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JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL
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OF GREATER WASHINGTON

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March 6, 1986

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The Jewish community remains deeply distressed over the internecine, religious and political strife in Lebanon.

Most recently, two more Lebanese Jews were murdered in a country which has suffered the wanton destruction of thousands of innocent civilians over the last, brief period. The Jewish community of Lebanon, once large and thriving, has now dwindled to but a handful. Unfortunately, it has become a community held hostage to the threat of terror and kidnapping.

It is clear that Syrian backing of extremist forces enables the horror of a bloody Lebanon to continue.

We praise the efforts of your administration to raise concern for politically divided and strife-torn Lebanon. But we urge that the administration redouble its efforts through the U.N., bi-lateral and multi-lateral efforts with our allies and all other appropriate ways, to press the government of Syria, which has clear influence over many of the radical groups, to do its utmost to protect the remaining civilians in Lebanon, including Lebanese Jewry.

Indeed, we pray for the day when all Lebanese citizens can once again enjoy a life free of the ravages of civil war. Our Jewish tradition teaches, "he who saves a single human life is regarded as having saved all of humanity". Such a moral imperative, we believe, should guide our nation in securing the physical and political safety of the Lebanese people.

Sincerely,

Helene Karpa

Helene Karpa,
President

CONSTITUENT ORGANIZATIONS

JEWISH COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER WASHINGTON

LEBANESE JEWS VICTIMS OF SHI'ITE MUSLIM TERROR

An International Relations Department Analysis

By George E. Gruen, Ph.D.
Director, Middle East Affairs, American Jewish Committee

The announced execution of two Lebanese Jews within one week by a radical Shi'ite Muslim group indicates an intensification of the terrorist campaign against Lebanon's tiny and defenseless Jewish community. The same group killed two other Jews in December. The latest victim is Dr. Elie Hallak, a prominent pediatrician and Vice President of the High Council of the Jewish community.

In a statement published on February 19 in the Lebanese and French press (An-Nahar, Beirut, Le Monde, Paris), the group, which calls itself the "Organization of the Oppressed (Mustadafin) in the World," said it would not release Dr. Hallak's body until Israel "stopped its criminal operations" in southern Lebanon, withdrew from "all of the occupied territories" and released "all our brothers detained in Khiyam," a South Lebanese Army detention camp.

Two Polaroid photographs accompanying the statement confirmed that he was in their hands, but in the pictures he appeared still to be alive. The caption supplied by his captors depicted him as "a leader of the Mossad," the Israeli intelligence service. This is ominous since the charge of spying for Israel has been used by the group to justify its killing of three other innocent Jews within the past two months.

The Organization of the Oppressed had not earlier admitted to holding Dr. Hallak, a man in his fifties, although he had been kidnapped in March 1985 together with three other Lebanese Jews, presumably because the group knew how patently false the charge of spying was. Dr. Hallak was a much loved and highly respected doctor, whose patients came from all ethnic and religious segments of Beirut's society and whom he treated regardless of their ability to pay. Indeed, some years ago he treated the son of one of the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization. When news of his abduction was revealed, the kidnapping was condemned by Christian and Muslim officials, including Justice Minister Nabih Berri, the leader of the mainstream Shi'ite group, Amal.

Even during his months of captivity, Dr. Hallak was reported to have served as a physician. The Organization of the Oppressed is apparently connected to the pro-Iranian Hezbullah (the Party of God). One of the Americans who had been held captive by the fundamentalist Hez-

bullah at the time of the TWA airliner hijacking last June reportedly had seen Dr. Hallak treating patients.

Dr. Hallak's wife, Rachel, and his three sons, André, Alain and Marc (in their teens and early twenties), have been living in Paris in order to escape the turmoil in Lebanon and to enable the boys to continue their education.

On Saturday, February 15, the Organization of the Oppressed brutally murdered Ibrahim (Abraham) Benisti, a Lebanese Jew in his forties. The group had previously kidnapped and murdered two other Jews, Haim Cohen and Professor Isaac Tarrab, in late December. At that time they threatened to kidnap and kill additional Jews unless all their demands were met. Ibrahim Benisti and his father, Yehuda, 68, were kidnapped in recent days. Yehuda's other son, Joseph, 33, had been abducted last May.

According to the Beirut police, Ibrahim Benisti's body was found wrapped in blankets on Sunday morning, February 16, in a street in West Beirut near the line dividing the predominantly Muslim section from Christian East Beirut. The coroner's office reported that Mr. Benisti's body bore signs of torture and beatings to the head. He was shot twice and then strangled.

Near the body was a copy of the statement issued by the Organization of the Oppressed to the press on Saturday night declaring that Mr. Benisti had been "a prominent agent" of the Mossad and that other Lebanese Jews they had captured were members of the same network. The charges were categorically denied as "nonsense" by the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Moreover, outraged students and friends of Professor Tarrab attested that the distinguished retired professor of mathematics had only nominally been Jewish and had no connection to Israel. Mr. Haim Cohen, 38, was a department store accountant, who was known as a kind and gentle person, who chose not to go to Israel, his sister-in-law, Rose Mary, in Los Angeles declared, because "he did not wish to face the possibility of killing his Arab friends in battle."

Indeed, none of the kidnap victims had been involved either in Lebanese internal politics or the Arab-Israel conflict. It was precisely because they felt fully integrated in Lebanese society and had both Muslim and Christian friends that they chose to remain in Lebanon even after the overwhelming majority of Lebanon's 6,000 Jews left in the years after the Six-Day War of 1967 and the decade of internal strife following the eruption of the civil war in 1975. Today fewer than 75 Lebanese Jews remain in Beirut, most of them in the eastern section of the city.

The tragic fate of the Benisti family is typical of the misplaced trust of those Lebanese Jews who remained. The family lived in the Wadi Abu Jamil section of Muslim West Beirut near the main synagogue. Yehuda Benisti operated a gift shop and general store near Beirut airport,

which adjoins a Shi'ite and Palestinian neighborhood. When Mr. Benisti's son, Joseph, was abducted on May 18 of last year, the father at first did not notify the police or the Jewish community, because he believed that his friends and customers from within the Shi'ite community would discretely intervene on behalf of his son and arrange for his release. It was only toward the end of last year, when all quiet interventions failed, that Mr. Benisti contacted the Jewish community in East Beirut for help.

According to the February 15 statement by the Organization of the Oppressed, they seized Yehuda Benisti as well as Ibrahim and Youssuf (Joseph), because "all three were part of an Israeli spy network."

In its statement, published in the Lebanese daily, An-Nahar, on February 16, the fanatical Shi'ite group declared that Ibrahim had been slain in revenge for Israel's presence in southern Lebanon, the alleged "violation of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. . .by the filthy boots of Jewish Israeli occupation," and the shelling of Shi'ite Muslim villages in South Lebanon. It also repeated the threat in its December statements that it would kill Jewish hostages unless "Shi'ite mujahidin" (holy warriors) captured by the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army were promptly released.

In its February 16 statement, the group threatened that "all those interested in having any kind of relations with Israel" would face "adequate measures from us." It added that "the punishment of the spy Ibrahim Benisti should serve as a warning."

The latest kidnappings bring to ten the number of Jews known to have been abducted in the past two years. The death of four, not including Dr. Hallak, has been officially confirmed. The Organization of the Oppressed had earlier claimed to be holding Elie (Youssef) Srour, 68, who was in charge of preparing the dead for burial according to Jewish rites, and Isaac Sasson, in his mid-60's, a pharmaceutical executive who is the President of the Lebanese Jewish community. Both were kidnapped at the end of March 1985.

On July 1, 1984 Raoul Sobhi Mizrahi, 54, an electrical engineer who ran a major electrical supply company, was kidnapped by three armed gunmen from his apartment in West Beirut. There were no ransom demands. He was beaten to death and his body was discovered on July 3. A group calling itself the "National Resistance Army--The Nation's Liberation Faction" said it had killed Mizrahi "because he was an Israeli agent." This was firmly denied by his family.

Still missing is Salim Jammous, secretary general of the Jewish community, who was kidnapped on August 15, 1984, reportedly by three armed men who abducted him from his car near the communal office located in the compound of the main synagogue in West Beirut.

Although the kidnappings have been condemned by both Muslim and Christian officials in Lebanon and numerous governments and international human rights organizations have appealed for their release, these appeals have thus far fallen on deaf ears. While Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran has ostensibly opposed hostage taking -- he claims the American Embassy personnel held hostage for 444 days were all "spies" -- he has not yet forcefully spoken out to call upon his supporters in Lebanon, such as the Organization of the Oppressed and the Hezbullah, to release these innocent Jews. They are entitled to protection under Islamic law as members of a recognized monotheistic faith.

At the Memorial Service for Murdered Lebanese Jewish Hostages and Plea for Redemption of All Held Captive in Lebanon, cosponsored by the American Jewish Committee, the New York Board of Rabbis and the Jewish Community Relations Council of New York, on January 8, 1986, the Rev. Joseph O'Hare, S.J., President of Fordham University, poignantly declared: "It is once again a cruel irony that the murderers of Haim Cohen and Isaac Tarrab should dare to call themselves representatives of the oppressed of the world. No greater human oppression is possible than the reduction of individual human beings to nameless symbols whose lives are snuffed out in some sterile political gesture."

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The Strategic Implications of West-East Technology Transfer

by

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for presentation to
the International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Ottawa, Canada
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Although the reasons are many--and yet not altogether clear--the Soviet Union, with its sizeable population of mathematicians, engineers, and highly trained technicians, has never been able to develop efficient manufacturing production lines. The problem may be rooted in the anomalies of central planning, insufficient (or wrong) incentives for Soviet managers and workers, failure to devise effective management techniques, or the politicization of the workplace, among other reasons.

The Soviet Union has sought to solve the problem through a systematic program to acquire Western know-how and equipment. This approach is not new. Substantial Western technological aid preceded the Bolshevik Revolution by more than half a century.

Coal, iron and steel-producing capability was developed with capital and technical assistance from British, French, Belgian, German and Dutch firms. Swedish know-how, in the form of the Nobel brothers, developed the oil fields of Baku on the shores of the Caspian Sea. This crucial development made the U.S.S.R. the world's leading oil producer by 1901. As Carl Gershman explains in Commentary (April, 1979): "The Trans-Siberian railway was built with Western (principally French) capital and technology, and the parallel telegraph line was built and operated by the Danes. Many American firms, too, participated in Russia's industrial development . . . International Harvester was the largest manufacturer of agricultural equipment in prewar Russia and Singer Sewing Machine had holdings worth over $100 million and employed a sales force in Russia of over 27,000 people in 1914."

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917 they appropriated all Western assets, but in three years, with the economy in a state of chaos, Lenin invited Western companies back under a system of concessions. By 1933 the concessions were eliminated, but not even this put an end to Western financial and technical aid to the Soviet Union.

American companies built the steelworks at Magnitogorsk in the Ural Mountains, the largest steelworks in the world at the time (a copy of the Gary, Indiana plant of U.S. Steel); the Dnepr River Dam in the Ukraine, which was critical to development of Soviet hydro-electric power; the Gorki automobile plant east of Moscow, which was constructed by the builder of the Ford Motor Company's River Rouge Plant; and a series of major chemical installations.

Since those days, Lenin's quip that Western businessmen would sell him the rope he needed to hang them has become a cliche capturing capitalist greed. For many years the West has indead sold the Soviet Union much of what it required to accomplish one of the most astonishing military build-ups ever. If Lenin were alive today, he might well conclude with delight that the nature of the capitalist has not changed. Western countries provided the military technology, equipment, and training that enabled the Soviets to convert their weak industrial base into a formidable military production complex. In the 1920s, the Soviets obtained prototypes of numerous aircraft engines from Western manufacturers and built composite "Soviet" models incorporating the best features of each. They

also imported military aircraft from Britain, France, Holland, Italy, and Sweden, thereby gaining a design base for their own aircraft industry. During the twenties and thirties, the USSR bought Western prototype tanks and based Soviet tank development on the best features of these foreign models.

The potential of dual-use technology was demonstrated early on. Western companies thought they were only helping mechanize Soviet agriculture when they provided assistance and equipment for construction of three great tractor factories at Stalingrad, Kharkhov, and Chelyabinsk. The Stalingrad plant, in fact, was built in the United States and delivered in component parts to the Soviet Union. There, American and German technicians supervised its assembly on the lower Volga River. From the start, the Soviets used the three plants for the production of tanks, armored cars, and self-propelled guns. An American industrial engineer familiar with Soviet industrial practices noted that the Tractor Construction Trust emphasized "production of tanks rather than tractors." In 1932 an American engineer then working in the Kharkhov plant reported that tank production took precedence over tractor production and that the Russians were training operators for this production "day and night."

World War II and the Cold War

On June 22, 1941, the Wehrmacht surged into the Soviet Union from the Black Sea to the Baltic. Within weeks the Red Army teetered on the brink of collapse. The Soviets asked for and got vast amounts of equipment from the West to support their

war effort. During this time, the Allies transferred radar equipment which, together with unclassified U.S. publications on radar theory, were the basis of postwar Soviet radar developments.

After World War II, the Soviets pillaged what was left of German industry, moved thousands of scientists and engineers to the Soviet Union and acquired several thousand plants estimated to have equaled 41 percent of Germany's 1943 industrial capacity.

After World War II, the Soviet Union redoubled its efforts to increase its military strength and went shopping in other Western markets. One major purchase was the Rolls-Royce "Nene" jet engine, which powered the MIG-15, an aircraft that menaced United Nations forces during the Korean War. Germany had provided substantial help in designing the MIG-15 airframe.

Soviet military production however, often lagged in quality as it leapt ahead in quantity. For example, during the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet industry had difficulty producing the precision bearings required for missile guidance systems. In the 1970s, however, the Soviet Union legally purchased grinding machines from the United States that did the job. These machines aided development of the Soviet ballistic missile program and freed financial and research resources for other purposes. Time and again over the last couple of decades, through legal purchases, use of open scientific sources, deceptive business practices and espionage, the Soviet Union has acquired American and other Western technology at a direct cost to the West of many billions of dollars and an indirect cost that is virtually incalculable.

All available evidence points to a Soviet decision, taken in the late 1950s, early 1960s, to invest heavily in the expansion of Russian military power and the Russian military-industrial base. One effect of this was to shift resources away from the civilian economy. At the same time, it was decided that trade with the West could be helpful to both the civilian and the military sectors. Despite profound fears of liberalization, Soviet policy emphasized the ties between their system and Western capitalism. Westerners were encouraged--although it didn't take much--to believe that better over-all relations were possible and that trade was the vehicle to accomplish it. These links were then exploited principally to develop the industrial base needed to permit the development of a modern military establishment. A collateral benefit for the Soviets has been the ability to play off Western European NATO members against the United States because of the Europeans' more immediate interest in detente and its accompanying commercial opportunities.

Detente is often dated from 1972, the year of the SALT I Treaty and the U.S.-Soviet agreement on principles intended, by the West at least, to guide superpower relations. In the late 1960s and early 1970s American diplomatic and trade officials argued that increased commerce with the East would lessen tensions and open new markets. President Johnson spoke of "expanding bridges" to the East. President Nixon foresaw a period of "cooperation" replacing one of "confrontation."

The Export Administration Act of 1969 reversed previous policy and declared that the U.S. would now "encourage trade

with all countries with which we have diplomatic or trading relations" and noted that trade restrictions harmed the U.S. balance of payments. The act authorized the Secretary of Commerce to revise regulations and to shorten lists of controlled commodities by removing items of non-military or marginal military use. That resulted in a less restrictive system of export controls, and it coincided with a Soviet judgment that high technology had become critical in the East-West military competition. The combination led to a qualitative improvement of Soviet strategic and conventional forces based on Western technology in the midst of a massive quantitative build-up.

There are many elements that influence a country's ability to bring its military power to bear, in peace as well as in war. Geography and the ability to deploy troops are, of course, important, as are the quality and quantity of manpower. In such crucial parts of the world as the Eurasian land mass and its periphery the Soviet Union has an obvious geographic advantage that the U.S. has sought to offset through alliances, the stationing of troops abroad, the pre-positioning of materiel and the development of efficient means of air and sea transport. The Soviet Union has an advantage in numbers that the United States cannot directly offset. Through superior training and motivation, it is possible for Western forces to outperform their Eastern counterparts, but we can only be certain of that by testing it in battle. Tactics, strategy and the skillful are other crucial elements of warfare in which the West might conceivably prove superior to its Soviet-bloc adversaries.

But the one area in which the competition is clear-cut is weaponry. Quantity is determined primarily by national priorities, reflected in levels of investment. But quality is mostly a function of innovation, carefully designed and well-controlled manufacturing processes and a skilled and motivated work force. The Soviet Union has the advantage when it comes to quantity because its economy is centrally controlled; and as a totalitarian state in which the military establishment holds vast power, popular desires for butter rather than guns has no effective political force or expression. The Politburo sets the priorities and they are followed.

But the West has the upper hand when it comes to innovation and manufacturing know-how. In the Soviet command economy, individual initiative is discouraged and innovation languishes. The emphasis is on meeting quotas, which are based largely on what is possible with existing methods and machinery. Managers are disinclined to experiment, to take risks. There are few incentives for change, reform is sporadic and economic performance diminished.

In the West, however, innovation usually means increased profit and long-term gain. There is a vast market to be served, and service is well rewarded. The system is geared to change, with the attendant risks. As a result of that and other factors, Western manufacturing processes are more advanced than those in the Soviet Union. And given the lamentable unwillingness to compete with the Soviet Union in quantity for social, economic and political reasons, the United States and its allies have

sought to offset the Soviet quantitative advantage through the exploitation of advanced technology. Recognizing that it is not possible to protect technology forever, the wisest U.S. policy makers concluded that it was both possible and necessary to protect lead times, the precious years it takes the Soviets to catch up. If the U.S. is to have a margin of safety, it is embodied in those lead times.

When the Soviet Union substantially increased the pace of its military build-up more than a decade ago, Soviet leaders recognized that even vast quantities of relatively crude weapons would not accomplish their military purpose. They understood they would also have to substantially upgrade the quality of their weapons systems. This was necessary not only to arm Soviet forces, but also to be able to provide their surrogates with weapons comparable to those with which the West has supplied to its allies and friends. The Soviets also understood that to meet their goal quickly, they would have to gain access to more Western technology. To get what they needed, they organized an elaborate collection effort.

The KGB and the intelligence directorate of the Soviet General Staff, and Soviet and East European science and technology organizations, play an important role in this well-coordinated effort to beg, borrow and steal Western technology. The Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology, for example, often takes the lead in negotiating government-to-government agreements to facilitate Soviet access to new and established Western technologies. Just one result of these relentless efforts is that

the Soviet Union has succeeded over the last ten years in building its own microelectronics industry, almost entirely with design and production-line technology acquired in the West. This, more than anything else, is responsible for the quantum leap in sophistication in Soviet weapons systems. Through legal and illegal means in the last decade the Soviet Union has acquired defense-critical Western technology in the following, among other, fields: computers, radar, inertial guidance systems, lasers, metallurgy, machine tools, integrated circuits, robotics, superplastic materials and electronics-quality silicon. Technologies acquired through acquisition methods ranging from fully licensed sales to illegal diversions and espionage complement one another and allow the Soviet Union to turn seemingly innocuous purchases into weapons system components.

The Soviet collection effort has been augmented by well-orchestrated disinformation. Partly as a result of its effectiveness, and partly because many in the West believed that expanded East-West trade and technology transfers would nourish a benign detente, the West failed fully to grasp Soviet objectives. Key Western organizations intended to control the flow of technology were allowed to atrophy. And even now, Soviet scientists and engineers often are able to reproduce advanced weapons in the NATO arsenal, largely because they can easily obtain the industrial know-how that makes them possible. It is only now that the first tentative efforts to meet this ongoing but recently stepped-up Soviet challenge are being replaced by more forceful measures.

Western Objectives

The Reagan Administration has no desire to conduct economic warfare against the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact countries. However, the U.S. government recognizes a critical need to overhaul and modernize the existing system of controlling militarily-relevant Western technology.

Since just after World War II, the United States, Canada, and our Western European allies (excluding Iceland and Spain) have been curtailing exports of equipment and technology to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries through an informal organization known as the Coordinatinng Committee (CoCom). In the early 1950s Japan joined CoCom. The common objective was to coordinate a Western effort to contain Soviet expansion.

CoCom's principal purpose has been to prevent the transfer of equipment and technology that contribute to Soviet military programs or to the military programs of other countries whose political and strategic goals menace those of the United States and its allies. For a variety of reasons, including strong pressure to increase East-West trade, Western governments have failed to make the CoCom case effectively.

The importance of both exploiting and protecting Western technology is now better understood. There is growing awareness that a superior technological base does not necessarily guarantee that the West will maintain its lead because some technical advantages, once lost, can never be fully regained. For example, the thrust-to-weight ratio of high-performance combat aircraft has long been an important Western advantage. It is made possible

by advanced metallurgical processes developed in the United States. If the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact were able to copy or steal this capability, it is unlikely that we would ever be able to fully recover the lost advantage. Before making technology accessible to the Soviet Union, we need to ask whether we can afford the cost and the time as well as the risk.

Controls: A Balanced Approach

Although not everything can be protected--and protecting technology is not without cost--it is, in general, more cost-effective to control technology that otherwise would contribute to the Soviet military build-up than not to control it. In many cases, significant defense-related resources such as micro-circuits have been sold to the Soviet Union for pittance. In the past, the West has gone through spasms of technology control followed by spasms of technology release.

A technology control program that is not consistently enforced is little better than no program at all. A consistent program is needed to help create conditions for maintaining the balance of power and inducing genuine arms control. For example, if the Soviets had not used Western technology to improve their guidance systems, it might have been easier to convince them to accept reductions of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

On the whole, the best way to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring Western technology is by concentrating on protecting manufacturing know-how rather than products. By focusing on basic

know-how we hope to slow the pace at which they can field new weapons. Let me emphasize that it should be the state-of-the-art in the Eastern Bloc, not in the West, that serves as a guideline for what may or may not be transferred.

The Controlling Mechanisms

Work has begun on the overhaul of the international machinery for controlling technology in the last two years. Perhaps the creakiest part of the control structure is CoCom itself, which has an annual operating budget of less than $500,000. CoCom lacks modern offices, adequate staff and even secure communications facilities. And it has no capacity to carry out independent assessments. It is obvious that unless it is modernized and given additional staff and funds, there is no way it can effectively confront the extensive Soviet operation to exploit Western technology.

More significantly, CoCom has no systematic way of evaluating proposed transfers of technology in the light of the strategic criteria it is supposed to apply--the potential contribution to the Soviet military effort. This is because CoCom as an institution has no direct access to military experts from the participating nations. The United States has proposed that a military panel be created and that it become part of CoCom's regular organization.

Enforcement

Another area that requires attention is enforcement. This encompasses, among other things, the need for new national laws

and close cooperation among law enforcement agencies, both nationally and internationally.

At home, the United States has significantly enhanced its own enforcement. One program, PROJECT EXODUS deserves special praise. EXODUS is a U.S. Customs operation to monitor outbound cargo. Since it began in January 1982, it has stopped a wide range of illegal transfers to the Soviet bloc valued in the millions of dollars. Before January 1982, virtually no cargo leaving the United States was inspected by Customs agents. Violators of U.S. laws are being indicted and those convicted are being sent to prison.

Non-CoCom Nations

Some progress has been made (but more is needed) in dealing with the advanced industrial nations outside CoCom. Most are intimately tied to the CoCom states and derive much of their industrial know-how and technology from them. Many benefit from defense cooperation with the NATO Alliance while trading with the East. Often the transfer of Western militarily-relevant technology is part of the bargain. Usually, contracts prohibit transfer of that technology to proscribed destinations, but only companies are obligated by such contracts, not countries. This makes enforcement complicated and sometimes contentious. On occasion, the terms of the contract may even conflict with national laws.

The system is clearly in need of change. The United States is developing technology-sharing arrangements that involve concrete, enforceable obligations on the part of the beneficiary

states. But the United States cannot do this effectively on its own. Similar efforts have to be made by the other CoCom nations. It is encouraging that some first steps in that direction are now being taken.

For numerous reasons, the loss of militarily-relevant technology cannot be reduced to zero. It is not possible to eliminate espionage; (more than 11,000 U.S. companies alone are cleared to handle classified work) and it is impossible to police every unscrupulous businessman who is prepared to sell proscribed technology to the Soviet Union. It is inevitable that some weapons-related technology will slip away as a result of legitimate academic and commercial contacts. It is not always possible to identify future military applications of civilian technology, and some militarily-relevant technology is available from non-CoCom sources.

But it <u>is</u> possible, despite the political, economic and technical obstacles, to limit the loss. Some progress has been made. The Customs Service's PROJECT EXODUS is the most visible example of an effective, new U.S. program. In addition, there is now greater appreciation of the magnitude of the problem in government agencies responsible for control and enforcement. A concrete effort is being made to reach a consensus with our allies about the risks involved and how to combat them without trampling needlessly on academic freedom or commercial opportunity. There are success stories to be told: plots have been foiled, rings broken up, arrests made and convictions obtained. Licenses have been refused and the CoCom process has

been used to prevent exports that if allowed would have strengthened the Soviet Union militarily. But the successes are still too few.

To match the Soviet Union's full-scale acquisition effort, the West needs a full-scale prevention effort. And it must be a comprehensive Western effort. Since no one country--not even the United States--has a sufficient lock on Western technology to keep the Soviet Union from getting what it wants, it is crucial that the United States, Japan and their European allies cooperate fully to protect the West's still adequate, but fast diminishing technological advantage. This cooperation must take into account historically different perspectives toward the Soviet Union, international trade and detente.

For one thing, Western Europe lives in the shadow of the Soviet Union; Soviet power is simultaneously more familiar and more frightening. To many Europeans it seems more prudent to feed the bear rather than to cage it. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is seen in Western Europe as an important customer for countries that are more dependent on trade than the United States; and a source of energy for countries that are more dependent on imported oil than the United States.

Given all that, responsible West Europeans are as eager as we Americans to contain Soviet military might. The main challenge in pursuing that goal in the area of technology transfer is to articulate a clear policy that takes account of the inevitable conflicts between European and American views and economic/political interests, while seeing to it that security is not

compromised. Once the U.S. and its allies concur in such a policy, the means of enforcing it can be put in place and the will to carry it out will be strong.

At the heart of the policy there must be a clear consensus about precisely what constitutes militarily-relevant technology. For some years the United States has been refining its definition. Possibly the single most important document in this area is "An Analysis of Export Control of U.S. Technology--a DoD Perspective." This 39-page paper, generally known as the Bucy Report because it was prepared by a task force headed by J. Fred Bucy, Jr., then the executive vice president of Texas Instruments, made an important breakthrough in the U.S. approach to the problem. It placed the focus on the exporting of know-how and certain keystone technologies, not products. Bucy's approach reshaped American thinking about the definition of technology and it has led to important revisions in the categories of technology considered most important to protect.

A series of technology and equipment lists have been developed to provide basic guidelines. The key domestic lists are a Munitions Control List, administered by the State Department, and a Commodity Control List, administered by the Commerce Department. They are constantly being revised to take into account new developments in research and production-line methods, and new ideas about what constitutes dual-use technology. The munitions list is straightforward. It proscribes the export of weapons and ordnance without a license. The Commodity Control List is more problematic because it is not always evident that every item on it has clear military

application, and many of the items have undeniable civilian uses. Because of this ambiguity, there is sometimes disagreement between companies whose business it is to make a profit and the government, which has a substantial interest in seeing American business prosper, but whose broader responsibility includes national security. Similar disagreements arise between academics, who have a fundamental interest in the free flow of scientific and technical information, and the government, which shares that interest, but whose first duty is to guarantee the safety of the state. The Defense Department places a high priority on resolving those differences.

There are also three international lists administered by CoCom. There is a munitions list (similar to the domestic munitions list administered by the State Department) and an atomic energy list. These lead to few disagreements. However, the third list, which is comparable to our Commodity Control List, contains most of the dual-use technologies, some of which can be bought from neutrals or other third parties as well as from CoCom members. Most of the conflicts between the United States and its allies concern what should be included in this industrial list and what exceptions to it should be granted. Here, too, sharper definitions are required, as is a better system of resolving disputes.

Over the last few years the U.S. Commodity Control List and the CoCom industrial list, which are virtually identical, have been substantially reshaped according to the standards proposed in the Bucy Report. But the complexities of the CoCom list

suggest the problems inherent in enforcement even after CoCom members have agreed on what the list should include. This list is made up of highly technical generic definitions of equipment. The definition for computers, for example, exceeds thirty pages.

At President Reagan's request, the CoCom nations in January, 1982, for the first time in 25 years, convened a high level meeting to discuss the technology transfer problem. Various new initiatives have resulted. The U.S. has suggested a number of ways to strengthen CoCom, including modernization of administrative methods and equipment, modernizing communication facilities and adding a computerized data base so that members can improve policy coordination and enforcement.

The United States has also pressed for the establishment of a committee of military and technological experts to advise CoCom. We hope member nations will add defense experts to their CoCom delegations to work on strategic analysis in preparing control lists and the reviewing of difficult transfer cases. Until Defense Secretary Weinberger suggested that NATO interest itself in the implications of technology transfer, there was not a single body within the Alliance with responsibility for monitoring this crucial issue.

Domestically, the Export Administration Act directs the Secretary of Defense to prepare a list of "militarily critical technologies." That list, which provides advisory export guidelines, also follows the recommendations of the Bucy panel by emphasizing design and manufacturing know-how; keystone manufacturing, inspection, and test equipment; and goods

accompanied by sophisticated operation, application, or maintenance know-how. More than 80 industrial firms reviewed and cooperated in establishing the first Militarily Critical Technologies List.

The Defense Department has also identified a group of industries in the U.S.S.R. that can put Western technology to military use by monitoring the industries to which "dual-use" technology is channeled. As a result, we can sometimes stop seemingly innocent but potentially dangerous technology transfers.

The U.S. attempt to monitor and control the Soviet Union's acquisitions more carefully has required extensive cooperation among federal agencies. A National Command Center coordinates their intelligence, inspection, and investigative activities. The Defense Department will soon begin operating a training program to help Customs officials recognize high technology items subject to national security controls. The FBI has provided major support, especially through its widespread experience with Soviet espionage, and the rest of the intelligence community has stepped up its efforts to prevent further losses in this area. Finally, the government has expanded security-assistance programs to advise defense and defense-related concerns targeted by Soviet intelligence.

To improve the ability of the United States to curtail the flow of militarily-relevant technology to the Soviet Union and its allies, President Reagan has proposed revisions in the Export Administration Act. The President's proposals would sharpen the distinction between critical and non-critical items, simultaneously making it easier to export technologies without significant military applications and more difficult for them to sell processes and

products that have important military uses. The new rules would include tougher sanctions on companies that violate export regulations; provisions for negotiating agreements with allies and neutrals to help enforce U.S. controls on a global basis; and controls on companies based abroad and on the activities of foreign nationals in the United States.

As we move further into the age of thinking computers, lasers and particle beams, it should be obvious to everyone that mastery of these technologies, and others still undreamed of, is vital to our national security and to our future as a free nation. The United States remains the pre-eminent innovator of high technology for defense and civilian purposes, but unless we are able to prevent the Soviet Union from rapidly duplicating our latest achievements, there is precious little advantage in being better and being first. We must protect our lead times. But if we err, it is surely better that we do so on the side of security.

Conclusion

The security of the United States, its allies and its friends, depends to a significant degree on the West's ability to preserve its advantage over the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact nations in militarily relevant technology. If the West is going to maintain a margin of safety it is going to have to be a technological margin. Our past program to prevent military, dual-use and other relevant technology from falling into Soviet hands has been inadequate. The Soviet Union has organized a major and generally effective effort to acquire Western know-how and equipment, both

legally and illegally. If the West wants to stop this flow it must successfully counter the effort. That will require a broader international consensus than now exists, reached through NATO and CoCom, on precisely what items and classes of technology must be protected; and a series of national political decisions to implement it. These will require an even greater level of cooperation between government and industry than now exists. Failing such action, the prospect is for a continuing erosion of our qualitative lead, which could ultimately turn the West's margin of security into a Soviet margin of terror.

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
Washington, D.C.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

4.2.87

Lebanon

HIZBOLLAH

THE PARTY OF GOD

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

H I Z B O L L A H

Hizbollah (literally, "the Party of God") is an umbrella organization which includes radical Shiite organizations which share a Khoumeiniist ideology. Hizbollah was founded in the wake of Operation Peace for Galilee. Iranian influence increased in Lebanon, as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards established themselves in Baalbek in the northern region of the Bekaa Valley. From there they infiltrated into West Beirut and south Lebanon.

The Iranian infiltration into Lebanon was part of a larger effort made by the Khoumeini regime to spread the "Islamic Revolution" beyond Iran. Lebanon became a favored objective because of its large Shiite population. Hizbollah was intended to act as an organizational framework for Shiite fundamentalists who are ruled by religious activists. They see the political solution for the Lebanese crisis in adoption of the Iranian doctrine. This includes recognizing terror as a means of achieving political goals.

It seems that the term "Hizbollah" was first given to the group of Lebanese volunteers who were trained, militarily and ideologically, in camps of the Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa Valley. However, while the term clearly refers to a distinct group with close ties to the other radical Shiite organizations, it is not constructed according to any usual party framework, with institutions and hierarchies. Instead it is a body with many secondary frameworks including organizations that have merged with the movement as did the "Islamic Amal" group, or local cells. On the local level, these "subgroups" are headed by functional and regional leaders. These, in turn, are subject to the umbrella organization of the radical Shiites: a Central Committee which includes members and senior radical leaders and which is supervised by the Iranian Ambassador in Damascus, with regional councils in Beirut, in the Bekaa and in southern Lebanon. It seems that there is no single functionary in Hizbollah who serves as the leader of the movement in Lebanon. Even so, it is clear that the "spiritual leader" of the movement in Lebanon is Sheikh Muhammed Hassin Fadallah, who acts as Mujtahid -- the chief decider of Islamic law for the fundamentalist Moslems and others in Lebanon, and who enjoys great spiritual-ethnic-religious influence. Other central figures include: Abbas Musswi, Hassin Musswi -- leader of "Islamic Amal", Sabhi Sfili, and Hassan Nasser Allah.

Hizbollah is in the process of institutionalizing itself. This includes the appointment of an official spokesman, Sheikh Ibrahim Alamin. At the same time, Hizbollah has created with Syrian and Iranian aid a wide militia network, beginning in the Baalbek area, spreading to the Shiite neighborhoods in West and South Beirut, and to south Lebanon. This network is, in fact, the main essence of the Hizbollah which is based on fighters and activists, and does not stress political activity as is usually case in the Lebanese arena. Hizbollah and the other Shiite organizations incorporate approximately 4,000 activists and fighters (2,500 in Bekaa, about 1,000 in Beirut and several hundred in south Lebanon). There is also a wide recruitment potential among the Shiite population on the basis of family and local loyalties.

In southern Lebanon Hizbollah has concentrated its efforts (especially since the completion of the withdrawl of Israeli forces from the area) in erecting a base of operations. This includes infiltrating activists and fighters, stockpiling weapons and swaying the Shiite population with the aid of religious leaders and money received from Iran. During this consolidation, Hizbollah has pointedly avoided taking part in the local struggles for power, and has generally adopted a passive stance against the steps that Amal has taken against it. Hizbollah's approach has been to build its infrastructure and to acquire influence among the Shiites in the south (icluding those in Amal), before beginning the active struggle over its policy.

It seems that Hizbollah has both overt and covert presence throughout the Shiite areas of southern Lebanon, and dominant control in several villages. Her main centers are: Jibshit, Sdikin, Maaraha, Maarub, Arab Salim and Kfar Sir.

The ideological concepts of Hizbollah are expressed in the political platform the movement published in February 1985 in which it was stressed that:

* The solution for the Lebanese crisis is rooted in the establishment of the "Islamic Republic", for only such a regime could promise justice and equality for the inhabitants of Lebanon. The Christian regime of Jumayel must be toppled, and Jemayel must stand before a court of justice along with the whole Christian camp.

* Hizbollah sets as an important mission the fight against "Western imperialism" in Lebanon. According to the party's viewpoint, one must fight the Americans and the French until they (and their institutions) depart Lebanon.

* The struggle with Israel is also presented as a primary goal, and it is not limited to the withdrawl of Israeli forces from Lebanon, but is intended to bring about the eradication of Israel and establish Islamic rule over Jerusalem.

Hizbollah presents the Shiite population in general, and the younger sections of it in particular, with an attractive alternative to the existing political and religious institutions of the community. This is in the guise of wide and easily acceptable religious and material solutions. Ideas such as "Islamic Rule" modeled after the Iranian success, side by side with active participation in the fight against the "Enemies of Islam", attract potential radical Shiites more than the political solutions offered by Amal in the legitimate Lebanese framework. Against the the economic crisis in Lebanon, the substantial support that Iran pours into Hizbollah facilitates its activities and serves as an important boost in the recruitment of young Shiites to the radical Islamic camp.

Hizbollah evolved from a minor factor in the Shiite community to a powerful element with growing influence, which is eating away at the poltical and religious institutions of the Shiite community.

The radical Shiite ideology of terror draws on the Islamic revolution in Iran as a source of inspiration, aid, and instruction. Hizbollah has carried out -- under the name of "Islamic Jihad" and with the blessings of religious leaders -- several spectacular acts of terror against Israeli, UN, American, and French targets. These attacks (Tyre, November 1983; the American Embassy and attacks against U.S. Marine and French HQ in 1983-84; "Gate of the Calf" in 1985) have included suicide missions. The Shiites have also employed hijacking (TWA flight 847, June 1985; the original hijackers were in all probability members of Hizbollah). This is side by side with the kidnapping of foreign citizens -- especially American and French. It should be noted that the terror attacks on IDF and SLA targets in southern Lebanon, carried out by Hizbollah and radical Shiites, are done under the cover name of "The Islamic Resistance". In these attacks Hizbollah exhibits fine operational and military capabilities. Although Hizbollah does in principle support the struggle against Israel with the objective of "liberating Jerusalem", the characteristics of its current attacks in southern Lebanon have not deviated from Amal's policies. This out of Hizbollah's wish to avoid leadership struggles with Amal at this time.

Hizbollah is an ideological adversary of Amal with whom it competes for control of the Shiite community. Due to this there are often local incidents between the organizations in the Bekaa Valley, in Beirut and in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, as a result of the "balance of weakness" between the two organizations (each unsure of its capability to win an all out confrontation), they maintain perfunctory contact for coordination and cooperation.

MILITARY UNITS - ORBAT

A. Amin al Muamin Brigade - Beirut.
B. Hammam al Mahdi Brigade - Beirut.
C. Said al Shuhada Brigade - al Khoumeini, Beirut.
D. Al Kuds (Jerusalem) Brigade - Baalkbek, Bekaa Valley. This unit is considered as a standing unit and is provided also with anti-tank weapons of Iranian manufacture (Sahner-7) modeled after the RPG.
E. Engineering (and sabotage) units.
F. "Liberation of Jerusaelm" unit - Beirut (a splinter of Al Kuds).
G. Gaish al Mahdi company - the Believing Resistance. (It is not clear whether this is a unit of Amal which participated in a Hizbollah activity, or whether it is an organic unit of Hizbollah).
H. Hammam Ali camp - Baalbek.

Note: These units, especially those designated as brigades, are of non-standard sizes. The names such as al Kuds Brigade, or al Khoumeini Brigade are probably only symbolic.

NAMES OF GROUPS (MAJMUAT)

A. Bint Jbail martyrs group.
B. Al Haj Mustafa Shakir martyr group.
C. Ali Mahdi martyr group (the Believing Resistance).
D. Sheikh Raab Harb group (it was this group that captured the two IDF soldiers in February 1985).
E. Tsafi Rahal martyr group.
F. Halil Akawi martyr group.
G. Ali Saliman martyr group (probably a terrorist cell which plants mines).
H. Rada alShaar (Abu Muhamad - commander of the Islamic Resistance in the western Bekaa Valley) martyr group.
I. "Martyrs of Islam" group - the Hammam al Khoumeini platoon of the Islamic Resistance.
J. "AlShahadaa" (the martyrs) Muhammad Auda, al Haj Mustafa Shakir and Ali Ismail.
K. Ahmad Mahmud al Mahdi martyr group.

WEAPONS

A. 106mm recoilless cannon (jeep mounted).
B. 122mm field artillery (truck towed).
C. Anti-aircraft artillery - 14.5mm four barrelled, 37mm dual-barrelled and 57mm single-barrelled.
D. M-113 APCs (in one parade 12 of these APCs appeared) armed with Grad rockets, with field cannons and in Malyutka (Sagger) anti-tank missiles (which also serve to attack surface targets).
E. Iranian manufactured anti-tank Sahner-7 (similar to RPG).
F. 81mm and 120mm mortars.
G. LAW missiles.
H. 107mm rocket launchers (Katyushas).
I. Dragon (American) anti-tank missiles.
J. 107mm rocket launchers (12 tube).
K. 122mm rocket launcher.

Shiite Moslem move[illegible]
his ally, Walid Jumblat, [illegible]
the mostly Druse Progressi[illegible]
Party, and Elie Hobeika, [illegible]
mander of the powerful Christian militia known as the Lebanese Forces.

"It is all over," Mr. Berri told reporters, alluding to the civil war that in ef-

Lebanon: 10 Years Of War

BEIRUT, Lebanon, Dec. 28 (Reuters) — The agreement today among Lebanese militia leaders came after 10 years of civil war. Here are some of the major events in a decade of fighting:

1975 — Fighting erupts in April after Christian gunmen ambush a busload of Palestinians in a Beirut suburb, killing 30 people. Cabinet resigns as fighting between Christians and Moslem-Palestinian alliance increases.

1976 — Christian forces overrun Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut in January, and Syrian troops intervene. Lebanese Army disintegrates; Syrians enter Beirut in November as part of a Saudi-backed deterrent force.

1977 — Druse forces overrun Christian villages in March after assassination of the Druse leader Kamal Jumblat.

1978 — Israel invades southern Lebanon and sets up a "security zone" under client militia, but withdraws as United Nations troops are deployed. Syrian-Christian fighting breaks out in Beirut.

1979 — A pro-Israeli militia under Maj. Saad Haddad proclaims the state of "Free Lebanon" in the security zone in April.

1981 — Fighting erupts in eastern town of Zahle between Syrians and Christians under Bashir Gemayel. Syria installs antiaircraft missiles in eastern Bekaa, and Israel begins air strikes against Palestinians.

1982 — Israel invades Lebanon in June with the declared goal of ousting Palestinians. Its forces push Syrian troops from capital and besiege West Beirut for 10 weeks. Palestinian fighters leave Beirut in August, and a peacekeeping force with troops from several nations is deployed. In September, Christian militiamen kill hundreds of Palestinian civilians in Beirut camps after President-elect Gemayel is assassinated. Mr. Gemayel's brother, Amin, is elected President.

1983 — A car bomb kills more than 50 people at the United States Embassy in April. Syria rejects accord Mr. Gemayel negotiated with Israel for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon. In October, suicide bombings kill 241 American servicemen and 58 members of French paratroop unit. Talks among Lebanese factions begin in Geneva, but adjourn in controversy. Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, evacuates fighters from Tripoli, the northern port, after siege by Palestinian rebels.

1984 — In February, Moslem militiamen seize control of West Beirut from army units loyal to President Gemayel. Peacekeeping force, including American troops, withdraws by end of February. President Gemayel cancels accord with Israel in March, but fighting between Christians and Moslems continues despite establishment of Syrian-backed Government of national unity.

1985 — Israelis begin pullout from southern Lebanon in February after talks on a negotiated withdrawal fail. Israeli raids on Shiite villages fail to stem attacks, and Christian forces suffer a string of defeats. Hundreds die in Shiite-Palestinian fighting in Beirut camps and in shelling and car-bomb attacks in spring and summer.