candidate, John B. Anderson, 15 percent. In 1984, however, Walter F. Mondale received 67 percent of the Jewish vote.

Now 54 percent of the Jews registered to vote said they expected to cast their ballots for the Democratic Presidential nominee in 1988; only 12 percent said they would pick the Republican; other whites split nearly evenly, with 31 percent saying they expected to vote for the Democrat and 30 percent inclining toward the Republican.

Jackson Viewed Unfavorably

But Jews, who were upset at expressions of anti-Semitism by the Rev. Jesse Jackson in his 1984 campaign for the Democratic nomination, continued to view him negatively; 54 percent had an unfavorable view of Mr. Jackson and 21 percent a favorable view.

Among other whites surveyed, 19 percent had a favorable view of Mr. Jackson and 41 percent an unfavorable

view. Blacks had an overwhelmingly favorable view of him.

Although many Jewish leaders have been critical of affirmative action programs, fearing they would lead to strict quotas, the survey found Jews sympathetic to giving preference in hiring or promotion to women, by 51 percent to 41 percent.

They were closely split, 48 percent to 45 percent, in favor of such programs for blacks. Jews were slightly more sympathetic than other whites to both forms of affirmative action, framed in terms of cases where there had been "job discrimination in the past."

Watch for the Style page.
It adds zest to your reading.
The New York Times

Ten Military Rockets Found in Crates Near Supermarket

HAVERHILL, Mass., April 11 (AP)

Ten armed, camouflage-painted military rockets were found in two wooden crates that sat unopened behind a supermarket for several weeks, the authorities said today.

The crates were found Friday by an employee of the De Moulas supermarket who was cleaning up behind the store, said Michael Lecourt, the store's manager. There was no immediate indication as to how the rockets got there or to whom they belonged.

The rockets were being stored at the state police barracks in Framingham, pending an investigation.

THE ESSENTIAL

Insulting the Memory Of the Holocaust

BY MAX GREEN

Rabbis who belong to the sanctuary movement are touring the country. They hope to persuade the nation's synagogues to declare themselves "sanctuaries" for illegal aliens from Central America.

Their speeches are replete with references to the Holocaust. They compare Nazis and right-wing death squads, Jews and Salvadoran refugees. Indeed, both Jewish and Gentile speakers from the movement often tell church and synagogue audiences that their purpose is to save Central American refugees from the fate of the six million Jews.

Away from the houses of worship, these leaders reveal a more far-reaching goal: the defeat of what they refer to as "fascist" or "imperialist" U.S. intervention in Central America. By this, they mean American support for the region's democratically-elected governments, particularly that of El Salvador.

To those attracted by the movement's humanitarian goal, the Chicago Religious Task Force, coordinating body for the movement, has this to say: "Some churches have declared themselves sanctuaries and done almost nothing to oppose U.S. military aid to Central America. We wonder whether this is adequate. What is the value of a sanctuary church that continues support (by silence, by vote or whatever) for U.S. policies in Central America?"

The movement's radical objective explains the blindness of its leaders to both the decline in human rights abuses in the Central American democracies, and the increased brutality of Nicaragua's Sandinista government and the antigovernment rebel group in El Salvador.

The sanctuary movement

arose at a time when right-wing death squads roamed almost at will in El Salvador. In 1981, there were 9,000 violent civilian deaths, many attributable to far-right paramilitary units. But the political landscape of the country has changed since Jose Napoleon Duarte's election to the presidency. In 1984, the year of Duarte's election, the number declined to 774, and to half that in 1985.

Guatemala has also been democratized; like El Salvador, the country now has freedom of the press, freedom of religion and free internationally-supervised elections.

Acknowledging the progress made by the Salvadoran and Guatemalan governments in human rights would put the sanctuary movement out of business. Instead, it behaves as if 1986 were 1980 and Napoleon Duarte were Robert D'Aubisson, the right-wing politician closely linked to the death squads.

The movement also focuses on the fate of Central American immigrants deported from the United States. Such deportations, one leader alleges, are like putting "Jews on boxcars bound for Dachau." Numerous studies, however, indicate that the hyperbole is all but baseless. The Intergovernmental Commission on Migration has not reported a single case of a deportee coming to harm. Even in the much-worse days of 1983, the American Civil Liberties Union failed to conclusively identify a single deportee who had suffered a human rights violation.

The movement also charges the U.S. government with mercilessly violating the rights of Salvadoran illegals. The facts belie this allegation as well. There are a total of 500,000 Salvadoran illegals in the United States, of whom fewer than 3,000 will be returned to their homeland this year. Of the relatively few that immigration authorities catch up with, many request political asylum, which is granted if they

can demonstrate a "well-founded fear of persecution if forced to return home." But, as Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams has explained, "under our laws, generalized conditions of poverty and civil unrest do not entitle people to leave their homeland and settle here. If this were our test, one half of the 100 million people living between the Rio Grande and the Panama Canal would meet it." As is, the United States takes in more legal immigrants and refugees (of whom the fourth-largest group is Salvadoran) than the rest of the world combined.

As the threat of persecution in El Salvador recedes, fewer Salvadorans meet the political asylum test. Fully 70 percent of Salvadorans caught by the Immigration and Naturalization Service return voluntarily, rather than under "deportation orders." The majority of the remaining 30 percent do not list fear of political persecution as a reason for being allowed to stay. Moreover, those who are deported have had every opportunity to appeal to administrative panels and the federal courts, guaranteeing due process of law.

The facts relating to the situation in El Salvador and to illegal Salvadoran immigrants to the United States appear to have passed the sanctuary movement by. Nevertheless, movement leaders continue to raise the specter of the Holocaust as they speak of "horrors" being committed with U.S. acquiescence.

These references to the Holocaust do more than insult the memory of the Jews who perished under Hitler's tyranny. They reveal a lack of concern for the truth, both past and present, that deserves our strongest rebuke.

For Jewish leaders in the sanctuary movement, nothing is sacred, not even Jewish history. They "use" the Holocaust demagogically because the facts are against them. Surely, this is not in the Jewish tradition. □

Max Green is associate director of the White House Office of Public Liaison. This article is adapted from the National Jewish Coalition Bulletin.

AIDS

-AND-

The Silent Jewish Majority

BY ANDREA JOLLES

Navah Harlow is waging a war on behalf of Jewish victims of the AIDS epidemic. Her war is one of small skirmishes, not large-scale campaigns. The battle is directed not against the disease but against the reluctance of congregational rabbis to succor the suffering. What brought her to the front lines, she says, was witnessing the anguish of a Jewish family whose son was dying of AIDS a year and a half ago.

Patients need help but hesitate to ask. Rabbis do not seek them out.

"They were from out of town and had to confront the fact that their son was gay and was dying," recalls Harlow, who is director of patient representatives at Beth Israel Hospital in New York. "They were deeply involved with their synagogue at home and were in need of spiritual guid-

ance here in New York." But Harlow could not find a rabbi willing to help.

Angry and frustrated, she wrote to the Committee on Medical Ethics of the New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, a supporter of Beth Israel. She urged them to sponsor a forum for rabbis explaining why and how they should counsel Jewish AIDS patients.

"Judaism teaches compassion and caring," she points out. "We all know the Biblical prohibition against homosexuality, but we have to respond in a human way. And we have to overcome the judgmental attitudes, the wrath of God syndrome [that homosexuals have been struck with AIDS as punishment for their lifestyle]."

According to Harlow, gay Jewish AIDS patients often hesitate to ask for rabbinic guidance. "They want spiritual support as they are dying," she says, "without having to justify their lifestyle."

Their hesitation is understandable. Even the most sympathetic rabbis interviewed for this article made statements implying that people contract AIDS *because* they are gay. In fact, AIDS is caused by a virus, not by an individual's sexual proclivity.

The patients need help but remain silent. Rabbis do not seek them out. Harlow notes that the Protestant clergy is far more responsive to the AIDS crisis.

Why has the Jewish community, which prides itself on humane concern and understanding, come to such an impasse? In large part, the frightening nature of the disease is to blame. AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) attacks the immune system and renders victims defenseless to a host of ravaging illnesses. It is transmitted through sexual contact and intravenous



Patricia Salazar, a Guatemalan refugee, addresses a Freedom Seder in Tucson.



Rabbi Henry Cohen of Philadelphia with a refugee given sanctuary by his synagogue.



A Central American activist speaks about the effects of the wars in his homeland.

Should Sanctuary Be Sanctioned?

The law of the land vs. Leviticus 19:33

BY CONNIE BLITT
AND DENNIS BERNSTEIN

"I am a refugee from Guatemala," said 11-year-old Patricia Salazar during a Freedom Seder last Passover at Temple Emanu-El in Tucson, Arizona. On the holiday that marks the Exodus of the Jews from Egypt, she spoke to congregants who had come to learn the parallels between the history of Jews as refugees and the current plight of Central American exiles.

"I can imagine the persecution of Jewish children during World War II in the Nazi concentration camps," the soft-spoken Salazar said. "Children in my country disappear, then reappear dead, and

nobody knows who did it."

In November 1984, Temple Emanu-El joined the sanctuary movement, which was founded in the early 1980s by Jim Corbett, a retired cattle rancher. Corbett, a Quaker, wanted to help meet the basic needs of Central American refugees who were entering Tucson, which is some 65 miles from Mexico, without going through border checkpoints. The city's religious community began to offer food, clothing, shelter and medical care to the new arrivals, who were considered illegal aliens by the authorities.

The sanctuary movement has since blossomed into a national grassroots network of over 300 churches and synagogues. Two states, Wisconsin and New Mexico, 14 cities and scores of smaller municipalities have also declared

themselves sanctuaries.


The movement is a response from the U.S. religious community to refugees who fear that the government will send them back to the torturous conditions they escaped in Central America. A church or synagogue that pledges support for the movement may decide to help in a variety of ways. At the core of the movement are congregations whose members host refugees and help them resettle in the United States. Other sanctuary-related activities include lobbying for reforms in immigration laws, offering legal assistance to refugees who face deportation, providing food and clothing for new arrivals and educating the public about the effects of the wars in Central America.

Some in the Jewish com-
Continued on page 22


Connie Blitt and Dennis Bernstein, who produce a daily investigative radio program in New York City, covered the Tucson sanctuary trial for Newsday.



PRODUCTS TO HELP YOU LOOK BETTER, FEEL BETTER!



Lose weight naturally with **SLIM-FAST**. Delicious nutritious shakes and bars for breakfast and lunch. Lose weight fast without feeling hungry. The Slim-Fast pledge: Give us a week and you'll lose weight!



Aqua Ban helps eliminate the bloating and discomfort of premenstrual water retention. Aqua Ban helps you to eliminate puffiness and swelling. You'll feel good all month long.



Cortizone 5 relieves itching, irritation, rashes. It penetrates deep under the skin for soothing relief and help in healing. Maximum Strength treatment for irritating rashes.

© 1987 Thompson Medical Co., Inc.

SANCTUARY

Continued from page 12



HARVEY FINKLE

An interfaith demonstration against the deportation of Guatemalan and El Salvadoran "illegal aliens."

munity believe that Jews have a special responsibility to be active in the sanctuary movement. Nobel laureate Elie-Wiesel, a Holocaust survivor, told a 1985 sanctuary conference, "It is impossible for human beings today, especially my contemporaries, who have seen what people can do to themselves and to one another, not to be involved." But others question whether the sanctuary movement, which breaks U.S. immigration laws, should be supported by a people who have always put the utmost value on the sanctity of law.

THE BIRTH OF THE MOVEMENT

The flow of Central Americans over the southern border of the United States has been constant since 1979 — the year that civil war broke out in El Salvador. On one side are the rebels, who say they are fighting a government that keeps its citizens in abject poverty while a few rich families prosper. On the other side is the U.S.-backed Duarte government, which maintains that the rebels must be stopped in order to maintain an orderly society and prevent the spread of Communism. Since then, some 60,000 noncombatant Salvadorans have been killed in political violence; many more have gone

into exile in surrounding countries.

A similar situation exists in lush, mountainous Guatemala. A series of dictators have intensified attacks against the peasant population, maintaining that force is necessary to prevent social unrest. "Violence has taken possession of Guatemala," declared a 1984 national bishop's conference. The Guatemalan bishops deplored "the irrational use of torture and massacres of entire families." In the last decade, 100,000 have died in the violence in Guatemala.

In El Salvador and Guatemala, one fifth of the population — generally people caught in the crossfire — have been forced from their homes. Scores of refugee camps have sprung up in the region. They are often overcrowded, with poor sanitary conditions and few supplies.

Because of the unbearable conditions in these camps, many flee north. Half a million Salvadorans now live in the United States. They often arrive poor and scarred both physically and emotionally by the torture and violence in their country. Over 100,000 Guatemalans are in the United States.

U.S. immigration officials routinely deport Central American refugees in large numbers, saying

that they don't qualify for asylum because they have come for economic reasons. "El Salvador has a long history of cases of immigration to the United States for economic reasons," said Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, who considers the sanctuary movement "a willful and casual violation of American law."

But the difference between political and economic refuge in a war-racked country like El Salvador is, according to Elie Wiesel, hard to discern. "Those men and women who leave a country because they are hungry, because they cannot see their children die, or because they cannot see their parents die of hunger, deserve our respect; they deserve our friendship and they deserve our support, just as do those who flee the very same country or others for 'political' reasons."

Sanctuary workers assert that their actions in behalf of the Central Americans are legal. The government, they say, is violating the law by refusing to fulfill obligations under existing U.S. and international refugee laws that guarantee safe haven to those fleeing war and oppression in their homelands.

The U.S. government has spent an estimated \$2 million to investigate and prosecute sanctuary activists and has even sent infiltrators with hidden tape recorders into church services and Bible study meetings. In a federal trial concluded last May in Tucson, eight sanctuary activists, including a priest, two ministers and a nun, were given suspended sentences for "harboring" and "transporting illegal aliens."

THE JEWISH RESPONSE

In the Jewish community, as in the larger American community, there is continuing debate over sanctuary.

The Orthodox community and several major Jewish organizations have been reluctant to take a stand. The issues are the legality of the sanctuary movement and the controversy over the reasons that Central Americans seek to enter the United States.

The National Jewish Com-



Rated by Experts.

Recommended by Critics.

And Kosher.

Rated and recommended by leading wine critics and editors, Kedem wines are expertly selected from world-renowned vineyards in France, Italy, California, New York, Israel and Spain.

And Kedem wines are superior to the world's great wines for one special reason.

They're kosher.



KEDEM®
INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS

A Heritage of Perfection

To send a gift of Kedem anywhere in the U.S., call 1-800-238-4373. Void where prohibited.

PASSOVER CHOCOLATE YOU CAN'T PASS OVER

*Kosher for
Passover*

BARTONS®
"Traditionally Delicious"

משך לפסח

munity Relations Advisory Council, which sets a suggested agenda for many local Jewish agencies, does not condone sanctuary but supports suspension of deportation of Salvadorans pending further study of the fate of those already returned to El Salvador.

But over 40 synagogues and Jewish groups and several prominent Jewish organizations have endorsed sanctuary.


• In April 1984, the Rabbinical Assembly of America (Conservative) endorsed the sanctuary movement, declaring that "the murder of innocent men, women and children is a 'chilul Hashem' — a desecration of the Name of the Holy One, Blessed be He" and that "hundreds and thousands of such men, women and children are fleeing oppression and murder in El Salvador and Guatemala and are seeking temporary sanctuary in the United States."

• The Central Conference of American Rabbis (Reform) passed a sanctuary resolution in June 1985, stating, "We applaud our members and their congregations who provide sanctuary — support, protection and advocacy — to all refugees who request safe haven out of fear of persecution upon return to their homelands." In November 1985, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations (UAHC), representing the majority of Reform congregations, declared support for the sanctuary movement.

• The American Jewish Congress passed a resolution in November 1986 saying it was "dismayed" by the federal government's refusal to ease immigration restrictions for Central Americans arriving in this country. The Congress supports "the reasonable efforts" of Americans who extend temporary haven and other assistance to such refugees.

The first national meeting of representatives from Jewish sanctuary congregations and involved Jewish organizations took place in September in Washington, D.C., during a sanctuary movement conference. The 75-member caucus discussed how to further Jewish involvement.

The motivation of many Jewish sanctuary activists is highly personal. Rabbi Weizenbaum of Temple Emanu-El explained how



HARVEY FINKLE

After crossing the U.S.-Mexican border at the Rio Grande, a group of young refugees enter Brownsville, Texas.

his father came to the United States from Poland in 1913 as an undocumented alien. He left behind a sister and brother who in 1942 "knocked on doors" in their village looking for protection from the Nazis. They found none and perished. "Know the heart of the stranger, for you were strangers," said the rabbi, quoting the verse from Leviticus 19:33 that is a cornerstone of the sanctuary movement. "It is literally true in my family as in many Jewish families, and is the very heart and soul of Judaism."

Weizenbaum noted that Tucson's proximity to the Mexican border makes sanctuary more than an abstract concept. "I would say almost every day of the week in our part of the country a human life is saved," Weizenbaum told teenagers at a Union of American Hebrew Congregations summer camp outside San Francisco. "I have personally spent time finding a surgeon to remove bullets from the leg of a Salvadoran. Another time I had to find a dentist quickly. You may wonder what we need a dentist for, but when the Guatemala-

lan police take a rifle butt and stuff it down your throat, it does affect your teeth. I called a dentist in the congregation. I said cancel your early afternoon appointments, I have more important work for you to do."

"What gives Judaism meaning for me has to do with not only ritual and tradition, but also with how Judaism responds to the world," commented Carole Weiner of sanctuary congregation Shir Shalom in Los Angeles, a city where over 400,000 Central Americans, mostly Salvadoran, now live.

Weiner volunteers at a shelter for newly-arrived Central Americans. "We've had people who were tortured, who were political prisoners," she recalled, "people who saw relatives killed, who had to flee" because they were community organizers and social activists.

The refugees stay at the shelter one month while they learn some English, receive legal advice and acclimate themselves to the United States. Sanctuary congregations donate clothes, furniture and some rent money so the refugees can establish apartments

of their own.

"The refugees have given me the opportunity to look more closely at my Judaism," said Weiner. "When I talk of sanctuary, I talk of the Jewish concept of *pikuach nefesh* — saving an endangered life. The refugees give me the opportunity to perform that *mitzva*."

THE LAW OF THE LAND

When a congregation considers supporting the sanctuary movement, the question of legality invariably arises. Some sanctuary work is legal: for example, posting a bond to release a refugee from detention prior to deportation or asylum hearings. But other activities — such as harboring "illegal aliens" — walk the delicate line of the law. Often, congregations vote to accept responsibility for a refugee only after lengthy debate.


"One thing that bothers me," declared attorney Sam Klafter of Rochester, New York, who unsuccessfully opposed his synagogue's bid to become a sanctuary, "is that before Jews throw off that which is legal, the law of the land, they better make darn sure they know what they're doing. We are a minority and the law protects us and gives us our rights."

San Francisco attorney Ephraim Margolin is also a strong believer in the law. Born in Germany, Margolin immigrated with his family to Palestine in 1936. In 1942 and '43, when the British colonial rulers of the territory started turning back shiploads of Jews who had begun to flee from the Nazis, Margolin joined the Jewish underground resistance in Palestine.

"When you live through the experience I lived through," said Margolin, one-time personal secretary to Menachem Begin, "you don't treat the plight of others as unimportant and you don't accept claims that we are only enforcing the law. At some point you have to do the right thing. If it's breaking the law, then you pay the price."

"Politically I am a Reaganite when it comes to foreign affairs," said Margolin, who is vice president of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. "I am not prepared to say that whatever

**HEY, GRANDPA —
I WANT TO
BE LIKE
YOU!**



**For only \$250
your son or
grandson can
be a Life
Member of
B'nai B'rith
and never
pay dues!**

On his eighteenth birthday your little guy will become a paid-up life member. Right now, he'll get a certificate, contract and his own Kiddush Cup. It costs a little more if he's more than a year old. So, call Lew Hamburger or anyone in Membership collect at (202) 857-6625 for the details. You'll be proud of your new member and he'll be proud for life.

**Sons of the Covenant Program
1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036**

**This Passover,
As Always,
Enjoy...**

SWEE-TOUCH-NEE
*The
Aristocrat
of Teas*



**For Nearly 100 Passover Seasons, Jewish
Families Have Served Swee-Touch-Nee Tea.**

Your Giving Club contribution today is an investment in our most vital, and cherished resource — our Jewish young people. It's the best investment you'll ever make!

America does in Central America is wrong; I do not say that INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] officials are Nazis. All I say is that when individuals are persecuted, you don't send them back to their deaths. You help them."

Margolin filed a brief in support of the sanctuary movement in the case of American Baptist Church vs. Attorney General Edwin Meese, a civil suit now pending in federal district court in San Francisco. The 80 churches and denominations that brought the suit are seeking to halt the deportation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans and stop prosecution of sanctuary workers. In his brief, Margolin argues that under international law, which the United States abides by, refugees fleeing war cannot be deported to their home country and must be given aid.

The federal government maintains that sanctuary activists, by assisting "illegal aliens," violate immigration law and undermine the well-established process that allows immigrants to enter the country legally. "[The sanctuary movement] prevents people from applying for asylum," INS district counsel Steve Abrams told a legislature in Rockland County, New York, that was considering a sanctuary proposal. He assured the legislators that under the current system "illegal aliens" who can prove they have a "well-founded fear of persecution" will be awarded political asylum, which is decided on a case-by-case basis.

Sanctuary workers say that many refugees hesitate to apply for asylum because they feel the INS deck is stacked against them.

Government statistics reinforce this perception. From October 1, 1985 to September 30, 1986, 77 percent of Soviets who applied received political asylum, as well as 75 percent of Romanians, 71 percent of Czechoslovakians and 61 percent of the applicants from Libya. This contrasts starkly with the five percent of Salvadorans and one percent of Guatemalans in the same period.

One sanctuary activist asked Abrams, "How would you feel about going into an operation in which the doctor only gave you a three percent chance to survive?"

The activists say that the refugees are living proof of massive human rights violations in countries supported by the United States. According to the activists the government does not want to legitimize these claims of persecution by awarding political asylum. But while members of the sanctuary movement have developed a political agenda in response to the stories of persecution they have heard from refugees, their primary motivation remains humanitarian. Care is given regardless of a refugee's political status, and refugees are not asked to take a political stand in exchange for the assistance they receive.

Two new congressional bills will focus national attention on the legal and political issues surrounding the sanctuary movement. In February, Representative Henry Gonzalez (D-Texas) introduced a bill to provide exception to the law that mandates a criminal penalty for those who harbor illegal aliens. According to the Gonzalez bill, the law would not apply to individuals who act on the basis of religious belief, who do not gain commercial or personal advantage from sanctuary work and who believe that each "illegal alien" helped is a political refugee who will be persecuted if returned to his homeland. There is another bill pending that would legitimize the status of the refugees being helped by the sanctuary movement.

DOUBTING THE REALITY

Some question whether there are wars raging in Central America that are causing an exodus. "If there was such a slaughter, such a tragedy," said one active synagogue member in Kansas City, Missouri, "we would know, our government would tell us."

"I would invite people who hide behind this facade that our government would tell us," said Rabbi Marshall Meyer of Conservative synagogue B'nai Jeshurun in New York City, "to think carefully about how much they knew as to precisely what was going on in Auschwitz or Dachau in 1941 and 1942."

Meyer, an impassioned and eloquent supporter of the sanctuary movement, returned to the United States in 1984 after 25 years in Argentina. He was one of

the first clergy of any denomination to speak out against the Argentine military junta that seized power in the early '70s and brutally murdered thousands of innocent people, among them over 1,200 Jews. Meyer, who is American, notes that many in the Jewish community here are still largely unaware of what transpired in Argentina.

AN INTERFAITH MOVEMENT

Some Jews are reluctant to participate in the sanctuary movement because many churches are involved and most refugees are Catholic.

Holocaust survivor Hedy Epstein encountered this kind of resistance from congregants in St. Louis, Missouri. "I know the terrible pain a refugee goes through, the isolation, the terrible loneliness; it's something that's with me every day," she said. "When I see another group, another individual go through that, I cannot just stand by and say I'm too busy, I don't have time, you're not Jewish."

During the Holocaust we accused some people of not helping because Jews were the victims," Rabbi Meyer added. "How can we, 40 years later, say that this is a Catholic problem because most of the Central Americans are Catholic?"

Rabbi Weizenbaum has found that working side by side with Christians to save lives has produced an extraordinary interfaith movement. "There is really a sanctuary community, people of all faiths and no faith, who are united in true communality over this work," he declared. "We feel this is our second congregation."

"Within the sanctuary movement all faiths participate because all faiths share the understanding that human life has to be protected," commented the Reverend John Fife, a founder of the sanctuary movement. "But beyond that, the Jewish community contributes the memory of the Holocaust, and the failure of the Christian church to understand our oneness with them at that moment. In many ways, that memory has compelled the sanctuary movement to say that Jews and Christians have to become one people in defense of refugees." □

Jewish politics

American Jews and America: The Mission of Israel Revisited

david Novak
Rabbi
Congregation Darchay Noam
Far Rockaway, New York
Adjunct Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Baruch College
City University of New York

I.

An American Jew can see his or her relationship to America in one of four ways, and which of these four ways is assigned prime importance ultimately reveals how that Jew is related to Judaism itself.

(1) Some American Jews see their relationship to America in essentially juridical terms, i.e., they see themselves as the anonymous legal personalities who are the subjects of the law of this democracy. Many of these same Jews have been in the leadership of other Americans who resist any emphasis of the interests of subgroups ("hyphenated Americans") in American public life. For them, America is still the "meltingpot", which is supposed to create but one enduring public realm, devoid of "special interest."¹ For all such Americans, this public realm is the primary source of human values.

For these Jews, Judaism has been at most reduced to a denomination of like-minded individuals, and at least it has been eliminated from their lives altogether. Even when just restricted but not eliminated, Judaism has been relegated to a very private and esoteric place. Needless to say, this creates a rather tenuous relationship with Judaism itself, which in the words of the Talmud, does not approve of "being placed in a corner, only to be studied by whomever wants to do so."² Furthermore, as the studies of Richard John Neuhaus and others have made abundantly clear, this is not the vision of America shared by a large majority of Americans, now or ever.³ In some significant ways these Jews have become what might be called "constitutional fundamentalists". Like more recognizable fundamentalists

(whom many of these Jews would be horrified to find themselves in the same logical company), they read "sacred texts" (for them, the Constitution of the United States) outside the context of history: either the history of the American people or the history of their own Jewish people. All of this makes their position --- outside of American court rooms of course --- rather difficult to advocate. In a significant way, these Jews are among the last doctrinaire secularists in America.⁴

(2) Some American Jews see their relationship to America in essentially political terms, i.e., they see themselves as members of a special interest group in the overall fabric of American power politics. As a special interest group, Jews have a distinct political agenda of concerns: the military and economic security of the State of Israel, the ~~emigration~~^{restrictive} of Soviet Jews, the elimination of "quotas, which would restrict Jews having full access to educational and other opportunities by limiting these opportunities to the actual percentage of the population Jews constitute." Like any successful special interest group in America --- and it has been said by friend and foe alike that the Jews might very well be the most successful special interest group in America today --- Jews have had to argue that their special interests in fact coincide with the general American interest, or even better, they have argued that ~~they~~ actually promote the general interest. Thus, e.g., the valid portrayal of Israel as "the only democracy in the Middle East" not only establishes an affinity between Americans and Israelis, but it is actually presented as part of the even more forceful argument that Israel is America's only stable and reliable ally

in the region.⁵

Usually, these Jews are less reluctant to remove their Judaism from their public life. They are more visibly Jewish than most of the previous group. Nevertheless, to a large extent, their Jewish self-definition is determined by reaction to external threats: Arab threats to the security of the State of Israel, Soviet threats to Jewish survival in Russia, and the threats of other "minorities" to Jewish opportunity in America. To a certain extent, they confirm the famous thesis of Jean-Paul Sartre (d. 1980) that it is anti-semitism which in fact determines who and what is a Jew.⁶ *More-*over, by being so externally oriented, many of these same Jews have not had sufficient concern for the internal aspects of Jewish survival, what might be called the "cultural" aspects of Jewish life: such matters as Jewish education (especially as intensely pursued in yeshivas and day schools), the threat of intermarriage and cultural assimilation, and the deteriorating Jewish quality of Jewish family life. Not only has this "political" Judaism elevated a part of Judaism (and ~~certainly~~ not the most important part) to a level of almost total concern and, thus, caused more thoughtful and learned Jews to question its ultimate Jewish authenticity, it also creates problems in dealing with a large segment of Americans --- mostly Christian Americans --- who do not see political affiliation and activism as the most fundamentally characterizing factor of a community. These Jews are often embarrassingly unprepared for what pro-Jewish gentiles now expect from them.

(3) Some American Jews see their relationship to America in essentially cultural terms, i.e., they see America as a "pluralistic" society in which Jewish cultural identity is to be maintained without a loss of political power or legal rights. For these Jews, and they are certainly not alone in this age of emphasis on ethnicity (most forcefully spearheaded by the whole "black is beautiful" phenomenon), America is a loose network of ethnic and religious communities having a sort of tacit contract with the polity as a whole, viz., the polity's political and legal primacy will be affirmed in return for not only the passive tolerance but the active encouragement of ethnic particularity.⁷ Thus, not so long ago to be "American" in the cultural sense, was at least to behave like a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (even if not actually joining the Episcopal Church); now these same former role models have become just one more ethnic group along with the rest of us immigrants and their children (and not even primus inter pares)--- the WASPs.

This cultural Judaism has certainly led to an even more visible and more internally lived "Jewishness" than that of the previous group of "political" Jews. To cite a personal example, I still marvel at the ease my children feel in being . . . practicing Jews in America today, compared with the self-consciousness practicing Jews of my generation felt when we were their age (there are also more of "us" now than before).⁸

Nevertheless, one could see this as wanting in terms of the theory of Jewishness more Jews ascribe to than any other (even though fewer actually understand it), viz., Zionism. For, if the

the Jews are essentially a cultural group, as Zionism asserts, then their chances for cultural survival and growth are far greater in a society where they constitute the clear majority, in a land filled with their historical associations, than in a land where they are a small minority of relative newcomers. These Jews, by their emphasis on culture, are thus the most vulnerable to the Zionist doctrine of shelilat ha-golah ("the negation of the Diaspora"), which asserts that Jewish culture outside of Israel is inevitably doomed, especially when the Jewish State exists and is developing Jewish culture.⁹

Furthermore, although many of these "cultural" Jews would see their culture as inextricable from their religion, their self-definition is rarely based on the classical Jewish doctrines of divine election and covenant. And, this not only makes their connection with Classical Judaism tenuous, it still does not enable them to respond to the sincere beseeching of those Americans who feel the greatest affinity with the Jewish people (including the State of Israel), i.e., Christians who have cleansed themselves of anti-semitism which they now regard as anti-Christian. These friends look to Jews to speak as the covenanted people of God; they ask for Jews to speak the language of Torah. When Christians asked (often demanded) that we Jews speak in a language they assigned us (a language rejecting our own vocabulary from intelligibility), then we were correct to suspect those Jews who were willing to respond in their terms. However, this objection hardly applies when we are now being asked by many Christians in America to, as Scripture puts

it, "instruct us from His ways" (Micah 4:2).

(4) Finally, there is a fourth group of Jews, which has always been quite small, but who have included some of the most important religious thinkers in the Jewish community, who see their relationship to America in essentially religious terms. Now there is a good deal of overlapping between these "religious" Jews and the "cultural"^{Jews} discussed above, especially when "cultural" is not a synonym for "anti-religious" as it has been for those who saw culture as almost an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, such as "Yiddish Culture" or "Hebrew Culture". Certainly, those whose Judaism is essentially religious are committed to Jewish culture, i.e., the Hebrew language, a recognizable and authentic Jewish life-style, the State of Israel, for all of these cultural factors have religious origins and structures. (In fact, this could be said about all historical culture. Thus, the error of the anti-religious Jewish "culturalists" was as much based on their ignorance or distortion of culture --- which comes from the Latin cultus¹⁰ --- as it was based on their reduction of Judaism to "Jewishness.")

II.

What distinguishes these "religious" Jews from merely "cultural" Jews is their relationship with the non-Jews, which in America primarily means their relationship with Christians. (Although these religious Jews would agree with even the "juridical" Jews and the "political" Jews that we cannot accept the notion of "Christian

America", they do recognize to a greater extent than these other types of Jews that Americans are indeed more predominantly Christian than anything else.) For, it is indisputable that Classical Judaism in both its scriptural and rabbinic developments has been concerned with what God demands of the gentiles as well as what God demands of the Jews, albeit not equally.¹¹ As such, our relationship with American Christians concerns what God demands here and now of our respective communities, and how and why these demands do indeed coincide on crucial public issues more often than not.

Heretofore, this essentially religious approach to Jewish life in America has taken one of two forms: the first that of Liberal Judaism; the second (and, interestingly enough, the newer phenomenon) that of Traditional Judaism. (I avoid using the denominational labels: Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, because they do not apply precisely enough to the intellectual typology I am employing in this paper.)

Liberal Judaism, first in the thought of its German progenitors, and later in the thought of their American disciples and successors, in response to the new relationship with the gentiles that came with the Emancipation, developed the idea of the "Mission of Israel". This idea was that Judaism not only is not a particularistic ethnic "fossil" (to use Toynbee's infamous characterization) to be overcome in the progress of history, but that Judaism is the true vanguard of that universal culture which the modern world proclaimed (Weltgeschichte in Hegel's terminology¹²) because of its unique theology of "Ethical Monotheism". The theory of Ethical

Monotheism was based on the assumption that the essence of Judaism is its ethical content (which, following Kant, unquestionably the modern philosopher who made the greatest impression on liberal and even traditional Jews, is essentially characterized by its universalizability¹³). Since this ideal "ethical culture" has not yet been historically realized, and since Judaism and the Jewish people understand and maintain its pristine purity better than all others, Jews are therefore required to preserve their unique cultural and religious identity in the interest of this not yet achieved "Messianic" climax of universal history. Those aspects of Jewish tradition which seemed to be not only particularistic but anti-universal were to be "reformed" as unworthy of the ethical essence of Judaism. In Germany this "reformation" was theorized rather conservatively by such theologians as Hermann Cohen (d. 1918) and Leo Baeck (d. 1956)¹⁴. In America it was more radically theorized and implemented by such theologians as Kaufmann Kohler (d. 1926) and Emil G. Hirsch (d. 1923)¹⁵ --- both sons-in-law^{and disciples} of the radical Reform theologian, David Einhorn (d. 1879), whose impact on American Jewish life and thought was less than theirs primarily because he came ^{to America} earlier than they, and his speech and writing remained exclusively German.

The idea of the "Mission of Israel", as the corollary of Ethical Monotheism or "Prophetic Judaism", gained additional impetus in America by coming at the same time and being possibly influenced by the "Social Gospel" school of thought, advocated by Walter Rauschenbusch (d. 1918) and other Protestant thinkers. All of this

was an attempt to see religion as providing the true ethical impetus for a culture and society which were becoming more and more secular in both theory and practice. For Jews, especially, this was a rather audacious attempt to relate Classical Judaism to contemporary American life, without dropping Judaism altogether as did the former rabbi, Felix Adler (d. 1933), the founder of the Ethical Culture Movement.¹⁶ One must admire the project as the first real attempt to define a Jewish religious participation in American life, existentially concerned with both Judaism and America as a society where Jews need no longer drop Judaism in order to be true participants.

Nevertheless, we rarely hear the slogan "Mission of Israel" any longer, let alone the idea articulated, even by liberal Jews. And, I think this is because it did not find a conceptualization and an expression which truly spoke to the needs of either the Jews or America.

First, those liberal Jews who advocated this idea were almost all anti-Zionists (perhaps, the great exception being Stephen S. Wise [d. 1949]). Zionism, as a nationalistic project for a sovereign Jewish state in the Land of Israel, was anathema to these Jews who saw Judaism's "mission" as being its ethical teaching and leadership of an essentially non-sectarian America. However, most Jews (even most Reform Jews after the 1937 repudiation of the overtly anti-nationalistic position of 1885) have been too committed to what Mordecai M. Kaplan (d. 1983) called "Jewish Peoplehood" to define Judaism in what seemed to be Protestant denominational terms.¹⁷ The Holocaust and the establishment of the State of Israel in the

1940's made this historical persistence an absolute political necessity. Thus, the Mission of Israel seemed to be inauthentically Jewish on both cultural-religious and political grounds.

Second, the social and political program of the advocates of the Mission of Israel was always rather vague on specific issues. When push came to shove, they almost always came out in favor of the liberal political programs of those whose basic outlook was secular. Always in the background one could hear the ghost of Felix Adler, well trained philosopher that he was, cutting away at this theology with Ockham's Razor, viz., asking what was uniquely Jewish or should be uniquely Jewish about this approach (to merely assign it scriptural origins -- rather doubtful anyway in its liberalized version -- is to commit the congenital fallacy¹⁸). If it was not, then still calling it the Mission of Israel could only smack of chauvinism. One suspects, therefore, that the enthusiasm for the Mission of Israel, expressed from so many pulpits earlier in this century, was more for the sake of showing Judaism to be au courant intellectually and socially than actually attempting to redirect America in a more Jewishly approved way. Perhaps, the greater ease that third, fourth, and even fifth generation American Jews now feel in American culture and society makes these apologetic exercises anachronistic.

However, something akin to the Mission of Israel, although to my knowledge the slogan has never been used by these Jewish thinkers, has emerged in the most unexpected quarters, viz., among some of the most traditional Jewish thinkers in America, who are usually characterized by even their fellow Jews as xenophobic in

their approach to the general society and culture. Thus, to cite a most important example, in 1963 during one of the periods of intense public debate over the perennial issue of prayer in the public schools, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein of New York, without a doubt the most influential halakhic authority among the growing number of American Jews who accept the full authority of the Halakhah --- an East European born and trained rabbi, who to this very day only speaks and writes in Hebrew or Yiddish --- was asked about the Jewish approach on this issue. The further irony was that this non-English speaking (except in private) authority was being asked by a colleague in a community of American Jews where all children are educated in intensely religious parochial schools. (In fact, in this Orthodox milieu, sending one's children to a public primary or secondary --- for some even to a college --- would result in instant and severe ostracism.) Why, then, was this question asked and why did Rabbi Feinstein write a pointed response to it, a response widely read by traditional Jews learned enough to understand its content and implications?

The answer to this question reveals much about Classical Judaism and the new position of traditional Jews in American culture and society.

Rabbi Feinstein's response draws upon the classical Jewish doctrine of the "Noahide commandments".¹⁹ This doctrine states that whereas the Jews are obligated to observe the 613 commandments in the Pentateuch (along with rabbinic interpretations and additions),

the gentiles are obligated to observe the seven commandments the Talmud determined were commanded by God to Adam and Noah and his descendants, i.e., to humanity.²⁰ Two of the foremost commandments are the twin prohibitions of blasphemy and idolatry. Now, based on the logical axiom that the negative presupposes the positive,²¹ Rabbi Feinstein quite cogently argued that these prohibitions presuppose an actual relationship with God on the part of the gentiles, the type of relationship which would certainly include regular prayer. Since Judaism, by its affirmation of the doctrine of the Noahide commandments obviously approves of this relationship and should therefore advocate it, Rabbi Feinstein concluded that Normative Judaism can express approval of prayer in the public schools.

Rabbi Feinstein's response indicates that traditional Jews are, contrary to popular prejudice, concerned with the moral and spiritual life of the general society at large (albeit he is not entirely comfortable with taking a public stand on this issue). It is only that this has not been a concern to which the tradition assigns top priority in comparison with more internal Jewish concerns. The *raison d'être* of Judaism is not to teach the gentiles but to obey God's Torah, whether the gentiles are interested in it or not. (The theological weakness of the liberal Mission of Israel idea was that it seemed to be a good deal more interested in the approval of the gentiles than in the approval of God.) If, however, the gentiles do see light in Israel (Isaiah 42:6), then, as an ancient rabbinic text puts it, they should "send their representatives and take the Torah for themselves."²² Nevertheless, Rabbi Feinstein's seriousness in dealing with this topic at all indicates two important sociological facts: (1) traditional Jews are now enough a part of American culture and society ~~to have to~~ ^{that they must} have an opinion on such questions of public

debate; (2) traditional Jews are concerned that America develop along ethical and religious lines which are not antithetical to Judaism's theocratic worldview,²³ viz., that the revealed Law of God is to be the basic norm for every society and for every human person. This is both for the sake of the survival of Judaism as well as for the sake of the survival of civilization itself.

For both existential and intellectual reasons I am in basic sympathy with this approach, which is certainly in the spirit of Classical Judaism, i.e., the Judaism formulated in Scripture and Rabbinic Literature. What it needs, however, is more thought so that it may speak more directly to the great crisis of values we are now living through in American democracy.

The problem with this approach, at least as heretofore articulated by its traditionalist spokesmen, is that it is "theocratic", i.e., it deduces legal prescriptions from religious texts, something which seems to run counter to the tendency of our democracy from the Founding Fathers until the present. Indeed, Maimonides (d. 1204), one of the greatest formulators of Classical Judaism, spoke about forcing the gentiles to follow the Noahide commandments --- if Jews, of course, have the power to do so.²⁴ This difficulty with applying theocratic norms in a democracy, which if not secularist is certainly non-sectarian, has also been faced by Roman Catholic traditionalists. And, indeed, we traditional Jews can learn much from someone like the Jesuit theologian, John Courtney Murray (d. 1967), who made such strides in clearing Roman Catholic ethical teaching

from being rejected by Americans as ipso facto theocratic and, hence, "un-American".²⁵

III.

At this point, I would like to assert that the dichotomy between religious doctrine and democracy, which is often seen as being insuperable in our society, might very well not be true when we look at how theology functions in the history of Judaism and how religious doctrine functions in the history of America.

Let me begin with two personal recollections, the type of oral reports of the words of teachers in which the discourse of the Talmud abounds.

In the Autumn of 1957 I entered the College of the University of Chicago. One of the courses I was required to take that first year was Social Sciences I, which dealt with the history of American political thought. At the same time, I was already intensely involved in the study of the Talmud, particularly in a tractate (Baba Kama) which deals with Jewish civil law. It was the custom at that time for distinguished professors in fields relating to our course of study to be invited to lecture to the combined sections of the course, periodically. Two of these lectures made a lasting impression on my thinking and I still remember them quite well.

The first lecture, by William Thomas Hutchinson (d. 1976), an expert on American constitutional history, presented the thesis that the reason why the American constitution of 1789 was far more

enduring than the constitution promulgated in France shortly thereafter, is because the former was the result of almost 200 years of colonial experience, whereas the latter was the result of purely philosophical speculation. What Hutchinson was presenting, it seems in retrospect, was a Common Law view of American history, viz., theory is only enunciated after sufficient precedent has been accumulated for a deliberate judgment to be made.²⁶

The second lecture I remember that year was by Avery Craven (d. 1980), an historian whose specialty was the period around the Civil War. Craven presented the thesis that the real preamble to the Constitution of the United States was not what is formally called the "preamble", but rather the Declaration of Independence. He illustrated his point by analyzing the institution of slavery. On strictly constitutional grounds, slavery was permitted and slaves had the status of chattel. That point was made with legal cogency by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney in the famous Dred Scott Decision of 1857. However, the Declaration of Independence, albeit written by Virginia slaveholder Thomas Jefferson, declared that "all men are created equal" (a theological statement if there ever was one, even though made by the nonchurchgoing Deist, Jefferson). According to Craven, the Civil War and the resulting thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, which outlawed slavery, affirmed the priority of the philosophical foundation of the constitution over specific legal reasoning in a matter of crucial importance in the life of this democracy. In fact, as I recall, Craven went so far

as to say, that had the events which made the thirteenth ammendment possible not taken place, it is doubtful whether our consitutional form of government would have endured.²⁷

Now, on the surface, the theses of Hutchinson and Craven seem to contradict one another. For, Hutchinson emphasized the priority of precedent over theory, while Craven emphasized the priority of theory over precedent. However, upon deeper examination they are in truth complementary in the sense of there being a dialectic between precedent and theory. Precedent by definition is historically prior, but precedent does lead to theory as a guide for which precedents are to be subsequently emphasized and which are to be subsequently deemphasized. Once there is enough precedent behind a theory that theory becomes regulative, i.e., a conditio sine qua non for the further development of the system of precedent. When precedents are invoked which ignore the tendency of development of the system, then theory must inform the process of selection. It functions as a criterion of judgment. The relation is dialectical in that neither the theoretical pole nor the practical pole is reducible to the other. Thus, the theory is more than an inductive generalization from the precedents and the precedents are not simply deduced from the theory. Like an electrical current between two poles, the full socio-political reality lies in-between them.

Even in those earlier days of my education, it seemed to me that something similar was also taking place in Normative Judaism. Later on, when I began to write Jewish thought, I systematically

examined the relation of theology and law in Jewish tradition. Now in Normative Judaism ethics is law, and that ethical-legal structure is theological in the sense that its origin is seen in God's will and its purpose is seen as being the highest good, viz., the nearness of God (Psalms 73:28). Any attempt, therefore, to remove Jewish ethics from its overall theological context is ultimately incredible. However, this does not mean that law (halakha) is deduced from theology (aggadah). The law, in its immediate manifestation, has a life of its own, developing along lines of precedent and the human assessment of human situations, as the Talmud puts it, "the human judge can only judge what his human eyes see."²⁹

This is important because it enables the law to draw upon a wealth of human experience and it encourages creative human judgment to operate. This mitigates, to a great extent, against the type of dogmatism that attempts to force all experience and judgment into a preset Procrustean Bed, the type of dogmatism that too readily has the answer before the question itself has been adequately experienced and formulated.³⁰

Nevertheless, in the great issues which the law has faced, issues dealing with fundamental questions of the essence of human personhood, the sanctity of human sexuality, the nature of human sociality, the vocation of the Jewish people, in these great issues the system of precedent is insufficient in and of itself because it is usually ambiguous, presenting prima facie conflicting options for judgment. It is ambiguous precisely because the authorities

of the past could not solve all problems in advance; they could not be substitutes for the living authorities of the present and the future.³¹

At these crucial points, the great authorities invoked the theological principles developed on the nonlegal side of Classical Judaism. But, let it be emphasized, they invoked these principles when and only when there was at least some purely legal precedent for them to choose. When the great issues (what contemporary legal theorists call "hard cases") arose, the system of precedent was indeed not sufficient in and of itself, but it was nonetheless still necessary. Thus, for example, when the whole theology of Kabbalah began to become fully explicated in the late middle ages, there was a tendency in some circles to see its main document, the Zohar, as now having a normative status equal to and even surpassing the Talmud. On the other hand, there were those authorities who regarded it as antinomian and, therefore, having no normative status at all. Finally, in the early sixteenth century, the Egyptian authority, Rabbi David ibn Abi Zimra, ruled that in and of itself the law of the Talmud takes normative precedence over the theology of the Zohar. However, when the law of the Talmud is itself ambiguous (as it frequently and thankfully is), presenting conflicting precedents and opinions, then the theology of the Zohar may be invoked as a criterion of judgment, emphasizing one tendency and deemphasizing (but never totally eliminating) the other.³²

IV.

The application of all of this to the crisis of values in America today can be the new agenda of the Mission of Israel, an agenda far more authentically Jewish and socially critical than that of the earlier liberal proponents of this idea.

The crisis of values in America today has become evident in the great issues of social debate which have emerged during the past three decades, issues which have inevitably been involved in landmark legal decisions.

Let us take the most persistent and intense issue of social debate in America for over a decade, the question of abortion. Here is a question which shows no signs whatsoever of abating during the next decade. And, this is because it deals with the most fundamental moral issue possible, the definition of human personhood and society's role in relation to it. Because this is so obviously a moral question which cannot be reduced to merely legal precedent, the 1973 Roe versus Wade decision of the United States Supreme Court by no means settled the issue but, if anything, exacerbated it. And, here we have a clear conflict of values, a Kulturkampf with monumental ramifications.

The legal system is ambiguous enough to call for extralegal factors in making a judgment. The fourteenth amendment to the Constitution speaks of the right of every "person" to "equal protection of the laws." However, nowhere does it define personhood. As such, a human fetus, whose personhood is by no means immediately evident, may or may not be entitled to the equal protection the

the Constitution mandates for persons and only persons. Here is where the legal system must look at systems of value to supply such definitions. And, here is where we see in bold relief the clash of values. For, if the fetus has the status of a person, in that it is the result of the creative sexual act of two human persons (unambiguously and irreducibly human persons, not things, because of their status as imago Dei), then it is subject to the same protection of the law as his or her parents.³³ If, on the other hand, personhood is determined by such other criteria as viability, independence, speech, rationality, quality of life or whatever, then a very different interpretation of the Constitution inevitably follows.

Now, even adopting the first theologically grounded view does not automatically solve the subsequent legal questions, as some pro-life advocates naively think.³⁴ For, to accept this broadest definition of human personhood does not solve questions of mortal conflict between persons. E.g., can the fetus at times be regarded as an unwarranted intruder (rodef) in the womb of another person --- as in cases of rape? These questions have been intensely debated in Jewish tradition, and there is a considerable literature on the subject even in English.³⁵ The parameters of this discussion in Normative (i.e., halakhic) Judaism have been that no one in this tradition can cogently assign the fetus the status of non-person on the level of a thing, having no rights at all. Conversely, no one can cogently maintain that the life of the fetus takes precedence over that of his or her mother. The real question --- involving the hard cases --- is how widely or narrowly are we to

interpret situations of "threatening intrusion."

In the context of Jewish tradition no one can simply say, "based on my theological principles, this is what the only ethical course of action can be." One can only use his or her theological principles, when legal precedent already exists, to exercise judgment and persuade others. So also is the case in the American tradition. Those who say that religion may not determine the law in our constitutional democracy, that religion may not impose its values on the society as a whole, are technically correct. The Constitution not only protects us from being subject to the rule of any religious community, but it even protects the non-religious minority (and let it be emphasized that they are the minority) from being subject to the rule of a consensus of all or most of the religious communities (a rather hypothetical state of affairs at present and in the foreseeable future). However, it is a totally unwarranted inference from this social fact to assume that the absence of religion from the process of specific legal reasoning requires its elimination from the general realm of social discourse and persuasion (as opposed to political coercion). Such an inference is guilty of nothing less than the fallacy of generalization. For, if this inference is made, then we are indeed left with what Richard John Neuhaus calls "the naked public square."³⁶ If "naked" is synonymous with "vacuous", then history as well as nature (to paraphrase Aristotle) abhors a vacuum, and the vacuum is inevitably filled with the type of secularism which makes the elimination of religion from the society qua society its own dogma.

It seems to me that the intention of our American doctrine of the separation of church and state is to deny the legitimacy of deducing politically acceptable action from dogma --- anyone's. But, aside from that type of dogmatic deduction (so obvious among those who engage in "one issue politics"), one's dogmas and doctrines should be brought into the public square, especially when it can be shown that they have strong affinities with the dogmas and doctrines which inspired American democracy in the first place and which sustained it at times of great crisis in its history.

The point made so tellingly by the late German-American Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich (d. 1965), that no one really acts without an "ultimate concern", is especially germane.³⁷ For it means that no area of human discourse and action is value-free, and it is better for the operation of one's values to be publically visible and, thus, socially responsible and responsive, rather than to be forced to be a purely private matter and, thus, in danger of becoming socially irresponsible and unresponsive (i.e., "dogmatic" in the pejorative sense of that term). Here too the late American Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr (d. 1971), still has much to teach all of us about how ^{biblical} theism can be seen as the most adequate foundation for democracy, without making it "theocratic" (which literally means "the rule of God", but usually means "the rule of church").³⁸

V.

The concluding question to be addressed is, to quote my

grandfather, "so, is all of this good or bad for the Jews?"

Well, I believe that this is good for the Jews --- very good --- because I also believe that Judaism does have some very important points to make in the moral and legal discourse of our society. There is a Mission of Israel and the exercise of that "missionary" project is totally consistent with the cultural, the political, even the juridical interests of Jews in American society.

First, if we Jews regard ourselves as having a mission in America today, then we obviously cannot accept the Zionist doctrine of the "negation of the diaspora" (shelilat ha-golah). This does not mean, however, that we ^{can or} should return to the anti-Zionism of the earlier liberal Jewish proponents of this idea. We Jews are a community constituted by the Torah³⁹, and that alone makes us quite different from a "denomination" in the American Protestant sense of that term. Our Torah-constituted community must be concerned with the Land and State of Israel, nonobservant --- even atheistic --- Jews, the Hebrew language and other "ethnic" matters. (In Greek ethnos means "people" and the Torah certainly designates us as a people, and because of that designation as Am Yisrael --- "the people who strive with God" [Genesis 32:29] --- I resist any secularist interpretation of Jewish "peoplehood".) The fact that we affirm that the Lord God of Israel is also Creator of heaven and earth, and the fact that we are bound by the law and teaching of the Torah wherever we happen to live, indicates on religious grounds the validity of any Jewish community to exist anywhere the Torah can be studied and the commandments⁴⁰ observed. Furthermore, we are morally

bound to support in every way a society which allows us the freedom to live as authentic Jews and which itself is bound by a law which we consider grounded in the law of God for all humankind. None of this implies that the unique Jewish status of the Land and State of Israel be denigrated or even bracketed in any way by American Jews. It simply means that we American Jews can cogently argue on precise Jewish religious grounds that America has value for us and that we have value for America. I emphasize this because I believe that the religious and intellectual life of American Jewry has been impoverished by the assumption --- consciously maintained by some, unconsciously by others --- that Jewish life in America is at best transient, that America is a trayfe medinah (literally, "a nonkosher society", a charge made at the turn of this century by some East European rabbis, who attempted to dissuade --- mostly unsuccessfully --- their flocks from joining the mass migration to America), that Jewish life in America is ultimately impossible. There is little in Jewish tradition and little in American Jewish experience (as recent studies have now shown⁴¹) to validate this view. (Hopefully, it will become a topic of more and more dialogue between Israeli and American Jews.)

Second, what are some of the values about which Judaism and American Jews can inform American social and political life? --- Since Jews and Judaism have suffered so, especially in this century of incomparable horrors, perhaps it is best to express them as a series of negations or prophetic warnings.

A. Judaism and American Jews have a good deal to warn America

about the danger of depersonalization in our society. The most valuable aspect of the Jewish doctrine of the human person as the image of God, for society, is that it gives the widest definition of human personhood possible, without eliminating the equally important distinction between the human and the nonhuman.⁴² However, the tendency in the twentieth century has been the exact opposite, viz., to limit personhood based on arbitrary factors such as physical condition, race, age, etc. This has been done by the state in the person of those who have the political power to do so. Here is where Judaism and the experience of the Jews once again coalesce, viz., the Jews have been the most agonized victims of the denial of this doctrine of Judaism. Therefore, those Jews who are intent that Americans (let alone Europeans who were closer to the scene of the crime) "never forget" the Holocaust and all that led up to it and made it possible, must eschew arbitrary definitions of human personhood so contrary to both Torah and Jewish experience.

B. Judaism and American Jews have a good deal to warn America about the danger of deculturization in our society. Not only does Judaism encourage Jews to live according to our own traditions and culture, it also encourages the same for non-Jews. This can best be illustrated by a hasidic story my late revered teacher, Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel (d. 1972) once told me about Rabbi Israel Baal Shem Tov, the founder of the Hasidic Movement in eighteenth century Poland. It seems as though the Baal Shem Tov had a Catholic coachman. One day when out riding, they passed a shrine of a saint, the type of which the Polish countryside abounded in. The coachman did not make the sign of the Cross when they passed by it. The

Baal Shem Tov immediately ordered his close disci¹p¹le who was with him then to fire the man. He reasoned that if his own was no longer sacred for him, he certainly would not respect what was sacred for someone else. The story is typical of very sound and persistent Jewish doctrine.⁴³

The modern industrial process of deculturization, turning everyone into the similar copy of his or her neighbor, thereby imitating the mass production of our own machines, creates a dangerous cultural and emotional vacuum. It denies an overall purpose to human life and simultaneously destroys our link with our past which once did reveal such purposes to us.⁴⁴ As such, it makes modern societies so vulnerable to the likes of Hitler, whose simplistic appeals to fears and fantasies no longer had to face, in any strong sense, the mediating safeguards of subtle and multifaceted tradition. Therefore, when some Jews seem to delight in being in the foreground of all that is irreverently avante-garde, they should ponder how much similar Jewish contributions to the traditionally vacuous culture of Weimar Germany did not destroy those aspects of German historical culture which may have been better bases of resistance to Hitler, had they not been so discredited already.⁴⁵ Here again, we see how Torah enlightens Jewish experience and how Jewish experience illustrates Torah.

C. Judaism and American Jews can also teach America about the dialectic between faith and history. The problem with so much of Christian moral teaching in America, especially traditional Christian moral teaching (Catholic, Orthodox, Evangelical) is its

fundamentalism. Now "fundamentalism" means many things, but it seems to be characterized by a conviction that "all the answers are right here in the Book", and it is only obstinence or ignorance which prevents God's plan from being implimented to immediately solve all our social ills. (In this sense, "fundamentalism" is certainly not an essentially Christian outlook; much of the traditionalist Jewish community is just as fundamentalistic.) In this view, history, the accumulated experience of highly fallible humans, has no value, indeed is regarded as a threat to the Truth. Here is where the Jewish obsession with the Law --- so often denigrated by Christians who misread Paul --- is ⁴⁶germaine. For, as we have seen, the Law is not a divine oracle which lights up whenever we approach it with a question. The Law is, rather, an historically developing system which subjects the most cogently argued theory to the collective precedents of the centuries old community. Fundamentalism is impatient with this slow, often bumbling, process and this is ^{precisely}~~precisely~~ why, in our century especially, it has been so easily manipulated by all sorts of political fanatics, who offer instant solutions to complex social problems. The Law saves us from this type of Utopian pseudo-messianism, just as it saves us from the relativistic vacuum wherein all norms are taken simply as matters of taste and, therefore, outside the range of rational discourse. ⁴⁷

For these reasons, I regard America today as providing a unique religious challenge to Judaism and the American Jews. It seems that at long last we are being taken seriously by some of the

most thoughtful elements in American society today, and we are being taken seriously as "Jewish Jews." How seriously we will take ourselves will largely depend on the Jewish piety, learning and insight of those whom we make the leaders of our community in America. Heretofore, we American Jews, contrary to the tendency of ~~almost~~ all of previous Jewish history, have hardly looked for piety, learning and Jewish insight in our leaders. But, now the times have changed radically. We must be up to them, demanding that those who speak about us and for us be capable, spiritually and intellectually, to articulate and implement our unique destiny in America.⁴⁸

Notes

1. These Jews are advocates of the famous maxim of the early Jewish Enlightenment (Haskalah) thinker, Judah Leib Gordon (d. 1892), viz., "be a Jew at home and a human being outside." See Encyclopedia Judaica, 7:801.
2. Kiddushin 66a.
3. See The Naked Public Square (Grand Rapids, 1984), passim.
4. See Leo Pfeffer, Creeds in Competition (New York, 1958), 46ff.
5. See Joseph Churba, The Politics of Defeat (New York, 1977), esp. 166ff.
6. See ^{his} Anti-Semite and Jew, trans. G. J. Becker (New York, 1948), 67ff.
7. The great proponent of this idea was Horace M. Kallen (d. 1974). See his Cultural Pluralism and the American Idea (Philadelphia, 1956), esp. 85ff.
8. See Charles E. Silberman, A Certain People (New York, 1985), 254ff.; also, Chaim I. Waxman, American Jews in Transition (Philadelphia, 1983), 124ff.
9. This doctrine was promulgated at the very beginnings of Zionism. See Ahad Ha-Am, "The Negation of the Diaspora" (1909) in The Zionist Idea, ed. A. Hertzberg (Philadelphia, 1959), 27--277. For a critique of this doctrine on cultural lines, see Mordecai M. Kaplan, "The Negation of Jewish Life in the Diaspora" (1948), ibid., 539-542.
10. See Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, NY, 1969), 41.

11. See D. Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism (New York and Toronto, 1983), esp. chap. 4.
12. See Emil L. Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought (Bloomington and London, 1967), 231-233.
13. See Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton (New York, 1964), 88ff.
14. See Cohen, Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism, trans. S. Kaplan (New York, 1972), 283ff.; Baeck, The Essence of Judaism, trans. V. Grubenwieser and L. Pearl (New York, 1948), 68ff.
- 1968
15. See Kohler, Jewish Theology (New York, 1918/repr.), 325ff.; Hirsch, My Religion, ed. G. B. Levi (New York, 1925), 259-262, 288ff.
16. For the sharp reaction to Adler's agnosticism by liberal Jewish thinkers, who were most threatened by it, see Benny Kraut, From Reform Judaism to Ethical Culture: The Religious Evolution of Felix Adler (Cincinnati, 1976), 135ff.
17. See Judaism As A Civilization (New York, 1934), 227ff. See, also, the earlier critique of Ahad Ha-Am in Selected Essays, trans. L. Simon (Philadelphia, 1912), 184ff. Interestingly enough, Ahad Ha-Am's critique is specifically directed against the version of this idea proposed by the French traditionalist rabbi, S. Munk. The idea was usually, but not exclusively, proposed by liberal rabbis.
18. See Kraut, op. cit., 169ff.

19. Igrot Mosheh: Orah Hayyim (New York, 1963), 2:196-198, no. 25.

20. See Novak, The Image of the Non-Jew in Judaism, passim.

21. See Nedarim 11b.

22. Tosefta Sotah 8.6; Sotah 35b.

23. Judaism was first characterized as a "theocracy" by Josephus. See Contra Apionem, 2.164-167.

24. Mishneh Torah: Hilkhot Melakhim, 8.10. See Novak, op. cit., 53-56.

25. See We Hold These Truths (New York, 1960), esp. chap. 5. For ancient Jewish suspicions of the combination of ecclesiastical and royal power, see Kiddushin 66a and Yerushalmi: Horayot 3.2/47c.

26. Along these lines note Robert Bolt, A Man For All Seasons (New York, 1960), Act 1, 37-38, ROPER: "Then you set man's law above God's!" MORE: "No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact -- I'm not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find such plain sailing, I can't navigate. I'm no voyager . . . This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast -- man's laws, not God's -- and if you cut them down . . . d'you think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then?"

27. See Craven's Civil War in the Making (Baton Rouge, 1959), 64ff.; also, Carl Becker, The Declaration of Independence (New York, 1922), 6.

For National Jewish Coalition

HUC Project: Jewish College Students Growing More Conservative

A growing conservatism among Jewish college students indicates that the organized Jewish community can no longer assume automatic support by young, voting-age Jews for liberal policies, according to a research project recently completed at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion in Los Angeles.

The thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements of the double master's degree programs offered by HUC's School of Jewish Communal Service and the University of Southern California's School of Social Work and School of Public Administration.

Entitled "Moving Right, What's Left?" the thesis by Amy Levine and Janet Schenker concludes that Jewish college students are still more liberal than their non-Jewish counterparts on most issues, but they are moving toward the right of the political spectrum.

"Although national opinion data show that Jews are consistently more liberal than other Americans, these data indicate a groundswell of conservative opinion, among the younger segment of the Jewish voting population," noted Dr. Bruce Phillips, thesis advisor and associate professor of Jewish communal studies at HUC. "While they currently do not have a great impact on Jewish opinion overall, Jewish students of the 1980s will be among the Jewish leaders at the turn of the century."

Two issues traditionally supported by the organized Jewish community on which Jewish students are becoming "more skeptical" are a strong commitment to human rights and dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, according to the thesis.

Findings in the thesis are drawn from two national studies of college students: the first conducted in

1969 by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education; the second conducted in 1984 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Among the subjects on which students were surveyed were: communal responsibility, constitutional issues, foreign policy, women's issues, national defense and U.S. domestic issues.

The thesis reveals that both Jewish and non-Jewish students are moving toward the political right, but that Jews were moving at a much faster rate, thereby converging with non-Jews. Areas of particular rightward movement were in attitudes toward capital punishment, the rights of the minority versus the majority, and the importance of community service and formulating values and goals. Exceptions to the movement occur, especially in the area of national defense where Jews became much more liberal and Protestants more conservative.

The thesis also compares shifts in attitudes within Jewish and non-Jewish groups. It concludes that Jewish students become more liberal on foreign policy, U.S. domestic issues and the right to ban persons

with extreme attitudes from speaking on campus. Protestants became more conservative on national defense, women's issues and minority-majority rights.

In analyzing the results, thesis authors said the growing conservatism among Jewish students and the attendant importance placed upon being financially well-off could adversely affect the field of Jewish communal service. The emphasis on financial well-being was accompanied by a "marked decrease" in support for the idea of the importance of community service.

The study proposes "individuals may lack the identification with, and commitment to, community service" and "while work in the Jewish community may be challenging, it is not often financially rewarding." In fact, the thesis says, "the field (communal service) may be unable to attract even those individuals who do see the importance of community service." ▲

For National Jewish Coalition

HUC Project: Jewish College Students Growing More Conservative

A growing conservatism among Jewish college students indicates that the organized Jewish community can no longer assume automatic support by young, voting-age Jews for liberal policies, according to a research project recently completed at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion in Los Angeles.

The thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements of the double master's degree programs offered by HUC's School of Jewish Communal Service and the University of Southern California's School of Social Work and School of Public Administration.

Entitled "Moving Right, What's Left?" the thesis by Amy Levine and Janet Schenker concludes that Jewish college students are still more liberal than their non-Jewish counterparts on most issues, but they are moving toward the right of the political spectrum.

"Although national opinion data show that Jews are consistently more liberal than other Americans, these data indicate a groundswell of conservative opinion, among the younger segment of the Jewish voting population," noted Dr. Bruce Phillips, thesis advisor and associate professor of Jewish communal studies at HUC. "While they currently do not have a great impact on Jewish opinion overall, Jewish students of the 1980s will be among the Jewish leaders at the turn of the century."

Two issues traditionally supported by the organized Jewish community on which Jewish students are becoming "more skeptical" are a strong commitment to human rights and dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, according to the thesis.

Findings in the thesis are drawn from two national studies of college students: the first conducted in

1969 by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education; the second conducted in 1984 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Among the subjects on which students were surveyed were: communal responsibility, constitutional issues, foreign policy, women's issues, national defense and U.S. domestic issues.

The thesis reveals that both Jewish and non-Jewish students are moving toward the political right, but that Jews were moving at a much faster rate, thereby converging with non-Jews. Areas of particular rightward movement were in attitudes toward capital punishment, the rights of the minority versus the majority, and the importance of community service and formulating values and goals. Exceptions to the movement occur, especially in the area of national defense where Jews became much more liberal and Protestants more conservative.

The thesis also compares shifts in attitudes within Jewish and non-Jewish groups. It concludes that Jewish students become more liberal on foreign policy, U.S. domestic issues and the right to ban persons

with extreme attitudes from speaking on campus. Protestants became more conservative on national defense, women's issues and minority-majority rights.

In analyzing the results, thesis authors said the growing conservatism among Jewish students and the attendant importance placed upon being financially well-off could adversely affect the field of Jewish communal service. The emphasis on financial well-being was accompanied by a "marked decrease" in support for the idea of the importance of community service.

The study proposes "individuals may lack the identification with, and commitment to, community service" and "while work in the Jewish community may be challenging, it is not often financially rewarding." In fact, the thesis says, "the field (communal service) may be unable to attract even those individuals who do see the importance of community service." ▲

VOTE, continued from 9A

forget about Jewish support, assuming a pro-Israel alternative. Hawkins, with her positions on school prayer and other conservative agenda issues, suffers in this respect. D'Amato, despite many similar stands, does not.

Even the one-third vote for Reagan that disappointed some Jewish leaders in 1984 compares favorably with the tallies for recent Republican presidential candidates, Rosenberg pointed out. Gerald Ford received only 25 percent of the Jewish vote in 1976; Richard Nixon got 15 percent of Jewish vote running against Hubert Humphrey in 1968, though he did much better against George McGovern in 1972, netting about one-third. Barry Goldwater got less than 10 percent in careening to landslide defeat against Lyndon Johnson in 1964.

But from across the political spectrum, all agreed that Reagan would have had more to show for his pro-Israel stance were it not for what Jews saw on their TV sets in August of 1984.

It was then, at the Republican national convention, that fundamentalist Christians flexed their political and theological clout on national television. Their calls to restore America as a Christian nation by supporting Reagan; the Republican National Committee's agreement to pass out Christian Bibles to the delegates; the emergence of the Armageddon issue as a factor in Reagan's attitude towards nuclear war and arms control — these were among the factors that halted, and then reversed, a climbing rate of Jewish support for Reagan.

"The polls turned around after the Dallas convention; you can track it," said David Pollack of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York. "Before that, Reagan had 50 percent of the Jews."

Said Rosenberg: "Jews will vote against anyone they see as threatening Israel's security or their status as Americans."

GOP Seeks Jewish Vote

Ironically, the role of Jesse Jackson during the Democratic primaries and into the July San Francisco convention had earlier sent Jews streaming towards Reagan. The August spectacle in Dallas abruptly sent them streaming back again.

Mark Neuman was at that convention. As political director of the National Jewish Coalition, he was — and is — one of the point men aiming to recruit Jews to the conservative Republican cause. The coalition, a partisan, conservative Republican organization despite its generic-sounding name, was among the groups and individuals hopelessly predicting a shift of Jews to the GOP that year.

The National Jewish Coalition has drawn the ire of many other Jewish groups for its willingness to consort with many conservatives those groups view as fundamentally hostile to Jewish interests and values, such as Helms. But asked about the presidential candidacy of fundamentalist leader Pat Robertson, Neuman drew the line.

"There have been no meetings of our people with him because Robertson is a very controversial figure," he said. "We're not interested in giving any appearance that the coalition is interested in advancing his campaign."

"He's not in the mainstream of the Republican Party; his remark that Christians are more patriotic Americans — that's outside of the mainstream."

Jewish Interests

Chris Gersten, executive director of

the National Jewish Coalition, outlined a broader ideological rationale for his group's stand.

"We think if a candidate is for Israel but also for major defense cuts, that's not in the interest of a stronger Israel," he said. "We want to make sure the Jewish community knows that, and it increasingly does."

The fundamentalists' call at the Republican National Convention to restore America as a Christian nation reversed a climbing rate of Jewish support for Reagan

"We want to make sure Jews know the Sandinistas forced out the Jews of Nicaragua from that country when they consider our Central American policy."

Gersten was referring to charges by the Reagan administration and the Anti Defamation League of B'nai B'rith that Sandinista anti-Semitism forced Nicaragua's tiny Jewish population to leave the country. Other Jewish groups have disputed that assertion, and a report by the U.S. embassy in Managua

found no support for it.

Many conservative Jews have questioned whether liberal Jewish activists do not extend their "Jewish" agenda far beyond the core of issues that actually are crucial to Jewish life. Asked if he was not defining an extended right-wing Jewish agenda that mirrored this same tendency, Gersten replied, "We don't do it in the same way. We don't say they're Jewish issues. But we solicit support from Jews on these issues because they're objectively in the best interests of the United States. It's not that as a Jew you have an obligation to vote this way on these issues."

Giving an example, Gersten explained, "We oppose sanctions against South Africa. But we don't spend a lot of time pointing out that sanctions and the rise of the African National Congress (a militant anti-apartheid group) would hurt Jews in South Africa."

"We do make the Jewish case on South Africa, SDI and other issues, but it's not the primary case," he said.

Asked why a specifically Jewish group was then needed to advocate such issues, Gersten replied candidly, "The Republican Party can't do it because it doesn't have the credibility. We do. We're developing that credibility. We're part of the Jewish community and our officers are well known members of the Jewish community."

So far, however, it appears those advocating a Republican shift and a right-wing Jewish agenda have yet to persuade many of their fellow Jews. As the surveys and exit polls indicate, Jews overwhelmingly demand a candidate's support for Israel as a "threshold" issue that admits him or her for serious consideration. But if both candidates have pro-Israel records most Jews appear to move quickly on to other issues in making their final decision.

(Special to JW)

Hardly diplomatic

Peres' treatment of Israel's envoy to U.S. called 'shabby'

By WOLF BLITZER

WASHINGTON — There is a widespread consensus among career Israeli diplomats, senior U.S. officials, prominent Jewish leaders and others in Washington that Ambassador Meir Rosenne has received some rather unfair and shabby treatment in recent days from Foreign Minister Shimon Peres.

After serving 34 years in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rosenne was summarily informed on March 6 that he would have a mere seven weeks to complete his Washington assignment and return home by May 1. He began to pack his bags.

On March 18, according to informed sources, Rosenne received a second message from the Foreign Ministry informing him he could stay in Washington until "one day after" Israel's Independence Day, which this year falls on May 6. The embassy in Washington holds a huge reception for U.S. leaders on that day, and officials in Jerusalem belatedly realized Rosenne should host the event. No new ambassador has yet been named.

The envoy, according to informed sources, began hasty preparations to wind up his four-year tour in Washington. For example, he immediately cancelled plans to receive a large delegation of prominent U.S. Jewish political activists on May 17. They were planning to attend the annual policy conference of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the pro-Israel lobbying organization on Capitol Hill.

On March 29, Rosenne was suddenly told to remain in Washington until June 1, presumably so he would be able to help receive Foreign Minister Peres, who is scheduled to address the AIPAC

meeting and then to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz and other U.S. officials.

Rosenne, a former envoy to Paris who earlier spent several years as the Foreign Ministry's legal adviser, also will have little time to wind up a whole series of ongoing negotiations with U.S. officials involving some sensitive subjects, such as the Jonathan Pollard scandal and the Iran arms affair probe.

He also is in the midst of delicate diplomatic talks with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Yuri Dubinin, on details for an exchange of Israeli and Soviet visits involving consular issues. Rosenne has held numerous talks with the Soviets in recent years, beginning with Dubinin's predecessor, Anatoly Dobrynin, who is today a senior foreign policy adviser to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Despite those delicate negotiations, Rosenne was told to complete his activities within the next few weeks.

He and his wife, Vera, also will have very little time left for the usual round of farewell parties and tributes always held in honor of departing Israeli ambassadors.

"This is no way to treat someone who has served Israel so faithfully all of these years," an embassy diplomat complained. "I've never seen anything like this in all the years I've served in the Foreign Ministry."

Appearing on NBC's "Today Show," Rosenne was asked why he was leaving. "I have been here four years, and before coming here, I spent four years as ambassador to France," he said. "So I have been away from Israel eight years now. It's quite a long time. And quite an exception, because in the Israeli diplomatic service, you are abroad between five and six years only."

... at
Club, spon-
sored Flushing
meals, danc-
ing ball and

AY, APRIL 11

International," coffee
serving folk singer,
at the Forest Hills
106-06 Queens
2-35. \$5.

APRIL 12

all, 3 p.m., at
Underhill and
as 21-39.
Greater
s free,

Religious Articles
Bar Mitzvah Sets
JUDAIC GIFT & ART GALLERY
59 Merrick Ave.
MERRICK
(516) 223-7050
Mon., Tues., Wed. 10-8
Thurs. 10-8, Fri. 10-3
Sun. 11-4
MAJOR CHARGES
SEDER PLATES &
PASSOVER ACCESSORIES
Lenox • Delft • English China
Israeli & others
Invitations Discounted

Yusset's Place
Featuring
Basson-Rosenstein
Muchnik and others

Records • Tapes • Videos
Children's & Adult Books

Gilari Catering

in West Hempstead is proud to announce that we will be open to serve you for all your Passover needs.

Please call us at 516/481-2060 and place your order today!

We wish a Happy and Kosher Pesach to all our friends and customers.

Gilari Catering Inc.
710 Dogwood Ave., West Hempstead, N.Y.

DONATE YOUR CAR OR RV

Help Support Yeshiva Kol Yaakov

POLITICS

Hart Campaign Trail Winding Through the Lone Star State

When Democrat Gary Hart sets off on a cross-country swing following his presidential announcement Monday, one of his stops will be Amarillo, Tex. True, it's a bit off the Iowa-New Hampshire beaten track, but Hart figures he's playing to a different kind of strength.

"When the activists in Iowa ask the question, 'Where's Gary been?' " said Paul Tully, Hart's political director, "Texas is one of the answers."

The Lone Star State contains the biggest trove of delegates to be won in "Super Tuesday" primary elections, and Hart has built a list of political supporters there that tops anything he has put together outside his home state of Colorado.

The list includes Lt. Gov. (and 1990 gubernatorial hopeful) Bill Hobby, Railroad Commissioner Mack Wallace, both known as conservative Democrats, influential state Sen. Ray Farabee, Rep. Martin Frost (D-Tex.), along with several prominent Hispanic leaders and liberal state legislators. The ideological breadth of Hart's support stands out. On the left, Agriculture Commissioner Jim Hightower has been saying nice things about Hart, though he hasn't endorsed him.

What also stands out is that the insider Washington wisdom—that Hart is sure to fade—is at variance from the insider Austin wisdom. "I think Hart's got the nomination," Hobby said.

Jackson: Confronting Allegations

■ Jesse L. Jackson went before a Jewish audience last week and confronted the anti-Semitism allegations that trailed his 1984 Democratic presidential campaign.

Jackson said the tensions over Black Muslim minister Louis Farrakhan should be put aside: "It would be unwise to make the issue of Farrakhan the centerpiece of our relationship." Instead, Jackson told a meeting of the Religious Action Center, "I urge us all today to focus our sights not on those issues on which we may differ but on the issues on which we agree." He said such issues as justice, education, housing and health care make up part of a "common agenda" that Jews and blacks share.

Introducing Jackson, Rabbi Alexander Schindler said that in 1984 Jews "feared his campaign was one of confrontation." But Schindler said, "Times have changed and Jesse Jackson has had the wisdom to change with the times."

Jackson, gearing to run again in 1988, urged the audience to look at his "cumulative box score," rather than "a given inning . . . where one struck out."

Rabbi David Saperstein said he invited Jackson because "for two years Jackson has conscientiously gone out of his way to address Jewish issues and express a conciliatory view of black-Jewish relations. And, he has done so with the kind of consistency and thoughtfulness that warranted a response from the organized Jewish community."

House Members: Staying Put in '88

■ Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.) can breathe easier: Rep. Connie Mack III (R-Fla.) decided last week not to challenge Chiles as expected. "I just concluded this was not the right time for me," Mack said.

Mack, who wants to be "involved in a 1988 pres-



Publication of the Friends of Mario (

idential race," according to spoliard, has accepted the offer of t Rep. Jack Kemp (R-N.Y.) to be his presidential campaign. It gives platform," Caulfield added.

Mack was considered his paridate against Chiles next year. the three-term senator has wansible candidates since a poli f showed Chiles tough to beat.

Meanwhile in New Mexico ing candidate to challenge decided he'd rather not. R been actively recruited t GOP to run for Senate, s to seek reelection inster

Bingaman has been Democrats' more vuln Bingaman aide Vince ment as "an inside-t" Skeen's decision is strength in the stat

Cuomo: Start

■ No, he's not Gov. Mario N political acti not meant t New York: ocratic j pay for '

Form setting \$200,00 Guidice pay for candid. Del Gi

Cuor ite-son there i In tl Comm 1986 azine and "

How 'Jewish' Do PACs Give?

By Walter Ruby

In May of this year, a cover story entitled "Unholy Alliance" by Robert Kuttner appeared in *The New Republic*, precipitating intense discussion both within and beyond the American Jewish community.

Kuttner charged that political action committees (PACs), whose sole agenda is support for Israel, are forming a close entente with right wing Republicans on Capitol Hill. The financial support of pro-Israel PACs and of individual pro-Israel givers may well, according to Kuttner, turn out to be the principal factor in helping the GOP retain control of the U.S. Senate in 1986.

Kuttner noted that while American Jews as a whole remain well to the left of the general population in terms of how they vote, the pro-Israel PACs are now delivering Jewish financial backing to candidates far to the right of positions that most Jews hold on the issues. Incumbent Republicans have discovered a cynical formula. They only have to demonstrate sufficient loyalty to Israel, and they can all but lock out their Democratic challengers from a substantial fraction of Jewish support, even when the challenger is more sympathetic to such deeply held Jewish concerns as separation of church and state.

A Well Documented Trend?

Kuttner's article received such widespread publicity because it appeared to present well documented evidence of a trend many had long suspected: the movement of much of the leadership of the Jewish community into an ever closer embrace of the U.S. right wing.

Yet as the 1986 Congressional races entered the home stretch, observers of the pro-Israel PAC scene are convinced that Kuttner's thesis of a pro-Israel PAC alliance with the Republican right is, at the very least, vastly overstated.

These observers point out that considerably more pro-Israel PAC money is going this year to Democrats than to Republicans. They note, too, that the Republicans who have been most strongly supported by the pro-Israel community have mainly been moderates and pragmatists. Ultra-rightists in the Jesse Helms mold have been largely shunned by supporters of pro-Israel PACs.

Democrats Receive PAC Money Too

Herbert Alexander, a professor of political science at the University of

Southern California, who is recognized as one of the nation's experts on PACs, said, "In fact, a lot of the early spending in the 1985-86 election cycle among the pro-Israel PACs and individual givers did go to Republican incumbents — people like (Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), (Sen. Robert Kasten (R-Wis.), The pro-Israel community also strongly backed Sen. Robert Packwood (R-Ore.) and Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kans.), and discouraged Jewish Democratic challengers from taking them on."

However, said Alexander, "In 1986, we've seen another pattern. Having given in 1985 to D'Amato, Kasten, and Packwood the pro-Israel PACs this year are giving their largest contribution to any individual candidate to Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) who is both an unabashed liberal and a determined fighter for Israel."

Alexander noticed that in a number of this year's close Senatorial races — in states like South Dakota, Nevada, Colorado and Missouri the pro-Israel PACs have mainly been backing the Democratic candidates.

Alexander added that the two Republican Senators up for re-election this year who are most commonly identified with the Jesse Helms wing of the GOP — Steven Symms of Idaho and Jeremiah Denton of Alabama — have garnered very little money from pro-Israel sources, whereas their Democratic opponents have been lavishly funded by the pro-Israel PACs.

More PAC Money To Democrats in '86

A source familiar with the thinking at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) — the pro-Israel lobbying group which does not fund candidates but carefully monitors campaign contributions — said that "While the bulk of the money given in 1985 went to several incumbent Republican Senators who have built close relationships with the pro-Israel community, or who hold leadership positions on committees which are involved in the allocation of aid Israel, I am convinced that in 1986 we will see substantially more pro-Israel money going to Democrats — in both the Senate and House — than to Republicans."

The source added, "If anything, it is the Republicans who can legitimately complain that the net effect of pro-Israel giving will be the strengthening of the Democrats' prospects in the Senate and House."

The source also said that Jewish support could tip a few vital Senate seats to the Democrats and thus help them to regain control of the Senate, where they presently have only 47 seats to 53 for the Republicans.



Sen. Robert Packwood



Sen. Alfonse D'Amato



NATPAC's Richard Altman



Sen. Alan Cranston

Rewarding Loyal Incumbents

One Jewish Republican, Mark Neuman, political director of the pro-Republican National Jewish Coalition, had exactly that complaint.

"Kuttner is all wrong to say that pro-Israel PACs focus on giving to Republicans and conservatives. It is true that pro-Israel PACs have backed some Republican incumbents, like D'Amato, Kasten, and (Sen. Paula) Hawkins (R-Fla.) because these Senators have taken a leadership role in fighting for foreign aid for Israel, and in opposing arms sales to the Arabs. After all, the basic way pro-Israel PACs are supposed to operate is to reward incumbents who have stood by us."

Neuman noted, however, "The real test of political loyalties is not where you have a good incumbent of either party running against a challenger who might also be good on Israel, since pro-Israel PACs, almost by definition, must reward the incumbent. The test comes where you have an open seat, where the two candidates are a liberal Democrat and a moderate-to-conservative Republican."

According to Neuman, who has carefully monitored the funding of candidates by the pro-Israel PACs, "While the level of support of Democrats by the pro-Israel community is less than during the 1983-84 cycle, when it was about 80 percent, the tendency to support Democrats is still substantial. I believe

that at the end of the 1985-86 election cycle, you will find that the pro-Israel community backed Democrats over Republicans by something like 60-65 percent to 30-35 percent."

FEC Statistics

In fact, a perusal of the 1985-86 contribution figures by the eleven pro-Israel PACs which made the largest contributions during the 1983-84 elections shows that the PACs have so far this year given an overwhelming preponderance of their support to Democratic candidates.

According to the latest figures from the Federal Election Commission, which show PAC contributions to candidates of both parties through the end of June, 1986, only the Hudson Valley Political Action Committee (HVPAC) of all of the top pro-Israel PACs, has contributed more money to Republican candidates than to Democrats.

While the final figures for contributions by pro-Israel PACs are certain to be substantially higher by the end of the 1986 campaign than those now available, the breakdown between Democrats and Republicans seemed unlikely to change significantly from the pattern already set.

The largest pro-Israel PAC, National PAC, had, as of the end of June of this year, contributed \$285,500 to 58 Democratic Senatorial and House candidates.

Continued on Next Page

Continued

Elsewhere, he noted, 48 percent of the Jewish respondents declared themselves opposed to building more nuclear power plants; when asked in the next question if they would favor building such plants "to lessen dependence on Arab oil," those opposed still led 42 percent to 38 percent.

"There's a certain kind of Jew who feels embarrassed that he does anything because he's a Jew; he's a citizen of the world," said Himmelfarb sardonically.

Liberalism Is Comfortable

Cohen rejected Himmelfarb's belief that Jews merely suppress their own interest — out of a misguided, assimilationist universalism. For Jews, said Cohen, liberalism is "the most comfortable mode of integration" in America, not a means of assimilation. Unlike Saperstein, he attributed the anomaly of Jews voting against their economic interests to their continued historical sense of being outsiders, even in America. This led them to strongly consider extra-economic factors, he said.

Cohen also noted that more than most other groups, Jews had attained their prosperity by the route of higher education — a traditionally liberalizing influence.

The whole to-do over Jewish voting seems almost quaint during an era in which Jewish campaign money reaches much further than those few areas in which Jewish votes can make a difference. Jews are disproportionate political givers, through both Jewish political action committees and as individuals giving for both specifically pro-Israel and broader, multi-issue reasons.

But a vote remains something special, even a bit sacred, as a personal statement of where a citizen really stands. Political donations, by contrast, merely reflect where a citizen or group of



Chris Gersten

citizens want to insure they will have access. This is, perhaps, why even the most liberal Jewish political activists contacted for this story expressed scant concern that Jewish money travels to regions on the right where Jewish votes seldom venture (with the exception of some pro-Israel PAC money that has gone to Sen. Jesse Helms, about which many were angered).

Voting Is Still Important

Besides, in some places Jewish voters still can play a significant role. In 1978, Jews gave 55 percent of their vote to Sen. Charles Percy, who went on to become chairman of the important Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There, the Illinois Republican incurred



Rabbi David Saperstein

the wrath of pro-Israel activists with his criticism of Israel during the War in Lebanon and calls for greater U.S. "even handedness" in the Middle East — viewed by many as a codeword for tilting towards the Arabs.

By 1984, many ardent supporters of Israel nationally were orchestrating a drive to stop Percy's re-election and contributing generously to his opponent, liberal Democrat Paul Simon. Whether in response to this campaign or in reaction to a highly publicized pro-school prayer statement by Percy — or because of additional, unknown, reasons — Jews gave Simon more than 75 percent of their vote. This translated into roughly 62,500 votes in a squeaker Percy lost by less than 60,000.

That choice, however, was easy. Jews were merely called upon to follow their

already established tendency to pro-pro-Israel liberal Democrat over aerate to conservative Republican something less than ardor for Israel

The Jewish Litmus Test

The harder task some Jewish lit have set themselves is encourage respectable number of Jewish voters not necessarily a majority — for Israel, conservative Republican candidates facing attractive pro-Israelists who are better on a number of issues many Jews still seem to about.

In the case of D'Amato, the portents are not bad. But most believe Hawkins electoral chances the Jewish community are min.

"I think Jews are going to heavily for Graham because of the and the heavy Democratic tion," said Larry Lipman, Washington correspondent for the *Palm Beach Post*. "He really lends across the board demographic categories." Lipman covers Hawkins in Washington, also been covering her Senate race.

Current polls show Graham a slight lead over Hawkins. But downs into individual ethnic groups were not available.

M.J. Rosenberg, Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee, believes he knows one reason the difference in favor each camp finds with Jewish voters.

"Republicans identified with a stream Republicans can get Jewish support," he said. "Reagan — who to be considered right — is now not so much. Helms is now seen as because the whole country has shifted."


According to Rosenberg, those Republicans seen as closely allied with Christian Right and its outlook

Please turn to VOTE, Page

European Designer, Est. 1969 david stern designing jeweler gemologist

Original Designs
by david stern

Old World Craftsmanship
In New Era Design



Ladies 14 karat gold custom crafted ring containing 34 square cut Rubies weighing approx. 1.75 carat t.w. and 30 carat t.w. square cut Diamonds

'1780



Ladies 14 karat yellow gold designer curb link necklace.

'2875



Ladies 14 karat hand crafted ring containing 42 carat t.w. of brilliant cut Diamonds.

'850

QUALITY • INTEGRITY • RELIABILITY

• ALL WORK DONE ON PREMISES •
Appraisals & Repairs Done in Full View
While You Wait
FREE APPRAISALS FOR YOUR PERSONAL JEWELRY
with any purchase and this ad

- Custom Jewelry
- Estate Appraisals
- Restraining
- Full Service Repairs
- We Buy Gold & Diamonds

TIRED OF THE SAME
OLD STYLES?
CUSTOM DESIGNS AND
RE-DESIGNS OUR SPECIALTY!

(Continued)

and \$160,500 to 35 Republican candidates.

According to NATPAC director Richard Altman, NATPAC had contributed nearly \$860,000 as of October 20, of which 58 percent had gone to Democrats.

The second largest giver for 1983-84, the Joint Action Committee for Political Affairs, had in 1985-86 (through the end of June 1986) backed 70 Democrats to the tune of \$124,000, and given only \$9,000 to seven Republicans.

Morris Amitay, the onetime director of AIPAC, and today the director of WASHPAC, noted that the Federal Election Commission figures might be somewhat skewed in favor of the Democrats because of the inclusion of House races.

Amitay noted, "Democrats outnumber Republicans in the House, and as the majority party, the Democrats control the committee chairmanships. So the FEC figures would reflect heavy pro-Israel PAC support for Democratic House candidates."

Nevertheless, the FEC figures of pro-Israel PAC giving for Senate races are not substantially different than those overall Congressional giving.

Why Do PACs Prefer One Candidate Over Another?

In interviews with the *Jewish World*, directors of several of the key PACs and close observers of the pro-Israel PAC scene strongly denied that the pro-Israel PACs have either a pro-Democrat or pro-Republican bias. They stressed that the decisions as to which candidates to support are based entirely on candidates' voting records on key Congressional votes vis-a-vis Israel, and have nothing to do with a candidate's ideology or positions on other domestic and international issues.

The only exceptions to this rule are the Multi Issue PAC (MIPAC), and a Jewish women's PAC called JACPAC. Both MIPAC and JACPAC have a clearly liberal bias.

In cases where both the incumbent and his challenger have equally good records on Israel, the PACs will almost invariably support the incumbent. According to David Pollack, assistant executive director of the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York (JCRC), "One of the most basic principles of Jewish life is *hakarat ha tov* (the recognition of good), which translates into an increasing predilection of Jews to vote for incumbents who have supported Jewish interests."

GOP's New Courtship

The sources also pointed out that in seeking to understand why Democrats still come out ahead in receiving pro-Israel PAC money, it is important to remember that the avid courtship between conservative Republicans and the Jewish community leadership is still a relatively new phenomenon.

While the leaders of the pro-Israel PACs have become increasingly receptive to Republican candidates over the last several years, their personal ties and support for Democratic candidates generally go back much further. Many Democrats have a long record of support for pro-Israel positions on issues of critical importance to the pro-Israel PACs, such as foreign aid, while many conservative Republicans long opposed foreign aid, and have come around to support it only in the last several years.

According to a director of one of the leading pro-Israel PACs, "In deciding who to back among two candidates who are presently supportive of Israel, pro-Israel PACs will factor in the totality of each candidate's votes on Israel over their entire careers and not only in the last year or two.

"Over the last two years, we have been disappointed to see some longtime liberal friends, like Tim Wirth, vote against the foreign aid bill, which con-

tains the aid package for Israel, because aid to the Contras attached to the foreign aid bill. But if we look at (Wirth's) overall record, we see a page of votes which signifies clear understanding and support for Israel as a close friend and strategic ally of the U.S. As a result, we will not abandon him because he felt morally obligated to oppose (the foreign aid bill) in the present circumstances. We look at many indicators, of which foreign aid is only one."

The Nicaraguan Issue

Asked about the complaint of Neuman and other Republicans that many pro-Israel PACs are backing liberals over conservatives in a number of races, despite the positive votes of the latter on foreign aid recently and the opposition of the former, the source commented, "If one looks at the larger picture one sees that the liberals who have recently voted against the bill because of the Nicaraguan issue, are lifelong supporters of foreign aid, whereas the conservatives opposed foreign aid on ideological grounds until very recently. While we are very encouraged in the change of thinking by many conservatives on this issue, and are backing many Republican candidates who have made this change, we are not going to turn our backs on old and loyal friends because of disappointment over one or two votes."

The source cautioned, however,

"While some pro-Israel PACs may support a Democrat who opposed foreign aid this year, the question is whether they will decide to do so several years down the road if that trend continues."

In any event, despite the continued Democratic edge in securing pro-Israel money, Republicans have reason to be pleased with the unprecedented success of many of their candidates in securing Jewish backing in the last several years.

With the three national Republican committees raising five times as much as the three Democratic national committees nationwide, and with many Republicans receiving lavish gifts from business sources at a time when the clout of organized labor has been sharply reduced, any diminution in the traditional overwhelming Jewish support of Democratic candidates represents a sharp blow to the party and its candidates.

Also, the much greater support of pro-Israel PACs for Republicans than in 1983-84 indicates that if present trends continue, Republicans could reach parity with Democrats in terms of funds received from the pro-Israel community as early as 1987-88.

But Not Yet At Parity

Howard Kohr, deputy director of the National Jewish Coalition, says that

Republicans "are not yet at parity" with Democrats as far as receipt of funds from pro-Israel PACs are concerned.

He adds that he still sees an imbalance in terms of the way the pro-Israel community judges liberals and conservatives.

"For years, AIPAC attacked conservatives because they refused to back foreign aid bills, which included support for Marxist governments like Mozambique and organizations like the International Monetary Fund. Yet, when liberals refuse to back foreign aid (because of Contra support), we don't hear the same voices raised in the pro-Israel community. What we are saying is that they can't change the rules in the middle of the game."

Nevertheless, Kohr sees reason for encouragement. "There is no question that a great deal of progress has been made. After all, an organization like the National Jewish Coalition (which was organized and funded by wealthy Jewish Republicans seeking to wean the Jewish community from its traditional support of liberals) could not have existed ten years ago. The notion that the Jewish community is totally committed to liberal Democrats has been shown to simply not be the case any longer. There is a process of re-alignment underway in American politics, and Jews are demonstrably a part of that. A lot of old beliefs are being shaken up."

Please turn to PAC's, Page 24A

*Stop...
listen...
do you hear it?
It's coming...
and if you listen
you will hear
the quiet of
Fox Hollow calling you.*

*Follow the quiet for a sneak model preview
of the most exciting new concept in single
family country homes.*

*Two and three bedroom homes starting
from only \$89,900.*

*Pre-construction prices in effect
this week only before Grand Opening.*

Fox Hollow

Yesterday's Values Styled for Today.

Take I-95 to Hypoluxo Road west to Lawrence Road, turn left ¼ mile to Fox Hollow entrance.
Sales Office: 4248 Grove Park Lane, Lantana, Florida 33462/(305) 433-5133.
Open daily 10 am to 6 pm. Brokers Warmly Welcome.

Another fine development by Landa Properties, Inc.

Prices subject to change without notice.

[Jewish World, 6/12-18/87]
7A

Nicaragua's ambassador to the U.N. told Jewish activists last week that her government welcomed Jewish repossession of a synagogue in Managua that it had earlier expropriated.

Several who attended a meeting with her at Nicaragua's U.N. mission spoke of possibly converting it into a Jewish cultural or education center for Nicaraguans. They also suggested using it for services on the High Holy Days for Jewish volunteers from around the world working in Nicaragua.

Events surrounding the synagogue and the community that owns it have inspired one of the angriest sidelights to the debate in this country on the nature of the Sandinista government and the administration's campaign to convince Americans to oppose it.

The tiny Nicaraguan Jewish community that built the synagogue has left, mostly for Miami. In July, 1983, President Reagan charged that anti-Semitic policies by the Sandinista regime spurred this flight. But except for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Jewish organizations have refused to join this charge. Several days before Reagan made his accusation, the American Embassy in Managua also reported it could find no support for it.

It was in July, 1983 that Rabbi Merton Rosenthal, director of Latin American Affairs for ADL, and two Nicaraguan Jews appeared at a White House press conference with Reagan. There, the two Nicaraguans denounced the Sandinista regime as anti-Semitic. Virtually the entire Jewish community of some 80 to 100 people had fled, they asserted, due to anti-Semitic threats and actions by the Sandinista regime. They and their compatriots had had their property confiscated as part of the effort to drive them out, the two Jews said. The synagogue itself was firebombed by Sandinistas while a service was in progress during the revolution, they added.

But others, including Nicaragua's independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights, concluded there was no concerted policy of harassing Jews as such. The Jews, almost all businessmen, were among more than 2,000 individuals whose property was confiscated under an "absentee owner" decree after the revolution. Other reports gave credence to incidents of anti-Semitic threats during the revolution that did not add up to Sandinista policy.

Some critics charged that Rosenthal and the ADL were cynically colluding with the administration in an attempt to mobilize the Jewish community behind the administration's Central American policy. Rosenthal angrily denied the charge.

Rosenthal waged a long campaign to secure the return of the synagogue, which was expropriated by the government after the Jews' departure. The Sandinistas at first claimed it had been taken as one of several properties owned

by Anastasio Somoza, a former communal leader they charged was a crony of Anastasio Somoza, the dictator overthrown by the revolution. But confronted with the deed showing communal ownership, the Sandinistas ultimately relented and acknowledged the synagogue's status.

In the meantime, however, the property had been given over to the Sandinista Youth Commission, which inhabited it until recently. At last week's meeting, Astorga announced that the group has now been vacated.

Rosenthal related that the Nicaraguan Jews were now "favorably disposed" to having the synagogue taken over by SEDICO, the Association of Jews in Central America. Rosenthal said he had recently spoken with SEDICO President Moises Sahaj of Guatemala, and he responded positively to the idea.

Last January, Edgar Chamorro, a former contra leader, told the Boston Globe of a meeting with three CIA officers in Coral Gables, Fla., in the spring of 1983, where they discussed ways of promoting the contra cause in the United States. One idea, he said, was to "target" American Jews by making the case that the Sandinistas were anti-Semitic. The plan was to invite two Nicaraguan Jews to the White House to give them a platform for dumping stories about mistreatment by the Sandinistas, he claimed.

Chamorro, who served from 1982 to 1984 as a director of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the main contra military organization, said all at the meeting knew the two men had not been persecuted for being Jews. "This was just a propaganda-type thing," he said. But he added that the CIA men viewed such "propaganda" as very valuable.

—Larry Cohler

The form

Jew.
Nica

S

N a that Nicar relations among fighting t But she nizes Isra ages, the zens of the

In an meeting: sion in N Astorga t Nicaragu condemn the origi also invit reinhabit which th one point tests and

But As Israel's r revealed c the Iran c

Enjoy Our Sight



from CURACAO
\$345

ITLM-ATIFL

4 days/3 nights per person double occ

Includes round trip airfare from Miami • Best hotels. Many other extras. 4 & 7 nights packa

How 'Jewish' Do Jews Vote?

By Larry Cohler

On Nov. 4, 1980, Adam Simms, being a reasonably committed Jew of sound mind and body, walked into a voting booth on Long Island and pulled the lever for Jimmy Carter. He did so after taking a deep breath for thoughtful reflection, and he did so with a number of misgivings.

But in the end, of course, he did so.

As Jews have, at least since Roosevelt, Simms contributed his ballot to the time honored tradition of making the Democratic the leading Jewish choice — albeit this time by a strikingly narrow plurality of 15 percent to Ronald Reagan's 10 percent and John Anderson's 16 percent.

In 1990, when a problematic Carter faced a largely untested and unknown Reagan, this choice seemed no great problem for most Jewish leaders. But by 1984, a nationally popular Reagan had established his reputation as the most ardently pro-Israel president in recent American history. And suddenly, when Simms and some two-thirds of Jewish voters pulled the lever for Walter Mondale, the news was disconcerting for more than a few Jewish leaders. Reagan's exertions for Israel, they noted, resulted in fewer Jewish votes than the first time he ran.

Now, the 1986 off year elections are at hand. And those in the know are aware that in the last off year elections, Jews outdid their presidential pattern, giving some three-quarters of their ballots to mostly liberal Democrats. With many of the Republican senators first elected on Reagan's coattails now up for reelection, some Jewish leaders are uneasy on rushing to respond to the fundamentally new phenomenon Reagan and these senators heralded: militant conservatives who are ardently pro-Israel but had on many other issues Jews care about in large numbers.

Graham vs. Hawkins

In Florida, Republican Sen. Paula Hawkins is facing a very tough challenge from Governor Bob Graham. Even Graham partisans agree Hawkins has bent over backwards to appeal to Jews on Israel, voting against her own Republican president on the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia despite great pressures. She continued to do so on a number of other arms sales pushed by the administration and flawlessly backed the foreign aid packages sought by pro-Israel activists for their cause.

But Hawkins also supports a constitutional amendment that would permit voluntary prayer in the public schools (though for now she says she would settle for a moment of silence); she backs the right of local school boards to require the teaching of creationism in their schools; she is a staunch opponent of women's right to abortion and enjoys the endorsement of Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell. Surveys indicate that American Jews support a nuclear test ban by a large majority, but she opposes this too.

Graham, who has long and deep relations with the Florida Jewish com-

munity and is known as a warm friend of Israel, holds opposite positions on all these issues. Asked about this by the *Jewish World*, Hawkins replied, "If I had a 100 percent report card on Israel issues when I wasn't committed to that prior to being elected, it seems to me I'd be rewarded by the Jewish vote (despite being) for a 'moment of silence' in schools. That's the kind of senator you need. A 'moment of silence' is a good trade-off."

Jews For Hawkins

In Florida's Boca Raton, local federation president James Nohd has joined with a number of former federation presidents in fearfully echoing Hawkins' view.

"Wouldn't it be something," they said in a leaflet mailed out to most of the county's Jews, "if history showed that Florida Jewish voters turned their backs on a trusted friend and supporter. Worse yet, we'd send a message to the United States Congress that support for Israel and Jewish causes holds no rewards in the Jewish community."

"Please let's not let anyone say that Florida's Jewish voter deserted a friend and supporter. Let's stand by Senator Hawkins as she has stood by us."

In a telephone interview, Nohd stressed he signed the Hawkins leaflet in his capacity as a private individual. He added that many Jewish leaders were backing Graham.

But the view voiced by Nohd is no isolated one among Jewish leaders in similar situations.

D'Amato vs. Green

In New York, Republican Sen. Alfonse D'Amato has backed Israel to the hilt and taken a lead role on Soviet Jewry as head of the congressional Helsinki Commission. His high-profile role at Marilyn Klinghoffer's side after her husband's murder by Palestinian terrorists is matched by numerous unpublicized acts supporting Jewish interests, say local Jewish leaders.

But the conservative D'Amato also opposes abortion and gay rights while more than 80 percent of American Jews support these causes, according to an American Jewish Committee survey. And like Hawkins, D'Amato strongly backs the hard-line Reagan arms control policies most Jews oppose.

His opponent, Mark Green, can point to a record of support for Israel and is much more in line with traditionally liberal New York Jewish views on other issues. But Green, who has held no previous public office, has run an undistinguished campaign and has been hobbled by an almost total lack of funds compared to the cash-rich D'Amato.

Rewarding Loyal Incumbents

Now many Jewish leaders are anticipating that Jewish voters will finally break the mold and back a pro-Israel conservative running against a weak pro-Israel liberal challenger this November.

One such leader, speaking on condi-



Gov. Bob Graham



Sen. Paula Hawkins

tion of anonymity, noted that D'Amato had done all he did for Israel and Soviet Jewry after receiving but three percent of the Jewish vote six years ago. This leader and many of his colleagues, he said, "feel an obligation to Hawkins and D'Amato. We have a responsibility to send a message that (Jews) will reward and appreciate."

Will rank-and-file Jewish voters accommodate these leaders' hopes? A September poll by the Marist College Institute For Public Opinion showed 32 percent of the Jews in New York State favoring D'Amato and 32 percent for Green. This compared to more than 47 percent of the overall sample favoring D'Amato and only 24.8 percent for the heavily outspent Green. But another poll, which has yet to be released, indicates Jews coming down three to two for D'Amato.

In essence, from their point of view, the question these leaders are posing is, "How 'Jewish' are Jewish voters willing to vote?"

Faith To Tradition

To Rabbi David Saperstein of the Reform movement's Religious Action Center, this pattern is evidence of Jews' faith to their traditions, despite the narrow interests that could lead elsewhere.

"By dint of our history of giving," he said, "We accept that you sacrifice for the good of the whole. If you are wealthier you have a particular obligation to do that."

Reform and Conservative Jews, he added, are particularly influenced by the Prophetic Tradition emphasizing pursuit of social justice as a core religious obligation.

The Jewish voting pattern is, of course, well-known in its general outline.

These voting patterns do no more than reflect the political attitudes many Jews hold. A 1984 survey sponsored by the American Jewish Committee indicated

that as the country has moved to the right, the Jews have too, to some extent. But because both Jews and the general electorate have shifted, the Jews retain approximately the same relative position on the left of the political spectrum.

Findings

Among the main findings of the survey, done by sociology professor Steven M. Cohen:

• Self-defined liberals outnumber conservatives by more than four to one. But middle-of-the-road Jews are about as numerous as the liberals.

• Jewish Democrats outnumber Republicans by more than four to one. But the Democratic column has been shrinking in favor of independents.

Generally, Cohen's survey indicates that the less intensively Jews are involved in religious and social life, the more markedly liberal their political attitudes. But at a certain point of assimilation this relationship abruptly changes, and Jews show no more liberalism than the rest of the electorate. Apparently, at that point, Jews not only live like WASPS but start voting like them.

To Milton Himmelfarb, retired director of research at the AJCommittee and a close observer of Jewish social behavior, Cohen's survey is proof positive that Jews don't vote or think Jewishly at all when it comes to politics. Their marked liberalism may be distinctive in relation to the electorate, he conceded, but that should not be confused with a clear understanding of Jewish political interests and a willingness to act on them.

Himmelfarb pointed to some survey items that tested the respondents' willingness to alter their liberalism for Jewish interests. In particular, he asked how could Jews be both for military cuts and a strong U.S. military to insure Israel's security?

Continued on Next Page

Israeli-U.S. Officials Study Lavi Jet

A senior Israeli Defense Ministry official has formally participated in the Pentagon's steering committee looking into possible alternatives to the development of the Lavi jet fighter, U.S. officials said. They described this as an "unprecedented" development in U.S.-Israeli military relations.

In recent months, they said, the head of the Israeli Defense Ministry's Purchasing Mission in New York, Avraham Ben-Yosef, has taken part in several inter-agency meetings on the Lavi at the Pentagon.

These sessions are chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Resources, Dov Zakheim, who earlier this year completed a Pentagon study showing that the Lavi would cost Israel considerably more than Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) has projected.

By December, Zakheim and his group are expected to submit to Israel a formal set of proposals aimed at convincing Israel to drop its planned production of 300 Lavi's over the next 20 years. The Pentagon remains convinced that the Lavi program is simply too expensive for Israel.

Instead, the U.S. would like Israel to consider alternatives, such as the possible co-production in Israel of a new plane consisting of an F-16 airframe with Lavi-inspired avionics.

Zakheim's group has reportedly been considering various other proposals which would be extremely attractive to Israeli officials.

For example, the U.S. could theoretically include in a new package the release of highly-classified technology involving the Stealth bomber, which is invisible to enemy radar. While the Lavi's avionics and electronics are

considered to be state-of-the-art, the plane's basic airframe is not.

Thus, the alternatives study could prove to be so attractive to the Israeli Air Force that existing plans for the development of the Lavi might in the end be dropped.

The decision to allow Ben-Yosef to participate in the Pentagon discussions was designed in large measure to reassure Israel of the Reagan administration's good intentions in moving ahead with the alternatives study. Zakheim, who personally has come under criticism in Israel for his earlier cost estimates, pushed for Ben-Yosef's participation. It was not opposed.

At the meetings, according to U.S. officials, Ben-Yosef has emerged as an active participant, making Israel automatically privy to all the latest U.S. thinking on the Lavi.

The U.S. already has allowed Israel to use over \$1 billion in military grants for the research and development of the Lavi in the U.S. and Israel. Despite this huge investment, the Americans still believe that Israel would be better off finding an alternative fighter.

The Lavi steering committee consists of experts from the Pentagon, the State Department, the National Security Council, the Office of Management and Budget and other governmental agencies.

Meanwhile, the General Accounting Office, a "watchdog" arm of the U.S. Congress, is currently in the midst of completing its own study on the costs of the Lavi. Its final conclusions remain unclear.

U.S. officials said that the GAO report might, in the end, support the Israeli figures — as opposed to those offered by the Pentagon. "But that hasn't happened yet," a well-informed source said. "The end result might be that the GAO could wind up somewhere down the middle."

— Wolf Blitzer

U.S. Holds Up Israel-Honduras Jet Sale

The Reagan administration is divided over Israel's proposed sale of Kfir jet fighters to Honduras, authoritative U.S. officials have disclosed.

Israeli Aircraft Industries has won a tentative contract from the Central American country for the Kfirs but the U.S. Treasury Department is still refusing to sign-off on the sale, the officials said.

Because the Kfir is powered by an American-made jet engine, the U.S. has veto power over all exports. Early in the Reagan administration, the U.S. approved the sale of 2 Kfirs to Ecuador.

As a result of that sale, Israel had anticipated no serious problems surfacing in Washington in connection with the new one to Honduras.

The sale is very important for IAI, which has been working on the contract for several years. There was no disclosure of the exact number of Kfirs involved.

— Wolf Blitzer

GOLDEN GREEK



**FAST FOOD FRANCHISES NOW AVAILABLE
SPECIALIZING IN GYROS, GREEK SALADS**

PITA SANDWICHES AND KA-BOS

**RAPIDLY EXPANDING IN
REGIONAL MALLS AND SHOPPING CENTERS
COAST TO COAST
NOW AVAILABLE**

**ALABAMA—FLORIDA—GEORGIA—LOUISIANA
MAINE—NEW JERSEY—OHIO—WASHINGTON, D.C.
NORTH CAROLINA—SOUTH CAROLINA
ALSO—ARGENTINA—PANAMA—VENEZUELA**

**CONTACT
FRANCHISE DEVELOPMENT
G.G.I. ENTERPRISES, INC.**

**6360 NW FIFTH WAY—SUITE 100
FT. LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33309
(305) 776-0738**

THE COURT AT PALM-AIRE

The Very Best In Residential Retirement Living.

- *Elegant Surroundings*
- *Gracious Residential Living*
- *Companionship*
- *Peace of Mind*
- *Security*



NOW OPEN!
Join our family of residents.

All Rental Programs Include . . .

- 24 hour security
- Resort environment
- Spacious studio, one-bedroom, two-bedroom and deluxe apartments
- Elegant dining
- Bus service
- Maid and linen service
- 24 hour emergency nursing service
- Pool, health spa and exercise rooms
- Numerous social activities
- Emergency call buttons
- Library, card room, art studio, music room and auditorium
- Beauty and barber shop
- And much more

Another community by

LIFE CARE COMMUNITIES CORPORATION

For more information call: (305) 975-8900. Or complete and mail this coupon today to: The Court at Palm-Aire, Inc. 2701 N. Course Dr. Pompano Beach, FL 33069

Name _____
Address _____
City _____

The Court
at Palm-Aire

MARTINO TIRE CO.

GOODYEAR

**Complete Line of Goodyear Tires in Stock
LARGEST INDEPENDENT GOODYEAR DEALER IN SOUTH FLORIDA**

5% SENIOR CITIZENS DISCOUNT
55 YEARS OR OLDER

WITH COUPON

ENGINE TUNE-UP

• Check Electronic Ignition Starting and Charging Systems • Install New Spark Plugs and Rotor • Set Timing to Recommended Specs • Adjust Carburetor • Lubricate and Adjust Choke

\$44.88 6 Cyl. \$49.88 8 Cyl.

\$39.88 MOST CARS 4 CYL.

Phone, valve, plugs & labor. For standard 4-cyl. and 56 for 1-cyl. 4-cyl. and 6-cyl. For 1-cyl. 4-cyl. and 6-cyl. add \$12 additional labor.

WITH COUPON

COOLING SYSTEM SPECIAL

• Pressure test the system and the radiator cap • Inspect all hoses and tighten at connections • Inspect and adjust all belts • Inspect both the radiator and water pump • Drain & refill the radiator and the cooling system

\$19.88 most cars

includes 1 gallon coolant antifreeze

CHEVETTES EXTRA
EXPIRES 10/31/86

WITH COUPON

AIR CONDITIONING SERVICE SPECIAL

• Freon Charge (upto 1 lb.) • Check for A/C Leaks • Check and tighten A/C Belt

\$14.88 Most Cars & Light Trucks

Evacuate & recharge A/C extra

EXPIRES 10/31/86

WITH COUPON

SHOCK ABSORBERS H.D. J SERIES

\$12.88 Each installed most cars

25% OFF 18 Product 11 Monroe Auto Equipment

On All Other Lines Of Monroe Shocks, Strut Cartridges, Gas Shocks, Air Shocks, Etc.

EXPIRES 10/31/86

8 ways to charge: American Express, Diners Club, Mastercard, Carte Blanche, Goodyear Silver Card, Choice, Discover, Visa.

LAKE PARK: 1018 FEDERAL HWY. 848-6648
LAKE WORTH: 4690 LAKE WORTH RD. 969-0808
Ask For DICK or JOHNNY
Ask for QUENTIN or CLAIR