

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988

Folder Title:

Jordan Arms Sales (2 of 2)

Box: 15

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Jordan's
Arm

Jordan's Real Security Needs

Jordan's main security threats are terrorism and subversion. King Hussein is constantly threatened by terrorism or even civil war, conducted by groups hostile to the peace process, either acting alone or with the support of outside powers.

Internal threats have been endemic to Jordan since its inception. There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to assassinate King Hussein, and King Abdullah was murdered by a dissident. At various times, groups in the military have plotted to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy. And, in 1970 and 1971 there was a major civil war in which the PLO and Arafat tried to take over the country. In recent years there have been numerous terrorist incidents. None of these episodes could have been countered by advanced fighter aircraft or antiaircraft missiles. Indeed, worldwide experience has demonstrated that the only ways to deal with this sort of threat is the skill and vigilance of internal security forces coupled with a proper program of economic development.

Jordan's Growing Arsenal

The Jordanian military has been substantially modernized in the last few years, and Jordan has no desperate need for new weapons. In recent years Jordan has been importing massive quantities of new weaponry. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, total Jordanian arms imports from 1981 to 1983 (the most recent figures available) amounted to over \$3 billion, including \$1.1 billion in 1983 alone. Indeed, Jordan was the world's seventh largest importer of arms in 1983. (Iraq and Saudi Arabia were first and second, and Israel ranked only 27th.) By contrast, Israel's purchases were only \$2.5 billion from 1981 to 1983, and only \$370 million in 1983.

These imports have included new French-built Mirage F-1 fighters, British Khalid battle tanks, Austrian artillery, and Spanish aircraft. Only a few weeks ago Jordan ordered arms worth \$300 million from Britain. American weapons sold to Jordan in recent years have included AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, Maverick air-to-ground missiles, tank modernization kits, and a variety of other weapons.

Jordan's Real Security Needs

Jordan's main security threats are terrorism and subversion. King Hussein is constantly threatened by terrorism or even civil war, conducted by groups hostile to the peace process, either acting alone or with the support of outside powers.

Internal threats have been endemic to Jordan since its inception. There have been numerous unsuccessful attempts to assassinate King Hussein, and King Abdullah was murdered by a dissident. At various times, groups in the military have plotted to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy. And, in 1970 and 1971 there was a major civil war in which the PLO and Arafat tried to take over the country. In recent years there have been numerous terrorist incidents. None of these episodes could have been countered by advanced fighter aircraft or antiaircraft missiles. Indeed, worldwide experience has demonstrated that the only ways to deal with this sort of threat is the skill and vigilance of internal security forces coupled with a proper program of economic development.

Jordan's Growing Arsenal

The Jordanian military has been substantially modernized in the last few years, and Jordan has no desperate need for new weapons. In recent years Jordan has been importing massive quantities of new weaponry. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, total Jordanian arms imports from 1981 to 1983 (the most recent figures available) amounted to over \$3 billion, including \$1.1 billion in 1983 alone. Indeed, Jordan was the world's seventh largest importer of arms in 1983. (Iraq and Saudi Arabia were first and second, and Israel ranked only 27th.) By contrast, Israel's purchases were only \$2.5 billion from 1981 to 1983, and only \$370 million in 1983.

These imports have included new French-built Mirage F-1 fighters, British Khalid battle tanks, Austrian artillery, and Spanish aircraft. Only a few weeks ago Jordan ordered arms worth \$300 million from Britain. American weapons sold to Jordan in recent years have included AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, Maverick air-to-ground missiles, tank modernization kits, and a variety of other weapons.

ann ode

Jordan/Defense Industry Liaison List

<u>Company</u>	<u>Product</u>	<u>Contact</u>
General Dynamics	F-16, Stinger Tanks	Jim Farber 553-1287 Carl Lauenstein Moon Mullins
FMC	APCs, Bradley	Wally Plummer 920-4255 John Mullett 293-7900
Raytheon	I-HAWK	Don Floyd 979-6100
Northrop	F-20, F-5	Woelf Gross 525-6767
Ford Aerospace	AIM-9J/AIM-9P	
Lockheed	C-130	Jim Roberts 955-3323
Westinghouse	TPS-43/63 Radars	

(Hughes Aircraft

TOWs, Radars
Maverick Missiles

Bell Helicopter
(Textron)

Cobra Helos

Sikorsky
(United Technologies)

S-76 Helos

Hughes Helicopters
(McDonnell-Douglas)

500D Helos

Stan Kimmitt
553-3800

Teledyne

Tank Engines, Avionics
Computers

Dick Hobbs

Cessna

T-37 Trainers

General Electric

A/C Engines, Radars

Bill Lehfeldt
637-4522

Bendix

Avionics

Rockwell (Collins)

A/C Radios, Laser
Trackers

Boeing-Vertol

CH-47 Helicopters

Texas Instruments

Laser Guided Bombs,
Tank Sights

BMV Corp.

M109-SP Howitzers

Marquardt Corp.

Rockeye Bombs

AM General

Military Vehicles

Honeywell

Radars and Avionics

Singer

Air Navigation Sets



THE AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

AIPAC MEMORANDUM

500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

September 27, 1985

HUSSEIN AVOIDS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

The United States has been waiting years for Jordan to sit down face-to-face with Israel to make peace. But each time we have called on the King to deliver on his promise, he has slipped away to take refuge behind another complicated maneuver.

Now, in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1985, the King has said and done nothing new.

The course the King is advocating is the very opposite of that followed by Anwar Sadat. Sadat said, "I will go to Jerusalem," and so he did. In one great step, cutting through all the rhetoric and hatred, the President of Egypt sat down with the Prime Minister of Israel, to negotiate the differences between the two countries.

Jordan, by contrast, says that "direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel are out of the question," in the words of a top Jordanian official, and proposes instead to lure the U.S. into the trap of an international conference under the control of the Soviet Union, Syria, and the PLO. "It is Jordan's position that the appropriate auspice is an international conference hosted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to which are invited the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the parties of the conflict."

Sadat explained in his memoirs that it was exactly to get away from the dangerous concept of an international conference, that he decided to go to Jerusalem.

An international conference would be yet another forum for the usual gang-up-on-Israel propaganda show, not a serious venue for peace negotiations. It would be a setting in which radical Arab and Communist forces would control events and exercise a veto over actions that the moderates might otherwise take. It would be a vehicle to advance the goals of the Soviet Union, Syria and the PLO, rather than peace between Israel and Jordan.

This is why the concept of the international conference originated in Moscow, and has been most ardently sponsored by radical allies of the Soviet Union like Syria and the PLO.

It is also the reason that the forces of moderation in the Middle East--like Anwar Sadat, the government of Israel, and the Reagan Administration--have recognized the trap and declined to be lured into it.

So when King Hussein insists on an "international conference" instead of direct negotiations, what he is in fact doing is moving away from peace and toward the position of the U.S.S.R. Indeed, the Hussein Plan of 1985 has less similarity to Camp David or the Reagan Plan, than it does to the Brezhnev Plan of 1982. The King has still failed to take an irrevocable step toward peace.

The time is now for Hussein to stop all these maneuvers and sit down with Israel face-to-face. Until he does, it is certainly not the time to give him lethal military equipment.



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

Jerusalem Post International Edition - September 28, 1985

Royal double-talk

How serious are King Hussein's 'peace moves'? HIRSH GOODMAN argues that the Jordanian monarch is less concerned with a Middle East settlement than with paving the way for the supply of advanced American fighter planes to his air force. Such planes would be an added threat to Israel's security and would strengthen the voice of those who say that it would be dangerous strategically to give up any part of the West Bank, writes Goodman.

IT IS GENUINELY difficult to understand Richard Murphy's staunch defence of Jordan's King Hussein on Capital Hill last week. The king had moved courageously and consequently faces overt threats to his regime and associates, the U.S. assistant secretary of state told a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

Even to Murphy's attuned diplomatic ear, the phrase must have sounded hollow indeed. For the truth of the matter is that the king has done anything but move courageously; indeed, he has ensured that this latest American-inspired peace initiative is doomed to oblivion, as were its predecessors.

When Murphy visited this region in August, King Hussein's position was that movement towards peace must be staggered. As learned from high-level sources, Hussein envisaged four stages: First, Murphy would meet four to six of the Palestinians on the list of seven submitted jointly by the PLO and Hussein; second, the PLO would then recognize Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; third, this would then lead to an American-PLO dialogue aimed at "legitimizing" the PLO, and fourth, in the final stage, there would be an international peace conference that would include all the Arab states, the PLO and the Soviets.

Murphy's counter-proposal was simple: he was prepared to meet with up to four members of the Palestinian list on condition that this was a prelude to a meeting between Israel, Jordan the U.S., the Palestinians and possibly Egypt to discuss tangible moves towards peace.

Hussein turned him down flatly and unequivocally. The king refused to budge on any of the four conditions he had stipulated - not even the demand for an international peace conference that the king knows is anathema to both Israel and the U.S., who have made it clear that a peace process that would include the Soviets and Syrians can only fail.

WHEN Prime Minister Shimon Peres visited the U.S. in late 1984, he used two powerful arguments against an international conference - arguments that were adopted and supported by the administration at the time. "If the Syrians sit at the table," Peres told Secretary of State George Shultz at a meeting at the State Department, "all the Arabs will dance according to the Syrian tune. If the Soviets are at the table," Peres continued, "the U.S. will be forced by circumstance to adopt a totally pro-Israel position, thus negating America's role as 'honest broker.'"

Murphy knows as well as the king that the last of the king's four in-violate conditions was introduced in order to preclude peace, not facilitate it.

Murphy left Amman further from achieving movement towards peace than before he embarked on his mission. To all intents and purposes the American peace initiative in its current form is dead; and Hussein, by the artful employment of double-talk diplomacy, has buried it.

The assistant secretary's interpretation of Hussein's recent actions as "courageous" steps toward Israel is perhaps better understood if one recognizes that Murphy, in addition to reporting on the pursuance of peace, is representing the administration that later this month is expected to place before Congress notification of its intention to sell Jordan sophisticated military equipment worth billions.

Given that Congress has emphatically linked the sale of any weapons to Jordan to tangible movement by Jordan toward peace, Murphy could hardly have been expected to report to Congress, when the administration hopes to "sell" it an arms package, that the king is as obdurate as ever. Once again, it seems, American diplomatic goals in the Middle East have been made subservient to



Assistant Secretary Murphy ... when diplomatic goals become subservient to economic ones. (Andre Bruttman)

economic ones; again long-term interests have lost out to short-term considerations based on the warped logic that pumping more TNT into the Middle East will bring about peace and stability.

The Reagan Administration is determined to go through with its arms package. That much has been made clear by administration officials who rationalize the inconsistency in policy goals with the now glib explanation that Hussein, with all his faults, remains pro-Western and moderate.

"And anyway," these officials continue, "if we don't sell him arms, the Europeans will" — an argument that gained considerable credibility last week when Britain announced over \$4 billion in sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

THE BRITISH decision, however, is not enough to get Murphy off the hook. Unlike the U.S., Britain has no pretension about spearheading a peace effort in the Middle East. Britain has no goal, no responsibility other than to provide employment for its troubled factories and foreign exchange to bolster its limp economy.

King Hussein neither requested nor received from Britain the high-grade sophisticated fighters requested from the Americans that would cut flying times from Amman to Jerusalem from four minutes to under three; and that are capable of delivering tons of ordnance on high density population targets with greater penetrability and survivability than ever before.

And even if the British do supply Tornados (that the king would have had to pay for — albeit under generous terms of credit), these would in no way be comparable to the F-16s the Americans are intending to supply, to be paid for, in the main part, by American aid. Israel would obviously prefer that there be no upgrading of the Jordanian air force; but if planes are to be supplied, better they be Tornados with the technology of the '70s than F-16s or F-20s, with the technology of the '90s.

In essence, if the Reagan Administration goes ahead with its intention to supply Hussein with weapons as a prize for obduracy, no matter what the rationale, even the most determined Israeli dove will have a hard time countering the scepticism and cynicism that such a decision must generate.

How can any responsible Israeli leader speak of territorial compromise — the giving up of vital strategic depth on the West Bank — when a Jordan that has submitted its foreign policy to PLO sanction receives weapons that would necessitate better early warning capabilities for

Israel. Under these circumstances no Israeli prime minister could counsel compromise and survive politically. If anything, a U.S. Administration decision to go ahead with a sophisticated weapons package to Jordan would add to the arguments of the right-wing of the national unity government (both in the Likud and Labour) who propound the non-negotiability of Eretz Yisrael, and who adamantly oppose any movement on the peace front beyond the narrow interpretation of the Camp David accords.

HUSSEIN, by standing by the four conditions laid down by the PLO, has done more than disappoint Murphy and play into the hands of the Israeli right. He has effectively eroded the support he enjoyed on the West Bank.

"If there is no difference between Hussein's position and that of the PLO, why should a Palestinian on the West bank support a 'Beduin King,' when he can identify with his own leaders," a senior Israeli defence official asked rhetorically last week.

The same official said that those charged with monitoring the situation on the West Bank were "amazed" at how quickly Hussein's power base, which gained considerably after Yasser Arafat's expulsion from Tripoli, has dissipated.

On Wednesday night last week, at a banquet in Amman in honour of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the Jordanian monarch used current events in the West Bank and Gaza to illustrate his point. Hussein again embarked on his well-worn litany of how time is running out; how fanaticism and radicalism are replacing reason; and how the suffering of his conquered brethren must be ended.

Indeed it must. But radicalizing West Bank moderates, strengthening Israeli hard-liners and ensuring the perennial stalemate of American peace initiatives is not the way to go about it. Neither is the unbridled supply of weapons to Jordan by the Americans. In the final analysis, the U.S. must recognize that weapons supplied independent of any movement toward peace are essentially the means of war.

The writer is the defence correspondent of The Jerusalem Post.

THE JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE

Questions & Answers

HOW DOES THE JORDAN ARMS SALE HARM U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

- It reduces the incentives for King Hussein to enter the peace process.
- It escalates an already staggering arms race in the region and heightens the likelihood of conflict.
- Until the King makes peace with Israel, a Jordanian arms buildup adds to the threat to the Jewish state.
- It narrows Israel's margin of security and weakens the Peres government's ability to take risks for peace.
- It deepens Israel's dependence on West Bank facilities to ensure her security and it adds to the burden on Israel's economy.

AIPAC

American Israel Public Affairs Committee
500 N. Capitol Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20001
(202) 638-2256

SUMMARY

Despite some positive words, King Hussein is in fact moving away from direct negotiations with Israel. Instead, he is embracing the Soviet concept of an "international conference" at which radical Arab forces and the U.S.S.R. would play a decisive role. He is seeking a position acceptable to the PLO and Syria, rather than begin a dialogue about real peace with Israel.

The Jordan arms package is therefore unwarranted, because the King faces no "added element of risk" of conventional attack like he might face if he broke with the radicals and sought peace with Israel.

In fact, delivery of this package under current conditions would hurt the peace process rather than advancing it, for two reasons: (1) It would reward obduracy and send a signal that when Jordan sits tight the U.S. will come around to its point of view. This would be a disincentive for the King to take the next steps that are necessary for peace. (2) It will erode Israel's margin of security, weakening the national unity government led by Shimon Peres and reducing its ability to take risks for peace. At the same time, it will add to the burdens on Israel's economy and force the Jewish state to choose between its economic health and its security.

The package threatens Israel because it builds the arsenal of Israel's closest neighbor, sharing its longest border. It increases the combined Arab capability to launch a surprise air attack, and might create an air defense umbrella under which the Arab ground forces can advance while being shielded from the Israeli Air Force (much as Syrian and Egyptian air defense played a key role in the combined surprise attack of October 6, 1973).

Jordan is not the most militant state in the Arab coalition, but it has participated in three past rounds of fighting against Israel. Its geographical proximity to Israel's heartland, and the high quality of its forces, give it an importance in the Arab coalition out of proportion to its size.

Israel cannot rely on Jordanian assurances to the U.S. that weapons supplied will not be used against Israel. In 1964, the U.S. supplied tanks to Jordan on the basis of such an assurance, but three years later Jordan violated the agreement and sent the tanks to the West Bank where they participated in the Six Day War. In 1973, U.S. weapons were sent with Jordanian troops to the Golan Heights, to support Syrian fighting against Israel.

While the Administration is describing the package as needed for Jordanian defense against Syria, Syria supports the sale to "the Jordanians, our brothers." Syria and Jordan are now engaged in a process of reconciliation, and historically have found it possible to cooperate against Israel on the battlefield even during periods when there were otherwise tensions between them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	The Peace Process and the Arms Sale	1
II.	Jordan and the Arms Sale	7
III.	Syria and the Arms Sale	15
IV.	The Threat to Israel	21
V.	The Effect on Israel's Economy	41

Section I:

**The Peace Process
and
The Arms Sale**

DOES THIS ARMS SALE CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS?

No. The arms sale is not a part of the peace process, but the antithesis of it. Weapons supplied independent of any movement toward peace are essentially the means of war.

A military buildup in Jordan--Israel's closest neighbor with the longest border--will further erode Israel's margin of security and increase the importance of vital strategic depth on the "West Bank." Going ahead with the Jordan arms sale under today's conditions--in the absence of direct negotiations with King Hussein--will weaken the Government of Israel led by Shimon Peres and its ability to accept risks in the peace process.

The arms sale will have an adverse impact on Jordan's positions in the peace process. For this process to have any prospect of success, King Hussein must go much further than he has in breaking with the radicals and agreeing to sit down with Israel. But, at the present time, he is taking refuge behind positions that will be acceptable to the radicals. If, under these circumstances, the United States nonetheless goes ahead with an arms sale, the message will go out that Jordanian obduracy pays off, and that when the Arabs dig in the U.S. will eventually come around to their position. This is the opposite of the situation that is required for the peace process to succeed. Giving in to Hussein, going ahead with the arms sale in spite of his failure to deliver in the peace process, will reduce the incentive for King Hussein to enter peace negotiations.

Conversely, American firmness--saying no to arms until Hussein sits down to real peace negotiations with Israel--is the one thing that can break this stalemate. It will say to Hussein, "The ball is in your court, and the choice is yours." It will keep the pressure on the Arab confrontation states to move toward real peace with Israel.

IS KING HUSSEIN DOING WHAT IS NEEDED FOR PEACE?

No. What is needed now is for Jordan to sit down to negotiate peace directly with Israel. This it has not done for 37 years and King Hussein continues to refuse to do so. At the very time that America is looking to him to take the courageous step that is necessary for peace, the King is retreating behind positions designed to win support from Arab radicals, not peace with Israel.

In fact, the position the King is now taking is actually a step backward from the position he took before this year. Consider the record:

- o In August 1982, the King privately assured the Administration that he was approaching a decision to enter negotiations with Israel.
- o In January 1983, the King told the United States that he had taken a decision to meet with Israel--provided he could get a Green Light from Arafat.
- o In April 1985, the King told the Administration that a Green Light would not be enough--Arafat would have to approve individual Palestinians who would participate in the negotiations.
- o In September 1985, Hussein told the United Nations that Arafat-designees would not be enough. The PLO itself would have to be a party at the table.
- o In September 1985, Hussein told the President that the Soviet Union would have to be a full party to the process as well, via an "international conference."

What has happened is that, instead of making the hard decision to sit down with Israel, bucking rejectionist opposition, Hussein has progressively backed off and taken refuge behind positions that will be acceptable to the rejectionists. No one has been more enthusiastic about the "international conference" formula, which Hussein now calls his own

idea, than the PLO, Syria, and the U.S.S.R., who have been pushing it for years.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE?

President Reagan has rejected the "international conference" formula because it would give the Russians a "stranglehold on negotiations" and "a calling card for inserting themselves more deeply into the Middle East." This is not in Jordan's interest, not in Israel's interest, and very definitely not in the interest of the United States.

President Sadat went to Jerusalem precisely to avoid the dangers of such conference. As he observed of Carter's effort to reconvene the Geneva comprehensive conference: "The Soviet Union has Syria in its pocket, the Syrians have the Palestinians in their pocket. In Geneva we would be busying ourselves with semantics and pedagogics."

In reality, an international conference would be little more than a fruitless propaganda exercise. It would turn the process over to the PLO, Syria and the Soviet Union--those parties who have no stake or interest in genuine peace with Israel. It is equivalent to allowing the foxes to rule over the chicken coop. One only has to observe the actions of the UN General Assembly or the Arab League to comprehend the consequences: a forum in which the most radical carries the veto.

An international conference would be controlled by the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples Republic of China--nations which recognize the PLO but have no diplomatic relations with Israel.

It didn't work in 1969; it didn't work in 1977; there is no reason to believe that it will work now. It will merely make progress more difficult by increasing Soviet influence, strengthening Arab radicals and discouraging Arab moderates.

WHY SHOULD THE U.S. NOT RECOGNIZE THE PLO, AS THE KING INSISTS?

King Hussein has moved away from the idea of direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel, and instead is emphasizing the goal of negotiations between the United States and the PLO. His foreign minister stated that the purpose of an initial meeting between the U.S. and an Arafat-approved joint delegation of Palestinians and Jordanians would be to advance this process of U.S. recognition of the PLO.

The PLO is the world's leading terrorist organization, and plays a key role in arming and training other terrorist groups in many countries. The Arafat wing of the PLO has claimed credit for over one hundred terrorist incidents in the brief period since Arafat signed the February 11 accord supposedly signalling his turn to moderation. During the same period, top officials of the Arafat wing have made numerous statements rejecting Israel's right to exist; rejecting 242; praising the U.S.S.R.; condemning the United States; extolling "armed struggle"; and pledging to continue the war against Israel until the final victory.

In short, the PLO remains a radical force committed to the destruction of Israel. It is far from meeting the conditions for U.S. recognition of the PLO that the President signed into law on August 8, 1985: recognition of Israel's right to exist, acceptance of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and renunciation of terrorism.

Cooperating in this Jordanian maneuver--shifting the focus from Jordanian negotiations with Israel to U.S. negotiations with the PLO--would substantially set back the peace process. The King's emphasis on this stratagem is further evidence that he is not ready for face-to-face negotiations with Israel.

Section II:
Jordan and the Arms Sale

DOESN'T KING HUSSEIN NEED MORE WEAPONS TO MODERNIZE HIS ARMED FORCES?

On the contrary, the Jordanian military has been substantially modernized in the last few years, and Jordan has no desperate need for new weapons. According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, total Jordanian arms imports from 1981 to 1983 (the most recent figures available) amounted to over \$3 billion, including \$1.1 billion in 1983 alone. From 1981 to 1983, arms imports amounted to 25% of Jordan's gross national product. Indeed, Jordan was the world's seventh largest importer of arms in 1983. (Iraq and Saudi Arabia were first and second, and Israel ranked only 26th.) By contrast, Israel's purchases were only \$2.5 billion from 1981 to 1983, and only \$370 million in 1983.

These imports have included new French-built Mirage F-1 fighters, British Khalid battle tanks, Austrian artillery, and Spanish aircraft. Only a few weeks ago Jordan ordered arms worth \$300 million from Britain, including air defense radars and tank munitions. American weapons sold to Jordan in recent years have included AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships, Maverick air-to-ground missiles, tank modernization kits, and a variety of other weapons.

WHO WILL PAY FOR THE WEAPONS?

The United States will reportedly offer Jordan grant military assistance amounting to at least \$750 million to pay for these weapons. Although it is claimed that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Countries will cover the remainder of the funds, there are no guarantees that this will happen. In 1978 the Saudis reneged on an agreement to pay for 50 F-5E fighters that were sold to Egypt in recognition of the risks that President Sadat was taking to advance the peace process. Saudi Arabia does not support the peace process.

**ISN'T IT BETTER FOR ISRAEL IF JORDAN HAS AMERICAN WEAPONS,
SINCE THE U.S. CAN EXERT MORE CONTROL OVER THE USE OF
AMERICAN WEAPONS?**

The United States will have little ability to control King Hussein's use of American weapons once they are delivered to Jordan. Jordan's attitude was revealed last year by Jordan's Foreign Minister, who said, "... arms will come to Jordan and immediately upon arrival they will become Jordanian Arab arms to which no conditions or other commitments are attached." (In an interview appearing on February 24, 1984 in al Hawadith, a London-based Arabic language journal).

King Hussein has also shown that he is quite willing to violate agreements with the United States. In 1964, he agreed not to deploy American-supplied M-48 Patton battle tanks in the West Bank as a condition of the sale. Yet, in May 1967 Jordan joined Egypt in an alliance against Israel, and promptly moved those tanks to the West Bank. Two weeks later the Patton tanks were fighting Israeli forces.

At the same time, American weapons are dangerous to Israel, because they are generally more capable than arms provided by other countries, and they pose more of a threat.

The danger posed by American weapons is intensified by another, commonly overlooked fact: Israel cannot buy countermeasures against American equipment, while it can obtain such systems against Soviet arms. As a result, Israel has to develop and produce its own countermeasures against U.S. weapons. Because of deep budget cuts, caused by the current economic crisis, Israel is less able to produce such equipment.

When the United States sells weapons to another country, more than just equipment is provided. Accompanying American weapons is highly effective training and support, something which other suppliers do less well. For example, Jordan has found Soviet training and support for the SA-8 surface-to-air missiles to be highly unsatisfactory, in contrast to the excellent training provided by the U.S. Similarly, the Jordanians have had difficulties maintaining their French-supplied Mirage F-1s because of expensive and unreliable French support.

KING HUSSEIN HAS REPORTEDLY ASSURED THE U.S. SENATE THAT THESE ARMS WILL NOT BE USED AGAINST ISRAEL. CAN WE TAKE HIM AT HIS WORD?

King Hussein has knowingly violated past agreements with the U.S. intended to prevent Jordan from attacking Israel with American arms.

In 1964 the United States sold Jordan a large number of M-48 Patton tanks on the condition that these weapons would never be deployed on the West Bank. Yet, in May 1967, the king violated this agreement and sent these M-48 tanks to the West Bank, where many of them were used against Israel. In 1973, Jordanian army forces used American weapons against Israel in the Golan Heights.

As these episodes demonstrated, the United States cannot stop Jordan from using its American-supplied equipment against Israel.

IF WE REFUSE TO SUPPLY KING HUSSEIN WITH ADVANCED WEAPONS, WON'T JORDAN GO TO THE EUROPEANS FOR THEM?

King Hussein wants American arms because they are qualitatively superior to alternative weapons available elsewhere, because he wants the arms as a symbol of U.S. support for Jordan, and most importantly, because he expects the United States to pay for them.

The United States is offering to provide a substantial amount of grant aid (at least \$750 million or more) to pay for the Jordanian arms. In contrast, European countries demand repayment. For example, Jordan's recent purchase of British arms was financed by a loan from British banks at commercial interest rates. To finance a purchase of European weapons equal in size to this proposed arms sale would force Jordan to take on additional debts equal to between a third and a half of its GNP (its foreign debt is already

equal to more than 50% of its GNP). Jordan's precarious financial situation and the failure of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states to provide expected levels of financial assistance (which was in any case predicated on Jordan's being a 'frontline' state at war with Israel) make it very unlikely that Jordan could find a replacement for the American assistance.

Nor could European arms fully substitute for the weapons that the State Department wants to give Jordan. For example, the Europeans have nothing comparable to the Improved HAWK missiles. Indeed, most European countries use the Improved HAWK themselves. Although the Jordanians could acquire advanced aircraft in Europe, the planes would not meet Jordan's military requirements as well as the American aircraft and would cost considerably more. In addition, European weapons are often harder to maintain than their American counterparts.

Finally, as the State Department points out, the Europeans cannot provide Jordan with the political backing that King Hussein wants.

WON'T KING HUSSEIN GO TO THE SOVIETS IF THE U.S. REFUSES TO PROVIDE HIM WITH THE WEAPONS THAT HE WANTS?

King Hussein needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs him.

King Hussein cannot afford to join the Soviet bloc, because:

- o The Soviet Union is permanently opposed to Jordan's political and economic orientation and has a long record of supporting revolutionary movements against monarchies like that in Jordan. In addition, the fundamental economic orientation of the country is towards the West.
- o The Soviet Union will always value Syria more than Jordan. In the event of a conflict between the two, King Hussein knows that the Soviet Union will inevita-

yet the Shah remained a loyal ally of the U.S. until the end.

ISN'T THERE A DANGER THAT TECHNOLOGY COULD BE COMPROMISED BY PROVIDING THESE WEAPONS TO JORDAN?

Yes. The Jordanians have allowed Soviet advisors into their country to train air defense personnel. Since these advisors will come into contact with Jordanians entrusted with the security of American air defense equipment, Soviet spies will have potential access to all the technology that the United States will be supplying to Jordan.

WON'T ARMS SALES TO JORDAN INCREASE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO KING HUSSEIN?

An arms sale to Jordan may even fuel domestic opposition to Hussein. The more closely aligned Jordan is with the "Great American Satan"--the more vocal and radical the Islamic opposition. The Iranian example should not be forgotten: massive U.S. weapons sales to Iran became a prime symbol for popular opposition to the Shah's rule. Advanced fighter aircraft are exactly the sort of symbol of U.S. influence that fuels these sentiments.

bly back Syria. Conversely, King Hussein knows that the U.S. and Israel will be inclined to come to his assistance in the event of a Syrian invasion, as they did in 1970. Should he join the Soviet camp, neither the U.S. nor Israel would have any incentive to provide such aid.

- o The United States and other Western countries can provide Jordan with economic assistance. Although the Soviet Union can provide arms, it has a poor record of delivering economic aid.
- o The Soviet Union favors radical changes in the Middle East, including a major role for the PLO which would undermine the security of the Hashemite monarchy. In addition, the Soviet Union cannot be counted on to support Jordan against its domestic radicals.
- o The Soviet Union has no influence with Israel, and plays no important role in the peace process. If King Hussein ever wants to get the peace process moving, he needs the U.S.

King Hussein can buy Soviet equipment and remain a U.S. ally

- o King Hussein will not give up the American security umbrella for a few Soviet arms.
- o Jordan has already purchased a large amount of Soviet weaponry, including SA-8 surface-to-air missiles and radar-controlled ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft guns. Earlier this year, Jordan purchased arms worth about \$250 million from the Soviets, possibly including SA-9 and SA-14 surface-to-air missiles, yet there is no indication of Jordan becoming a Soviet ally.
- o Other U.S. allies have purchased Soviet weapons, without ever being tempted to abandon the United States and join the Soviet bloc. The Iranians under the Shah purchased large amounts of Soviet weaponry,

Section III:
Syria and the Arms Sale

IS SYRIA AN ENEMY OR AN ALLY OF JORDAN?

The Administration has argued that Jordan needs advanced American weapons to counter "the conventional military threat" that "comes principally from Syria." Jordan does, indeed, at times, have tensions with Syria. But periods of tension between Syria and Jordan have, historically, been interspersed with periods of cooperation. And diplomatic tensions have not prevented Jordan from joining with Syria for combined operations against Israel repeatedly in the past.

Jordanian-Syrian Military Alliance

During the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars, Jordan joined in military alliance with Syria despite continuing strains in their diplomatic relations. These cases reflect a broader pattern in Jordanian-Syrian relations of military cooperation in spite of political tensions.

- o On May 14, 1948, during the War of Independence, Jordan's Arab Legion joined Syria and four other Arab countries, in a combined attack against Israel.
- o On October 22, 1956, Jordan joined a multilateral military pact with Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen, against Israel.
- o On June 5, 1967, during the Six-Day War, Syrian forces were invited to enter Jordan in support of the Jordanian army, despite the fact that on May 23 Jordan and Syria had broken off diplomatic relations!
- o On September 1, 1969, Jordan met with Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and Egypt to coordinate military activity against Israel. The communique that was issued following this meeting called it "a starting point for liberating the occupied land."
- o On September 18, 1969 the leaders of Jordan, Syria and Iraq established an Eastern Command to coordinate the actions of the Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi armies

against Israel. This command was based in Syria.

- o On October 6, 1973, during the Yom Kippur War, Jordan sent an armored division to support the Syrian army on the Golan Heights, despite significant strains in their other relations. Jordan used American weaponry against Israel.
- o On August 22, 1975, Jordan and Syria formed a Joint Supreme Command, headed by King Hussein and President Assad, to adopt "joint and coordinated decisions and positions" on military and political issues, to plan a "unified foreign policy", and to plan the "integration of the armed forces of the two countries."
- o In December, 1975, Jordan and Syria held joint military training exercises which involved the movement of two Jordanian armored brigades - 10,000 men - into Syria. These exercises were jointly planned and conducted under Syrian command.
- o In 1976, Jordan and Syria held military exercises to test the effectiveness of their joint forces.

Jordanian-Syrian Diplomatic Alliance

King Hussein has maneuvered his way around the issue of direct negotiations with Israel, taking refuge instead behind a formula acceptable to the radical states.

- o In 1978, King Hussein joined Syria and the radical states in rejecting the Camp David Accords.
- o In 1985, rather than taking steps towards direct negotiations, King Hussein has promoted the Syrian formula for an international conference. In addition, he has insisted on Syrian participation in the negotiations.

Recent Moves Toward Reconciliation

While there have been clear tensions between Jordan and Syria at times over the last five years, recent high-level meetings indicate that these countries may be moving towards a new reconciliation.

- o On September 16 and 17, 1985, Syrian Prime Minister al-Kasm and Jordanian Prime Minister al-Rafia met in Saudi Arabia. These high-level meetings resulted in agreements on steps to improve relations and to increase cooperation based on the framework of commitments at Arab summits. A second meeting will be held on October 15, 1985.
- o On August 21, 1985, Jordan announced the creation of a free industry trade zone between Jordan and Syria.
- o On April 20, 1985, the Jordanian Agriculture Ministry, announced an agreement to increase exports to Syria. It also announced plans to increase areas of economic cooperation.

DOES SYRIA OPPOSE THE ARMS SALE?

No, Syria supports the sale! While the Administration has depicted Syria as the primary threat to Jordan's security, Jordanian and Syrian officials have indicated otherwise.

- o In an interview on September 27, 1985, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shar said that Syria was disappointed with the proposed arms sale "not because you supplied the Jordanians, our brothers, with arms," but because Congressional concern focused on the need to protect Jordan "from the Syrians, and not from the Israelis."
- o In an interview on October 4, 1985, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shar said: "Relations between Syria and Jordan are between two

states that share a border, cooperation, trade, economy, passports, and public security."

- o In an interview in September, 1985, Jordan's Prime Minister al-Rifa'i said: "There is no dispute between Jordan and Syria, only differences on certain political issues."
- o In an interview on May 20, 1985, King Hussein said: "There are many projects between us and Syria on the bilateral level. God willing, time will come when the entire Arab nation will be in one line."
- o In an interview on April 9, 1985, Jordan's Deputy Prime Minister Arar insisted: "We consider Syria and Iraq to be our natural rear in the event of a Zionist aggression against us."

Section IV:
The Threat to Israel

WHAT IS ISRAEL'S VIEW OF THE ARMS SALE?

"I will ask the U.S. administration not to supply weapons to Jordan as long as Jordan is in an avowed, or secret, state of war with Israel, and I do not intend to retreat from that." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 9/19/85)

"No speech can justify arms sales. Israel continues to oppose arms sale between the U.S. and Jordan." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 9/29/85)

"40 new F-16's will be received in three years and could strike many targets in Israel. It will be another heavy burden on the strategic shoulders of the state. Weapons are always being given to the Arabs and then we have to ask for balance in aid and arms. And the Mobile HAWK missiles are a serious military security problem." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 10/2/85)

The American argument, to the effect that Jordan is facing a Syrian threat due to its willingness to enter the political process, is groundless, because so far Jordan has not tried to enter this process. The U.S. weapons in themselves are no answer in the case of a Syrian threat. Therefore we publicly oppose the proposed weapons deal." (Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 9/16/85)

"Hussein has not cancelled the state of belligerency with Israel. He is still in a formal state of war with Israel. I think the Americans tried to influence him to announce something about the end of belligerency but he would talk only about the atmosphere of non-belligerency. We are not a meteorological station. Our positions are still far apart. He was not even prepared to respond to the American request, let alone ours." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 10/2/85)

"Arms are meant to serve policy. And if these arms are not intended to serve a policy of belligerence vis-a-vis Israel, this should be stated authoritatively, unequivocally and publicly [by Jordan]. Because the supply of American tanks to Jordan at the start of 1960's is still fresh in our mind: when Jordan undertook that those tanks would not cross the Jordan River and would not be employed against Israel. But once an environment of opportunity arose, Jordan used those

tanks to attack Israel in 1967, without any provocation whatsoever on Israel's part." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 6/11/85)

"I doubt whether three battle squadrons of F-20's and improved Hawk missiles will prevent Syria from going ahead with an attack on Jordan. And if an immediate Syrian threat has in fact arisen because of Jordan's possible move towards a strategy of peace, a different, immediate deterrent must be sought against such a threat." (Prime Minister Shimon Peres, 6/10/85)

"Israel voices its concern over the accelerated supply of large quantities of weapons to a number of belligerent Arab governments in our region. These regimes do not need these arms for their defense, but are stockpiling them to use against Israel. This can only serve to undermine the chances for peace in the Middle East." (Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Address to the United Nations, 10/2/85)

WHY ARE ARMS IN JORDAN DANGEROUS TO ISRAEL?

Geography has made Israel especially vulnerable to attacks from Jordan--

- o Israel's longest border is with Jordan. This 300 kilometer border is more than double the length of the border with Lebanon and nearly four times as long as the border with Syria. Although portions of the terrain along the Jordanian border are relatively inaccessible to ground forces, aircraft are unaffected by such limitations.
- o Jordanian air bases are in close proximity to targets in Israel. Amman is barely 50 miles from Jerusalem, and the Mafraq Air Base is less than 100 miles from Tel Aviv. As a result, ground attack aircraft based at King Faisal Air Base at Jafr in South Jordan are only 7 minutes away from Eilat

and the new air base at Ovda. It is less than 10 minutes flying time from King Hussein Air Base in Mafraq to Haifa or Tel Aviv.

These conditions make Jordan the state best positioned to spearhead a combined Arab attack against Israel, especially a surprise attack.

IS JORDAN LIKELY TO ATTACK ISRAEL?

Not by itself, but no one Arab state has ever attacked Israel by itself. In each instance when Jordan fought against Israel in the past, it was as part of a larger coalition of Arab countries. Israel must consider the possible danger to its security of a potential alliance combining Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Libya, Kuwait, and even Iraq.

Jordan has fought Israel in three wars: in 1948, in 1967, and in 1973. In addition, Jordan allowed a unit of the Palestine Liberation Army, an offshoot of the PLO and ostensibly a part of the Jordanian armed forces and now armed with American weapons, to fight in Lebanon against Israel in 1982.

If King Hussein may not today intend to launch an offensive against Israel, it is partly accountable to the fact that Jordan lacks the air defenses needed to launch an effective offensive against Israel. However, he may not have the choice of staying out of a war once he receives sophisticated air defenses, if Syria and others pressure him to participate as they did in 1967. In 1973, he used the excuse that he lacked air defenses to reduce pressure on him to attack across the Jordan River.

These arms will pose a special danger to Israel in the next war. Israel is especially vulnerable to attacks from Jordan because it shares its longest border with the Hashemite Kingdom (nearly four times the length of the Syria-Israel border) and because the Jordanian border is in such close proximity to targets

in Israel (it is only 45 miles from Jordan to Tel Aviv).

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN THE PROPOSED JORDAN ARMS PACKAGE?

- 40 Advanced fighter aircraft, either F-20A Tigersharks or, more likely, F-16Cs in an air defense variant, to provide Jordan with 2 squadrons of fighters (18 aircraft each) plus 4 replacement/attrition aircraft
- 12 Mobile Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile firing units, each consisting of three triple launchers and associated fire control radars
- 14 Mobile Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile fire command posts and conversion equipment to make Jordan's existing 14 batteries mobile
- 108 Stinger hand-held antiaircraft missiles, including 72 launchers with missiles plus 36 reloads
- 300 AIM-9P Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
- 32 M-3 Bradley cavalry fighting vehicles

The package is worth either \$1.5 billion if F-20s are provided, or \$1.9 billion if F-16Cs are provided.

WHAT THREAT IS POSED BY ADVANCED AIRCRAFT?

Arab air forces are now giving priority to strengthening their air forces, since they know that Israel must maintain air superiority in order to survive. Even limited penetrations of Israeli air space could significantly hurt Israel and alter the overall military balance. Targets of attack could include Israeli air bases, command posts, early warning radars, mobilization centers for ground units, naval facilities, or other high priority targets, the loss of which would seriously affect Israeli combat capabilities.

Jordanian advanced aircraft should not be taken in isolation, since they will be qualitatively important additions to the overall Arab air threat array in a "reasonable worst case." Jordan's 100+ combat aircraft, must be viewed in the context of the total Arab air forces, which, excluding Egypt, exceed 2100 planes.

In such a coalition, the Syrians could provide the quantity while Jordan, using its sophisticated American aircraft and air defenses, provides the quality. Jordan could, for example, pose a particular threat by providing aircraft capable of penetrating Israel's defenses to hit selected high valued targets.

The combined potential of the Arab coalition is significant because, unlike ground forces which move slowly, aircraft can be redeployed relatively quickly over long distances. Even in a short war, Arab countries not bordering on Israel could swiftly transfer aircraft to front-line states, thus providing reinforcements and replacements.

WHAT THREAT DOES THE F-16 POSE?

The F-16C is one of the most capable fighter aircraft now in service. It is possibly the best single-seat ground attack aircraft in the world.

The version of the F-16C that might be supplied to Jordan is apparently a lower cost model being developed for the U.S. Air Force known as the F-16C air defense variant. Since this variant has never flown, and is still being developed by General Dynamics, it is not possible to describe its capabilities fully. Based on what is now known, and despite the name, however, the F-16C air defense variant will be an excellent ground attack aircraft.

- o The F-16C air defense variant will be able to carry an impressive weapons payload. It can carry ordnance weighing as much as 7.5 tons, including Maverick air-to-surface missiles and laser-guided bombs.
- o The F-16C air defense variant will have a long range. It can carry 4 tons of ordnance, and still carry enough fuel to fly 250 nautical miles at low altitude. This would allow Jordan to operate the aircraft from air bases in Iraq and still be able to strike targets anywhere in Israel.
- o The F-16C air defense variant will have sophisticated weapons delivery capabilities. Even model F-16As have demonstrated an impressive ability to deliver weapons to within a few feet of the intended target.

In addition, the F-16C would be a superior all-weather interceptor.

- o The F-16C air defense variant is an improved version of one of the world's most successful fighters. F-16s are credited with destruction of 40 enemy aircraft, and no F-16s are known to have been destroyed by enemy aircraft.

- o The F-16C air defense variant would have superior maneuverability and acceleration. The F-16 is unsurpassed as a dog-fighting aircraft.
- o The F-16C air defense variant would have a fast reaction time due to a laser inertial navigation system, like the one in the F-20A, that would reduce scramble time from two and a half minutes to less than one minute.
- o The F-16C air defense variant reportedly will have an all environment capability, resulting from adoption of an improved version of the AN/APG-66 radar used on the F-16A.



WHAT IS THE THREAT POSED BY THE F-20A?


Certain characteristics make the F-20A particularly well suited for use in surprise attacks.

- o The F-20A has an extremely fast reaction time, because of a quick-starting engine and a laser-gyro inertial navigation system that warms up in less than half the time of older systems. It takes less than a minute for an F-20A to be in the air after a "cold" start.
- o The F-20A has excellent ground attack capabilities. It can carry five laser-guided bombs or four Maverick air-to-surface missiles. High accuracy using conventional weapons is made possible by an advanced design weapons delivery system.
- o The F-20A has sophisticated electronics. Its advanced radar has a "freeze" mode that allows the pilot to turn off the radar, yet still keep a radar-generated map for navigation to the target. This is particularly useful in a surprise attack, since the F-20s cannot be detected by tracking of the signals from their radars. The F-20A's radar is so powerful that it can show individual aircraft on the ground at distances of 10 miles.

The F-20A has other characteristics that make it one of the best fighter-bombers now flying.

- o The F-20A has short takeoff and landing capabilities, permitting operation from small airfields and even roads.
- o The F-20A has excellent acceleration and maneuverability, resulting from use of the F404 engine employed in the Navy's F-18 fighter and through employment of sophisticated design features, giving the aircraft a more rapid rate of climb, tighter turning radius, higher top speed, and 70% more thrust than the F-5E.

- o The F-20A can fly more combat missions than any other aircraft, because it is easier to maintain and, according to Northrop, has "four times the reliability of most fighter aircraft."



ISN'T THE F-20 LESS DANGEROUS FOR ISRAEL THAN THE F-16C?

Although originally developed as an "export" fighter with lesser capabilities than the F-16 used by the U.S. Air Force, Northrop has transformed the F-20A into a fighter-bomber with many capabilities equal to those of the latest F-16C.

- o The F-20A can fly fifty percent more combat sorties than the F-16C: 6.7 combat sorties per day, compared with only 4.2 per day for the F-16C. Northrop has shown that the F-20 can fly as many as 12 sorties per day.
- o The F-20A has the same range in many air-to-ground combat missions as the F-16C.

- o The F-20A can deliver ground attack ordnance with an accuracy unsurpassed by any other fighter-bomber.

The F-20A is considered the equal of the F-16C in air-to-air combat.


- o The F-20A is as agile as the F-16, and has a similar thrust-to-weight ratio.
- o The F-20A's radar can detect an F-16 at 48 nautical miles, while the F-16 can detect the F-20 at only 35 to 43 nautical miles.
- o The F-20A's radar can track up to 10 aircraft at a time, the same as for the F-16C.

BUT AREN'T THESE AIRCRAFT DESIGNED ONLY TO DEFEND AGAINST AIR ATTACKS?

The F-20A and the F-16C air defense variant both have significant ground attack capabilities. In addition, these capabilities could be enhanced by future arms sales. Both planes can both use sophisticated ground attack munitions, including laser-guided bombs and Maverick air-to-ground missiles, which Jordan could obtain in a future sale or Saudi Arabia could supply out of its own over-stocked arsenal.

WILL THIS AIRCRAFT SALE SATISFY KING HUSSEIN'S DESIRE FOR ADVANCED FIGHTER-BOMBERS?

No. The Jordanians have indicated that they would like to expand their air force from its existing inventory of 115 to 160. Because the Jordanians intend to retire some of their older aircraft, even after this sale the Jordanians plans call for the purchase of another 40 fighter-bombers in the next few years.




WHAT IS THE THREAT POSED BY MOBILE IMPROVED HAWKS?

The upgraded capabilities of the mobile Improved Hawks that the Jordanians want to obtain will significantly enhance Jordanian military capabilities.

First, Jordan's current Improved Hawk missiles are emplaced in concrete, and cannot be moved. In contrast, the new equipment would be mobile. Such an acquisition would strengthen Jordan in three ways:

- o Increased survivability: Because the existing launchers are emplaced in concrete, their precise location can be identified, facilitating attacks against them. In contrast, the new units can be moved, so that Israel would have to constantly monitor their activity in order to locate them. Since the difficulty in locating air defense equipment is its biggest defense against attack, the mobile missiles would significantly complicate the task of devising countermeasures.
- o Support for offensive operations: Mobile Improved Hawks can provide protection to ground formations attacking across the Jordan River, while the existing missiles are deployed in such a way that they would provide only minimal support for offensive operations. It is impossible to concentrate static missiles in forward battle areas, and the existing missile units cannot be advanced to protect attacking units. In addition, the mobile Hawk is designed to use leap-frogging tactics: a fire section can be moved forward under the cover of the rest of the battery; once the advanced fire section is in place, it can protect other fire sections as they are sent forward.
- o Increased effectiveness: Israel knows where the existing Jordanian Hawk batteries are located, making it possible to minimize the danger posed by the Hawk missiles. The mobile missiles can fill gaps between existing Jordanian missile sites, or be rapidly moved to new areas in order to ambush attacking aircraft.

In addition, the proposed upgrades would significantly increase the lethality of the Hawk, and make it harder for Israel to locate and attack the firing units. For example, the upgrades could include the new agile continuous wave acquisition radar (ACWAR) that employs sophisticated phased array technologies. Such a system could not be jammed by Israel's existing countermeasures equipment.



ISN'T THE HAWK A DEFENSIVE WEAPON?

It was Egyptian and Syrian acquisition of just such "defensive" air defense systems that made it possible for them to launch their surprise attack against Israel in October 1973.

The supply of this "defensive" air defense package attacks the very basis of Israel's security by providing Jordan with weapons that undermine the cornerstone of Israel's security, its air superiority.


Israel does not have enough soldiers to guard its long and vulnerable borders, so it relies on a small standing force supported by a large number of reservists. Israel's air force has the critical and difficult task of protecting the country while the reservists are being mobilized.

The proposed arms package gives to Jordan weapons that can weaken Israel's air force and its ability to defend the country's borders. Without adequate air support, Israel's front-line ground forces could be overwhelmed by the numerically superior Arab armies.

In addition, delivery of this package will increase the chance that Jordan will participate in a future war. In 1973, Jordan had no sophisticated air

defenses, and used this fact to explain to the other Arab states why it declined to participate in the initial attack. King Hussein limited his participation in the fighting to the transfer of only a single division to Syria, where it could fight on the Golan Heights under the protection of Syrian air defenses.

Once Jordan has acquired a sophisticated air defense system, the Jordanian military would have the capabilities required to participate in a combined surprise attack on Israel. At the same time, Jordan would be able to provide a secure base for expeditionary forces from other Arab countries.



WHAT IS THE THREAT FROM STINGER MISSILES?

The Stinger is an ideal terrorist weapon. It can be carried easily by one man, and has a warhead sufficiently powerful to destroy civilian aircraft. It is also far more effective than the old SA-7 missiles now used by PLO terrorists. Civilian aircraft from most countries have no defenses at all against anti-aircraft missiles. Israeli commercial aircraft do have countermeasures against the less sophisticated SA-7, but existing equipment may well be ineffective against the Stinger.

Because the Jordanian military includes many Palestinians, including some potentially sympathetic to the PLO, it is all too likely that Stingers could be stolen and used as a terrorist weapon. No safeguards can guarantee that the Stingers will stay out of the hands of terrorists.

Supply of the Stinger to Jordan also will have an adverse effect on the Arab-Israeli military balance. Each new advanced weapon supplied to Arab countries hostile to Israel adds to the burden of Israel's defense. While Israel may know how to counter the Stinger, new equipment will have to be developed, built and installed for this purpose. This costly process will increase Israel's defense burden at a time when its military budget is being reduced for economic reasons. And until the new countermeasures are fielded (a process that could take some time), Israeli aircraft will be vulnerable to the Stinger.

WOULD THESE ARMS PROTECT JORDAN FROM THE REAL SYRIAN THREAT?

This arms package will not significantly strengthen Jordan's defenses against a Syrian attack. Terrorism and subversion are the main tools used by the Syrians against their opponents. Sophisticated weapons will do little to protect Jordan from such threats.

The Syrians apparently do not view these arms as a danger to them. Instead, they see them as part of the overall Arab arsenal to be used against Israel. On September 27, Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Al-Shara said: "Well, I must admit that when we hear the news about Jordan being supplied with American arms, we were, to a great extent disappointed, not because you supply the Jordanians, our brothers, with arms, but because in the Congress the debate is concentrated only that the Jordanians are to be supplied with arms in order to protect themselves from the Syrians, and not from the Israelis. The Israelis are the aggressors. The Israelis are the occupying force."

BUT COULDN'T THE AIRCRAFT STOP SYRIAN AIR ATTACKS IF THE SYRIANS DID BY SOME CHANCE ATTACK JORDAN?

Syria now has the largest and most sophisticated ground-based air defense system in the Middle East. The Soviets have provided the Syrians with a full panoply of weapons, including 150 batteries of SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, SA-6, SA-7, SA-8, and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles, possibly the SA-11, SA-13, and SA-14 systems as well, and more than 1,000 antiaircraft guns. Most of the weapons are mobile: according to one estimate about two-thirds of the missile batteries are equipped with one of two mobile systems, either the SA-6 or the SA-8 missile. A majority of the antiaircraft guns are also self-propelled, including at least 300 ZSU-23-4s and 250 ZSU-57-2s.

Syria's air defense forces alone have nearly as many men as the entire Jordanian army: 50,000 men compared to 68,000.

To be effective, Jordanian F-16s or F-20s would have to fly through these air defenses, surviving attacks from some of the best Soviet antiaircraft weapons. In 1973, the Syrians destroyed over 50 Israeli aircraft, most of them in the first few days of the war.

Only air forces equipped with air defense suppression capabilities can hope to operate effectively in such an environment. Jordan's air force does not have these capabilities and would have difficulties providing air cover in the areas threatened by Syrian air defenses.

In addition, Jordan's air bases are vulnerable to attack from Syria. During such attacks, the aircraft based at the air bases could be destroyed on the ground, or sufficient damage could be done to the air bases to make flight operations impossible.

Four of Jordan's five main air bases are within 40 miles of the Syrian border. This makes them potentially vulnerable to being overrun by Syrian ground forces, neutralized by artillery bombardment, knocked out by Syrian missile attack, or disrupted by Syrian commando attack. Finally, some of the air bases are now in range of Syrian surface-to-air missiles, which would make it difficult for aircraft to operate from those bases during hostilities. If the Syrians make only modest advances on the ground, four of the air bases could be within range of Syrian air defenses.

For all these reasons, Jordanian security against Syria will depend in the future, as it has in the past, on the deterrent power of the Israeli Air Force.


Section V:
The Effect on Israel's Economy

WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT, FROM AN ECONOMIC STANDPOINT,
IF ISRAEL IS HIT WITH A MAJOR ARMS SALE TO A HOSTILE
STATE?

Just as Israel is beginning to see results from its economic austerity plan, an arms sale to Jordan--which would require increased Israeli expenditure on arms--would severely disrupt this progress.

Israel simply does not have any additional resources to pay for new arms to meet the added Jordan threat. Israel is at the bottom of the budget barrel, and must in fact cut, not increase its security expenditures. The Jordan arms will worsen the dilemma, described by Shimon Peres, of the choice "to become economically strong or militarily weak."

Israel already spends more on defense as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP) than any other western country. Israel spends the equivalent of 22% of its GDP on defense compared to 7% for the U.S. and 1% for Japan.



Israel cannot win a war of economic attrition against its neighbors who either have vast oil reserves or enjoy the patronage of those who do. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States may be willing to pay part of this arms package for Jordan while acquiring more for


themselves as well, but Israel has only one place to turn when its economic coffers are empty and that is to its friends in the U.S.


HOW WOULD SELLING ARMS TO JORDAN UNDERMINE AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN?

A key part of Israel's economic plan is cutting government spending in order to reduce a highly inflationary budget deficit.

Excluding debt servicing, spending on defense accounts for the largest portion of the government budget (over one-third). Yet, Israel's defense spending of \$4-5 billion is dwarfed by the almost \$50 billion a year Arab countries spend on their military forces.

The importance of Israel's budget cutting has been stressed by U.S. officials in discussions with Israeli leaders. Therefore, it would be ironic if the U.S. Government forced Israel to increase its budget and retreat from its austerity program in order to meet an increased U.S.-generated Jordanian threat.





HASN'T ISRAEL'S DEFENSE SECTOR BEEN SPARED FROM GOVERNMENT CUTS SO FAR?

On the contrary, the Government of Israel has already made deep cuts in its defense budget, more than in any other area of the budget.

From 1983 to 1985, the government has already cut the defense budget by about 20% with further reductions planned.


The IDF has been forced to:

- o cut back on basic training,
- o fire 2000 professional soldiers and defense--related civilian employees with further dismissals to come,
- o ground aircraft and pilots, and
- o reduce stockpiles of munitions and other equipment.

After cutting the excess fat, further reductions in spending already are threatening Israel's combat readiness.

**IF ISRAEL IS FORCED TO SPEND MORE ON ARMS TO COUNTER
THE JORDANIAN THREAT, WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT ON ISRAEL'S
DEBT SITUATION?**

Israel already has incurred a sizeable debt, almost half to the U.S. Government. Most of this debt is a result of defense-related purchases. As the debt increases so do Israel's debt repayments, today almost nine times what they were in 1972.



The dramatic rise in the cost of arms adds to Israeli debt as the country attempts to maintain a military balance in the region. A first-line fighter plane costs 5 times more today than in 1970 and 15 times more than in 1960.

Israel has no funds to meet the added Jordan threat. Therefore, to pay for this increased cost, Israel will either need more military aid from the U.S. or more loans at high interest rates from private banks. This will increase Israel's external debt -- the highest per capita debt in the world -- and cause her foreign exchange reserves to plummet below an already dangerous level.

WHAT WOULD BE THE IMPACT ON ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE?

An arms sale to Jordan will place an additional financial burden on Israel at a time when the country is struggling to get back on the path of economic growth after several years of no or little growth.

Scarce financial resources will be diverted from capital investment necessary for growth to military defensive hardware.

Workers' wages have already eroded and are continuing to fall.

Unemployment is steadily rising, approaching historic levels.

Social programs are being cut to the bone. Hospitals are turning away patients; many services which were previously free are now subject to user fees.

If more resources are diverted to defense, the average Israeli will suffer further. This raises the danger of more Israelis leaving the country at a time when emigration rates are the highest in Israeli history.

THE JORDANIAN ARMS PACKAGE

Arms Sales

I. Summary

As an integral part of U.S. strategy to continue progress toward peace in the Middle East, and in recognition of Jordan's legitimate defense needs, the President is notifying the Congress of his intention to sell Jordan a package of defensive arms which includes advanced fighter aircraft (either F-20 or F-16 air defense variant), Improved Hawk air defense missiles, AIM-9P4 air-to-air missiles, Stinger air defense missiles and Bradley M-3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles. The provision of these defensive arms to Jordan is essential for two reasons: first, it conveys, in the short term, a powerful message of U.S. political support for King Hussein's efforts to bring about a comprehensive, lasting peace settlement between Israel and the Arab World; and second, in the longer term, it will meet Jordan's most pressing military deficiency -- namely its ability to provide adequate air defense against an external attack and military intimidation by the adversaries of peace. The U.S. role in the modernization of Jordan's defensive capabilities is fully consistent with the close defense relationship which has evolved between our two nations over 35 years and eight U.S. administrations, and is supportive of Jordan's role as a bulwark of stability and moderation in the Middle East. This modest package of defensive arms is necessary to maintain our defense relationship with Jordan, provide Jordan with a credible deterrent against aggression, and, most importantly, sustain Jordan's vital role in the peace process. Approving the package will not guarantee the success of the peace process; but denying it almost certainly spells failure. Were it denied, Jordan would be forced to turn to Europe or the Soviet Union, thereby eliminating any U.S. role in determining the use of Jordanian arms and diminishing U.S. influence in the region. Finally, U.S. credibility would suffer enormously were we to deny a friendly nation which supports U.S. Middle East policy the means by which to defend its people and its territory.

II. Military Justification

The conventional threat. The conventional military threat to Jordan comes principally from Syria, which bitterly opposes King Hussein's effort to arrange for new Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Syria enjoys enormous numerical advantages over Jordan, as illustrated in the following table.

<u>Category</u>	<u>Syria: Jordan Ratio</u>
Personnel (active duty)	4.9:1
Tanks	4:1
Armored Personnel Carriers	2.5:1
Artillery	4.2:1
Combat Aircraft	5:1

(Source: The Middle East Military Balance 1984, Tel Aviv University)

Jordan's most immediate deficiency is inadequate air defense. Although Royal Jordanian Air Force interceptor pilots (flying U.S. F-5s and Mirage F-1s) would resist Syrian aggression courageously, Syria's overwhelming force of more advanced Soviet fighters would quickly overwhelm them. Similarly, Jordan's surface-to-air missile system, particularly its immobile Hawks, would be unable to defend the country against a determined Syrian air campaign.

The unconventional threat. Aside from the Syrian conventional threat to Jordan, e.g., Syria's invasion in 1970 and an ominous border build-up in 1980, Jordan faces a campaign of intimidation including overflights, infiltration, and terrorism. This campaign, orchestrated by Syria, has been stepped up since King Hussein reestablished relations with Egypt and hosted the Palestine National Council meeting in Amman last fall. The Jordanians, with U.S. technical assistance, have managed to keep the frontier with Israel quiet for fifteen years by interdicting Syrian-based infiltrators. Jordan is determined to prevent terrorists from using Jordanian territory to launch attacks against Israel. Although modern aircraft and air defense missiles do not stop infiltrators and terrorists, it is indisputable that vigorous Jordanian counter-terrorist measures could easily escalate to armed confrontation with the Syrians. Were this to happen today, Syria and Jordan are both well aware that every successive level of escalation would favor Syria. This serious imbalance must be redressed in order for Jordan to proceed with its peace diplomacy without fear of provoking an attack it could not repel, or being intimidated into a less vigorous anti-terrorist stance.

Jordan's defensive posture. Jordan's military posture is necessarily defensive, as depicted in the following table:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>ISRAEL</u>	<u>SYRIA</u>	<u>JORDAN</u>
Population (millions)	4.06	9.31	2.59
Active Duty Strength	170,000	394,000	80,300
Active Duty & Reserves	540,000	784,000	110,300
Combat Aircraft			
- High quality	455	240	36
- Others	185	410	94*
Tanks			
- High quality	600	2,100	230
- Others	3,050	1,600	685

(Source: The Middle East Military Balance 1984, Tel Aviv University)

* Includes a number of F-104s and F-5A/Bs in non-flying status.

Even the modest Jordanian self-defense force levels reflected above cannot be sustained by Jordan's economy without outside assistance. Modernization of the sort contained in our proposal is beyond Jordan's economic capability without substantial assistance from other countries. Even with such assistance, we will not be constructing an offensive capability for Jordan, let alone making the Kingdom a regional military power. Jordan fully realizes that any offensive action against either Israel or Syria would be tantamount to national suicide, even assuming upgraded fighter and air defense capabilities.

Jordan: a reliable defense partner. Despite the small size and limited equipment inventory of Jordan's armed forces, Jordanian soldiers are the most professional in the Arab World. This is borne out through the experiences of thousands of American servicemen who interact annually with them in a series of sophisticated command post, air defense, and crisis resupply exercises. Jordan is an important element of U.S. planning and Southwest Asia contingencies, and has made clear its willingness to aid friendly Gulf states threatened by aggression or subversion. This high morale, self-confidence and military pride is threatened by the preponderance of outmoded and unusable equipment upon which Jordan is forced to rely. If the prospect of a successful defense against Syria or any other aggressor appears increasingly hopeless because the U.S. is unwilling to help Jordan acquire the capability to defend itself, Jordan's military may lose the confidence of the Jordanian people, who may decide that the future of their country is best served by loosening ties with their traditional security partner, the United States.

The need. Jordan's most pressing need is increased air defense capability. Its outnumbered ground forces can inflict severe punishment on a Syrian invasion force provided Syria is denied air superiority. At present, the Royal Jordanian Air Force must rely on a small number of aging F-5s and Mirage F-1s to counter much more advanced Syrian MIG-23s and 25s. Even if Syria were to hold back the bulk of its fighters for other contingencies, those committed against Jordan would still enjoy a comfortable numerical edge as well as an overwhelming qualitative advantage, allowing Syria to achieve complete air superiority in a few days.

Inadequate anti-aircraft defense. Part of the reason for Jordan's grim prospects lies in an inadequate anti-aircraft defense. We required Jordan to immobilize in concrete the 14 Improved Hawk missile batteries acquired from the U.S. in the late 1970s. As such, they are vulnerable to artillery fire, electronic warfare suppression, and to air attacks using techniques such as "corridor blasting." Because it has not been able to acquire mobile Hawk missiles and Stinger missiles from

the U.S., Jordan has attempted to fill the gaping holes in its air defense system with a variety of Soviet guns and missiles. Yet King Hussein acquired the Soviet weaponry only reluctantly as a stopgap measure to partially (and inadequately) address his forces' severe air defense needs. The Jordanian leadership has little confidence in the quality of Soviet support or the value of pursuing closer ties with the Soviet Union. King Hussein wants instead to broaden and deepen political and military relations with the U.S.

Terrorism. Jordan has suffered as much as any country in the Middle East at the hands of terrorists and extremists. As the table below indicates, the terror campaign against Jordan has been stepped up since the February 11, 1985 Jordanian-Palestinian joint agreement, and has not ignored the targeting of U.S. interests.

1985

- Feb. 11 Jordanian-Palestinian joint peace announcement, Amman.
- Feb. 22 Bomb discovered in American Research Center, Amman.
- Mar. 9 Bomb explosion in Jordanian airliner.
- Mar. 21 Hand grenade attack in airlines office, Athens.
- Apr. 3 Rocket attack, Jordanian Embassy, Rome.
- Apr. 4 Rocket attack, Jordanian airliner, Athens.
- Jun. 11 Jordanian airliner hijacked, Beirut.
- Jul. 1 Bomb attack, airlines office, Madrid.
- Jul. 24 Assassination of Ziad al-Sati, Jordanian diplomat in Turkey and brother-in-law of Jordanian Commander-in-Chief.

Jordan's determination to stand up to these terrorist attacks deserves our support. Although the proposed arms sale will not provide immediate direct relief from these attacks, it will certainly convey America's commitment to stand by its moderate friends in the region against all levels of extremist threats.

U.S. commitment to Israel. Any major U.S. effort to upgrade Jordan's air defense capabilities must be consistent with the bedrock American commitment to preserve Israel's qualitative military advantage over any combination of potential foes. Aside from the fact that a Jordanian political decision to undertake

offensive operations against Israel is extraordinarily remote, the proposed arms package would do virtually nothing for Jordan's non-existent "offensive capability" against Israel or even its defensive capability against Israel. If a sale were consummated as early as this year, deliveries would not be completed until the end of the decade and beyond. The Intelligence Community assesses that Israeli military superiority vis-a-vis the Arab states will continue to increase during this period, and Jordan's acquisition of modest numbers of U.S. weapons would not change this basic assessment. Given Jordan's public commitment to negotiate peace with Israel, its willingness to take political risks that threaten confrontation with Syria, and its proven track record of interdicting Syrian-based infiltrators trying to attack Israeli targets, it is difficult, indeed misleading, to portray the minimal fulfillment of Jordan's defensive needs as a threat to Israel.

III. RELATIONSHIP OF ARMS PACKAGE TO PEACE PROCESS

Peace as the ultimate guarantor of Israeli security. Our longstanding commitment to ensure Israel's security within secure and internationally recognized borders is a central component of U.S. policy in the Middle East. The basic operational element of this policy has been to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge to defend against any likely combination of potential aggressors.

At the same time, we have long held that the best guarantee for the security of Israel is a general Middle Eastern peace. Israel itself recognized and applied this principle in the treaty with Egypt in which it exchanged a strategic territorial buffer for peace. The treaty produced not only peace between Israel and its most powerful enemy, but also a fundamental shift in the regional geopolitical balance that has strengthened the U.S. strategic posture there while weakening that of the Soviet Union.

As a central actor in the search for a general Arab-Israeli peace, Jordan's continued security is fundamentally important to U.S. objectives in the Middle East, including our quest for a general peace, our efforts to curb Soviet influence in the region, and our interest in moderation and stability.

The Hussein Initiative. In the past several months, Jordan has taken significant and courageous initiatives to advance the cause of peace. To set the stage for peace talks, King Hussein renewed relations with Egypt, making the point that no state should be ostracized for making peace with Israel. On February 11 of this year, he concluded an agreement with the PLO for a common diplomatic approach to a political settlement. This partnership with the PLO is the key element in King Hussein's strategy; the PLO provides Jordan with the "legitimacy" it needs in the

Arab-Palestinian context to undertake negotiations with Israel regarding the West Bank and Gaza. As leader of a small, vulnerable state, Hussein would risk his throne and the pro-Western orientation of his kingdom should he ignore this need for legitimacy.

Of crucial importance have been Hussein's steps to accept certain basic premises regarded as key by both the U.S. and Israel. King Hussein has publicly recognized Israel's right to exist and has endorsed President Reagan's September 1, 1982 initiative, which is based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and is fully consistent with the Camp David Accords between Israel, Egypt, and the U.S. During his visit to Washington in May, the King affirmed that he seeks negotiations between a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation on one side and Israel on the other, within a supportive international context. He publicly stated his desire to proceed in a non-belligerent environment to seek negotiations this year.

Risks to Jordan. Jordan has taken these steps despite considerable risks. These risks include a sharply increased threat of military and terrorist attacks from rejectionist states such as Syria, radical elements of the PLO, and Islamic fundamentalists. They also include possible political and economic ostracism in the Arab world, as was the case with Egypt, in retaliation for making peace with Israel. These risks will undoubtedly increase further as Jordan continues to engage in the process. Rejectionist forces have already begun to react with accelerated infiltration and assassination attempts against Jordanian officials. These subversive acts are likely to increase as the peace process progresses.

Importance of U.S. political support. It is in the long term interest of Israel, the U.S., and the moderate Arab states to encourage and support King Hussein's journey and to help him resist those who oppose him. We can best do this by contributing to the stability of Jordan and by helping to meet its legitimate security needs. Visible U.S. political backing, coupled with a security assistance relationship that addresses its mutually recognized defense needs, will provide Jordan with the confidence it needs to continue moving forward on the path to direct negotiations with Israel.

Moderate Arab states are awaiting the U.S. response to Hussein's efforts before making further commitments of support: Unequivocal support from us will encourage others to support King Hussein's effort or at least to refrain from undermining it. U.S. equivocation will likely dishearten Arab moderates and succor radicalism from both Muslim fundamentalists and leftists.

Preservation of U.S. role as mediator. By helping to meet Jordan's security needs, the U.S. also helps to preserve its own role as mediator of the peace process. Although most Arab states are uncomfortable with our special relationship with Israel, they recognize that the relationship is a foundation stone of U.S. Middle East policy and some even indicate grudging respect for our willingness to stand by our friends. They also recognize that the U.S. can, at the same time, act as a fair and trustworthy interlocutor, as we did during the 1973-1975 disengagement agreements and the Camp David Accords. Arab perception of our ability to be equitable stems in large part from our willingness to help meet the security needs of Arab states which perceive a threat springing from their pro-American orientation. To refuse arms to Jordan at this juncture would greatly undermine Arab confidence in our readiness and ability to mediate broader peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

U.S. arms and political leverage. U.S. reluctance to respond to Jordanian arms requests in the recent past weakened both Jordan's moderate influence in the area and our leverage with the Jordanians, creating a situation that was uncomfortable for both nations and which served the interests of neither.

More important, arms from other sources -- although they might partially address the issue of security -- would not do so in a way that strengthened the peace process and the posture of the U.S. in the area. Arms purchases from Western European countries -- while an available source of supply -- carry comparatively little political meaning and none of the implicit security support Jordan seeks, particularly for taking risks in the peace process. Faced with the hostility of rejectionist forces, Jordan is less likely to be willing to incur the obvious security and political risks in the process if it lacks U.S. political support. If the major source of its military sustenance is Western Europe, which lacks effective political influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, or the Soviet Union, which supports Syria and opposes Arab-Israeli peace, there will be no perceived U.S. political support for peace.

The tyranny of uncertainty. At the same time, it cannot be assured that the provision of arms to Jordan will guarantee any particular outcome in the peace process. In this business, there are no guarantees. Arms for Jordan and their implicit political and security support can improve the conditions and the atmosphere for the process but cannot determine the results. We learned this during the Camp David negotiations. Despite the impetus provided by President Sadat's dramatic, and politically risky, visit to Jerusalem and the strong U.S. backing for the overall peace effort, the road to peace proved long and hard, and at times appeared destined to failure. This situation did not

prevent the United States from agreeing to supply necessary defensive weapons to Egypt, including 50 F-5E air defense aircraft, prior to the convening of peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. At the same time, refusing to provide security assistance to our friends in the region does not rescue us from the tyranny of uncertainty, or provide us with any better "guarantees" for the security of Israel.

IV. Weapons Systems under Consideration

General. The arms package which we are notifying has an estimated cost of \$1.55 billion and is composed of the following system:

- 40 advanced fighter aircraft (F-20 or F-16 air defense variant) -- 2 squadrons of 18 aircraft each plus 2 training/attrition aircraft per squadron;
- 300 AIM-9P4 infrared air-to-air missiles;
- 12 Improved Hawk surface-to-air missile firing units with associated support equipment;
- 14 Improved Hawk surface-to-air platoon command posts and conversion equipment designed to make the current Jordanian Improved Hawk units mobile;
- 72 Stinger shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and 36 reloads;
- 32 Bradley M-3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles.

With the exception of the Bradleys, the entire package is designed to help the Jordanians improve their single greatest combat deficiency: air defense. King Hussein's highest priority is to equip his Air Force with an advanced air defense fighter as soon as possible. Delivery lead times range from 24 months for the F-20 -- an aircraft which has yet to go into production -- to 48 to 60 months for the new generation Improved Hawk missiles. While a prompt and favorable U.S. decision on the package is of immense significance because of the political support it conveys to King Hussein's peace initiative, such a decision would not give Jordan an immediate improvement in military capability. It would, however, over time, significantly strengthen Jordan's capability to defend itself.

F-20. The F-20 is a multirole tactical fighter incorporating advanced technology in aerodynamics, propulsion, digital controls, airframe, avionics, and armament. It is equipped with a General Electric F404 engine designed with emphasis on,

reliability. The aircraft features advanced digital electronics and a multimode coherent radar. The F-20, with its ring laser gyro, is designed for rapid scrambling in an air defense mode. This makes it attractive to the Jordanians, who face the prospect of enemy air attacks materializing within minutes over their northern cities and bases. The Jordanians are seeking F-20s for assignment to interceptor squadrons. Their acquisition would reduce the ratio of Syrian to Jordanian aircraft, although the Syrian inventory will still increase faster in terms of absolute numbers. Ultimately, however, Jordan is expected to retain its fighter force at a constant level of about 100 aircraft, retiring some of its F-5s as the F-20s enter the inventory toward the end of the decade.

F-16. The F-16 is a multirole tactical fighter which has been produced for the U.S. Air Force and many foreign nations. The specially configured air defense variant, which is designed for an all-environment air superiority mission, combines the airframe and cockpit of the F-16C with an upgraded version of the APG-66 radar from the F-16A. Its air-to-ground capabilities will be significantly less than those of the F-16C. It will be powered by either the GE F-110 or the Pratt and Whitney F-100 engines, and will incorporate a modified inertial navigation set to enable more rapid scrambling against enemy air attack. The F-16 would be used in the same numbers and roles as the F-20.

AIM-9P4. The AIM-9P4 (Sidewinder) is a short range air-to-air missile designed for use at a wide variety of altitudes. Its combat capability of 1-3 miles is between that of a conventional cannon and a medium range air-to-air missile and is used to defend the aircraft against an attacker at short range. It is not, however, as capable as the AIM-9L, which is the Israeli inventory. The package includes 300 AIM-9P4 missiles for Jordan. With each aircraft capable of carrying six missiles, Jordan's two squadrons of advanced fighters will be provided one basic load per aircraft, with a minimal total reserve supply of 60 missiles.

I-Hawk missiles. At present, the Jordanians operate 14 batteries of Improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles. The U.S. sold this air defense missile system to Jordan in 1976 in a transaction involving Saudi financing. Congressional opposition to the sale led President Ford to offer the missiles to Jordan under the condition that they be rendered immobile in fixed sites. While reluctantly accepted by Jordan, this arrangement fell far short of providing it an adequate air defense. The 14 sites provide protection for the capital city of Amman, key military bases, and airfields. Their immobility combined with a lack of overlapping coverage, however, has rendered them extremely vulnerable. Given the fact that Jordan has amply demonstrated its peaceful

intentions toward Israel, a stand which has increased the threat from the region's rejectionists, the political decisions of 9 years ago which rendered Jordan's Hawks immobile do not meet the political-military realities of 1985 and beyond. Moreover, despite concerns being expressed that Jordan might move its Hawk missiles closer to the West Bank, the severe tactical disadvantages of moving the missiles along exposed, winding roads and placing them in the low ground of the Jordan Valley makes this highly unlikely. Rather, the value of mobility to Jordan lies in being able to complicate targeting by potential attackers through being able to move launchers out of fixed positions and likewise in being able to fill gaps in heretofore porous air defense lines.

The proposed package would make Jordan's existing 14 batteries mobile in their current Improved Hawk configuration, and would provide Jordan with 12 additional missile firing units from a product improvement program scheduled for U.S. Army acceptance in 1986. This technological upgrade will not be operational in Jordan until the end of the decade. Although the Improved Hawk is far from easy to pack up, move and set up again -- thereby rendering it of limited use in an offensive mode -- its mobility is of vital importance in the defense of rear areas. With mobility, the Jordanians would be able to move their missile units every few days or weeks, closing defensive gaps and denying Syria predictable open corridors through which to plan and execute a successful attack. Also, if deployed in rear areas beyond the range of Israeli artillery, the Jordan ridge line creates radar blind spots that render the missiles ineffective against Israel.

Stinger. Stinger, a man-portable 34.5 pound system, is designed for use against low-flying aircraft. It would provide the Jordanians with an air defense weapon which can be rapidly deployed as a point defense for sites near the capital and key installations under attack by hostile aircraft. The small number of Stingers requested militates against their deployment with infantry units. Although the latest in Stinger technology, the Passive Optical Seeker Technique (POST), is not releasable to Jordan, the basic Stinger would provide an improvement over the older Redeye system. The number of systems requested by the Jordanians is far lower than its 1984 request. After the U.S. withdrew its offer to sell Stinger in 1984, Jordan turned to the Soviet Union, which provided the roughly equivalent SA-14. The Jordanians believe that the Stinger is a more reliable and capable system, based on the past performance of Soviet-supplied portable air defense systems, but do not have the resources to acquire a full, duplicative system.

Bradley. The Bradley M-3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle carries a five-man team for reconnaissance missions. It has a range of 300 miles, road speed of 42 MPH, and is armed with a 25mm automatic stabilized cannon, a 7.62 coaxial machinegun, and a TOW antitank guided missile system. The Jordanians need the Bradley to upgrade their ground reconnaissance capabilities. The 32 vehicles they have requested represent an insignificant enhancement in the overall Middle East military balance. In light of reports that Jordan has been offered the Soviet BMP for its armored reconnaissance needs, the Jordanian request for Bradleys from the U.S. provides further evidence of their preference for American workmanship, American technology, and the American system of security assistance--but most importantly their commitment to close political relations with the U.S.

Security. Jordan has long since demonstrated its ability to provide a very high degree of security for all of its weapons. Concerns about the possible diversion of U.S. weapons to terrorists, particularly Stinger shoulder fired SAMs, are answered by Jordan's perfect record in this area. In fact, Jordan has had the U.S. Redeye--the shoulder fired IR-homing predecessor of the Stinger missile--in its inventory for 9 years. None has ever been lost or diverted. In addition, Jordan has agreed to an especially rigorous security system for the Stinger involving separate storage of missiles and launchers and random inspection by U.S. security personnel.

Effects of the package. Two independent U.S. intelligence studies of the likely effects of the proposed arms package on the Middle Eastern power balance reached essentially the same three conclusions: (1) the addition of this weaponry to the Jordanian inventory will not provide Jordan with a credible offensive capability against Israel or Syria; (2) while an enhanced air defense would marginally increase the effectiveness of Jordanian resistance were Israel to attack Jordan, nothing short of U.S. intervention could prevent the rapid destruction of Jordan's military forces in the event of an all-out Israeli assault; and (3) a credible Jordanian air defense could deter a Syrian attack by making it a costly and time-consuming enterprise.

The morale factor. Military capabilities cannot be measured in terms of equipment inventories alone. Jordan's armed forces have known for many years that they are outgunned at every level by their neighbors, and that the tools at their disposal pale in comparison with those which have been supplied to Syria by the Soviet Union and to Israel by the United States. Nevertheless they have been able to take pride in a military tradition which has featured discipline, devotion to King and country, and professionalism. King Hussein has used his armed forces to help transform a weak country of fewer than three million into a

pillar of moderation and stability in a region known for neither. Since 1971 he has concentrated on Jordan's economic development, largely at the expense of military modernization and pay. King Hussein realizes that the pride and professionalism of his military cannot be indefinitely maintained if the quality of its weapons and equipment continues to deteriorate, particularly in contrast to the steady modernization being undertaken by his neighbors. In terms of military capabilities, therefore, the most significant short-term effect of this arms package will be its role in convincing observers throughout the Middle East that the King, with American backing, is serious about preserving and defending his Kingdom. It is this assurance that will enable Jordan's military to maintain its readiness and morale in spite of the unfavorable odds it faces.

V. Implications of Not Going Forward with the Sale

The implications of not providing Jordan this package of defensive arms are quite clear, and may be summarized briefly.

- The peace process may be fatally damaged. Without the strong signal of U.S. support conveyed by the arms package, King Hussein will pull back from his exposed position of seeking broader peace negotiations with Israel and may have to move cautiously toward a tactical realignment with Syria and its regional policies. Moderate Palestinian elements will either have to reconcile with Damascus or seek other avenues to advance their cause. The net effect will be a strengthening of Syria and other rejectionist Arab elements at the expense of moderate Arab states and Palestinians seeking diplomatic solutions to their grievances.
- King Hussein will critically review his armed forces' relationship with the U.S. The King probably would not, given his predisposition toward the West and instincts for survival, sever all military-to-military ties. Given our unwillingness to help the Jordan Armed Forces modernize, however, he might find it prudent to be far more circumspect about permitting combined exercises and other U.S. activities on Jordanian soil. The prospect of Jordanian forces cooperating with the U.S. in regional defense matters would be sharply reduced.
- King Hussein will need to move quickly to provide his armed forces with substitutes for the American weaponry he much prefers but cannot obtain. European suppliers are all-too-eager to step in with a combination of high-priced equipment, training, some credits and no end-use restrictions attached. The provision of arms from Western Europe will not carry the same political message of support

as a U.S. sale, and will not have the same confidence-building effect on King Hussein with respect to his continuing to accept risks in pursuit of peace with Israel. King Hussein may also be forced to turn again to the Soviets, despite his opposition to their politics and doubts about the efficacy of their arms, because they are able to offer high-quality equipment, attractive terms and rapid deliveries. Much as he distrusts the Soviets, the King may eventually be obliged to tolerate a larger Soviet presence to support sophisticated equipment for which Jordan has failed to find a comparable alternative source. The Soviet Union would welcome the opportunity to provide increased primary responsibility for security assistance to Jordan, and claim closer bilateral political and security cooperation as a consequence. The United States, and presumably Israel, would hardly find such an historic strategic reversal across Israel's longest border a reassuring prospect. Moreover, the loss of revenue and jobs for the United States, particularly in a period of large trade deficit, is a factor which must be recognized.

- If King Hussein goes elsewhere for arms, Israel loses the reassurance of indirect U.S. control. With long U.S. delivery lead times and follow-on support in terms of training, spare parts, and replacement items, the U.S. does exercise considerable leverage over how Jordan uses U.S. arms and equipment. An arms supply relationship with the U.S. helps ensure that worst-case scenarios -- such as a Jordan led by an Ayatollah, or Jordan as part of a massive anti-Israeli Arab coalition -- would have minimal effect on Israel's security.
- The credibility of the U.S. throughout the region would be severely undermined. Failure to support a military establishment whose relationship with American forces in the region is virtually unparalleled in the Middle East would send a clear, unmistakable signal: the U.S. cannot be relied upon to support its friends. Other moderate Arab states might well be led to reconsider their own defense relationships with the U.S. The Syrian and Soviet argument -- that the U.S. is fundamentally incapable of dealing forthrightly with both Israelis and Arabs -- would gain new credibility. Even Israelis, given all they know about the relationship between King Hussein and eight successive American Presidents, would have to wonder about the depth and durability of the U.S. commitment to them over the long term. They would have to question whether any "friend" of the U.S. could be permanently immune from the kind of treatment given King Hussein.

VI. Conclusion. This proposed sale of defensive weaponry to Jordan clearly serves the long term interests of the United States and Israel, as well as Jordan. It will help facilitate steps toward a just and lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors by conveying both political support and the promise of an enhanced defensive capability to Jordan. In the face of a Soviet supported Syrian threat to Jordan and Israel alike, a small, vulnerable state such as Jordan would find it very difficult to conclude and help enforce a binding peace agreement with Israel without the political and military support of the United States. The interests of all those interested in peace demand that no party, Arab or Israeli, be defeated by blackmail and intimidation. This proposed arms sale focuses on Jordan's recognized air defense deficiencies. It is militarily modest but fully in keeping with the close American-Jordanian security assistance relationship which has been pursued by King Hussein and every American administration since 1950; all of which have recognized the valuable contributions to United States interests made by Jordan, both as a voice of moderation and as a force for stability in a troubled region.



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

May 8, 1985

JORDAN: PEACE NOT PLANES

AIPAC

King Hussein is once again coming to Washington to seek advanced American weapons. He is not willing to sit down to negotiate peace with Israel. But he does want to acquire sophisticated military systems, including advanced combat aircraft, mobile Improved HAWK surface-to-air missiles, and air-to-air missiles.

The fact is that Jordan refuses to negotiate with Israel and maintains a hostile attitude toward the Jewish state:

- Jordan continues to spurn direct negotiations with Israel. As its Deputy Premier Sulayman Arar declared, "Direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel are out of the question." (Al-Majallah, 4/3-9/85)
- King Hussein rejects direct negotiations with Israel on the one hand and then blames the United States for the lack of progress on the other, even threatening Washington that "American credibility is nearing its final test."
- King Hussein seeks to increase the role of the Soviet Union in the region by insisting on the discredited idea of an international conference, which he terms the "most appropriate and credible" forum. In reality it would be little more than a fruitless propaganda exercise.
- King Hussein has given Yasir Arafat veto power over any negotiations. Instead of direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan, he wants negotiations between the United States and the PLO, admonishing Washington that, "I cannot continue to be the person in between" the United States and the PLO.
- Jordan now hosts the headquarters of the terrorist PLO. Indeed, Yasir Arafat's deputy, Abu Jihad, claimed responsibility for the recent abortive terrorist attack against Israel from Amman.
- Jordan demands that the United States "cease...all dealings with Israel in order to isolate it in all fields." (U.N. General Assembly Resolution, 39/146B, 12/14/84)

Jordan is a country which has gone to war with Israel on three occasions. If U.S. arms are provided to King Hussein before he makes peace with Israel, they will:

- increase the threat of an Arab offensive along Israel's long and vulnerable border with Jordan.
- reduce Israel's ability to operate combat aircraft even in defense of its own territory.
- increase Jordan's war-making ability and therefore the likelihood of its participation in the next war.
- increase Israel's defense burden by forcing it to implement costly countermeasures.
- remove the incentive for King Hussein to enter peace negotiations.

In the 1970's, the United States waited until after Egypt entered direct peace negotiations with Israel before supplying arms to the Egyptians. This is an excellent principle that also should be applied to Jordan. Providing arms now would reward Jordanian intransigence and discourage other Arab states from participating in the peace process.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee has incorporated language into the FY1986 Foreign Assistance Authorization Bill that no U.S. military aid be used to pay for weapons purchased by Jordan until the President certifies that King Hussein is publicly committed to enter into direct negotiations with Israel under the terms of U.N. Resolution 242 and the Camp David Agreements. This is a sound principle which should guide U.S. policy.