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LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERROR AND SUBVERSION

THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



"The acts of the Palestinian Fedayeen are the holiest on the face of the earth."

(Libyan News Agency, 1.1.86)

GENERAL

Libya, under Khadaffi's leadership has consistently supported subversion in the Middle East and in the world at large. Libya lends ideological and financial support to terrorist groups all over the world. As a political entity, Libya is a source of local and global instability--in its anarchist ideology and its active support for opposition movements in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Libya does not hesitate to use force—from the murder of individuals to incitement of conflicts within and among states. Its philosophy of violence also finds expression in Libya's enormous arsenal of arms which well exceeds her needs and manpower. Part of this arsenal is exported to elements serving Khadaffi's interests, whether they be nations, underground movements, or terrorist organizations.

In the field of international terror, Khadaffi is prepared to supply weapons, training, and operational support to groups fighting for "national liberation". According to Khadaffi, the goal of "national liberation" can be achieved only by "revolutionary armed struggle"—meaning armed attacks the world over, against civilian targets(i.e. airlines, tourists, and large events).

On the occasion of the anniversary of the Libyan revolution (1 September 1985), Khadaffi expressed his support for Palestinian terror in general, and for attacks on Israeli settlements and airliners in particular. Khadaffi declared that:

- The partial allocation of Libyan resources will bring the "Palestinian resistance" to a level at which it will pose a serious threat to "the Zionist settlements in conquered northern Palestine." Libya will serve as a "base for liberation", from which operations may be launched if no bases are found in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, or Egypt.
- It is Libya's right to take steps to deter defeatist Arab regimes from maintaining contacts (covert or overt) with Egypt. According to Khadaffi, Egypt is developing air traffic relations with Israel; therefore, Egyptian jets which fly to Israel and to Arab states are to be seen as Zionist aircraft, and should be treated as such by Arab airports (i.e. boycotted).

TERROR AGAINST THE LIBYAN OPPOSITION

The Libyan regime sees itself as under a continuous threat from "the enemies of the democratic revolution". The regime claims the right to "eliminate" exiles and members of the Libyan opposition in other countries. The campaign to exterminate opponents of the Libyan regime has on occasion, during the 1980's, been waged on European soil--in Italy, Greece, West Germany, and Britain. The Libyan regime refers to exiled opposition elements as "stray dogs" who must be cleared from its path.

These Libyan murder operations are coordinated from Tripoli by personnel from the "People's Bureaus" (as the Libyan diplomatic posts are called). These activities are based upon support rendered by Libyan embassies (and other offices such as the Libyan national airline) which serve as fronts, ensuring the safe transport of arms.

A vivid example is the series of bombings in Britain at the beginning of 1984, directed against Libyan exiles. These events reached a climax when shots were fired from the Libyan embassy in London on a crowd of protesters in April 1984. A British policewoman was killed in the shooting. American intelligence officials made public (on ABC News) the fact that the order to use force against the demonstration had come from Libya to its embassy in London. (This was revealed in a message intercepted by an American intelligence satellite.)

Assassination attempts (successful and unsuccessful) against members of the Libyan opposition have taken place in Athens (June 1984 and October 1985), Rome, Vienna, Cyprus, and Bonn (a total of five murders from January to June, 1985). Three attempted attacks on Libyan exiles were uncovered in Egypt, starting in late 1984 (two of these assassination attempts against former Libyan Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Bakkush (November 1984, November 1985) and a June 1985 attempt on the life of another exile.

In the summer of 1984, Libyan agents tried to infiltrate into Saudi Arabia with small arms on board a special flight bringing Libyan pilgrims to Mecca. It may well be that these weapons were to be used against members of the Libyan opposition residing in Saudi Arabia.

LIBYA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT

Khadaffi's policies violate the accepted international norms of behavior. Khadaffi's frequently calls for the "liberation" of territory from lawfully recognized governments. Libyan diplomats have also been expelled for interference in the internal affairs of host countries.

Khadaffi is fond of publicly declaring his stance on a number of issues: his willingness to take armed action against Arab rulers who oppose "Arab unity"; his intent to fight several African governments, especially South Africa; his support for the unification and independence of all Ireland, and even for the struggles for independence by the tiny nations of Oceania (Caledonia, Martinique, and New Guinea). As a result of these statements and activities, in the last two years relations have been severed between Libya and several Arab countries (Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, and South Yemen), as well as with the U.K., Zaire, and Mauritius.

In April 1983, the Swiss government demanded that the Libyan charge d'affairs leave the country, after he had been accused of passing two revolvers to local terrorists. In December 1985, two Libyan diplomats were expelled from Spain, after security officials had followed them and uncovered clear evidence that they had been planning an attack.

THE LIBYAN PROHIBITION ON SHIPPING IN THE GULF OF SIRTE

The Libyans have claimed for years that the entire Gulf of Sirte is Libyan sovereign territory, and that foreign shipping may not enter, nor may aircraft fly over it without Libyan permission. In August 1981, an incident occurred over the Gulf when American jets downed two Libyan fighter planes that had tried to intercept them. The Libyans declared, in contradiction of international law, that the Gulf of Sirte is part of their "domestic waters", and claim that their territorial waters end 12 miles north of the imaginary line connecting the two northernmost ends of the Gulf. (Libya restated this claim in an announcement to naval authorities in January 1985.)

MINING OF THE RED SEA

In the summer of 1984, almost 20 naval mines detonated in Egyptian territorial waters and the Red Sea. Although it is not absolutely certain who was responsible for the mines which were laid against commercial and general shipping, all evidence focuses suspicion on the Libyan vessel Ghat which passed through the Suez Canal in 1984, and sailed south into the Red Sea without calling at any port until its return to Libya. The Libyan News Agency, as usual, denied any connection to the action. Another version of events places the blame on Iran (which used "Islamic Jihad" as its agent). This version adds that Egyptian authorities intercepted a message in which the Libyans congratulated the Iranians on the success of the operation.

SUBVERSION IN THE ARAB WORLD

Khadaffi continues to call for the unification of the Arab world on the basis of revolutionary regimes united by pan-Arab Nasserism. He claims the right to interfere in the affairs of moderate, pro-Western states, according to his whims. He is engaged in activities against the nations of the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, even when ostensible Libyan relations with these states appear to be good.

In 1982, Libya planned the assassination of Jordan's King Hussein by downing his plane with SA-7 man-portable missiles.

The Libyans, in addition to supplying large amounts of arms to Iran, encourage internal Iraqi opposition (including Kurdish opposition) to the regime of Iraqi leader Sadaam Hussein, with Syrian cooperation.

THE AFRICAN THEATER

General

Khadaffi conducts Libya's affairs while simultaneously dealing with three spheres of influence: the Arab, the African, and the Islamic. He claims to operate on the Africa continent according to the dictates of a historical, religious and tribal tradition which is to be realized in a political framework under Libyan leadership. Beyond its attempts to gain influence in African states, the Khadaffi regime trains various subversive elements and has sent out military task forces to Sudan (1976), Uganda (1979) and to Chad (in the 1980's).

Khadaffi's antagonistic approach is vividly portrayed in the African sphere in territorial claims he has made, and with the annexation of territories in Chad (the Aozou Strip), Niger, Tunisia and Algeria, all with the goal of restoring Libya to its "historic" borders.

North Africa

Sudan- Libya is the motivating force behind underground movements and incitement of opposition in North Africa and the Horn of Africa. During the years of Numeiri's rule in the Sudan, Libya provided a territorial base for opposition forces and encouraged ferment and subversion inside the Sudan, displaying a readiness to intervene militarily in case of a rebellion (July 1976, February 1983).

Ethiopia- serves as a useful launching point for Libyan activities in the Horn of Africa. Via Ethiopia, Libya sends weapons to Somali rebels, and, in the past, to rebels in southern Sudan. In May 1984, a mysterious bomb blast in an Addis Ababa apartment in which several Libyans had been staying bore witness to Libyan preparations to send arms to some African subversives (or perhaps this was an explosive charge which was intended to explode elsewhere).

Tunisia- is a constant target of Libyan subversion in anticipation of the passing away of Tunisian President Bourguiba. Libya exerts extensive pressure on Tunisia—political, economic (e.g. the expulsion of several thousand Tunisian workers in summer 1985), subversive (an attempt to send letter-bombs, the exposure of which led to the breaking off of Tunisian-Libyan relations), and military (the incidents at Jafsa in 1980 and Libyan aircraft penetrations of Tunisian airspace in 1985).

Egypt- Khadaffi attempts to attack Egyptian political interests, in order to damage the integrity and stability of the Egyptian government, and so to deter the Egyptians from aiding Libyan exiles. Last year, Egypt exposed two assassination attempts on the former Libyan premier who is an expatriot in Egypt. The Egyptians clearly blame Libya for the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner to Malta (November 1985), and in its wake, military tension increased between the two neighboring states. Egypt has also accused Tripoli of the car-bomb attack on the American embassy in Cairo (May 1985).

In addition, a defecting Libyan MIG-23 pilot (July 1984) stated in Egypt that he was trained in Libya for a unique mission to bomb the Aswan High Dam.

On the African Continent

At the beginning of 1980, and in the summer of 1983, the Libyan army intervened in Chad. In September 1984, Khadaffi signed an agreement with French President Mitterrand for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Chad. The agreement paved the way for a meeting between the two leaders at Khartoum, but the Libyan ruler, cunning as ever, violated the agreement outright, while the French fulfilled their part of the accord. Libyan forces remain in Chad.

The Ivory Coast, Zaire, and Kenya are all targets for Libyan terror and subversion - partially due to their ties with Israel.

LIBYAN ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Khadaffi aids radical and underground movements in Latin America as part of an effort to eliminate American and Western influence in the region. An outstanding example of this is his aid to the Sandanista regime in Nicaragua. In April 1983, jets transporting Libyan arms were stopped while flying over Brazil, under the guise of carrying medical supplies. The jets were headed for Nicaragua, part of their cargo intended for the Columbian underground terrorist organization M-19. Other Latin American elements enjoying Libyan support (arms, money, training) include organizations in El Salvador, Haiti and Peru.

LIBYAN SUPPORT OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

GENERAL

Col. Muammar Khadaffi's extremist policies regarding the State of Israel have won him many close allies among the various Palestinian terrorist organizations. At present, Libya gives special support to George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Ahmed Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC) and to the Abu Nidal Faction. In addition, Libya gives various forms of assistance to the world's other terrorist and underground organizations.

Libya's support for the terrorist organizations is motivated by several factors:

- A. Ideological Identification - Libya, not unlike the PLO, takes a radical stance in all matters concerning the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, rejecting all ideas that do not involve both a military solution to the conflict and the destruction of the State of Israel.
- B. Libya expresses its ideology concerning the destruction of Israel via the auspices of the PLO, and together they work towards this objective. Libya thus assures for itself a role in shaping events in the Arab world.
- C. The terrorist organizations also serve to undermine those Arab regimes that Khadaffi defines as "reactionary."

In truth, the PLO-Libya relationship undergoes periodic fluctuations, during which time Libya aligns itself with various terrorist factions, according to the particular circumstances. Any wavering from the "hard line" stance as defined by Khadaffi is immediately censured by the Libyan regime.

From the summer of 1981 until the split within the Fatah organization (May 1983), Libya provided massive amounts of aid to Yassir Arafat's Fatah. Although the relationship cooled afterwards, efforts are being made to bring about a rapprochement between Khadaffi and Arafat.

"The National Arab Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine"

In the early 1970's Libya founded and operated a terrorist organization called "The National Arab Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine", which split away from Fatah. Most of its activities were targeted against international air traffic. The organization was financed and operated by Libya, its members being trained on Libyan soil. Its members came from Fatah, the Habash Front, Jibril Front and other terrorist organizations. The National Arab Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine was headed by Marwan Hadad.

The National Arab Youth Organization for the Liberation of Palestine committed a number of terrorist attacks, including:

8.9.74: A TWA plane is blown up over Athens, killing all 88 passengers and crew personnel aboard.

3.3.74: A British plane is hijacked enroute from Beirut to Amsterdam. The terrorists blow-up the plane after the passengers were taken off.

17.12.73: A Pan-American airliner is hijacked in Fiumicino airport, Rome. The hijackers killed 31 people and wounded 40 others. At the same time, a Lufthansa flight is hijacked to Kuwait; one hostage is killed.

5.8.73: In a mass murder attack in Athens airport, four civilians are killed and 54 others wounded, most of them passengers from a TWA flight that had arrived from Israel.

9.4.73: The home of the Israeli ambassador in Nicosia is sabotaged, and an attempt is made to hijack an "Arkia" airplane.

As of late, the organization's activities have been very limited.

"The Revolutionary Arab - Palestinian Committees"

While most of Libya's involvement in terrorist acts occur abroad, Tripoli also encourages different Lebanese factions to commit terrorist acts against Israel. Beginning in 1984, a terrorist organization called the "Revolutionary Arab-Palestinian Committees" (RAPC) began operating under Libyan auspices.

The RAPC includes Palestinians and other terrorists who abandoned various leftist Lebanese factions. The organization is comprised of several hundred members, and its main base is located in the Lebanese Bekaa. RAPC also has bases in the Tripoli area of northern Lebanon.

On 2 December 1985, a RAPC terrorist squad was caught trying to infiltrate the Israel-Lebanon border in an attempt to carry out an attack on Kiryat Shemoneh. The terrorists were carrying Kalachnikov assault rifles, explosives, knives, maps, compasses and food. (RAPC's headquarters were bombed by IAF jets on 4 September 1985, about 1 mile east of Koub Elias.)

Libyan Connections With the Abu Nidal Faction

The Abu Nidal Faction has recently improved relations with the Khadaffi regime. There is now considerable coordination between Sabri al-Bana (known as Abu Nidal) and Col. Khadaffi in all matters concerning the Arab- Israeli conflict. The organization's offices work freely and openly in Tripoli, Abu Nidal having recently transferred there to supervise organizational and political activities (including the attempt to improve coordination with other Palestinian organizations), as well as the planning of terrorist attacks.

Abu Nidal has been granting interviews in Libya to Arab ("Alqabas", Kuwait) and Western ("Der Spiegel") reporters. A Saudi Arabian newspaper recently stated (October 1985) that in a recent visit by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister to Libya, Abu Nidal made it clear to him that his organization would not stop its activities against Kuwait until the latter renewed ties with the his organization.

On 8 September 1985, Abdul Sallam Jalloud, considered the #2 man in Libya and a member of the Revolutionary Libyan Council Command, met with Abu Nidal. On 28 September 1985, Abu Nidal then met with the Libyan leader himself, Col. Khadaffi (according to the Libyan News Agency).

The Egyptian newspaper "Akher Sa'a" (4 December 1985) noted that Abu Nidal was responsible for the training of various elements that took part in hijackings and assassinations in cooperation with the Libyan and Cuban intelligence services. A central Fatah organization member, Halil Abd el Hamid (Abu al-Houl), confirmed on 27 November 1985, that Abu Nidal operates in complete cooperation with Libyan intelligence services (according to the Egyptian magazine "Al Mussawar").

The Abu Nidal Faction declared on 2 February 1985 (according to Radio Monte Carlo) that, in the wake of the concentration of Egyptian forces on Libya's border, it has placed all its resources at Tripoli's disposal. On 4 December 1985, the Egyptian newspaper "Al Ali" reported that the United States received photographs of terrorist-run training camps located in Libyan territory (via satellite). An American State Department spokesman stated (30 December 1985) that Libya grants substantial assistance to the Abu Nidal terrorist organization in the form of money, arms and refuge.

On 5 January 1986 Khadaffi, while being interviewed in Libya by the American television network NBC, was asked, "What will be Abu Nidal's next step?" The Libyan leader's response was, "To liberate his homeland, Palestine." When asked how Abu Nidal intended to carry this out, Khadaffi retorted, "By every possible means, of course!"

Thus, it is clear that Libya is deeply involved in Abu Nidal Faction terrorist operations, and their cooperation recently has been very apparent:

1. The Egyptians directly accuse Libya of serving as the base from which the hijackers of the Egyptian plane (November 1985) left on its way to Athens. (According to an Iraqi newspaper, the hijackers belonged to the Libyan NAYOLP.) In May 1985, Egypt uncovered a combined attempt to attack an American target in Cairo by Abu Nidal, Abu Mussa, and Libya.

On 26 November 1985 Egyptian Minister of Defense Abu Ghazala declared that Egypt had actual proof of Libyan involvement in the hijacking of the plane to Malta. Radio Cairo (25 November 1985) reported that "Libya planned and financed the hijacking, which was carried out by a Palestinian splinter group, financially backed and encouraged by Libya, which is a known supporter of terrorists and which provides them with shelter."

Libyan agents and Abu Nidal met with the hijackers in Athens in order to complete the plans of the hijacking. Also present at this meeting was Ahmed Khadaffi Al Dam, cousin of the Libyan ruler.

The newspapers "Al Wafd" (Egypt) and "Al Athad" (Abu Dhabi) report (according to A.P. in Cairo, 25 November 1985) that Khadaffi personally ordered the hijacking of the Egyptian plane to Malta. He is also said to have supervised the plan (after the arrest of four Libyan agents that had infiltrated into Egypt in early November 1985, to assassinate ex-Libyan prime minister, Abdul Hamid Bakkush).

The newspaper "Al Taliya al Arabia" (published in Paris) reported on 2 December 1985 that two of the hijackers of the plane came from Libya (the other two coming from Damascus). The article states that it was planned by Abu Nidal and Shafik Aridha, who worked for some time as a building contractor in Libya and received special training from Libyan intelligence under the direction of three officers: Lt. Cols. Abdullah Hejaz, Sanoui and Salam Abu Shrida.

In December 1985, British military sources were quoted in press reports as stating that Abu Nidal put his services at Khadaffi's disposal for \$12 million a year. In a meeting between them in Tripoli in late September 1985, it was decided that most of the hijackers would attack British, American, Israeli and Egyptian targets as part of a new terror campaign to be carried out under the auspices of the Libyan Intelligence. ("HaAretz", December 1985)

Ironically, Hassan Ashkal, a colonel in the Libyan army who was aware of the secret meeting and handed over the first payment of 5 million pounds sterling to Abu Nidal, was shot and killed a day after the Egyptian raid on the plane in Malta. It appears that Khadaffi wished to silence him after the results of the raid were known, for fear that he would betray the secret of Abu Nidal's deal to Egypt.

2. The documents used in the terrorist attacks on the airports in Rome and Vienna (27 December 1985) were, in part, actual Tunisian passports confiscated from Tunisian citizens who had worked in Libya and later expelled en masse by Tripoli.

According to the West German paper "Bild am Sonntag" (29 December 1985) Colonel Khadaffi promised to provide Abu Nidal with \$12.7 million annually for terrorist acts. In their reported meeting in Libya, the first payment of \$4.7 million was made by the late Col. Ashkal. The newspaper stated that in recent weeks via diplomatic mail boxes of grenades, light arms and explosives were smuggled via diplomatic pouches to terrorist contacts in Europe.

Abu Nidal dispatched a number of terrorist squads to Europe, two of which perpetrated the attacks on the airports of Rome and Vienna on 27 December 1985. On 30 December, Italian Prime Minister Bruno Craxi issued a strong verbal attack on Libya, in which he accused them of cooperating in the attacks on the airports.

One of the terrorists who took part in the attack on the Rome airport said that he belongs to a group of 300 terrorists that received Libyan backed training to commit suicide attacks on European airports (according to Italian police sources). The training took place in Lebanon with Khadaffi's full support.

The official Libyan News Agency praised the massacres in the Middle East and in Rome and Vienna, describing them as "brave acts" and "acts of courage...carried out by the sons of the martyrs of the Sabra and Shatilla camps."

Political Support of the PLO by Libya

The political support Libya renders to the PLO is expressed in numerous proclamations of mutual support. Khadaffi, in a meeting with the Revolutionary Committees on 1 September 1985 (according to Radio Libya), made it clear that for "American agents and Zionism in the Arab homeland, the sentence is death...(and) destruction. We will never let them be!"

Khadaffi called for the continued support of the Palestinian resistance and the unification of the various factions in order to begin a new phase, one which will create a real danger for the "Zionist enemy". Khadaffi called on the Libyan people to allocate part of Libya's resources for the Palestinian resistance, which he views as their true partner: "...When we decided in the 11th year of the Palestinian revolution (1980) to increase the weaponry of the Palestinian resistance, and we did so, this brought about the strengthening of the Palestinian resistance's potential and its ability to pose a threat to the Zionist settlements on the occupied land of Palestine."

"It is our duty to serve as a base for liberation. The Fedayeen must set out from Libya..(or) other bases that will be put at their disposal in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt."

Khadaffi (according to "Alqabas", Kuwait, 19 September 1985) declared that "the solution for the Palestinian problem is war from the (Jordan) river to the (Mediterranean) sea. Nothing else is a solution. Closed historic Arab borders for the Palestinian resistance must be opened."

The Libyan Foreign Minister Al Tariki (in an interview with "Al Ittihad", Abu Dhabi, 19.11.85) stated: "As to Libya-PLO relations, there are no problems with the organization. Libya still recognizes the PLO as the sole leader of the Palestinian people. Libya is willing to accept any

Palestinian authority, including Arafat, in planning for the liberation of Palestinian territory."

Libyan Financial Assistance to Terrorist Organizations

Libya is not satisfied with verbal support for the Palestinian terrorist organizations, but also extends pecuniary assistance to finance their terrorist activities.

Lebanese reports have stated that Libya (in April 1984) set a price on terrorist attacks against the IDF and Israeli civilians. Their rates:

Setting an Explosive Charge.....	10,000 Lebanese Pounds
Throwing a Hand Grenade.....	20,000 Lebanese Pounds
Arms Fire.....	30,000 Lebanese Pounds
Suicide Mission (to be paid to the family of the person committing suicide).....	300,000 Lebanese Pounds

On 10 February 1984, Lebanese Phalangist Radio reported that the person in charge of Libyan Intelligence transferred to Abu Mussa (head of the Fatah rebel faction) a total of \$800,000 at his office in the Yarmouk camp, in order to cover expenses involved in transferring "armed Palestinians".

In an interview with "Middle East" magazine, Abu Mussa admitted that his followers were funded by Libyan (and Iranian) aid: "Our brothers from Libya are also helping us and this is nothing to be ashamed of."

At the Baghdad Conference (October 1978), Khadaffi promised to give the PLO \$39.3 million per year. In addition, Libya is channeling grants to various PLO bodies following the perpetration of terrorist acts as a gesture of his approval of their murderous operations. For example:

- * Libya granted 5 million pounds sterling to the Fatah group, "Black September", which perpetrated the murder of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics (5 September 1972).
- * Libya financed the terrorist operation in Vienna (21 December 1975) in which Habash Front terrorists siezed an OPEC building and took as hostages the OPEC oil ministers meeting there hostage (four people were killed and another wounded).
- * Khadaffi made a grant of \$5,000 to finance an attack on an El-Al jet in the Istanbul airport (11 August 1976) in which four people (including two Israelis) were killed and 21 others (including 18 Israelis) were wounded.

In accordance with a law instituted by Khadaffi, 6% of the monthly income of Palestinians employed in Libya is deducted and transferred to the "Palestinian National Fund".

Press reports over the years have continually reiterated the extent of financial support Libya provides the PLO:

- * The Libyan government announced on 20 July 1981 that it was prepared to pay the price of physical and military damages caused to the "Palestinian Revolution" and to the Lebanese people by Zionist attacks." (Radio Beirut, 20 July 1981).
- * The Lebanese newspaper "An Nabar Al Anabi Waduli" reported on 29 June 1981 that the first part of the Libyan financial aid reached the Fatah movement (valued at \$10 million).
- * The Lebanese newspaper "Al Siad" reported on 26 December 1980 that Jordanian Prime Minister Mudar Badran stated that a group of Palestinians, numbering only 30 people, received \$6 million from Khadaffi.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The military assistance that Libya provides to the terrorists is wide-ranging and formidable; it includes supply of weapons and ordnance, support in training terrorists, sending Libyan "volunteers" to join the terrorist ranks, help in escape following a terrorist attack, transfer of intelligence information in preparation for attacks and providing identification papers and passports to terrorists setting out on attacks.

A. Supply of Weaponry and Ordnance

Libya's policy involves the acquisition of weaponry and other military equipment, principally coming from the Eastern bloc, far beyond her practical ability to absorb and use such materiel herself. These armaments are intended for (in addition to her own military use) Arab nations, particularly the "Confrontation States", facing Israel, as well as the terrorists.

In the Lebanese Civil War (1975 - 1977) Libya took an active part in the supply of weapons and ammunition to the terrorists and leftist organizations.

Supply of Weapons to Terrorists Abroad

Libya supplies weapons to terrorists for their activities abroad, such as for the August 1976 attack on El-Al passengers at the Istanbul airport.

Libyan embassies throughout the world serve as distribution points, via their diplomatic mail pouches, for the Libyan arms pipeline to terrorists. For example, the murderers of the Israeli athletes in Munich (1972) used Libya's diplomatic mail to receive their weapons in Germany. Also, the attackers of the Saudi embassy in Khartoum, who murdered three Western diplomats, utilized Libya's diplomatic pouch to receive their weapons in Sudan. Libyan embassies are also used as arms warehouses to further assist terrorist acquisition of arms.

April 1981 - Massive Supply to Terrorists

From the beginning of April 1981, until Operation Peace for Galilee (1982) Libya intensified her arms supply to the terrorists, based upon her growing and expanding involvement in the Lebanese crisis. Libya concentrated on shipping weaponry to the terrorists in Lebanon so that they could be used in attacks against Israel.

On 1.5.81 the Libyan Chief of Staff Abu Bakar Yunis and Foreign Minister Ali Turkki visited Syria. In their meetings, they agreed to put Libya's massive arms supplies at the disposal of the terrorists. Following the visit to Libya by Ibrahim Kolehlat, leader of "Murabitun" (one of the leftist Lebanese movements), it was also decided to supply the leftist forces in Lebanon.

Since April 1981 (until the 24 July 1981 cease-fire in Lebanon) Libya began to channel arms to the PLO by means of an air and sea lift. The ships and planes arrived in Syria, and from there the weapons were transferred via land to the terrorists in Lebanon. These weapons included:

- SA-9 surface-to-air missiles and ZSU anti-aircraft artillery.
(It should be noted that on 28 May 1981 the IAF destroyed terrorist S.A.-9 missile batteries in Damour. Four Libyans were killed and three wounded.)
- BM-21 122 mm. rocket launchers (each having 40 launchers).
- 122 mm. GRAD missiles, to be launched from the BM-21 launchers.
- 130mm., 122 mm. and 57 mm. guns. (The 130 mm. M-46 gun has an effective range of 28.5 km.)

Following the cease-fire, Libya continued to funnel weapons to the terrorists via both Syria and ports in Lebanon. Via the air-lift, Libya sent the terrorists 200 tons of weapons and ammunition in a number of flights in Soviet transport planes. The sea-lift brought 15,000 tons of weaponry. The terrorists in Lebanon reportedly received dozens of various types of howitzers, dozens of BM-21 rocket launchers and two patrol boats.

Examples and Declarations of the Libyan Arms Supply to the PLO

- * The American television network ABC reported on 12 September 1981 that, based on American intelligence reports, Libyan leader Muammar Khadaffi announced the transfer of two patrol boats to the terrorists, in response to Israeli attacks against terrorist positions on the Lebanese coast.
- * Khadaffi, in a 1.9.81 speech marking the anniversary of the Libyan revolution: "The balance of power between the terrorists and Israel has significantly changed since last September, since they received weapons from Libya." (Reuters, 2 September 1981)

- * The A.P. News Agency reported on 28 August 1981, based on American sources, that Libya sent new Soviet-made arms shipments to the terrorists in southern Lebanon, in spite of the cease-fire in the region.
- * Ahmed Jibril, leader of the Popular Front/General Command: "A number of months ago an air and naval bridge was set up between Libya and the Palestinian Resistance." (Radio Monte Carlo, 27 August 1981)
- * "Abu Iyyad", Arafat's assistant, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper "Elrai Elaam", on 17 August 1981: "Allow me to speak in the name of Fatah. The relations between us and Libya are very good. A good part of our position in the south (of Lebanon) is due to Libyan arms."
- * An announcement released by the Libyan News Agency on 29 May 1980 at the end of the Palestinian Congress in Tripoli stated: "The use of armed force is the only way to guard Palestinian revolutionary activities until all of Palestine is liberated."

B. Training Assistance

Libya has set up (in her territory) training camps, in which hundreds of terrorists are trained. Some of the terrorists undergo training for specific attacks. One example is the slaughter at the Istanbul airport (August 1976), in which the terrorists trained specifically for this act. Military exercises at Libyan camps include use of small arms, anti-aircraft missiles and explosive materials. The terrorists also take pilot's courses (in various aircraft, mostly the MIG-23) and naval courses. Terrorists also train as suicide pilots in Libya and prepare planes carrying explosives directed at targets in Israel. Libya has sent instructors to Lebanon in order to teach and train the terrorists in the operation of the latest weaponry that was supplied to them. For example, in May 1981, Libyan instructors came to Lebanon following supply of the latest B.M.-21 Katyusha launchers.

In addition to the Palestinian terrorists who train in these camps, there are also volunteers who are recruited by Libya from different European and Arab states. The volunteers are inducted into terrorist and underground organizations around the world.

Western and Arab sources, and even the terrorists themselves, bear witness to Libyan support in terrorist training:

- * Ahmed Jibril, in an interview with the Lebanese paper "El Sapir": "Libya trains members of the Popular Front/GC in the hijacking of airplanes, armed with explosives, in suicide targets against Israel. 'Front' pilots trained in Soviet-made MIG-23 jets in Libya and in Aden...It is known that the U.S. cancelled the sale of Boeing aircraft to Libya after its intelligence reported that Palestinian pilots were flying MIG-23 aircraft." (A.P. News Agency, 19.7.81)
- * According to "Newsweek" magazine, Libyan trainers were sent to teach Palestinian terrorists operation of the latest arms sent to them in early June 1981. "Time" magazine simultaneously reported that 400-500 Libyan military personnel, all officers, arrived in Lebanon to give train PLO members.

C. Deployment of Libyan Volunteers to Terrorist Ranks in Lebanon

Hundreds of Libyan soldiers, wearing Libyan uniforms, served in the ranks of the terrorists in Lebanon up until Operation Peace for Galilee (not including those sent for weapons training purposes). There were Libyan soldiers who served in terrorist anti-aircraft and other units. For example, the SA-9 missile batteries sent by Libya to the PLO were operated by the terrorists under the command of a Libyan officer. There were also dozens of other Libyan soldiers involved in the actual operation of these missiles. Libyan soldiers were active in terrorist ranks as early as 1973, during the Yom Kippur War.

Examples and Declarations of the Libyan Presence in Terrorist Ranks:

- * Khadaffi in a speech marking the Libyan revolution (1 September 1981): "Libyans responded to the call and thousands of volunteers stood by the Lebanese National Movement and the Palestinian Movement. The world knows that Libyans fell as casualties in Damour, Nabatiya, Sidon and in Palestinian ranks against aggression. Libyans stand at the ready in schools, universities, institutes, factories, cities and farms and they ask to quickly volunteer to fight with the Palestinian people...The balance of power has seen a marked change in the last year, as the result of the deployment of Libyan soldiers on the side of the Palestinian movement and her allies. The armed Palestinian struggle will intensify until it reaches Israeli settlements. For the first time residents were uprooted from these settlements and there began an Israeli flight from north Palestine into the country following Palestinian artillery and missile fire. (Libyan News Agency, 2.9.81)
- * Libyan Foreign Minister Turkki, in a Kuwaiti press conference on 5.8.81: "The blood of Libyan youth was spilt in South Lebanon, and Libya is truly fighting in Lebanese territory against the Zionist enemy for (Libya) is always found beside her weapon." (according to the Kuwaiti newspaper "Al Siyasa", 12.8.81)
- * Ahmed Jibril, in an interview with the Lebanese paper "Al Seyassah" 19 July 1981: "Even though the number of Libyan citizens is small, since 1972 she has sent volunteers to fight in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance. At present there are some 600 Libyan volunteers, some of who fell at El Arkoub (Fatahland). A few months ago volunteers from the Libyan people again came and fought in Palestinian revolutionary ranks and hundreds of these are still with us today."

D. Recruitment of Volunteers to Terrorist Ranks

Libyan diplomatic posts throughout the world are used as "draft boards" for foreign and Palestinian volunteers abroad who are interested in joining the ranks of the terrorists. It is known that the Libyan embassy in Athens openly recruits young Arabs to terrorist organizations.

PLO offices in Libya use the local media, which is put at their disposal, to recruit volunteers to their ranks. On 16 September 1981, Radio Libya broadcast the following call: "According to a decision of the Palestinian National Council on general mobilization, and in response to Khadaffi's call, PLO offices turn to all Palestinians in Libya over the age of 18 to sign up at (local) PLO agencies."

On 26 January 1984, the Libyan News Agency broadcasted a call for volunteers to join in freeing Palestine. The announcement stated: "The Palestinian resistance calls upon the Sons of the glorious Arab nation to volunteer for combat in the Army for the Liberation of Palestine. The volunteers should report to the offices of the Popular Front/ General Command, Saiqa, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Struggle Front or at the Libyan People's offices wherever they may be."

E. Collection of Intelligence Material

The Libyans greatly assist terrorist activities abroad in the collection of intelligence material. Intelligence personnel and Libyan representatives abroad are involved in the collection of this information in order to prepare terrorist attacks around the world.

F. Documentation

Libya supplies terrorists with counterfeit Libyan passports and different forms of documentation, enabling them to travel freely to different states over the globe and to carry out terrorist attacks.

Libyan embassies the world over provide terrorists with assistance and the appropriate papers and documentation required to continue their subversive activities.

G. Libya - Staging Point for Attacks

Libya also serves as a staging point for terrorists setting off on attacks abroad:

- * Mass murder attack in Athens airport (5 August 1973) in which there were 58 casualties.
- * Mass murder attack in Fiumichiani airport in Rome (17 December 1973); 71 casualties.
- * Attack on El-Al passengers in Istanbul (11 August 1976); 25 casualties.

H. Libya - Shelter and Refuge for Terrorists

More than any other Arab state, Libya serves as a shelter for terrorists who have carried out attacks abroad. Libyan representatives all over the world frequently aid terrorists to escape from nations in which they have committed terrorist acts, as well as making sure that these terrorists make their way safely to Libya.

In Libya shelter was provided for:

- * The two hijackers of a Lufthansa jet (October 1972) and the three murderers of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich, who were released following the hijacking of the German plane.
- * Seven terrorists that broke into the home of the Israeli ambassador in Cyprus and who attempted to hijack an Arkia jet (April 1973).
- * Four Habash Front and Japanese Red Army terrorists who hijacked a Japanese jumbo-jet (July 1973) and landed it in Libya.
- * The terrorists who carried out the slaughter at the Athens airport (August 1973).
- * Saiqa organization terrorists who hijacked the train of immigrants from the USSR on the Austrian-Czech border (September 1973).
- * Three out of the five Fatah terrorists who were arrested in Rome (September 1973) in an attempt to attack an El-Al jet by means of SA-7 missiles.
- * Five Fatah terrorists who took over the Saudi Arabian embassy in Paris (September 1973).
- * Five Japanese Red Army terrorists who took over the Swedish diplomatic agency and the American consulate in Kuala Lumpur (August 1975) together with five Japanese who the Japanese government agreed to free after the attack.

- * Six Habash Front terrorists who took oil ministers hostage in the OPEC meeting in Vienna (December 1975).
- * Three Jibril Front terrorists who hijacked a KLM jet (September 1976).

I. Libya as a Supporter of International Terror

Since Khadaffi's rise to power in 1969, Libya has given support to nearly every terrorist and underground organization in the world. These include support of the IRA in Ireland and the ETA in Spain. Khadaffi declared that he would strengthen ties to the IRA after Britain cut her relations with Libya (following the murder of the British police woman by a Libyan diplomat in 1984). It was also reported that the ETA received some Libyan financial aid.

The Japanese Red Army, which had close ties with Libya in the 1970's, combined with the Habash Front to hijack a Japanese airliner in 1973. It landed in Tripoli and was blown up on the ground. Moreover, while on their way to carry out an attack in Thailand (April 1982) Red Army terrorists met with the Libyan representative to Malaysia. Another terrorist squad in Libyan service planned a hijacking in 1981, but it was foiled by the Egyptians.

Occasionally, newspaper reports appear regarding mercenaries of different nationalities working for the Libyans. The Libyan opposition published in their publication, "Al Tahrir" (February 1985), a detailed list of some 40 military camps all over Libya which, according to the paper, are used for the training of Arabs, Palestinians, Africans and other nationalities (Europeans, Latin Americans and Japanese) for terrorist targets. The article states that Libyan and European terrorists receive training in bases in the Benghazi and Ras Hilal regions (one mentioned was the "7th of April" base near Benghazi). After a 6 month basic training course, the terrorists go through training in the fields of sabotage, kidnapping, hijacking, firing of hand-held missiles, and counterfeiting documents. The Habash Front terrorists who struck in Istanbul underwent this training.

The periodical "El Dastur" (London) reported on 25 November 1985 that there are more than 20 terrorist training camps in Libya. On 2 November 1985 Radio Monte Carlo quoted a Columbian newspaper, which reported that one of the leaders of force M-19 recently returned to Libya with Palestinian fighters, who came with him to overthrow the Bogota regime.

On 4 December 1985, the Egyptian paper "Akhar Sa'ad" published a report on the terrorist training camps in Libya. The newspaper stated that the terrorist training bases were located in the following areas:

- Wahat-Ja'abub Desert Region, in the south, on the Egyptian border.
- Code Region "476", some 476 km. from Benghazi.
- In the town of Sinouin and Joud Eldaim.
- In the city of Zouara and in Baab Aziza.

There are over 20 terrorist training camps in Libya, two of the largest camps for the training of terrorists and mercenaries located 20 km. distance from Elbitza'a. Two are near Tobruk, where some 7,000 terrorists of various nationalities are deployed; where operational preparation is carried out by Syrian officers and by Palestinians whose organizations split from the PLO.

Libyan intelligence has divided the terrorist mercenaries into various training camps according to the following distribution:

- Tunisians, Morroccans and Sudanese in military camps "Saret", "Sabha" and "Elzavia".
- Africans from Guinea, Senegal, Nigeria, Chad and Zaire, in camps "Zinjor" and "Kaddas".

There are three bodies responsible for the overseeing of the terrorists and mercenaries:

1. The Secret Committee (or Headquarters of the Revolution), made up of political and military experts on sabotage and terror, headed by Col. Khadaffi himself.
2. The Arab Office, which specializes in sabotage and terrorist operations in Arab states.
3. Foreign Contacts Office, which is responsible for the hiring, paying, and recruitment of mercenaries via Libyan embassies in Europe, Africa and Arab states; it is run by Maj. Sif, one of Khadaffi's cohorts.

There are East German, Cuban and ex-CIA and ex-FBI agents who serve as organizers and planners of the terrorist training. The Libyan regime budgets \$100 million yearly for financial aid to terrorist organizations, including to the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, the IRA, ETA and others.

Libyan intelligence also recruits prisoners who have committed serious crimes. The prisoners are then freed on the condition that they join suicide squads which will carry out operations outside of Libya. One such terrorist belonged to the four-man squad which was sent by Libyan intelligence to strike at Libyan opposition leader B'kanj Mariut.

What is strange is that Kadaffi openly publicizes and occasionally takes out ads in London, Gulf State and Moroccan papers calling for mercenaries to join his ranks in exchange for lucrative salaries.

- * The PLO set up training bases for American underground organizations in Libya which operate under Fatah auspices. Patrick Argoalo, who together with the Palestinian terrorist Leila Khaled attacked an El-Al jet in September 1979 (in which 5 people were casualties), trained in one of these camps.
- * Bruce Macklin, researcher for "Freedom House" (which researches, in part, activities of subversive organizations), claimed in Summer 1981, that Nicaraguan Interior Minister Borj, was a known personage in Beirut and Damascus in the 1970's. Aided by Libyan money and Fatah counsel, he often obtained all sorts of weaponry and sent it to states in Latin America via Fatah-owned Lebanese ships.
- * Media sources state that in Nicaragua, along the north-west coast, a network of 13 terrorist training camps have been established. Part of the funds came from Libya, and most of the direction of these installations comes from Fatah personnel.
- * It is known that various foreign arms dealers carry out their trade in Miami (Florida) hotels, with South American nations. It appears that the PLO and Libya are active in this arms traffic; their primary goal is the channeling of arms to San Salvador rebels. Thus, for instance, in 1981, an 11-man group carrying Libyan diplomatic passports landed in Miami airport, but upon examination, were discovered as Fatah agents.
- * The Italian Weekly "L'Espresso" reported on 19.10.81 that Italian police have indisputable proof indicating that European terrorists receive weapons via Libyan aid. The weekly reported that several Red Brigade and "Front Line" members arrested by police verified that Libya organizes arms deliveries to Western European terror groups via the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine.



United States Department of State

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LIBYAN SANCTIONS

THE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS WERE DISTRIBUTED
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Max
Green

Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of Aggression

Character of Libyan Policy

Mu'ammarr Qadhafi seized power in a military coup in 1969. Since then he has forcibly sought to remake Libyan society according to his own revolutionary precepts. Qadhafi's ambitions are not confined within Libya's borders, however. He fancies himself a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder Third World politics to his taste. His vision provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes, and for undermining moderate governments by supporting--or manufacturing--subversive groups and abetting terrorists. Qadhafi's aggressive policies increasingly have focused on undermining US and other Western interests in the Third World as he sees these as the main barrier to his radical and expansionist goals. Qadhafi's commitment of political, economic, and military resources in support of anti-Western activities worldwide may be surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea or Cuba. He is particularly hostile to Israel and the US. His tactics include a mixture of threats and material support for terrorism, offers of cooperation, economic incentives and intimidation, and outright military aggression.

Libyan Involvement in Terrorism

Qadhafi has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy and supports radical groups which use terrorist tactics. Tripoli operates numerous training camps for foreign dissident groups that provide instruction in the use of explosive devices, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques. Libya also abuses diplomatic privilege by storing arms and explosives at its diplomatic establishments, as occurred during the shoot-out at its embassy in London in April 1984.

The main targets of Libyan terrorist activities have been expatriate Libyan dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments. In almost all cases, the assassins use handguns to kill their victims, often provided by the Libyan diplomatic establishment in their country. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for anti-exile operations; for other types of attacks he tends to employ surrogates or mercenaries.

The Libyan Government in 1980 began a concerted effort to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles. By the time the first phase ended in 1981, 11 Libyan dissidents living abroad had been murdered. Libya in 1985 sponsored five attacks against exiled Libyan dissidents. Targets of these attacks lived in Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy and Austria.

Qadhafi has at least twice tried to murder Libyan exiles in Egypt only to have his agents intercepted by Egyptian security. In the more recent attempt, a four-man Libyan team was arrested in November during an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near Cairo.

Libya also has plotted antiexile attacks in the United States. A Libyan exile in Colorado was shot and wounded by a Libyan-hired assassin in 1981. In May 1984, the FBI arrested two Libyans near Philadelphia for attempting to buy silenced handguns--the usual Libyan assassination weapon. A year later in May 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and a ring of nonofficial Libyans was broken up in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four states.

Qadhafi also targets moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. There is evidence of Libyan-backed assassination plots against such Arab leaders as President Mubarak of Egypt and former President Nimeiri of Sudan. For example those arrested after last November's attempted attack on Libyan exiles in Egypt stated that Qadhafi's target list included President Mubarak. Jordan's King Hussein and Iraq's Saddam Hussein are almost certainly on Qadhafi's list because of restored ties with Cairo and Washington respectively.

Qadhafi also has been implicated in plots to assassinate other moderate heads of state. In September 1984 the Chadian government uncovered a Libyan-sponsored plot in which a briefcase bomb was to explode during a cabinet meeting chaired by Chadian President Habre. More recently, Zairian officials thwarted a Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu in September 1985.

Libyan Links to Middle East Radicals.

Longstanding Libyan support for radical Palestinian groups is growing. Qadhafi has provided safehaven, money and arms to these groups--including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the Fatah dissidents and the notorious Abu Nidal Group. Training for Palestinians and other radicals frequently takes place at several locations in Libya. These anti-Arafat Palestinians are widely engaged in terrorist activities and focus their terrorist activity on Israel and the occupied territories. More recently, however, Libya's support has broadened to include logistical support for terrorist operations. For example, Libya provided passports to the Abu Nidal members responsible for the attack on the El Al counter in Vienna. The Abu Nidal Group is particularly appealing to Qadhafi because of its track record of successful terrorist operations. Abu Nidal's targeting of moderate Palestinians and moderate Arab leaders is consistent with Libya's antipathy toward participants in the peace process. According to Libyan press reports, Abu Nidal met with Qadhafi in Libya at least twice in 1985. Abu

Nidal also gave an interview in Tripoli to a German publication last year and met with Qadhafi's chief lieutenant, Abd al-Salam Jallud. In addition, Libya has provided sanctuary, training assistance, and financial support to the Abu Nidal organization, and there are reliable press and other reports that its headquarters have been moved to Libya. The evidence points to Libya's having been involved in the bloody hijacking of Egyptair 648 (see attached paper on Abu Nidal).

Libya is trying to improve ties with other regional terrorist groups. Qadhafi would also like closer links to Tehran's terrorist effort. He announced a "strategic alliance" with Iran last summer, which he hopes to use as a foundation for joint operational planning for terrorist attacks against various regional foes. He also supports Egyptian and Tunisian dissidents.

Libya also provided refuge for notorious international terrorist Carlos, who headed a network of terrorists for hire. His group was responsible for numerous vicious attacks including the hostage-taking of OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1975.

Libyan Terrorism Against the United States

During the past 18 months, Qadhafi has made several public references to expanding his terrorism campaign to cover US targets. In a June 1984 speech, for example, he told his Libyan audience that "we are capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America." During a speech last September observing the 16th anniversary of his takeover, Qadhafi remarked that "we have the right to fight America, and we have the right to export terrorism to them..." Qadhafi recently threatened in a press conference on 2 January to "pursue US citizens in their country and streets" if the United States takes action in response to Libya's alleged involvement in the Rome and Vienna terrorist attacks.

There have been several instances over the years of Libyan-sponsored attacks against US interest. These examples include the sacking of our Embassy in Tripoli in 1979, the discovery by Sudanese authorities of a Libyan plot to blow up the American Embassy Club in Khartoum by planting explosives in stereo speakers. US personnel also have been on Qadhafi's target list, as indicated by the plan in 1977 to assassinate our Ambassador in Cairo.

Radicalism in the Arab World

Qadhafi's foremost ambition is to dominate and unite the Arab World. He frequently compares himself to Garibaldi or Bismarck and has justified his use of violence and terrorism against moderate Arab regimes as necessary to achieve Arab unity.

Egypt, because of its peace treaty with Israel, is a special target. Libyan agents have been active in Egypt since the 1970s, and Qadhafi has offered support to various opponents of the

Egyptian government. In October 1981, immediately after President Sadat was assassinated, Qadhafi called on Egyptians to overthrow their government; within a week at Cairo International Airport two bombs exploded that had been concealed in luggage unloaded from a flight originating in Tripoli.

More recently Qadhafi has sought to embarrass the government of President Mubarak and undermine the Egyptian economy. A Libyan ship captained by a senior Libyan naval commando laid mines in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez that damaged 18 merchant ships in July and August 1984. In May 1985 the Egyptians thwarted a plot by radical Palestinians backed by Libya to destroy the US Embassy in Cairo with a truck bomb. Last summer Qadhafi expelled over 10,000 Egyptian workers in Libya--confiscating their savings and most of their belongings--in what was in part an effort to place a greater burden on the strained Egyptian economy. Also during 1985, Cairo captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reported that their plan was to destabilize the Mubarak government through sabotage and inciting civil unrest.

Sudan also is a priority target. Qadhafi has long offered training and support to Sudanese dissidents and sponsored acts of sabotage against the government of former President Nimeiri. He was a major source of arms and money for southern Sudanese rebels that began a guerrilla war against the central government two years ago. In February 1983 the Sudanese, with Egyptian assistance, thwarted a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt, and in March 1984 a Libyan TU-22 bombed Omdurman, Sudan in a failed attempt to destroy a radio station there that broadcast condemnations of Qadhafi's policies by Libyan oppositionists.

Since Nimeiri's fall from power Qadhafi has exploited the resumption of diplomatic ties with Sudan to build a network for subversion inimical to Sudan's efforts to establish a parliamentary democracy. A number of known Libyan terrorists have been assigned to the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) or airline office in Khartoum. Qadhafi also has provided arms, funding, training and probably direction to the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, a small group in Sudan dedicated to establishing a government on the Libyan model in Sudan. In May, a planeload of these dissidents arrived in Khartoum armed with assault rifles.

Qadhafi also is working to expand his influence in the countries of the Arab Maghreb. Qadhafi refuses to negotiate with Algeria to determine the correct location of the Libyan-Algerian border. Perhaps angered over President Bendjedid's moderation, Qadhafi reportedly provides money to Algerian dissidents such as Ahmed Ben Bella.

In Tunisia, Qadhafi has long sought to bring down the pro-Western government of Habib Bourguiba. In 1980, Libyan-supported guerrillas attacked the southern Tunisian mining town of Gafsa;

when France offered its support to Tunis, Libyan mobs burned both the French and Tunisian embassies while security forces stood idly by. Following bread riots in Tunisia in January 1984 saboteurs originating in Libya dynamited a pipeline near the Libyan-Tunisian border. In an effort to exacerbate social tensions, this past year, Qadhafi expelled over 30,000 Tunisian workers and confiscated their property. In September, when Tunisian newspapers attacked Qadhafi for the expulsions, a Libyan diplomat attempted to mail letter bombs to the critical journalists. Several exploded, wounding two postal workers and causing Tunis to sever diplomatic relations.

Libya is staunchly opposed to the Middle East peace process, and Qadhafi is doing all he can to subvert it. In Lebanon, Libyan arms and money have flowed to different militias and Palestinian groups actively opposed to the government of President Gemayel. Qadhafi has been especially eager to undermine the influence of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat because Qadhafi perceives him as too willing to consider a negotiated settlement with Israel. As a result Qadhafi has thrown his support to radical Palestinian groups--including the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Abu Nidal--that advocate continued war against Israel. Since 1981 Qadhafi has shipped these groups items as prosaic as uniforms and as powerful as tanks and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. In 1984 Libyan troops participated in the Syrian-backed assault on Arafat's forces in northern Lebanon.

The Persian Gulf also is an arena for Libyan meddling. Qadhafi has allied himself with Iran in its war against Iraq, and has provided Tehran with T-55 tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, ammunition, and even SCUD rockets. In addition Libya provides arms and money to Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq and to the antigovernment group the "Union of Iraqi Democrats." In 1984 and 1985, Libyan agents attempted to disrupt the Islamic pilgrimage ceremonies in Saudi Arabia; in 1984 entire planeloads of Libyan "pilgrims" were discovered to be carrying arms. Libya continues to enjoy good relations with and has provided support to the National Democratic Front that operates out of Marxist South Yemen against the government of President Salih in North Yemen. Although Libya restored diplomatic relations with Somalia last May, Qadhafi has not severed his relationship with Somali opposition groups he has long supported.

Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Tripoli views Black Africa as a principal arena for forging a group of anti-Western radical states that will strengthen Libyan influence in international fora and confer upon Qadhafi status as a world leader. Qadhafi's aggressiveness has been strengthened by the propensity of the international community to ignore his often blatant disregard for the sovereignty of small African nations.

Chad, of course, is the most egregious example. In 1973

Qadhafi forcibly annexed the northern portion of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. Throughout the 1970s Libya supported various tribal and guerrilla groups in Chad in a bid to install a pliable regime in N'Djamena. Having failed to achieve this indirectly, in October 1980 the Libyan army entered Chad and attempted to impose a union between the two countries. The Libyan occupation force withdrew in November 1981, but returned in 1983 when the pro-Libyan Chadian leader Goukouni Oueddei was ousted by current President Hissene Habre. Only intervention by French armed forces confined the Libyan occupation to the northern 40 percent of Chad. French forces were withdrawn in the fall of 1984, but Qadhafi reneged on an agreement reached with President Mitterrand and continues to occupy northern Chad with an army of several thousand.

The drought-battered countries of the Sahel offer Qadhafi many opportunities for meddling. Qadhafi continues to provide arms and training to the nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in an effort to undermine the governments of Mali and Niger.

Qadhafi also is determined to topple President Mobutu of Zaire. Qadhafi is motivated by hostility to Kinshasa's close ties to the West, its recognition of Israel, and its support for Chadian President Habre. Qadhafi also is aware of Zaire's role as a leading producer of cobalt and other strategic minerals. Tripoli provides training in sabotage and small arms to several different guerrilla groups including the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese National Movement. Libyan diplomatic facilities in countries bordering Zaire are centers of support for these groups.

Meddling in Latin America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi's determination to strike at US interests and to spread his philosophy of revolution has led to a more aggressive Libyan posture in Latin America. Although many governments and groups in this region are wary of Qadhafi, some are willing to accept his financial and military support.

Tripoli views Nicaragua as its base in Central America and accordingly seeks to strengthen the Sandinista dictatorship in Managua. In addition to several hundred million dollars in economic assistance, Qadhafi's support to the Sandinistas has included anti-aircraft guns, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers, and small arms. At least several dozen Libyan military personnel are in Nicaragua. Libyan support has enhanced the Sandinistas' ability to subvert neighboring states. In addition, Libya has provided some arms and money to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. During the past year Libya has provided training, guidance, and funds to a key far-left terrorist group to enable it to expand armed action against the government of Chile.

Libyan agents have been increasingly active among the

Caribbean islands, especially since the summer of 1984. The loss of its People's Bureau in Grenada following the collapse of the Bishop government in 1983 forced Tripoli to attempt to establish its centers for subversion in other diplomatic posts in the region. Qadhafi also has used religion as a cover for intelligence activities in the area, sponsoring Islamic conferences in which the Libyan participants often are intelligence officers or operatives of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees. Leftist leaders from the Dominican Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, the French Departments, and elsewhere have also been invited to Libya for "seminars" and paramilitary training. Particularly worrisome is Libyan urging of leftist politicians to undertake violent action rather than pursue legal means to replace moderate governments in the region.

South and Southeast Asia

As elsewhere, Libyan diplomatic missions in this region provide the infrastructure for Libyan subversion, disbursing funds and arranging for the training of leftists and other dissidents.

In South Asia, Libyan activities are focussed on the Islamic states. No doubt reflecting his dependence on Russian arms, Qadhafi is one of the few Muslim leaders who does not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Libya maintains relations with Pakistan, it has also been involved with the "al-Zulfiqar" terrorist group. Qadhafi in addition has provided training and money to opponents of President Ershad of Bangladesh.

In Southeast Asia, Qadhafi concentrates on Muslim minorities. For some time he has provided paramilitary training to the small Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, Libya continues to send assistance to the Muslim Moro separatists on Mindanao despite a 1976 agreement with Manila to cease such aid. New Caledonia, a French possession in the South Pacific, has no appreciable Muslim population, but Libya has nevertheless provided military training and some funding to the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the group responsible for most of the pro-independence violence on the island. Libyan intelligence operatives are known to be active on other islands in Oceania.

The Erosion of International Norms

Qadhafi's subversion is not confined to those countries that are the direct object of his ambitions. The international community as whole suffers from Qadhafi's disrespect for international norms of behavior and accepted practice. Qadhafi has abused diplomatic privilege for terrorist purposes, reneged on international agreements, and blatantly used terrorist violence against political opponents. In addition, Qadhafi's

support of terrorism, regardless of his direct operational involvement in a given terrorist act, helps legitimize terrorism as an acceptable political activity.

Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism 1980-85

1985

December	Italy/Austria:	Passports used by Abu Nidal terrorists in attack on El Al counter provided by Libya.
November	Malta:	Hijacking of Egyptair airliner by Abu Nidal supporters may have involved Libyan support.
	Egypt:	Four-man team of Libyan agents arrested shortly before attempting to attack gathering of Libyan exiles. Former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush the main target.
October	Greece:	Libyan merchant wounded in Athens by two gunmen the victim had left Libya five years earlier.
September	Tunisia:	Libyan diplomat smuggles about 100 letter bombs addressed to journalists into Tunisia. Several explode injuring two postal workers and causing Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.
May	United States:	A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata, and 16 non-official Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in connection with a plot to kill dissidents in several different states.
April	West Germany:	Moroccan citizen resident in the FRG since 1960 killed by Libyan, who was arrested at the scene.
	West Germany:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed in Bonn by Libyan gunman who was arrested. The assassin also wounded two German passersby, one seriously. The victim had been a target of the Libyan regime for at least two years.
	Cyprus:	Libyan businessman assassinated in downtown Nicosia by an unidentified gunman. The victim was the director of an offshore holding company and was believed to be an opponent of the Libyan regime.
March	Italy:	Libyan jeweler murdered in his shop in Rome. A silencer-equipped pistol was left at the scene by the assassin.
February	Austria:	Former Libyan Ambassador to Austria severely wounded by two shots fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had supported Qadhafi's seizure of power in 1969, but he quit his post in disgust at the regime in 1980.

1984

November	Egypt:	President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush had been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showing Bakoush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claimed Bakoush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."
September	Italy:	A Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled in a hotel in Rome. The victim had been the subject of Libyan requests for deportation to Libya.
	Chad:	Chadians discover plot to assassinate President Habre with an attache case bomb. Evidence of the plot, including photographs of the bomb, was provided to the United Nations the following February when Chad lodged a complaint against Libya.
August	United Kingdom:	One of six Libyans awaiting trial for bomb attacks in London in March, 1983 found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may have been silenced by the Libyan government.
	Belgium:	A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian Embassy in Brussels.
July	Belgium:	A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire.
	Red Sea:	Libya mined the Red Sea, damaging 18 merchant ships of varying nationalities.
	Greece:	Two Libyan students found murdered in their apartment in a crime reminiscent of Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980 and 1981. The two were beaten, strangled, and gagged before being shot twice in the back.
June	Greece:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens killed by two men on a motorbike.
	Greece:	A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qadhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee of Libyan Arab Airlines.
May	Libya:	Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the Libyan masses have decided to form suicide commandos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically."

April	United Kingdom:	A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's Heathrow Airport, injuring 25.
	Libya:	A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure British government during siege of Libyan People's Bureau in London.
	United Kingdom:	British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy.
March	United Kingdom:	Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.
	Sudan:	One Libyan TU-22 bomber drops bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists.
February	Libya:	Following annual Libyan General People's Congress, the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the death penalty."
	Libya:	Libyan authorities take no action while a mob burned the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.
	Congo:	Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Government of Chad threatened in Brazzaville, Congo.

1983

August	Upper Volta:	Libya gave material support to coup in Upper Volta.
July	Chad:	Libya invaded Chad for the second time. Occupation continues into 1985.
June	West Germany:	Eight Libyan students in West Germany, all members of an anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are harassing and threatening them.
February	Libya:	Libyan General People's Congress warn all Libyans in exile to return home or face the "anger of the Libyan people."

1982

No incidents known.

1981

November	Sudan:	Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum.
October	Sudan:	Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hussein Habre, failed when those sent to conduct the operation surrendered.
	Egypt:	Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane coming from Libya via Malta.
August	Libya:	Two Libyan SU-22s that fired at US Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra shot down.
July	United States:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed Ogden, Utah.
June	Sudan:	Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.
February	Italy:	Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent anti-Qadhafi exile was the target.

1980

November	United Kingdom:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in London.
	United Kingdom:	Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned by eating peanuts containing thalium.
October	Chad:	Libyan forces occupied Chad. Qadhafi attempted to force a Libya-Chad union.
	Gambia:	Libyan subversion in Gambia caused break in relations. Senegalese troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty.
June	Italy:	Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome.
	Italy:	Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expiration of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles to return home.
May	Italy:	Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The arrested Libyan gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people."

	Greece:	Libyan exile killed in Athens. His throat was slit.
	Italy:	Libyan businessman found strangled to death in Rome.
	West Germany:	Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
	Italy:	Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots to the head.
April	United Kingdom:	Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London.
	Italy:	Well known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested assassin said he was an enemy of Colonel Qadhafi.
	United Kingdom:	Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist.
February	Libya:	Tunisian and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob while Libyan authorities took no action.
 <u>1979</u>		
December	Libya:	An estimated 2000 Libyans set fire to the US Embassy in Tripoli. The Libyan authorities did not respond to requests by the Embassy for protection.
November	West Germany:	Two Libyans arrested with three suspected Palestinians for an unspecified terrorist operation.

The Abu Nidal Group

Introduction

The Abu Nidal group is among the most dangerous of the Middle Eastern terrorist organizations. It is probably the best organized and most effective of the radical Palestinian terrorist groups, carefully planning its operations and keeping its information tightly compartmented.

The group has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to operate in any country it chooses. It has staged attacks in over 20 countries on three continents, and operates throughout the Middle East.

Abu Nidal has conducted over 60 terrorist attacks during the last eight years--at least 30 of them since the beginning of 1984.¹ Two-thirds of the group's nearly 20 attacks this year have taken place in western Europe, as innocent bystanders increasingly have become casualties of the group's assaults:

- The simultaneous attacks on airline offices in Rome and Vienna on December 27, which have the hallmarks of Abu Nidal, left more than a dozen dead, including 5 Americans.
- The Egypt Air hijacking in late November ultimately cost the lives of 59 passengers.
- The group bombed the British Air office in Rome in September injuring 15 persons, many of them passersby.
- Abu Nidal members threw grenades at Rome's Cafe de Paris in September, injuring 38 tourists--among them Americans, Germans, Britons, Italians, Argentines, and Brazilians.
- The group bombed two hotels in Athens, one in September that injured 19, mostly British tourists, and one in August that injured 13 Britons.
- In Spain, Abu Nidal attacks in July at the British Air office and the nearby Alia ticket office killed one and wounded 24 customers and employees.
- Also in July the group was probably responsible for the bombing of two restaurants in Kuwait, killing eight and injuring almost 90.
- In April, an Abu Nidal terrorist fired a rocket at a Jordanian airliner as it was taking off from Athens airport. The rocket hit the plane but did not explode. Hundreds of casualties might have resulted had the operation been successful.

The official name of the Abu Nidal organization is "Fatah - Revolutionary Council", which it usually employs when attacking Israeli targets. But it has employed a number of cover names for its operations. Originally the group operated under the name Black June; more recently, the group has used the name Arab Revolutionary Brigades when it staged attacks against Persian Gulf targets. It also acts as Black September when it attacks Jordanian and Palestinian targets and employs the name Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM) as its signature for attacks against British targets. It added Egyptian nomenclatures when it hijacked the Egyptair plane in November.

Background

The group is headed by Sabri al-Banna (who uses the nom de guerre Abu Nidal), grew out of elements that broke away a decade ago from PLO Chairman Arafat's Fatah organization. The group is committed to the use of violence to destroy diplomatic efforts designed to reconcile Israel and the Arab states, especially those mounted earlier this year by King Hussein and Arafat's PLO.. The Abu Nidal group also calls for the destruction of ruling "reactionary" regimes such as Jordan, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf states and is critical of what it sees as Arafat's and the PLO's moderation and lack of revolutionary base and zeal. Consequently the group contends that both inter-Arab and intra-Palestinian terrorism are needed to force the all-embracing Arab revolution which in turn would lead to the liberation of Palestine.

The group was formed in 1974 after Arafat instituted a ban on PLO involvement with international terrorism outside Israel and the occupied territories. Abu Nidal's radical views found favor at the time with the Iraqi regime, which helped him create the organization that Abu Nidal called "Fatah - the Revolutionary Council" to promote his claim that his organization, rather than the one led by Arafat, was the legitimate Fatah. He has similarly duplicated other Fatah organizational titles to suggest a parallel structure with the original.

Beginning in the early 1980s, Baghdad suppressed activities of the Abu Nidal group out of Iraq. Elements of the group then moved to Damascus. Since early 1984, Libya began to provide increased support to the group and Abu Nidal himself and many of the groups operations may have moved there within the last 12 months.

The group probably has several hundred members although an accurate count is difficult.. We believe the group has a number of cells throughout western Europe and the Middle East, and makes use of the large number of Palestinian students

studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. These new recruits for example, were involved in the five grenade attacks staged by the group in 1985.

Current Operations and Trends

Based on the style of Abu Nidal attacks it is evident that the group is willing to cause indiscriminate casualties. Apart from assassinations of particular individuals, Abu Nidal operations through November 1985 resulted in nearly 70 deaths and 201 wounded among innocent bystanders--and the number could have been much higher if the Jordanian airliner attack in Athens had been successful. In the previous year, 111 died in the crash of a Gulf Air jet on which an Abu Nidal bomb may have exploded.

The Abu Nidal group has concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests since 1984. These attacks were provoked by the Jordanian agreement to host the PNC meeting in November 1984 and King Hussein's February accord with Arafat to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. Abu Nidal operatives are thought to have assassinated former West Bank mayor and Palestinian moderate Fahd Qawasmeh in December 1984 shortly after his election to the PLO Executive Council. The anti-Jordanian/PLO campaign has not abated. As long as Jordanian and PLO efforts toward Middle East peace negotiations continue, attacks against both Jordanian and Palestinian targets probably will also.

Aside from the attack on Alia offices in Madrid in July and the attempt to down a Jordanian airliner over Athens in April, other incidents involving Jordanian targets in 1985 have included:

- the November 24 assassination of a Palestinian in Amman.
- the murder of a Jordanian publisher in Athens in September.
- a plot to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador to Greece in August.
- the murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara on July 24.
- a rocket attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome in April.

The group has also targeted British interests. ROSM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in March 1985 of a British journalist in Lebanon and the assassination of British diplomats in India and Greece in 1984. The purpose of the attacks probably is to force the UK to release group members

imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982.

Even before the recent attacks on Vienna and Rome airports, Abu Nidal had begun to concentrate his field of operations in Western Europe. Although his targets have been his usual enemies, e.g. British, Israeli, moderate Arab, he has become very indiscriminate about injuring bystanders. The relatively relaxed controls in Western European countries has been conducive to his operations there. The pattern of concentrating his efforts in Europe has coincided with the strengthening of his links with Libya. The likelihood of Libyan financing, safehaven, and logistical assistance should be very helpful to his future international terrorist operations.

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LOS ANGELES TIMES 30 MARCH 1986 Pg. V-1

A Revised U.S. Message Aimed at Libya's Kadafi

By Richard B. Straus

WASHINGTON

It was a good week for Ronald Reagan. "Mr. Lucky," as one White House insider called the President, "certainly knows how to pick his opponents." First, Libyan strongman Moammar Kadafi sent a ragtag group of undertrained and ill-equipped forces against a vastly superior U.S. naval armada—with predictable results. Then, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega surprised and delighted his harshest critics by dispatching Sandinista soldiers into neighboring Honduras, prompting swift U.S. military assistance and ensuring victory in the *contra* aid fight, at least in the Senate.

But, to hear it from White House aides, these self-inflicted wounds suffered by old Reagan Administration nemeses aren't coincidental. While not the result of specific White House efforts, staffers nonetheless regard these events as the fruits of their long-term planning. "It is part of a broader trend and approach we have initiated," said one senior Administration policy maker.

This official explained that the Administration's determination to put "regional security on the East-West agenda" has placed the Soviet Union and its friends on the defensive around the world. As a result, whether in Libya, Nicaragua or Afghanistan (another example cited by this official), opponents' mistakes are quickly pounced on by an Administration "willing to deal with threats and be responsive to friends."

Although there was broad agreement within the Administration over the need to confront the Sandinistas, action against Libya, until two weeks ago, was much more problematic. Defense Secretary Casper W. Weinberger remained the major holdout in the long campaign to confront Kadafi.

But at a high-level White House meeting on March 14, after what one observer called "much beating around the head," Weinberger finally accepted the inevitable. "It took a certain tenacity," admitted an Administration official, who explained that the defense secretary has long been opposed to the use of U.S. force in the Middle East.

Weinberger was the most reluctant combatant in Lebanon during the American Marines' stay there from 1982 to 1984. He initially opposed the U.S. interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers in October, 1985. After the Dec. 27 terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna, Weinberger urged restraint in arguments with Administra-

tion hard-liners, such as Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who pressed for military retaliation against Libya. In reluctantly agreeing to proceed with scheduled naval maneuvers north of the Gulf of Sidra early this year, Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff still succeeded in keeping U.S. forces above Kadafi's "Line of Death." They accomplished this, in part, by arguing that two aircraft carriers were insufficient to meet the possible combat risk.

"Going to war you must have the Pentagon, and Casper Weinberger is a pretty big obstacle," said one Administration insider at the time. "But the attacks at Rome and Vienna allowed those who were after Kadafi for years to steamroll the opposition," this official added.

So it was apparent this month, with the temporary stationing in the Mediterranean of a third U.S. aircraft carrier, the America, that Weinberger had run out of maneuvering room. Therefore, the defense secretary knew the decision he had acquiesced to during the March 14 meeting was likely to lead to confrontation. "We decided this was to be an 'emphatic challenge'" said one senior U.S. official. "It was to be constant operations . . . not just darting in and out."

Kadafi then played right into American hands. "He probably miscalculated," said one long-time Arab analyst. "First, he underestimated the severity of the U.S. military response. Second, he probably had little or no understanding of our ability to render him militarily impotent."

U.S. officials confirmed that the three carrier task groups operated under "a complete umbrella, as if we were taking on the Soviets." With improved technology—some learned from Israeli experiences against Syria in 1982—the United States, in the words of one White House official, "made the Libyans look like the Polish cavalry charging German tanks in World War II."

Conventional wisdom has it that Kadafi, despite the military drubbing he received, will gain politically in the Arab world merely by having demonstrated his willingness to take on a superpower. As one analyst put it, "It is normal for small countries to lose to big countries."

But other Arab affairs experts are not so sure. Thus far, one well-connected former U.S. official argues, the somewhat muted reaction from all but a few fellow Arab leaders testifies to what an outcast Kadafi has become in the Arab world. This expert explained, "Arabs don't like a loser." And, in his view, the pounding Libya took "has considerably shortened Kadafi's life

span."

Still, experts both in and out of the State Department agree that the United States will not get off scot-free in the Arab world. Pro-American Arab leaders lose credibility with their publics when continually forced to choose between fellow Arabs and the West. One Middle East specialist said, "I know it is hard for Americans to accept, but there is such a thing as Arab public opinion, which all leaders there must deal with when crafting policy."

An Egyptian official, who asserts the U.S. actions against Libya will have no impact on his domestic credibility, nonetheless regards the U.S. moves as counterproductive. "While we don't shed any tears for Kadafi, we don't want him to be a hero at home," he said. "You Americans have rallied his people and hurt those who oppose him." Moreover, reflecting the views of a number of other observers, this diplomat notes that, with the U.S. naval maneuvers completed, "it will be clear to all that America can't keep up the pressure."

But if, as appears likely, Kadafi continues to back terrorist actions against U.S. installations and American citizens, the Administration is ready to up the ante. Shultz is known to believe that, "an overwhelming application of force will embolden internal Libyan opposition."

Meanwhile, the Europeans, if judged by the reaction of their Washington-based diplomatic corps, have long been resigned to a series of U.S.-Libyan skirmishes. "It is no longer a question of 'if' but 'when and how,'" declared one well-informed European diplomat weeks ago.

Responding to Administration blandishments suggesting that cooperation from the Europeans on economic sanctions against Libya would reduce the likelihood of a shoot-out, this diplomat shrugged his shoulders and said, "It is an American issue whatever we think or do."

The one-sided fire fight that took place in the Gulf of Sidra last week was indeed an American issue in the same sense as arms control is an American issue. It was designed and implemented by officials who in their own words were "mindful of the need to send a broader signal."

As one senior U.S. official explained: "Actions like these against Libya have a salutary effect on East-West relations. They demonstrate the limitation on the Soviet Union's ability to defend client states. They show the superiority of U.S. [military] techniques. They prove the Soviets can't score gains 'on the cheek.' They are part of a global trend and will necessarily impact on our [continuing] reassessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Union." □

LOS ANGELES TIMES 30 MARCH 1986 Pg. 1

Reagan Aides Depicted as Unanimous in Tough Line

By JACK NELSON, *Times Washington Bureau Chief*

WASHINGTON—President Reagan reached his decisions to press ahead with the bruising campaign for military aid for the Nicaraguan rebels and to confront Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra in a rare atmosphere of almost total unanimity within the White House and among his larger circle of foreign policy advisers.

In marked contrast to Reagan's first term, when more moderate voices in the White House tended to have a tempering influence on presidential decisions, the circle of advisers closest to Reagan now tend to share a relatively hard-line view on such issues as Nicaragua and Libya.

After a series of White House staff changes last year, the President is supported by what longtime Reagan adviser Lyn Nofziger described in an interview as "a more assertive team in the second term, especially in foreign policy."

Nofziger added: "Of course, in the second term, the President's not going to stand for reelection, so there's not as much to lose from a political standpoint. Nobody says that, but there's that feeling."

In the case of Libya, despite some earlier reservations at the Pentagon, officials at the White House and elsewhere in the Administration say that when the final recommendation was presented to Reagan, no one spoke out against accepting Moammar Kadafi's dare and ordering U.S. forces to cross the "line of death" in the Gulf of Sidra—a course of action designed in part to draw the Libyans into armed conflict.

Similarly, no one dissented from the policy of playing political hardball with Democrats in Congress who oppose military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, known as *contras*.

"Everybody was on board," said Patrick J. Buchanan, Reagan's combative communications assistant. "And the guy making the toughest speeches on aid to the contras was not Buchanan but (Secretary of State) George Shultz."

Even Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, who has often

differed sharply with Shultz over foreign policy issues and has been more cautious than Shultz in the debate over preemptive strikes against terrorists, finally agreed to the Gulf of Sidra maneuvers, which officials knew were likely to lead to armed conflict.

Shultz had been looking for several months for a way to retaliate against Kadafi for his terrorist activities, according to Administration officials who participated in the planning for the large-scale Gulf of Sidra exercises. And Shultz's hand has been strengthened by his close friendship with

Donald T. Regan, who became the President's chief of staff last year at the beginning of his second term.

Defense Department officials were less than enthusiastic over Shultz's demands for a tough approach, according to the officials, and at one point told him, "We're not in the counterterrorism business."

But Shultz and John M. Poindexter, the President's national security adviser, "really pushed," one official said, and the Pentagon finally agreed to the approach that led to the confrontation between the Libyans and U.S. forces.

Last year's shake-up of the White House staff came about primarily because of personal decisions by individual aides to make career changes, but the result has been a potentially significant shift in the atmosphere in which final presidential decisions on foreign policy are weighed.

Some of the President's outside advisers are worried about the possible political fallout from the hard-line approach, especially over the issue of aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. They point out that, despite Reagan's pressure, he apparently changed few if any votes in the Senate, which voted to approve military aid by a six-vote margin, 53 to 47. And, they say, the President could wind up losing the issue again in forthcoming votes in the House, which turned down contra aid, 222-210, on March 20.

One key adviser, who asked not to be identified by name, said there is "some evidence we might have

won the contra vote in the House if a less confrontive style had been used."

"It's become a trade-off between a willingness to confront versus a desire to win," he added. "The first-term team operated on the assumption it was important for the President to win on these policy issues, to get his laws through Congress by using a variety of pressures and inducements. Now the White House seems to believe it's not necessary to win but to make a statement, to draw a line in the dirt, to put an issue in its most bold and bright colors even if it means hardening the opposition."

This style, he said, "may have suited the (Richard M.) Nixon White House in the early '70s when it was prone to retreat into the bunker, but it doesn't fit the personality, needs or requirements of a Ronald Reagan."

The key to the new approach is chief of staff Regan, an ex-Marine colonel and former Wall Street executive who has often emphasized that he has no agenda of his own and adheres strictly to the President's. Under him, the White House staff tends to reinforce Reagan's own hard-line instincts on combatting terrorism and communism.

Regan's first-term predecessor as top White House adviser, James A. Baker III, now secretary of the Treasury, was much more likely to weigh the political consequences of any such decisions and to advise the President to follow a more moderate course.

"There's no question Don is more aggressive than Jim Baker was, and I don't mean that in a pejorative sense," said Nofziger, who served under Baker as Reagan's top political adviser in the first term. "But now, the President is getting the kind of advice that says to do something rather than let's sit back and take a look."

Along with Baker, Michael K. Deaver, who was deputy chief of staff, was frequently a restraining force in the first term when other Reagan advisers counseled the President to take a more confrontational approach in both foreign and domestic policy. And both probably would have argued for greater restraint in the cases of Libya and Nicaragua, according to several former Reagan Administration officials.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

ONCE UPON A TIME IN LIBYA

*... where 25,000
Jews lived very well
indeed.*

**DAVID A.
HARRIS**

MOMENT

MAY 1987

The year 1987 marks the twentieth anniversary of two distinct but intimately related events, one that has been the focus of considerable attention, the other virtually ignored. As the world followed the June 1967 war raging between Israel and her Arab neighbors, an ancient Jewish community was on the verge of disappearing. It was then that Libya's remaining 4,000 Jews—who had survived colonial occupiers from the Phoenicians and the Greeks to the Italians and the British, as well as 16 years of Libyan national independence—were forced to leave their country in the wake of a vicious pogrom, the third since 1945.

"American Jews often ask me the same questions when they hear where I am from," said Guilia. (She, like the other Libyan Jews interviewed, asked that her real name not be used.) In 1967, at the age of 16, she fled her native Libya. "'Do you mean Lebanon? Oh, Libya! Was there really a Jewish community in Libya? Do you speak Yiddish? And how was it to live under Qaddhafi?' In other words, most American Jews have absolutely no idea that we ever existed, much less that we were once a thriving Jewish community. . . . We were expelled from Libya before Qaddhafi seized power in 1969. Yes, there was a pre-Qaddhafi Libya! It was a sometimes wonderful and beautiful country that, notwithstanding the complexities of being Jews in an Arab country, my family and I considered home. And it was a special place where we enjoyed the influence of Italian, British, French, American, and local cultures, together with an unshakable identity as Jews. But we were forced to leave, and the experience has scarred us for life."

According to the first-century Jewish historian Josephus, Jews were first settled in Cyrene and other parts of present-day eastern Libya by the

David A. Harris has been deputy director of the American Jewish Committee's International Relations Department since 1984. Beginning July 1, he will be the AJC's Washington representative.

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Egyptian ruler Ptolemy Lagos (323–282 B.C.E.). With their numbers likely bolstered by Berbers who had converted to Judaism, later supplemented by Jews fleeing the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions and, from the seventeenth century, by Jews from Leghorn and other Italian cities, Jews lived continuously in Libya for well over two millennia, predating the Muslim conquest in 642 C.E. by centuries.

In 1911, 350 years of Ottoman rule ended and the Italian colonial period began. At the time, Libya's Jewish population numbered 20,000. The next quarter century was to prove a golden age for Libya's Jews. They enjoyed equal rights with the country's other residents and benefited from increased employment and educational opportunities. By 1931, nearly 25,000 Jews lived in Libya, of whom all but 4,000 lived in Tripoli and a dozen towns and villages in Tripolitania province, the westernmost of the three provinces that make up modern Libya. The remainder were centered in Cyrenaica province, to the east, largely in the coastal city of Benghazi. No Jews lived in the interior province of Fezzan.

The introduction of anti-Jewish legislation in Fascist Italy was extended to Libya in 1936. Under its provisions, on Shabbat, Jewish shops had to remain open and Jewish schoolchildren were required to attend school. Identity cards stamped "Race: Jewish" were issued to all Libyan Jews. By 1940, Libya became the scene of heavy fighting between the Axis and British armies. On orders from the German military commander, the Axis forces, in 1942, plundered Jewish shops and deported 2,600 Benghazi Jews to Giado, a remote military outpost overlooking the Sahara Desert.

More than 200 Libyan Jews of British nationality were among those deported to Italy in 1942 by the Fascists. Rita, now a U.S. resident, was 11 years old at the time. She remembers:

"The Fascists sent us to a camp in Abruzzi, the mountainous region east of Rome," she recalled. "We were well treated, even permitted kosher food and a synagogue. Italian Jews sent us matzoh for Passover and



Jewish cave-dwellers, 1943

Photos courtesy of Beth Haifutsoth, the Nahum Goldmann Museum of the Jewish Diaspora

books. You must understand that the Italians were very different from the Germans. After nearly two and a half years in Abruzzi, we were deported by the Nazis to Bergen-Belsen. In our group was a three-month-old boy who had been born in the Italian camp. He was circumcised in secret in Bergen-Belsen. You see, we never gave up our beliefs. We never forgot who we were, even there. Fortunately, through a combination of luck, our British passports, and Red Cross interest in the camps in Germany, we were transferred to a civilian prisoner-of-war camp after six months. In September 1945, I returned to Tripoli and, as far as I know, virtually all the others deported from Libya survived as well."

By contrast, nearly 2,000 able-bodied Tripoli Jews were conscripted into forced labor. In January 1943, two weeks before these conscriptees were to be sent to Tunisia, the British army liberated Libya. Louis Rabinowitz, a senior Jewish chaplain with the victorious forces, recorded his impressions:

"... Under Axis order, the conscripted Jews of Tripoli toiled from daybreak to nightfall throughout the long summer days, with one meal a day. ... But they only worked six days a week. Even the Axis knew that

nothing would induce these pious . . . Jews to work on the Sabbath." And, referring to Giado, the camp for Benghazi Jews, Rabinowitz noted that "no one was exempt from this cruel edict. . . . Were it not for the weekly loads of food which were sent to them by the Tripoli Jewish community, they would surely have starved to death. . . . As it was, 215 of the internees were laid to rest. They had died from undernourishment and typhus." (from "Chronicles: Liberation in North Africa," *The Menorah Journal*, vol. 33, April-June 1945.)

Jewish soldiers of the British Eighth Army, recruited in Palestine, were the first to enter Tripoli in 1943. Under their influence, Zionist activity among Libyan Jews, which had gained strength in the 1920s and '30s but was curtailed by the Axis powers, was revived. The American Joint Distribution Committee (A.J.D.C.) provided cash relief to indigent Jews; the Jewish soldiers assisted in re-establishing the Jewish schools that had been closed by the Axis occupiers.

Pan-Islamic and anti-Jewish propaganda fueled by the Arab League, coupled with the rise of Libyan nationalism, led to Muslim rioting in 1945 in Tripolitania province. Not until the third day did the British even

attempt to end the rioting. (Many Libyan Jews are persuaded that the British were, in fact, at least partially responsible for the pogrom, citing the otherwise inexplicable British delay in responding to the violence. According to this view, the British were disturbed by Jewish calls for an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Also, they were reportedly anxious to hold on to their colonies and manipulated Arab-Jewish relations in Libya to prove that the country was not ready for independence.) In the end, the death toll was 130, with 450 injured and 4,000 left homeless; nine synagogues were destroyed and countless Jewish-owned shops damaged.

Three years later, provoked by Libyan nationalists and Tunisian volunteers passing through Libya to the Palestine front, mobs again attacked the Jewish quarters. But this time a quicker British response, as well as the efforts of the Jews themselves, in the form of a self-defense organization created in the wake of the 1945 pogrom, limited the damage. Even so, 15 Jews were killed and hundreds of families were left homeless.

As a result of the two pogroms, decades of reasonably cordial relations with Muslims came to an end. Driven by fear for their safety and well-being, and drawn by the creation of the Jewish state, the vast majority of Libya's 39,000 Jews began to consider *aliyah*, immigration to Palestine. In 1948, because of British restrictions, emigration to the fledgling Jewish state was carried out clandestinely via Tunisia, France, and Italy. Twenty-five hundred Libyan Jews—mainly young people eager to aid Israel's struggle for independence—had succeeded in reaching Israel by April 1949, when it became possible for the Jewish Agency openly to organize monthly trips by ship from Tripoli to Haifa. By 1952, the first year of Libyan independence, 33,000 Libyan Jews had emigrated to Israel. Abe Loskove, who was director of the A.J.D.C.'s Libyan operation during those tumultuous years of mass *aliyah*, recalled the period in a recent interview:

"There was a veritable clamor to get out of the country as a result of the 1948 pogrom and the excitement of

the new Jewish state. Everyone was shouting 'aliyah.' We had to work fast, as the handwriting was on the wall. Once Libya achieved independence, we knew *aliyah* would stop. But as much as people wanted to leave and Israel wanted them to come, we were presented with a formidable challenge. Many of the Libyan Jews, especially from the *hara* (ghetto) in Tripoli and the interior, suffered from trachoma, tinea, tuberculosis, and malnutrition. Our primary goal was to address these urgent medical needs before people left. . . . Jews departed in such large numbers that the ships were often carrying twice as many passengers as they were built for. In all, this *aliyah* was very successful. Libyan Jews integrated quickly and beautifully in Israel."


In December 1951, Libya became an independent state ruled by King Idris I, who had been the leader of Cyrenaica province. The 6,000 Jews who remained did so for a variety of reasons: ties to the land and culture, age, infirmity, non-transferable business interests, quality of life, indecision, missed opportunities, faith in the country's leadership. The 1945 and '48 pogroms had certainly left their mark, but they were still seen as aberrations from the true Libyan character of tolerance. After all, Arab-Jewish relations in Libya had been good. In the 1943-44 *American Jewish Year Book*, for instance, it was reported that the Libyan Jewish condition under Axis occupation "would have been far worse, had it not been for the friendly attitude of the Muslim population." Relations would undoubtedly remain cordial, the Jews felt, under the leadership of the King, who had been admired for his benevolent rule in Cyrenaica. And the Libyan Constitution, drafted under the supervision of a special United Nations Commission and adopted in 1951, contained important protection clauses. Jews and the other minorities (Italians, Maltese, and Greeks) were accorded full rights. In fact, the document was regarded as a model for other Muslim countries with Jewish populations destined for decolonialization.

Abraham Karlikow, then assistant

director of the American Jewish Committee's Paris office and later the AJC's director of foreign affairs, worked closely with Libyan Jewish leaders to achieve these guarantees. He described the community in a 1951 report, less than a year before Libyan independence: "The Jewish community of Tripoli is extremely Orthodox, and this applies to the westernized, better-off Jews as much as to the poor Jews of the *hara*, where half of Libya's remaining Jews continue to live. On the Sabbath the leading business street in Tripoli, the Corso Vittorio Emanuele, is virtually shut down. . . . The community had 30 synagogues before the war; now there are 7. . . . The interests of the men center around their business. . . . There is hardly a Jewish professional in the country. [A study of more than 6,000 Libyan heads of households who arrived in Israel between 1948 and 1951 found that, among the respondents, 47 percent were artisans, 15 percent merchants, 7.5 percent clerks and administrators, 7 percent construction and transport workers, 6 percent farmers, and 3 percent in the liberal professions.]

"The community was sharply divided on economic grounds. The financially better-off Jews in Tripoli adopted western dress and manners . . . and could double for middle-class businessmen in New York without any particular difficulty. The poor Jews lived much like the Arabs around them. On the surface, in dress, language, and manner, they could hardly be distinguished from their Arab neighbors. Their living conditions were frightful. . . . The leadership of the community is centered in the Jewish Community Board, whose major responsibilities include the provision of relief to the disadvantaged, synagogue and cemetery upkeep, Jewish educational assistance (together with A.J.D.C. and the Alliance Israelite Universelle), and contact with the authorities. . . . Whereas 11 rabbinical academies existed in Tripoli in 1880, by 1950 there were none, and a Hebrew teachers' seminary that opened in 1947 was shut down a few years later because of the large-scale emigration."

Notwithstanding constitutional



Courtyard of the home of a Jewish family in a small town in Tripolitania

guarantees, restrictions on the Jewish community were gradually imposed. As early as 1952, Jews were forbidden to return home if they visited Israel, and access to Libyan passports became virtually impossible. Few Libyan Jews were granted citizenship in the newly independent Libyan state, though most families had lived in the country for generations. The next year, Libya joined the Arab League and increasingly echoed its anti-Israel rhetoric. All contact with Israel was proscribed. In 1958, the Tripolitania Jewish Community Board was forcibly dissolved and the authorities appointed a Muslim to administer the affairs of the community. Two years later, the Alliance Israelite Universelle school, which had functioned since 1870, was closed. In 1961, a law was promulgated permitting the seizure of all property belonging to Jews who emigrated to Israel.

Ten years after independence, Jews could not vote, hold public office, serve in the army, obtain Libyan passports, purchase new property, acquire majority ownership in any new business, or supervise their own communal affairs. Yet the Jews remained. Their daily lives were, to a substantial degree, largely unaffected by these prohibitions: Access to the syna-

gogues was unimpeded; businesses often prospered; for many, their British, French, Italian, or Tunisian citizenship inspired a degree of confidence and security; and faith in King Idris's basic friendship to the Jewish minority continued. An elderly Tripoli Jew whom I met in Israel in 1984 tried to explain his decision to stay in Libya through the '50s and early '60s:

"It's quite natural to wonder why we remained in a country increasingly inhospitable to Jews and implacably opposed to Israel and Zionism. How could we live tranquilly when we constantly feared the uncovering of our contact with relatives who had left for Israel in 1948 and 1949? I guess the answer is really rather simple: Our roots in Libya were deep, our attachment to the country strong, and our daily lives as Jews, believe it or not, unhindered. We came to resign ourselves, almost to take for granted, our political powerlessness and physical vulnerability. Without specific provocation, it would have been difficult to just get up and leave for an uncertain future."

As late as January 1967, Tripoli's Jews felt sufficiently confident of their position to plan the construction of a new synagogue in the city center. But in the ensuing months, growing tension throughout the Middle East and North Africa was fueled by Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasser's provocative actions against the Jewish state and fiery anti-Israeli rhetoric. Libya's Jews hoped they would somehow remain untouched by events beyond their country's borders, but the outbreak of war in the Middle East in June of that year dispelled any such hopes. A Libyan Jew who served as a correspondent in Tripoli for an international Jewish organization recalled the impact of the Six-Day War on the Jewish community:

"At 10 o'clock on the morning of June 5, the news that hostilities had started between Israel and the Arab states spread throughout the city like lightning. 'The Week for Palestine' (inspired by Nasser's pan-Arab pronouncements), which had begun a few days earlier with controlled and pacific demonstrations . . . exploded into

fanatic and destructive demonstrations against the peaceful Jewish population. . . . The mob, drunk with fanaticism and constantly excited by false news (from the battlefield), hurled itself ferociously and violently upon Jewish stores and homes, provoking fire, destruction, and massacre. The sections most heavily attacked included the *hara*. . . . The government had to proclaim a state of emergency and ordered a curfew from 7 P.M. until 6 A.M. For the safety of the Jews of the *hara* and the distant sections, they were taken to a barrack at Gurgi, about four kilometers from the city center, but those Jews living in other sections were asked not to leave their homes since the police were unable to give them adequate protection. . . . Several Arabs and Italians who tried to buy bread for their Jewish friends were blackmailed and threatened with serious measures if they did it again."

Corriere della Sera, a leading Italian newspaper, carried an interview on June 13 with a 14-year-old boy, one of six Jewish refugees who managed to flee Libya at the time. "From the day the war began, I did not go out of my house," he recalled. "For a while we used the food we had; then we began fasting. Once in a while, threatening phone calls came for us. We decided to escape from Tripoli when the eleventh call came and a man's voice said, 'Dirty Jew, we shall chop you in a thousand pieces.'"

Giulia, who was then a 16-year-old pupil in an Italian school in Tripoli, still remembers those traumatic events with obvious pain:

"Tension was building in the weeks prior to the outbreak of the war. Then the war began, and we huddled at home—my parents and eight children, ranging in age from 17 to 3. The mob came. It seemed there were a thousand wild-eyed, chanting men. Some had jars of gasoline which they began to empty in our house. One was about to strike a match when another Arab, whom we had known for years, called on the crowd to withdraw. He said that we were a decent family who had never harmed anyone. Amazingly, everyone complied. That act took unspeakable courage."

Beda, Giulia's mother, had had

warm relations with Muslims all her life. During the 1950s, her family had been the only Jews in a town midway between Tripoli and Benghazi, where they remained observant. The children attended a Catholic school (the alternative being an Arab/Muslim school), but were excused from prayers. The family does not recall any anti-Semitic incidents either in that coastal town or later in Tripoli, where they moved in the early '60s. Thus, the ferocity of the Muslim outburst in June 1967 not only surprised them but also caused great anguish and soul-searching.

"Many Jews were murdered during the riots," Beda recalled. "I had known several of the victims well, and it causes me untold grief to this day to recall their fate. And the wanton destruction of the Jewish buildings, homes, and stores, and our forced expulsion rip at my soul. The graves of all my relatives are there. The most difficult thing of all is that I have not been able to return to the gravesites of my family. And were I allowed to travel in Libya today, I would find that the Jewish cemeteries have been destroyed to make way for roads and hotels. . . .

"Qaddhafi ignored our appeals to exhume and transfer the bodies before construction began. And our synagogues have been desecrated, turned into mosques or cultural centers. Still, despite everything that happened in 1967, Libya was my country. Yes, many local Arabs came to kill us, and did viciously kill the others. But I cannot overlook the fact that other Arabs saved us at great personal risk. After the mob left our home that first day, we were afraid to stay there. Muslim friends broke the curfew to shepherd our family to the safety of their own home and kept us there for 10 days until things quieted down. We owe them our lives."

By the time calm was restored, 18 Jews in Tripoli were dead. Two families were killed by a Libyan official who said he was escorting them to shelter. An old woman and a young boy were murdered as they ventured out of their homes in search of food. A girl tried to get to the *souk* (market) dressed in a *barracan* (Arab dress) and with covered face, but was recog-

nized and killed on the spot. And an old Maltese was mistaken for a Jew and fatally stabbed. Property damage was in the millions of dollars.

The 230 Jews in Benghazi fared somewhat better. Though shops were destroyed, the police controlled the situation much sooner than in Tripoli and transported the Jews to a camp near the city for their own protection.

The death toll might have been even higher had it not been for the courageous intervention of Cesare Pasquinelli, Italy's ambassador to Libya, who personally extended protection to several Jews in danger and ordered all Italian diplomatic missions in the country to help in any way they could. Pasquinelli, who had acted similarly during World War II to rescue French Jews, died shortly afterwards. Libyan Jews in Israel honored him posthumously for his heroism.

Finally, faced with a complete breakdown of law and order, the Libyan government urged the Jews to leave the country temporarily. Whereas, in the past, Jews had had considerable difficulty obtaining travel documents, Libyan officials were now visiting Jewish homes and issuing such documents on the spot. Escorts were provided to the airports. But departing Jews were permitted only one suitcase and the equivalent of \$50.

In June and July, some 4,000 Jews traveled to Italy, where they were assisted by the Jewish Agency, A.J.D.C., the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, the ad hoc Emergency Committee of Jews from Libya, and the Italian Jewish community. About 1,300 of these refugees continued on to Israel, where they joined 33,000 Libyan Jews who had emigrated in the 1940s and early '50s and were by then well established in such locales as Netanya and Bat Yam. Twenty-two hundred remained in Italy, primarily in Rome and Milan. Already fluent in Italian and heavily influenced by the dominant Italian culture in Libya, their adaptation was comparatively easy. A few hundred eventually resettled in the United States. Today, only 6 elderly Jews remain in Tripoli.

The Association of Jews from Libya, whose current president is



Mother and daughter in traditional dress, Tripoli, 1914

Raffaello Fellah, was founded in 1970. Based in Rome, it has sought to pressure the Libyan government to provide compensation for seized Jewish communal and personal assets. The association also collaborates with the Cultural Center of the Jews of Libya in Israel and Beth Hatefutsoth, the Tel Aviv-based Museum of the Jewish Diaspora, to help preserve the legacy of the community. A photographic exhibit was featured at the museum, and several booklets on Libyan Jewish history have been published.

Predictably, the so-called temporary exodus in 1967 became permanent. A few score of Jews remained in Libya, while others managed, in the two years prior to Qaddhafi's coup d'état in September 1969, to return briefly in an attempt to regain their possessions. While a few succeeded, others, who became trapped in Libya after Qaddhafi's accession to power, had great difficulty in getting out, and some were forcibly detained for years.

In 1970, the Libyan government announced a series of laws to confiscate the assets of Libya's Jews, issuing bonds providing for fair compensation payable within 15 years. But 1985 came and went with no compensation ever paid, despite the ef-

forts of the Association of Libyan Jews and others to gain the help of western governments and international organizations. Qaddhafi has excused his defaulting on the bonds by asserting that "the alignment of the Jews with Israel, the Arab nations' enemy, has forfeited their right to compensation."

And so, with only a few scattered international protests and scant press attention, another once-thriving Jewish community came to an end.

Indeed, within two decades of Israel's founding, nearly one million Jews from Muslim countries emigrated or were forced to leave. Ancient communities in Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries disappeared. Still, as Yusef, a 55-year-old Rishon le-Zion resident who arrived in Israel in the 1950s, explained: "After more than 2,000 years, it has all come to an end for us. Or maybe not. Maybe it was all by way of preparation for the next 2,000 years, for our lives in the Jewish homeland. We are strong believers in God, you know, and in the fulfillment of His will." ★

LIBYA

THE ECONOMIST 19 April 1986 Pg.17



Reagan decides it had to be done

FROM OUR WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT

The bombing raid on Libya, explained President Reagan, was a single engagement in a long battle. It would be a singular victory if that one engagement succeeded in quickly ending the unruly rule of Colonel Moammar Qaddafi. The early hopes in the aftermath of the attack that he might have been overthrown or killed by his own soldiers were dashed on Wednesday evening when he appeared on Libyan television. But even if, as is likely, he does not go soon, America has turned a momentous corner in its dealings with terrorism in general and the Libyan variety in particular.

Mr Reagan has agonised, with remarkable honesty, between the argument for military retribution advanced by his secretary of state, Mr George Shultz, and the response of his secretary of defence, Mr Caspar Weinberger, that military action should be chosen only when the goal is distinct and obtainable. The president's doubts were finally swept away by the combination of a smoking grenade, an

isolated target and a not impossible goal.

He opted for military action five days before the raid took place. The military men then took the details over while the diplomats tried to square the western allies. Having broken through this first-time barrier, the president is now closer to Mr Shultz's camp. Whatever happens in Libya, he is more likely to say yes to future strikes—justified, the Americans claim, by a nation's inherent right of self-defence.

The reaction we care about, the administration said, putting a bold face on the disapproval from most of the world in the early aftermath of the raid, is the reaction of the American people. And most Americans loved it. The frustration that has been building up since the slaughter of the marines in Beirut in 1983 was suddenly released. The United States, to the grateful relief of most of its citizens, was no longer a Gulliver tormented by Lilliputians.

Up to a point. Americans, from their president down, identify terrorism with Colonel Qaddafi. One reason is that the Libyan leader has, until now, been unusually visible, as well as provocative, in the shadowy, slippery world of Carloses, Abu Nidals and Muslim fanatics. The deterrent effect on the Libyan colonel of this attack, with its explicit message that it was a beginning only, is as yet unproven. Its effect on the shadowy ones is even harder to predict.

The evidence linking the Libyan regime with the discotheque explosion in West Berlin would stand up in any court of law, say senators on the intelligence committee who have seen it. The administration, which is caught between its desire to confound the sceptics and its need to protect its intelligence methods and sources, insists that it has equally compelling evidence on some 30 directives from the Libyan government to its foreign missions exhorting them to kill Americans. Many of these exhortations were phrased in pretty general terms, but some had specific instructions, including a plan to attack people queueing for visas outside the American consulate in Paris. The orders poured forth from Tripoli, in a dramatic escalation of violence, immediately after last month's battle in the Gulf of Sirte, when American aircraft sank at least two Libyan patrol ships.

Officially, America's aim was to make Colonel Qaddafi change his ways; unofficially, it is accepted in Washington that the only good Qaddafi is a dead, or at least overthrown, Qaddafi. American intelligence sources placed their hopes squarely on the information they were getting, mainly from Arab sources, about widespread disaffection among the Libyan armed forces. Some Libyan officers, Americans were told, are fed up with the ostracism, danger and bad company that their leader wishes upon them. There has been more than one attempt over the past year or two to assassinate him. Critics of the raid—and there were a few—feared that the American bombs might have put this day back: no patriotic Libyan wants to be branded a CIA agent.

Assassination is off-limits for the CIA itself, or for any American security force: it is prohibited by an executive order signed by President Carter and renewed by President Reagan. Although the barracks where the colonel and his family live was one of the bombing targets, the

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US-Libyan crisis — Moscow keeps its distance

By Robert O. Freedman

THE restrained Soviet response to the American attacks on Libya — which has been limited to rhetorical denunciations and the postponement of a scheduled meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz — should come as no surprise.

Despite selling Libya billions of dollars' worth of varied military equipment, and giving lip service to Libya in its clashes with the United States, Soviet leaders have been very careful to limit the Soviet Union's relationship to the often unpredictable Col. Muammar Qaddafi.

After unsuccessfully seeking a treaty with the Soviet Union in 1983 (the most Moscow would do at the time was agree "in principle" to a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation — something the USSR quickly forgot when Libya intervened in Chad and found itself in a confrontation with France), Colonel Qaddafi again sought a treaty with the USSR during his visit to Moscow last October.

Once again Moscow refused, although the agreement to send SAM-5 antiaircraft missiles to Libya may have been concluded at this time, perhaps as a Soviet gesture to Libya in lieu of the treaty.

There is, however, another explanation for Moscow's decision to send the SAM-5s.

With rumors rife in the Middle East over a US-Soviet "deal" on the Middle East at the 1985 summit in Geneva, it is possible that by sending the SAM-5s after the summit, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wanted to send a signal to the Soviet Union's Arab allies that he had not sold them out.

Nonetheless, despite sending the missiles (and the Soviet advisers to man them), Moscow continued to keep Qaddafi at arm's length.

During the US-Libyan crisis in January, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Vladimir Lomeiko, in refusing to answer a press conference question on what the stand of the USSR would be if the US attacked Libya, noted only that Soviet actions are aimed at "preventing conflicts," not at "constructing scenarios for their escalation."

The same Mr. Lomeiko, at a Moscow press briefing on March 25 after the US attack on Libyan SAM bases at the Gulf of Sidra, noted only that the Soviet Union had provided "moral and political support" to the Libyan people, and would take "all measures appropriate within the framework of existing treaties."

The absence of any promised military support in Lomeiko's statement, and the fact that the Soviet Union and Libya still have no formal treaty pledging Moscow to come to Qaddafi's aid, demonstrate, however, that the USSR was not willing to back up Qaddafi with more than words; indeed, that absence of strong backing comes

despite Qaddafi's efforts to press Moscow to take a firmer stand by claiming the Soviet Union and Libya had an agreement to "coordinate their efforts during dangerous conflicts."

What then of the future?

While Moscow has been long trying to rally the Arabs into a pro-Soviet and anti-American alliance, it seems highly doubtful that they will be able to exploit the US-Libyan clash to achieve such a goal.

There are a number of reasons explaining this irony:

- The Arab world is badly split, not least because non-Arab Iran is backed in its war with Iraq by Libya and Syria.

- In addition, the Gulf Arabs and Jordan are fearful of an Iranian breakthrough against Iraq, and they depend on the US as their protector of last resort against Ayatollah Khomeini.

- There is also the matter of Soviet credibility.

While official Moscow spokesmen have denied any Soviet military presence in Libya — thus avoiding the need to take action if any "nonexistent" Soviet advisers were killed at Libyan military bases destroyed by the US — the fact of the matter is that the USSR sent SAM-5s, planes, and tanks to Libya (and saw some of this equipment destroyed by the United States), but it took no action to aid its Arab friend.

This may well bring back memories in the Arab world of the Soviet failure to aid Syria and Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

One remedy for this would be for Moscow finally to agree in fact to the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Libya that Colonel Qaddafi has been seeking for so long now — possibly in return for Soviet air and naval bases in Libya.

While such a development would be tempting to Moscow, which could exploit the bases to regain the strategic benefits it lost in 1972 when it was expelled from its bases in Egypt by Anwar Sadat, a treaty would closely tie Moscow to the mercurial Libyan leader, thereby greatly increasing the risk of a US-Soviet confrontation over Libya.

Such a treaty would also very likely jeopardize any chance of Soviet-American agreements in such areas as trade and nuclear arms limitation.

Given Mr. Gorbachev's evident priorities of rebuilding the Soviet economy, consolidating his power further in the USSR, and achieving a strategic arms agreement with the US, it seems at the present time unlikely that he would take such a risk.

Robert O. Freedman, Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone professor of political science and dean of graduate studies of the Baltimore Hebrew College, is the author of "Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970" and editor of "Israel in the Begin Era" and "The Middle East Since Camp David."

REAGAN...CONTINUED

intention, it was said, was not to kill him; he is often on the move, not always sleeping in the same place. His adopted baby daughter is said to have been killed in the raid, however, and two of his sons, aged three and four, were badly hurt.

This is not the kind of news that Americans, including their soft-hearted president (who is better equipped to accept anonymous distress than individual sad stories), like to hear. Some people, in a macabre way, tended to balance the dead Libyan baby against that other doll-like baby who was blown last month out of the TWA airliner (an explosion for which the Libyans are not, for once,

being held responsible).

Americans watching their television after the raid were struck by the discrepancy between the words of official spokesmen, talking of precisely targeted military installations, and the television pictures of gutted houses and wounded civilians. Reporters were shown a few bombed zones only. Even so, the embarrassed suggestion by American military men that the damage might have been caused by Libyan anti-aircraft fire rang implausibly. Another suggestion is that a bomb fell off when the missing American bomber was hit.

The civilian casualties are what the Americans call one "downside" of the

raid. There are others. The Soviet Union cancelled next month's summit-planning meeting between Mr Shultz and the Soviet foreign minister, Mr Edward Shevardnadze. This means that a summer summit, already unlikely, is now out of the question. A winter summit, say administration sources, depends on whether the Russians really want one. Americans had earlier been cheered by the sight of Mr Georgi Arbatov, a senior Kremlin official, saying crossly on American television that the Soviet Union had no obligation to defend Libya and that Colonel Qaddafi did not always tell the truth.

The Americans take hard the lack of

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How the blows went in


The American attack on Libya was two separate prongs jabbed simultaneously into the heart of Qaddafi territory. The eastern thrust, at targets around Benghazi, was made by 15 A-6 aircraft of the American navy from the carriers *Coral Sea* and *America*. They were accompanied by EA-6B electronic aircraft whose purpose was to jam the Libyans' radar and communications equipment. The second prong, aimed at Tripoli, was made up of 18 F-111 strike aircraft of the American air force, which flew from Britain, accompanied by 30 flying tankers and three EF-111A aircraft with the same jamming equipment as their naval counterparts. The A-6s and F-111s boast America's most modern night-bombing systems.

The F-111s were not allowed to fly over France or—it seems—Spain and Portugal. So they took a long route around the Iberian peninsula and into the Mediterranean through the Strait of Gibraltar, a 13-hour round trip of nearly 6,000 miles, with a number of mid-air refuellings.

The bombers were equipped with a device called Pave Tack, which is a combination of telescope, infra-red night-sight and laser designator. The bombardier spots his target visually and illuminates it with a laser beam. Laser-guided bombs can then home in to within a few feet of the target.

The other methods of launching bombs are by radar, or by dropping them on a chosen latitude and longitude. Both are less accurate than the laser method, although well-trained men in an F-111 (like the A-6, it has a two-man crew) should get within a few tens of yards of the target. Wider misses are usually the navigator's fault, which could account for the damage done to an apartment building nearly a mile from the nearest target that the Americans say they were aiming for.

After their last fuel re-fill before the attack, the F-111s probably dropped to 1,000 feet or so for the run-in. The American air force generally prefers this



sort of height to the very low approach favoured by the British RAF, because it puts the aircraft out of range of small anti-aircraft guns. The attackers then depend on their jammers and other counter-measures to protect them from missiles.

Before the attackers started in, the aircraft carriers put up E-2C radar aircraft and at least two gaggles of fighters to protect them in case Libyan fighters had been able to get off the ground. They also sent two groups of F-18 and A-7 aircraft in to attack Libyan anti-aircraft sites with radar-homing missiles.

The F-111s attacked Tripoli in three groups, each hitting one of the three main targets (see map): the Aziziyah barracks, where Colonel Qaddafi was said to be sleeping; an intelligence-cum-terrorist centre in the embassy area; and the airfield farther south. These attacks lasted about 11 minutes. All three groups met heavy anti-aircraft fire, from both guns and missiles. One of the F-111s, presumably hit, is thought to have crashed in the sea, and both crewmen

were lost. An overheated engine forced another to make an emergency landing at the American base at Rota, in southern Spain, on the way home to Britain.

The F-111s carried 500-pound, 750-pound and 2,000-pound bombs, some of which were laser-guided. The Americans have not yet said exactly how many bombs they dropped, but each F-111 could comfortably have carried 8,000 pounds. The pilots were ordered to jettison their bombs into the sea if they could not positively identify their targets, and at least one aircraft did so.

The navy concentrated on two eastern targets near Benghazi. The A-6's navigation-attack system is as modern as the F-111's, and it carries a pod on its nose that can do the night-vision-laser-designation trick. The navy could have carried out the entire attack on its own had there been enough A-6s on the two aircraft carriers—these are the only navy planes suitable for night attacks—but the ships carry only 20 between them, and that would not have been enough to hit all five targets simultaneously.

Protected by their jammer aircraft, the 15 A-6s struck the Al Jamahiriya barracks near Benghazi and, to prevent Libyan fighters from getting off the ground, the nearby Benina air base. They ran into heavy fire near Benghazi, but hardly any over the airfield. For the attacks on the airfield they probably used Rockeye cluster bombs, which can do damage over a wide area.

First reports suggest that dozens of fighters were destroyed there and much damage done to the barracks, which are supposed to house the Muslim Legion, a paramilitary force made up of people of many nationalities and generally considered a prime pool of terrorist talent. All the navy aircraft returned safely to the carriers.

Like the air force, the navy has not revealed the total weight of bombs used. The A-6s are likely to have dropped about 75 tons. The F-111s' load on this trip was probably around 72 tons. That is what a dozen medium army guns could fire in about an hour and a quarter. A hard blow, but not an obliteration.

REAGAN...CONTINUED

support from friends and allies: only Britain, Canada and Israel rallied to America's side. These people have short memories, say members of the administration and Congress, expressing their keen disappointment at the lack of sympathy, and at the ingratitude, of old and new friends. The French government, in particular, is damned for its refusal to allow the British-based bombers to fly over France, a refusal that nearly doubled the length of their journey. Mr Robert McFarlane, less restrained now that he is no longer the National Security Adviser, trashed the Europeans for their greed and for their fear.

Many congressmen hastened to announce their support for the raid, but some held back, saying, in effect, that it would be a success if it succeeded. Senator Christopher Dodd, a Democrat from Connecticut, said, for instance, that it would be a matter of weeks before it could be decided whether the counter-terrorist response was both proper and effective. Senator Charles Mathias, the Republican from Maryland who is retiring this year, was almost alone in arguing that Middle East terrorism does not exist in a vacuum and that one reason why travelling Americans are in danger is that their country is believed by many Arabs to have given up on Arab-Israeli peace.

The Libyans

It hurt

FROM A SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT

TRIPOLI

For most Libyans the long quarrel with America had seemed to be rather abstract—a personal affair between their revolutionary colonel and the American president. Even after American aircraft crossed the "line of death" last month and sank at least two missile-carrying Libyan boats in the Gulf of Sirte, the anti-American shouting that duly followed seemed to lack gusto and sincerity. This week's attacks produced more genuine passion. Whether it also produced the



Swearing revenge

beginning of the end for Libya's leader is still unclear.

Nearly 100 civilians are said to have died and at least as many more to have been wounded in Tripoli. An attack that may have been intended for a terrorist safe-house demolished several ordinary homes, sheared masonry off the back of the French embassy, damaged the residence of the Swiss ambassador and the embassies of Austria, Finland and Romania. More than a dozen foreigners were injured, including several Greek children.

If the other targets the American aircraft were aiming at were more accurately hit, the damage to them was probably heavy. Not surprisingly, the Libyans did not refer to that. They preferred to show the effects on the residential area, where dazed people were stumbling through the rubble hours after the attack. In front of one wrecked house lay the body of a middle-aged man in striped pyjamas. In another, rescue workers dug out the body of a 14-year-old girl. Many bystanders swore revenge against America.

But the American bombers did hit

Part of a Radio Tripoli broadcast on April 16th:

"Arab workers, Arab students, masses of Arab peasants, valiant soldiers and officers of Arabdom, masses of teachers, engineers, doctors, technicians, mass of Arab women, move now in the direction of US embassies, companies and bases and the dens of American espionage.

"Move, burn and destroy them because they pounce on you and participate in annihilating you. Shame, curse and disgrace be upon the agents of the United States in the Arab homeland who welcome the US fleets and allow them to

pass through our air space, who welcome the envoys and the dogs of the mad terrorist Reagan, who hold dubious meetings with them and offer them facilities, and even open to them the bedrooms of their wives.

"The masses of these countries must now encircle the headquarters of the humiliated, betraying, languid governments, also the embassies, companies and bases of the United States, and kill every American, civilian or military, without mercy and ruthlessly and without any compassion pursue them everywhere."

Colonel Qaddafi's villa. Eight bombs seem to have fallen on his compound in the sprawling Aziziyah barracks. Three fell just in front of his house, part of which collapsed. His family were inside, presumably asleep in their beds. Two of his eight children were badly hurt. His adopted baby daughter is said to have died in hospital. Another bomb hit the colonel's tennis court and two others just missed his tent, where, according to one young guard, the leader of the revolution had been asleep. A tent with a touch of high-tech, it has two telephones, four electric radiators, a glass-topped desk and lace-edged sheets on a narrow camp bed.

The atmosphere in Tripoli was tense. Most Libyans stayed indoors. A scattering of young men, some in uniform, others in civilian dress, most of them toting AK-47 rifles, patrolled the cross-roads and lounged in doorways. Libyans said American aircraft had come back several times after the main raid. Some armed men nervously started shooting, even though the sky seemed empty.

The Europeans

Tut tut, mostly

Among the European Community's 12 member governments—11 of them NATO allies of the United States—the British government was alone in immediately voicing full support for the American air attack on Libya. The American bombers from airfields in Britain had to take a roundabout route over the Atlantic because they could not fly over France, Spain or Portugal.

Of the twelve, it was Mr Andreas Papandreou's Socialist government in Greece that attacked the American action most bluntly. It demanded an immediate EEC meeting, which was set for April 17th in Paris. Holland's foreign minister, Mr Hans Van Den Broek (who is the EEC council's current chairman), criticised the American action in strong terms. Belgium's Mr Leo Tindemans said angrily that Britain's Sir Geoffrey Howe must explain how much he had known about the operation at the time of the EEC's foreign ministers' meeting at The Hague on April 14th.

Relatively mild disapproval was voiced the next day by Spain's Socialist prime minister, Mr Felipe Gonzalez. "I do not agree with the method used," he said, but he described as intolerable the "threats against Spain and other countries" made by Colonel Qaddafi—who, on April 11th, had told the states of southern Europe that from that day onwards they were in his "counter-attack zone".

France—after much discussion on
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REAGAN...CONTINUED

ain. In theory, she might have told the Americans that she would reserve the right to distance herself publicly from the purpose for which the bombers were to be used. Such a stance would have been uncomfortable, but perhaps less so than the one she decided to adopt.

She told parliament on April 15th that the Americans were entitled to use their inherent right of self-defence; that refusal to take any risk meant that "terrorist governments will win and one can only cringe before them"; and that, in agreeing to the use of airfields in Britain, she had been influenced by the fact that large American forces were in Europe to defend its freedom and by the evidence of Libyan support for IRA terrorism in the United Kingdom itself.

Some of her own Conservatives still voiced anxiety, and hasty efforts were mounted to rally support for the next day's debate in the Commons. As for the opposition, the Labour and Alliance leaders seemed to have their parties pretty solidly behind them when they launched their attacks on a government that happened to have met a humiliating defeat, only a few hours earlier, on the somewhat different issue of whether more shops should be allowed to sell their wares on Sundays.

The Arabs

Hot words, cooler calculations

Of course the Arabs are angry. Few of them care much for Colonel Qaddafi, and many have cause to detest him. But they do not relish the sight of Arab territory being bombed by American aircraft. They also fear a new wave of terrorist violence. The real questions, however, are whether the governments of Arab countries, together or singly, will do anything concrete to make life nasty for the

Americans; and whether, once the initial brouhaha has died down, American policy in the Middle East will have been badly hurt.

So far, the Arabs have shown little sign of taking tangible collective action against America. Formal diplomatic relations, which America has with every country in the Middle East except South Yemen and Iran, have yet to be severed by anybody. Although Syria has come closest to telling Libya that it will help with arms and men, no Arab government seems willing to make a physical stand alongside Colonel Qaddafi.

The oil weapon is much blunter than it was a decade ago. Libya provides about 6% of OPEC's production. But OPEC has rebuffed a Libyan idea to embargo oil sales to America. With the price so low, few if any Arab countries are likely to take such economic risks on their own.

If America raised its hostility another notch by imposing a naval blockade, it would be very hard for Libya to send any of its oil out abroad. All Libya's pipelines go from wells to seaports. Algeria might like to help transport a few drops out, but the oilfields are on the less friendly Egyptian side of the country. If Libya were unable to export its oil, the world price might go up a few dollars a barrel. The protests of Arabs who dislike American intervention but also dislike cheap oil might then sound even more hollow.

The Arabs remain divided and dispirited. For three years they have been waiting in vain for enough of a consensus to hold a summit conference. But the Gulf war (in which Syria, almost alone among Arabs, favours Iran) and the question of peace with Israel (which Egypt, alone among Arabs, has formally signed) are still preventing a conference.

Egypt is probably in the trickiest spot because it gets \$2.3 billion a year in economic and military help from America and yet wants to be fully accepted back into the Arab world. Things are going badly for President Hosni Mubarak at

home and, though most Egyptians still see Colonel Qaddafi as a dangerous rogue, they are alarmed by the prospect of more terror being unleashed against America and its friends in the Middle East. The first official Egyptian response to the bombing stopped short of outright damnation, but the affair will help the Muslim fundamentalists beavering away below the Egyptian surface.

If Arab countries seem reluctant to put their money or their guns where their mouths are, individual Arabs and non-Arab Muslims may take action. Even if Tripoli becomes temporarily unfashionable as a base for thinking up acts of terror against European or American targets, other hardened centres of terror—Damascus, Tehran and Lebanon—may become busier. The Iranian ayatollahs are no less keen, however hard pressed they are by war in the Gulf, to give money to anti-American zealots. Anarchistic Lebanon is, with Syrian approval, the haven of a lot more terrorists than Libya is.

It is argued that America's plausibility as a broker for peace in the Middle East has been further dented. But many Arabs have long been sceptical of America's role because of the pro-Israeli coloration of American public opinion. The raids on Tripoli and Benghazi may have fortified this Arab view.

Many Arabs think that Colonel Qaddafi is wrong on most things but is at least right to keep up the battle against Israel. That, primarily, is what makes Arabs ambivalent towards the colonel's terrorism. Yet, when his radio tells his Arab brothers not just to hit back at America but to "drink the blood" of all Americans, "in their embassies, in their consulates, in their companies' offices," and to "tear them with your teeth, with your bombs, with your daggers," the response from Arabs as a whole may not be enthusiastic. It is the hard core of international terror based in Lebanon's Bekaa valley and in Beirut that may take note.

Spook corner

One of the remarkable features of the American attack was the claim by the Americans that they had broken Libya's codes and, in effect, listened in to its discussion with its officials abroad. The Americans say that before the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5th they intercepted instructions from the Libyan government to its embassy in East Berlin, and to several groups in Western Europe, to begin attacks on "American targets".

The day before the bombing a message from the East Berlin embassy reported that an attack would be carried out the following day, and a later message to Tripoli reported that it had been a success. The Libyan government sent its congratulations. Perhaps during the same series of intercepts, the Americans say they came upon a message ordering an attack on people waiting for visas at the American consulate in Paris. With this help, the French security forces were able to prevent the attack.

The unusual thing is that the Americans have disclosed so much information about these intercepts; only a few years ago even to acknowledge that the United States engaged in such activities was a

criminal offence. President Reagan himself revealed several details in his speech on April 14th, including the date—March 25th—of the message ordering the Berlin bombing. It is usually argued that even this degree of frankness endangers the interception operation.

Information based on the intercepts was passed on to the French, West German and British governments, and possibly to those of some other NATO countries. Both Britain and West Germany later said they had their own information which bore out the American claims. In London the evidence was also given to leaders of the opposition parties.

How and where the messages were intercepted has not been said. The most likely places are the British listening post on Cyprus, an American or British one in West Berlin, or the telephone network in Berlin, which has for years been liberally tapped by intelligence services of several countries. Once intercepted, the coded messages would have been sent for de-coding either to America's National Security Agency at Fort Meade, in Maryland, or the British GCHQ at Cheltenham.

REAGAN...CONTINUED

April 15th at the Elysée—formally deplored the American action. Its new foreign minister, Mr Jean-Bernard Raimond, repeated an earlier call for an "appropriate" European response to any attempt by the Libyan ruler to carry out his threats against southern Europe.

France shares the American view that Libya bears responsibility for terrorism. French officials confirm that the two Libyan diplomats expelled two weeks ago had been helping to set up an attack on the American consulate in Paris. The holding of French hostages in Lebanon, the recent spate of bombings in Paris and the appointment of Mr Jacques Chirac as prime minister have produced a shift in France's attitude. In March President Mitterrand stopped resisting the American proposal that the Tokyo seven-power summit on May 4th-6th should discuss terrorism. But it would be out of character for the French to endorse the American action, although they have been driven to use military force against Colonel Qaddafi themselves, in Chad, and even though the former president, Mr Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, said that France should have permitted an American overflight.

The West German government reacted mildly to the American attack. The chancellor, Mr Helmut Kohl, expressed his doubts but said he understood why the Americans had acted. A government

statement came close to saying that Colonel Qaddafi was getting his just deserts.

The main opposition party in Bonn, the Social Democrats, attacked Mr Reagan's action, and the Greens promptly organised anti-American demonstrations. More significant for Mr Kohl was the fact that the junior partner in his coalition, the Free Democratic party, criticised the American attack more robustly than his own Christian Democrats were prepared to do. The foreign minister, Mr Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who is a Free Democrat, apparently told the other EEC ministers at the Hague meeting that the Americans had not convinced him of Libya's involvement in terrorist attacks earlier this month.

As to who planted the Berlin bomb, the West German authorities had until this week refused to base a final verdict on the intercept material passed to them by the Americans (see box). On April 16th, however, a spokesman for the Bonn government announced that its own intelligence services had intercepted messages between Tripoli and the Libyan mission in East Berlin which were similar to those decoded by the Americans and showed that the Libyans "at least" knew about the bombing.

The Bonn government has been anxious about the impact of these events on its relations with East Germany. The American, British and French govern-

ments, too, have to take account of the delicate problems that arise from their role in Berlin. When they announced on April 13th that people regarded as "posing a threat to the population of Berlin" were to be stopped at the east-west crossing points, they called this departure from the precious principle of free movement an "exceptional and provisional" step.

Italy's Socialist prime minister, Mr Bettino Craxi, announced on April 15th the "disagreement" of his coalition government, in which the Christian Democrats are the biggest party, with the American action. He said it was liable to provoke "further explosive reactions of fanaticism, extremism and criminal and suicide acts." Later that day the Libyans claimed to have destroyed an American navigational station on Lampedusa, an Italian island south-west of Malta; but Mr Craxi said that the two missiles fired from a Libyan vessel had fallen into the sea.

Since the terrorist attack on Rome's airport in December Italy's attitude to Libya had hardened, and last week Mr Craxi was calling for joint European action to "isolate" Colonel Qaddafi. But he was clearly troubled about the fate of the 10,000 Italians in Libya, and about the close economic ties between the two countries. Italy has long been the biggest importer of Libyan oil; the Libyan government has a large shareholding in Fiat; and a Libyan default on debts would hit Italian creditors hard.

The British government's consent to the American action—which the Americans had wanted for political as well as operational reasons—inevitably drew upon it charges of duplicity from some European capitals. At The Hague on April 14th Sir Geoffrey Howe, the foreign secretary, knew that an American decision to use military force was in the offing. He opposed, unsuccessfully, an appeal for American restraint. Meanwhile Mrs Margaret Thatcher had been trying, over the telephone to Washington, to dissuade the Americans from an action which, privately, some British ministers and their officials regarded as likely to be counter-productive against Colonel Qaddafi.

But when it became clear that the Americans were bent on a military strike, the prime minister felt she simply could not refuse to let the F-111s fly from Brit-

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TRIPOLI...CONTINUED

making an example of him too. Their purpose should not be revenge, however vengeful they may feel; it is to persuade Colonel Qaddafi to change his ways.

Better behaviour by Libya is not out of the question. Colonel Qaddafi is not the "mad dog" that President Reagan has described. He is deeply committed to certain principles and to his means of achieving them. That does not make him irrational or impervious to pressure. Two of his own children were injured, and an adopted daughter is said to have been killed. The thought of being killed or overthrown must grow in his mind when he sees that people are trying to achieve those things. The thought of what his actions are bringing down upon Libya must nag at his countrymen and (more to the point) his soldiers. The bombing may at first strengthen the colonel's grip. The longer-term calculations of his army officers, the only Libyans whose say about a change of policy or of leader might matter, could move towards a different conclusion.

Prepare the next steps

The odds are, at least for a while, against a coup. The stories on Wednesday of internal risings against him seemed to stem from wild anti-aircraft fire and surprised newsmen's wishful thinking. America and Western Europe should therefore be aware that this week's events—including the range of attacks on Thursday from Heathrow to Lebanon—could be a prelude to even nastier ones. What should the West be ready to do?

If Libya does respond with more terrorism, the next step up the military ladder would be a blockade of Libya's oil-exporting ports, probably by mining them. This is a bigger and in many ways riskier military

operation than the bombing America carried out this week: apart from anything else, it would need to go on for a long time and would involve interfering with neutral (eg, Soviet) rights of passage. It would, however, be less likely than the bombing was to kill civilians, and for that reason would have this week been preferable to the bombing raids. The blockade would need to last until the colonel condemned terrorism without reservation, and handed over some known terrorists to western governments.

Beyond a blockade, if that did not work in making Colonel Qaddafi lay down his terrorist weapon, would lie an invasion and overthrow of Libya's government. Even that would not get rid of terrorism. Terror in the modern sense—the murder of people who have no personal connection with the political grievance behind it—is not merely a phenomenon of the Middle East, though that is its chief arena. It has its roots there in the legitimate complaints of Palestinian Arabs, though it has produced many another, twisted, flower. The question of Palestine is not, it seems, about to be settled. Even if it were, there would still be people willing for other reasons, half-rational or wholly irrational, to take advantage of the technologies that make random murder so dramatic and practicable, and there would be governments willing to back them.

Even those who shrink from punitive measures against such governments accept the humdrum need for better airport security, intelligence about terrorists, control over Libya's embassies and the like. Saving lives is always better than avenging them. But the terrorist war of the late twentieth century has passed the stage where defence on its own is enough.

Thatcher bombed

**The flight from Thatcherism, as rebels mass**

Mrs Thatcher's popularity, unlike Mr Reagan's, did not improve with the bombing of Tripoli. It may rise only if Colonel Qaddafi is tamed or falls. If the war against terrorism becomes a dragging-out one, and if Falklands experience is any guide, a sense of engagement in war will reinforce one of the two major parties in British politics at the expense of the two minor ones. Even before the American bombers flew from British bases, the Liberal-Social Democrat Alliance came a demoralising third in the Fulham by-election on April 10th. A strong Labour candidate took advantage of the government's unpopularity, giving his party its first by-election gain from the Tories this Parliament.

Poll-watchers can expect a fascinating summer. On May 8th two more by-elections will coincide with local elections in a substantial test of party muscle. After three years leading the Labour party, Mr Neil Kinnock is beginning to look, and even sound, less like a student politician. There was an assurance to his performance on Libya, at a time when British opinion polls were

against the bombing and on his side. The Militant saga did not harm Labour in Fulham. Instead, each bout of Militant madness gives Mr Kinnock air time to portray himself as firm of resolve and politically moderate. The local elections will bring Labour more council seats, and not all the new councillors will be from the loony left. Fulham lends Labour credibility.

Mr Kinnock's advisers can tell him simply to keep at it. Unless Mr Reagan wins a war for her, Mrs Thatcher has no such luxury. She can draw some comfort that the 10% swing to Labour at Fulham would still not give Mr Kinnock an overall majority at a general election, and that the Alliance has been dealt a blow. Tory managers profess to be pleased that the loss of the Tories' poll share since 1983 now appears to be helping Labour rather than the Alliance. It gives them an easier target to attack, and boosts morale among constituency workers to whom the Alliance has become a plague. But Mrs Thatcher is a long way short of looking like getting an overall majority at the next election. Few doubt that Mr

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Appointment in Tripoli

In bombing Libya, the United States killed sleeping women and children and opened a dangerous new period in which terrorism against Americans and West Europeans may, for a time, get worse rather than better. Most Europeans but very few Americans conclude that America was wrong to use its bombers against Libya. The United States did not choose the best instrument of force available to it. Aerial bombardment rarely serves a political end, and better options were available on the night of April 14th-15th. It is not foolish or weak-kneed to worry about what will come next. Nevertheless, the time had arrived to use some kind of force against Colonel Qaddafi. Unless this week's bombing causes him to stop sponsoring terrorists, the time will come when it will be right to use more force and, if necessary, to overthrow him.

The United States should have no illusions about the course on which it has set out. It will be precarious, frustrating and possibly unrewarding. Twenty-five years ago America was confident that its big army and air force, with all the shiniest technology, could defeat guerrilla insurrections. That confidence was smashed in Vietnam, and the United States spent several years afterwards believing that military force could solve nothing. Under Ronald Reagan it rediscovered on the tiny island of Grenada that armed clout sometimes achieves good things. But the United States and its European allies face in terrorism a threat that is even more intractable than the guerrillas of the 1960s.

The need for action

Americans would be wrong to conclude that force and more force will, by itself, suppress terrorism. A combination of political and economic pressure, better police work and attempts to ease the conflicts that help to generate terrorism are also needed to contain it. But it has to be understood, especially in a week of sickening television shots of the victims of American bombs, why military force must be one of the instruments in the fight against terrorism.

Two reasons, one present and one prospective, justify an extreme course of action against Colonel Qaddafi. The present one is that, in attacking Libya, the United States was defending itself. America's existence, of course, is not threatened by anything that the colonel could do, even in his wildest dreams. But a

government's first duty is to protect the lives of its citizens, and the evidence has damningly piled up over the years that Mr Qaddafi has paid for, housed, trained and directed terrorists whose business is to murder Americans (and Europeans). Proof of Libya's complicity in the latest terrorist attack, the bombing on April 5th of a West Berlin discotheque frequented by American soldiers, has convinced even some habitual sceptics. The colonel shows no true remorse over any of this—indeed, Mr Reagan and Mrs Thatcher claim that more terrorist attacks backed by him were in the works—and the United States has ample grounds for trying to stop him from going any farther.

Many people wonder why sanctions short of military force would not do. The answer is that the United States has tried all of them, and they have done no good. Had it been joined in its efforts by European governments, it might have been less inclined to go for the bombing that most of them deplored this week. The bland measures belatedly adopted by the EEC's foreign ministers a few hours before America attacked were a tiny move in the right direction, but it is hard to believe that a man of Mr Qaddafi's passion and sincerity would be deflected by diplomatic reproofs. Some critics of America's bombing claim that it will encourage him to further wildness. So it might. But to do nothing—to accept failure—certainly would. To doubt that is to misunderstand the nature of modern terrorism and the minds of its perpetrators.

The prospective reason for using force against Mr Qaddafi is that before this century is over the rush of technology will probably deliver into the hands of some minuscule powers conventional weapons of frightening power, and quite possibly nuclear weapons as well. The West and Russia can live with their armed competition with each other. Neither can tolerate a world in which Qaddafis can give a few terrorists the power to wipe out whole cities and countries that do not concede their demands. The physical safety of the West ten years from now depends on its setting clear rules today which tell state backers of terrorism that they will be stopped.

Colonel Qaddafi is not the only, and perhaps not even the biggest, present backer of terrorism. The Syrian and Iranian governments are formidable competitors for that title. But Mr Qaddafi has made an example of himself. The Americans are justified in

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THATCHER...CONTINUED

Kinnock would take office with a minority administration in a hung Parliament, and that he would happily compromise with a big enough group of Alliance MPs to stay there a while. Last week both the Welsh and Scottish nationalist parties indicated possible support for him.

For Mrs Thatcher a summer of battle promises only more trouble. Her susceptibility to backbench opinion is outstripping even that of Lord Wilson in his later years, and is exasperating ministers whose radical plans had been drawn up at her bidding—often at political risk to themselves. Over Westland, over BL, over Sunday trading and now over the Swan Hunter/Harlands contract, she has been inclined to run at the first sign of trouble and, as BL suggested, with no clear idea of where she is running to. Monday's loss of the shops bill was an inept piece of cabinet mismanagement. Here was a proposal in the centre of the government's deregulation programme. It was in the Queen's speech, passed the Lords and was presented to the Commons under a three-line whip. In a possible preview of hung Parliaments and rampant lobbyists to come, frightened Tory backbenchers threw it out. Will these backbenchers now throw out any controversial measure requiring their support? As an election approaches, Parliament looks like becoming open house to the minority-issue politics prevalent in Washington.

Hatches battened

In her domestic policies, Mrs Thatcher is in open retreat from Thatcherism. Mr Paul Channon's sensible ambitions for BL, Mr Norman Fowler's social security proposals, Mr Kenneth Baker's new rates plan, Mr Douglas Hurd's shops bill, even Sir Keith Joseph's radical suggestions for schools, have become policies

for the next administration, or for the manifesto: not for today. In the Whitehall bilaterals which are still Mrs Thatcher's style of government, radicalism and free-market principles are rarely talked about now. The government is in the depressing phase when ultra-caution is the order of the domestic day. At home, only the chancellor of the exchequer is left to honour Mrs Thatcher's claim to radicalism. The continued supremacy of the Treasury over cabinet policy has encouraged her to disregard pleas for a prudent wetness in pursuit of her one aim of tax reduction. Spending departments have been warned of dire consequences should they imperil next year's tax cuts with plans to overspend. Yet £1 billion of marginal increases in public spending might have a higher electoral yield than equally marginal reductions in direct taxation. A bloody public spending round this autumn will galvanise the lobbies to which Mrs Thatcher is now so in thrall, while strengthening the impression that all she personally wants to do is cut public services. Tory hostility towards all the doings of the public sector—so potent a force in the 1970s—is no longer a vote-winner. It is a gift to Labour and the Alliance.

Mrs Thatcher may yet decide to do what she might have done in 1983 (had it not been for the Falklands) and run for election on her own personality and against the weaknesses of her government. She remains an effective and energetic leader. But recent by-election results suggest that more than 1m Tory voters from 1983 have already left her, and dither only over whether Labour or the Alliance offers a better chance of getting her out. Unless there is a surprisingly quick victory against terrorism, her present undeclared domestic strategy of combining policy timidity with public-spending inflexibility is unlikely to win them back.

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Muammar Qadhafi's Libya and its Training Camps

How Libya Theoretically Works

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya (a Qadhafi-coined word meaning, roughly, "mass-based state") is, in theory, the purest form of people's democracy with no ruling party or Government institutions imposed from above. (How it *actually* runs, of course, is something else again.) Again in theory, "People's Committees" function as the means of expressing popular rule, and exist both for given regions (neighborhoods, for example) and professional bodies (a factory or work committee). These in turn elect and direct higher levels of committees, up to the national level, where the General People's Congress is the supreme body. The General People's Congress elects a General People's Committee, which functions as the Cabinet. Because conventional attributes of state sovereignty have been rejected, there is no Head of State; Libya does not maintain Embassies abroad but rather "People's Offices" (in Arab states, which are considered fellow parts of the one Arab nation, "Brotherhood Offices").

How Libya Really Works

The Revolutionary Committees. In addition to the "People's Committees", there is a network of "Revolutionary Committees" which are intended to safeguard the revolution and report counterrevolutionary activities. These are linked to a wide variety of intelligence and security services, some with overlapping functions, and most entrusted to Qadhafi intimates or relatives. East Germany has trained and equipped much of the security forces. Although Qadhafi's all-woman personal bodyguard has drawn bemused attention around the world, the security protecting him and the inner power structure is considerable.

The core leadership. The real power rests overwhelmingly in Qadhafi's own hands, but given his dislike of day-to-day detail and penchant for long meditations in the desert, he has entrusted key duties to his closest aides. These form the real inner leadership of Libya. Qadhafi himself (whose only title is the semi-official "Revolutionary Leader") was profiled in considerable detail in the *Weekly's Leadership Profile* of January 13-19, 1986.

Qadhafi's second in command, Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud (*Leadership Profile*, March 21, 1983) is the number two man in the power structure, and widely considered more pragmatic, less visionary, sometimes more conventionally pro-Soviet than Qadhafi. There is reason to believe that Qadhafi and Jallud have deliberately cultivated a sort of "good cop/bad cop" image for themselves. There have been many rumors of foiled plots against Qadhafi involving Jallud; these are believed to have originated, in some cases, with Qadhafi and Jallud themselves, as disinformation measures. Jallud has no independent power base of his own; while he might serve as a figurehead if the Army took power, he would more likely be ousted with Qadhafi.

Only three other members of the original Revolution Command Council of 1969 still hold power. One is the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Brigadier Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir (*Leadership Profile*, March 31-April 6, 1986), whose only claim to a power base is the regular Army, though it is highly questionable that he could depend on its support. Rather, the Army would likely see Yunis as a Qadhafi ally, supportive of plans to downgrade the Army or abolish it in favor of a People's Militia. The other two surviving RCC members, Khuwayldi Humaydi and Mustafa Kharrubi, respectively hold military and intelligence posts, but also seem to lack any independent power base. A number of Qadhafi's relatives and fellow tribesmen hold key posts; his cousin Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam long held the foreign intelligence operations responsibility, but seems to have faded from the scene recently. An in-law, Hassan Ishkal, reportedly was killed in infighting late last year.

The Army. As there have been persistent reports of Army mutinies, it is unsurprising that the US attack clearly was aimed at striking Qadhafi's own power centers ('Aziziyah and Jamahiriyya barracks) and that other military targets were hit only for suppression purposes. The US openly hoped that the Army, seeing Qadhafi under attack, would move; reports that firing continued in Tripoli after the air attack ended might indicate that there was some internal development. (Or AA fire may have simply continued randomly.) Qadhafi has several times criticized the Army — in 1983 allowing the Revolutionary Committees to accuse the Army of drug and prostitution operations — and has pushed for an "armed populace" to replace the regular forces. The regular forces resist this. The loyalties of the Army in a "crunch" remain uncertain, as the Tobruk mutiny of 1980 (put down only with East German help) demonstrated, military mutinies can happen.

Resistance to Qadhafi

How secure is Qadhafi, and what are the alternatives? It is easier to ask these questions than to answer them. There have been many incidents of opposition, some quite violent, and many reported attacks on Qadhafi.

INTERNAL OPPOSITION: Other than speculation about possible Army disquiet, little can be said with confidence about the nature of internal opposition to Qadhafi, since open opposition, in the past few years at least, tends to be answered with execution. With the sharp economic decline of the past year, many previously content groups may show signs of dissidence; an overzealous seizure of private property a few years ago has alienated large segments of the middle classes, groups which themselves welcomed the destruction of the old monarchy-era landowners. Several groups may be identified as disaffected:

- **Religious Groups.** Despite Qadhafi's own vision of himself as a devout Muslim spreading the cause of Islam, his personal religious view are self-formed, and he is considered heterodox by the traditional Sunni 'ulama, the clerical class. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was blamed for a coup attempt in 1984, probably still has an effective underground cell structure which could be used as a vehicle for opposition.

- **The Sanusiyya.** The Sanusi Order, an Islamic Sufi order which is best known for having led the fight against the Italians (and which then produced Libya's only King, Idris) was supposedly wiped out after the revolution. There are indications, however, that it survives as a popular movement, especially in Cyrenaica, the eastern part of Libya which was its cradle. This brings us to:

- **Cyrenaica.** Although a handful of the leaders of the revolution came from Cyrenaica (eastern Libya around Benghazi), that region has lost much of the influence it enjoyed under the monarchy, which started in Benghazi and under which Benghazi enjoyed a status as co-capital with Tripoli. Although the oil wells are in the east and much of the arable land as well, the revolution has clearly favored Tripolitania. Cyrenaica has shown many signs of being a center of resistance. Gar Yunis University in Benghazi is the most dissidence-ridden of the country's universities, and the mutiny in Tobruk in 1980 shows that even the region's military forces are dissatisfied. Rumors of naval and other mutinies in Benghazi have persisted through the years.

- **Tribal Opposition.** Although the Revolution allegedly ended tribalism, Qadhafi has in fact greatly favored his own small, once powerless Qadhaf al-Dam tribe. This has led to resentment on the part of the larger, once-more-powerful tribal groups. These could prove potent, since the Army and all other key institutions, except for some of the security services (which are heavily Qadhaf al-Dam) naturally draw from the larger tribes.

EXTERNAL OPPOSITION: Libya's external opposition has occasionally claimed responsibility for internal attacks on Qadhafi, perhaps with some credibility. But a persistent campaign of assassination against exiled opponents — "stray dogs" in the Libyan jargon — has decimated its leadership and demoralized much of its rank and file. Furthermore, the opposition consists of a wide array of political positions, ranging from unreconstructed monarchists who were rich landholders before the revolution, to disillusioned revolutionaries who backed Qadhafi

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British Approval of U. S. Action Prompts Debate in Parliament



Four General Dynamics F-111 attack aircraft of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing make a formation takeoff shortly after 7 p. m. London time Apr. 14 from the U. S. air base at Lakenheath, England, en route

to targets in Libya. In addition to weapons under the aircraft's variable-geometry wing, some of the F-111s carried laser-guided bombs internally. Note afterburners on all four aircraft.

London—British government came under strong fire both from political opponents and some supporters last week for agreeing to allow the U. S. to launch aircraft from British bases to bomb Libyan targets.

The British action provoked Parliament to hold an emergency one-day debate on the entire Libyan situation and the British part in the U. S. response to it.

There also were demonstrations in London and other major European cities, both against the U. S. action and against the British for assisting in it.

British decision to permit U. S. use of the bases, which was granted by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on Apr. 12, after a briefing by Gen. Vernon Walters, President Reagan's special envoy, was defended by her and most of her Conservative Party members in the debate on the grounds that the U. S. was justified in striking back at Libya and that more deaths would have been likely if the attacks had been launched from the U. S. Sixth Fleet's carriers only.

The U. S. masked its preparations for the strike from Britain, to a degree, by saying that the increased activity at the U. S. bases and the large number of tanker aircraft flown in from U. S. bases were part of a planned NATO exercise.

About 30 tankers, mostly McDonnell Douglas KC-10s, but also including some Boeing KC-135s, were moved into U. S. bases at Fairford and Mildenhall, England, several days before the attack. Since France and Spain both denied the U. S. force overflight clearance, the total distance to the Libyan targets was more

than 2,800 naut. mi., which necessitated several in-flight refuelings.

Strike aircraft that operated from Britain included 18 General Dynamics F-111Fs of the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing based at Lakenheath, England, and three Grumman EF-111A Raven electronic warfare aircraft from the 42nd Electronic Combat Squadron based at Upper Heyford, England.

Pave Tack System

The F-111F aircraft operated by the 48th TFW were selected for the mission because they are the only F-111s in Europe equipped with the Ford Aerodynamic AN/AVQ-26 Pave Tack electro-optical target-acquisition and weapon-aiming system (AW&ST Sept. 6, 1982, p. 200).

The EF-111As only recently became operational with U. S. 17th Air Force (AW&ST Aug. 5, 1985, p. 44). The F-111Fs are controlled by U. S. Third Air Force, headquartered in Britain.

After the attack, direct airline service between Britain and Libya was suspended, and there was no indication late last week when it would be resumed. British Caledonian formerly operated three flights per week to Tripoli.

Diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya were broken by Britain in 1984 after a policewoman was shot and killed by someone inside the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) in London. Britain expelled all the diplomats in the embassy and has never restored relations.

In the debate in Parliament last week, Thatcher said President Reagan asked for

British assistance and support. "He sought our support under the consultative arrangements which have continued under successive governments for over 30 years," she said. "He also sought our agreement to the use of U. S. aircraft based in this country. Our agreement was necessary."

"We had to consider the wider implications, including our relations with other countries, and we had to weigh the importance for our security of our alliance with the U. S. and the American role in the defense of Europe."

She said Reagan assured her that only clearly defined targets having a relation to terrorist activities would be hit, and noted that there were no other F-111s based anywhere in Europe that could be used in the attack.

"Had Britain refused permission for the use of these aircraft, the American operation would still have taken place, but more lives would probably have been lost on the ground and in the air," she said, referring to the probable use of Boeing B-52 aircraft if the F-111s had not been available.

Thatcher also noted that the U. S. has said that further strikes might be ordered if Libyan terrorists continue their activity. She said she had notified the U. S. that Britain was reserving its position on "any question of further action which might be more general or less clearly directed against terrorism."

"It is clearly understood between President Reagan and myself that if there was any question of using U. S. aircraft based in this country in a further action, that

CAMPS...CONTINUED

until one or another stage of his curious ideological progression. One of the most dangerous opponents, 'Umar al-Muheishi, was a fellow member of the Revolutionary Command Council with Qadhafi at the time of the coup. After moving constantly throughout the Arab world leading resistance to Qadhafi, Muheishi ultimately was turned over to Libya by the Moroccans in 1983, as part of the warming of relations which preceded the Oujda accords. Muheishi has not been heard from since and is presumed to have been executed. The most visible of the exile groups is the National Front for the Salvation of Libya. This is led by former Ambassador Muhammad Mgarief, who broke with Qadhafi in 1980. Its supporters tend to be those who, like Mgarief, applauded the accomplishments of the revolution but opposed the policy of concentrating on export of revolution rather than domestic development. There are, however, a number of other groups

How Will Qadhafi Go?

Very few observers would be willing to bet that Muammar Qadhafi will die a natural death at a ripe old age as leader of Libya. But scenarios for his overthrow vary considerably. Most would agree, however, that the likeliest — almost the only — way Qadhafi could lose power would be by a military coup. That might well occur if the Army remains dissatisfied. The Army's earlier humiliations in Qadhafi's foreign adventures — the border war with Egypt in 1977, the defeat by Tanzania in Uganda, the first round in Chad — occurred when Qadhafi was still riding high domestically, due to high oil prices and resultant high levels of luxury goods despite heavy expenditures on foreign adventures. Today, with Libyan belts severely tightened, foreign adventures such as the renewed occupation of northern Chad are far less popular, with the Army as surely as with the populace. There is even speculation that the Soviet Union might welcome a replacement for Qadhafi: if true, the vaunted security and intelligence services, which are East German-managed, might well prove less than reliable in a crisis.

Some believe that Qadhafi was particularly vulnerable in the fall of 1985, a period when the US was urging Egypt to try to make a military attack. Had Qadhafi lost a border clash with Egypt, the Army might have been provoked into moving. Now, with Qadhafi posing as David against a superpower Goliath, an anti-Qadhafi move is less likely: no new military committee would want to be seen as a US puppet.

Who or What Comes After?

If Qadhafi goes, the nearly certain replacement would be a military committee of some sort. It might retain some of the present leadership, perhaps Jallud, though it seems likelier to find its own leadership from lower levels. It might, conceivably, move quickly towards democracy as the Sudanese Army has done, but Middle Eastern experience suggests that that is unlikely. Internationally, it might well prove more conventionally pro-Soviet than Qadhafi, but on the usual Third World model, as a normal Soviet client rather than a loose cannon on the Mediterranean deck. If the Soviets backed the overthrow, such a more conventional model would be the likely result. An openly pro-US Government seems unlikely, though a pro-Egyptian or mainstream Arab (Algerian model, for example) might be possible.

The new Government would face enormous problems: an economy strapped by falling oil prices, bankrupted by foreign adventures and ill-planned management, and a foreign policy which has alienated the Arab world and embroiled the country in an African war. A pragmatic non-ideological type of leadership, even if pro-Soviet, might emerge, as occurred in Algeria.

Qadhafi and Terror

The US attack was defended on the grounds that Qadhafi's Libya is behind a long list of international terrorist incidents. Whatever the wisdom or otherwise of the attack, there is little disputing the Libyan record in this regard. Of current states, only Iran can rival Libya in this regard. While it is quite true that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", Qadhafi has shown little discrimination in his willingness to encourage links with a bewildering range of groups, some leftist, some right-wing, some purely nihilist, and from an equally broad range of countries. He has concentrated on the Middle East and Africa, but his adventures with the IRA, Spanish Basque groups, the Moros in the Philippines, and meddling from Nicaragua to New Caledonia, show that he has little regard for regional boundaries.

Although there have been periods when Libya has welcomed Yasir Arafat, it has almost always preferred to deal with the more radical Palestinian groups such as the PFLP and DFLP. Libyan connections with Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna') have been openly proclaimed by Qadhafi. The infamous Carlos (Ilvich Ramirez Sanchez) has been reported in Libya, though many believe that he is no longer active, if alive. In recent years, many national liberation groups of an Islamic bent, including the Moros, have shifted their base from Tripoli to Tehran, but the continuing links between Libya and Iran suggest that coordination continues. Qadhafi's so-called Islamic Legion, which has been active in Chad, is a sort of reverse-image foreign legion of African recruits aimed at carrying out Libyan aims in the Sahara and Sahel.

Training Camps: The US raid on April 14 hit one known training camp, Sidi Bilal near Tripoli. A large number of others have been reported or alleged through the years, and have been reported in the Egyptian and other anti-Libyan Arab press, in Western intelligence reports, and in past editions of the *Weekly*. Among those camps alleged in the past to exist and to be training foreigners or other groups, although these may not be fully reliable or may be very out of date.

Aouzou, in northern Chad (Chadians)
 'Aziziyya, south of Tripoli (foreigners, formerly POLISARIO)
 Walid Camp, near Tripoli (Egyptians, Yemenis, Saudis)
 Bir al-Ghanem, 50 mi SE of Tripoli (Tunisians)
 Ghadames, in W Libya (Africans)
 al-Ma'had ("the Institute") (Libyans)
 al-Jada'im (Egyptians, Sudanese, other Arabs)
 Kufra, in the Kufra oasis (Sudanese, others)
 al-Sai'qa camp near Benghazi (Africans, Italian Red Brigades, Basques)
 al-Shahid Magarief Camp (Libyans)
 al-Mard Camp, E of Tobruk (Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis, mainly religious fundamentalists)
 Misurata Camp, at Misurata (Mil. College for Palestinians, Europeans)
 Ma'sar Ra's Talal or Halal (Anti-Arafat Palestinians, Sudanese, Iraqis, Lebanese)
 Sebha East, at Sebha Oasis (operatives for W Europe)
 Sebha West, at Sebha Oasis (operatives for the Americas, elsewhere)
 Sahrata Camp, near Tripoli (Chadians, Palestinians, Tunisians, Iraqis, Japanese, Latin Americans)
 April 7 Camp, S of Tripoli (southern Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians, pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'ites)
 Jaghubub Camp, Jaghubub oasis (Egyptians, Sudanese)
 al-Kashaf Camp in Tripoli (demolition training)

Green Mountain Camp, in Cyrenaica (Algerians and Tunisians)
 Khums Camp (on the Tripolitanian coast) (Tunisians)
 Sidi Bilal Camp SW of Tripoli (Palestinians, Tunisians, Lebanese, Yemenis) (Hit in the US attack.)
 Jurman Camp (same as above)
 Surt Camp at Surt
 Tajura' camp E of Tripoli (frogmen)
 al-Takhali Camp in Tripoli (desert warfare)
 al-Tamimi Camp E of Derna (desert warfare, possibly also trains Libyans to attack exile opposition figures)
 Tarhuna Camp SE of Tripoli (Arab groups)
 Taybni Camp (Tunisians)
 Tobruk East (Arabs)
 Tobruk West (non-Arabs)
 Tukida Camp (Iranians in "special skills", also Palestinians, Omanis, Chadians, Iranians)
 Umm al-Aranib Camp S of Sebha (Iranian *Pasdarans*)
 'Uqba Bin Nafi' Camp (near airbase of same name, the former Wheelus AFB) (Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans, Venezuelans, Chadians, Argentines), said to specialize in urban warfare
 Marda Camp (formerly backers of 'Abdallah Zakariyya of Sudan trained here, now back in Sudan)
 Green Hope camp near Kufra (same note as above)

Libya Under Qadhafi: A Pattern of AggressionCharacter of Libyan Policy

Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, a zealot with messianic pretensions, seized power in a military coup in 1969. Since then he has forcibly sought to remake Libyan society according to his own eccentric revolutionary precepts. In 1979 Qadhafi declared Libya a "state of the masses," ostensibly a direct democracy governed by local committees but in reality a brutal police state enforced by young radicals loyal to Qadhafi. At the apex of power in Libya is Qadhafi, although he disingenuously claims not to be a head of state, preferring instead the title "Leader of the Revolution."

Qadhafi's ambitions are not confined within Libya's borders, however. He fancies himself a leader and agent of historic forces that will reorder Third World politics. His vision provides both a motive and a rationale for providing military and financial aid to radical regimes, and for undermining moderate governments by supporting--or manufacturing--subversive groups and on occasion abetting terrorists.

Qadhafi's aggressive policies increasingly have focused on undermining US and other Western interests in the Third World as he sees these as the main barrier to his radical and expansionist goals. Qadhafi's commitment of political, economic, and military resources in support of anti-Western activities worldwide is surpassed only by the Soviet Union, its East European allies, and possibly North Korea or Cuba. He is particularly hostile to Israel and the US. His tactics include a mixture of threats and support for terrorism, offers of cooperation, economic incentives and intimidation, and outright military aggression.

Radicalism in the Arab World

Qadhafi's foremost ambition is to dominate and unite the Arab World. He frequently compares himself to Garibaldi or Bismarck and has justified his use of violence against moderate Arab regimes as necessary to achieve Arab unity.

Egypt, because of its peace treaty with Israel, is a special target. Libyan agents have been active in Egypt since the 1970s, and Qadhafi has offered support to various opponents of the Egyptian government. In October 1981, immediately after President Sadat was assassinated, Qadhafi called on Egyptians to overthrow their government; within a week at Cairo International Airport two bombs concealed in luggage unloaded from a flight originating in Tripoli exploded.

More recently Qadhafi has sought to embarrass the government of President Mubarak and undermine the Egyptian economy. A Libyan ship captained by a senior Libyan naval commando is believed to have laid mines in the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez that

damaged 18 merchant ships in July and August 1984. In May 1985 the Egyptians thwarted what they believed was a plot by radical Palestinians backed by Libya to destroy the US Embassy in Cairo with a truck bomb. Last summer Qadhafi expelled over 10,000 Egyptian workers in Libya--confiscating their savings and most of their belongings--in what was in part an effort to place a greater burden on the strained Egyptian economy. Qadhafi has at least twice tried to murder Libyan exiles in Egypt only to have his agents intercepted by Egyptian security.

Sudan also is a priority target. Qadhafi has long offered training and support to Sudanese dissidents and sponsored acts of sabotage against the government of former President Nimeiri. He was a major source of arms and money for southern Sudanese rebels that began a guerrilla war against the central government two years ago. In February 1983 the Sudanese, with Egyptian assistance, thwarted a Libyan-sponsored coup attempt, and in April 1984 a Libyan TU-22 bombed Omdurman, Sudan in a failed attempt to destroy a radio station there that broadcast Sudanese condemnations of Qadhafi's policies.

Since Nimeiri's fall from power Qadhafi has exploited the resumption of diplomatic ties with Sudan to build a network for subversion inimical to Sudan's efforts to establish a parliamentary democracy. A number of known Libyan terrorists have been assigned to the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) or airline office in Khartoum. Qadhafi also has provided arms, funding, training and probably direction to the Sudanese Revolutionary Committees, a small group in Sudan dedicated to establishing a government on the Libyan model in Sudan. In May a planeload of these dissidents arrived in Khartoum armed with assault rifles.

Qadhafi also is working to expand his influence in the countries of the Arab Maghreb. Qadhafi refuses to negotiate with Algeria to determine the correct location of the Libyan-Algerian border, which he disdains as a colonial creation. Perhaps angered over President Bendjedid's moderation, Qadhafi reportedly provides money to Algerian dissidents such as Ahmed Ben Bella.

In Tunisia, Qadhafi has long sought to bring down the pro-Western government of Habib Bourguiba. In 1980 Libyan-supported guerrillas attacked the southern Tunisian mining town of Gafsa; when Tunisia braced for conflict with Libya and France offered its support to Tunis, Libyan mobs burned the French and Tunisian embassies while security forces stood idly by. Following bread riots in Tunisia in January 1984 saboteurs originating in Libya dynamited a pipeline near the Libyan-Tunisian border. In an effort to exacerbate social tensions, this past year, Qadhafi expelled over 30,000 Tunisian workers and confiscated their property. In September, when Tunisian newspapers attacked Qadhafi for the expulsions, a Libyan diplomat attempted to mail letter bombs to the critical journalists, but most were fortunately intercepted by Tunisian authorities.

Libya is staunchly opposed to the Middle East peace process and is doing all he can to subvert it. In Lebanon, Libyan arms and money flowed to different militias and Palestinian groups actively opposed to the government of President Gemayel. Qadhafi has been especially eager to undermine the influence of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat because Qadhafi perceives him as too willing to consider a negotiated settlement with Israel. As a result Qadhafi has thrown his support to radical Palestinian groups--including the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Abu Nidal--that advocate continued war against Israel. Since 1981 Qadhafi has shipped these groups items as prosaic as uniforms and as powerful as tanks and BM-21 multiple rocket launchers. In 1984 Libyan troops participated in the Syrian-backed assault on Arafat's forces in northern Lebanon.

The Persian Gulf also is an arena for Libyan meddling. Qadhafi has allied himself with Iran in its war against Iraq, and has provided Tehran with T-55 tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, ammunition, and even SCUD rockets. In addition Libya provides arms and money to Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq and to the antigovernment group the "Union of Iraqi Democrats." In 1984 and 1985, Libyan agents attempted to disrupt the Islamic pilgrimages ceremonies in Saudi Arabia; in 1984 entire planeloads of Libyan "pilgrims" were discovered to be carrying arms. Libya continues to enjoy good relations with and has provided support to the National Democratic Front that operates out of Marxist South Yemen against the government of President Salih in North Yemen. Although Libya restored diplomatic relations with Somalia last May, there is no evidence that Qadhafi has severed his relationship with Somali opposition groups he has long supported.

Involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa

Tripoli views Black Africa as a principal arena for forging a group of non-aligned, radical states that will strengthen Libyan influence in international fora and confer upon Qadhafi status as a world leader. Qadhafi's aggressiveness probably has been strengthened by the failure of the international community to prevent his often blatant disregard for the sovereignty of small African nations.

Chad, of course, is the most egregious example. In 1973 Qadhafi forcibly annexed the northern portion of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. Throughout the 1970s Libya supported various tribal and guerrilla groups in Chad in a bid to install a pliable regime in N'Djamena. Having failed to achieve this indirectly, in October 1980 the Libyan army invaded Chad and attempted to impose a union between the two countries. The Libyan occupation force withdrew in November 1981, but returned in 1983 when the pro-Libyan Chadian leader Goukouni Oueddei was ousted by current President Hissene Habre. Only intervention by French and Zairean armed forces confined the Libyan occupation to the northern half of Chad. French forces were withdrawn in the fall of 1984, but Qadhafi reneged on an agreement reached with President Mitterrand and continues to occupy northern Chad with his army.

The drought-battered countries of the Sahel offer Qadhafi many opportunities for meddling. Qadhafi continues to provide arms and training to the nomadic Tuareg tribesmen in an effort to undermine the governments of Mali and Niger. In 1983 Libyan support was instrumental in bringing Thomas Sankara to power in Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), a country Qadhafi now refers to as the "second state of the masses."

Qadhafi also is determined to topple President Mobutu of Zaire. Qadhafi is motivated by hostility to Kinshasa's close ties to the West, its recognition of Israel, and its support for Chadian President Habre. Qadhafi also is aware of Zaire's role as a leading producer of cobalt and other strategic minerals. Tripoli provides training in sabotage and small arms to several different guerrilla groups including the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese National Movement. Libyan diplomatic facilities in countries bordering Zaire are centers of support for these groups.

Meddling in Central America and the Caribbean

Qadhafi's determination to strike at US interests and to spread his philosophy of revolution have led to a more aggressive Libyan posture in Latin America. Although many governments and groups in this region are wary of Qadhafi, there are some willing to accept his financial and military support.

Tripoli views Nicaragua as its main base in Central America and accordingly seeks to strengthen the Sandinista dictatorship in Managua. In addition to several hundred million dollars in economic assistance, Qadhafi has provided the Sandinistas with light strike aircraft, helicopters, anti-aircraft guns, SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers, and small arms. At least several dozen Libyan military personnel are in Nicaragua. Libyan support has indirectly enhanced the Sandinistas' ability to subvert neighboring states. In addition, Libya periodically provides arms and money to insurgents in Guatemala, El Salvador, as well as the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia.

Libyan agents have been increasingly active among the Caribbean islands, especially since the summer of 1984. The loss of its People's Bureau in Grenada following the collapse of the Bishop government in 1983 forced Tripoli to establish its centers for subversion in other diplomatic posts in the region. Qadhafi also has used religion as a cover for intelligence activities in the area, sponsoring Islamic conferences in which the Libyan participants often are intelligence officers or operatives of the Libyan Revolutionary Committees. Leftist leaders from the Dominican Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and elsewhere have also been invited to Libya for "seminars" and paramilitary training. Particularly worrisome is the Libyan penchant for urging leftist politicians to undertake violent action rather than pursue legal means to replace moderate governments in the region.

South and Southeast Asia

As elsewhere, Libyan diplomatic missions in this region provide the infrastructure for Libyan subversion, disbursing funds and arranging for the training of leftists and other dissidents.

In South Asia, Libyan activities are focussed on the Islamic states. No doubt reflecting his dependence on Russian arms Qadhafi is one of the few Muslim leaders who does not criticize the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Although Libya maintains relations with Pakistan, it has also been involved with the "al-Zulfiqar" terrorist group. Qadhafi in addition has provided training and money to opponents of President Ershad of Bangladesh.

In Southeast Asia, Qadhafi concentrates on Muslim minorities. For some time he has provided paramilitary training to the small Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand. In the Philippines, Libyan assistance continues to reach the Muslim Moro separatists on Mindanao despite a 1976 agreement with Manila to cease such aid. New Caledonia, a French possession in the South Pacific, has no appreciable Muslim population, but Libya has nevertheless provided military training and some funding to the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, the group responsible for most of the pro-independence violence on the island. Libyan intelligence operatives are known to be active on other islands in Oceania.

The Erosion of International Norms

Qadhafi's subversion is not confined to those countries that are the direct object of his ambitions. The international community as a whole suffers from Qadhafi's disrespect for international norms of behavior and accepted practice. Qadhafi has abused diplomatic privilege for terrorist purposes, reneged on international agreements, and blatantly used violence against opponents. In addition, Qadhafi's moral support of terrorism, regardless of his direct operational involvement in a given terrorist act, helps legitimize terrorism as an acceptable political activity. Over time, the Libyan example may encourage other states or groups to engage in similar irresponsible behavior.

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30 APRIL 1986

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76% of Americans Polled Back Bombing of Libya

By Barry Sussman
Washington Post Staff Writer

By lopsided majorities, Americans say they think that President Reagan acted properly in bombing Libya and would support military attacks on Syria and Iran if those nations are found to be sponsoring terrorism, according to a Washington Post-ABC News public opinion poll.

Only one in five surveyed, however, said they think that the April 15 strike against Tripoli and other Libyan sites will reduce international terrorism or make the world safer. And four of every five people said they think that a major terrorist act in the United States is at least somewhat likely during 1986, according to the poll.

In thrust, the survey, taken from Thursday through Monday evening, shows the public strongly behind aggressive action against terrorism but wary of rocky times ahead. Three out of four people said they would be afraid to travel on some international flights or cruise ships because of the danger of hijacking or terrorism.

Among the poll's chief findings:

- Reagan's overall approval rating has jumped to 70 percent, higher than at any other time in his presidency except for a brief period after he was shot in an assassination attempt in March 1981. His rating for handling of the economy, for handling of foreign affairs in general and "for making the right decisions" in world affairs are all higher than they had ever been.

- Seventy-seven percent say the European allies are not sufficiently supporting American attempts to stop terrorism. But that feeling, based on other questions, is aimed particularly at France, not at all at England and, apparently, not at West Germany.

- The public also has shifted views on Israel and Egypt, the two major U.S. allies in the Middle East. Israel, which praised the U.S. action, is seen more favorably than at any time since it invaded Lebanon in 1982. Egypt, which criticized the attack, is seen less favorably than in any previous Post-ABC News poll.

The survey began 10 days after the raid on Libya, giving Americans time for second thoughts. Nevertheless, 76 percent in the survey said they approved of the air raid, a level slightly higher than found in polls in the immediate aftermath.

Support is extremely broad-based, with 67 percent of Democrats, 73 percent of independents and 87 percent of Republicans saying that they support the bombing. Among women, who are often highly critical of the use of force, 70 percent approved. Among blacks, where majority support is seldom found for any Reagan action, 58 percent approved.

Despite a string of terrorist incidents since the bombing, 68 percent in the survey said the strike against Libya has been more a success for the United States than a failure; only 25 percent view it as more a failure than a success.

Seventy-seven percent said the raid was justified because of the role Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has played in terrorist acts. However, more than half of the people interviewed said others in the Middle East aside from Qaddafi bear equal or greater blame for most terrorism.

Reagan has said the United States might attack Syria or Iran if they were found responsible for terrorist acts against Americans. In the survey 67 percent said they would support military action against those countries "if evidence is found linking" them to such acts; 30 percent said they would disapprove.

Some critics of the bombing have charged that it leaves the United States in a worsened position in the Middle East, but few Americans—15 percent in the poll—say that they go along with that thinking. Instead, 47 percent think the raid leaves this nation in a stronger position in the Middle East and 37 percent see no change.

As for the European allies, the poll showed very high support for England, with 90 percent saying they consider England a reliable ally, "one that can be trusted to cooperate with the United States in almost any circumstances." Amer-

How the Poll Was Conducted

The Washington Post-ABC News public opinion poll on attitudes toward terrorism and other issues was conducted by telephone April 24-28. In all, 1,505 persons 18 and older in the continental United States were interviewed at random.

The sample was adjusted slightly to conform to Census Bureau figures for the overall population with regard to age, education, race and gender.

Theoretically, in 19 cases out of 20, a poll this size is subject to a margin of sampling error of about 3 percentage points. Figures based on portions of the sample, such as Republicans or Democrats, are subject to a slightly higher sampling error margin. In addition, polls have other potential sources of error.

ican F111 bombers flew from England, with permission from Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, to attack Libya.

Similarly, 62 percent said they consider West Germany a reliable ally, about the same as in a Post-ABC News poll in 1981.

But 54 percent in the survey of 1,505 people nationwide said they do not consider France a reliable ally, twice as many as said that in a 1981 Post-ABC News poll. France refused air rights for the planes taking off from England.

The poll suggests that the rallying around Reagan's antiterrorism moves may be having an impact on attitudes toward his policies in Central America. Forty-seven percent in the survey said they approved Reagan's handling of the situation in Nicaragua, while 40 percent said they disapproved. That is a reversal from a Post-ABC News poll a month ago, when 37 percent approved and 52 percent disapproved.

But opposition remains strong to Reagan's support for aid to the contras fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Sixty-five percent in the survey said they opposed Reagan's request to give \$100 million in military and other aid to the contras; 28 percent approved giving such aid.

Reagan urges Senate to ratify treaty easing extradition of IRA terrorists

By James Morrison
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Grateful for Britain's help in the U.S. bombing raid on Libya, the Reagan administration is applying new pressure on the Senate to approve a treaty allowing easier extradition of suspected Irish terrorists to England.

The State Department this week called on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where the treaty has been held up since last August, to send the new accord to the full Senate for the constitutionally required approval.

"The administration believes the Senate should swiftly ratify the treaty, demonstrating our willingness to support the British on an issue of terrorism of primary importance to them," State Department spokesman Charles Redman said.

"We are pushing hard for ratification of this important anti-terrorist measure," he said. "This new treaty makes clear that acts of terrorist violence will no longer be excused or condoned as 'politically motivated.'"

A State Department source said the Reagan administration has been pushing for passage of the treaty for months, but "new attention is being paid to it" because of British help in the Libyan raid.

Both the United States and England believe the current extradition pact between the two countries allows IRA terrorists to seek refuge here under the guise of fleeing political persecution from the British occupation of Northern Ireland.

The current treaty allows the extradition of suspects linked to murder, kidnapping, bombings or other violent acts. But it also allows a suspect to escape extradition by claiming his action was a political protest.

President Reagan, in letters to Committee Chairman Richard Lugar of Indiana and Senate Majority Leader Rob-

ert Dole of Kansas, noted that "Great Britain demonstrated once again . . . she is our staunchest ally in the battle against international terrorism," referring to Britain's cooperation in the U.S. air raid on Libya.

Mr. Reagan, in his letters, called for the defeat of a Democratic amendment that, he said, would "weaken the treaty in ways that would create new legal loopholes for terrorists."

The amendment, proposed by Sen.

President Reagan noted that "Great Britain demonstrated once again . . . she is our staunchest ally in the battle against international terrorism."

Claiborn Pell of Rhode Island, would allow extradition of terrorists suspected of mailing letter bombs but not for planting car bombs, and for the killers of civilians but not of police officers and soldiers.

"I frankly do not understand such an approach," Mr. Reagan said. "Our own recent unpleasant experiences with terrorism clearly demonstrate that American servicemen are a primary target. We should not do anything that suggests in any form that it is permissible to attack soldiers or policemen."

Sen. Lugar has been unwilling to force a vote on the proposed treaty because of uncertainty of holding together his narrow 9-to-8 majority on the committee, one Senate source said.

The Democrats, under pressure from the Irish-American lobby, have been un-

willing to close the legal loophole in the treaty.

But recently the Republicans have tied President Reagan's request for \$250 million in economic aid to Northern Ireland — which is strongly favored by the Democrats — to the treaty proposal. Committee member Paul Sarbanes, a Maryland Democrat, charged that the aid package is being held "direct hostage" to the treaty. The aid bill is intended to support last year's Anglo-Irish agreement that permits the Catholic-dominated Republic to help the Protestant-dominated North in an effort to bring peace to the strife-torn region.

The committee is scheduled to meet again on Thursday to debate the treaty.

In England, Mrs. Thatcher has found herself defending her decision to assist the American raid on Britain as opposition members of Parliament claim her action sparked Arab extremists to kill four Englishmen in retaliation.

"This country too is among the many that have suffered from Libyan terrorism," Mrs. Thatcher said in a recent speech to the House of Commons. "It is also beyond doubt that Libya provides the Provisional IRA with money and weapons."

Her decision to assist the United States is eroding support for her Conservative Party in two upcoming special parliamentary elections, according to a poll released yesterday by the British Broadcasting Corp. The poll showed 60 percent of voters in the normally safe Conservative districts of Derbyshire West and Ryedale, North Yorkshire, disapprove of the government's action.

In Washington, British Embassy spokesman R.A. Burns said the first proof of Libyan involvement with the IRA was on March 28, 1973, when the navy of the Irish Republic intercepted a Cypriot ship laden with five tons of arms

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bound for the west coast of the southern Irish state.

"Her cargo, which included 250 Soviet-made rifles, with ammunition and mines, had been loaded in Tripoli and provided by [Libyan leader Col. Muammar] Qaddafi," Mr. Burns said.

In 1979 "there were persistent reports" that Thomas McMahon, one of the convicted killers of Lord Louis Mountbatten, was trained in the use of explosives in Libya, Mr. Burns said.

Britain broke diplomatic relations with Libya after an English policewoman

was killed by gunmen in the Libyan Embassy in London in 1984.

Irish Republic police last year discovered the largest cache of IRA arms at two dumps in County Sligo and County Roscommon that were packed in "Libyan Armed Forces" crates.

"The ammunition was of a type manufactured in Yugoslavia for the Libyan Army," he said.

Mr. Burns also recounted Col. Qaddafi's support for the IRA in a speech marking the 1972 evacuation of the United States from a former military base in Libya.

Middle East: The Libya Raid

The US raid on Libya April 14 was certainly one of the most predictable surprise attacks in memory, since the US had been signalling its intentions for days. Still, as this issue went to press there was considerable evidence that the Libyan air defenses were ill-prepared and caught by surprise, with no blackout and street lights still burning in Benghazi and Tripoli; Libyan SAMs, for the most part, were successfully jammed or evaded (they may have caused some of the damage in Tripoli as they fell to earth), and that Libya's interceptor force was not in evidence at all. (Libyan pilots are notoriously ill-trained for night flying: they're said to sometimes end up landing in the wrong country.) The night attack may have added an element of surprise, and apparently electronic measures were quite successful; most antiaircraft firing occurred after the raiders had passed. (At presstime it was not certain how the one missing US F-111 had been lost.)

The political implications of the raid remained uncertain at presstime; for a background study, see the "Dossier" on Pages Four and Five. In military cost, the Libyans reportedly expended a large number of SAMs (SA-2s, -3s, -6s, -8s, and perhaps -5s may have been fired, and the Sixth Fleet also referred to French-made SAMs, presumably Libyan *Crotales*); preliminary results also showed that three to five Il-76 *Candid* transports were hit at Tripoli military airport and five to 12 MiG-23s in hangars at Benina Air Base near Benghazi; the MiG-23 spares hangar at Benina was destroyed. The Pentagon identified Benina as the home base for the war in Chad. The command centers at the Bab al-'Aziziyya barracks in Tripoli and the Jamahiriyya Barracks in Benghazi — the alternate leadership command post — were attacked, and at least in the case of 'Aziziyya (where Muammar Qadhafi's home is located), the Pentagon said structural damage was done. Also attacked was the training camp at Sidi Bilal near Tripoli, where terrorist training is said to occur (See Page Five) and which the Pentagon identified as a port facility used as a training base for Libyan commandos.

THE FORCES: The US Naval aircraft from the carriers *America* and *Coral Sea*, which were operating in the central Mediterranean outside the Tripoli Flight Information Region (FIR), with the *Coral Sea* to the East and the *America* to the West. In the attacks in the Benghazi area (Jamahiriyya Barracks and Benina Air Base), bombings were carried out by A-6 *Intruder* aircraft and A-7 *Corsairs*; in both the Benghazi and Tripoli raids, A-7s and F-18s from the carriers (the F-18s presumably from the *America*) flew combat air patrol; "dozens" of HARM and *Sbrike* missiles were fired for suppression of air defenses. In both sets of attacks, 500, 750 and 2,000 pound laser-guided munitions and precision-guided gravity bombs were employed.

The bombing parts of the Tripoli raids (the 'Aziziyya Barracks, the military part of Tripoli airport, and the Sidi Bilal training camp) were carried out by the US Air Force using 18 F-111Fs from the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing, Third Air Force, at RAF Lakenheath, in the UK. These F-111s flew some 2,800 nautical miles each way via the Strait of Gibraltar. Also involved were three EF-111 electronic warfare aircraft from the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, Third Air Force, at RAF Upper Heyford. These were refuelled in flight by 12 KC-10 and 9 KC-135 tankers from RAF Mildenhall, and five KC-10s and four KC-135s from the 7020th Air Base Group, RAF Fairford. The Navy provided the combat air patrol activities for the Tripoli raids as well. One F-111 failed to appear at its rendezvous point after the raid and is presumed lost. (For some other considerations in the attack, see Page One.)

MUSICAL PORTFOLIOS: Once again, the Israeli coalition Government survived after it appeared inevitable that Shimon Peres would take action which could lead to its breakup; this time the day was saved by the compromise under which Yitzhak Modai, whom Peres had vowed to oust as Finance Minister, switched posts with Justice Minister Moshe Nissim. (At first Modai apparently suggested switching posts with Ariel Sharon, something Labor would have been unlikely to accept. Then Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir offered to change posts, but since Shamir has no economic background and Modai none in foreign policy, that seemed an unlikely scenario. Apparently Peres won assurance that Modai would not regain the Finance Ministry after the scheduled rotation this fall.

NEW ISRAELI AIR DEFENSES: Israeli Brig. Gen. Yariv Eitan, Commander of Antiaircraft defenses, has said that new systems for identifying enemy aircraft have recently been mounted on a number of IDF *Hawk* and *Chaparral* SAM systems. He said the systems are particularly effective against low-flying aircraft and helicopter gunships. Eytan also said that the IDF can combat surface-to-surface missiles, and has "devised methods" to deal with Syria's SS-21s.

Asia: Future US Sales to China?

The recent visit of US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral James D. Watkins to the People's Republic of China emphasizes the sincerity with which the US is treating China's expressed interest in US equipment and help in modernizing the Chinese Navy. During a 10-day visit, Watkins and a naval delegation resumed naval discussions on ways to cooperate on ASW. An informed source in Washington indicated that specific technology is being discussed, but no details have been released to date. Sonar and torpedoes would most likely be included, and not LM-2500 gas turbine engines as a report printed recently in *The Washington Post* indicated. Last August, a commercial agreement was made between General Electric and China for the installation of five LM-2500 engines on two *Luda*-class destroyers. However, there is some speculation that the PRC may now be considering putting these engines onboard a new and more advanced ship, of about the same size and class, which is yet to be built.

Watkins' trip came one week after the announcement in Washington of the US multi-million dollar avionics sale to the PRC. In the past China has shown interest in US equipment, and then later reneged when the costs became clear.

MORE ON THAILAND'S WAR RESERVES: Consultations between the US and Thailand on the war reserve

Weekly Update: Libya Raid Questions; China Refuelling; Guatemala

LIBYAN DOSSIER: This week's *Weekly* includes a special two-page dossier on Muammar Qadhafi's Libya, assessing the sources of power, the chief internal and external roots of opposition, the possibilities of Qadhafi's overthrow and the likely succession, and a discussion of (and list of) the camps where Qadhafi trains foreign operatives for terror operations. The dossier was prepared on April 16, at a time when confused reports of events in Tripoli raised the possibility that Qadhafi might already be in jeopardy or overthrown. It appears on Pages Four and Five.

WHY THE DELAY? It is a fairly open secret around Washington that the original US plan for the Libyan raid was to strike on the weekend of April 11-12; why then was the raid delayed until the night of April 14-15? A major reason seems to have been the inability of the US to persuade the British to permit the use of US F-111s operating out of British air bases. By this account, the British finally came around on Sunday, allowing the Monday night raid. (Caspar Weinberger had also been out of the country until the weekend, which may have contributed to the delay.)

WHY THE F-111s? Another question raised by the Libyan raid: why did the US have to use F-111s operating out of Britain, when it had two carrier battle groups sitting offshore? The official answer given by the Pentagon: if only the Navy's aviation had been used, only four of the five targets could have been covered simultaneously, thus depriving the attackers of the element of surprise on the fifth target. But only 15 carrier aircraft were used for the actual attack (A-6s and A-7s), with Navy A-7s and F-18s flying cover for both the Navy raids at Benghazi and the Air Force raids over Tripoli. This compares with 18 F-111s. But this is less than a third of the total potential ground attack force available to the *America* and the *Coral Sea*, if the light attack capabilities of the A-7 and F-18 squadrons are included. (Also: if two carrier battle groups — twice what the US usually keeps in the Mediterranean — cannot carry out a raid of Libyan dimensions, what use would they be in a major conflict?) It's true that the F-111Fs have superior strike capabilities as far as accuracy goes, given their *Pave Tack* laser target designator/rangers (though the accuracy achieved remained an open question as this was written), and this may have helped make the case to the British, but was the margin sufficient to justify the grueling, five-to-seven-hour, 2,800-nautical-miles each way roundabout route through the Strait of Gibraltar? The likeliest answer seems to be that for one, perhaps two, reasons, the F-111s were preferred: one reason was US determination that at least one of its allies be seen as acting with it, in this case Britain. The other reason may have been an Air Force desire to be involved, and not leave all the action to the Navy.

PRC RETROFITTING F-7s AND F-5s: Inside sources have informed the *Weekly* that the Chinese Air Force is taking active steps, under the direction of the new Commander of the PLA Air Force, Wang Hai, to introduce an inflight refueling capability on the F-5 and F-7 series combat aircraft. The whole question of flight refueling, sources say, is causing an enormous amount of controversy within the PLA. The F-5 series (F-5 and F-5A), known in domestic Chinese service as the Shenyang J-5 series (J-5 and J-5A), are copies of the Soviet MiG-17F and MiG-17PF aircraft, respectively, which are no longer in production. The F-7, domestically known as the Xian J-7 is a copy of the MiG-21. China's inventory includes some 290 F-5s, 250 F-5As and over 300 F-7s.

CEREZO'S PUSH: Ever since his inauguration in January Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo has been pushing for a meeting of the five Central American Presidents at Esquipulas as a way of promoting his ideas on "active neutrality" and Guatemala's leadership in the region. The meeting now looks set for sometime in May, after the inauguration of Costa Rica's Oscar Arias. A number of factors may be giving Cerezo's efforts a boost: the apparent impotence of the Contadora Group, the comparative size of the Guatemalan economy and the fact that the country has no real problems with its neighbors. Cerezo will need luck to revive the Central American Common Market plan in which Guatemala would be a certain beneficiary. To take up the fallen mantle of Contadora, and actually achieve something, will probably take more than luck.

U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISTS

At 7:00 p.m. EST, April 14, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities and military assets that support Muammar Qadhafi's international terrorist activities.

This necessary move by the President is supported by the American people, and established a dramatic marker by which Libya and the rest of the world can assess future U.S. responses to acts of terrorism against Americans.

The attack followed clear and irrefutable evidence that Qadhafi had ordered and helped execute the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that killed two people and injured 230, as well as confirmed reports of Libyan planning and preparation for numerous additional terror attacks.

Repeated Warnings, Diplomatic Efforts, Sanctions Unheeded

- o As early as July 1985, the President warned Libya that continued sponsorship of terrorism was a form of aggression under the United Nations Charter and would bring an appropriate response.
- o In accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the U.S. response was in self defense and was intended to pre-empt Qadhafi's widespread and ongoing campaign of terrorist activities against Americans and the rest of the civilized world.
- o The U.S. strike damaged the Libyan terrorist infrastructure and demonstrated to Qadhafi that he cannot continue these savage attacks on innocent, defenseless civilians with impunity and without cost. As President Reagan said, "If necessary, we will do it again."

Appeasement of terrorism affords no safety

Qadhafi launched a bloody assault on American servicemen in Berlin and was planning a series of other such atrocities against Americans.

To sit back passively would have been inexcusable and could have cost many American lives. Inaction would have been a clear invitation to Qadhafi to proceed.

Within Libya there are many Libyans who must be outraged by Qadhafi's behavior and his obvious disregard for innocent human lives. He has squandered his country's resources in building his military might and exporting terrorism.

REPEATED WARNINGS TO LIBYA IGNORED

The President repeatedly warned Libya that continued sponsorship of international terrorism would bring a swift and appropriate response from the United States:

"...these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the Government and people of the United States. And under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself... [T]he American people are not -- I repeat, not -- going to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people."

--- President Reagan
July 8, 1985

Less than six months later, Libya backed terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports that killed 20 people and wounded 110 on December 27, 1985.

"...we call upon other nations to join us in denying [Libya] the normal economic and diplomatic privileges of the civilized world. If these steps do not end Qadhafi's terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken."

--- President Reagan
January 7, 1986

On January 15, 1986, Qadhafi declared that Libya will train, arm and protect Arab guerillas for "suicide and terrorist missions." On March 25, Qadhafi vowed his forces will not give up their "brave confrontation" against the United States.

"...the United States will not be intimidated by new threats of terrorism against us. We're aware of intensive Libyan preparations that were already underway for terrorist operations against Americans. Mr. Qadhafi must know that we will hold him fully accountable for any such actions."

--- President Reagan
March 27, 1986

On March 28, Libya urged "all Arab peoples" to attack anything American, "be it an interest, goods, a ship, a plane or a person." On April 5, a Libyan bomb ripped through a West Berlin discotheque, killing an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and injuring 230 people, among them some 50 American military personnel.

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

Qadhafi's agents are particularly active in the Arab world, where they have been involved in assassination attempts, provision of weapons to radical groups, and plots to destabilize and undermine neighboring governments.

Elsewhere in the world, Qadhafi provides money, training, and technical support to revolutionary and terrorist groups as disparate as the Sandinistas, Colombian M-19 guerrillas, Caribbean leftist movements, the Irish Republican Army, rebel movements throughout Africa, and muslim insurgents in Thailand and the Philippines.

Qadhafi: Focus of World Terrorism

- o Libya has become a textbook case of state-supported terrorism -- operating terrorist training camps for instruction in demolition, sabotage, hijacking and assassination.
- o Libya makes a mockery of international diplomatic privilege to smuggle arms and explosives and store them at its diplomatic missions, as was clearly demonstrated by the shoot-out at the Libyan embassy in London in April 1984, where a British policewoman was gunned down.
- o Libyan "diplomats" have also been directly involved in several recent terrorist operations, including a plot to kill dissident Libyan students in the U.S. last year.

Safe Haven for Abu Nidal Terrorists

- o Libya has a long history of support for radical Palestinian terrorists, including the notorious Abu Nidal group. With the active support of Qadhafi, Abu Nidal has moved its base of operations to Libya over the past year.
- o Abu Nidal has conducted at least 30 terrorist attacks since the beginning of 1984. Last year, two-thirds of these attacks took place in Western Europe.
- o Libya was involved in helping Abu Nidal carry out the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, and provided at least two of the Tunisian passports used by the terrorists. Qadhafi's spokesman referred to these attacks as "heroic actions."
- o Abu Nidal was also responsible for the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner last November which resulted in the deaths of 59 passengers, including one American. Libya is suspected of providing assistance in this attack.

PRE-EMPTING LIBYAN TERRORIST ATTACKS

Despite repeated warnings by President Reagan, Qadhafi showed no intention of stopping his attacks against Americans. Qadhafi and key lieutenants of his terrorist apparatus have on-going plans for violence against U.S. citizens and facilities in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

- o U.S. citizens are being followed and our embassies watched by Libyan agents in a number of cities around the world.
- o Reports indicate that Qadhafi intends to attack American citizens and facilities overseas.
- o In Africa, Libyans are planning attacks and conducting surveillance of U.S. facilities in no less than ten countries. Just last week, three Libyan agents entered one of these African countries intent on bombing the U.S. Chancery and kidnapping our Ambassador.

There is compelling evidence of Libyan involvement in other planned attacks against United States citizens in recent weeks, several of which were designed to cause maximum casualties similar to the Berlin bombing.

- o France expelled two members of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris for their involvement in a planned attack on visa applicants waiting in line at the U.S. Embassy on March 28.
- o Six days later, France expelled two Fatah Force 17 members recruited by Libya to conduct another operation against the United States in Paris.
- o On April 6, a Libyan-inspired plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Beirut resulted in a near miss when a 107 mm rocket fired at the Embassy exploded on launch.

There is ample evidence that Qadhafi and his key lieutenants have planned to conduct widespread attacks against Americans over the next several weeks and that they were confident they could carry out a series of hostile acts against the United States.

The President's action has put Qadhafi on notice that future terrorist actions will only come at considerable cost.

Release of additional evidence on the specific nature of Qadhafi's terrorist network and agenda would compromise U.S. intelligence sources.

stockpile project, reportedly worth \$20-million, for Thailand (See the *Weekly* April 7-13, 1986) are scheduled to take place within two months time, and according to some observers, possibly even within the next few weeks. The talks are expected to cover such aspects of the project as the types of weapons and ammunition, their location, sharing of expenditure and how the stockpile is to be used by both countries' forces. The consultations were agreed upon by US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda during Weinberger's recent visit to Bangkok. The program will require US Congressional approval, and according to the US State Department will require an amendment from Congress, because Thailand, which has no US bases, is not listed as an exception in the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Act states that "no stockpile may be located outside the boundaries of a United States military base or a military base used primarily by the United States".

DPRK'S STATE BUDGET: A report on North Korea's State budget for 1985 and 1986 was presented by Deputy Minister of Finance Yun Ki-chong at the Seventh Supreme People's Assembly in the first week of April. The report states that the DPRK last year spent 14.4 percent of the State budget on national defense. According to Yun, the State budgetary expenditure for 1985 was 27.3-billion won (approximately \$25.6-billion at the official rate of exchange). The report added that the 1986 budgetary revenue and expenditure is expected to reach about 28.5-billion won. No mention was reportedly made of whether the same percentage has been allotted to national defense.

Latin America: Japanese, Swedes Interest in Astros II

Japan's Mitsubishi and Sweden's Bofors are both reportedly negotiating with Brazil's Avibras, the maker of the *Astros II* artillery saturation rocket system. According to Brazilian press reports, Mitsubishi may have already reached a preliminary agreement with Avibras. The Japanese are expected to manufacture the Brazilian rocket system solely for the use of their own armed forces. A figure of some \$400-million has been suggested as the minimum amount that Avibras might earn from the Japanese deal.

The Aeronautical and Space Division of Japan's Nissan Motor Company does manufacture two rocket launchers, the Type 67 single rocket and the Type 75 130mm multiple rocket system. Neither is considered particularly advanced. Bofors, Sweden's well-known artillery manufacturer, does not manufacture a rocket system.

Elsewhere in Brazil, it has been reported that the US helicopter manufacturer, Sikorsky, may be close to forming a joint venture with the Brazilian firm, Embraer, to begin work on a joint helicopter. Other contenders for the venture are the US' Bell and France's Aérospatiale which owns 45 percent of Brazil's Helibras. Helibras has been in financial difficulties for some time now and a large-scale Sikorsky deal could well spell its doom.

BOLIVIA SEEKS PAMPAS: Bolivia's Chief of the Air Force, Division General Jorge Eduardo Rodriguez Bravo has announced that his country is interested in buying 12 IA-63 *Pampas*, the most recent trainer aircraft manufactured by Argentina's Fabrica Militar de Aviones at Cordoba. Bravo, who has been on a visit to Argentina, visited the facilities at Cordoba to inspect the aircraft.

The first of the *Pampas* prototypes was flown in October 1984. Flight testing is expected to be completed by the end of this year, with the first dozen production models delivered to the Argentine Air Force by late 1987 or early 1988. In order for Bolivia to buy the aircraft, however, serious financial obstacles would have to be overcome. It would represent the *Pampa's* first foreign sale.

CLARIFICATION, HONDURAN STYLE: On April 7, Honduran President Jose Azcona, speaking at the closing ceremonies for the joint *Tosta-86* maneuvers between US and Honduran forces, admitted asking the US "for military assistance to transfer Honduran troops" to the area where "troops of a neighboring country entered our territory". That same day, however, the President's Press Secretariat released a document saying that "it is completely false that President Jose Azcona asked the Reagan Administration for \$20-million during the Holy Week crisis".

Africa: Coup Plot Aborted in Lesotho

Lesotho's ruling Military Council has reportedly arrested some 26 Army officers for plotting a coup, according to South African reports. According to some reports, the persons arrested included some with links to the former Basotho National Party of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, deposed by the Royal Lesotho Defence Force on January 20. There have been several signs of continuing dissidence in Lesotho since the coup, including the deaths of two imprisoned figures, who had backed the BNP and had opposed the policies of current Military Council leader Gen. Justin Lekhanya prior to the coup.

Pacific: Australian Defense Policy/US Ties

Australia will not pursue an isolationist defense policy, according to Australian Minister of Defense Kim Beazley, who made the statement recently before Parliament. Beazley reportedly said that a recent review, which is to be released next week, does not advocate such an approach to defense. He said the Government follows a policy of defense self-reliance, which allows Australia to meet any threat to its security from its own region. However, he

Muammar Qadhafi's Libya and its Training Camps

How Libya Theoretically Works

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya (a Qadhafi-coined word meaning, roughly, "mass-based state") is, in theory, the purest form of people's democracy with no ruling party or Government institutions imposed from above. (How it *actually* runs, of course, is something else again.) Again in theory, "People's Committees" function as the means of expressing popular rule, and exist both for given regions (neighborhoods, for example) and professional bodies (a factory or work committee). These in turn elect and direct higher levels of committees, up to the national level, where the General People's Congress is the supreme body. The General People's Congress elects a General People's Committee, which functions as the Cabinet. Because conventional attributes of state sovereignty have been rejected, there is no Head of State; Libya does not maintain Embassies abroad but rather "People's Offices" (in Arab states, which are considered fellow parts of the one Arab nation, "Brotherhood Offices").

How Libya Really Works

The Revolutionary Committees. In addition to the "People's Committees", there is a network of "Revolutionary Committees" which are intended to safeguard the revolution and report counterrevolutionary activities. These are linked to a wide variety of intelligence and security services, some with overlapping functions, and most entrusted to Qadhafi intimates or relatives. East Germany has trained and equipped much of the security forces. Although Qadhafi's all-woman personal bodyguard has drawn bemused attention around the world, the security protecting him and the inner power structure is considerable.

The core leadership. The real power rests overwhelmingly in Qadhafi's own hands, but given his dislike of day-to-day detail and penchant for long meditations in the desert, he has entrusted key duties to his closest aides. These form the real inner leadership of Libya. Qadhafi himself (whose only title is the semi-official "Revolutionary Leader") was profiled in considerable detail in the *Weekly's Leadership Profile* of January 13-19, 1986.

Qadhafi's second in command, Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud (*Leadership Profile*, March 21, 1983) is the number two man in the power structure, and widely considered more pragmatic, less visionary, sometimes more conventionally pro-Soviet than Qadhafi. There is reason to believe that Qadhafi and Jallud have deliberately cultivated a sort of "good cop/bad cop" image for themselves. There have been many rumors of foiled plots against Qadhafi involving Jallud; these are believed to have originated, in some cases, with Qadhafi and Jallud themselves, as disinformation measures. Jallud has no independent power base of his own; while he might serve as a figurehead if the Army took power, he would more likely be ousted with Qadhafi.

Only three other members of the original Revolution Command Council of 1969 still hold power. One is the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Brigadier Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir (*Leadership Profile*, March 31-April 6, 1986), whose only claim to a power base is the regular Army, though it is highly questionable that he could depend on its support. Rather, the Army would likely see Yunis as a Qadhafi ally, supportive of plans to downgrade the Army or abolish it in favor of a People's Militia. The other two surviving RCC members, Khuwayldi Humaydi and Mustafa Kharrubi, respectively hold military and intelligence posts, but also seem to lack any independent power base. A number of Qadhafi's relatives and fellow tribesmen hold key posts; his cousin Ahmad Qadhaf al-Dam long held the foreign intelligence operations responsibility, but seems to have faded from the scene recently. An in-law, Hassan Ishkal, reportedly was killed in infighting late last year.

The Army. As there have been persistent reports of Army mutinies, it is unsurprising that the US attack clearly was aimed at striking Qadhafi's own power centers ('Aziziyya and Jamahiriyya barracks) and that other military targets were hit only for suppression purposes. The US openly hoped that the Army, seeing Qadhafi under attack, would move; reports that firing continued in Tripoli after the air attack ended might indicate that there was some internal development. (Or AA fire may have simply continued randomly.) Qadhafi has several times criticized the Army — in 1983 allowing the Revolutionary Committees to accuse the Army of drug and prostitution operations — and has pushed for an "armed populace" to replace the regular forces. The regular forces resist this. The loyalties of the Army in a "crunch" remain uncertain; as the Tobruk mutiny of 1980 (put down only with East German help) demonstrated, military mutinies can happen.

Resistance to Qadhafi

How secure is Qadhafi, and what are the alternatives? It is easier to ask these questions than to answer them. There have been many incidents of opposition, some quite violent, and many reported attacks on Qadhafi.

INTERNAL OPPOSITION: Other than speculation about possible Army disquiet, little can be said with confidence about the nature of internal opposition to Qadhafi, since open opposition, in the past few years at least, tends to be answered with execution. With the sharp economic decline of the past year, many previously content groups may show signs of dissidence; an overzealous seizure of private property a few years ago has alienated large segments of the middle classes, groups which themselves welcomed the destruction of the old monarchy-era landowners. Several groups may be identified as disaffected:

- **Religious Groups.** Despite Qadhafi's own vision of himself as a devout Muslim spreading the cause of Islam, his personal religious view are self-formed, and he is considered heterodox by the traditional Sunni *'ulama*, the clerical class. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood, which was blamed for a coup attempt in 1984, probably still has an effective underground cell structure which could be used as a vehicle for opposition.

- **The Sanusiyya.** The Sanusi Order, an Islamic Sufi order which is best known for having led the fight against the Italians (and which then produced Libya's only King, Idris) was supposedly wiped out after the revolution. There are indications, however, that it survives as a popular movement, especially in Cyrenaica, the eastern part of Libya which was its cradle. This brings us to:

- **Cyrenaica.** Although a handful of the leaders of the revolution came from Cyrenaica (eastern Libya around Benghazi), that region has lost much of the influence it enjoyed under the monarchy, which started in Benghazi and under which Benghazi enjoyed a status as co-capital with Tripoli. Although the oil wells are in the east and much of the arable land as well, the revolution has clearly favored Tripolitania. Cyrenaica has shown many signs of being a center of resistance: Gar Yunis University in Benghazi is the most dissidence-ridden of the country's universities, and the mutiny in Tobruk in 1980 shows that even the region's military forces are dissatisfied. Rumors of naval and other mutinies in Benghazi have persisted through the years.

- **Tribal Opposition.** Although the Revolution allegedly ended tribalism, Qadhafi has in fact greatly favored his own small, once powerless Qadhaf al-Dam tribe. This has led to resentment on the part of the larger, once-more-powerful tribal groups. These could prove potent, since the Army and all other key institutions, except for some of the security services (which are heavily Qadhaf al-Dam) naturally draw from the larger tribes.

EXTERNAL OPPOSITION: Libya's external opposition has occasionally claimed responsibility for internal attacks on Qadhafi, perhaps with some credibility. But a persistent campaign of assassination against exiled opponents — "stray dogs" in the Libyan jargon — has decimated its leadership and demoralized much of its rank and file. Furthermore, the opposition consists of a wide array of political positions, ranging from unreconstructed monarchists who were rich landholders before the revolution, to disillusioned revolutionaries who backed Qadhafi

Muammar Qadhafi's Libya and its Training Camps

until one or another stage of his curious ideological progression. One of the most dangerous opponents, 'Umar al-Muheishi, was a fellow member of the Revolutionary Command Council with Qadhafi at the time of the coup. After moving constantly throughout the Arab world leading resistance to Qadhafi, Muheishi ultimately was turned over to Libya by the Moroccans in 1983, as part of the warming of relations which preceded the Oujda accords. Muheishi has not been heard from since and is presumed to have been executed. The most visible of the exile groups is the **National Front for the Salvation of Libya**. This is led by former Ambassador Muhammad Mgarief, who broke with Qadhafi in 1980. Its supporters tend to be those who, like Mgarief, applauded the accomplishments of the revolution but opposed the policy of concentrating on export of revolution rather than domestic development. There are, however, a number of other groups.

How Will Qadhafi Go?

Very few observers would be willing to bet that Muammar Qadhafi will die a natural death at a ripe old age as leader of Libya. But scenarios for his overthrow vary considerably. Most would agree, however, that the likeliest — almost the only — way Qadhafi could lose power would be by a military coup. That might well occur if the Army remains dissatisfied. The Army's earlier humiliations in Qadhafi's foreign adventures — the border war with Egypt in 1977, the defeat by Tanzania in Uganda, the first round in Chad — occurred when Qadhafi was still riding high domestically, due to high oil prices and resultant high levels of luxury goods despite heavy expenditures on foreign adventures. Today, with Libyan belts severely tightened, foreign adventures such as the renewed occupation of northern Chad are far less popular, with the Army as surely as with the populace. There is even speculation that the Soviet Union might welcome a replacement for Qadhafi; if true, the vaunted security and intelligence services, which are East German-managed, might well prove less than reliable in a crisis.

Some believe that Qadhafi was particularly vulnerable in the fall of 1985, a period when the US was urging Egypt to try to make a military attack. Had Qadhafi lost a border clash with Egypt, the Army might have been provoked into moving. Now, with Qadhafi posing as David against a superpower Goliath, an anti-Qadhafi move is less likely: no new military committee would want to be seen as a US puppet.

Who or What Comes After?

If Qadhafi goes, the nearly certain replacement would be a military committee of some sort. It might retain some of the present leadership, perhaps Jallud, though it seems likelier to find its own leadership from lower levels. It might, conceivably, move quickly towards democracy as the Sudanese Army has done, but Middle Eastern experience suggests that that is unlikely. Internationally, it might well prove more conventionally pro-Soviet than Qadhafi, but on the usual Third World model, as a normal Soviet client rather than a loose cannon on the Mediterranean deck. If the Soviets backed the overthrow, such a more conventional model would be the likely result. An openly pro-US Government seems unlikely, though a pro-Egyptian or mainstream Arab (Algerian model, for example) might be possible.

The new Government would face enormous problems: an economy strapped by falling oil prices, bankrupted by foreign adventures and ill-planned management, and a foreign policy which has alienated the Arab world and embroiled the country in an African war. A pragmatic, non-ideological type of leadership, even if pro-Soviet, might emerge, as occurred in Algeria.

Qadhafi and Terror

The US attack was defended on the grounds that Qadhafi's Libya is behind a long list of international terrorist incidents. Whatever the wisdom or otherwise of the attack, there is little disputing the Libyan record in this regard. Of current states, only Iran can rival Libya in this regard. While it is quite true that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter", Qadhafi has shown little discrimination in his willingness to encourage links with a bewildering range of groups, some leftist, some right-wing, some purely nihilist, and from an equally broad range of countries. He has concentrated on the Middle East and Africa, but his adventures with the IRA, Spanish Basque groups, the Moros in the Philippines, and meddling from Nicaragua to New Caledonia, show that he has little regard for regional boundaries.

Although there have been periods when Libya has welcomed Yasir Arafat, it has almost always preferred to deal with the more radical Palestinian groups such as the PFLP and DFLP. Libyan connections with Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna') have been openly proclaimed by Qadhafi. The infamous Carlos (Ilyich Ramirez Sanchez) has been reported in Libya, though many believe that he is no longer active, if alive. In recent years, many national liberation groups of an Islamic bent, including the Moros, have shifted their base from Tripoli to Tehran, but the continuing links between Libya and Iran suggest that coordination continues. Qadhafi's so-called **Islamic Legion**, which has been active in Chad, is a sort of reverse-image foreign legion of African recruits aimed at carrying out Libyan aims in the Sahara and Sahel.

Training Camps: The US raid on April 14 hit one known training camp, Sidi Bilal near Tripoli. A large number of others have been reported or alleged through the years, and have been reported in the Egyptian and other anti-Libyan Arab press, in Western intelligence reports, and in past editions of the *Weekly*. Among those camps alleged in the past to exist and to be training foreigners or other groups, although these may not be fully reliable or may be very out of date:

Aouzou, in northern Chad (Chadians)
'Azziyya, south of Tripoli (foreigners, formerly POLISARIO)
Walid Camp, near Tripoli (Egyptians, Yemenis, Saudis)
Bir al-Ghanem, 50 mi. SE of Tripoli (Tunisians)
Ghadames, in W Libya (Africans)
al-Ma'had ("the Institute") (Libyans)
al-Jada'im (Egyptians, Sudanese, other Arabs)
Kufra, in the Kufra oasis (Sudanese, others)
al-Sa'iqa camp near Benghazi (Africans, Italian Red Brigades, Basques)
al-Shahid Magarief Camp (Libyans)
al-Mard Camp, E of Tobruk (Tunisians, Egyptians, Yemenis; mainly religious fundamentalists)
Misurata Camp, at Misurata (Mil. College for Palestinians, Europeans)
Ma'sar Ra's Talal or Halal (Anti-Arafat Palestinians, Sudanese, Iraqis, Lebanese)
Sebha East, at Sebha Oasis (operatives for W Europe)
Sebha West, at Sebha Oasis (operatives for the Americas, elsewhere)
Sabrata Camp, near Tripoli (Chadians, Palestinians, Tunisians, Iraqis, Japanese, Latin Americans)
April 7 Camp, S of Tripoli (southern Sudanese; Tunisians, Algerians, pro-Iranian Iraqi Shi'ites)
Jaghbug Camp, Jaghbug oasis (Egyptians, Sudanese)
al-Kashaf Camp in Tripoli (demolition training)

Green Mountain Camp, in Cyrenaica (Algerians and Tunisians)
Khums Camp (on the Tripolitanian coast) (Tunisians)
Sidi Bilal Camp SW of Tripoli (Palestinians, Tunisians, Lebanese, Yemenis) (Hit in the US attack.)
Jurman Camp (same as above)
Surt Camp at Surt
Tajura' camp E of Tripoli (frogmen)
al-Takbali Camp in Tripoli (desert warfare)
al-Tamimi Camp E of Derna (desert warfare, possibly also trains Libyans to attack exile opposition figures)
Tarhuna Camp SE of Tripoli (Arab groups)
Taybmi Camp (Tunisians)
Tobruk East (Arabs)
Tobruk West (non-Arabs)
Tukida Camp (Iranians in "special skills"; also Palestinians, Omanis, Chadians, Iranians)
Umm al-Aranib Camp S of Sebha (Iranian *Pasdarans*)
'Uqba Bin Nafi' Camp (near airbase of same name, the former Wheelus AFB) (Sudanese, Tunisians, Algerians, Moroccans, Venezuelans, Chadians, Argentines); said to specialize in urban warfare.
Mazda Camp (formerly backers of 'Abdallah Zakariyya of Sudan trained here; now back in Sudan)
Green Hope camp, near Kufra (same note as above)

continued from Page Three

added that Australia fully recognizes its regional obligations and maintains defense cooperation with most countries in the Southwest Pacific. The Melbourne Overseas Service reported that the review of Australia's defense forces is understood to recommend changes to the Army, Navy and Air Force in support of a strategy to defend the Australian continent from attack rather than the earlier forward policy of confronting potential enemies outside Australia.

In a related development, recent discussions between Beazley and US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in Canberra have reportedly focused on the ailing ANZUS defense alliance between New Zealand, Australia and the US; the problems in New Caledonia; and Soviet interest in the South Pacific. The talks on ANZUS reportedly centered on ways to expand cooperation between the US and Australia. The US and New Zealand have seemingly reached an impasse for the time being concerning New Zealand's required confirmation of nuclear capability as a prerequisite to port entry and the US' policy of neither confirming nor denying such information. These high-level talks seem to have capped the ongoing bilateral discussions between Australia and the US and do not bode well for New Zealand, which is currently reviewing the passage of anti-nuclear legislation.

The discussions are also said to have broached the subject of the US buying more Australian-produced defense equipment in the future. Nonetheless, it seems that such talks of cooperation are still a long way from being entirely satisfactory. Recent unconfirmed reports suggest that a US Navy request for its own oil storage facilities in Western Australia to service US warships has been refused by Australia. The US Navy is believed to have requested facilities to stockpile fuel oil and turbine fuel to be used by its warships operating in the Indian Ocean. Australian reports indicate that the Government has instead offered the US access to surplus Australian Navy storage capacity or the right to negotiate for facilities with a commercial dealer.

Transition: Recent Appointments and Changes

Brazil: Brazil's largest party, the PMDB, has named its executive board. President (and Liberal Party member) Jose Sarney is the Honorary President, while Chamber of Deputies President, Ulysses Guimaraes has been re-elected party President for the eighth time.

China (PRC): Wang Enmao, Qian Xuesen and Lei Jieqiong were elected Vice-Chairmen of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference (CPPCC), China's top consultative body. Wang is a former Secretary of the Communist Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and is now Director of the region's Advisory Commission. Qian is currently Vice President of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology and Deputy Director of the Science and Technology Commission for National Defense. Lei is Vice Chairman of the China Association for Promoting Democracy.

Contadora Group: The Contadora Group have given themselves a deadline of June 6 to complete negotiations on their regional peace initiative. In November they left slip a previous "final" deadline.

Ethiopia: A Constitution Drafting Committee is preparing a draft constitution for what will be called the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.

Haiti: Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy, President of Haiti's three-man ruling council, has been confined to his home by his doctors due to exhaustion.

Israel: The Cabinet crisis was resolved when it was agreed that Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai and Justice Minister Moshe Nissim would switch posts.

Jordan: 'Ali Kharis was named Ambassador Plenipotentiary to Syria, the first in two years.

Lesotho: The Government has detained 26 Army officers for an alleged coup plot. (See Page Three).

Morocco: Mohamed Barrada was named Minister of Finance.

Philippines: Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Fidel Ramos retired 18 generals and two flag officers in the AFP. Nineteen other officers were retired and eight generals and three colonels were given a six-month extension of their tours of duty. Among the generals who were retired are AFP Comptroller Brig. Gen. Jacinto Galang Jr., who was replaced by Col. Jesus Saclan; and Chief of the Philippines Air Force Security Command Brig. Augustus Paiso who has been replaced by Col. Miguel Hinlo. Commander of the Constabulary Support Command Brig. Gen. Paul Canalida was replaced by Col. Ramon Salaya. Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) guerillas are reportedly holding preliminary ceasefire talks with local military commanders in the southern Philippines.

South Africa: All racial restrictions in hotels, restaurants, and public accommodations have been abolished. The move was made with little public fanfare, as part of an amendment to the Liquor Act of 1977. ■

The Rumor Mill

There are rumors in the Philippines that Ferdinand R. "Bongbong" Marcos, Jr., son of former President Ferdinand Marcos and former Ilocos Norte Governor, may have returned and is preparing to launch an "offensive" from Ilocos Norte . . . Rumors in Colombia say that Venezuelan troops crossed over the border with tanks "intimidating the peasants" in the towns of El Rancho and Mas Ayuda . . . According to allegations stemming from Panama's Christian

Syria reportedly dispatched pilots to Libya to assist the Libyan air force.

Government radio described US action against Libya as part of a "hostile policy which is aimed at controlling the region, subjugating the Arab nation, and enabling Israel to continue its aggression against the Arabs in all their countries. These raid are a new attempt to terrorize and intimidate the Third World states." (April 15)

In Teheran, representatives of the Libyan, Syrian and Iranian foreign ministers issued a joint communique calling on all Arab and Islamic countries to sever diplomatic, economic and military relations with the United States. (Radio Damascus, April 16)

TUNISIA

No Arab state found itself in a more delicate position after the raid than Tunisia. Because of long-time enmity between Tunisia and Qadhdhafi, Tunis was generally supportive of the raid. Yet, the government was quick to point out its non-involvement in the action and to move forcefully to curb public disturbances that were more violent than in any other Arab country.

Government Statements

No official statements praising or condemning the US raid against Libya were issued.

However, the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) reported that "public circles" in Tunisia "strongly condemned the American aggression." (KUNA, April 16)

Tunis was quick to deny reports that Tunisia was party to the US action. A foreign ministry spokesman "categorically denied" reports that America carried out its attack "over Tunisian land and airspace." (April 17)

Opposition Protest and Government Response

Opposition parties were highly critical of the US action and took the opportunity to protest against the pro-American regime of President Bourguiba. The Kuwaiti newspaper *al-Watan* noted that opposition parties "called on the government to sever diplomatic relations with the United States and to resume such relations with Libya." (April 22)

Mass demonstrations were held in Tunis after the raid, but government troops moved forcefully to quell them. Sixteen opposition leaders, representing six political parties, were arrested in the protests. Leading opposition leader Ahmad al-Mestiri, head of the Socialist Democratic Party, was arrested "under charges of instigating anti-American demonstrations." (KUNA, April 17) One student was killed during the demonstrations. (KUNA, April 21) A gasoline bomb was thrown at a US diplomat's car near the residence of US Marines in Tunis. No injuries were reported. (*Washington Post*, April 18)

In the aftermath of public disturbances, Premier Muhammad Mzali was stripped of his portfolio as Interior Minister in a ministerial reshuffle. This action was intended to signal a tougher government attitude toward the opposition. Mzali had advocated dialogue with the opposition and had opposed the detention of Mestiri. (KUNA, April 28) In addition, the government announced the reorganization of the university system in response to unrest on several campuses. (KUNA, April 28)

SOUTH YEMEN (PDRY)

South Yemen, like Syria, labeled the US air strikes "part of the state terrorism practiced by the United States against Libya and our Arab peoples." Moreover, Aden offered to "place all its resources at the disposal" of the Libyan regime and called for an emergency meeting of Arab foreign and defense ministers to "adopt deterrent measures to confront the [US] aggression." (Aden Radio, April 15)

SUDAN

Like Syria, Sudan offered firm commitments of support to the Libyan regime in the wake of the US air strikes. The Provisional Military Government strongly condemned the US action and offered "every available assistance" to Libya; Sudanese defense minister, Gen. 'Uthman 'Abdallah visited Tripoli to underscore Sudan's support of Qadhafi. (Radio Omdurman, April 15)

According to Information Minister Muhammad Bashir, "Sudan will exert every possible effort to give any kind of support [to Libya] and will put its facilities under the request of the Libyans to face the American aggression." (*Washington Post*, April 16)

Sudan temporarily recalled its ambassador from Washington for consultations. (Sudan News Agency, April 16). The ambassador has already returned to his post.

Sudan was the scene of mass opposition to the Libya raid. Political sentiments were already running at a fever pitch, since the raid occurred in the middle of Sudan's multi-day balloting for parliamentary elections.

US Embassy Communications Officer William J. Caulkins was shot in Khartoum by unknown assailants and flown to Saudi Arabia for medical attention. In response, the State Department ordered the evacuation of about 500 "nonessential" embassy personnel and dependents.

Thousands of demonstrators, many from the University of Khartoum, rallied in front of the US Embassy; government soldiers controlled the crowd and kept it away from the embassy compound. (*Washington Post*, April 16)

However, Sadeq al-Mahdi, whose 'Umma Party won the largest bloc of seats in parliamentary elections, expressed a willingness to improve ties with Washington. In his first statement since the elections, Mahdi said he supported "strengthening relations with Libya and the Western countries, particularly the US." He did not condemn the US raids against Libya. (SUNA, April 22)

Sudan's other major political parties condemned the US air strikes. Two small, leftist parties opened an office in Khartoum to recruit volunteers to join Libyan forces fighting against the United States. (*Washington Post*, April 16)

SYRIA

Syria remained Libya's strongest Arab supporter throughout the confrontation with the United States. Damascus its willingness to place "all its potentials at the disposal of Arab Libya" and called on Arab states to "take all necessary measures to abort ... and foil" US policy. (Radio Damascus, April 15)

OMAN

Oman has not issued a statement of praise or condemnation of the raid on Libya. However, Minister for Foreign Affairs Yusuf al-'Alawi 'Abdallah indicated Oman's reluctance to attend an Arab League summit meeting by noting that "it is necessary to prepare well for it to achieve the desired results." (Oman News Agency, April 20)

More significantly, 'Abdullah asserted that a cycle of recrimination against the West's stand of confronting terrorism would not help in the fight against terror: "If the idea to hold an Arab summit is to adopt measures against the Western countries as a reaction to their measures against Libya, this means that the Arab summit would be a means of expanding the circle of confrontation." (Gulf News Agency, quoting 'Uman, April 26)

QATAR

Qatar's Council of Ministers issued a statement denouncing "the use of force to resolve international disputes" and extending solidarity toward the Libyan people. Qatar called on the "whole international community ... to act expeditiously to spare the Mediterranean region any new military actions that might have dire consequences..." (Doha Radio, April 16)

Less than two weeks later, a Qatari expeditionary force occupied the Bahraini island of Fasht al-Dibal in an effort to settle by force a lingering territorial dispute between the two GCC states.

SAUDI ARABIA

An official Saudi spokesman declared his government's "great regret and condemnation" of the US air strikes against Libya. The Saudi government statement repudiated the use of force "because violence does not serve the desired goal of the establishment of peace but escalates the climate of tension in the Mediterranean and in the entire Arab region." Also, the spokesman "reaffirmed" the Saudi kingdom's support for "the Libyan people and indeed for any fraternal Arab people subjected to such an attack." (Riyadh Radio, April 15)

Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the United Nations condemned US "aggression" against Libya as a "license for Israeli terrorism to attack any time and everywhere." He called Israel "the largest terrorist institution in history." (Radio Riyadh, April 17)

Neither King Fahd nor Crown Prince 'Abdallah has issued a public statement concerning the raid on Libya.

In an interview with West German television, Interior Minister Prince Nayif asserted "the Kingdom's willingness to cooperate on an international level with the Western group, or others, to fight terrorism." (Saudi Press Agency, May 2)

Saudi Arabia cancelled a high-level trade mission to the United States, scheduled for September 1986, citing the lack of sufficient time for planning.

According to KUNA, an "official source" affirmed Kuwait's readiness to take part in an Arab meeting at the highest levels.

LEBANON

President Amin Gemayel has been silent on the US action. Premier Rashid Karami, a Sunni, condemned the air strikes as an "act of aggression [that] expresses the mentality of a haughty and arrogant person who believes that he is free to take whatever measures he likes." (Radio Beirut, April 15)

"We demand that all Arab states adopt an appropriate stand and respond to these thoughtless actions in a practical manner," Karami said. (Radio Beirut, April 15)

A previously unknown terrorist group, Arab Commando Cells, claimed responsibility for murdering American hostage Peter Kilburn in retaliation for the US strikes against Libya. (*New York Times*, April 19)

MOROCCO

King Hassan has not made a personal statement regarding the US action. However, many statements have been attributed to him, both condemning the raid and expressing dissatisfaction with the use of force to remedy the terrorist problem.

According to an editorial in the Casablanca newspaper, *Le Matin Du Sahara*, Hassan sent Colonel Qadhdhafi "a message in which he expressed his complete consternation and reprobation, and the Moroccan people's complete solidarity with the Libyan people in the face of this aggression."

However, quotations attributed to Hassan emphasize his anxiety at the use of force rather than his support of the Libyan regime. For example:

* "We pray to God to put an end to the climate of folly thus established and to ensure that the spirit of peace and clearheadedness prevails."

* "The use of indiscriminate means of destruction on any scale ... has never been the appropriate solution to...problems [and] merely produces more equally indiscriminate violence."

NORTH YEMEN (YAR)

Radio Sana'a reported that President Abdallah Salih and PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat "affirmed that this conspicuous attack against a sister Arab country is considered an attack against the entire Arab nation and that the time has come to hold an urgent Arab summit to discuss all of the attacks against the Arab nation from whatever source." (April 15)

The YAR cabinet reaffirmed the President's position that the proposed Arab summit should "bring about a unified Arab stand in line with the Arab League Charter and the joint Arab Defense Pact." (Radio Sana'a, April 16)

Terrorists shot and wounded US Embassy Communications Officer Arthur L. Pollick in Sana'a. (*New York Times*, April 25)

He further emphasized "the need to heed international law and world organizations, particularly the United Nations, to settle disputes among countries." (April 17)

Although 'Aziz rejected "this kind of behavior...when it is practiced by... big powers," he also rejected similar behavior "practiced by other countries, even if they are members of the movement." (Radio Baghdad, April 17)

Furthermore, 'Aziz drew a clear distinction between denunciation of the US air strikes and support for the Qadhdhafi regime. In an interview with *al-Watan al-Arabi*, he said, "This obvious condemnation does not at all mean support for the Libyan regime's stands and policy because many of the Arabs and others who condemned the US aggression have basic and strong reservations about the Libyan regime's odd stands and deviant policies." (cited by Iraqi News Agency, May 3)

Iraq's opposition to the convening of an extraordinary Arab summit dealing only with the Libyan situation was explained by the government newspaper *al-Thawrah*: "any Arab meeting...must first discuss the Iranian aggression against Iraq before discussing the US aggression against Libya." (April 18)

JORDAN

Though opposed to the US use of force, Jordan shared Washington's concern about the danger of unchecked Libyan terrorism, a sentiment nourished by the memory of the burning of the Jordanian embassy in Tripoli.

Muhammad Kamal, Amman's ambassador to Washington, said that "as an Arab country and a member of the Arab League, we have in principle to condemn any attack on any Arab country coming from any source." However, Kamal was also critical of the Arab world for its inability to curb terrorism: "The United States would not have attacked today" if the Arab states had been able to "work together to resolve this." (*Washington Post*, April 16)

Displeasure at the use of force did not dissuade Jordan from warmly receiving a British trade delegation and the British armed forces chief of staff just days after the raid. (Petra, Jordanian News Agency, April 21; April 24)

About 30 demonstrators gathered in protest in front of the American embassy in Amman; they were dispersed by police. (Radio Monte Carlo, April 16)

KUWAIT

Kuwait declared its support for the Libyan people, denounced the US air strikes and joined in the call for an emergency Arab summit.

The Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) quoted a "responsible source" saying that "Kuwait voices its condemnation and denunciation of these [US] raids: we, on the basis of our pan-Arab responsibilities, feel it is important to stand by and have solidarity with the Arab nation while some of our Arab countries and peoples are subjected to this direct aggression..." (April 15)

Radio Kuwait reported that the National Assembly "denounces this flagrant aggression and appeals to Arab countries and their parliaments to work to end their secondary differences of opinion to defend their dignity and sovereignty." (April 15)

Later in April, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butros Butros-Ghali reaffirmed Egypt's ties with Washington and said that all Arab governments were "agreed in condemning the policy of destabilisation led by Libya in the Arab world, in Africa and in the world in general." (Agence France Presse, April 29)

A week after the raid, Egypt approved an American request for the transit of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier through the Suez Canal to the Eastern Mediterranean.

Opposition Response

Opposition parties were more outspoken in their criticism of the US raid. The National Progressive Unionist Grouping, for example, "roundly condemned" the attack and labeled it "the culmination of a series of US acts of aggression which seeks to step up world tension." (MENA, April 15)

Some of the opposition, however, stated their sympathy with the need to solve the terrorist problem. Wahid Ra'fat, deputy leader of the Neo-Wafd Party, stated that "the entire international community must find a remedy to the issue of international terrorism." (MENA, April 15)

Press: Criticism and Support

At first, the Egyptian press was critical of the US raid. *Al-Ahram's* International Edition accused the US of pursuing "a cowboy policy" and showing "its disregard for world order." The paper said that the US "has appointed itself policeman, prosecutor, judge, and executioner." (April 16)

Soon, though, the press began to address the rationale for the US action, acknowledging that "Libya...is alone responsible for creating the motives...that prompted US policy." (*Al-Ahram*, April 17)

The strongest criticism of Qadhafi came from *Akhbar al-Yom's* Editor-in-Chief, Ibrahim Sa'ada. Qadhafi, he wrote, "turned his back to his people and his nation and became an insignificant tool in the hands of the Soviets...In this way, Qadhafi became the first world terrorist." Sa'ada criticized the hypocrisy of Arab countries that "try in vain to neutralize [Qadhafi] and appease him openly while trying secretly to overthrow him." He also condemned European opposition to the air raid, claiming that they "would have been the first to recognize [a] new regime in Tripoli." His conclusion: "This is politics to say openly what you do not believe in secretly, to support what you hate and to antagonize what you like!" (April 19)

Anti-American protests were limited to flag-burning ceremonies conducted by about 100 Egyptian lawyers near the US Embassy in Cairo.

Popular protests in recent days by Islamic fundamentalists have been targeted against the Mubarak regime and have no specific origin in the US action against Libya.

IRAQ

Iraq's opposition to the US air strikes was tempered by Libya's role as one of the premier Arab supporters of its enemy, Iran. Baghdad criticized the US raid, but refused to accede to requests for an Arab summit whose agenda was limited to discussions of Libya raid.

According to Radio Baghdad, Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz stated that "Iraq strongly condemns this [US] aggression and expresses solidarity with the Arab people in Libya."

ARAB REACTION TO THE US AIR STRIKES AGAINST LIBYA

ARAB LEAGUE

Arab League Foreign Ministers meeting in Fez, Morocco on April 30-May 1 were unable to agree on a date, place or agenda for a Libyan-proposed Arab summit to discuss the US air strikes.

Libyan and Syrian requests to limit the summit's agenda to discussion of the US action were rejected by Iraq and the Gulf states, which wanted the Arab leaders to address the Gulf War as well. Also, PLO chairman Yasir Arafat wanted the summit to discuss the issue of "secret diplomacy" between Israel and Jordan.

Libya's request to change the venue of the proposed summit from Morocco to the Libyan desert town of Sebha provoked further inter-Arab divisions. (*Washington Post*, May 3)

Earlier, at an emergency ministerial meeting, the Arab League condemned the US raid against Libya and issued a call for the foreign ministers conference to prepare for an Arab summit meeting. At that time, the Arab League rejected Libya's request for punitive sanctions against.

Chedli Klibi, Arab League Secretary-General, said the US raid "compromises, perhaps irreversibly, United States relations with Arab peoples." (*Washington Post*, April 21)

OPEC

Representatives of eight of OPEC's 13 member-states voted to approve a resolution condemning American air strikes against Libya. The statement "expressed deep concern for acts against international law" and "extended condolences to the Libyan people for the human losses incurred." Five members -- Venezuela, Ecuador, Nigeria, Gabon and Indonesia -- said that they had to consult with their governments.

None of the OPEC members supported Libya's request for an oil embargo against America. (*New York Times*, April 16)

ALGERIA

Algeria's Foreign Ministry issued a statement expressing "deepest concern" at the "most serious threat [that] hangs over the fraternal Libyan people." (Radio Algiers, April 15)

Radio Algiers reported a telephone conversation between President Bendjedid and Col. Qadhdhafi in which the two leaders discussed the "unjust US aggression." A station commentator called the US raid "a return...to the law of the jungle." (April 15)

Two days later, Algeria called for an extraordinary Arab summit. President Bendjedid reportedly telephoned Col. Qadhdhafi several times to discuss the situation. (Radio Algiers, April 17)

Yet, in spite of Algeria's posture against the raid, a visit to Washington by the Director-General of the Algerian foreign ministry proceeded as scheduled.

BAHRAIN

Bahrain "condemned" the US attack, saying that it "jeopardizes the supreme interests of the Arab nation." The government repudiated the US use of force and urged that "the settlement of international disputes should be made through concerned international organizations and according to known norms." (Manama, Gulf News Agency, April 15)

A Bahraini newspaper, *Al-Khaliq*, proposed an Arab boycott of "commodities, equipment, and even films made in the United States." (Manama, Gulf News Agency, April 16)

The Bahraini press was hotly critical of the disunity in the Arab world, with one newspaper (*Akhbar al-Khaliq*) calling the failure to convene an Arab summit "the acme of Arab impotence" and a sign that "the Arabs will not make a move no matter how great the aggression directed at any Arab country." (Manama, Gulf News Agency, May 4)

EGYPT

Immediately after the raid, Egypt expressed "great disturbance and dissatisfaction." (Middle East News Agency [MENA], April 15). But that criticism was soon tempered by a strong condemnation of Qadhdhafi, reaffirmation of US-Egyptian ties and permission for the transit of a nuclear-powered American aircraft carrier through the Suez Canal for duty in the Eastern Mediterranean.

While leftist and Muslim fundamentalist opposition parties were highly critical of the US action, only one, small anti-American demonstration took place in Cairo.

Government Response

Minister of Information Safwat al-Sharif issued the following statement:

"It was with great disturbance and dissatisfaction that Egypt heard the news [of the US attack]...

"This action contradicts the commitment of states to refrain from resorting to the use of force in resolving their disputes...

"The use of force in any form cannot lead to the solution of international problems and the easing of world tension..."

Sharif reaffirmed President Mubarak's call for an international conference to combat terrorism "so that all countries may meet their responsibilities to combat terrorism...and may refrain from the use of terrorism or the participation in any sort of terrorist activity." (MENA, April 15)

Condemnations of Qadhdhafi

Like many Arab governments, Egypt was quick to distinguish its solidarity with the Libyan people from its criticism of the Libyan regime. Foreign Minister 'Isamat abd-al-Majid said that while "we in Egypt harbor only love and friendship for the Libyan Arab people...it is no secret that we have criticized the Libyan leadership." He accused Libya of carrying out "attempts to jeopardize the security of Egypt." (Abu Dhabi, *al-Ittihad*, April 15)

On April 19, Qadhdhafi's personal envoy arrived in Egypt aboard a private Libyan airplane with a request for Egyptian military and diplomatic support in Tripoli's confrontation with America. All requests were denied and the envoy, Lt. Col. 'Abd-al-Fattah Yunis, was returned to Tripoli April 23. (MENA, April 25)

U.S. TARGETS -- ROOTS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM

The U.S. pre-emptive action was directed at these military and terrorist staging areas in Libya:

Azizia barracks compound:

This facility contains command and communications centers for use in conducting terrorist attacks and other subversive activities. The attack was undertaken in an effort to disrupt Qadhafi's limited ability to stage additional terrorist attacks and to vividly demonstrate Qadhafi's limited capacity for response to his adversaries, who oppose his terrorist and subversive activities.

Tripoli military aircraft parking area (Tripoli airport):

Targets in this area included IL-76s, which Qadhafi uses as a primary means of air transport to support his subversive and terrorist activities. We have evidence that these aircraft have been used to resupply Libyan forces and Libyan-backed dissidents in Chad and have even been used to transport military equipment elsewhere around the world. Three of these IL-76 aircraft were involved in an abortive 1983 effort to transport L-39 jet trainers to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Banghazi army barracks east:

We had information that this facility provided an alternative command post for Qadhafi's activities.

Sidi Bilal port facility:

This base is used as a training center for Libyan naval commandos. The head of this unit supervised the mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984 -- an action which damaged at least 19 merchant ships. Libyan frogmen have also undertaken training at this base to conduct unconventional strikes against U.S. and allied shipping and shore facilities in the Mediterranean. Radical Palestinians and other dissident groups, naval commandos, and frogmen are regularly trained at this location.

Benina airfield:

Libya's primary base for MIG-23 fighter interceptors. Striking Benina airfield was essential to ensure the security of our attacking forces. Benina is also the home of units which support Libyan-directed forces in Chad. Soviet-supplied "Flogger" aircraft parking areas were targetted.



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BACKGROUNDER

ARAB REACTION TO THE US AIR STRIKES AGAINST LIBYA

Robert Satloff
Jonathan Barkey

May 9, 1986

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SUMMARY

Arab Reaction to the US Air Strikes Against Libya

Contrary to the opinion of some analysts, Arab world reaction to the US bombing raid on Tripoli and Benghazi has been surprisingly mild. Although all Arab countries have criticized the US air strikes, virtually no substantive actions have been taken to underscore their vocal condemnations. Moreover, there has been no outpouring of mass protest against America. Violent retaliation against Americans and US interests has been minimal.

International Organizations:

* Meeting in Morocco April 30-May 1, Arab League foreign ministers were unable to agree on a date, site or agenda for a Libyan-proposed summit meeting. Earlier, an emergency ministerial meeting of the Arab League had condemned US military action against Libya but had rejected Libya's request for punitive sanctions against America.

* OPEC oil ministers overwhelmingly rejected Libya's demand for an oil embargo against America.

State Reactions:

Bilateral relations between Arab states and America remain unaffected.

* **Diplomatically**, no Arab state has broken relations with the United States or cancelled a diplomatic mission. Sudan's ambassador, recalled to Khartoum for consultations, has now returned to Washington.

* **Militarily**, no Arab state has severed prepositioning or access agreements and no Arab state has announced the cancellation of future joint military maneuvers.

* **Economically**, there has been no interruption in the normal course of business, trade or finance with any Arab country. Saudi Arabia did cancel a September 1986 trade mission but gave insufficient time for planning as the explanation.

* **Culturally**, there has been no change in exchange programs between America and any Arab country.

Arab states differed on the level of condemnation and the form of support they offered Libya.

* Many states, including Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and Morocco, denounced the raid for reasons of "pan-Arab responsibility" and opposition to the use of force as a means to settle disputes.

* But they drew distinctions between the solidarity they expressed for "the Libyan people" and support for Qadhafi himself. Indeed, editorials in the Egyptian and Iraqi state-controlled press were openly critical of Qadhafi's rule.

* Only three countries, pro-Soviet Syria and South Yemen and the provisional government in Sudan, reinforced their rhetoric with offers of material support to Libya.

Popular Opposition:

Mass rioting and violence against Americans and US interests has been limited and sporadic.

* Tunis (Tunisia) and Khartoum (Sudan) were the sites of the only large-scale protests against America; government police controlled the crowds and prevented attacks on US embassies.

* Demonstrations in Cairo (Egypt) and Amman (Jordan) were small, peaceful and, on the whole, inconsequential.

* In Khartoum and Sana'a (North Yemen), US embassy communications officers were the targets of assassination attempts.

* Terrorists in Lebanon claimed responsibility for the murder of one American and two Britons in retaliation for the US raid.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Official radio reported that ruler Shaykh Zayid affirmed the UAE's stand in support of "the Arab Libyan people, who are facing the US attacks." The Shaykh reportedly conveyed this message to Col. Qadhdhafi during a telephone conversation. (Abu Dhabi, WAM, April 15)

The UAE's envoy to the UN Security Council voted with the majority in favor of a resolution condemning the US raid, a measure vetoed by America, France and Britain.

The UAE canceled a joint UAE-British Committee meeting in London as well as a UAE trade exhibition there. Also, the government canceled a meeting between the Abu Dhabi Aviation Company and a visiting US mission. (Manama, Gulf News Agency, April 15)

with package

Libyan Jews to hold first world meeting

The first international convention of Jews from Libya will be held in Manhattan June 6-7.

Raffaello Fellah, founder and president of the Association of Jews from Libya, said in a press conference at the New York offices of the American Jewish Committee that the convention is timed to coincide with the 20th anniversary of the forced departure of the Libyan Jewish community in 1967. Almost all 4,500 Libyan Jews were forced to leave in the wake of the Six-Day War, including Fellah, a businessman who now resides in Italy.

During the conference, to be held at the Shearith Israel (Spanish-Portuguese) Synagogue on Central Park West, legal experts will seek ways to pursue Libyan Jewish personal and communal property claims against Libya.

Fellah explained that in 1970, Col. Muammar Khaddafy's revolutionary regime nationalized the property of Jews who had left Libya indefinitely, promising indem-

nification in 15 years. In 1985, when payment became due, the Libyan leader failed to fulfill his promise, Fellah charged.

Since establishment of Israel in 1948, about 40,000 Jews have left Libya, Fellah said, with most going to Israel. Many of them left in waves as a result of the pogroms that accompanied each new Middle East war, he said, adding that Libyan Jews' claims against the Libyan government total "some billions of dollars."

Other events at the upcoming conference include the premiere of a documentary film on the Jews of Libya, an exhibition of photographs of Libyan Jewry and religious objects from the Beth El Synagogue in Tripoli and a symposium on the history of Libyan Jewry.

According to Fellah, whose father was murdered in a 1945 pogrom in Tripoli, only "five-and-a-half Jews" are currently living in Libya. The half, he explained, is a result of a mixed marriage be-

tween an Arab and a Jew.

The convention, which is expected to attract hundreds of Libyan Jews from Israel, Italy and the United States, is jointly sponsored by the Association of Jews from Libya, the American Jewish Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Jewish Telegraphic Agency
JEWISH WEEK, MAY 1, 1987

The tools of Khadafy's terror

According to the U.S. State Department, Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy has offered support to the following terrorist groups around the world:

The Libyans

The main targets of Libyan terrorism have been anti-Khadafy Libyans. They are tracked down by pro-Khadafy agents around the world, even within the United States and particularly in Europe. These acts are believed to be carried out by Libyan diplomats from Libyan People's Bureaus — what the Libyans call their embassies — around the world.

For example, a Libyan-hired assassin shot and wounded a Libyan exile in Colorado in 1981. An anti-Khadafy student was killed in Utah the same year. The FBI arrested two Libyans in Philadelphia in 1984 for attempting to buy silenced handguns. In May, 1985, a Libyan diplomat to the United Nations was declared persona non grata and expelled. A group of Libyans was broken up after being connected with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four states.

Abu Nidal

This group is considered among the most dangerous in the Middle East. It is responsible for 60 attacks in the last eight years, including the simultaneous assaults on airports in Rome and Vienna last December that killed 18 people, and the Egyptair hijacking in November that left 59 people dead.

The group, officially called "Fatah — the Revolutionary Council," has used many cover names. It is headed by Sabri al-Banna — whose nom de guerre is Abu Nidal, the tag which has stuck with the group.

Abu Nidal is said to have met with Khadafy twice in 1985. Libya is said to have provided sanctuary, training assistance and financial support to his organization, and there are reports the group is now headquartered in Libya.

In Ireland and Europe

Through Abu Nidal and by itself, Libya has helped the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland. Through Abu Nidal, Libya also is said to have assisted European terrorist groups, such as FP-25 in Portugal and anti-Turkish Armenian groups. Khadafy also has offered training and safe havens to German and Bulgarian terrorists.

Carlos

This notorious international terrorist, who has not been heard from recently, was given refuge by Khadafy. Carlos organized numerous vicious attacks, including hostage-taking among the oil

ministers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna in 1975.

The Sandinistas

Khadafy is said to view Sandinista-controlled Nicaragua as his base in Central America. Libya has provided the Sandinistas with several hundred million dollars in economic assistance, as well as antiaircraft guns, SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles and launchers and small arms. Khadafy's support is said to help the Sandinistas destabilize neighboring governments.

In Central, Latin America

Libya has provided arms and money to insurgents in Guatemala and El Salvador, as well as to the M-19 terrorist group in Colombia. It is also said to be training members of a far-left terrorist group for action against the right-wing government in Chile.

In the Caribbean

Libya had a center for regional subversion in its People's Bureau in Grenada until 1983, when the United States invaded and toppled the Communist government. Since then, Khadafy has offered support to leftist leaders from the Dominican Republic, Dominica, Barbados, Antigua and Barbuda, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia and the French territories. Leaders have been invited to Libya for "seminars" and paramilitary training.

On the Indian subcontinent

Dissidents in Islamic states have received assistance from Libya. These groups include the "al-Zulfiqar" terrorist group in Pakistan, opponents of President Ershad in Bangladesh, and the Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front, a group responsible for pro-independence violence on the island of New Caledonia, a French possession in the South Pacific.

In the Philippines

The Muslim Moro separatists on Mindanao have been receiving Libyan assistance despite a 1976 agreement with the Manila government to stop such aid.

The Japanese Red Army

This anti-Western group took over U.S. and Swedish consulates in Kuala Lumpur in 1975. Some experts believe Khadafy has provided a safe

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

TOOLS...CONTINUED

haven, as well as training, for them in Libya.

In Chad, the Sub-Sahara

Various tribal and guerrilla groups in Chad received assistance as Khadafy attempted to build his stature in the Third World in the 1970s. When Khadafy was not able, through these groups, to establish a government in Chad to his liking, Libya invaded that country in 1980, attempting to absorb it. Khadafy withdrew in 1981 but attacked again in 1983. With help from the French, Chad confined Libyan troops to the northern 40 percent of the country, where that army remains.

Arms and training also go to nomadic tribesmen in an effort to undermine the governments of Mali and Niger. Several different guerrilla groups operate in Zaire, including the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo and the Congolese National Movement.

In the Middle East

Groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and Fatah dissidents oppose Yasir Arafat's main Palestine Liberation Organization and believe Arafat has shown too much willingness to negotiate a Middle East peace agreement with Israel. They have focused their terrorist activities on Israel and Israeli-occupied territories. Libya has sent them uniforms, tanks and rocket launchers.

In Egypt

Khadafy is a committed foe of Egypt because of its 1979 peace accord with Israel. Khadafy has supported Egyptian dissident groups in an effort to destabilize the government there through sabotage and by inciting civil unrest. He also called for Egyptians to overthrow their government after President Sadat was assassinated in October, 1981.

In the Sudan

Dissidents have been trained and given support in their fight against the central government, and Libya is said to have sponsored terrorist acts against the government of former President Nimeiri. Libya also is said to be a major source of arms and money for southern Sudanese rebels, who began a guerrilla war against the civilian government two years ago. Libya sponsored an unsuccessful coup in February, 1983. Since Nimeiri's fall from power, a number of known Libyan terrorists have been assigned to the People's Bureau in Khartoum.

In Algeria, Tunisia

Financial support has gone to dissidents in Algeria who oppose moderate President Bendjedid, and Libyan-backed guerrillas have been trying to bring down the pro-Western Tunisian government of Habib Bourguiba for several years. Saboteurs who originated in Libya dynamited a Tunisian pipeline in January, 1984.

In Iraq

Arms and money have flowed from Libya to Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq and to another antigovernment group, the "Union of Iraqi Democrats."

The Iranians

The Iranian government has received Libyan aid in its war with Iraq, including tanks, antitank and antiaircraft artillery, ammunition and Scud rockets.

In North Yemen

A group that operates out of Marxist South Yemen, trying to destabilize the government of North Yemen, has received Libyan aid.

Compiled by DAN STETS,
Journal-Bulletin Washington Bureau

NEWSWEEK 28 April 1986 (22) Pg. 26

Reagan's Raiders

A clockwork rendezvous and some nasty surprises

The attack took precisely 11 minutes. Just before 2 in the morning, 18 F-111 fighter-bombers streaked across the Libyan coast at 540 miles per hour, hugging the terrain at an altitude of only 200 feet. Two groups of six F-111s turned sharply left, toward the Sidi Bilal naval base and the Bab al Aziziya barracks, where Muammar Kaddafi makes his home. The third group looped to the south and then swung around to attack Tripoli's military airfield. Closing in, the American planes climbed to 500 feet so that their electronic aiming devices could locate the targets. Lasers found the range, and in the second seat of each plane, a weapons officer held the target in the cross hairs of an infrared scope. At the last moment, each pilot eased back on the stick, raising the nose of his plane and lobbing its bombs on a laser-lit path toward the target.

Street lights were still on in Tripoli when the attack began, and a few cars raced for home as the first bombs fell. After a few minutes, the Libyans began to fire their antiaircraft guns and missiles, stitching the dark sky with tracer bullets and rocket plumes. Off to the east, carrier-based U.S. Navy planes pounded the port of Benghazi. Thirteen minutes after the raid on the two cities began, the Navy confirmed that all of its attack planes were "feet wet"—safely out over the sea. But one of the Air Force planes wasn't so lucky; apparently hit by anti-aircraft fire, the F-111 plunged to the Mediterranean in a ball of flames.

There were other tragedies ashore. The attackers missed Kaddafi but reportedly killed his 15-month-old daughter and wounded two of his six sons. Errant bombs slammed into residential buildings around the French Embassy. In all, the Libyans said that 37 people died in the raids and 93 were injured. Given that toll, no one was crowing about precision bombing or fool-proof equipment. In fact, because of various glitches, 7 of the 32 attack planes had been forced to abort their bombing runs. But there was no denying the courage and professionalism that went into pulling off a mission of such complexity. Starting from airfields in Britain and carriers in the Mediterranean, a huge strike force had assembled with near-perfect timing, tracking toward the targets on finely calibrated

courses. The air crews did the rest. "No matter how much equipment you've got," said Adm. William Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "it still takes a lot of guts to keep that aircraft steady and line up the cross hairs when all kinds of stuff is coming up around you."

Night vision: Ronald Reagan decided on the evening of April 8 that he wanted to strike at Libya, and the military planners were given stiff conditions: to punish Kaddafi for sponsoring terrorism, but to run the least possible risk of killing American pilots or Libyan bystanders. Those criteria suggested a low-level, night attack against targets located near the sea and away from residential areas. Night bombing meant that the targets had to present clear, distinct shapes, the type that show up best on radar screens and infrared scopes. Although carrier-based A-6 planes could do the job, there weren't enough of them on hand to hit several targets simultaneously. Land-based F-111s were ideal, but permission would be needed from their British landlord, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Thatcher demanded, and got, the right to approve Washington's target list. She also insisted that, in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the raid had to be "defensive" rather than retaliatory. This piece of hairsplitting was necessitated by her own pronouncement earlier this year that bombing in retaliation for


terrorism is illegal. Eventually, three targets were chosen for the F-111s in the Tripoli area: the Aziziya barracks, which Kaddafi uses as his headquarters; the Sidi Bilal port facility, where Palestinian frogmen have been trained, and the military airfield, the base for Soviet-made Il-76 transport planes used by some of Kaddafi's mischief-makers. In Benghazi, two targets were selected: a barracks and an airfield where MiG-23s, Libya's most potent interceptors, are stationed. Some tempting targets were ruled out because of their proximity to innocent civilians. One was the Tripoli office of Abu Nidal, the Palestinian terrorist blamed for the airport massacres in Rome and Vienna last Christmas. Another was Libya's intelligence headquarters building—located dangerously close to the French Embassy.

In order to preserve secrecy, Pentagon planners were determined to stage the raid as quickly as possible. But twice during the days before the attack, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and CIA Director William Casey got into an argument over timing. The CIA wanted time to get agents in Libya out of harm's way. Weinberger argued that any delay would expose Air Force and Navy pilots to greater danger by giving the Libyans a chance to prepare their defenses. "Cap was furious at Casey," a senior civilian official told NEWSWEEK.

'Stay the hell out of it': The Pentagon hedged its bets in other ways, perhaps to avoid the fate of the failed Iranian rescue mission six years ago. Extra planes were sent along on the first leg of the long flight from Britain: six F-111s, one EF-111 electronic-warfare plane and several tankers. All of those planes turned back after the first refueling point over the Bay of Biscay, but another extra EF-111 went all the way to Libya. The Pentagon also resisted the temptation to manage the mission after it got under way. The noninterference rule came from Crowe. Once a mission has begun, he told

RAIDERS...Pg. 10

The Long Way Around



RAIDERS...From Pg. 9

NEWSWEEK's John Barry, "you just clench your teeth and stay the hell out of it."

More than six hours before the attack was to begin, the F-111s left Britain, escorted by 28 tankers and 5 EF-111 Ravens—the largest air-combat group to gather over Britain since the end of World War II. It took an hour for the planes to get airborne from four fields in Suffolk, and their assembly point was well out over the English Channel, where the planes could not be seen from land. Cruising at the optimum altitude of 20,000 feet, the planes headed for Libya, 2,800 miles away on a round-about route skirting the territory of France and other skittish U.S. allies that denied the use of their airspace to the Americans. About five hours later, the U.S. Sixth Fleet began to launch its own planes from the carriers America and Coral Sea. In addition to the A-6s that would bomb Benghazi, the fleet provided complete air cover for both target zones: EA-6B electronic-warfare planes, A-7s and F/A-18s armed with radar-busting missiles, F-14 fighters and E-2C command-and-control aircraft.

The great escape: The attackers achieved nearly complete surprise. The day before the raid, according to U.S. naval sources, Soviet ships hurriedly put to sea from Malta and Tripoli—searching for the Sixth Fleet, judging from their communications. Did Moscow suspect that something was up? Early Monday morning, the American ships managed to slip away from their Soviet shadows. For the rest of the day, the Soviets were unable to find them. This feat of evasion was not unprecedented; last summer three U.S. carrier battle groups eluded Soviet naval surveillance in the Atlantic. But this particular escape couldn't have happened at a better time.

About 10 minutes before H hour, U.S. monitors heard chatter on the Libyan air-defense circuits as some radar operators reported confusing blips on their screens. The fleet's electronic countermeasures already had begun, and apparently the Libyans never suspected that an attack was imminent. A few hours before the raid, Kaddafi told an Italian interviewer that he did not expect the Americans to attack. "There is no problem between Libya and the United States," he said. When U.S. warplanes reached their targets, the street lights were still on in both Tripoli and Benghazi. "With all the lights on, you could see the targets just where they were supposed to be," one pilot said at a press briefing aboard the America.

The planes weren't just on target; they were also on time. In the Pentagon's military command center, Weinberger and Crowe were watching television at H hour—7 p.m. Washington time. In a live broadcast from Tripoli on Cable News Network, correspondent John Donovan announced: "There is a war that has broken out here... Planes have been flying over-

head, tracer bullets are flying off into the darkness trying to pick out those planes. We don't know who is fighting who." Weinberger and Crowe were among the few people in the television audience who knew exactly what was happening.

A few minutes before the bombing runs began, Navy planes launched a missile attack on Libya's antiaircraft defenses. A-7s and F/A-18s, which had been flying over the sea at 200 feet, rose to 500 feet or more, deliberately allowing themselves to be spotted by Libyan radar. When their electronic sensors detected the radar locking onto them, the planes fired Shrike and HARM missiles, which are designed to suppress antiaircraft missile launchers by homing in on their radar transmissions.

Fear of flying: The tactic seemed to produce results. As the Navy A-6s attacked Benghazi, U.S. radio monitors intercepted a message from the commander of a Libyan surface-to-air missile battery. "My radar doesn't work," he complained. When a SAM battery defending the Benina airfield near Benghazi was ordered to open fire, its commander replied: "It's out. It's gone. I can't do it." The airfield's MiG-23 interceptors never took off. When Tripoli ordered Benina to launch the MiG's, the commander refused, claiming in a long and heated radio conversation that his field had been put out of commission. Later, U.S. reconnaissance flights found that at least four MiG-23s had been destroyed on the ground.

Still, the Libyans managed to put up some intense groundfire over Benghazi. "They came at us with a wide spectrum of surface-to-air missiles, and there were antiaircraft [guns] of all kinds," Vice Adm. Frank Kelso, the commander of the Sixth Fleet, said afterward. One of his pilots recalled dodging a SAM that looked like "a Roman candle coming up at us." He added: "One was enough for me."

As they approached Tripoli, the F-111s lined themselves up with an electronic beacon from a U.S. base on Italy's Lampedusa Island (which may explain why Libyan patrol boats launched a futile missile attack on the island the next day). Then the American planes sneaked in behind the Libyan radar, swooping in from the west and south to paste the airfield, the naval facility and Kaddafi's barracks. When Libyan radar finally locked onto

them, the F-111s sent signals to Navy planes, which quickly suppressed the radar, probably saving some Air Force lives.

Still, there was a nasty surprise waiting in Tripoli: old-fashioned antiaircraft fire from Soviet-made ZSU-23 four-barreled guns clustered around the Aziziya barracks. That was where the Air Force lost an

F-111 piloted by Capt. Fernando Ribas-Dominicci. He and his weapons officer, Capt. Paul Lorence, tried to get out to sea before ejecting, but as they crossed the coast, their plane exploded in flames, crashing into the Mediterranean less than 10 miles out.

Diplomatic incident: When word got back to Washington that the French Embassy had been hit in the raid, Weinberger refused to believe it at first. "That would be, I think, virtually impossible," he assured reporters at a news briefing after Reagan's address to the nation on Monday night. Weinberger was wrong; the embassy was damaged, and several nearby apartment buildings were hard hit, killing or wounding many residents of an upper-class neighborhood that otherwise might have been ill-disposed toward Kaddafi.

Pentagon officials weren't sure how many bombs had landed in the area or why they fell there. One theory was that Ribas-Dominicci had tried to release his four 2,000-pound bombs after his F-111 was hit, but that at least one of the bombs hung onto the wing pylon instead of dropping free. Then, as Ribas-Dominicci wrenched his plane into a 70-degree left-hand turn toward the sea, the remaining bomb or bombs might have been snapped away from the wing by centrifugal force and launched onto a trajectory toward the French Embassy. That was only a theory that seemed to fit the topography and the circumstances. American officials insisted that, whatever actually happened, the bombing of civilian homes was a ghastly but unavoidable accident.

Considerable pains were taken to prevent just such a tragedy. The rules of engagement for the mission specified that each F-111 had to locate its target in both of its aiming systems, one that uses radar and another that employs an infrared scope. A skilled "Wizzo"—weapons-systems operator—can achieve good accuracy with only one aiming device, but the planners established the "double lock" rule to make sure the right targets were hit. In the end, five of the 18 F-111s and two of the 14 A-6s had to abort their missions. Of the six planes that attacked the Aziziya barracks, two could not achieve double lock, and the pilots did not release their bombs. It was just possible, therefore, that Muammar Kaddafi owed his life to the scruples of his adversaries.

RUSSELL WATSON with JOHN BARRY and JOHN WILCOTT in Washington and bureau reports

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
28 April 86 (22) Pg. 18

Congress is being urged to hit Qadhafi where it really hurts—in the wallet. A move is under way to deny a \$7.6 million Pentagon contract for tractors to an Italian firm that turns out to be partly owned by the Libyan government.

FROM FAWN

Libya

USIA WIRELESS FILE

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*POL402 05/29/86

EUROPEANS TAKE FURTHER STEPS TO COUNTER LIBYAN TERRORISM

(Backgrounder on moves against Libyan diplomats) (630)

by Edmund Scherr

USIA Staff Writer

Washington -- In the wake of increasing evidence that Libya is tied to terrorist attacks in their region, West European governments continue to expel Libyans suspected of terrorist activities and to reduce the number of personnel in Libyan diplomatic missions -- the so-called Libyan Peoples' Bureaus.

Italy on May 23 expelled eight more Libyan officials for what the government called "activities incompatible" with their official status.

These expulsions bring to 19 the number of Libyan officials ordered to leave Italy since the European Community foreign ministers on April 21 voted to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence within the community. The community also placed restrictions on the travel of Libyan officials, and stricter visa controls on Libyans.

The EC action came after a U.S. call to its European allies to isolate and punish Libya for supporting and directing international terrorism -- and after allied agreement at the Tokyo summit on a firm new strategy against terrorism.

On May 6 in Tokyo, the seven major industrial democracies agreed to enforce stricter immigration and diplomatic controls, as well as improving extradition procedures and strengthening interaction between police and security services.

Evidence of Libyan responsibility for the April 5 bombing of a West Berlin disco prompted the April 15 U.S. air strike against terrorist support facilities in Libya. American officials have emphasized that Libyan support for international terrorism must not be "cost free."

U.S. officials have said that the air strike was aimed at trying to stop Libyan leader Qadhafi's "support for and involvement in international terrorism."

While the United States has urged its allies to take stronger measures and follow the Reagan administration action in imposing economic and trade sanctions against Libya, the United States has welcomed the EC action against the Peoples' Bureaus as a "first step."

Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead said that the United States welcomed the EC measures "and the promise to do more."

"There is a better understanding" that the Libyan threat "is a problem to all of us," Whitehead said, adding that cooperation with the community to combat terrorism "is moving along rapidly."

U.S. officials have noted the considerable cooperation between the United States and its European allies in efforts to combat terrorism. They have emphasized that there is a better exchange of intelligence information on terrorism and a more coordinated approach on dealing with terrorist incidents.

In encouraging U.S. allies to close the Peoples' Bureaus, American officials have argued that the tightened constraints on Libyan diplomats "will aid significantly in our common effort to combat terrorist-related activities by Libya."

Whitehead observed that some European nations have important economic relations with Libya and cannot be expected to act quickly in response to Libyan actions. He pointed out that even though Italy has close trade ties with Libya, Italian Prime Minister Craxi has been "very tough" in his measures against Libyan diplomats.

Following are some of the other actions by EC countries following the April 21 EC measures against Libya.

-- The West German government ordered the staff of the Peoples' Bureau in that nation reduced from 41 to 19.

-- Spain expelled the Libyan consul in Madrid along with ten other people accused of plotting terrorist acts with Libyan support.

-- A Turkish prosecutor formally charged the Libyan consul in Istanbul in a plot to bomb a U.S. officers' club. Five other Libyans have also been charged in the plot.

-- Britain, which closed Libya's London Embassy several years ago in retaliation for a British policewoman's murder, arrested and deported 21 Libyan students in the interest of national security. They had been accused of organizing Libyan student revolutionary activities.

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Chad: US Policy

July 1987

Background: Chad is a large, diverse nation strategically located in the middle of Africa. Beginning with independence in 1960, it suffered from a long period of civil war sparked by ethnic and regional differences, and its internal turmoil prompted several Organization of African Unity (OAU) attempts to reconcile the warring factions. This turmoil also provoked Libyan attempts to further its political and territorial ambitions in Africa, including the occupation of northern Chad in 1973 and efforts to place a subservient government in N'djamena. Chad, assisted by France and the US, has stubbornly resisted Libyan aggression. Having endured a crippling famine and achieved national reconciliation, the government of President Hissein Habre launched a series of attacks that pushed Libyan troops into a few strongholds along the Chad-Libyan border. For the first time in 14 years, the Chadian Government now stands poised to regain control of all its territory.



Libyan aggression and Chadian resistance: Libya has intervened in Chad three times since 1973:

- First, in 1973 Libyan troops illegally occupied the northern border area of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. Libyan claims to the territory have received no international support and violate the basis for African stability, set forth in an early OAU resolution in which member states pledged to respect the borders existing at the time of their independence.
- The second intervention occurred in 1980, when 7,000 Libyan troops entered Chad at the invitation of then President Goukouni to put down an uprising led by Hissein Habre. After defeating Habre's forces, which withdrew eastward, the Libyans remained as a virtual occupation force. However, Libya's announced goal of unification with Chad provoked an international outcry and Goukouni, responding to pressure from the OAU, requested the complete withdrawal of Libyan troops. In November 1981, the Libyans pulled back to their entrenched positions in the Aozou Strip.
- The third and most recent Libyan intervention occurred in 1982 when Habre's strengthened national forces successfully overthrew the Goukouni government. Determined to install a subservient government in N'djamena, Libya's Qadhafi regrouped and rearmed Goukouni's troops in the Tibesti mountains and, in the summer of 1983, launched an offensive against government positions in northern and eastern Chad. Following a series of initial reverses, Habre's army defeated the insurgents. To save Goukouni's forces, Libya intervened directly with air and ground assaults and forced Chadian troops to withdraw south of the 16th parallel. Intervention by French and Zairian military forces dissuaded Libyan forces from advancing further south. In the fall of 1984, France and Libya negotiated an

agreement to withdraw all foreign forces from Chad. Although France and Zaire honored the agreement, Libyan military forces remained in northern Chad.

In the spring of 1986, Goukouni's Libyan-backed forces launched heavy attacks along, and south of, the 16th parallel. These attacks were decisively defeated by Habre's forces, precipitating factional fighting among Goukouni's rebel coalition forces in northern Chad. By late October, most former Chadian rebels, including Goukouni's forces, had broken with Libya and turned their allegiance to the Chadian Government. From January through March 1987, Chadian forces launched successful attacks against Libyan positions in northern Chad, driving the Libyans back into a small section of the Aozou Strip. In spite of this dramatic turn of events, the Habre government recognizes that Libya will continue to threaten Chad from its military bases in southern Libya and with terrorist acts. Nevertheless, the Chadians have displayed their intention and ability to resist Libyan aggression.

Chadian Government accomplishments: Under President Habre's leadership, Chad has weathered famine and war and achieved greater cohesion despite its divisive history. Since coming to power in 1982, the Habre government has been accorded full international recognition as the legitimate government of Chad. Habre has brought about reconciliation with former political and armed opponents, thus ending Chad's long years of civil strife, and made considerable progress in rebuilding Chad from the ravages of civil war and drought. The government is determined to restore Chad's territorial integrity and sovereignty by resisting Libyan aggression. On international issues, it has compiled a moderate, essentially pro-Western record.

US policy: The US supports the Chadian Government in resisting Libyan aggression, restoring its territorial integrity, and pursuing reconstruction and internal political reconciliation. The US believes that resistance to Libyan domination of Chad is important for regional security, and is concerned about the threat posed to Chad and its neighbors by the continued Libyan occupation of parts of northern Chad.

US aid: The US has provided economic aid to Chad, including substantial emergency food aid as well as relief and rehabilitation assistance. For fiscal years 1983 through 1986, US economic and humanitarian aid to Chad totaled almost \$100 million; security assistance totaled \$48 million.

In 1983, in response to the Libyan invasion of northern Chad, the President authorized \$25 million in military equipment for Chad. In March and December 1986 he authorized \$25 million in emergency military equipment assistance, and in March 1987 authorized a further \$10 million for equipment. US equipment assistance includes small arms, ammunition, trucks, jeeps, antiaircraft and antitank weapons, uniforms, and first aid kits. Our assistance will continue to complement that of France, which has historically shouldered the principal Western assistance responsibilities in Chad.