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SPECIAL REPORTS

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How conservative think tanks have helped to transform the terms of political debate

"IDEAS MOVE NATIONS"

BY GREGG EASTERBROOK

AS RECENTLY AS 1950 LIONEL TRILLING COULD PROclaim, as if it were incontestable, that American conservatives had no ideas, only "irritable mental gestures." Today, though many conservatives remain irritable, ideas they possess in abundance. Conservative thinking has not only claimed the presidency; it has spread throughout our political and intellectual life and stands poised to become the dominant strain in American public policy. While the political ascent of conservatism has taken place in full public view, the intellectual transformation has for the most part occurred behind the scenes, in a network of think tanks whose efforts have been influential to an extent that only now, five years after President Reagan's election, begins to be clear.

Conservative think tanks and similar organizations have flourished since the mid-1970s. The American Enterprise Institute (AEI) had twelve resident thinkers when Jimmy Carter was elected; today it has forty-five, and a total staff of nearly 150. The Heritage Foundation has sprung from nothing to command an annual budget of $11 million. The budget of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has grown from $975,000 ten years ago to $8.6 million today. Over a somewhat longer period the endowment of the Hoover Institution has increased from $2 million to $70 million.

At least twenty-five other noteworthy public-policy groups have been formed or dramatically expanded through the decade; nearly all are anti-liberal. They include the Cato, Manhattan, Lehrman, Hudson, Shavano, Pacific, Sequoia, and Competitive Enterprise institutes; the committees on the Present Danger, for the Survival of a Free Congress, and for the Free World; the institutes for Foreign Policy Analysis, for Contemporary Studies, and for Humane Studies; the centers for Study of Public Choice, for the Study of American Business, and for Judicial Studies; the Political Economy Research Center; the Reason Foundation; the Washington, American, Capital, and Mountain States legal foundations; the Ethics and Public Policy Center; the National Center for Policy Analysis; the National Institute for Public Policy; and the Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy.

Today conservative commentators have their liberal counterparts outgunned by a wide margin. Conservative thinking has liberal thinking outgunned as well. In vigor, freshness, and appeal, market-oriented theories have surpassed government-oriented theories at nearly every turn. This feat has been accomplished in the main by circumventing the expected source of intellectual developments—the universities. Conservative thinkers have taken their case directly to Congress, the media, and the public—to the marketplace of ideas.

The New New Class

THINK TANKS ARE AN AMERICAN PHENOMENON. NO other country accords such significance to private institutions designed to influence public decisions. Brookings, the progenitor of think tanks, began in the 1920s with money from the industrialist Robert S. Brookings, a Renaissance man who aspired to bring the new discipline of economics to backwater Washington. During the New Deal the Brookings Institution was market-oriented—for example, it opposed Roosevelt's central planning agency, the National Resources Planning Board. Only much later did the institution acquire a reputation as the fountainhead of liberalism.

Through the 1950s and 1960s, as Americans enjoyed steady increases in their standard of living and U.S. industry reigned over world commerce, institutional Washington came to consider the economy a dead issue. Social justice and Vietnam dominated the agenda: Brookings concentrated on those fields, emerging as a chief source of arguments in favor of the Great Society and opposed to U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In the Washington swirl, where few people have the time actually to read the reports they debate, respectability is often proportional to tonnage. The more studies someone tosses on the table, the more likely he is to win his point. For years Brookings held a monopoly on tonnage. Its papers supporting liberal positions went unchallenged by serious conservative rebuttals.

Though the force of liberal ideas grew during the Great Society, few liberal think tanks were founded. During this period young men and women on the make in Washington formed consulting companies. Federal consulting was a growth industry, because by hiring consultants agencies could evade Civil Service ceilings and expand even as their official size remained the same. The first big consulting boom was in poverty-fighting. When the environment became the hot issue, many poverty consultants switched to that field. Energy was the next bankable issue, with a related boomlet in Arab studies.

But consultants with liberal backgrounds were ill equipped for a transition to the hot issue of the late 1970s, the economy. And as the conceptual emphasis changed, so did the money flow. Poverty, the environment, and energy were fields in which consultants generally argued for increased government authority: the bureaucracy was happy to fund such thinking. Most economic research, however, called for reduced government involvement. Funding for that would have to come from somewhere else.

Together with Washington commentators and regulators, liberal consultants were condemned during the 1970s

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by conservative intellectuals as representing a "new class" of overeducated spongers who performed no productive labor but merely issued edicts regarding the labor of others, while living comfortably off the surplus. With each passing year, warnings about the new class went, the proportion of talkers to do-ers would increase, and the prestige of talking rather than doing would grow, until U.S. society became so top heavy that paralysis set in.

As the 1970s progressed, a core of politically active conservative intellectuals, most prominently Irving Kristol, began to argue in publications like *The Public Interest* and *The Wall Street Journal* that if business wanted market logic to regain the initiative, it would have to create a new class of its own—scholars whose career prospects depended on private enterprise, not government or the universities. You get what you pay for, Kristol in effect argued, and if businessmen wanted intellectual horsepower, they would have to open their pocketbooks.

Traditionally, corporate philanthropy had been directed either toward charity or toward independent organizations like the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations. Pressured by the media and by academics to make gestures of broadmindedness, businessmen seemed to feel that they could gain social approval only by sharing their proceeds with credentialed intermediaries who would use the money to fund attacks on capitalism. Paying to have oneself attacked was a kind of corporate ablution.

The rise of Nader's Raiders and similar public-interest groups—which achieved remarkable results, considering how badly outgunned *they* were—brought a change in business thinking about money and public affairs. So did the frustration felt by oil companies, which were being fattened by rising prices but dreamed of being fatter still if federal regulations were abolished. They were willing to invest a sliver of their riches in changing Washington's mood.

In 1977 Henry Ford II angrily resigned from the board of the Ford Foundation, saying that he was fed up with its anti-capitalist output. Many companies started political-action committees and created "corporate foundations" whose giving habits were tightly controlled by management. And a handful of wealthy right-wing foundations representing Richard Mellon Scaife, Joseph Coors, and the Olin Chemical and Smith Richardson pharmaceutical fortunes began to dedicate themselves to influencing politics. Just as liberal analysts had once discovered that they could do well billing the government to advocate government expansion, so conservative thinkers now saw an attractive opportunity to take business funds to advocate government contraction.

In 1973 two young congressional aides, Edwin Feulner and Paul Weyrich, quit their jobs to start the Heritage Foundation. Three years later a longtime Brookings fellow, Ernest Lefever, started the Ethics and Public Policy Center. In 1977 a group of libertarians started the Cato Institute. The Committee on the Present Danger was founded nine days after Carter's election. The Center for Strategic and International Studies, which had existed quietly since its creation in 1962 by David Abshire, a retired Army officer (now ambassador to NATO), sensed its moment. Liberal consultancies had found their causes in poverty, energy, and the environment; the new think tanks would find bankable issues in the windfall-profits tax, the SALT II treaty, the nuclear freeze, Star Wars, industrial policy, and comparable worth.

When plum positions started going to them, conservatives discovered that the new class wasn't so bad after all. Norman Ture, one of the original supply-siders, supported himself through the late 1970s by taking donations for his Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation. While Ronald Reagan was composing his first cabinet, Ture wrote a paper for the Heritage Foundation advocating—in the best new-class style—the creation of a new government post, that of Treasury Department undersecretary for tax policy, and, after some assiduous circulating of the paper with résumé attached, landed the job for himself. Following the change of administrations in 1980 some conservatives found think tanks useful vehicles for advancing their ideas and their careers. Colin Gray, a nuclear hard-liner known for a *Foreign Policy* article titled "Victory Is Possible," failed to land a top position at Defense or the National Security Council, so he started the National Institute for Public Policy, which produces studies on beam weapons and other Star Wars components. Meanwhile, the major conservative think tanks hardly had to chase money: it was brought to them eagerly.

Warming the Ideas

"HISTORICALLY, CONSERVATIVES IN THE UNITED States have come across as racists and know-nothings," Michael Horowitz, who did work for AEI and Heritage in the late 1970s and held a high position in the Office of Management and Budget before being nominated to a federal judgeship, told me. "It was essential to create a moral and intellectual basis for conservative beliefs which had its own vision and wasn't just a reaction against liberalism."

To a point this image problem was inevitable. The slogans of capitalism (Every man for himself, and Don't expect any favors) sound horrible, while the usual effects (prosperity and freedom) are terrific. The slogans of socialism (Everybody is equal, and We'll look after you) sound stirring, while the usual effects (stagnation and statism) leave something to be desired. For conservatism to capture the intellectual market it would have to sound like more than the nay-saying of wealthy old white men. It would have to speak, as liberalism did, of a better future.

A turning point for the movement's world view was George Gilder's *Wealth and Poverty*, funded through the new think-tank network and published just as Reagan won in 1980. In the book Gilder argued for tax cuts, a long-standing conservative cause. But rather than employ the traditional negative line (which boils down to "Get your hands out of my pockets"), Gilder stood the argument on its head. Adam Smith, he said, had it wrong. Capitalism isn't a voodoo through which many selfish acts inexplicably advance the whole. It's a magnanimous organism in which everybody wants the best for everybody else—since, after all, one person cannot prosper selling his product unless many others are prosperous enough to buy. Big tax cuts, Gilder said, will trigger an outburst of altruism.

Gilder may or may not have been right, but he had found a whole new vocabulary for market thinking, one that was progressive and kind-hearted rather than dour. In the late 1970s Jeane Kirkpatrick had written, "Sometimes Republican speakers communicate a warmer concern for fiscal abstractions than for any other subject and some-

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times Republican audiences respond like a group of accountants who can conceive no greater good than a balanced budget." How quickly and how completely the priorities would be reversed! Conservative theorists would lose all interest in mere fiscal abstraction, such as the federal debt (Heritage's *Mandate for Leadership*, Volume II, wouldn't use the word *deficit* until page 219), while learning to frame their ideas in terms of the "greater good." By 1985 the Ethics and Public Policy Center would hold a conference on the underclass at which the speeches would be focused entirely on market mechanisms to help the poor. Not once were welfare queens or ghetto Cadillacs, the sort of small-minded crotchets that would have dominated a similar conservative conference a decade ago, even mentioned. Conservatism, by acquiring a positive vision, had become warmer.

Housing the Converts

ALL MOVEMENTS TREASURE CONVERTS, AND THE growing conservative think tanks became instruments for the care, feeding, and display of theirs. AEI was home to Kirkpatrick, Michael Novak, Ben Wattenberg, and others who wasted no opportunity to point out that they had switched sides. Ernest Lefever, of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and Max Kampelman, the general counsel to the Committee on the Present Danger (now a special arms negotiator), had been conscientious objectors during the Second World War. Charles Murray, whose *Losing Ground*, a critique of social spending, was written for the Manhattan Institute, is a former Peace Corps volunteer and the child of a factory worker. Thomas Sowell, Glenn Loury, and Walter Williams, all rising conservative theorists, are black, which qualifies them as converts regardless of when they began thinking in market terms.

The more spectacular the conversion the better. Michael Horowitz began an article about his: "I am Jewish, was student body president at City College of New York, taught civil rights law in Mississippi during the sixties, now grieve at the loss of Al Lowenstein, the remarkable friend who most taught me to care about the political process. The best man at my wedding was a Democratic Congressman with a 100 percent ADA rating." Just as a former drunkard who beat his wife and stole from the collection plate will be the star of any revival meeting, so reformed liberals became the headliners at many conservative get-togethers. Conservatives wanted to win not just elections but hearts and minds.

For public-policy impact, intellectuals and journalists make prime converts, because there is nothing (at least nothing obvious) in it for them. All manner of lobbyists, some even lapsed Democrats, were running around Washington preaching capital formation and market magic, but who believed them? They were fabulously paid to read their lines. Public-interest advocates and liberal academics often had more standing on Capitol Hill than corporate vice-presidents, precisely because they made relatively little money and did not gain personally from the outcome of political decisions. By establishing think tanks, conservatism could acquire the same sheen of detachment. The beauty of it all was that thinkers come cheaper than lobbyists.

AEI, Heritage, and CSIS became exceptionally press conscious. Any time the elite media mentioned a Heritage or Cato study, the movement would score points in heaven. Think-tank managers who swore oaths in private about the liberal biases of the big media nevertheless found themselves longing for their stamp of approval.

Understanding that many reporters hunger to feel important, the new think tanks courted and flattered reporters in a way Brookings never had, inviting them to conferences not as observers but as participants. Catering to the journalists' convenience, they sent reams of information free (Brookings, the old profiteer, actually charged for its work) and provided messenger service for reporters on deadline. Having an impressive AEI study hand-delivered to a reporter while its Brookings counterpart was lost in the mail was often half the battle for a mention in a news column. Also, it helped that most conservative think tanks prefer writing that makes for pleasant reading and vivid quotation to dense academic prose. Someone snowbound in a mountain cabin would far rather find back copies of AEI's *Regulation* (with headlines like "Curse of the Mummy's Tomb") or Heritage's *Policy Review* than the soporiferous *Brookings Review*.

As the new think tanks have grown and the quality of their work has improved, members of the Washington press corps have become more dependent on them, more likely to quote AEI than puzzle out a topic on their own—which, of course, fits the plan quite well. Once journalists began paying attention, they served as an important cross-check of developing theory. To play in *Newsweek* or on CBS, an idea had to be phrased in the new good-for-society-terms. In turn, a favorable mention in the media was taken as proof that a conservative proposal had so much power that even liberals were forced to acknowledge it.

Star Attractions

JEANE KIRKPATRICK BECAME THE GREATEST THINK-tank discovery. Only Reagan himself was received with more enthusiasm at the 1984 Republican Convention. A former professor at Georgetown University, a board member of the Committee on the Present Danger, and (to the everlasting embarrassment of CSIS, which is affiliated with Georgetown) a fellow at AEI, she wrote a much discussed article for *Commentary* magazine, "Dictatorships and Double Standards," in 1979. Kirkpatrick ridiculed Carter's decision not to reinforce the Shah and Somoza in their waning hours. We shouldn't be so choosy about our allies, she declared. This one article propelled Kirkpatrick to national prominence—the academic's most deeply cherished fantasy. Since then there has been a scramble among the new think tanks to link their names to Kirkpatrick's. She has been featured at forums sponsored by Heritage, CSIS, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Hoover, and others, all of which display her photograph prominently in promotional literature. When Kirkpatrick returned to AEI last year, the institute's *Foreign Policy and Defense Review* devoted its back cover to a full-page announcement.

There have been many discoveries besides Kirkpatrick. Christopher DeMuth, Reagan's first-term "deregulation czar," won his post on the strength of a series of articles in *Regulation* on cost-benefit analysis for federal safety rules. Lawrence Korb, formerly an assistant secretary of defense, was an AEI fellow who wrote a paper that Frank Shake-

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speare—an influential, behind-the-scenes conservative who would later become the chairman of Heritage—showed to former National Security Advisor Richard Allen, who in turn gave it to Reagan. In 1980 *Regulation*'s editors were Murray Weidenbaum and Antonin Scalia. Weidenbaum became the first Reagan chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Scalia was named a federal appeals judge.

Martin Anderson, Reagan's domestic-policy adviser until 1982, came from Hoover. James C. Miller III, Reagan's first Federal Trade Commission chairman and now the administrator of the Office of Management and Budget, came from AEI. James Watt, the former secretary of the interior; William Bennett, the secretary of education; John Svahn and Marshall Breger, presidential assistants; William Niskanen, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers (now the chairman of the Cato Institute); Chester Crocker, an assistant secretary of state; Kenneth Adelman, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—this is a far from complete list of think-tank alumni who took prominent roles in the Administration.

What follows is a discussion of four of the leading conservative think tanks: the American Enterprise Institute, the most nearly centrist of the new tanks; the Heritage Foundation, the one with the most influence in the Reagan Administration; the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the toniest; and the Cato Institute, which takes market thinking further than any of the others—to that point on the continuum of opinion where right becomes left.

AEI

"WITHOUT AEI, REAGAN NEVER WOULD HAVE been elected," an informed White House official says. "AEI made conservatism intellectually respectable." This is perhaps true—and is also a sore point with the New Right, the name usually given to the extremist side of Reagan's political support. Because the American Enterprise Institute pre-dates the New Right and has become, through its success, part of permanent Washington, New Right conservatives hold it in suspicion. When *The Washington Times*, the movement's *Pravda*, ran a wall-poster-style chart of major conservative organizations, AEI was not included.

AEI was founded in 1943 by Lewis Brown, an industrialist who hoped to match the influence of Robert S. Brookings. In its early years the institute was transparently a mouthpiece for big business. Serious work at AEI did not begin until a man named William Baroody took charge, in 1954. Baroody restructured AEI to resemble Brookings, with fellows given wide latitude and expected in return to produce the sort of work usually described as "major." AEI as a result is more scholastic in tone than the newer think tanks, more concerned with propriety and dignified behavior. "We aim to be in the mainstream," says William Baroody, Jr., who has run the institute since his father died, in 1977. In addition to Kirkpatrick, Novak, and Wattenberg, AEI lays claim to Gerald Ford, Arthur F. Burns, Philip Habib, the Congress specialist Norman J. Ornstein, the legal expert Bruce Fein, the Harvard scholar James Q. Wilson, and the economist Herbert Stein.

Most of AEI was rooting for George Bush in 1980, and though alliances gracefully shifted as the primaries progressed, AEI doesn't subscribe to "the movement," as, say, Heritage does. AEI has been critical of the MX missile, and attacks on the Reagan deficit that Rudolph Penner made as a fellow seem to have helped him win his current post as the head of the Congressional Budget Office, traditionally a Democratic enclave.

AEI was the first think tank to discover the power of taking ideas directly to the public, bypassing the formal big-university filtering system. In 1975, when AEI was still small, it began to distribute op-ed articles written by its adjunct scholars. Then it started to send free taped commentaries to radio stations—now a practice of many think tanks—and later packaged a television show.

Around the time of the Carter-Ford election, when conservative money was beginning to flow, AEI sharply increased its roster of resident scholars—thinkers physically located in the Washington office, as opposed to adjunct scholars, whose main jobs are elsewhere—and gave them impressive, academic-sounding titles, such as the George Frederick Jewett Scholar in Public Policy Research (this is Michael Novak's position). "My father always said we would need to achieve a critical mass of people in the city"—people available to meet with congressmen and reporters, and press home conservative views—Baroody, Jr., told me. Such a mass would also make a pool of ready candidates for appointment to Administration positions.

A primary objective of all think tanks, regardless of ideology, is to be employment agencies for Presidents, in order both to influence policy and to crown the organization with prestige. Getting a high-level job "is what you live for in a think tank," says Lawrence Korb, formerly of the Defense Department and now an executive of Raytheon Corporation. "Talk centers on it obsessively." Korb notes that think-tank personnel make good appointees partly because they are eagerly available. "All you have to do to move from AEI to the Administration is walk across the street," he says. "You don't have to move your family to D.C., because you're already there. You don't have to give up a good job you might not get back, because the think tank will always take you back. You don't have to put your assets into some kind of complicated trust, because if your background is academics, you don't have any assets. And a businessman or lawyer coming into government usually has to make a financial sacrifice. To someone from academia, on the other hand, $60,000 [the typical pay for high-level appointees] is a raise."

Essential to all think tanks are events at which donors rub shoulders with Washington personages. The less such events seem like fund-raisers, and the more like *Meet the Press*, the better. Each summer AEI stages a World Forum, hosted by Gerald Ford, in Vail, Colorado, for chief executives of corporations that make contributions. In December it holds a Public Policy Week, during which the institute's offices are converted into a sort of intellectual theme park. In 1984 the week was topped off by a "gala Public Policy Dinner" at which Reagan addressed 1,200 guests in evening clothes. Lesser luncheons and breakfasts are held almost continually: conservatives seem to think best while eating. Even the Ethics and Public Policy Center, with a staff of just sixteen, in 1984 held one "major" conference and two medium ones, a black-tie dinner, a reception in

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the Capitol building, eight "dinner seminars," many luncheons, and a breakfast at which Representative Jack Kemp and National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane spoke.

Like most think tanks, AEI raises money each year; only Brookings and Hoover have substantial endowments. AEI drew 51 percent of its $12 million budget for 1985 (up from $4 million a decade ago) from corporate donations, the highest corporate-support percentage of the major think tanks. The institute has twenty-seven trustees, most of them executives of corporations that are donors. Fourteen of the twenty-seven are from defense contractors, drug companies, or banks—businesses with a special interest in government decisions. An advocate of relaxed antitrust laws, AEI notes in its current annual report that "the wave of corporate mergers led to a reduction of more than $100,000" in its support last year, because several friendly companies were gobbled out of existence.

AEI has a new headquarters building (about half of which it plans to lease) under construction on Pennsylvania Avenue, halfway between the White House and the Hill. "The historic Pennsylvania Avenue location, Washington's corridor of power, will enable our scholars and fellows to interact more readily with key policy makers," an AEI publication reads. Aside from suggesting a picture of scholars poised on the roof, arms outstretched like antennae to receive emanations from Congress and the executive, this invocation of a large new building, and the commitment to the future that it represents, shows that AEI does not expect government to wither away. "Very little of our output involves calls for the abolition of government agencies," says Walter Olson, an AEI fellow.

Heritage

"WE'RE NOT HERE TO BE SOME KIND OF PH.D. committee giving equal time," says Burton Pines, a vice-president of Heritage. "Our role is to provide conservative public-policy makers with arguments to bolster our side. We're not troubled over this. There are plenty of think tanks on the other side."

Although Heritage officially calls itself "nonpartisan" (tax laws require this charade), in practice it is actively aligned with the Administration. Just after the 1980 elections Heritage published a thousand-page book called *Mandate for Leadership*, which contained an elaborate series of policy recommendations for nearly every federal agency. When Reagan was re-elected, Heritage issued a successor volume; the pair are popularly known as *Mandate* I and *Mandate* II.

Probably no other documents have been as widely circulated in Washington during the past five years as *Mandate* I and *Mandate* II, and by any standard they are impressive. Each reflects a detailed understanding of how the federal government actually works (as opposed to how it officially works) and addresses the sort of questions that are short on media appeal but critical in Washington: how to motivate the bureaucracy, how to get bills through committee, and so on. Recommendations range from the hard-to-dispute (greater competition in health care) to the intriguing (private management of wilderness areas, and "transportation enterprise zones") to the suspiciously pro-regulatory (a requirement that U.S. attorneys file "victims impact statements") to calls for that Washington perennial the presidential commission. There are dis[illegible] government offshoots as obscure as the Federal Financing Bank Advisory Board and the Interagency Coordinating Council.

Heritage also produces a blizzard of lesser materials: more than 200 books, monographs, and legislative analyses in 1984, and numerous "executive memos," many labeled "RUSH!" Just how much of Heritage's advice is actually taken by the Administration is hard to judge. Heritage likes to assert that 60 percent of the policy recommendations in *Mandate* I were adopted, but it's impossible to say how many of the developments for which it claims credit would have happened anyway. For instance, Heritage associates itself with the idea for Star Wars, because the book *High Frontier*, by the retired general Daniel Graham, was released under its auspices in 1982; but pressure for a space defense program had been building quietly in many Washington quarters for several years. In other cases Reagan's action went beyond what Heritage advised. *Mandate* I said that the mission of the Community Services Administration should be "redefined." In his first budget David Stockman abolished the CSA altogether (one of the few government-program terminations that Reagan has actually carried out).

At one time Heritage had an image as a warren of loonies. But by 1985 even *The Washington Post* was treating it with respect. One reason for this grudging acceptance is that the warming trend in conservative theory has reached Heritage, too. Since Reagan's election Heritage publications have rarely employed New Right rhetoric and have been surprisingly quiet on "social agenda" questions. *Mandate* II contained only a single paragraph on school prayer—making the nebulous recommendation that Reagan publicize the efforts of the states to restore public praying—but offered eighteen pages on the Department of Commerce. Paul Weyrich, a founder of Heritage, resigned from it in 1975 in order to start the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress, which is now closer than Heritage to Jesse Helms and Jerry Falwell. Many Heritage analysts are uncomfortable with these cable-TV-style conservatives, in part because some items on their wish list are unconstitutional and in part because the anti-intellectual hostility that animates the far right is as likely to find its target at Heritage as anywhere else.

In fact, when reading studies like the *Mandate* volumes, one gets the feeling that Heritage is trying to calm down its own constituency as much as to flay the liberals. Sections patiently explain why even the President can't just shut down whole agencies or cancel programs overnight. Having preached for some time that "if only we had the White House there'd be a few changes around here," organizations like Heritage now need to produce convincing reasons why many of the promised changes haven't been made. There is a more immediately practical consideration here too. If government actually did wither away, Heritage fellows would be out of jobs. Donors must be gently given to understand that the touch is going to be put on them far into the future.

The foundation's office is on Capitol Hill, and this choice of location is significant. Being on the Hill allows Heritage to woo the young staff aides in Congress, the ones who will someday occupy heavy-hitting positions downtown. Almost every day Heritage holds an event at

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which food is served—cold cuts and beer being reliable bait for young staff. It also hosts biweekly networking sessions called the Third Generation lectures, which consistently draw a hundred or more Hill staffers.

Heritage fellows are expected to get out of the office and work the congressional committees. By doing this kind of grunt work—the kind that more self-important think tanks shun—Heritage keeps a step ahead of the news and avoids depending heavily on the kind of official statements that are impressive from afar but bear little relation to what's really going on. Most of its leading thinkers—Dinesh D'Souza, Stuart Butler, Milton Copulos, Anna Kondratas, Adam Meyerson, Phil Truluck—are young and not yet names. "I worry about losing the courage to send a twenty-seven-year-old in to brief a senator or testify about a Heritage position," Burton Pines says. "If we started hiring older people with safe, established reputations, we would lose our cutting edge." Heritage's young Turks make more mistakes than the cautious, experienced analysts at AEI, but they are also willing to take chances on ideas that have not been sanctioned by the capital's mentioning apparatus. Their pay is good but not grand—the development of conservatives willing to pursue something other than money being, perhaps, the most significant sign of changed times in institutional Washington.

Heritage has a media strategy similar to its personnel policy: it goes after the little fish in the press as well as the big. "During the time the elite media was ignoring us, we discovered that there are 1,600 dailies and weeklies around the country," Pines says. "Statistically, most people don't get their news from the big media; they get it from little papers." So Heritage began to send copies of its studies, topped by press releases in what Pines calls "easy-to-read form specially designed for reporters and editors," to the small papers. Each study mailed, Heritage found, produces 200 to 500 stories. Often the press release is published verbatim. When the story comes in, Heritage sends a copy of the clipping to the congressman in whose district it appeared.

Preaching government contraction has helped Heritage expand rapidly. Its largest source of money—providing at least $5 million over the past decade—has been Richard Mellon Scaife, a great-grandson of the banker Thomas Mellon. From a personal fortune estimated at $150 million Scaife gives about $10 million annually to conservative causes through the Carthage, Allegheny, and Sarah Scaife foundations. The next largest conservative donor, the Olin Foundation, gives about $5 million annually to various causes, while the Coors and Smith Richardson foundations each give about $3 million a year.

Scaife cultivates a secretive demeanor and refuses to speak to reporters. When Karen Rothmyer, a contributing editor of the *Columbia Journalism Review* and the author of what is now the standard work on Scaife, approached him for an interview, Scaife assailed her with a volley of obscenities. Scaife's name rarely appears in Heritage promotional literature, though there are frequent references to Joseph Coors, an affable person associated with a high-quality yuppie product.

Unlike AEI, which received about $500,000 in federal grants last year, and CSIS, whose budget is roughly 15 percent federal, Heritage takes no government grants. It draws by far the highest proportion of general public support, getting about a third of its budget from small donors. Heritage receives major donations from its trustees Shelby Cullom Davis, a wealthy New York financier, and the one-time New York gubernatorial candidate Lewis Lehrman (who, despite having his own, competing think tank, was the head of a recent Heritage fund drive), the Reader's Digest Association, and many corporations, primarily oil and defense firms. Recently it has amassed its first endowment, for an Asian Studies Center. Several conservative think tanks are active in Asian affairs, because Taiwanese and South Korean industrialists are big givers acutely concerned with Washington access.

CSIS

THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL Studies, like Hoover at Stanford, is a conservative policy center attached to a generally liberal university (in this case, Georgetown). Unlike Hoover, CSIS is located well away from the parent campus: its offices on K Street, Washington's legal row, have the aspect of an investment-banking firm.

Perhaps because of its emphasis on international affairs, CSIS is the most aristocratic of the think tanks, and the most ceremonial. Big names abound. Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and James Schlesinger are "senior scholar-statesmen in residence." Other CSIS names are Thomas Moorer, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Ray Cline, a former deputy CIA director for intelligence; the authors Walter Laqueur and Michael Ledeen; the military analyst Edward Luttwak; and the economist Paul Craig Roberts. The most recent CSIS annual report resembles a social directory, listing a sixty-five person advisory board, a fourteen-person executive board, a twenty-seven-person international research council, staff, and a hundred scholars. The 1984 report listed 578 CSIS forum participants, plus more roundtables, symposia, and colloquia than any one person could ever attend. It also managed to drop Kissinger's name thirty-four times.

Because CSIS is heavy with people who would accept only top positions, it sent few into the Reagan Administration—Chester Crocker, the author of the Administration's "constructive engagement" policy toward South Africa, is its only prominent alumnus. Big names mean big overhead: Kissinger, Brzezinski, and Schlesinger have separate suites, perhaps to keep their ego fields from interacting. The big names are expected to "bring money with them" (to use the think-tank argot), raising a portion of the overhead from foundation contacts or on the cocktail-party circuit. A recent CSIS newsletter noted, "James Schlesinger. . . met with senior leadership of Texaco Inc. to discuss a number of defense and energy policy issues and to share a personal perspective on contemporary geopolitics."

Geopolitical perspectives are also shared at the annual shoulder-rubbing roundtables that CSIS holds in Washington, Dallas, Houston, and Miami (additional events in Los Angeles and Chicago are planned). Entrée to such occasions generally requires about a $5,000 donation. The chief executive officers of large corporate donors received a "high-level CSIS briefing" in Washington for the second Reagan inauguration (whenever CEOs come to town, they

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expect important-sounding things to do), and CSIS stages a prestigious annual retreat in Williamsburg, Virginia, similar to AEI's Colorado gathering.

CSIS's output in the press and on TV is second to none. "We had more than 2,500 media appearances in 1984, and it's going to add up to more in 1985, because Beirut has been a big story and we have most of Washington's world-class terrorism experts here," William Taylor, the executive director of CSIS, told me recently. He handed over a copy of the center's media guide: "When a big story breaks, this is a media bible." The guide is cross-referenced and includes the home phone numbers of several CSIS officers who run an "alert system." If an important international story develops at night or over a weekend, CSIS fellows call in to the office, forming a duty rotation of experts available for interviews and television appearances.

CSIS thus performs a valued service for the major media, creating instant access to former officials who are presumed to have inside information. Some of the media return the favor: *The New York Times* and NBC News are among CSIS's financial supporters. Brzezinski, Cline, Laqueur, the retired CIA director Richard Helms, a retired chief of staff of the Army, General Edward Meyer, and others make up the center's Steering Committee on Terrorism, as if CSIS itself had something other than words to steer. (Committees are a favorite think-tank gambit for lending the appearance of formal policy-making responsibilities. After Reagan's re-election the Hudson Institute announced a Committee on the Next Agenda composed of many prominent names. This committee earned the president of Hudson, Thomas Bell, lunch at the White House and a photo opportunity with Reagan, but compared with the thoughtful *Mandate* II its report was a comic book. The thirteen single-spaced pages of generalities advocated, for example, "a national commission to report on the quality of family life" and the creation of yet another government post, for a cabinet-level "broker" who would "play an important coordination function in government" by reconciling "overlapping defense, foreign, economic and trade areas"—which sounds suspiciously like what the President is supposed to do.)

CSIS also performs a valued service for the State Department, staging forums for visiting diplomats whom the department doesn't quite know what to do with (whenever foreign leaders come to town, they too expect important-sounding things to do) and sometimes conducting semi-sanctioned negotiations that avoid the tortuosities of official government contacts. A CSIS team preceded Reagan on his visit to China.

Both Taylor, the executive director, and Amos Jordan, who has succeeded David Abshire, the founder, as president, were once Army instructors at West Point. Nevertheless, CSIS has not refrained from criticism of the military. Senior Fellow Edward Luttwak's recent *The Pentagon and the Art of War* is scorching; CSIS's most successful project in 1984 was a study, signed by six of the seven living former secretaries of defense, calling for reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The test of this study's success is that it made Navy Secretary John Lehman—whose service would stand to lose in most JCS reform plans—furious. Melissa Healy and Michael Duffy reported in *Defense Week*, a trade newsletter for the defense industry, that Lehman worked behind the scenes to block the CSIS report.

Scaife—who was also unhappy about the Joint Chiefs of Staff study—is CSIS's biggest donor, having given at least $7 million in the past decade. (CSIS and Georgetown raise funds separately; there is some hostility between the center and the school, mainly because CSIS fellows can make twice as much as Georgetown professors while being spared the drudgery of correcting blue books.) Other important donors include the Ford, Rockefeller, MacArthur, and Noble foundations; the Prince Charitable Trust; Hallmark Cards, Inc.; eleven defense contractors; and Sheikh Salman al Hethlain and Prince Turki bin Abdulaziz (CSIS has a "Middle East" project, appealing to Arab-American interests, and also a "Near East" project, of more interest to pro-Israel groups).

Cato

LAST JUNE, ON A DAY WHEN SAVINGS ACCOUNTS IN Maryland were frozen because the state's private deposit-insurance company had collapsed, the Cato Institute held a Capitol Hill forum to advocate that private deposit-insurance companies replace the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. "It is my belief that consumers would be willing to give up their federal guarantees in return for deposits backed by triple-A corporate bonds," Catherine England, a Cato analyst, declared. Senior staffers from the Joint Economic Committee, the Treasury Department, the Federal Trade Commission, the Office of Management and Budget, and other agencies had come to listen.

In a sense, no one took the session seriously. At a time when banks were teetering, the political prospects of abolishing federal deposit insurance were slim to nonexistent. Yet in another sense there was great interest, as the attendance showed. Cato is in the vanguard of market thinking, and Washington is as fascinated today by market theories as it was twenty years ago by big-government theories. During the forum Bert Ely, another Cato speaker, said that banks could protect their deposits through a system of self-insurance. An official from the Farm Credit Administration rose to protest: that was the way that FCA affiliates had been insured, the system hadn't worked, and Cato was "completely ignoring the real world." To a libertarian this is not necessarily an insult.

Cato was once close to the Libertarian Party, whose presidential candidate managed to win one percent of the vote in 1980. The Libertarian Party believes that government should go away, period. Its candidate in 1984, David Bergland, vowed to abolish the CIA, the FBI, the IRS, Social Security, and public schools. If citizens wanted national defense, he said, they could band together and contract for it voluntarily.

That was too much even for Cato. It continues, however, to say that almost all government regulation should end: that in an information-rich society like ours, consumers exert enough pressure on industry through their buying habits to prevent abuses, and to the extent that they fail to exert pressure, that's their problem. Cato wants a phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe and South Korea, and an end to other entangling alliances. Government, in its view, should exist only to provide po-

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lice protection, enforce contracts, and repel invasions. Cato's hero is Friedrich Hayek, who won the Nobel Prize for economics in 1974 and is the godfather of the "Austrian school," dear to the hearts of many on the right. Hayek recently attached his name to Cato by becoming a senior fellow, the institute having campaigned long and hard to get him. Hayek proposes abolishing the uniform national currency and instead using private-label money issued by business. "What is so dangerous and ought to be done away with is not government's right to issue money but the *exclusive* right to do so and their power to force people to use it and accept it at a particular price," he has written.

In summary form, this sounds like a crackpot idea. It's not, although neither is it practical—and that sums up much of libertarian thinking. As a logical exercise one can imagine competing "brands" of currency driving monetary exchange values to a perfect level and increasing economic efficiency. In the real world, where people's hopes and fears add non-logical considerations, private currency might spawn catastrophe. Still, speculation about such matters can result in smaller insights that are applicable under real conditions. An example is the work for Cato done by Peter Ferrara, an attorney, who proposes that Social Security be replaced with a form of private super-IRA accounts. The plan has faults, but it is the kind of not-so-crazy-as-it-sounds idea that may ultimately inspire practical change.

Libertarianism springs from the American West: Cato, the Pacific Institute, and the Reason Foundation, all libertarian, were all started in California. On its good side libertarianism reflects the dream of the American West—of the individual above all, with society constantly forming and reforming itself to reflect individual aspiration. Culturally, the eastern United States is Europe transplanted, with many Old World habits and class expectations continuing to operate at a subtle level. The West is the world made new, and its residents need not honor what they left behind. Here, though, is libertarianism's bad side—a desire to renounce all social obligations and live as if the United States had no poverty and no enemies.

Cato gets the largest portion of its $1.3 million annual budget through Charles Koch, the son of a Kansas oilman, who has given around $5 million to libertarian causes, and it has also received significant support from his brother David, the Libertarian Party's vice-presidential candidate in 1980. Other donors include Shelby Cullom Davis, several oil and chemical firms, and the American Broadcasting Company. Scaife is a major sponsor, but he insists that his money be spent only on economic studies, not on international affairs, because Cato favors reduced military spending. Cato is the only one of the new think tanks to have no major defense contractors among its supporters.

The chairmanship of Cato was assumed last year by William Niskanen, a former member of the Council of Economic Advisers. Niskanen entered the libertarian hall of fame when, in 1980, as director of economics at Ford Motor Company, he was fired for publicly opposing the company's campaign for quotas on imported cars, which he said would only hurt consumers.

The Good Old Days

INTELLECTUALLY, IT IS ALWAYS EASIER TO BE THE PARTY out of power, and conservative think tanks often exhibit a certain nostalgia for the good old days, when Carter was President and taking the blame. Indeed, their work sometimes gives the impression that he *is* still President.

Failures of federal agencies to reduce regulation are decried as though Reagan did not now control the agencies. Recent issues of Heritage's *Policy Review* have declared that a government agency director is "judged by the standard of whether what he does corresponds to the conventional (liberal) wisdom" and that "one faces intellectual ostracism for uttering the words 'Cold War.' " (A mantra popular among conservative intellectuals is the sentence that begins with a phrase like "No one dares say . . . ") A *Policy Review* critic called the book *I, Martha Adams*, in which Russian troops invade the United States and slaughter millions, "a conservative's dream novel." An article by Midge Decter, the head of the Manhattan-based Committee for the Free World, announced, "As a society we do not even any longer have the moral courage to cast out in horror—a horror we all feel—the child pornographer, the pedophile, the committer of incest. We hem and haw and let the courts decide." Unless Times Square is a microcosm of middle America, this last is as far out of touch with the nation's political mood as the left ever strayed. And by the way, aren't courts *supposed* to determine the punishment for crimes?

It's good business for conservative think tanks to suggest that even after five years of a strong conservative President, a Republican Senate, and a popular conservative mandate, liberalism is still secretly controlling Washington. Foreign affairs are the focus of many such complaints: liberals are somehow preventing bomber pilots from spotting terrorists; many of the new think tanks have demanded full economic sanctions against Libya, even as lobbyists for U.S. oil companies, which continue to operate there, have petitioned the Administration for more trade freedom.

Perhaps the climactic moment of conservative nostalgia for the days when somebody else was to blame occurred last May. The Shavano Institute, a think tank affiliated with Hillsdale College, in Michigan—which is to the right approximately what Antioch is to the left—held a Washington conference. Kirkpatrick was the featured guest. Frank Shakespeare, who was serving as chairman, had helped arrange $45,000 in federal funding—the type of self-serving use of public money that drives conservatives wild when liberal groups are the beneficiaries. The purpose of the conference was to prove that the United States and the Soviet Union are not "morally equivalent." The idea that they are equivalent carries no weight in the United States except with fringe groups, but does have some respectable backing in Europe. All the heavy artillery of conservatism was there, and the participants were speaking to their own.

The writer Tom Wolfe kicked off the event by saying, "I want to congratulate you all on the courage that you've shown in coming here," as though secret-police agents were circulating in the audience, jotting down names,

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when in fact attendance was a career plum. Joseph Sobran, an editor of *National Review*, suggested that nefarious forces were blocking the production of anti-Communist movies, adding, "Sometimes I wonder if there's some sort of ideological Hays Office operating in Hollywood, protecting the viewing public from the indecorous manifestations of the Cold War mentality." The conference was held two weeks before the premiere of *Rambo*.

The secretary of education, William Bennett, said, "Much of what goes on in the American classroom today is expressly designed to prevent our future intellectuals from telling the difference between American and Soviet values." Irving Kristol complained that *peace* has become "a Stalinist word" and that it has "acquired such momentum that no one dares come out and speak against the use of the word *peace*." He then dared, objecting to the name of the Peace Corps.

Michael Novak predicted that "over the next five years the greatest historical expansion of Soviet power beyond the postwar boundaries of the USSR is likely to be attempted." (What, then, did the Reagan defense buildup accomplish?) Tom Bethell, a former AEI fellow and a writer for *The American Spectator*, said that "the ideology which undergirds the American press is congruent with, in some sense, the ideology of the Soviet Union" (though "to make any such observation is a complete violation of etiquette") and that "we do not hear. . . any explicit discussion of the socialist ideology and we certainly do not find any criticism of it in the news"—which requires one to exclude from "the news" the papers with the largest and second largest circulations in the country, *The Wall Street Journal* and *USA Today*.

Arnold Beichman, a Hoover fellow, said that "we are debating and negotiating among ourselves while the Soviet Union need debate nothing, protected as it is by a powerful liberal-left phalanx in the American media, the academy, the professions, and above all in the Congress of the United States." R. Emmett Tyrrell, the editor of *The American Spectator*, declared that the rock singer Madonna wore funny clothes because she was "influenced by American liberalism."

Directed Conclusions

"THE WHOLE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSERVative philosophy was really begun by just a handful of people," Michael Horowitz says, and he names Richard Larry, the grant director for the Sarah Scaife Foundation; Michael Joyce, the grant director for the Olin Foundation; and Leslie Lenkowsky, who once controlled grant awards for the Smith Richardson Foundation and moved to AEI after his nomination as deputy director of the U.S. Information Agency fell through because he became embroiled in the conflict over the agency's blacklisting of liberal speakers. "They understood that just by funding a few writers and a few chairs they could make a breakthrough." Scaife and Olin are principal donors to Heritage, CSIS, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Cato, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, *The American Spectator* magazine, the Committee on the Present Danger, the Manhattan Institute, the Capital Legal Foundation, the Reason Foundation, and other new conservative think tanks and foundations. Walter Williams—whose recent book *The State Against Blacks* contains such nuggets as "Discrimination may be defined as an act of choice based upon utility maximization"—Irving Kristol, the conservative criminologist Ernest van den Haag, and Richard McKenzie, a rising young market economist affiliated with Heritage and Cato, all hold John M. Olin chairs at their universities.

The regularity with which the same thinkers' names appear on think-tank rosters is as remarkable as the regularity with which Scaife and Olin are listed as donors. Kristol, the editor of *The Public Interest*, is also the publisher of the new neo-conservative journal *The National Interest*, a member of the board of editors for *Regulation*, an AEI fellow, a Hudson fellow, and an adviser to the Lehrman and Manhattan institutes. Midge Decter is a Heritage trustee, an Ethics and Public Policy Center director, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), a Hudson fellow, and an advisory-board member for *The National Interest*. Martin Anderson, of Hoover, is also a Hudson fellow, a Reason adviser, and a member of the board of the CPD. Michael Novak has affiliations with AEI, the CPD, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and Hudson; Ernest Lefever with the Ethics and Public Policy Center, the CPD, and Heritage; Thomas Gale Moore, of Hoover and recently named to the Council of Economic Advisers, with AEI, Cato, and Reason. James Buchanan, of the Center for Study of Public Choice, is also an adjunct scholar at AEI and Cato, and an adviser to Hoover, Reason, and the Political Economy Research Center. The leaders of the three major conservative think tanks—William Baroody, of AEI, Edwin Feulner, of Heritage, and David Abshire, of CSIS—once served together as aides to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird.

The recurrence of the same names makes it fair to ask if what appears to be a conservative intellectual groundswell is really just multiple manifestations of one phenomenon. Perhaps twenty years must pass before this question can be answered fully, but a reasonable guess is no. Since ideas run in cycles, an uprising against liberal theory was bound to occur someday (just as there will someday be a liberal revival in which some of the currently regnant conservative ideas are discredited). Equally important, during the 1970s millions of Americans came to the conclusion that liberalism was asleep at the wheel.

But now that conservatism is the fashion, the overlap of names and places suggests a society of like-minded people reinforcing one another's preconceived notions and rejecting any thinking that does not fit the mold—practicing what consultants call the art of "directed conclusions."

Cato, for example, flatly states that it will not release any study that calls for a government program. The institute's president, Edward Crane, says that he receives one or two commissioned reports each year that are "inconsistent," and he does not publish them. The analyst Jonathan Stein lost his job at CSIS several months after he published a book highly critical of Star Wars, the study of which is worth millions to think tanks that toe the line. (CSIS denies there was any connection.) AEI has criticized Reagan Administration decisions, but when I skimmed through its publications catalogue, I was hard pressed to find any title that looked as if it would upset a corporate sponsor—and the 1977 study "Lobbying: A Constitutionally Protected Right" probably did not dam-

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age that year's fund-raising campaign.

In 1983 Navy Secretary Lehman awarded management of the Center for Naval Analyses, a semi-independent organization similar to the Rand Corporation, to the Hudson Institute. This added $17 million to Hudson's consolidated revenues. Hudson, for its part, named Lehman's friend Francis West a vice-president and put under him a project on a "history of the 600-ship Navy," the Navy Secretary's most treasured goal. On contract to Hoosiers for Economic Development, Hudson issued a report on whether acid rain is really a problem. Hudson's headquarters is in Indianapolis; Indiana is a producer of the sulfur-bearing coals that cause acid rain. Take a wild guess as to what the Hoosiers for Economic Development study concludes.

The Heritage Foundation was among the first to notice the rising "military reform" movement (which is by no means anti-defense). In 1979 Heritage released a study endorsing military reform in general terms. Later it commissioned George W. S. Kuhn, a former Army captain, to write about the subject. Kuhn produced a report called "Ending Defense Stagnation," which was published as a chapter of the book *Agenda '83*, midway through the *Mandate* series. Kuhn's report named names of weapons that didn't work and military commands that were redundant. He concluded, "Increased spending is not buying improved strength."

Heritage management was initially enthusiastic about the study. A publicity blitz was mounted and copies were sent to the White House; there was considerable press coverage. Then the repercussions began. Caspar Weinberger was infuriated, probably because the report struck too close to home (several of the weapons and practices Kuhn criticized have been canceled or modified in the years since). Weinberger ordered each of the four services to write rebuttals. Lehman—who had been a roommate of Edwin Feulner's in Georgetown—sent the Navy rebuttal and an angry letter to Coors, who in turn called Feulner. Publicity efforts for the study instantly stopped. Kuhn was given the silent treatment, and no further Heritage work. References to his study have disappeared, Kremlin style, from Heritage literature.

To replace Kuhn, Heritage hired Theodore Crackel, a recently retired Army lieutenant colonel. According to Heritage sources, Crackel was chosen because it was believed that he would write nothing controversial: he was expected to produce ruminations about grand strategy, a general subject, without mentioning anything concerning money for specific contractors. To Heritage's dismay, Crackel proceeded to advocate reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other big taboo. Reportedly, Lehman went through the ceiling.

"There was pressure brought to bear to scuttle certain aspects of that story," Crackel, who now works for General Electric's military-planning division, told me recently. At first the report was to be published separately, but Lehman persuaded Feulner to withhold it, Crackel said. Eventually it was included as a chapter in *Mandate* II. "When it finally came out, Heritage made no effort to publicize it," Crackel said. "I had to call up newspapers myself to point out to them that it was in there."

While coming down hard on most government subsidies, Heritage has tiptoed lightly around the subject of the Synthetic Fuels Corporation. This federal agency is headed by Edward Noble, a trustee of the Samuel Robert Noble Foundation—which is one of Heritage's major contributors, having given more than $1.2 million. *Mandate* II contained a single paragraph criticizing the SFC; a thick Heritage book called *Free Market Energy* barely mentioned synfuels. In the spring of 1985, when abolition of the SFC began to seem likely (the House voted to terminate all synfuels spending, and Noble made an abortive attempt to award $744 million in extra subsidies before his authority expired), Heritage issued a backgrounder on "salvaging the Synthetic Fuels Corporation." The two synfuels projects that would have received most of the extra $744 million that Noble tried to confer are owned by Dow and Union Petrochemical. Both are listed by Heritage as "major" contributors.

Several conservative analysts to whom I mentioned these incidents answered by saying, Would Brookings in the 1960s have published a report attacking federal funds for mass transit or education? Perhaps not. But one side's mental blind spots hardly justify the other's.

Looking Out for Number One

A COMMON COMPLAINT ABOUT WASHINGTON INSTITUTIONS is that no matter how well intentioned they are at birth, by adolescence they have learned to put self-preservation ahead of purpose. Anti-poverty agencies provide nice livings for Ph.D.s and "service facilitators" but not much in the way of poverty reduction. Idealistic young lawyers come to town to file class-action suits and end up on K Street defending the Teamsters. Think tanks are established to fight the deficit and end up adding to it.

Since all the new conservative think tanks are nonprofit, donations to them are tax deductible—which means that each time their budgets grow, the federal debt grows as well. Inasmuch as most large individual contributors are in the 50 percent bracket, a $100 donation to a conservative think tank costs the donor $50 and the U.S. Treasury $50. A $100 corporate donation costs a company in the top, 46 percent bracket $54 and the Treasury $46. The government, in effect, pays half the cost of condemning government spending. Nonprofit status also permits conservative think tanks to use federally subsidized postal rates.

Walking through the halls at Heritage and Cato not long ago, I had to remind myself continually that, as a reporter, *I* was the one who represented private enterprise. The new think tanks are tax favored. They make their money not by selling products but by taking gifts. A high percentage of their scholars began at tax-supported universities, and the greatest aspiration for many is a government job. The major publications of conservatism—the think-tank periodicals, plus *Commentary*, *The Public Interest*, and *The American Spectator*—are produced by tax-exempt foundations operating off the dole.

Tax preferences are another of those phenomena that people object to "in principle" when what they really mean is that they object to who gets the deal. Since the liberal think tanks make use of nonprofit status, it would be unreasonable to expect the conservative think tanks not to. But their philosophy might lead one to expect them to call for the abolition of this indulgence, as part of the

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general campaign to reduce the federal deficit and lower taxes. This they most definitely do not do. In fact, one Reagan initiative that many new think tanks have fought is tax reform—because, while helping most taxpayers, it would hurt them.

Reagan's tax manifesto of November, 1984, known as Treasury I, proposed cutting the top individual rate to 35 percent and the top corporate rate to 33 percent, which would have substantially reduced the basic tax burden but would have raised the effective cost of $100 think-tank donations to $65 for an individual and $67 for a corporation. Treasury I would further have barred non-itemizers from claiming deductions for contributions and would have allowed itemizers to claim deductions only for gifts in excess of two percent of adjusted gross income (a level that few reach). These proposals were part of a plan to make taxes lower, simpler, and more neutral. The think tanks were not amused.

Heritage called on Reagan to stop "flirting with these 'flat' tax proposals" and instead seek gradual changes "over the next few years." The Heritage recommendations were written by Norman Ture, whose own Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation receives more favorable tax treatment under the status quo. When the second Reagan tax plan, Treasury II, which did away with the two-percent floor and made other concessions to nonprofit organizations, was released last spring, Heritage fired off a RUSH! memorandum labeling the new plan "a clear improvement."

Those who don't like government may chortle at the idea of using tax preferences to support anti-government theorizing, but the practice is offensive for two reasons. First, if the ultimate goal is to reduce the portion of GNP consumed by government—a fine goal—somebody somewhere must agree to surrender his special favors and pay his own way. No matter how much is done to cut the budget, as long as net spending is in deficit every dollar deducted from one person's taxes must be added either to someone else's or to the debt. Second, by using tax preferences the think tanks are dodging the "true cost" test that they advocate everyone else undergo. If giving $100 to thinkers creates $100 worth of value in the form of profound opinions, press clips, or whatever, why shouldn't it cost $100?

The Terms Transformed

BESIDES USING UP EVERY CONCEIVABLE VARIATION ON titles like "In Defense of a Free Market" and "Strategic Realities for the Eighties," what, on balance, have the new think tanks accomplished?

They've routed a generation of assumptions about government; today even Brookings's hottest scholar, Robert Crandall, is a market thinker. By and large the new conservatives have been graceful in victory—certainly more graceful than the liberal intellectuals who, during their heyday, in the 1960s, held the losing side in scalding contempt. They've created an intellectual competitor for the university system, which is good, and rendered it dependent on not offending corporate patrons, which is bad. They have produced a substantial body of worthwhile commentary but few true thunderbolts, considering the sums of money and time invested. "The really big ideas are not going to be funded," Kenneth Adelman says. He is both a think-tank alumnus and a paying customer of think tanks in his role as the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "Think tanks are good at controlled studies of specific questions. But the really big ideas, the breakthroughs, come from outside the system. They pop up in journals written by someone you never heard of who had no outside help."

Perhaps the most lasting contribution of the new think tanks is that they have transformed the terms of public-policy debate. In politics, words are map coordinates that show on whose territory a battle is being fought. Whenever liberalism succeeded in defining its goals as the public interest, in opposition to the private interest, victory was near. To the extent that conservatism can now define its goals in terms of the greater good, it can win on merit what it could once win only by quantity of campaign contributions.

One example of the transformation of terms is that discussions of entrepreneurship are now conducted using words like *spirit* and *vision*—glorifications, to be sure, but closer to the truth than some words of the 1960s, such as *greed*. Another example is the reaction to Charles Murray's *Losing Ground*, the Washington intellectual event of 1985. Murray's basic contention—that too much aid harms the poor—differs little from what George Gilder said in 1980 and Martin Anderson said in 1981. But Gilder and Anderson were mocked; Murray has been taken seriously. Now Glenn Loury and others have begun to say much the same thing without evoking a backlash—for example, that in public schools where the Great Society prescription of admission formulas, lower standards, and due process has been administered, minority achievement has declined.

It may be that thinkers like Murray and Loury will ultimately be judged wrong. But the terms of debate will never again be the same. Government-imposed solutions will no longer automatically be considered to be in the best interest of the poor, leaving only the question, How much can we afford? Nor will market-mediated approaches automatically be considered apologies for the rich, leaving only the question, How much will we let them get away with?

Equally important—and here's the good part—transforming the terms of debate has transformed conservatives themselves. The great fear regarding "warmed" conservative philosophy is that it conceals a hidden agenda: nice new reasons to ignore the luckless and the left out replace the nasty old ones. There's an element of this especially in the Republican country-club set. But just as the new terms of political discourse make it harder to be a limousine liberal, they make it harder to be a troglodyte. Reagan himself, in discussing the issues, now uses a vocabulary entirely different from that of his campaign days. His mean little anecdote about vodka bought with food stamps has disappeared, and it's hard to imagine it making a comeback. Precisely because the new think tanks have raised the standard of conservative thinking, conservative ideas that are poorly thought through or merely selfish stand much less chance today than they did in 1981.

"Look what happened to Anne Gorsuch," Michael Horowitz says. "She never spent any time at a think tank. She wasn't comfortable in the world of ideas. When it came time to make a decision, she would just check the

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Darts & Laurels

To Deputy Secretary of Defense William Howard Taft IV—for sticking his neck out in recent weeks to give NATO armaments cooperation the emphasis it warrants but hasn't had for years, and for supporting the initiatives of the US Ambassador to NATO, David M. Abshire, to make NATO armaments cooperation work by appointing Dennis E. Kloske, formerly Abshire's special advisor on such matters, as his own Special Advisor for NATO Armaments.

To Lt. Col. Harold W. Healy, USA—for quietly and smoothly orchestrating so many complex, important, and occasionally unpredictable trips to Europe by the Secretary of Defense. Healy works behind the scenes as the Military Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy. Thus, he integrates the policy/security/public affairs/protocol aspects of every visit Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger makes to Europe, and accompanies him on them to make sure things stay on track. Healy has one of the most important but unheralded jobs in the Pentagon. He keeps cool under fire, keeps his boss' boss' boss from being blind-sided by unexpected blivets, and skillfully deflects extraneous problems that might sidetrack national policy and Alliance cohesion.

To the US Congress—for once again failing to get its act together when it comes to funding national defense. Over the past few weeks, the Senate Armed Services Committee has been listening to reams of testimony on whether or not the Department of Defense should be reorganized. However, a crucial element in any such reorganization, virtually all sides agree, must also be a dramatic change in the way Congress oversees the Pentagon.

For several years running, Congressional appropriators have been funding billions that their colleagues on the respective authorizing committees never budgeted or approved, let alone held hearings on. Last fiscal year, for instance, DoD found itself the beneficiary of an unauthorized $2.8-billion in appropriated funds. This year the Senate appropriated *$7.2-billion* for Pentagon programs never authorized by the House Armed Services Committees.

The inevitable power struggles that result from such budget shenanigans confuse the public, weaken support for the military, tempt DoD to exploit such conflicts, and make DoD budgeting efforts difficult to the extreme. ■ ☆ ■

JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY 7 December 1985 (24) Pg. 1227

US Army pressing for heavy lift helicopter

THE US ARMY will continue to press for a development programme for a heavy lift helicopter capable of handling external payloads up to 35 tons, US officials report. The army had planned to resume work on the XCH-62 helicopter in this year's budget but it was cut from the proposal submitted to Congress because of budget constraints.

However, the army, which is the manager for the the Heavy Lift Research Vehicle project and is working with the navy, NASA and Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency, intends to resurrect the request in the coming year.

The army has said its original justification for the XCH-62 still exists, in that there is a valid military need for a 35-ton lift capability.

If it had received the proposed $25 million in research money this year, it would have led to a construction completion and flight demonstration of the HLRV beginning in 1989.

The service stresses that the vehicle will be strictly for technology development research. Its Advanced Cargo Rotorcraft programme is the future planned heavy lift vehicle; this is intended for full-scale engineering development in 1995 and will use the information gained from the HLRV, officials said.

IDEAS...from Pg.11-SR

box marked *C* for *conservative* without understanding why or following any vision other than her desire to be loyal to the Administration.

"But for her loyalty the White House caught hell over and over again, and the EPA was reduced to a circus. Other people, like William Baxter [the former assistant attorney general for antitrust] and Jim Miller [the Office of Management and Budget administrator], have accomplished far more in real policy terms than Gorsuch, without causing any shouts in the night, because they were at home in the world of ideas."

Horowitz, who when I interviewed him was working in the Old Executive Office Building, ranked among the very few people in Washington who actually had a window commanding a view of the White House. "Look out that window," he said. "Do you know how I got here? Ideas. Ideas do count. Ideas move nations." □

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Enduring Misconceptions about the Soviet Union

Paul Hollander

I have been teaching courses on Soviet society since 1963 and have published books and articles on Soviet affairs during that period. From the beginning of my life in the United States, I have been impressed by how difficult it is even for educated Americans to understand the Soviet system and by how little help is given by schools, colleges, mass media, and opinion leaders. I have recently come to the conclusion that there has been little, if any, progress in public understanding of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, misconceptions and wrongheaded stereotypes persist, modified by occasional semantic innovations or trendy concepts.

Learning about the Soviet system has never been easy. The language barrier, a secretive regime, lack of opportunity for field studies, and limited scholarly contacts have all combined to limit the flow of information. Even today, only a handful of social scientists specialize in Soviet studies or teach courses about Soviet society. Over the years, I have come to realize, however, that the problem has not been the lack of information as such, and under Khrushchev and Brezhnev it even became easier to learn about certain aspects of Soviet society, with Soviet social scientists and journalists contributing to the growth of knowledge and providing occasional revelations that had formerly been proscribed.

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Numerous authentic accounts of Soviet concentration camps had been published in the West before Solzhenitsyn's Gulag series, though they received little attention. There was likewise information about the less genial aspects of Stalin's personality before Khrushchev addressed himself to the topic at the 20th Party Congress. Public awareness of such matters, however, remained negligible. Curiously enough, even before anti-communism had the unsavory reputation (in liberal circles, at any rate) it later acquired as a consequence of the activities of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy, a thorough understanding of the Soviet system was a rare phenomenon. Anti-communists, moreover, were no better informed than the sympathizers or those otherwise inclined to give Soviet authorities the benefit of the doubt.

I have gradually come to realize that it is not information about the actual state of affairs in Soviet society—published in scholarly journals by well-funded researchers with the requisite language skills—that determines U.S. beliefs about and attitudes toward the Soviet Union. They are determined rather by domestic political and cultural conditions and by "climates of opinion."

American and Western misconceptions of the Soviet Union have a long and remarkable history—as long as that of the Soviet Union itself. I have documented and analyzed many of these misconceptions in a study entitled *Political Pilgrims* (Hollander 1981, 1983).

WISHFUL THINKING

Except for Billy Graham's praise for Soviet religious freedom and for the caviar generously provided for distinguished visiting dignitaries like himself (Hollander 1983, 278–79), nothing today quite matches the bizarre misconceptions and grotesque misperceptions common in the 1930s and early 1940s among some of the most revered intellectuals and public figures of the times. These included such writers, philosophers, scientists, and journalists as Louis Aragon, Henri Barbusse, J.D. Bernal, Bertolt Brecht, Malcolm Cowley, John Dewey, Theodore Dreiser, W.E.B. Dubois, Lion Feuchtwanger, Louis Fisher, Julian Huxley, Harold Laski, Pablo Neruda, Romain Rolland, Jean-Paul Sartre, G.B. Shaw, Upton Sinclair, Anna Louise Strong, H.G. Wells, Edmund Wilson, and many others.

It is significant that admiration for the Soviet Union peaked between the late 1920s and the mid-1930s—that is, during the period of the forced collectivization of agriculture and the attendant famines, the Purge, the establishment of the cult of Stalin, and the Moscow trials. This suggests that the actual nature of a political system and its evaluation by outsiders may be entirely independent of each other. Generations of Western visitors—especially during the 1930s—managed to tour the USSR and see nothing but the fairyland carefully fabricated by their hosts to shield them from unpleasant impressions and experiences.

Western intellectuals who visited the Soviet Union in the 1930s were characterized by an overwhelmingly favorable predisposition to project upon the Soviet Union their hopes and expectations. They were particularly impressed by the sense of purpose and community they discovered, the sense of justice and social equality, the dedication and sincerity of the leaders, the spirit of popular participation, the rise of the New Soviet Man, and the humaneness of the political system, including its enlightened penal policies.

That such erroneous beliefs and misperceptions could exist suggests that predisposition predetermines perception and that conditions in Western societies generated expectations for which fulfillment was sought elsewhere. American intellectuals and opinion leaders thus flocked to the Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s looking for alternatives to the economic and social bankruptcy of the Depression years. The Soviet Union with its planned economy, full employment, and (specious) political stability presented an appealing antithesis to the crisis-ridden societies of the West.

That phenomenon recurred in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. In the 1960s, the attention of American intellectuals was drawn to Cuba, a new revolutionary society of great apparent vitality that presented striking contrast to the racial problems, social injustice, and empty affluence the critics deplored in the United States. Involvement in the Vietnam War intensified the quest for more just and peaceful societies, which some believed they had found in Cuba, North Vietnam, or Mao's China. Sympathy for yet another Marxist-Leninist society sprang up in the 1980s when the actions and policies of the Reagan presidency gave rise to a new wave of social criticism and political estrangement that found emotionally satisfying expression in championing Nicaragua, which was seen as a victim of the Reagan administration and earlier American policy. In each instance, the idealization and misperception of Marxist-Leninist societies were conditioned by domestic discontents.

Among the recurring misconceptions is the belief that the Soviet system, stimulated by vigorous trade with the United States, is on the verge of recognizing the advantages of the free enterprise system and embracing the benefits of capitalistic methods of production and distribution. By doing so, Soviet leaders would thus gracefully preside over the gradual transformation and humaniza-

tion of their system, and new capitalistic techniques would effect liberalization within both the cultural and political realm.

The readiness to attribute such propensities to Soviet leaders—besides being a manifestation of wishful thinking, a major and most enduring influence on American attitudes toward the Soviet Union derives from a pragmatic disposition that is reluctant to believe that political leaders can take ideas and ideologies seriously. The English author, Claude Cockburn, commented on these attitudes as early as the late 1920s: "Wall Street men . . . looked upon the USSR . . . as in effect just another fast-developing area with a big trade potential . . . as though the Revolution and the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism were puerile incidents, temporary deviations from the ultimate forward movement of the world alongside businesslike American lines" (Cockburn 1958, 123). William Barrett, in turn, observed in 1946 that "the fellow travellers . . . would love to believe that Russia is capitalist at heart, and so no worse, and therefore just as good—by God!—as anybody else" (Barrett 1982, 247). More recently, Joseph Finder paraphrased a current version of this outlook: "[A] taste of capitalism would turn the old men of the Politburo from increasing military stockpiles to improving the Russian way of life" (Finder 1983, 316).

Of late, the plea for more trade and the desire for more profit have acquired an uplifting moral justification—namely, that trade will not only be profitable but assure lasting peace. As Donald M. Kendall of the Pepsi Corporation put it, "We should give the Soviet Union a stake in peace which we are best prepared to give through trade" (Kendall 1983).

Generations of American business leaders such as Cyrus Eaton, Armand Hammer, Averell Harriman, and David Rockefeller entertained such ideas, finding it genuinely difficult to believe that Soviet leaders' calculations of cost-benefit ratios could be significantly different from their own or from these of any self-respecting head of a major business corporation. Efforts to assimilate the image of the Soviet Union to that of a modern business corporation have also been assisted by occasional scholarly efforts—for example, Alfred G. Meyer's conception of "USSR Incorporated" —that focus on the allegedly universal characteristics of modern bureaucratic organizations, which transcend political and ideological boundaries (Hollander 1983, 67–77, 105–14).

Probably the major source of such misconceptions of the Soviet system and the conduct and aspiration of its leaders is to be found in the related processes of projection and wishful thinking. They have been with us for a long time but have of late been given new impetus by the fear of nuclear war. Wishful thinking regarding Soviet foreign policy typically manifests itself in minimizing Soviet aggression when it occurs and in questioning any aggressive intent when it can be inferred from ideology or policy statements. The wishful observer accepts Soviet statements at their face value when they convey benevolent attitudes but disbelieves them when they reflect hostility or belligerence. In the latter case, they are viewed as mere rhetoric produced for domestic consumption, or dismissed as ideological window dressing, issued to please a few aged diehards or hawks left over from the days of Stalin. The combination of pragmatic and wishful thinking enables many Americans to play down simultaneously both the Soviet expressions of hostility and its ideological underpinnings.

It is not hard to understand why so many American businessmen, journalists, politicians, and peace activists have been disposed to deny or belittle the ideological foundations and determinants of Soviet attitudes and policies. If they were taken seriously, they would render Soviet expansionism more plausible and more highly patterned—the very phenomenon these groups prefer to ignore. The more seriously Soviet leaders take their ideology, the less likely will they be to accommodate the West, to behave like heads of just another status quo power, and to put domestic shortages ahead of foreign-policy objectives. Crediting them with serious ideological commitments also clashes with the image of a team of pragmatic, technocratic, managerial types wishful Americans have favored for decades. Even a perception of the Soviet Union as merely obeying the imperatives and dynamics of great-power status and filling the vacuum left by the other great powers is more comforting than the image of a political system propelled by a messianic urge to spread the true belief and export institutions that support it. When, therefore, Soviet expansionism is reluctantly acknowledged, it tends to be viewed by wishful thinkers as limited in its objectives, capable of satisfaction or appeasement, and a mere continuation of the age-old Russian quest for security.

Wishful thinking comes into play on those occasions when Soviet conduct is particularly painful to contemplate and when its realistic interpretation tends to undermine the observer's sense of security. Thus Vladimir Bukovsky, the Soviet dissident, observed:

> Even the most undeniable facts —like the shooting down of the Korean airliner . . . or the invasion of Afghanistan—failed to change public opinion in the West. Instead . . . Soviet behavior in both cases has prompted many to look for more "rational" explanation of Soviet motives . . . And more often than not, these explanations tend to blame the Western governments rather than the Soviet.

> In general, whenever a person is confronted with something mind-boggling . . . horrible and beyond his control, he goes through a succession of mental states ranging from denial to guilt, from fantastic rationalizations to acute depression. (Bukovsky 1986)

Wishful thinking often appears in conjunction with efforts to "understand" Soviet behavior. Long before the earnest present-day appeals to goodwill and understanding on behalf of peace and friendship, William Barrett had spotted and criticized this attitude as early as 1946. To the advice that "we must be neither for nor against Russia, but we must try to understand her," Barrett responded: "Analogously, we should have been neither for nor against Hitler, but simply have tried to understand him" (Barrett 1983, 254).

THE THERAPEUTIC APPROACH

Barrett's comment is a reminder that appeals to "understand" and thereby regard with a measure of sympathy the behavior of either individuals or political entities are always made selectively. Just as few pleaded for sympathetically understanding the Nazis, so today few would argue for sympathetically understanding the Afrikaners and their abhorrent policies of segregation and discrimination. The obvious reason such arguments are not made is that doing so would blunt the edge of moral indignation toward South African whites. By way of contrast, appeals for understanding the Soviet leaders and their policies have proliferated in the 1980s, giving rise to what I have called the therapeutic approach toward Soviet behavior. George F. Kennan, for example, wrote:

> [T]hese Soviet Communists with whom we will now have to deal are flesh-and-blood people like ourselves, misguided if you will but no more guilty than we are of the circumstances into which they were born. They too, like ourselves, are simply trying to make the best of it. (Kennan 1983)

Elsewhere Kennan lapsed into a clinical vocabulary in describing Soviet leaders and the reason they deserve understanding and sympathy. He saw them as having "a congenital sense of insecurity" and a "neurotic fear of penetration," as being "easily frightened," and further characterized them as frustrated, obsessive, secretive, defensive, fixated, troubled and anxious (Kennan 1982, 153). He also perceived them

> as a group of quite ordinary men [the "banality of evil" thesis of Hannah Arendt], to some extent victims . . . of the ideology on which they have been reared, but shaped far more importantly by the discipline of responsibilities . . . as rulers of a great country . . . more seriously concerned to preserve the present limits of their political power than to expand those limits . . . whose motivation is essentially defensive . . . whose attention is riveted primarily on the unsolved problems of economic development within their own country. (Kennan 1982, 64–65)

Kennan and his followers have viewed the Soviet Union as being in the grip of necessity and without alternatives—constrained or propelled by a form of selective historical determinism that deprives it of sensible choices, though it allows great freedom of action to its adversaries. A historical destiny, it

is claimed, compels the Soviet Union to act sometimes imprudently, to expand, to conquer (or at least not to relinquish conquests), to repress dissent at home, and to conduct itself generally in ways that Western observers view with regret and distaste, but, more importantly, with understanding and never judgmentally. Thus, for example, Jerry Hough advises against a "rush to judgment" of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and generally appreciates the influence of "feelings of anger and grievance on Soviet policy" (Hough 1980).

This therapeutic approach is discernible in various degrees in the work of such scholars as Steven Cohen, Stanley Hoffman, Jerry Hough, Theodore von Laue, Marshall Shulman, and their younger colleagues of the "revisionist" school of Soviet historiography (Kenez 1986).

One major premise of this approach is the insistence that Western scholars and politicians not employ culturally conditioned Western criteria in their interpretation and evaluation of Soviet affairs. They must be aware, for instance, that what appears as aggressive behavior to us may be only the acting out of historically conditioned insecurities and apprehensions. In the therapeutic approach, unattractive forms of Soviet behavior —including abusive rhetoric and hostile propaganda—must not be protested overmuch but excused rather as due to a difficult past. Such tolerance will generate trust and promote better international and Soviet-American relations.

Some of the associated premises bolstering the therapeutic approach are: (1) the Soviet Union is a status quo power; (2) there is a basic symmetry between the superpowers; (3) many or most of the tensions between them result from mutually reinforcing misperceptions and misunderstandings; (4) anti-Soviet or anti-communist attitudes are basically irrational; (5) the Cold War was the reflection for the most part of such attitudes rather than a genuine conflict of interests; and (6) when the relations between the superpowers are warmer and friendlier, Soviet domestic policies become more liberal. Such components and correlates of the therapeutic approach have recently received increasing vocal expression and have been assimilated into the ideology of the peace movement, which insists that only the kind of understanding sketched above will avert nuclear holocaust (Hollander 1985).

A culmination of the non-judgmental, therapeutic approach was the attempt by the historian Theodore von Laue to restore the image of Stalin morally and historically.

Laue's vision of Stalin is inseparable from the conception of Russia as the underdog and eternal victim, which required a Stalin as the tough-minded redeemer of his victimized nation. As is often the case, Laue's hesitancy at condemning Stalin or the Soviet Union is more than balanced by his animosity toward the United States and his indignation toward his more judgmental colleagues:

> American and Western historians have sat solemnly and self-righteously in judgement of Stalin. One wondered by what right, by what standards, by what power of their imagination? How can the bookish tribe of scholars judge the harsh realities which shaped Stalin and his judgement? . . . Our sights cleared at last, we are left to praise Stalin as a tragic giant set into the darkest part of the twentieth century . . .
>
> Praise then to the strength and fortitude of mind and body that raised Stalin to such heights—and compassion too for his frailties. (Von Laue 1981)

In other statements, Laue undertook to save us from the "guilt of moral imperialism." His reassessment of Stalin represents a bizarre culmination of a one-sided historical determinism that cast the Soviet Union once and for all in the role of an underdog nation and sought to explain or excuse every aspect of Soviet conduct as the outcome of the imperatives of modernization in the face of supposedly insuperable odds and obstacles. The halo earned in the course of this uphill struggle was viewed as also belonging to Stalin.

The therapeutic approach may give rise to therapeutic appeasement, which differs from ordinary appeasement by the circuitous justification that it is not based, as is more customary, on the overwhelming strength of the power to be appeased but on its weakness. This type of appeasement is more acceptable psychologically and politically than one that justifies appeasement on the basis of the adversary's superior strength, since the latter acknowledges one's own weakness or fear. When a policy of appeasement is predicated upon the weakness, insecurity, or folly of the other side, the appeaser thereby assumes a superior, mature, and rational role. Why fight over banana republics, tribal countries in Africa, sundry quagmires, remote unimportant places like Angola or Afghanistan? Let them have Grenada, Benin, or the Malagasy Republic if that will make them happy. Let them gratify the childish, irrational, grabby impulses bred by their historical insecurity. We understand it all!

Some of these attitudes are not limited to relations with the Soviet Union but are linked to what Irving Kristol called "the liberal theory of antisocial behav-

ior" in international affairs. In his view, the State Department has for some time "implicitly subscribed to what Philip Rieff called the 'therapeutic ethic,' according to which undisciplined nations would be chided for their transgressions . . . and would thereby learn to behave in a 'proper' and 'socially responsible' way. Even the strategy of containment of the Soviet Union had this theory behind it" (Kristol 1986, 11). While such a theory applies to the Soviets insofar as their transgressions are seen as a temporary course of conduct that can be outgrown, there has been less emphasis on chiding than on forbearance and understanding.

As was noted earlier, projection is another mechanism that—in conjunction with wishful thinking and the therapeutic understanding—creates a distorted image of the Soviet Union. It comes into play when Soviet policies, institutions, and leaders are cast into forms familiar to the American experience. They have their hard lines and we have ours; their military lobbies for a larger slice of the budget pie and so does ours; they have their self-perpetuating bureaucracies and so do we; their leaders are under pressure to satisfy a public that demands more consumer goods and has no stomach for military adventures, while Americans pressure their elected representatives to spend more on human welfare and less on arms; their leaders believe no more in their ideological pronouncements than American politicians making speeches on the stump; they are as interested in the balance of power and global peace as we are. We blundered into Vietnam; they were drawn into Afghanistan. Similar projections by our business tycoons attributed Western economic rationality to Soviet political leaders.

FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS

The convergence of projection and wishful thinking is especially pronounced when a new Soviet leader emerges and is greeted with effusive expressions of hope and confident anticipation that he will behave like an American politician. As a critic of such perceptions puts it:

> Andropov's accession to power . . . was accompanied by a corresponding ennoblement of his image. Suddenly he became in *The Wall Street Journal* "silver-haired and dapper." His stature, previously reported in *The Washington Post* as an unimpressive "five feet eight inches," was abruptly elevated to "tall and urbane." *The Times* noted that Andropov "stood conspicuously taller than most" Soviet leaders and that "his spectacles, intense gaze, and donnish demeanor gave him the air of a scholar."
>
> Soon there were reports that Andropov was a man of extraordinary accomplishment . . . . According to an article in *The Washington Post*, Andropov "is fond of cynical political jokes with an anti-regime twist . . . collects abstract art, likes jazz . . . swims, plays tennis, and wears clothes that are sharply tailored in West European style . . . ." *The Wall Street Journal* added that Andropov "likes Glenn Miller records, good Scotch whisky, Oriental rugs, and American books." To the list of his musical favorites *Time* added "Chubby Checker, Frank Sinatra, Peggy Lee and Bob Eberly" and . . . said that he enjoyed singing "hearty renditions of Russian songs" at after-theater parties. The *Christian Science Monitor* suggested that he has "tried his hand at writing verse . . . of a comic variety."
>
> According to *The Washington Post* Yuri Andropov is "a perfect host" . . . . (Epstein 1983)

More recently, similarly excited expectations were generated by Gorbachev's rise to power—an even more suitable target for wishful projections, since he is younger than his predecessors and boasts a well-dressed wife.

Members of a recent U.S. congressional delegation to Moscow came away with highly favorable impressions of Gorbachev, whom they perceived (as virtually all his predecessors also had been) as a man "we can do business with."

Speaker of the House Thomas O'Neill was impressed "not only with his politician's informality but also with [his] solid grasp of the issues and of American politics." O'Neill found him "easy and gracious. He is like one of those New York corporation lawyers." Senator Paul S. Sarbanes, a Maryland Democrat, suggested that the way Mr. Gorbachev "makes his points, as a lawyer does in reasoned fashion," made the Americans wonder whether he could be argued into compromises. Silvio Conte, a Massachusetts Republican, thought that "he would be a good candidate for New York City . . . a sharp dresser . . . [a] smooth guy." Robert Byrd, Senate Minority Leader, noted that "He is a younger man, educated, clever, and trained as a lawyer." As Hedrick Smith summed it up, "Mr. Gorbachev's mixture of wit and argument and his informal manner left several senators feeling as if they had met an American-style politician in the Kremlin" (Smith 1985).

Clearly, Americans are eager to see Soviet politics and politicians in a highly personalized manner, as counterparts of American politics and politicians and portrayed as American politics is portrayed by the American media. Emphasis on the personal characteristics of Soviet leaders helps to humanize and assimilate them into the familiar American political and cultural context, makes them less threatening, and diminishes the significance of their ideologi-

cal convictions and political values.

It should be pointed out that such projections are not merely or invariably the products of wishful thinking. Projection is also encouraged by simple ignorance and becomes a device for filling in the gaps of one's knowledge of Soviet behavior, policies, or institutions. In the absence of information to the contrary, it is tempting to assume that people all over the world have social and political arrangements, beliefs, and values similar to one's own. This tendency is strengthened by what remains of the American belief in universal progress: that countries all over the world will gradually and naturally gravitate toward some kind of political democracy; that it is difficult to rule people against their will; that human nature is basically good and sooner or later finds expression; that material improvements and political liberalization go hand in hand as do universal education and demands for liberty. Some of these beliefs also find their way into the so-called convergence theory of modern industrial societies, which predicts the gradual liberalization of Soviet society. The hope that a new Soviet leader will be better than his predecessor may be linked to the American cultural belief that change is usually for the better.

The major source of projection is thus an ingrained inability to conceive that political institutions, cultural traditions, and conditions of life elsewhere are different from one's own. People project their fantasies and their conceptions of ideal social arrangements upon distant countries.

REVISIONIST SCHOLARSHIP

Benign images of the Soviet Union examined herein have their roots in genuine political change—such as that which followed Stalin's death—but also in wishful thinking. Some scholarly reflection favorable to the Soviet system has rejected the concept of totalitarianism, which had previously been used to characterize the Soviet Union. Several years ago, I wrote that the concept of

> totalitarianism . . . has come under heavy criticism both by those who have come to believe that it has *never* been a useful concept and by those who think that it has been rendered obsolete by social change in the Soviet Union. The applicability of pluralism to American society in turn has been questioned most forcefully by C. Wright Mills and his numerous followers. Note that the growing denial of pluralism in American society by one group of social scientists has been paralleled by an increasing imputation of pluralism to the Soviet Union by another group. Indeed the search for signs of pluralism (however feeble or minor) in the Soviet Union has been just as determined and purposeful as the pursuit of data to prove its nonexistence in the United States! These two endeavors have been carried out by different groups of scholars, yet they spring from the same underlying "Zeitgeist," which prompts many American intellectuals to approach their own society in the most critical spirit and other societies fearful of being critical—increasingly haunted by the specter of self-righteousness." (Hollander 1973, 110)

The state of affairs described thirteen years ago is still with us. In the 1980s, the desire to see evidences of pluralism in the Soviet Union persists as does also skepticism about pluralism in American society. Jerry Hough, for example, stated that the Soviet leadership under Brezhnev "almost seems to have made the Soviet Union closer to the spirit of the pluralist model of American political science than is the United States." He also discerned that there existed in the USSR political participation as meaningful as that in the United States and an effort to create constitutional restraints within the Soviet leadership (Powell 1979, 111–12). Hough's perception of political participation in the Soviet Union is colored by a reluctance to distinguish between pseudo-participation that is a ritualistic endorsement of high level decisions performed under duress and official pressure on the one hand and participation that is voluntary and can influence the political process on the other (Hough and Fainsod 1970, 297–98).

The concept of totalitarianism remains discredited by and large and at any rate is inapplicable to the Soviet system (Cohen 1985), and a new school of revisionist scholarship has arisen that seeks to redefine—sometimes retroactively—the character of the Soviet system. The main thrust of this revisionist historiography has aimed at minimizing centralized authoritarianism in Soviet social and political transformations. Peter Kenez commented on such endeavors as follows:

> In the writings of the revisionists there is no ambiguity. Denying the extraordinary nature and importance of state intervention in the life of society is at the very heart of their interpretation of the 1930s . . . . Stalinism disappears as a phenomenon. In their presentation the politics of the 1930s was humdrum politics: interest groups fought with one another; the government was simply responding either to public pressure or . . . [that] of circumstances, such as the bad harvest . . . . [T]he Soviet government

> was just like any other government operating in difficult circumstances. This view is utterly contrary to all available evidence. (Kenez 1986, 4–5)

Arch J. Getty, in his book *The Origin of the Great Purges* (1985), has presented a revisionist account of the Purges—the most ambitious attempt to date to rehabilitate the Soviet system by removing the stains of the past from the present by denying or overlooking the past and its greatest moral outrage. Kenez comments:

> The very title . . . leads one to expect an explanation for one of the bloodiest terrors in history. It soon turns out, however, that for Getty the purges meant above all a revision of party rolls . . . . He then proceeds to devote far more space to the 1935 exchange of party cards than to mass murder. He adds, rather disingenuously, that he will not discuss in detail the bloody aspects of his story, for that has been done by others . . . . His choice of subject matter reminds one of a historian who chooses to write an account of a shoe factory operating in . . . Auschwitz. He uses many documents and he does not falsify the material. He decides not to use all available sources and dismisses the testimony of survivors as "biased." Instead he concentrates on factory records. He discusses matters of production, supply and marketing . . . . He does not notice the gas chambers. (Kenez 1986, 8–9)

THE POST-VIETNAM ERA

In the 1960s and early 1970s, perceptions of the Soviet Union were conditioned by U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Those preoccupied with critiques of American society were disinclined to dwell on flaws of its foreign critics and adversaries, including the Soviet Union. In the 1980s, other influences have come into play. At every level of American society—from grass-roots nuclear-freeze activists and promoters of sister cities and nuclear-free zones to members of Congress and State Department officials—the specter of nuclear war has become a determinant of the images held of the Soviet Union. As a rule, the more fervent the desire for peace at any price and the more vivid the visions of the nuclear holocaust and its imminence, the greater the internal pressure has been to redefine the nature of the Soviet system and discount criticisms directed against it. Insofar as the totalitarian image of the Soviet Union invited strong criticism and stressed the uniquely repressive characteristics of such societies, it had to be jettisoned—at first by experts, and then by the media and by the educated general public.

A 1984 survey by Daniel Yankelovitch and John Dole illustrates the relationship between the fear of nuclear war and the changing conceptions of the Soviet Union and what attitudes toward it were considered appropriate. It was found that "Americans have come to believe that nuclear war is unwinnable, unsurvivable." Moreover, "the public now is having second thoughts about the dangers of . . . an assertive posture at a time when the United States is no longer seen to maintain nuclear superiority."

The Vietnam defeat made a distinctive contribution to the development of these attitudes: "From our Vietnam experience, voters draw the lesson that we must keep uppermost in mind the limits of American power . . . . [W]e must avoid being provocative and confrontational." Clearly, there has been an upsurge of fear about nuclear war. Of those surveyed, 38 percent believe that such a war is likely to occur within the next ten years and 50 percent of those who believe this are under 30. It may be noted that such fears suggest a connection between trust in deterrence on the one hand and American nuclear superiority on the other. In other words, it appears that people felt less threatened when U.S. superiority was unquestioned than when a different balance of power is established.

The Yankelovitch survey found a readiness on the part of Americans to blame their country for the poor relations with the Soviet Union: "Huge majorities (76 percent of those surveyed) feel that America has been less forthcoming in working things out with the Russians than it might be and that we have to share some of their blame for the deterioration in the relationship." It is significant that, according to the findings of this survey, younger and better educated Americans are more willing to give the benefit of doubt to the Soviet regime and indicate more trusting attitudes: "[T]hey are almost totally free of the ideological hostility that the majority of Americans feel toward the Soviet Union." Even more significant, these younger Americans are more skeptical in some ways of their own authorities than of those of the Soviet Union: "[Y]oung Americans . . . believe the degree of Soviet cheating is overstated by those who oppose negotiating with them." Fifty-nine percent of those under 30 expressed this view.

While most respondents expressed great fear of nuclear war, the Soviet Union itself was seen as less threatening, a country not interested in expanding its influence or imposing its social-political systems on others. Thus "by a margin of 67 percent to 28 percent, people agree that we should let the communists have their system while we

have ours, that 'there is room in the world for both.'" Likewise, "by a margin of 59 percent to 19 percent, Americans also say we would be better off if we stopped treating the Soviets as enemies and tried to hammer out our differences in a live-and-let-live spirit" (Yankelovitch and Dole 1984, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39–40, 43, 44–45). Evidently, neither survey designers nor respondents gave much thought to the possibility that the Soviet Union may be deeply committed to a hostile view of the United States and that such an attitude has deep ideological and political roots.

What exactly is the connection between the peace movements and the fear of nuclear war? The most plausible answer is that these movements emerge in response to such fears and reflect them. At the same time, the peace and anti-nuclear movements themselves stimulate such fears by constantly dwelling on the horrors of nuclear destruction and their likelihood unless the policies they advocate are introduced. Much of what goes under "peace studies" in schools and colleges consists of the vividly detailed depiction of the gruesome consequences of nuclear war (Adelson 1985, Ryerson 1986).

If, as suggested earlier, the peace and anti-nuclear movements have become a major influence on perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s—and a major source of reinvigorated misconceptions of it—it is important to understand the characteristics and origins of these movements and the broader cultural and political context in which they function. The most immediate cause for their resurgence appears to be the installation of intermediate-range missiles by NATO in Western Europe, a measure which stimulated vigorous Soviet effort to thwart such action by diplomatic, political, and propaganda campaigns. While the Soviet Union sought to stimulate and infiltrate Western peace movements in order to achieve such specific goals (Bukovsky 1982, Radosh 1983) ,these activities were probably also conditioned by a changed vision of the West, and especially the United States, in the post-Vietnam era. In the words of two Hungarian émigré scholars:

> They [Soviet leaders] are more and more convinced especially after Vietnam and the Watergate affair (which for them was the ultimate proof of the contemptible lack of authority in this unruly society), that the West has very weak knees and that a combination of menacing gestures and peace-loving phrases will force Western countries. into important political and economic concessions. (Feher and Heller 1983, 148)

It is of interest to note that Western susceptibilities to apocalyptic fears have deep roots and preceded the invention of nuclear weapons. Today, it is largely forgotten that, as Malcolm Muggeridge recalls, similar sentiments were widespread before the outbreak of World War II:

> We had all been talking about war, for, literally, years past. It would be the end of civilization . . . . Our cities would be razed to the ground in the twinkling of the eye . . . . There is no defense against aerial bombardment. Many thus held forth with great vigour and authority at dinner tables, in clubs and railway carriages; as did leading articles, sermons . . . after-dinner speeches at gatherings like the League of Nations Union and the Peace Pledge Union . . . . Books appeared interminably on the subject with lurid blurbs . . . . Films were made about it, garden fêtes dedicated to it, tiny tots lisped rhymes about it. All agreed that another war was unthinkable, unspeakable, inconceivable and must at all costs be averted. (Muggeridge 1974, 73)

Such a sense of impending doom before World War II followed closely upon the heels of the Depression and the economic crisis and social dislocations it produced; it was a time conducive to a vision of the West as decadent and worthy of being judged severely—perhaps of being destroyed. Similarly unflattering images of the West, and especially of the United States, are rife today: heedlessly immersed in an irrational and lethal arms race, misusing its science and technology, polluting its environment, appropriating the resources of the world for purposes of frivolous consumption, exploiting the Third World, becoming increasingly impersonal, bureaucratized, and dehumanized —it is hardly surprising if such images inspire (or reflect) loathing and the attendant anticipation of impending, well-deserved punishment. As Feher and Heller put it, "The Doomsday atmosphere . . . has to be understood in a literal sense . . . . The ultimate content of this anxiety is the emphatic feeling of a New Fall . . . the conviction that 'progress' was poison" (Feher and Heller 1983, 161).

ENHANCING TRUST

As if to counteract these terrifying visions, which the peace movement itself has helped to stimulate and perpetuate, ideologues and activists have begun to emphasize the unity of mankind, the humanity and basic goodness of ordinary people, and, more specifically, the redeeming results of grass-roots contacts between American and Soviet citizens. Activities enhancing understanding and trust are encouraged—peace

cruises and peace treks, jointly climbing mountains, riding bicycles, singing folk songs, attending storytellers' conferences, playing volleyball, eating hamburgers, exchanging photos of children, women sharing special concerns about peace and war. Such attitudes were not limited to peace activists. Charles Wick, head of the U.S. Information Agency said: "The exciting thing about this [exchange] agreement is that it will promote the kind of understanding and mutual trust . . . on which can be built a genuine foundation for genuine arms control. When people understand each other, governments cannot be far behind" (Samuel 1986, 102-3).

In fact a curious duality permeates the peace movement, a readiness to oscillate between profound gloom and childlike optimism. On the one hand, the imminence of nuclear holocaust is endlessly reiterated, and its horrors are conjured up in the darkest colors. On the other hand, it is constantly stressed that the conflict between the superpowers has, in effect, no objective basis but is a product of irrational, mutually reinforcing fears, misunderstandings, misperceptions, stereotypes, and mistrust, that can be dispelled only by personal warmth and an abundance of contacts and meetings by the citizens of the two countries. It follows that views critical of the Soviet Union harm the cause of peace and impede mutual understanding because they engender or reinforce mistrust and suspicion that in turn fuel the arms race. The similarities, not the differences, are emphasized: "People who cultivate wheat can't possibly want war" (Howard 1986, 122). A member of an American women's delegation seeking dialogue wrote: "What we lacked in knowledge we made up for in enthusiasm, and we shared a sort of innocent faith that the women of our two countries were probably more alike than different" (Russell 1983, 41).

The proposition that a major source of tension between the two countries has been due to misperceptions and misunderstandings has also been adopted by such specialists on Soviet affairs as Marshall Shulman of Columbia University (formerly of the State Department). He wrote: "The hostility did not grow out of any natural antipathy between the peoples of the two countries but with the passage of time each has come to be so persuaded of the malign intent of the other that it has become difficult to distinguish what is real and what is fancied in the perceptions each holds of the other" (Shulman 1984, 63). Richard Barnett, author of *The Giants,* argued that "the cold war is a history of mutually reinforcing misconceptions" and that "monumental misunderstandings" occurred in Soviet-American relations (Barnett 1976, 95, 14).

Peace activists took it upon themselves to dispel such misconceptions and prevent the rise of new ones. A much-favored method, which became highly popular in the 1980s, has been the establishment of ties between American and Soviet communities in the framework of the sister-city program. The latter firmly embraced, in effect institutionalized, the major American misconceptions and illusions about Soviet society and especially its political institutions.

In my own town—Northampton, Massachusetts—prompted by a vocal group of peace-loving citizens, the mayor addressed the following letter to his presumed counterpart, the mayor of the Soviet town of Yelabuga, which was selected for Northampton by the Ground Zero Pairing Project, a national organization promoting sister cities:

> Your city of Yelabuga of the USSR and our city of Northampton, Mass., USA, have much in common. We are about the same size and we are located in an attractive area. More importantly, we are united in our love for our children and hopes for their future. (Hollander 1984)

While the goodwill underlying these sentiments is not in doubt, the attribution of meaningful commonality borders on the surrealistic. To be sure, the mayor could have added that we are also united with the citizens of Yelabuga (and of other Soviet cities, or for that matter non-Soviet cities and citizens!) in preferring pleasure to pain, health to sickness, a good diet to a poor one, fresh to polluted air, and making love rather than war.

At the town meeting devoted to discussing the establishment of sister-city ties, much was said about the importance of communications between Americans and the Soviet people. But what exactly should or could be communicated? Several speakers suggested with commendable candor that the communications on our part should be "completely innocuous" and non-political. "Praise them"; "Forget about advertising ourselves"; "They should find out that we are people too." In other words, highlight the similarities; play down the differences.

Yet it is the differences that matter most, especially in the context peace activists are most concerned with —namely, the citizens' access to government and their influence on its policies. For example, if Soviet citizens have any idea about the magnitude of Soviet military expenditures and believe that the money could be better spent on human welfare, they refrain from revealing such sentiments; if they are unhappy with Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, they don't make their feelings publicly known. If they are not unhappy, that too reveals a profound asymmetry between their attitude and those of many Americans vocally opposed to any American military intervention abroad.

If they had a better understanding of the nature of the Soviet system, peace activists would realize that there is no

such thing, as far as Soviet citizens are concerned, as spontaneous, informal, and risk-free protest against official policies, or a similar, unauthorized, grass-roots contact with groups of Americans free of governmental supervision and manipulation. From its earliest beginnings, the Soviet authorities abhorred this or any other kind of spontaneity in political life and have done everything in their power—which was considerable—to extinguish such initiatives. Only by wishfully projecting upon the Soviet system characteristics it does not have can American peace activists believe that they will do business with their Soviet "counterparts" (Ryerson 1984). Worst of all, the vast majority of Soviet citizens do not even believe that they should be in a position to influence government policy.

Such misunderstandings may help to explain why only twenty-six Soviet towns responded to the invitation of one thousand American towns to join hands in the pursuit of peace and why, in at least one instance, an American town (Greenbelt, Maryland) was "paired" with its Soviet "counterpart" that boasted a forced labor camp and KGB prison (Eckstein 1986).

At the confluence of the peace movement and the adversary culture, a new set of factors come into play that contribute to the misconceptions of the Soviet Union.

HOSTILITY TOWARD THE U.S.

While peace activists generally refrain from criticism of the Soviet Union, they are inclined to criticize the United States—its foreign policy, domestic institutions, prevailing values, and policies. It is hard to know whether or not those attracted to the peace movements are predisposed, to begin with, toward a highly critical view of American society, or if such attitudes develop in the course of involvement with such groups, subcultures, and their associated activities. Whatever the reason—and I am inclined to believe that it is the former—there is a striking contrast between the willingness to give the benefit of doubt to Soviet policies and the readiness to hold the American government responsible for a wide range of global problems, including the arms race and Soviet-American tensions. Following the Chernobyl disaster, two American peace activists offered a benign interpretation of the withholding of information by the Soviets and excused it on the grounds of an apparently laudable "tendency on the part of the Soviet leadership to downplay catastrophes and instead offer reassurance to the Soviet people so as to prevent emotional distress." They also argued that such withholding of information ("this practice of governmental and media protection") was beneficial for mental health and made Soviet youth more optimistic about world peace (Chivian and Mack 1986). It is not hard to imagine their response if the American authorities had attempted to conceal —in the interests of public emotional welfare and mental health—a malfunction of an American nuclear power plant.

Peace activists and social critics alike tend to find the source of Soviet-American rivalry and conflict (and a host of other problems) in the nature of American society. Ramsey Clark, for instance, has argued that "We need a revolutionary change in values, because we glorify violence and want 'things' inordinately . . . . Money dominates politics in America and, through politics, government." He also favored unilateral disarmament on the part of the United States (Bohjalian 1980). A professor of "medical-psychiatric anthropology" argued on the op-ed page of *The New York Times* that the United States has become so militaristic that even the music played on classical-music radio stations was "intended to rouse a martial spirit." Not only music but also "cinema [and] fashion all express that toughness, defiance, eagerness for unbridled action, [and] truculence that lie at the heart of the . . . 'national mood.' They are part of a great national preparation—for war" (Stein 1980). A book-length study was dedicated to the proposition that belief in a Soviet threat (in an "illusory enemy") was nothing but a product of the American domestic political process and of the groups dominating it (Wolfe 1979).

Such views have been widespread in the 1980s and associated with cross-fertilization between the anti-nuclear peace movement and the survival of the adversary culture—that is to say, elements and activists of the protest movements of the 1960s (Hollander 1986). It was not surprising that "the nuclear disarmament rally . . . expected to draw hundreds of thousands of people into Manhattan . . . has been conceived and organized by groups with a history of protest reaching back to anti-Vietnam War days and by a new set of protesters" (Herman 1982).

Vaclav Havel, a Czech dissident, captured the roots of the connection between the Western peace movements and a broader agenda of protest and aspiration:

> For them the fight for peace is probably something more than simply a matter of certain demands for disarmament . . . an opportunity to build unconforming, uncorrupted social structures, an opportunity for life in a humanly richer community, for self-realization outside the stereotypes of a consumer society, and for expressing their resistance to those stereotypes. (Havel 1985)

Although the self-critical sentiments that foster the more favorable or benefit-of-doubt attitudes toward the Soviet Union are predominantly produced by conditions within American society, there have also been Soviet contributions to these attitudes. In particular, expressions of hostility and guilt-inducing techniques have been widely used—for example, accusations of American warmongering combined with constant reminders of the number of Soviet people killed in World War II, far exceeding the number of Americans killed, a reminder apt to make most Americans feel guilty and at the same time impress them with the sincerity of the Soviet desire for peace. Expressions of hostility by themselves can lead to a characteristic, good-natured American soul-searching that ultimately yields the conclusion that amends must be made and critical judgments of the Soviet Union revised. Richard Pipes observed that "a strong residue of Protestant ethic causes Americans to regard all hostility to them as being at least in some measure brought about by their own faults . . . . It is quite possible to exploit this tendency . . . . Thus is created an atmosphere conducive to concessions whose purpose is to propitiate the allegedly injured party" (Pipes 1972, 14).

MORAL EQUIVALENCE

Many of the trends and tendencies associated with the misconceptions of the Soviet system discussed above have found support and new expression in the currently popular moral-equivalence thesis first brought into critical focus by Jeane Kirkpatrick (Roche 1986). The core of the idea is that there are no important differences between the United States and the Soviet Union—usually referred to as the superpowers—and certainly none that would give any moral credit to the United States over the USSR.

The moral-equivalence thesis allows those embracing it to appear both objective and detached (they don't favor either of the rival superpowers) and at the same time provides a respectable retreat for those who had earlier sympathized with the Soviet Union, which is now seen as neither any better nor any worse than the United States. Most importantly, by obliterating important distinctions between the two societies it allows for more effective denigration of the United States.

In fact, contrary to appearances, the moral-equivalence school is far from being truly neutral or objective but usually harbors some degree of hostility toward the United States. Those who subscribe to it tend to be far more critical of the United States than of the USSR, and their critiques of the latter are perfunctory while their critiques of the United States are intense, passionate, and specific. Thus on close inspection the moral-equivalence thesis reveals an asymmetry: an adversarial disposition toward the United States nurtured by a moral passion and indignation wholly absent from critiques of the USSR.

The moral-equivalence thesis reflects developments noted earlier: (1) the passing of the idealization of the Soviet Union (which, however, has not necessarily been replaced by a seriously critical understanding of it); (2) the rise of the peace movement and the pressures it has exerted against critical views of the Soviet Union; (3) the survival and institutionalization of the adversary culture that does not take kindly to regarding the United States as better than any other country, and especially one that continues to claim socialist credentials; and (4) the moral-equivalence position also appeals to those anti-anti-communist intellectuals and opinion makers who remain apprehensive about the possibility that a strongly critical stand toward the Soviet Union might put them in the unsavory company of cold warriors and right-wingers.

A social-scientific precursor of the moral-equivalence school may be found in the convergence theory that was fashionable in the 1960s and postulated growing similarities between the United States and the Soviet Union due to the imperatives of modernization (Wolfe 1981). This, however, was an essentially optimistic view: The Soviet Union was to become more liberal and democratic, gradually adopting the practices and values of advanced pluralistic societies (such as the United States). The message of moral equivalence is more cynical, stressing the unappealing attributes both societies have in common—a state of affairs that should discourage the United States and its champions from assuming an air of moral superiority.

Thus Richard Barnet points out—in what might be regarded as a definitive handbook on moral equivalence, *The Giants*—that "the CIA and the KGB have the same conspiratorial world view," that "in both countries leading military bureaucrats constitute a potent political force," and "the military establishments in the United States and the Soviet Union are . . . each other's best allies," that "Khrushchev and Dulles were perfect partners," that "both sides have a professional interest in the nostalgic illusion of victory through secret weapons," that "both societies were suffering a crisis of legitimacy," that "both are preoccupied with security problems," that "military bureaucracies are developing in the Soviet Union that are mirror images of American bureaucracies," that "the madness of one bureaucracy sustains the other," and that "each [country] is a prisoner of

a sixty-year-old obsession" (Barnet 1977, 93, 106, 111, 119, 168, 169, 171, 173, 175).

The affinity toward the moral-equivalence thesis also feeds on a generally diminished capacity to make distinctions that has been with us since the 1960s, a legacy of the anti-intellectualism of that period. Other examples of this attitude include the propensity to dilute distinctions between mental health and mental illness, religion and therapy, learning and entertainment, political freedom and repression, art and politics, what is private and what is public.

Thus in the final analysis we are led back to the suggestion that conditions within the United States are the most important determinants of American perceptions of the Soviet Union. It is unfortunate that these conditions, more often than not, predispose to misconceptions rather than to understanding.■

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FIRST CLASS

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CONSERVATIVE ACTION FOUNDATION

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CAF HELPS "REPUBLICANS" ESCAPE HIGH GRASS

The Conservative Action Foundation (CAF) is distributing toy lawnmowers to selected Republican members of Congress and other conservatives to emphasize their lackluster support for President Reagan in the wake of administration arms sales to Iran.

CAF's direct action effort is keyed off an editorial by White House Communications Director Patrick Buchanan which stated that the Republican Party establishment has headed for the "tall grass" and deserted President Reagan on this issue.

CAF's goal in providing selected members of Congress with a toy lawnmower is to dramatize the need for them to find their way out of the tall grass and offer President Reagan their full support.

"What is really under attack here is the Reagan Doctrine," commented CAF President Lee Bellinger. "We don't believe it is proper for administration officials to circumvent the law," added Bellinger, "but we think that there is a real danger that the Republican party establishment may hang the President out to dry.

"We are delivering a real lawnmower to Nightline jockey Howard Phillips, who

MORE

should know better than to kick the President when he is down," continued Bellinger.

CAF activists will deliver the toy lawnmowers on Thursday December 11. Each lawnmower will be wrapped with a red ribbon and will bear a note saying "We hope this will help you to find your way out of the high grass--Sincerely, CAF."

Specific members of Congress who have been selected by CAF to receive the toy lawnmowers include Senators Durenberger, Kassebaum, Lugar, Mathias, Simpson, Specter and Weicker. On the House side, Representatives Conte, Leach, Lott and Michel have the distinction of being targeted by CAF.

"I find it absolutely appalling that these same Republicans who in the past were so quick to wrap themselves in Reagan's coattails the past six years are now so eager to acquiesce in his demise," concluded Bellinger.

Past actions by the Conservative Action Foundation include the launching of the "Freedom Warrior" in support of would-be Soviet defector Miroslav Medvid, and a direct action campaign against Gray & Company, which forced them to drop a $250,000 public relations contract with Marxist Angola. More recently, CAF founded a program in support of the peace shield. Known as CANA, the Coalition Against Nuclear Annihilation seeks to build a broad grass roots coalition of space shield supporters from across the political spectrum to ensure the survival and deployment of SDI in the post-Reagan era.

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ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY SPRING 1987 Pg. 5

Offense-Defense and Arms Control

Edward L. Rowny

IN GREEK MYTHOLOGY, Nemesis was the goddess of divine retribution, the personification of an impersonal force that would intervene to neutralize evil and preserve good in the world. But more darkly, she was also an instrument of vengeance. The sanctuary in which she lived was a meadow in the forest where no mortal could trespass. Any man arrogant enough to trespass the meadow would unleash cosmic destruction. Thus she lay undisturbed lest mankind risk perishing.

Both visions of Nemesis continue to haunt Western strategy. On the one hand, the threat of reciprocal nuclear vengeance between East and West has prevented nuclear war for over 40 years. Yet, on the other hand, the growing imbalance between Eastern and Western nuclear arsenals and our ability to check them have brought us to the very threshold of Nemesis' sanctuary. Indeed, an unfulfilled premise of the 1972 ABM Treaty was that significant reductions in strategic ballistic missiles would occur. The 1979 SALT II framework simply institutionalized this deterioration.

There are some who argue that moving beyond our current offense-reliant regime risks taunting Nemesis. There are others who see just the opposite. They have caught glimpses of technology which holds out the promise of, once and for all, devaluing the most destabilizing of weapons—strategic ballistic nuclear missiles. These weapons are the most destabilizing because they are fast, cannot be recalled, and are hard-target killers. Their value is such that they are most likely to be used first in a crisis. Moreover, they are the ones in which the Soviets have invested the most. So far, we have not been able to curb their growth. Even more ominous is a steady movement toward a Soviet heavy ICBM force which could ultimately be capable of a decapitating first strike against U.S. counterforce targets. With greatly degraded retaliatory forces and no defenses, U.S. cities would be hostage to a coup de grace. In such a scenario, the attacker could achieve his war aims without risking unacceptable damage to himself. Yet, we have not really been able to find ways to insure ourselves against such a possibility. This paper explores the thesis that moving to a greater mix of offenses and defenses will enhance both arms control stability and crisis stability, and thus will no longer make strategic ballistic missiles a good investment.

Edward L. Rowny is the special adviser to the president and the secretary of state for arms control matters. He has been directly involved in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union for over 12 years, including more than 2 years as head of the U.S. delegation to START. The views in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. government.

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Our fundamental objective under the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program is to seek better ways to ensure U.S. and allied security using the increased contributions of defenses—defenses that threaten no one. Of course, while it is difficult to be certain of capabilities of potential systems based on technologies not yet developed, defenses based on the new technologies we are investigating would not have offensive roles. President Ronald Reagan has personally assured General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev that we are not seeking to develop a first-strike capability through SDI; we are researching defensive systems, not offensive weapons. We do not expect the Soviet Union to accept our assurances on faith alone; indeed, one of our objectives in the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative, which we have proposed in Geneva, is to allow Soviet scientists to see first-hand that on-going SDI research does not involve offensive weapons.

From its inception, SDI has been a program open to continuous discussion by the media, the Congress, and the U.S. public. Our open society ensures that our programs are consistent with their stated intentions. This is in contrast to the USSR, where even the existence of a heavily funded strategic defense research program is denied. Moreover, creating effective defenses that could make ballistic missiles obsolete would require systems highly optimized for this purpose, making them unsuitable for offensive purposes. Effective offensive weapons such as ballistic missiles already exist. The point of SDI is to find defenses against ballistic missiles, not to augment their offensive capabilities. In short, we are not developing, under the guise of SDI, new offensive weapons; the defenses we are investigating would not have offensive roles; and the U.S. Open Laboratories Initiative would provide an opportunity for Soviet scientists to see these facts first-hand.

The momentum of this purpose is being given impetus by the participation of scientists and industrialists, not only in the United States but in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy, and Israel. It is also, for the first time in modern history, an attempt to have strategy drive the development of technology. However, this will not be an easy task to accomplish. In addition to resistance from those who are comfortable with the current offensive nuclear strategy and are not convinced that an offense-defense mix will be more stable, there remain formidable problems. One is the unpredictability of the rate at which technological innovation will take place. Another is managing the transition to an offense-defense mix through the arms control process with the USSR. Yet another problem is managing this transition so that decoupling does not occur between the United States and our NATO and Asian allies.

In terms of technological innovation, it is likely that, no matter what the pace of breakthroughs, the United States will lead the Soviet Union in a number of key technological areas for the foreseeable future. In particular, this will include computers and their accompanying software. It will also include electro-optical sensing, navigation and guidance, microelectronics and integrated circuit manufacturing, robotics and machine intelligence, signal processing, signature reduction, and telecommunications. Less clear, however, is the rate at which the United States can maintain a lead in

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"But today the struggle": Spain and the intellectuals

by Ronald Radosh

Coming to terms with the truth about the Spanish Civil War seems more than ever to pose insurmountable difficulties for those intellectuals—perhaps the majority—who were brought up to believe that Spain in the Thirties was the one great cause in that "low dishonest decade," as Auden called it, which need never be either reconsidered or repented. Yet the publication of two new anthologies on the fiftieth anniversary of the war—Valentine Cunningham's *Spanish Front* and John Miller's *Voices Against Tyranny*—together with the discussion they have generated come as a sober reminder that this is a subject that remains part of the unfinished business of recent intellectual history.[1] "No episode in the 1930s," Paul Johnson has aptly observed, "has been more lied about than this one, and only in recent years have historians begun to dig it out from the mountain of mendacity beneath which it was buried for a generation."[2] Judging from some recent commentaries on Spain in the Thirties, there are still many intellectuals who would prefer—even today—to let the terrible truth remain buried rather than have their fantasies of a noble past destroyed.

For most Left intellectuals, in fact, Spain in the Thirties is a cause to be reaffirmed rather than investigated. Reviewing *Spanish Front* and *Voices Against Tyranny* in *The New York Times,* for example, Herbert Mitgang wrote that for all the doubts caused by the actions of Soviet commissars in Spain, George Orwell and other intellectuals "never regretted that they had gone to Spain" in support of the Republican side.[3] In the same vein, Christopher Hitchens, writing about Spain in *Grand Street,* asserts that there is "something creepy about the 'compulsion' to chuck Old Left causes [like the Spanish Civil War] over the side."[4] Despite all that Hitchens claims to understand about the betrayal of the Spanish Republic by the Soviets and the Communists, he cites Orwell to support his conclusion that Spain in the Thirties "was a state of affairs worth fighting for." And writing in *The New Republic,* the distinguished literary critic Alfred Kazin offers the same quotation from Orwell—who was talking about the libertarian-anarchist revolution of 1936—and comments that "truth would always be Orwell's ace in the hole." To Kazin, the "truth" is that the Civil War is simply "the wound that will not

1 *Spanish Front: Writers on the Civil War,* edited by Valentine Cunningham, Oxford University Press, 388 pages, $7.95; and *Voices Against Tyranny: Writing of the Spanish Civil War,* edited by John Miller, Charles Scribner's Sons, 227 pages, $7.95.

2 Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties.* Harper & Row, 1983, pages 321-340. Other citations from Paul Johnson are from these pages.

3 Herbert Mitgang, *The New York Times,* August 18, 1986, page C18.

4 Christopher Hitchens, "Re-Bunking," *Grand Street,* Summer 1986, pages 228-231.

heal"; hence, the "destroyers of the Spanish Republic would always be my enemies."[5]

To those like Kazin who still consider Spain "their" war, it was the one pure cause of the 1930s. "It was the passion of that small segment of my generation," Murray Kempton has written, "which felt a personal commitment to the revolution."[6] The cause was easily definable—support of a legally elected democratic government battling reactionary generals who fought to install a Spanish version of fascism. The democratic Republic stood alone: the Western democracies stayed neutral and refused to sell it arms, while the regimes in Germany and Italy rushed men, airplanes, and weapons to aid General Franco's rebellion. Defense of the Republic became a symbol for all that was good and decent, as the "progressive" world organized against the tides of reaction and Nazism.

The truth, of course, is not so simple. The Civil War took place because indecisive elections in February 1936 revealed a nation divided in half; the irresponsible militancy of sectors of the more extreme Left fed the aims of the insurgent generals. Once civil war broke out, both sides were responsible for unspeakable and equally repugnant atrocities. The foreign intervention of Germany prevented Franco's defeat, just as Soviet military aid allowed the Republic the means to beat back the initial advance of Franco's forces.

The problem was that the Soviet Union exacted a harsh price from the Spanish Republic for receipt of that military aid. Stalin's involvement came rather late in the war, by way of a policy of cautious military intervention. Soviet tanks, planes, and artillery did not reach Spain until October and November of 1936, and they were of a limited caliber—no match for the heavy equipment supplied by the Germans and Italians. Even so, Stalin insisted upon payment in advance; he took the valued gold reserves of the Republic out of Spain and into Russia. Fearing involvement in a war with Germany and Italy, Stalin limited his aid to bolstering the resistance of the anti-Franco forces in the hope that Britain and France might be induced to abandon their policy of non-intervention.

Stalin's cynical goal was to steer internal developments in Spain to coincide with the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. He wanted to prolong the existence of the Republic until the Western democracies joined him in supporting the Republicans. It was a strategy of stalemate: Stalin purposely never gave the Republic enough arms with which to win. At the same time, he secretly began to negotiate with Nazi Germany, hedging his bet lest the first course fail to produce results.

The price paid by the Republic for the much-heralded Soviet aid was the factor that led to the ultimate betrayal. In exchange for military aid, Stalin demanded the transformation of the once free Republic into a prototype of what became the People's Democracies in the postwar world. The findings of historians have helped us to understand just how total Soviet control of the Spanish Republic had become. Indeed, the most recent contributions starkly confirm the validity of the revelations of General Walter Krivitsky, the very first defector from the NKVD (the forerunner of the KGB). At the time—in 1938—much of the left-wing world treated Krivitsky's confession as anti-Bolshevik paranoia—most especially his revelation that Stalin was already dealing with the Nazis, but also his detailed accounts of the torture and police-state methods brought to Spain by the Soviets as part of their program of "assistance." We know now that Krivitsky was telling the truth.

When Hugh Thomas published the first edition of his now classic work, *The Spanish Civil War,* in 1961, he warned readers that "Krivitsky's evidence must be regarded as tainted unless corroborated." By 1966, when he brought out the second edition of his history, Thomas had revised that early

5 Alfred Kazin, "The Wound That Will Not Heal," *The New Republic,* August 25, 1986, pages 39-41.

6 Murray Kempton, *Part of Our Time.* Dell, 1955, page 317.

judgment, and wrote that "Krivitsky's evidence can generally be accepted."[7] But it was left to Burnett Bolloten, author of the majestic historical study—forty years in the making—*The Spanish Revolution* (1979), to give Krivitsky's work a close reading, and to conclude not only that this NKVD general was telling the truth but that "Krivitsky's revelations have proved to be amazingly accurate, including many of the smallest details, and they constitute a major contribution to our knowledge of Soviet foreign policy aims and Soviet intervention in the Spanish civil war."[8] Regarding torture, Krivitsky had written that what the Russians brought to the Republic was unmitigated repression and terror—a civil war against the Spanish Left. The regular police corps was reorganized. Communists secured the pivotal positions in the newly rebuilt police, which became a formal part of the Soviet apparatus in Spain. The NKVD, Krivitsky wrote in his memoirs, "had its own special prisons. Its units carried out assassinations and kidnappings, filled hidden dungeons and made flying raids. It functioned . . . independently of the Loyalist government . . . . The Soviet Union seemed to have a grip on Loyalist Spain, as if it were already a Soviet possession."[9]

At the time, of course, these comments were treated as smears by an untrustworthy renegade who was said to be in league with the Nazis. Just how accurate Krivitsky actually was, however, can best be appreciated by looking at the conclusions reached by the dean of left-wing British historians, E. H. Carr. Carr was as sympathetic to the Soviet Union as any historian could be, yet he declared in his posthumously published book, *The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War,* that by 1937 the Russians had brought to Spain an institution known as SIM, "a new body whose professed function was counter espionage," and that it "quickly spread its tentacles to all parts of Republican Spain, occupying itself with repression and torture." Spain, Carr wrote, had become "what its enemies called it, the puppet of Moscow."[10]

Another British historian, Antony Beevor, writes in his book *The Spanish Civil War* that the torture introduced was of a new and quantitatively different caliber.[11] It went beyond "beatings with rubber piping, hot and cold water treatment, splinters inserted under nails and mock executions." Under Soviet direction, Beevor tells us, "cell floors were specially constructed with the sharp corners of bricks pointing upward so that the naked prisoners were in constant pain. Strange metallic sounds, colours, lights and sloping floors were used as disorientation and sensory-deprivation techniques."[12]

The evidence is unmistakable that, by 1937, the Spanish "Red" Republic had more in common with Franco's territories in Spain, or with the authoritarian regime after his victory, than it did with the libertarian revolt of 1936 that had been heralded by the much-quoted George Orwell. As Beevor so aptly writes, the Communists were in "many ways the counterpart of Franco . . . practitioners of statecraft [who] . . . exploited the war emergency to label any opposition . . . as treasonable to the cause." As one Anarchist militant put it: for the people of Spain, "whether Negrin won with his communist cohorts, or Franco won with his Italians and Germans, the results would be the same for us."[13]

What if the Republic, and not Franco, had won? In *The Spanish Revolution,* the historian

7 Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish Civil War.* Eyer and Spottiswood, 1961, page 263; revised edition, Penguin, 1965, page 337. A third edition was published by Harper & Row last month.

8 Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution: The Left and the Struggle for Power during the Civil War.* University of North Carolina Press, 1979, page 110.

9 Walter G. Krivitsky, *In Stalin's Secret Service.* Harper, 1939, pages 102-107, 291.

10 E. H. Carr, *The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War.* Pantheon, 1984, page 44; page 31.

11 Antony Beevor, *The Spanish Civil War.* Orbis Publishing, 1982, pages 211-212.

12 Beevor, page 281.

13 The anarchist militant is Abad de Santillan, quoted in Beevor, page 194.

Stanley G. Payne judges that if one goes by left-wing policy during the Civil War, there is little reason to assume that a Communist-dominated Republic would have shown any tolerance for dissent or even led to a subsiding of brutal internal terror. Indeed, Payne writes, "there was nothing in Franco's zone to equal the almost constant interparty murder that went on under the People's Republic." This reality, Payne argues, accounted for much of the "final collapse of morale" within the Republican ranks.[14]

Even one former Spanish militant in the PCE (Spanish Communist Party), the future novelist and screenwriter Jorge Semprun (who was a leader of the Communist underground between 1959 and 1964), admits that, under Franco's authoritarian reign, Spain reached a higher level of material and social progress, along with industrial and military strength, than existed in any "socialist" regime under Soviet control. And, he adds, under Franco the working class in Spain had more freedom than their counterpart in any country "improperly called Socialist." In the Eastern European states, "it is not allowed to strike. It can organize itself only in labor unions that are mere transmission belts of the state apparatus and the single party, compared to which the vertical unions of the Franco dictatorship were genuine democratic paradises."[15] One can honestly agree with the judgment of Joaquín Maurín, once an intellectual activist with the Communist-syndicalist Worker Peasant Bloc, who wrote a full quarter of a century later, in 1966, that "from the moment in which the alternative was posed, beginning in June 1937, between the Communist party, at the orders of Moscow, or the opposing military regime, reactionary but Spanish, the conclusion of the Civil War was predetermined."[16]

14 Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Revolution.* Norton, 1970, page 313.

15 Jorge Semprun, *The Autobiography of Federico Sanchez and the Communist Underground in Spain.* Karz, 1979, page 133.

16 Cited in Payne, page 374.

Understanding some of this history is a prerequisite for evaluating the story of the Western intellectuals and their response to the Civil War. As we have seen, Alfred Kazin and others make much of Orwell's statement that though there was much he did not understand and did not even like about revolutionary Barcelona, "I recognized it immediately as a state of affairs worth fighting for." The quotation is accurate, but those who cite Orwell tend to omit the careful distinction he made between the original revolt and the very different reality after 1937. Orwell recognized this new reality full well, and he did not like what he saw. While he heralded Spain of August 1936 as a people's revolt, he had reached the sad conclusion that by January of 1937 "the Communists were using every possible method, fair and foul, to stamp out what was left of the revolution." He went on to cite, as one of his reviews reprinted in *Spanish Front* reminds us, "the ceaseless arrests, the censored newspapers and the prowling hordes of armed police," comparing the situation to a "nightmare."[17] Does anyone really think that this was the Spain that Orwell saw as worth defending and fighting for?

Spain, as Mr. Kazin has so eloquently reminded us, became the central metaphor for artists, intellectuals, and writers of the 1930s. Hemingway immortalized the conflict in *For Whom the Bell Tolls,* although the veterans of the International Brigades were angered by his critical portrayal of the fanatic French commissar, André Marty. Nicknamed "the butcher of Albacete" because of his murder of at least five hundred of his own men for desertion or Trotskyism, Marty is believed to have killed, by a minimum count, one-tenth of all the volunteers who died in Spain.

"Madrid is the heart," of a world, a civilization and an ideal, Auden opined in his poem "Spain" (1937). He spoke for a generation when he said one had to put aside "the

17 George Orwell, "Spanish Nightmare," from *Time & Tide,* July 31, 1937; reprinted in Cunningham, pages 316-317.

walks by the lake . . . the bicycle races." There was only one task: "But to-day the struggle."[18] These two new anthologies devoted to writings about the Spanish Civil War remind us of just how much the attitude epitomized by Auden's poem (which he subsequently—to his honor—repudiated) was typical of the intellectual response at the time. They also serve to remind us, as Paul Johnson wrote, that "the intellectuals of the Left did not want to know the objective truth; they were unwilling for their illusions to be shattered. They were overwhelmed by the glamour and excitement of the cause and few had the gritty determination of Orwell to uphold absolute standards of morality."

In this respect, the role of Stephen Spender is particularly instructive. Spender has written the introduction to John Miller's anthology, *Voices Against Tyranny,* and he uses the opportunity to reflect on what Spain meant to the writers and artists of his generation. Spender now says that Auden, who had been criticized by Orwell for the poem on Spain, "came to agree with Orwell to the extent of feeling that his conscientious attempt to politicize his poetry in support of 'Spain' led him into very alien territory"; it opened him, Auden felt, to the grave charge of "using poetry to tell lies." Hence, because of the concluding lines of "Spain," Auden never allowed it to be reprinted during the remainder of his lifetime. The last lines of the poem had declared that

> History to the defeated
> May say Alas but cannot help nor pardon.

Auden commented that "[T]his is a lie." As for himself, Spender now admits that "there were atrocities on the Republican side perhaps equalling those committed by the rebels." On the subject of atrocities, however, he never refers to Arthur Koestler's account, in *The Invisible Writing,* of the way Comintern propagandist Otto Katz manufactured phony fascist atrocities out of his office in Paris.[19] This is an important part of the story, for Stalinism was thus aided, as Paul Johnson writes, "not only by superb public relations but by the naïveté, gullibility and, it must also be said, the mendacity and corruption of Western intellectuals, especially their willingness to overlook what W. H. Auden called 'the necessary murder.'"

One might hope that, fifty years later, Western intellectuals would have more perspective on the events that once moved them into such tight corners. Yet, judging from Spender's introduction to *Voices Against Tyranny,* Spain still appears to be what Spender calls a simple "direct confrontation between good and evil, right and wrong, freedom and tyranny." In this view, there was only one bad side—that of Franco. Spender does observe that Auden and he too curbed their true shock over things like the destruction of the churches. Looking back, he reflects, there was an authentic Wordsworthian recognition of the joys of rebellion, but he bemoans the fact "that we could not see any of the terrible murders happening behind this scene of revolution." He now acknowledges "that there is no trust to be placed in travellers' impressions of popular rejoicing soon after revolution."

Spender, however, is still being disingenuous. His own career is a salutary reminder of how total identification with the "right" side corrupts intellectual integrity. One of the documents reprinted in Valentine Cunningham's *Spanish Front* is Spender's "I Join the Communist Party"—printed in the London *Daily Worker* in 1937—in which Spender apologized for first doubting that the Moscow trials were anything but honest, and explained that he now understood the nature "of the gigantic plot against the Soviet Government." This early heresy, Spender told his new comrades, occurred because he was then only "a liberal approaching com-

18 W. H. Auden, "Spain," from *The English Auden: Poems, Essays and Dramatic Writings 1927-1939,* reprinted in Miller, page 211.

19 Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing.* Macmillan, 1954, page 327.

munism." Now that Spender understood that Stalin was right, he was ready to join the Party, evidently a necessity if one desired to go to Valencia to engage in anti-Fascist propaganda.[20]

Having joined the Party, Spender became an ardent spokesman for it. In that capacity, he took part in the International Writers' Congress held in Madrid in 1937. This was the prototype of those events that were later to occur with regularity in Havana during the 1960s and Nicaragua in the 1980s—events in which Western intellectuals reaffirm their closeness to the revolutionary struggle by partying in its midst. In Spain, Spender recorded, he and other delegates were "treated like princes or ministers . . . riding in Rolls Royces, banqueted, fêted, sung and danced to," all while the battle raged around them. The same Writers' Congress was noted for its conclusion, which consisted of a massive attack on André Gide, who was excoriated as a "fascist monster" for the book he had recently published criticizing the USSR.[21]

Spender's 1937 account tells how they were "woken up at 4 a.m. by the air-raid alarms," as the reality of the war intruded upon the Congress. Evidently, it did not intrude too much for Spender to proclaim that the Spanish writer José Bergamín was the right man to rebuke Gide, because Bergamín had a "mind which sees not merely the truth of isolated facts which Gide observed in the USSR, but the far more important truth of the effect which Gide's book is going to have."

If Spender bought the classic rationale of the Stalinized intellectual, it was this affair that caused another participant in the Congress, the Dutch Communist Jef Last, to suffer a severe disillusionment. Proud that the Congress condemned the murder of writers by Franco and other Fascists, Last asked, "why this conspiracy of silence around the cultural reaction in Russia . . . ?" Last could not accept the argument, presented to him by Egon Erwin Kisch, that when you hear of a Fascist bombing of a school you have "to defend everything that has been done on our side, *even the trials!*" Acting alone, Last protested against the Soviet delegates' demands that Gide be attacked by the Congress. Indeed, he pointed out, few in attendance had even read the book they were being asked to condemn. Gide had not been translated into Spanish and his book was not available anywhere in Spain.[22]

Spender then stood with the regular Communists. Later, of course, he broke with them, and today he writes that there is a "'truth' of 'Spain' that remained independent of, and survived the mold of, Communism into which successive Republican governments were forced." Even anti-Communists who supported the Republic, Spender writes, "nevertheless retained their belief in the justice of the Republican cause."

But when Spender was in Spain—at the very time he was attending the 1937 Congress and spoke in Britain on behalf of aid for the International Brigades—he privately held to a different "truth." It is to the credit of Valentine Cunningham that he includes the remarkable letter which Spender wrote to Virginia Woolf on April 2, 1937, in which the poet reflects that "politicians are detestable anywhere," and that Spain has shown him "the lies and unscrupulousness of some of the people who are recruiting at home" for the International Brigades, including those "of the *Daily Worker.*" He had not seen the poet Julian Bell, her nephew, Spender wrote to Woolf, and he assumed that "he has not joined the Brigade." While Spender himself spoke in England in favor of the volunteers, he told Woolf that he

20 Stephen Spender, "I Join the Communist Party," London *Daily Worker,* February 19, 1937, in Cunningham, pages 7-9.

21 Stephen Spender, "Spain Invites the World's Writers," from *Notes on the International Congress, Summer 1937* from *New Writing,* Autumn 1937, in Cunningham, pages 85-91. Gide's book, *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.,* was published in 1936.

22 Jef Last, from *The Spanish Tragedy.* Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939; in Cunningham, pages 94-100.

hoped Bell "will not do so," since participating in the Brigades called for "terrific narrowness and a religious dogmatism about the Communist Party line," as well as "toughness, cynicism and insensibility."[23]

Since Spender never said anything similar in public—and does not say anything like this in print even today—his letter is riveting. "The sensitive, the weak, the romantic, the enthusiastic, the truthful live in Hell," he wrote to Woolf, "and cannot get away." The Hell he spoke of was not that of Franco. "The political commissars . . . bully so much that even people who were quite enthusiastic Party Members have been driven into hating the whole thing." Spender told the story of one veteran he spoke with, who "complained to me bitterly about the inquisitional methods of the Party." Noting that it was a lie that the men were volunteers who could leave when they liked, Spender wrote Woolf that actually they were "trapped there," and wounds or mental collapse were not considered grounds for leaving, "unless one belongs to the Party élite and is sent home as a propagandist to show one's arm in a sling to audiences." Bitterly, Spender revealed that his closest friend fought in an offensive in which the men were sent to be slaughtered, with only olive groves for protection. After his friend's mental collapse, Spender tried to hire him as his personal secretary. The Party refused, and sent the man back to battle. He sought to escape, and was then put in a labor camp. Spender asked that nothing he had written be repeated, particularly "the more unpleasant truths about the Brigade."

Privately, Spender sought to help such men leave Spain, and he condemned the total fanaticism of the Party leaders who were really "unconcerned with Spain" and were intolerant of any dissent. But such truths had to be carefully guarded. Thus, Spender asked Woolf to quote his letter anonymously "to any pacifist or democrat who wants to fight." Privately, he hoped they would refrain from enlistment with the International Brigades. Publicly, Spender towed the line, and his published poems supported the cause. Of the martyred John Cornford, he said, in a review written in September of 1938, that he exemplified "the potentialities of a generation" that was fighting "for a form of society for which [it] was also willing to die."[24] When Spender wrote the letter to Virginia Woolf, was he secretly hoping that she would show it to Cornford before he made the fatal decision to join the battle, as Cornford wrote, "whether I like it or not"?

How are we to judge a writer who says one thing to a friend in private and quite the opposite to an innocent and credulous public on such a momentous issue? It is no wonder that Richard Gott was recently moved to observe that, the more we gain some historical perspective on Spain, "the more blurred becomes the morality."[25] It is worth remembering, however, that there *were* some writers who grasped the morality of the situation at the time, and showed an exemplary bravery and candor in acknowledging the villainy of their chosen side. The Catholic writer Georges Bernanos, once a supporter of the rightist and anti-Semitic Action Française, saw firsthand the horror of the atrocities perpetrated by the Franco forces and sanctified by the Catholic priests. In his searing account from *A Diary of My Times* (1938), which appears in the Cunningham anthology, Bernanos tells of "the organizing of Terrorism" by the Italian Black Shirts brought to Majorca by Franco.[26] Bernanos recoiled in horror at the figure of three thousand killed by right-wing death squads, as we would call them today, in a

23 Stephen Spender to Virginia Woolf, April 2, 1937, Henry W. and Albert A. Berg Collection, New York Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tuden Foundations, in Cunningham, pages 307-309.

24 Review of *John Cornford: A Memoir*; *New Statesman & Nation,* November 12, 1938, in Cunningham, pages 328-330.

25 Richard Gott, "The Spanish Tragedy," *Manchester Guardian Weekly,* July 27, 1986, page 22.

26 Georges Bernanos, *A Diary of My Times.* The Bodley Head, 1938; in Cunningham, pages 145-152.

brief seven-month period. On that small island, he wrote, one could "witness the blowing-out of fifteen wrong-thinking brains per day." Hating "the sound and sight of it," Bernanos told the world the truth, despite the fact that it meant he was criticizing his own side. Bernanos saw that civil war meant "there is no longer any justice," and he pointed out that even moderate Republicans were shot "like dogs just the same," even though they had nothing to do with the Red Terror of Barcelona. To this Catholic intellectual, civil war meant terrorism had become "the order of the day."

On the Left, Simone Weil was Bernanos's counterpart. "[H]oping every day," she wrote in a letter to Bernanos, ". . . for the victory of one side and the defeat of the other," Weil went to Spain in August 1936.[27] After two months there, Weil no longer saw the war as one "of starving peasants against landed proprietors and a clergy in league" with them, but instead she viewed it as "a war between Russia, Germany and Italy." Almost witnessing an unjustified execution of a priest by Republican militants was enough to push Weil toward pacifism. Seeing the famed anarchist Durruti execute a young Falangist soldier, who had been conscripted against his will, never stopped weighing on her conscience. What Weil objected to was the relentless pleasure in murder that occurred on all sides. Killing "Fascists" and seeing them as beasts made the Republicans, in Weil's view, no better than the enemy; they too were excluding "a category of human beings from among those whose lives have worth." Such behavior, she wrote in her letter to Bernanos in 1938, soon obscured "the very purpose of the struggle." She had her sympathies with the anarchists and their cause, but Weil put her finger on what made the soldiers—as it made the Marxist guerrillas of the 1960s—a new elite. "An abyss separated the men with the weapons," Weil wrote, "from the unarmed population," an abyss Weil saw as similar to that which separated "the rich from the poor." Hence Weil felt that Bernanos, a monarchist, was closer to her than the proletarian comrades of the Aragon militia she had come to Spain to support.

If the Spanish War was a "People's War," as Valentine Cunningham claims, "the most potent and emotionally engaging focus of thirties democratic struggles and progressive working-class ambitions," it was also a writers' war, in which almost all writers felt the need to take sides. It is true that most writers of merit were on the Republican side. But can one say with a clear conscience that the forces of the Republic were fighting, as Cunningham suggests, for the survival of art and culture in free societies, when, had the Red side won, such a free society would have been just as much at risk as it was after the Franco victory?

Orwell had warned, in the concluding pages of *Homage to Catalonia*, that one should beware of partisanship, and of the distortion caused by his having seen only one corner of events. And he warned that readers should "beware of exactly the same things when you read any other book on this period." What happened, of course, was that writers went to Spain and, on the basis of brief tours, committed themselves and their art to the cause. Weil noted that it was "in fashion to go on a tour down there, to take in a spot of revolution, and to come back with articles bursting out of your pen." She noted such endeavors had to be superficial, especially since in the gale of civil war and revolution "principles get completely out of phase with realities," and the criterion for judging events disappears. How, she queried, could one "report something coherently on the strength of a short stay and some fragmentary observations?"

The problem continues into our own day. As Paul Hollander has lately reminded us, scores of modern-day political pilgrims continue the journeys to "socialist" countries and bring back their enthusiastic accounts of revolution, despite the realities

27 Simone Weil, "Lettre à Georges Bernanos," *Écrits Historiques et Politiques*. Editions Gallimard, 1960, in Cunningham, pages 253-257.

that somehow evade their notice.[28] As even Cunningham acknowledges, Spain does not "sustain the earliest lyrical and romantic readings of the war as the zone where the necessary evils and terrors of revolution and war might after a temporary outing prove the gateway to happy conclusions."

We need to be especially alert to the accounts of the International Brigades in Spain, for on this subject particularly a great deal of emotion has been invested and a great many lies told. When, some years ago, Orwell condemned a memoir by the International Brigidista John Sommerfield as "sentimental tripe," he wrote that "we shall almost certainly get some good books from members of the International Brigade, but we shall have to wait for them until the war is over."[29] Such a book was in fact written, and it is far more powerful, honest, and moving than many of the didactic excerpts to be found in either of the new anthologies. William Herrick's novel *Hermanos!,* first published in 1969, is again available from Second Chance Press.[30] Herrick has given us what is perhaps the first honest portrayal of the war from within the Brigades in Spain, a searing, tough indictment, filled with the bitter reality of youthful bravery and idealism crushed by the agenda of the Comintern and its decision to allow so many thousands to die for nothing. Given that Herrick's novel is virtually the only critical account of the Civil War experience from the inside, an excerpt from it would have strengthened both of the new anthologies immeasurably. And another, younger novelist, David Evanier, continues the tradition with his forthcoming novel of the Old Left; a recently published excerpt pertaining to the International Brigades traces one veteran's destruction as part of his experience with the Soviet tank corps.[31]

Reading the committed partisans of the Left so many years later cannot but leave one with a bitter taste. How weak seem the partisans, and how prescient seem those who had doubts and expressed them. Indeed, one is struck by the intellectual courage it took to give anything but the expected answer, particularly when the question was framed, as it was in 1937 in a declaration "To the Writers and Poets of England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales" by Auden, Spender, Neruda, and Aragon: "Are you for or against . . . the People of Republican Spain? . . . it is impossible any longer to take no side." Those who answered by insisting that no side be taken must be given high marks for intellectual fortitude, and for refusing to ride with the herd.

Aldous Huxley spoke a simple truth when he replied, to those who demanded he side with the Reds, that dictatorial Communism would produce "results with which history has made us only too sickeningly familiar." T. S. Eliot replied that, while he was sympathetic to the Republicans, "it is best that at least a few men of letters should remain isolated." Condemned as a Fascist for these sentiments, Eliot at least was able to stay aloof from the foolish chorus of Stalinist hosannas in which the rest of the intellectuals joined. Was he not correct, then, to claim that, were the Left to win, it would "be the victory of the worst rather than of the best features . . . a travesty of the humanitarian ideals which have led so many people" to work for the Republic?[32] Eliot was wrong, I think, to have opposed lifting the embargo on arms. Despite the tragedy of

28 Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba.* Oxford University Press, 1981.

29 George Orwell, review of John Sommerfield's *Volunteer in Spain,* from *Time & Tide,* July 31, 1937, in Cunningham, page 19.

30 William Herrick, *Hermanos!* Second Chance Press, 1983.

31 David Evanier, "How Sammy Klarfeld Became a Vacillating Element in Spain," *The Journal of Contemporary Studies,* Summer/Fall 1985, pages 89-106.

32 Quotations from Aldous Huxley and T. S. Eliot are from *Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War, 1937.* Lawrence and Wishart Ltd., 1937, in Cunningham, pages 51-57.

the conflict—and the evils of Communism—the main threat to the world in the Thirties was that of the menace of aggressive Hitlerism. But Eliot was right, after all, on the moral issue involved, that democracy had little to do with supporting either "Berlin or Moscow."

Those who argued that the Fascists killed Lorca—and therefore all writers must stand with the Republic—would be hard pressed to refute the argument of Salvador Dali that Lorca's "death was exploited for propaganda purposes," and that personally the poet was "the most a-political person on earth."[33]

Undoubtedly, some did side with the Republic because of a valid opposition to Fascism, and because the Republic had the support of the populace. But who can question the accuracy of Vita Sackville-West, who addressed the hypocrisy of the call to support "the *legal* Government of Spain"? "Is this because it is the *legal* Government," she asked, "or because it is a Communist Government?"[34] (One is reminded of the pro-Sandinista writers today who ask that we not oppose the "legal" government of Nicaragua—something they did not hesitate to do when Somoza represented its legitimacy.) Noting that, if legality were the issue, these writers would have to support the existing regimes in Italy and Germany if rebellion broke out against them, Sackville-West identified the real issue: ". . . you want to see Communism established in Spain as well as in Russia, and you do not care a snap of the fingers whether a Government is 'legal' or not." Demanding frankness, Sackville-West challenged what she called the "subterranean forms of propaganda."

It was apparent that defenders of the Republic would use almost any argument to gather support. Virtually all honest observers knew about the brutal assassinations ordered by the Comintern for socialists, anarchists, and POUM revolutionaries after 1937. Yet Ernst Toller, whose propagandistic appeal to Americans started the campaign on behalf of Spain in the United States, emphasized the humanity of the Republic's troops toward its worst enemies. He had seen with his own eyes, Toller wrote, "the humane treatment of war prisoners, of Nazi pilots and Italian Fascist flyers who have killed dozens of children, dozens of women."[35] How false was the picture painted by Toller, of a free society in which Syndicalist, Communist, and parliamentary liberal were totally free and cooperated in word and deed for one aim—the destruction of the armed rebellion. It was Toller who orchestrated the false defense of Spain, and assured the worried liberals in the United States that "it is a lie that the fight is going on between Communism and Fascism." After all, he assured American liberals, Negrin had said that "private property is protected in Spain," and was simply trying to do "the same things that President Roosevelt strives to do: free the country from the power of economic Royalists." It was precisely these directives, forced upon Negrin by the Comintern, as Bolloten writes, that antagonized "other parties of the left and eventually" undermined the war effort "and the will to fight."[36] Having lost its reason and inspiration to fight, the Republic found itself with low morale among its would-be defenders and dependent upon the most treacherous of allies, Joseph Stalin and the Comintern apparatus.

How appropriate, then, that Cunningham ends his collection with "Crusade in Spain" by Jason Gurney,[37] who speaks the clear truth when he writes that "nobody, from either side, came out of it with clean hands." A member of the British section of the

33 Salvador Dali, *The Secret Life of Salvador Dali.* Dasa Ediciones, 1942, in Miller, pages 203-210.

34 Vita Sackville-West's comment is also from *Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War,* in Cunningham, page 229

35 Ernst Toller, "Transcript of Broadcast to the USA," *New Statesman & Nation,* October 8, 1938, in Cunningham, pages 72-75.

36 Burnett Bolloten, *The Spanish Revolution,* page 173.

37 Jason Gurney, *Crusade in Spain.* Faber and Faber Ltd., 1974, in Cunningham, pages 379-380.

International Brigades, Gurney noted that he and his comrades "had wilfully deluded ourselves into the belief that we were fighting a noble Crusade because we needed a crusade—the opportunity to fight against the manifest evils of Fascism . . . which seemed then as if it would overwhelm every value of Western civilization."

Gurney felt, writing in the mid-1970s, that "[W]e were wrong, we deceived ourselves and were deceived by others." But he argues as well that their fight was not in vain, and he does not regret his own part in that fight. "The situation," he says, "is not to be judged by what we now know of it, but only as it appeared in the context of the period." But much *was* known then, and suppressed by those who knew. Gurney would have it both ways. History has taught him the truth about Communism. But he still insists that because "others took advantage of our idealism in order to destroy it does not in any way invalidate the decision which we made." And this man who claims to understand history gives his last word to the blabbering of "La Pasionaria," Dolores Ibarruri. This famous Communist deputy, who sang the praises of the departing brigidistas as they were suffering the consequences of her betrayal, went immediately thereafter to Moscow, where she remained in exile until Franco's death. Those brave men who gave their lives had allowed themselves to be part of an ideological and propaganda instrument forged by the Comintern for its own purposes. Had they looked closer, they could have discerned the truth at the time. In 1986, those who still respond to the Spanish Civil War as simply "our cause" have no excuse.