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WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET O - OUTGOING I - INTERNAL I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 88102123Name of Correspondent: HON DAVID BONIOR MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: WRITE REGARDING US POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA. RECOMMEND THAT YOU INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION & NICARAGUA LEAD TO THE EXODUS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, FACILITIES AND MATERIAL FROM NICARAGUA AND AN AGREEMENT THAT SUCH EXODUS SHOULD BE PERMANENT

ROUTE TO:

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CHBAIL</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>88102123</u>	<u>AK</u>	<u>AFICB85</u>
<u>92DOS</u>	Referral Note:	<u>8810307</u>		<u>111</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>alt 3d70x</u>		<u>111</u>
	Referral Note:			<u>111</u>
	Referral Note:			<u>111</u>
	Referral Note:			<u>111</u>

## ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet  
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

## DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

## FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Acknowledgement sent to all sign

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March 3, 1988

Dear Congressman:

Thank you for your letter of February 23 to the President, cosigned by sixty-six of your colleagues, regarding U.S. policy in Central America and, particularly, with respect to Nicaragua.

We appreciate being advised of your interest in this matter. You may be assured that we have noted your suggestion that the President initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union and the government of Nicaragua leading to the permanent exodus of military personnel, facilities, and material from Nicaragua.

In an effort to be of assistance, we have forwarded your letter to the appropriate Administration officials for their careful review. You will receive a more detailed response in the near future.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

Alan M. Kranowitz  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Les AuCoin  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

AMK/KRJ/JWR/pt (Sy6-AK3)

cc: w/copy of inc. to Ed Fox, Cong. Affairs, STATE -- for DIRECT  
cc: w/copy of inc. to NSC Secretariat -- FYI

*letter shall signee*

March 2, 1988

Dear:

Thank you for your letter of February 23 to the President, cosigned by sixty-seven of your colleagues, regarding U.S. policy in Central America, and particularly, with respect to Nicaragua.

We appreciate being advised of your interest in this matter, and have noted your suggestion that the President initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union and the government of Nicaragua leading to the exodus of military personnel, facilities and material from Nicaragua and an agreement that such exodus be permanent.

In an effort to be of assistance, we have forwarded your letter to the appropriate Administration officials for their careful review. You will receive a more detailed response in the near future.

With best wishes,

Cordially,

Alan M. Kranowitz  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

AMK:KRJ:JWR:jwr

cc: w/copy of inc to Ed Fox, Congressional Affairs, State --  
for DIRECT  
cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat -- fyi

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# Congress of the United States

## House of Representatives

### Washington, DC 20515

February 23, 1988

President Ronald W. Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

For the past six years, the Congress and the Nation have been divided on what the United States' policy should be toward Nicaragua. This has resulted in inconsistent support for the policy you have advocated. It has been very confusing for the rest of the world and has weakened our influence.

It is important now to modify our policy so that it can gain solid bipartisan support of the Congress and the people. Such a policy can be implemented with confidence and consistency. We would like to call to your attention one element that such a policy should contain and request your support.

The United States has valid security concerns in Central America. Chief among these is to make sure that the United States and the neighboring countries of Central and South America are not threatened or endangered by the presence of military materiel, personnel or facilities of the Soviet Union or its allies. At present, the greatest danger of such a threat is in Nicaragua under the government of the Sandinista junta.

It is evident that our recent policy of supporting the counter-revolutionary "contra" forces has not led to the reduction of a Soviet threat. In fact, a case could be made that our policy has encouraged the Sandinistas to seek and receive an increasingly lethal complement of military hardware, including the Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters. There are also rumors of the construction of submarine bases and airfields capable of landing the largest bombers.

It is clear that, irrespective of the support that the United States gives to the contras, they are simply incapable of preventing the importation into Nicaragua of the kind of hardware that would present a threat to our country. Nor should we delegate to a proxy army the responsibility for protecting against a major national security threat to the United States. This is properly the function of the United States, itself.

Therefore, we request that you initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union and the government of Nicaragua leading to the exodus of military personnel, facilities and materiel from Nicaragua and an agreement that such exodus should be permanent. Since General Secretary Gorbachev has indicated a willingness to enter into discussions of this security issue and the general climate seems conducive to the recognition of individual and mutual interests, it would seem timely for such discussions to start.

We understand your disappointment that your policy was not adopted by the Congress. Nonetheless, we believe that, as part of a new, bipartisan policy toward Central America, we can build upon the cessation of military aid to the contras by challenging the Soviets to do the same with respect to the Sandinistas. We urge you to present this challenge to the Soviet Union at the earliest possible date, followed by negotiations on the removal of existing stockpiles.

The actions we recommend can be taken totally in parallel with other policy modifications regarding the future role of the contras, the cease fire and the pursuit of more effective democracy on the part of the Sandinista government.


We hope that you will act favorably toward these suggestions and we stand ready to support such actions as part of a more comprehensive policy for our relations with Central America.

Sincerely,




Jim Olin 2/26

HON. JIM OLIN




2/6 David Bonior

HON. DAVID BONIOR




Matthew McHugh 2/27

HON. MATTHEW McHUGH




Alex McMillan

HON. ALEX McMILLAN




Buddy MacKay 2/28

HON. BUDDY MacKAY




2/6 George Brown

HON. GEORGE BROWN




Tony Coelho 2/29

HON. TONY COELHO




2/3 Harley Staggers

HON. HARLEY STAGGERS




Rick Boucher 2/30

HON. RICK BOUCHER




2/1 Doug Walgren

HON. DOUG WALGREN



Pat Schroeder 2/1

HON. PAT SCHROEDER



2/2 Thomas S. Foley

HON. THOMAS S. FOLEY

Jim Jontz 201

HON. JIM JONTZ

201 Vin + Kostmayer

HON. PETER KOSTMAYER

Rich H. Stallings 202

HON. RICHARD STALLINGS

202 Bob Borski x

HON. BOB BORSKI

Howard L. Berman 203

HON. HOWARD BERMAN

203 Mac Sweeney

HON. MAC SWEENEY

Tom McMullen 204

HON. TOM McMILLEN

204 Dave McCurdy

HON. DAVE McCURDY

J. Roy Rowland 205

HON. J. ROY ROWLAND

205 Solomon P. Ortiz

HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ

J. A. Traficant, Jr. 206

HON. J. A. TRAFICANT, JR.

206 Bob Traxler

HON. BOB TRAXLER

Albert G. Bustamante 207

HON. ALBERT G. BUSTAMANTE

207 Bruce Vento

HON. BRUCE VENTO

Ron Wyden 208

HON. RON WYDEN

208 Tim Valentine

HON. TIM VALENTINE

Claudine Schneider 209

HON. CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER

209 Dennis Eckart

HON. DENNIS ECKART

Roy Dyson 210

HON. ROY DYSON

210 Mike Synar

HON. MIKE SYNAR

James McClure Clarke

HON. JAMES MCCLURE CLARKE

Esteban E. Torres

HON. ESTEBAN E. TORRES

Lindsay Thomas

HON. LINDSAY THOMAS

Mike Lowry

HON. MIKE LOWRY

Benjamin L. Cardin

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN

Bill Hughes

HON. BILL HUGHES

Mary Rose Oakar

HON. MARY ROSE OAKAR

Carl C. Perkins

HON. CARL C. PERKINS

Dick Durbin

HON. DICK DURBIN

Bob Mrazek

HON. BOB MRAZEK

Lane Evans

HON. LANE EVANS

Ronald Coleman

HON. RONALD COLEMAN

Frank McCloskey

HON. FRANK McCLOSKEY

Dave Nagle

HON. DAVE NAGLE

Ed Jones

HON. ED JONES

Bart Gordon

HON. BART GORDON

Gerry Sikorski

HON. GERRY SIKORSKI

Norm Dicks

HON. NORM DICKS

Dan Glickman

HON. DAN GLICKMAN

Leon Panetta

HON. LEON PANETTA

Mike Espy

HON. MIKE ESPY

J. Cooper

HON. JIM COOPER

Nicholas Mavroules

HON. NICHOLAS MAVROULES

Martin Lancaster

HON. MARTIN LANCASTER

Howard Wolpe

HON. HOWARD WOLPE

Philip Sharp

HON. PHILIP SHARP

Jim Leach

HON. JIM LEACH

Joseph E. Brennan

HON. JOSEPH E. BRENNAN

William H. Gray, III

HON. WILLIAM H. GRAY, III

Barbara Boxer

HON. BARBARA BOXER

Les AuCoin

HON. LES AUCOIN

Bill Green

HON. BILL GREEN

Tom Sawyer

HON. THOMAS C. SAWYER

Jim Slattery

HON. JIM SLATTERY

*Cron  
Ariv*

Communiqué from La Prensa, June 27, 1986

The Board of Directors, the management, and the personnel of La Prensa have the duty of informing the free world that the fearful threats so often made against this source of information, the herald of liberty in Nicaragua, have been carried out. A three-line communiqué from the Censorship Department of the Interior Ministry, released on Thursday, June 26, announced the Sandinista government's decision to close La Prensa indefinitely.

We now tell all the persons and institutions around the world which have honored us with awards and encouraged us with kind words of support that the dreaded moment has arrived when the Sandinista government decrees the end of publication of La Prensa.

We consider this a dark moment for the people of Nicaragua. At this solemn moment we repeat the phrase spoken by our martyred director, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal: "Without freedom of the press, there is no freedom of conscience, there is no freedom of thought, and even the right to life is undermined."

We always maintained that on the day La Prensa was closed, the last flicker of freedom would go out in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, that moment has come, and we believe that a time of torment is approaching for our people.

In announcing its decision to silence us totally, after more than four years of burdensome and humiliating censorship, the Sandinista government shows not strength, but weakness. It shows its inability to coexist with free communications media, not even when they are gagged in the most brutal manner.

We must clarify that we have not officially been given any reason for the closing of La Prensa. It is only the Sandinista press organs which have accused us of being "counter-revolutionaries," "imperialists," and "traitors," incorrect terms which we roundly reject as products of the political passion and sick hatred with which those media have attacked us.

Our latest issues from this week contain material that is informative and balanced, with some elements close to the ruling Sandinismo and other elements opposed to the way in which Sandinismo sees things. Our last editorial, which was to appear in the June 26 issue before the censors prohibited it, contains some highly patriotic statements about the situation Nicaragua is experiencing. What they cannot tolerate in us is that we do not follow servilely the single line of thought dictated by the FSLN.

There is a grotesque paradox here: We are publicly accused of aiding the enemies of Nicaragua, even though it is well known that all material published in La Prensa since 1982 has been minutely inspected and authorized by the Censorship Department of the Interior Ministry.

In any case, it is as if the Sandinista government itself had published this material, supposedly beneficial to the enemies of Nicaragua, since it is the Sandinista government which for years has authorized every line printed in La Prensa.

La Prensa laments its closing particularly because it has been the refuge of the last hopes of the Nicaraguan people that they would not totally lose their liberties.

It is the Nicaraguan people who are left behind, now that La Prensa is closed. They are condemned to suffer in total silence, to endure all the abuses that the authorities wish to visit upon them.

La Prensa looks back with pride upon the years of struggle since it rose from the ashes after being struck down by the fury of the Somoza dictatorship. Today it enters another period of forced silence, subjected to the decree of another dictatorship which, unfortunately, has enthroned itself in Nicaragua on the ruins of the previous dictatorship.

La Prensa thanks once more all those, in Nicaragua and around the world, who have honored it as the living symbol of the struggle for liberty and law. Its directors, its management, and its personnel in general enter this new period of forced silence, trusting in God and in his infinite justice that there will come better times for our suffering nation, and that we will finally come to enjoy the justice, the freedom, and the rights for which Nicaraguans have fought and suffered for so long.

This last hope of ours is nourished by the fact that, during its 60 years of life, La Prensa has suffered through the worst times alongside the Nicaraguan people, and it has emerged triumphant alongside them. We are confident that some day soon La Prensa will re-emerge in freedom together with Nicaragua itself, with which it is inseparably united in a common destiny.

Nicaragua shall be a republic again!

“Misconceptions About U.S. Policy toward Nicaragua

## Misconceptions About U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua

(cont'd)

America



# **Misconceptions About U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua**

## **Introduction**

In 1979, the Nicaraguan people overthrew the Somoza dictatorship. The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which led the military struggle, pledged that it would promote political pluralism, a mixed economy, and a nonaligned foreign policy. Since 1979, the Sandinistas have steered the revolution ever further toward Marxism-Leninism, leaving their original promises unfulfilled. The U.S. Government sought from the outset to build a positive relationship with the new Government of National Reconstruction (GRN), but as the Sandinistas made clear that they had no intention of fulfilling their earlier promises, relations between the two nations deteriorated.

The complexities of the situation in Nicaragua, accompanied by a vigorous Sandinista propaganda campaign, have resulted in much confusion about U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. This pamphlet corrects the most common misconceptions.

Department of State Publication 9417  
Inter-American Series 117  
Released June 1985

**Misconception:** U.S. policy is aimed at overthrowing the Sandinista regime.

**Facts:**

- U.S. policy toward Nicaragua has four objectives:

- 1) An end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups in neighboring countries;
- 2) Severance of Nicaraguan military and security ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc;
- 3) Reduction of Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore military equilibrium to the region; and
- 4) Fulfillment of the original Sandinista promises to support democratic pluralism and respect human and civil rights.

- The Sandinistas are aware of these objectives and know that the concerns of the United States and Nicaragua's neighbors could be met by changes in the behavior of the government in Managua.

- The objectives of the United States are consistent with the 21 points adopted in September 1983 by the participants in the Contadora process, including Nicaragua.

**Misconception:** The Sandinistas are essentially reform-minded nationalists, but U.S. hostility has driven them into the arms of Cuba and the Soviet Union.

**Facts:**

- The FSLN leadership is composed of committed revolutionaries who openly embrace Marxist-Leninist ideology. They claim to be a vanguard party with a historic right to lead the Nicaraguan people to "socialism"

(read: communism). The Sandinistas condemn the United States as the center of capitalism and imperialism and thus the principal obstacle to world revolution. The FSLN hymn proclaims the Sandinista commitment to fight against "the Yankee, enemy of humanity."

• In a secret speech made in the spring of 1984 to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), a Moscow-line Communist party, Sandinista National Directorate member and political coordinator Bayardo Arce acknowledged that the FSLN had never intended to comply with its promises to promote pluralism, a mixed economy, and non-alignment. Arce explained that the FSLN had made these commitments simply to gain international support and thereby forestall possible U.S. intervention. He referred to the elections as "a nuisance" and described the FSLN's goal of building a Socialist Nicaragua with "a dictatorship of the proletariat." Arce closed his speech appealing for "the unity of the Marxist-Leninists of Nicaragua." (The complete text of the Arce speech was printed in the Spanish newspaper *La Vanguardia* on July 31, 1984.)



July 26, 1979, Holguin, Cuba: Within a week of their defeating the Somoza regime, top Sandinista leaders flew to Cuba to celebrate their victory with Fidel Castro and to commemorate the traditional Cuban revolution holiday, the 26th of July. This photo shows Fidel Castro and Comandante Bayardo Arce, Political Committee Coordinator of the FSLN.  
(Bohemia, 1979)

• The Sandinistas' fraternal relations with the Communist government of Cuba are based both on ideology and the long history of Cuban support for the FSLN. The Sandinistas regard Fidel Castro as their mentor. Not only did he furnish them with a model for their revolution, Castro also provided shelter and training during their 18 years of struggle against Somoza, and he supplied them with the weapons for their final offensive in 1979. Castro has continually coached the Sandinistas, and he even brokered the arrangement among the three FSLN factions which led to the formation of the current National Directorate in March 1979.

• Within a week of the Sandinista victory in 1979, Cuba placed about 100 military and security personnel in Nicaragua. Currently, the number of such advisers has swollen to 2,500-3,500. In addition, Cuba has stationed thousands of "civilians" in Nicaragua, including a vast array of technicians and advisers as well as teachers, doctors, and construction workers.

• In addition to the Cubans, Nicaragua also has at least 200 Soviet and other East-bloc military advisers, and about 50 advisers from Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

• The United States openly distanced itself from the Somoza regime in 1978-79, and in June 1979 cosponsored an Organization of American States (OAS) resolution calling for its replacement. The United States endeavored to foster good relations with the new Sandinista government and offered it an alternative to alignment with Cuba and the Soviet Union. During the GRN's first 18 months, the United States took the leading role in the international effort to assist Nicaragua and authorized \$118 million in bilateral aid, far more than any other nation. The United States also supported the flow of \$1.6 billion from international financial institutions and Western democracies



Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega with Soviet leadership during one of his many trips to Moscow.

(Sovfoto-Eastfoto, 1982)

and the refinancing of Nicaragua's debt to private foreign banks.

• Because evidence showed that the Sandinistas were materially supporting the Communist guerrillas in El Salvador, the United States began suspending new aid funds to Nicaragua in late 1980; in April 1981 the United States discontinued economic assistance to the Nicaraguan Government. Despite the strains in our relations, in 1982 the United States offered a new \$5.1 million aid package to nongovernmental organizations, but the Sandinistas blocked these programs.

**Misconception:** U.S. hostility has compelled the Sandinistas to develop a large military force for its own protection.

#### Facts:

• The Sandinistas have always intended to establish a one-party Marxist state with an oversized military. In September 1979, just 2 months after seizing power, the Sandinista leadership met in seclusion for 3 days to map out their plans to consolidate the revolution internally and to promote "revolutionary internationalism." The report of this meeting, "Analysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista Peoples' Revolu-

tion" (commonly referred to as the "72-hour Document"), has been the blueprint which the Sandinistas have followed for more than 5 years.

• The Sandinistas, as former guerrilla fighters, planned from the outset to create a large military establishment, closely emulating the Cuban model. Long before any serious armed opposition arose, the Sandinista Peoples' Army (controlled at all levels by the FSLN party) made plans for increasing its manpower, building numerous bases, and training personnel in the use of sophisticated military hardware. The current growth in the Sandinista Army merely continues the decisions made in 1979-1980.

• The size of the Sandinista military now exceeds all legitimate defensive needs and is far larger than that of any other Central American country. Their active duty forces are estimated to exceed 60,000, some 5 times the size of Somoza's National Guard at its peak. These troops are supplemented by approximately 60,000 members of reserve and militia units. Moreover, the Sandinistas have acquired huge amounts of Soviet hardware, including at least 340 tanks and armored vehicles, scores of artillery pieces and rocket launchers, patrol boats, and



The Sandinistas now have at least 340 tanks and armored vehicles. The mainstay of this armored force is some 110 Soviet-made T-55 tanks. Nicaragua also has nearly 30 PT-76 light amphibious tanks. This photo shows a Soviet-made T-55 tank in Managua.

dozens of helicopters, including several MI-24s, the Soviets' top-of-the-line attack gunship.

**Misconception:** U.S. actions forced the Sandinistas to implement the State of Emergency which now suspends many of the civil liberties of Nicaraguans.

### Facts:

- Long before the Sandinistas faced any threat from armed opposition forces, they were already committing repressive acts.
- In November 1980, Sandinista security forces gunned down Jorge Salazar, the vice president of the private sector umbrella group, Supreme Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP).
- In November 1980 and again in March 1981, the Sandinistas blocked the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement Party headed by former junta member Alfonso Robelo from holding peaceful rallies.
- In early 1981, the Sandinistas arrested the President of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), Jose Esteban Gonzalez, and occupied the Commission's office. (The ensuing international uproar over his arrest convinced the Sandinistas to release Gonzalez; he now lives in exile, having been convicted in absentia of subversive acts and condemned to a lengthy prison sentence.)
- In February 1981, the Sandinistas arrested numerous Miskito Indian leaders for protesting Sandinista mistreatment of the indigenous population of the Atlantic Coast region. In late 1981-early 1982, the Sandinistas forced approximately 10,000 Miskitos to move from their ancestral homelands to distant resettlement camps.

(These and other repressive acts have caused thousands of Miskitos to flee into exile.)

• Beginning in 1981, the independent daily *La Prensa* was shut down several times and its owners threatened. The newspaper continues to be censored daily.

• In October 1981, five private sector leaders were jailed for 5 months for signing a letter protesting the Sandinistas' actions to implant Marxism-Leninism in Nicaragua.

• The Sandinistas imposed the State of Emergency in March 1982, claiming that it was a necessary response to a military threat. In fact, however, the State of Emergency has served primarily to provide the Sandinistas with the legal windowdressing to stifle dissent as they institutionalize their control over Nicaragua. Under its provisions, they have muzzled the free press, restricted the legitimate political activities of opposition parties, and held political prisoners without trial for prolonged periods.



July 9, 1984, Managua, Nicaragua: In the continuing conflict between the Catholic Church and the Sandinistas, Nicaragua's Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo and many priests demonstrated against Sandinista treatment of Father Luis Amado Pena. Sandinista authorities had accused Pena of "counterrevolutionary activities" and placed him under house arrest. The Sandinistas responded by expelling 10 foreign-born priests who had lived in Nicaragua for several years, including some who had not even participated in the demonstration.

(Wide World photo)

The State of Emergency has not been effective in checking the growth of the armed opposition. The many repressive acts committed by the Sandinista Government have actually led thousands of Nicaraguans to join the anti-Sandinista forces.

• The April 22, 1984, Pastoral Letter by the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference refutes the Sandinistas' assertion that U.S. aggression required curtailment of civil liberties. The letter states: "It is dishonest to constantly blame internal aggression and violence on foreign aggression. It is useless to blame the evil past for everything without recognizing the problems of the present."

**Misconception:** The United States is seeking a military solution, and charges about the Sandinistas' military buildup and their possible acquisition of MiGs are intended to lay the groundwork for an eventual invasion.

### Facts:

• President Reagan has made clear that the United States has no plans or desire to introduce U.S. combat troops into Central America. The United States actively supports the Contadora process aimed at achieving a political solution to the situation in Central America.

• The Sandinistas' military buildup is a major destabilizing element in the region and a matter of grave concern to Nicaragua's neighbors. Costa Rica has no army. Honduras relies on its small air force to offset partially the Sandinistas' overwhelming superiority in ground forces. The introduction of MiGs or other high performance aircraft would neutralize Honduras' only deterrent and further destabilize the region.

• At the same time, the United States cannot ignore the fact that the Sandinistas, supported by the Cubans and the Soviets,

are carrying out a military-based strategy both internally and externally in the region. It is they who seek a military solution, both for their own internal opposition and for the guerrilla war in El Salvador.

**Misconception:** The United States is responsible for Nicaragua's economic crisis.

**Facts:**

- Sandinista policies which emphasize Marxist Ideology over economic realities are the root cause of Nicaragua's economic deterioration. While the Sandinistas have paid lip service to a mixed economy, they have placed an ever greater portion of the economy under direct government control. Even the half of the economy still in private hands is subject to strict government regulation.

- Sandinista anti-private sector policies such as confiscations—often used to punish political opponents—high taxes, declining internal financial credit, and stringent controls on prices, wages, and foreign exchange have strangled private enterprise, discouraged production, and prompted many Nicaraguan business leaders, managers, and professionals to go into exile.

- These misguided policies have exacerbated the problems caused by war damage during the revolution and the world economic recession. Today, the per capita Gross National Product is 25% below the 1977 pre-revolutionary level and exports have declined 70% in real terms. The foreign debt has tripled from \$1.6 to \$4.6 billion in less than 6 years, and Nicaragua is seriously in arrears in debt repayments to most of its major creditors. The Nicaraguan people are suffering from growing shortages of food and basic consumer goods, an inflation rate of more than 60%, a one-third drop in real wages in the past 3 years, and more than 20% unemployment.

- The United States initially supported assistance to Nicaragua in international financial institutions, and for 18 months provided more bilateral economic aid than any other country to Nicaragua. Not until May 1985 did the United States impose trade sanctions on Nicaragua in response to the Sandinistas' unceasing efforts to subvert their neighbors, their destabilizing military buildup, their close ties to the Soviet bloc, and their imposition of non-democratic rule.

**Misconception:** The Sandinistas have attempted to improve relations with the United States while the United States has done nothing in return.

**Facts:**

- The United States has made numerous attempts to engage the Sandinistas in serious negotiations. Senior U.S. diplomats have traveled to Nicaragua repeatedly to discuss our concerns directly with the Sandinistas. During his June 1, 1984, visit to Managua, Secretary of State George Shultz designated Special Envoy for Central America, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, as the U.S. representative in a projected series of bilateral meetings with Nicaragua. Since that time, Ambassador Shlaudeman has met nine times with Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco.

- When the Sandinistas have made positive gestures, the United States has responded favorably. For example, in December 1983 Secretary Shultz publicly welcomed the Sandinista announcement of upcoming elections and offer of amnesty for the rebels, expressing hope that these would become a reality. Unfortunately, the Sandinistas' actions, such as continuing to support the Salvadoran insurgents, repression of opposition politicians, harassment of church leaders, and censorship, run counter to their professed willingness to be flexible.



January 25, 1985, Managua, Nicaragua: Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hosein Musavi (right), who visited Nicaragua for 3 days, is bid farewell by President Daniel Ortega (left). During his visit, Iran's Prime Minister underscored the ties of friendship between Iran and Nicaragua, and said that the two revolutionary governments shared similar ideals.

(Wide World Photo)

**Misconception:** The U.S. is supporting former Somocistas who are spreading terror in Nicaragua.

**Facts:**

- The vast majority of those now in armed opposition to the Sandinistas had no ties with the Somoza regime, and many were actually Sandinista fighters. The leaders of the armed groups, such as Adolfo Calero and Eden Pastora, were staunch enemies of Somoza and played active roles in the revolution. They and thousands of other Nicaraguans, mostly poor peasants and workers, became disillusioned by the Sandinistas' broken promises and maltreatment of the population. Judging that civic opposition was futile, they have taken up arms to restore the revolution's original goals. They have chosen to risk their lives rather than submit to the Sandinista regime.

- The armed opposition has focused its operations on military objectives and some government-owned companies and facilities. Unlike the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador who have concentrated attacks on economic infrastructure, the Nicaraguan armed opposition has attacked very few economic targets and has sought to avoid civilian casualties. Tragically, the Sandinistas have adopted a practice of mixing civilian government workers with troops in truck convoys, and civilians have been killed when these convoys have been attacked. The Sandinistas are engaged in a propaganda campaign to use such incidents to portray the opposition as human rights violators. It is more likely that the Sandinistas through use of heavy weapons—multiple rocket launchers, artillery, and helicopter gunships—have inflicted far more civilian casualties than have their opponents.

- Until the Sandinistas began to face armed internal opposition, they had been able to support violence and terrorism elsewhere in Central America with impunity. Only after the Sandinistas themselves began to incur costs from fighting an internal guerrilla movement did they signal a willingness to engage in meaningful negotiations with their Central American neighbors.

**Misconception:** Nicaragua's neighbors have never protested that the Sandinistas were assisting insurgents, and the United States has never produced any evidence of Sandinista support for subversion.

**Facts:**

- The Governments of El Salvador and Honduras have repeatedly denounced the Sandinistas' materiel support for armed Marxist groups. Guerrilla documents, captured weapons shipments, and statements

by guerrilla prisoners and defectors prove continuing Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran insurgents.

• The Honduran military has captured two large groups of insurgents who admitted to having been trained in Cuba and infiltrated into Honduras through Nicaragua. The Sandinistas sent them to initiate armed operations against the democratic government of Honduras.

• Costa Rica, a nation without an army, has diplomatically protested numerous incursions by the Sandinista Army into Costa Rica. Protests, both official and private, have been lodged as well over Sandinista support of the radical wing of the legal Costa Rican Communist party, and FSLN support of terrorist actions in Costa Rica.

• The United States closely monitors arms trafficking in Central America. While most of this information cannot be released to the public in order to protect intelligence sources and methods, the appropriate committees of the U.S. Congress have reviewed the intelligence and judged that it proves

Sandinista materiel support for guerrillas in the region. (See *Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-Up and Support for Central American Subversion*, July 18, 1984, and *News Briefing: Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador*, August 8, 1984.)

**Misconception:** The United States decided well before the Nicaraguan elections took place to brand them a farce.

### Facts:

• The United States consistently has called for fair and free elections in Nicaragua, and the development of democracy has been one of the objectives of our policy.

• The legitimacy of an electoral process cannot be determined solely by the technical aspects of the process on election day. The Nicaraguan election was seriously flawed, for one party—the FSLN—controlled from the outset every aspect of the process, including the electoral machinery, most of the media, the police, the army, the courts, and mass organizations such as the neighborhood watch committees. The Sandinistas refused to grant the parties of the democratic opposition even the minimal conditions for a genuinely free election and sent mobs to disrupt their meetings. Sandinista supporters staffed the voting stations, registered the voters, and counted the ballots. Two-thirds of the precincts had not a single observer from any party except the FSLN to monitor the conduct of the voting operation and report on irregularities.

• The Sandinistas faced only token opposition on election day. Three of the parties on the ballot were minuscule Communist organizations. Another was a small group of the democratic left officially allied with the FSLN since 1980. The remaining party ran



May, 1, 1980, Havana, Cuba: The three major Marxist-Leninist revolutionary leaders in Latin America are portrayed here at the May Day celebration in Havana: (left) Daniel Ortega, leader of Nicaraguan Sandinista Government; (center) the late Maurice Bishop, leader of the 1979 coup in Grenada; (right) Fidel Castro, considered the mentor of both.

(Wide World photo)

under the name of the traditional conservative party, a title it obtained with Sandinista assistance. (It was one small faction of the parent party.) One democratic party pulled out of the campaign in late October to protest Sandinista abuses, but the FSLN-controlled Supreme Electoral Council ruled that the party's name stay on the ballot.

- The Nicaraguan election contrasted sharply with that in El Salvador where power was hotly contested and the Salvadoran people were given a real opportunity to select their leaders from a variety of political persuasions. Whereas in El Salvador the government offered the far left an opportunity to participate—which the far left declined—the Sandinistas emphatically excluded the armed Nicaraguan opposition from any role in the elections. The FSLN rebuffed all efforts by the civic opposition to obtain conditions which would have made the elections meaningful.

- The Contadora plan calls for free and fair elections as a requirement for peace and national reconciliation in all the Central American countries.

- There has been widespread international criticism of the Nicaraguan electoral process. For example:

- a) "What the regime in Nicaragua is doing is exactly what always has happened in all Communist regimes, but in different shades. In the case of the neighbor country, for reasons that are perfectly transparent, the elections are an effective instrument to better the image of the regime, that is to say, to project to the outside world the appearance of a frank, open democracy and even a return to the original proposition of the anti-Somoza insurrection.... There will not really be freedom of the press, nor a right to strike, nor free

issuance of the vote. The result of the ballot box has already been dictated by the regime." (Costa Rican newspaper *La Nacion*, August 10, 1984)

- b) "The preparations for the elections and the country's political climate being what they are, free voting by individual citizens cannot be expected. The EDU [European Democratic Union] mission has arrived at the conclusion that in this context the demands of the *Coordinadora* are fully justified—leaving aside the general amnesty and the dialogue with the armed opposition; without a realization of these demands free elections are not possible; on the contrary, it is the rejection of the demands which is an important indication that free elections are not intended.... The elections are being shaped and exploited by the Government of Nicaragua to the end of consolidating its own power and of facilitating further measures on the road to a Marxist-Leninist regime. The government for these reasons cannot afford free elections because they would conjure up the serious danger of its losing the majority." (European Democratic Union report on Nicaragua's electoral process, September 1984)

- c) "Only the naive believe that Sunday's election in Nicaragua was a democratic or legitimizing proof of the Sandinistas' popularity. The result was ordained when opposition parties tamely accepted terms that barred them from power." (New York Times editorial, November 7, 1984)



January 10, 1985, Managua, Nicaragua: Daniel Ortega greets Cuban leader Fidel Castro, the only foreign head of state to attend Ortega's inauguration as president.

(Wide World photo)

**Misconception:** The United States has been attacking Nicaragua's human rights record while ignoring serious situations in El Salvador and Guatemala.

#### Facts:

- The United States has always voiced its concern about the human rights situation in El Salvador and Guatemala, and it sought to use its influence on those governments to curb such abuses. There have been im-

provements in both countries. In El Salvador, according to information from the Catholic Church, the number of murders committed by right-wing death squads has decreased steadily in the last 4 years with a sharp downturn in 1984. By the end of 1984, they were far lower than the number attributed to the Marxist guerrillas.

- The human rights situation in Nicaragua is deplorable. The independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights has documented numerous cases of murders, disappearances, tortures, and prolonged detentions without trial for which the Sandinista Government is directly responsible. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission's report for 1983-1984 states that "it is necessary to introduce far-reaching remedies that will bring about unrestricted observance of these rights [to personal freedom, to a fair trial, and to due process], which at this time are significantly weakened."

- Following the November elections, the situation deteriorated markedly. The Sandinistas once again imposed heavy censorship of *La Prensa*. The GRN prevented individuals whom it considered its opponents from leaving the country, among them democratic politicians, private sector leaders, union officials, and even a bishop.

**Misconception:** The United States has not taken effective steps to encourage democracy and oppose dictators in Central America.

#### Facts:

- The United States strongly supports democracy in Central America, and this support is yielding positive results.
- Honduras in the past 4 years has made the transition from a military regime to a democratic civilian government.

- El Salvador has continued the democratic process launched in October 1979, weathering challenges from a violent right and a foreign-supported Marxist insurgency, to hold free elections and install a constitutional civilian government.

- Guatemala has committed itself to return to democracy, and in July 1984 elections were held for a constituent assembly. Presidential elections are scheduled for 1985.

- Costa Rica continues to enjoy a flourishing democracy.

- Of the Central American states, only Nicaragua is moving away from democracy.

- In addition to its firm political support for democracy in Central America, in the past 5 years the United States has provided nearly \$2 billion of economic aid to stimulate development and about \$670 million of military aid to build a shield behind which these fragile democracies can grow.

**Misconception:** The underlying reason for the problems in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations is the American concern that a Marxist Nicaragua could become a model for other Central American countries.

### Facts:

- The Sandinista seizure of power in 1979 aroused hopes that the Nicaraguan people would soon enjoy a democratic government which would promote social justice and improve the quality of their lives. The Sandinistas, utilizing vast amounts of foreign aid—much of it from the United States—announced a number of programs, including a literacy campaign, construction of clinics, and expanded medical care. The programs were announced with much fanfare, and the Sandinista press releases describing the “miraculous” successes of

these programs were generally repeated uncritically by the international press.

- Had the Sandinistas fulfilled their promises to the Nicaraguan people for better lives and had the new government evolved toward a social democratic system, they possibly might have developed a model that could be emulated. Today none of Nicaragua's neighbors desire to voluntarily copy the Sandinista system. Instead, they fear attempts by force of arms to impose that system on their countries.

- The widely touted literacy and health programs launched by the Sandinistas have not worked as people hoped. To sustain progress in combating adult illiteracy, a continuing effort is required. Initial gains are disappearing for lack of followup and the unavailability of interesting and uncensored reading material. The people are tired of the Marxist propaganda material made available to them in the guise of instructional material. The quality of instruction in the educational system has decreased. In 1983 only a small percentage of graduating secondary school students could pass a standardized examination. This lowering of academic standards is attributable in part to the injection of massive doses of Sandinista political propaganda into the educational program and to the conscription of school age children into the military.

- While some advances have been made in preventive health care, the quality of curative medicine in Nicaragua has fallen sharply. The Sandinistas' repressive policies have driven many Nicaraguan doctors, nurses, and medical technicians into exile. Nicaraguans complain that the Cuban personnel who provide much of the medical service in Nicaragua today are poorly trained.


- Similarly, the Sandinista claims of expansion of the number of trade unions have not improved the lot of the workers. The crea-

tion of new unions under Sandinista control has been a ruse to repress and destroy the free trade unions. The International Labor Organization in March 1984 expressed "serious concern" over the large number of trade unionists and employee representatives arrested and noted that "freedom of association can only be exercised" where fundamental human rights and "freedom from arbitrary arrest are fully respected and guaranteed." Many former trade union leaders have gone into exile.

- Despite billions of dollars of foreign aid since 1979, per capita income in Nicaragua has declined to the levels of the early 1960s. Inflation is soaring—an estimated 100% in 1984 alone—and workers' wages continually decline in purchasing power.

- Whereas Nicaragua, prior to 1979, was a net exporter of foodstuffs, it is now a net importer of food. Production has dropped and Nicaraguans are facing serious shortages of food as well as basic consumer goods. Food is rationed. The issuance of ration coupons by the local Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs) has become a method of political pressure. Queues, typical of Eastern Europe, are now an everyday sight in Nicaraguan markets. Basic necessities often are available only on the black market at highly inflated prices. Peasant food producers often prefer selling to black market vendors who pay their bills.

- In contrast to the poverty affecting Nicaraguan workers and peasants, the Sandinista elite drive luxury cars, and have followed the Soviet example of opening special stores where they can buy goods unavailable to the rest of the population. People elsewhere in Central America are not yearning to have the Nicaraguan model imposed upon them.




Grade-school arithmetic books use pictures of Soviet-made AK-47 rifles and hand grenades to teach children to count.

For further information, contact the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean:

S/LPD  
Room 6253  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520





# Documents on the Nicaraguan Resistance: Leaders, Military Personnel, and Program



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

March 1986

*This Special Report contains a collection of basic documents and data pertaining to the character of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. The purpose of this Report is to partially answer the question: "who" is the democratic resistance?*

*These documents provide an insight into the debate about the relationship between civilian and military leaders within the resistance, about the organizational nature of resistance military forces (especially those of the FDN), and about the political programs of those struggling for freedom against the Soviet-equipped and Cuban-advised Sandinista dictatorship.*

## Document 1

*Letter from Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams to Senator Richard G. Lugar (Ind.), Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 24, 1986*


February 24, 1986

Dear Mr. Chairman:

You asked about the allegation that the Nicaraguan resistance consists of, or is led by, supporters of the late dictator Anastasio Somoza. We have reviewed the facts carefully and conclude that this charge is incorrect and misleading.

The leaders of the main resistance organization, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), are Adolfo Calero,

## Background of Senior FDN Military Personnel, November 1985



Source: Document I, Table 1.

Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo. All three actively opposed Somoza while he was still in power. Calero was jailed by Somoza; first Robelo then Cruz became Junta members with the Sandinistas.

The largest guerrilla forces belong to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), headed by Calero since 1983. Other important resistance organizations include ARDE, built by Robelo and former Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora, and MISURASATA and KISAN guerrillas active among the Indians of the Atlantic Coast.

We expect the UNO coalition to continue to broaden, both inside and outside of Nicaragua, but UNO is already far more representative of the wishes of the Nicaraguan people than Somoza ever was or than the Sandinistas are today.

Resistance fighters are overwhelmingly rural youths. Most are between 18 and 22 years old; when Somoza fell in 1979, they were in their early teens. They fight today in response to Sandinista attempts to control their farming, their churches, and in some cases their indigenous cultures. Many joined the resistance in preference to being drafted to fight for the Sandinistas against their friends and neighbors. In defending their families and communities, these young Nicaraguans are fighting for self-determination above all else. Their struggle is not on behalf of the old dictatorship—it is against the new dictatorship armed by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

The commanders are older than their troops (most are 25–35), are more likely to come from urban areas, and have more diverse occupations and backgrounds. They include both former National Guardsmen and former Sandinista fighters, but most are civilians from the very groups the Sandinistas claim to represent: peasants, small farmers, urban professionals, and students. One was a primary school teacher; another, an evangelical pastor. Even in the FDN, which has the largest number of former military professionals, less than half the commanders have prior military experience, either in the National Guard under Somoza or in the army, militia, or security services under the Sandinistas.

We have obtained information on the backgrounds of all senior FDN military leaders, including the incumbents of every position from the civil-military command down to task force deputy commander or executive officer. The results, based on a November 1985 survey, are summarized in Table I, below. Allowing for casualties, transfers, and other personnel changes, we believe that this general pattern holds today.

### Acronyms

KISAN—Nicaraguan East Coast Indian Unity
UNO—United Nicaraguan Opposition
FDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Forces
FRS—Sandino Revolutionary Front
MDN—Nicaraguan Democratic Movement
ARDE—Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
FARN—Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force
MISURASATA—Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity
MISURA—Miskito, Sumo, and Rama
EPS—Sandinista Popular Army
MPS—Sandinista Popular Militia

TABLE I  
Prior Occupations of Senior FDN Military Leaders

Civilian.....	78
Professionals or urban employees.....	39
Peasants or small farmers.....	34
Students.....	5
<b>Military.....</b>	<b>71</b>
<i>National Guard</i> .....	41
Officers.....	23
Soldiers.....	18
<i>Sandinista army, militia, or security services</i> .....	30
Officers.....	8
Soldiers.....	22
No information available.....	4
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>153</b>

While accepting that most FDN fighters are peasants, a report prepared last year for the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus (*Who are the Contras?*, April 18, 1985) claimed that the FDN “army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen.” This allegation, though false, has become almost an article of faith for many who oppose U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

The Caucus staff claimed that “46 of the 48 positions in the FDN’s command structure are held by former Guardsmen.” “[A]ll but one of the 12 top central staff” and “five out of six regional commanders, and all 30 task force commanders” were said to be Guardsmen.

The Caucus staff is correct in identifying the FDN’s military commander, Enrique Bermudez, as a former Guard officer. It is also correct in describing the FDN’s regional and task force commanders as “the key military field leaders.” But the report’s overall figures and conclusions are incorrect.

The FDN has 14 regional commands (each has roughly 800 combatants organized into 2 to 4 task forces). At the

time of the survey, the FDN had 52 task forces or equivalent commands (task forces have from 60 to 700 members). Tables II and III show the backgrounds of the regional and task force commanders. They are based on the same data as Table I.

TABLE II  
Prior Occupations of FDN Regional Commanders

Sandinista Soldiers.....	6
National Guard Soldiers.....	2
Peasants or Small Farmers.....	2
National Guard Officer.....	1
Civilian Medical Doctor.....	1
Evangelical Pastor.....	1
Student.....	1
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>14</b>

Rather than 5 of 6 regional commanders being former Guard members as asserted in the Caucus report, we find 3 of 14.

TABLE III  
Prior Occupations of Commanders of FDN Task Forces or Equivalent Commands


Peasants or Small Farmers.....	19
National Guard.....	14
Officers .....	5
Soldiers .....	9
Sandinista Army or Militia .....	13
Officers .....	4
Soldiers .....	9
Medical Student .....	1
No Information .....	4
Vacant .....	1
<b>TOTAL</b> .....	<b>52</b>

Whereas the Caucus report claimed that 30 out of 30 task force commanders were former Guardsmen, we find that 14 out of 47 did have prior Guard service, but that 33, more than twice as many, never served in the Guard in any capacity.

FDN headquarters links the strong-willed and independent field commanders who control the troops with the UNO political leadership. The Caucus claim of 11 former Guardsmen in 12 top positions omitted several positions held by persons who were not former Guardsmen. A complete count must include all members of the strategic and civil-military commands, all operational commanders, and all chiefs of support services. Of the 21 individuals in these positions late last year, 12 (including Bermudez) once served in the Guard. A former Sandinista Army officer and eight civilians from professional or tech-

## Resistance Forces, 1979-85

(estimated total combatants)



nical backgrounds held the other key positions.

As noted above, it is true that the FDN's military commander was in the National Guard. But it is wrong to call Enrique Bermudez a backer of Somoza. Somoza had him posted out of Nicaragua during the last three years of his regime. Not even the Sandinistas accused Bermudez of human rights abuses under Somoza. In 1979, Somoza rejected a Carter Administration suggestion that Bermudez, then a colonel, might assume command of the National Guard after Somoza's departure.

The presence in the resistance of men like Bermudez seems unobjectionable unless one is seeking to deny to the resistance the services of all former Guardsmen simply because they once served in the Guard. That is a standard not followed by the Sandinistas themselves, who have used former Guardsmen together with Cuban, Soviet and other foreign advisors and technicians to consolidate their power on the basis of a pervasive military security apparatus.

\* \* \*

The Sandinista armed forces are the largest and best equipped in the history of Central America. They are at least six times larger than the armed forces of any of the Somozas at their height.

Although the Sandinistas frequently portray themselves as nationalists, their soldiers are trained and supported in combat by thousands of Cubans and other foreigners known as "internationalists." When Daniel Ortega spoke in Havana on February 5 to the Congress of the Cuban Communist Party about "the blood of Cuban internationalists fallen on Nicaraguan ground," he was talking about Cubans killed fighting Nicaraguans inside Nicaragua.

Resistance to the Sandinistas and to their Cuban and other foreign allies is eroding past differences and gradually forging a new national coalition similar to the one that rose up against Somoza. In the early days, who fought with whom typically depended on relationships that went back to the Somoza era. When Pastora, for example, first took up arms against his former comrades, he refused to have anything to do with former Guardsmen or with anyone else who had not been actively Sandinista at least for a time. The increased coordination within UNO between ARDE commanders associated with Pastora and FDN commanders also operating on the southern front is therefore a significant change.

More must be done to improve the human rights performance of the armed resistance (UNO has begun a program

one of whose objectives is to assign at least one fully trained person in human rights to every task force). More must be done politically to develop, articulate, and coordinate the programs of the armed resistance with those of the civil opposition.

Sandinista abuses have aroused entire sectors of the population. Some FDN units are made up of men from the same cluster of villages or the same department. Other units reflect a new Nicaraguan nationalism: Four of the fourteen regional commands have among their commanders both former Guard and former Sandinista military personnel. In three of the four, former Sandinista military personnel outrank (and hence give orders to) former Guardsmen.

To continue to associate Nicaragua's resistance forces with Somoza is patently misleading. Somoza is dead. The Central American dictatorships associated with Somoza have all given way to elected governments committed to democracy. Today, the only Central American President who wears a military uniform is the Sandinista president of Nicaragua.

We join with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces and the people of Nicaragua in our commitment

to a democratic outcome for that country. The people of Nicaragua and the resistance forces are struggling for a future of freedom and peace, and they deserve our support.

Sincerely,  
ELLIOTT ABRAMS

## Document 2

*Letter from Senator Claiborne Pell (R.I.), Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Assistant Secretary Abrams, March 4, 1986*

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This regards your recent letter to Senator Lugar commenting on the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus' report of last April, entitled "Who Are the Contras?" As you may know, I have been interested in receiving information from the Department on the make-up of the military leadership of the FDN. I am encouraged that the Department is now addressing the issue, and agree that it is a legitimate and important topic of debate.

I am interested to read in your report that, although you dispute certain of the Caucus' conclusions, you do confirm its staff's finding of last spring that there is substantial involvement in the FDN military leadership of ex-National Guardsmen. Specifically, you determine—as indeed did its staff—that over 40 of the FDN command were formerly members of Somoza's National Guard.

I am disturbed, however, that your report is both incomplete and at times inconsistent with past assertions of your Administration.

It is incomplete because it fails to include the names, titles or backgrounds of any military leader other than Enrique Bermudez, thus precluding the Caucus' staff and other analysts from verifying its conclusions. And it is inconsistent in that it appears directly to contradict at least one key finding of your predecessor, Langhorne Motley: last spring, he confirmed that nine of ten of the FDN General Staff were ex-Guardsmen; in contrast, your report neglects so much as to mention a General Staff. In addition, it greatly expands Ambassador Motley's definition of military leadership well past the command level to include lower-ranking "civil-military" personnel and task force deputies. This seems to more than double (from 66 to 153) the

leadership total, and artificially reduces the percentage of former Guards.

Since the Administration has requested mostly *military* rather than "humanitarian" aid this year, and since, therefore, it is the *military* leaders of the contras who will be the actual recipients of the aid, I would appreciate precise and specific responses to the following questions about the military leadership of the FDN:

- (1) Who served on the ten-member General Staff referred to in Ambassador Motley's letter last April, and who now holds their title or duty?
- (2) Are nine of the ten-member General Staff still, as Ambassador Motley confirmed in the letter, former members of the National Guard?
- (3) Is Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez coordinating the regional commands as commander of theater operations? (For questions 3-9, if this individual is not serving in the position, where is he serving, if at all?)
- (4) Is "El Venado" serving as G-1, General Staff commander for personnel?
- (5) Is "El Toro" serving as G-2, General Staff commander for personnel?
- (6) Is "Mike Lima" serving as G-3, General Staff commander for operations?
- (7) Is Armando "El Policia" Lopez serving as G-4, General Staff commander for logistics?
- (8) Is "El Invisible" serving as G-5, General Staff commander for logistics?
- (9) Is Juan Gomez serving as commander of air operations?
- (10) What is the current role in the FDN and whereabouts of Ricardo Lau, who press reports placed in contra camps as recently as last month?
- (11) Who commands the 14 regional commands cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each command?
- (12) Who commands the 52 task forces cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each task force?
- (13) Who are the roughly 75 individuals tabulated in your letter to Senator Lugar who are neither General Staff, regional commanders or task force commanders, and what are their specific titles or duties?
- (14) What are the positions and who are the occupants of the leadership posts referred to in the chart entitled "Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985" that accompanied Secretary Shultz's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 27?

Biographical information on individuals you will be naming in your response would also be of use.

Since Congress will be voting on the aid request later this month, we would hope a response to these questions could be provided prior to March 11.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,  
CLAIBORNE PELL  
Ranking Minority  
Member

## Document 3

*Letter from Assistant Secretary Abrams to Senator Pell, March 14, 1986*

Dear Senator Pell:

I agree fully that accurate information on the military leaders of the FDN is important to the debate over U.S. policy in Central America. I welcome the opportunity to answer your questions of March 4.

Let me first say, however, that our identifying 41 out of 153 members of the FDN senior personnel as former Guardsmen does not confirm the principal contention of the April 1985 Caucus staff report that the FDN "army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen."

Allowing for growth and force expansion, but counting the positions performing the same functions the Caucus report used to base its claim that 46 out of 48 were former Guardsmen, we found 29 former Guards out of 82 individuals whose backgrounds were identified. Thirty-five per cent is *not* the same as 96 per cent.

Who are the almost two thirds of the FDN's military leaders who are *not* former Guardsmen? In response to your inquiries, I am enclosing a list [see Document 6] of Senior FDN military personnel. It identifies their positions and their previous occupations, including discrepancies when they have come to our attention. It shows that a majority are civilians, that they come from both urban and rural backgrounds, and that many previously served in Sandinista army or militia units.

This brings me to a second key point: the resistance forces have grown steadily since 1982. This means that more people now joining were previously with the Sandinistas *than* with the Guard, which ceased to exist more than six years ago. It also means that the

FDN's organization and components are themselves constantly changing.

For example, the Jorge Salazar Regional Command began in 1983 as a task force of some 250 men operating in northern Nicaragua. It was effective, it attracted ralliers and grew. It became a regional command. It continued to grow. By November 1985 it had become an operational command with three regional commands and ten task forces; the initial force of 250 fighters had grown to nearly 5,000.

These remarkable increases in fighters and combat units have had a direct impact on the headquarters staff and services their operations require. The Nicaraguan resistance is not a conventional army. It is an irregular army of volunteers, and volunteers follow who they want to follow. Operating in the field against larger Cuban-trained and advised forces, FDN units must of necessity be led by individual commanders who can inspire a following. And the headquarters must not only link these men and the troops they control to each other, it must also act as a link between them and the political leadership in the FDN directorate and now beyond the FDN in UNO. No single component can be said to dominate the resistance movement; all elements must be taken into account.

\*\*\*

Answers to your specific questions follow.

(1) Who served on the ten-member General Staff referred to in Ambassador Motley's letter last April, and who now holds their title or duty?

Ambassador Motley's letter, like the Caucus report, used "general staff" as short-hand for senior headquarters positions. In its early days, the FDN did have an entity called a "General Staff", but it was dissolved in January 1984 as part of a political and military restructuring. The Strategic Command and a variety of specialized services were developed to coordinate as coherently as possible the actions undertaken in the field by the growing number of individual units.

As I noted in my letter to Senator Lugar, a count of the senior headquarters leadership today is not complete unless it includes "all members of the strategic and civil-military commands, all operational commanders, and all chiefs of support services." As of the November 1985 survey, this came to a total of 23 positions. The positions and the 21 individuals occupying them are identified in the enclosed list of FDN military personnel.

(2) Are nine of the ten-member General Staff still, as Ambassador Motley confirmed in the letter, former members of the National Guard?

No. As noted above, there is no "General Staff." Of the 21 individuals in senior headquarters positions as of last November, 12 (including Bermudez) once served in the Guard. A former Sandinista Army officer and eight civilians from professional or technical backgrounds held the other nine positions. As noted in the enclosed list, one former guardsman has been replaced by a civilian since November.

(3) Is Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez coordinating the regional commands as commander of theater operations?

No. There is no "commander of theater operations". The growth of the FDN forces has been such that no one person coordinates all regional commands. Walter Calderon Lopez, "Tono", still heads the Tactical Operations Command (TOC). But three other commands now operate independently of the TOC and at the same hierarchical level: Operational Command Rafaela Herrera (commanded by a former Lieutenant in the Sandinista armed forces, Encarnacion Baldivia Chavarria, "Tigrillo"); Operational Command Diriangen; and Operational Command Jorge Salazar.

(4) Is "El Venado" serving as G-1, General Staff Commander for personnel?

With the understanding that there is no "General Staff," yes. Harlie Duarte Pichardo, "Venado", is the assistant for personnel in the Strategic Command.

(5) Is "El Toro" serving as G-2 General Staff commander for personnel?

No. I presume question meant to refer to intelligence, which is where the Caucus report located him, and not personnel, covered in question 4 above. The Strategic Command assistant for intelligence is Rodolfo Ampie Quiroz, "Invisible". Donald Torres, "Toro", is in charge of counterintelligence.

(6) Is "Mike Lima" serving as G-3, General Staff commander for operations?

Yes, subject to the same qualifications noted above. The Strategic Command assistant for operations is Luis Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima." Denis Pineda Careamo, "Benny", was listed in this position in November.

(7) Is Armando "El Policia" Lopez serving as G-4, General Staff commander for logistics?

No. The Strategic Command assistant for logistics is Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito", a former medical student. Armando Lopez, "Policia", left this position last December, and now carries out other logistics functions.

(8) Is "El Invisible" serving as G-5, General Staff commander for logistics?

No. Logistics was dealt with in question 7. I presume this question was meant to refer to "psychological warfare," which is where the Caucus report listed "Invisible". No position was so designated in the November survey. Today, Rodolfo Ampie Quiroz, "Invisible", is Strategic Command assistant for intelligence and commander of a task force.

(9) Is Juan Gomez serving as commander of air operations?

Yes. Juan Gomez, "Juanillo", is the FDN's senior pilot, and is often referred to as head of air operations.

(10) What is the current role in the FDN and whereabouts of Ricardo Lau, who press reports placed in contra camps as recently as last month?

Ricardo Lau, "Chino Lau", left the FDN more than a year and a half ago. He is said to reside in Guatemala. We have no information on his presence in FDN areas this year.

(11) Who commands the 14 regional commands cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each command?

See enclosed list.

(12) Who commands the 52 task forces cited in your letter to Senator Lugar, and what is the name of each task force?

See enclosed list.

(13) Who are the roughly 75 individuals tabulated in your letter to Senator Lugar who are neither General Staff, regional commanders or task force commanders, and what are their specific duties?

See enclosed list.

(14) What are the positions and who are the occupants of the leadership posts referred to in the chart entitled "Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985" that accompanied Secretary Shultz's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 27?

The chart is based on Table I in my letter to Senator Lugar.

\*\*\*

Let me conclude with two final thoughts on the military and the political aspects of the war in Nicaragua.

The first is that, despite internal shortcomings and the steady growth of the Sandinista armed forces and internal security units in numbers, operational capability, and weaponry, the resistance is militarily viable.

Keeping together some 20,000 fighters is in itself not a small achievement given existing conditions inside and outside Nicaragua. Over the past several years, between one-third and one-half of these fighters have been operating inside Nicaragua at any given time.

The UNO/FDN forces can be considered the "cutting edge" of a broader national resistance movement. This broader movement includes such organizations as:

- UNO/FARN under the leadership of Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro operate small units in the Northern Rio San Juan and Southern Zelaya;
- Sandino Revolutionary Front (ARDE/FRS), under the leadership of Eden Pastora, also operates along the southern region of Nicaragua; and
- UNO/KISAN and MISURASATA Miskito and independent Creole fighters operate from Northern Zelaya to North of Bluefields along the Atlantic Coast.

By 1985 armed resistance forces were engaging in military operations in more than half of Nicaragua's 16 departments. Comparing the areas in which resistance forces operated in 1982-83 with those in which they have been active since 1984-85 reveals a steady expansion, from hit-and-run raids primarily concentrated along the northern Nicaraguan border to multi-taskforce operations in such departments as Matagalpa, Boaco and Chontales in central Nicaragua, including the lengthy presence of some 1500 members of the Jorge Salazar Command in southern Zelaya and along the Rama Road. Some of these areas are as much as 45 days' march from the Honduran border.

While non-FDN forces remain small and are largely organized into small tactical units of 40-70 men, they do continue to make their presence known. The military leaders of these groups are either former Sandinistas or independents. Like the experience within the FDN itself, where former Guardsmen and former Sandinistas fight side by side, the former Sandinistas in these non-FDN forces are increasing their coordination with the FDN in the strengthened political framework of cooperation with UNO.

For a movement some have declared ineffective, defeated, or even dead, the

Nicaraguan resistance is displaying a resiliency that is given little recognition by anyone but the Sandinistas.

This brings me to my final point. The United States supports all the major groups in opposition to the Sandinista dictatorship. Our only conditions are that any group we support subscribe to democratic principles, that it respect internationally-accepted standards of conduct and refrain from criminal activity, and that it cooperate with other like-minded groups. In this regard, I am enclosing for your convenient reference a copy of UNO's Declaration of Principles and Objectives, signed in Caracas, Venezuela, on January 22, 1986.

As I wrote Senator Lugar, the people of Nicaragua and the resistance forces are struggling for a future of freedom and peace, and they deserve our support.

Sincerely,  
ELLIOTT ABRAMS

## Document 4

### Selected Biographies of Resistance Leaders

**Enrique Bermudez Varela** is the military commander of the UNO/FDN armed forces. He is a military engineer who graduated from the Nicaraguan Military Academy and also attended the Agulhas Negras Military Academy in Brazil, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the U.S. Army School of the Americas. From 1976 to 1979, Bermudez served as the Defense Attaché in Washington, D.C., and was not involved in or associated with human rights abuses committed during the civil war. Roberto Sanchez, the Sandinista Army spokesman in Managua, noted in December 1982 that Bermudez has never been identified with "war crimes" committed under Somoza. This statement has never been repudiated by the Sandinistas or Sanchez.

**Adolfo Calero Portocarrero**, a lifelong opponent of Somoza, has been president of the National Directorate of the FDN since December 1983. He began his political career in the 1950s as an activist in the Conservative Party. In 1959 he helped organize managerial strikes in support of an insurrection headed by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily *La Prensa*. In 1978,

Calero served as his party's representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) and was jailed for initiating a general strike against Somoza. A 1978 *New York Times* article described Calero as "the most forceful" of Somoza's opponents. After attempting to cooperate with the Sandinistas, Calero went into exile at the end of 1982. He helped found UNO in 1985. Calero graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1953, did graduate work in industrial management at Syracuse University, and holds a law degree from the University of Central America in Nicaragua.

**Alfredo Cesar Aguirre** earned a B.S. degree in industrial relations from the University of Texas and an M.B.A. from Stanford University. After serving as general administrator of the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, he joined the Sandinistas in 1978 and was tortured and imprisoned by the government during Somoza's last year. After the Sandinista victory in 1979, Cesar became Executive Director of the International Reconstruction Fund. In 1980-81 he was executive director of the Banking Superior Council. In 1981-82 he was president of the Central Bank. After breaking with the Sandinistas, Cesar went into exile in Costa Rica and became an adviser to the Costa Rican Government, specializing in external debt. In mid-1985 he became the most prominent of six founding members of the Southern Opposition Block (BOS).

**Fernando Chamorro Rappaccioli**, "El Negro," leader of UNO/FARN and commander of ARDE's military forces, has been a prominent anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He participated in numerous military actions against the dictator and was repeatedly jailed or exiled by Somoza. During the revolution, he executed a spectacular rocket attack on Somoza's Managua bunker from the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979, he fought on the southern front with the Sandinistas. The increasingly communist nature of the regime, and the absence of an effort to implement the democratic goals of the revolution, drove Chamorro into exile in 1982 at which time he joined in the founding of ARDE. When Pastora was expelled as a result of policy disputes within the organization, Chamorro became the military leader.

**Arturo Jose Cruz Porras** was a member of Nicaragua's Governing Junta from May 1980 to March 1981. He was jailed twice by Somoza, once for 3 months and later for 11 months. In

1977, Cruz was invited by the Sandinistas to be one of "The Group of 12," prominent Nicaraguans who would serve as a bridge between the Sandinistas and other groups in the civil opposition to Somoza. A long-time member of the Conservative Party, Cruz is an economist who holds graduate and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University. He has specialized in development banking and has worked for the Inter-American Development Bank. Following the revolution, Mr. Cruz served as president of the Central Bank in 1979-80, as a member of the governing junta from May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United States from June 1981 until his resignation in December in protest over Sandinista policies. Cruz was the presidential candidate of the unified opposition Coordinadora Democratica in the November 1984 elections but refused to register his candidacy in protest over the Sandinista government's refusal to permit a fair electoral contest. He helped found UNO in 1985.

**Wycliffe Diego** is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian pastor and an active member of the Miskito organization ALPROMISU. He was jailed by Somoza in 1971 for allegedly being a communist. When MISURASATA was formed in 1979, Diego served as a member of its executive board. Reacting to the Sandinista mistreatment of Nicaragua's indigenous population, Diego went into exile and helped found the armed resistance group MISURA. He was wounded in a Sandinista-engineered 1982 assassination attempt and is today a key figure in UNO/KISAN.

**Eden Pastora Gomez**, the legendary Commander Zero and leader of the ARDE/FRS, was the Sandinistas' most popular hero and a senior official of their government until he distanced himself from them in 1981. In August 1978 Pastora led the unit that captured the National Palace in Managua. That operation gained the release of 59 political prisoners, but its lasting significance was that it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people and enabled the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to Somoza. After the fall of Somoza, Pastora became Vice Minister of Interior and then Vice Minister of Defense. In April 1982 he announced his opposition to the Sandinista regime. That same year he was cofounder of ARDE. In April 1983 he took up arms against the Sandinistas in southern Nicaragua.

**Brooklyn Rivera Bryan** is a Miskito Indian from the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. He supported the revolution against Somoza and was a founding member of MISURASATA when it was created under Sandinista auspices in 1979. In February 1981, Rivera and other Indian leaders were arrested by the Sandinistas and accused of "counter-revolutionary activities." He was released from jail after a short time and continued to protest Sandinista efforts to nationalize Indian lands and to relocate the Indian population. He resisted efforts to force the "cultural assimilation" of the various Indian groups by the Sandinistas. He was driven into exile and carries on the fight for freedom as head of MISURASATA, now independent of the Sandinistas.

**Alfonso Robelo Callejas**, political coordinator of ARDE and head of the MDN, was trained as a chemical engineer. He served as director of the University of Central America from 1970 to 1972 and was president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce until 1975. He then headed the development institute INDE. Following the assassination of *La Prensa* editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Robelo founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, a moderate, democratic-oriented political party of businessmen, industrialists, and professionals opposed to the Somoza regime. After the revolution Robelo was one of the five members of the original 1979 junta. He resigned in 1980 because of the Marxist tendencies in the FSLN-dominated government and the growing Cuban influence in the country. Harassed by the FSLN after his resignation, he was finally forced into exile in 1982, at which time he and Eden Pastora founded the Democratic Alliance. Robelo helped found UNO in 1985.

**Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz**, FDN Directorate member in charge of civil affairs. The son of an anti-Somoza figure, he became politically active at an early age. He participated in the anti-Somoza youth movement and became involved in the Independent Liberal Party, ultimately becoming its political secretary. He was jailed twice in the 1950s for anti-Somoza activities. After spending several years abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept a position at the University of Central America where he remained during the revolution. In 1981 he abandoned his university post to go into exile and take up the struggle against the Sandinistas. Educated as a veterinarian, Rodriguez has been a professor and university president as well as a cattleman and coffeegrower.

**Lucia Cardenal Viuda de Salazar** is the widow of Jorge Salazar Arguello, a prominent Nicaraguan businessman who was murdered by the Sandinista security forces in November 1980. She was educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua and the United States. During the revolution, the Salazars collaborated with the Sandinistas and harbored Sandinista militants who were being sought by Somoza's forces. Her late husband, a top official of the private sector organization Superior Council of Private Enterprise, played a key role in the civic opposition to Sandinista policies in 1980. A progressive and charismatic leader whose popularity was rising, he was shot and killed by Sandinista State Security police who claimed he was participating in a conspiracy. After his murder Mrs. Salazar fled Nicaragua and joined the FDN.

**Aristides Sanchez** is the FDN Directorate member responsible for logistics. He holds a Doctor of Law degree and graduated in Italy with a specialization in labor law. Cattleman and agriculturalist.

## Document 5

### UNITED NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

Under the protection of God and interpreting the hopes of the great majority of people in Nicaragua, who with heroic patriotism shook off the yoke of the previous dictatorship and now suffer the repression by force of arms of new tyrants and foreign intervention;

#### GIVING HOMAGE:

To the noble sacrifice of the democratic resistance forces which have shed their blood and continue to offer their lives in an unequal war against an army in the service of Soviet imperialism, from which it receives direction, training, weapons and supplies;


To the civic courage and democratic vocation of the political parties, labor and social organizations, ethnic minorities and individuals who have maintained a firm attitude against the abuses of the military tyranny of the Sandinista Front;

#### AFFIRMING:

That the people of Nicaragua have demonstrated their will to free themselves from the totalitarian regime which oppresses them with the support of foreign forces and the so-called inter-

## **Components of the UNO/FDN Military Forces**

This chart focuses on the headquarters and combat components of military forces of the United Nicaraguan Opposition/Nicaraguan Democratic Force (UNO/FDN) as reported in November 1985. At any given time, organizational and authority relationships can fluctuate because of communications difficulties, dispersal of units, and other operational requirements of the war in Nicaragua.



nationalists, carrying out a painful defensive war and a war of liberation, which have witnessed heroic actions inspired by the highest degree of patriotism on the part of the combatants of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance and of broad sectors of the population;

#### **RECOGNIZING:**

That the courage and sacrifice of different sectors comprising the nation have created, in the face of repression, the conditions for the liberation of Nicaragua, faithful to the historic tradition that has led them to rise up in arms when their freedom and democratic aspirations have been snatched away from them;

#### **CONSIDERING:**

The historic democratic determination of the Nicaraguans, translated in the past struggles against the Somoza dynasty and in the present struggle against the totalitarianism of the Sandinista Front, the firm belief in a juridical order and respect for the constitution of the country and the sacrifices for the full exercise of its precepts;

#### **COMMITTED:**

To the unrestricted observance of the human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception, the establishment of a State of Law which permits the full development of the individual and the promotion of social justice;

#### **RECOGNIZING:**

That the tragic situation of Nicaragua, embroiled in chaos as a consequence of the present dictatorship, requires the adoption of special and urgent measures in the political, economic and social arenas which guarantee the quick and orderly transition toward a democratic State, by means of a Provisional Government of a duration strictly limited by the needs of the transition;

#### **REAFFIRMING:**

Our commitment to peace and democracy contained in the Pronouncements of San Jose of March 1, 1985, of San Salvador of June 12, 1985, and our support for the calls for National Dialogue demanded by the Democratic Coordinator and the Nicaraguan Bishops Conference;

#### **TAKING INTO ACCOUNT:**

The civil war of Nicaragua, which threatens the peace of the region and of the American continent, brought about by the failure of the military tyranny of the Sandinista Front to fulfill the resolutions of the XVII Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting of the Organization of American States of June 23, 1979 which, in an action which set a precedent in

our continent, explicitly withdrew its recognition of one of the member governments in order to grant it to an insurgent force, which committed itself to establish democracy and respect the human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception;

#### **CONVINCED:**

That the solidarity and reconciliation of all Nicaraguans, as well as the support and understanding of the peoples and governments of the free world, will contribute effectively to the creation of the indispensable conditions so that a democratic and pluralistic process is established which guarantees peace, sovereignty and freedom to our people;

#### **THEREFORE:**

On behalf of the Directorate of the United Nicaraguan Opposition and with the full support of its Permanent Advisory Committee, we propose to the Nicaraguan people and inform our sister Latin American nations and the democratic governments of the world, while at the same time requesting their support and solidarity, the Principles and Objectives of a Provisional Government of National Reconciliation.

### **PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES**

#### **I. Regarding the Political System:**

1. To democratize Nicaragua, guaranteeing and promoting political pluralism and the participation of all citizens at the local and national level, through the exercise of representative democracy, respecting their ethnic, cultural and religious values;

2. To establish a political system which guarantees the separation and independence of the powers of the government;

3. To establish a rule of law which assures the equality of the citizens before the law; respect for, the full exercise of, and effective development of Human Rights through the independence of the Judicial Power; giving guarantees to national Human Rights organizations, and adhering strictly to international obligations deriving from written agreements;

4. To guarantee the strictest respect for freedoms, especially those of speech, association, worship and unions with respect for agreements numbers 87 and 98 of the International Labor Organization, such as the undeniable right to strike;

5. To recognize the primacy of Civil Society over the State and the achievement of the common good as its principal objective;

6. To create an autonomous electoral system which guarantees representative democracy and respect for the popular will, freely expressed in periodic elections, assuring alternability in office, through the principle of non re-election.

7. To promulgate a Civil Service Law, establishing the administrative career. There will be created the National Comptrollership Commission to guarantee the efficient and honest use of public funds and State resources;

8. To abolish any and all types of capital punishment and to eliminate permanently and unequivocally the special tribunals which have been abusively created by the Sandinista Front;

9. To decree a General Amnesty for political and related common crimes, as an expression of the process of rehabilitation and reconciliation, without exception;

10. To recognize the historic rights of the indigenous peoples of Nicaragua, adopting special administrative and developmental measures in order to accelerate the progress of the Atlantic Coast; fostering the participation of its people in matters affecting the region, preserving their cultural identity and strengthening the nationality and territorial integrity of the Nation;

11. To demilitarize society by subjecting the military to the civil authority, proceeding to dismantle military, para-military and security organizations and the organizations of repressive nature of the Sandinista regime;

12. To create a National Army in the service of the Nation and the defense of its sovereignty, of adequate proportions for those objectives and composed principally of those Freedom Fighters who wish to serve professionally and loyally in democratic institutions, and by other Nicaraguans who also meet the conditions of moral character. No person with a record of human rights violations will be able to become a part of the new National Army.

#### **II. Socio-Economic Affairs:**

1. To recognize the family as the basis of society, making its protection a fundamental objective of the Government of Reconciliation;

2. To give preferential use of state resources to satisfy basic human needs: especially employment, food, health, education and housing;

3. To assure that education responds to the fundamental principles of freedom of instruction and the right of parents to select the best for their children. The preservation and the development of culture and sports will be an important



- Denis Pineda Carcamo, "Benny," assistant for operations, *GN sub-lieutenant*. (Replaced since November by Luis Alfonso Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima," *GN sub-lieutenant*.)
- Armando Lopez, "L-26" or "Policia," assistant for Logistics, *GN lieutenant*. (Replaced since November by Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito," *medical student*.)
- Sebastian Flores, "Q-25," assistant for communications, *civilian radio technician*.

## SUPPORT SERVICES

### Logistics

- Mario Sacasa, "Romano," *graduate in economics*.
- Rodolfo Robles, "Raul," *public accountant*.
- Ramon Selva, "Marcel," *graduate in agriculture*.
- Agustin Bodan, "Pincho," *agricultural engineer*.
- Abel Ignacio Cespedes, "Ciro," *GN lieutenant colonel*.

### Civil Affairs

- Carlos Icaza (see Office of Legal Affairs).
- Jaques Pearson, "Jaques," *civilian professional*.
- Oscar Sugranes, "Oscar," *civilian professional*.

### Communications

- Frank Arana, "Cosaco," *graduate in business administration*.

### Medical

- Ernesto Matamoros, "Dr. Tomas," *military physician, GN lieutenant colonel*.
- Otto Mojica, "Dr. Jacinto," *odontologist*.
- Salvador Marin, "Dr. Francisco," *physician and surgeon*.
- Jose Plazahola, "Dr. Jose," *physician and surgeon*.
- Garry Britton, "Dr. Awas Tara," *physician and surgeon*.
- Pablo Rivas, "Dr. Pinto," *physician and surgeon*.
- Jose Quintana, "Dr. Rafael," *physician and surgeon*.
- Francisco Rugama, "Dr. Ruben," *physician and surgeon*.
- Pedro Mora, "Dr. Orlando," *physician and surgeon*.
- Rodrigo Lezama, "Dr. Lezama," *physician and surgeon*.

### Air Force

- Juan Gomez, "Juanillo," *commander, GN colonel*.
- Arnaldo Arana, "Tejano," *subcommander, GN captain*.
- Guillermo Gomez, "Memo," *pilot, GN sublieutenant*.
- Oscar Porras Aragon, "Pancho," *pilot, GN sublieutenant*.
- Manuel Mairena Rivas, "Manuel," *pilot, civilian*.
- Frank Stadthagen, "Frank," *pilot, civilian*.
- Carlos Vargas Lopez, "Carlos," *pilot, civilian*.
- Arnaldo Antonio Blanco, "Arnaldo," *pilot, civilian*.
- Jose Ernesto Santillana Mendoza, "Tito," *pilot, civilian*.
- Camilo Gonzalez Lopez, "Camilo," *pilot, civilian*.
- Wilfredo Gutierrez, "Wilfredo," *pilot, civilian*.
- Jaime Lau, "Jaime," *pilot, civilian*.
- Guillermo Osorio, "Guillermo," *pilot, civilian*.
- Ramon Zuniga, "Ramon," *pilot, civilian*.
- Henri H. Motino, "Henri," *pilot, civilian*.
- Jose Jimenez Cruz, "Jose," *pilot, civilian*.
- ★ Gustavo Quezada, "Waiki," *pilot, Sandinista Popular Army sub-lieutenant*.
- Juan Jose Zelaya Jarquin, "Genaro," *air intelligence assistant, GN major*.
- Gilberto Jiron, "Gilberto," *mechanic, civilian*.

### Naval Force

- Isidro Sandino, "Jose Alvarado," *commander, GN colonel*.

### Counterintelligence

- Donald Torres, "Toro," *officer in charge, GN major*.

## REGIONAL COMMANDS

### NICARAO

- Jose Benito Bravo Centeno, "Mack," *commander, GN sergeant*.
- Filemon Espinal Aguilar (or Aguilera), "4-2," *executive officer, GN sergeant* (not identified at time of November survey).

### Task Force Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

- Filemon Espinal Aguilar (or Aguilera), *commander (see Regional Command Nicarao)*.

### Task Force Comandante Omar

- Jose Camilo Vasquez Tercero, "Samuel," *commander, GN soldier* (since identified as farmer).

### Task Force Monimbo

- Miguel Angel Hernandez Calderon, "Ocran," *GN soldier*.

## SEGOVIA

- Manuel Adan Rugama Acevedo, "Aureliano," *commander, civilian physician and surgeon*.
- ★ Jose Maria Rodriguez Espinoza, "Segovia," *executive officer Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) sublieutenant*.

### Task Force Yali

- Francisco Montenegro Cruz, "Nelson," *farmer*.
- ★ Feliciano Flores Rivera, "Mano Negra," *executive officer, Sandinista Popular Militia (MPS) soldier*.

### Task Force Ruben Dario

- Amado Tercero Castro, "Rojito," *commander, farmer*.

### Task Force Subtiava

- ★ Rodolfo Garcia Castro, "Nortiel," *commander, EPS sublieutenant*.
- ★ Teodoro Altamirano, "Egdoro," *executive officer, MPS soldier*.

### Task Force Jicaro

- Marcial Sanchez Carrasco, "Sacarias," *commander, cattleman*.
- Ricardo Galindo Urbina, "Rufo," *executive officer, cattleman*.

## SAN JACINTO

- Francisco (or Jose Federico) Ruiz Castellon, "Renato," *commander, GN lieutenant*.
- Marlon Blandon Osorno, "Gorron," *executive officer, GN sublieutenant* (not listed since November).

### Task Force Rigoberto Cabezas

- Gerardo Martinez, "Chaco," *commander, GN sublieutenant* (not listed since November).
- Guillermo Yobanks Soliz, "Jhonne," *executive officer, GN sergeant*.

### Task Force Xolotlan

- Javier Gomez Ortega, *commander, Willi" or "Willy," GN sublieutenant*.

- Jose Aguirrez Garcia, "Chino 4," executive officer, *GN corporal* (since identified as Regional Command executive officer and Task Force Rigoberto Cabezas commander).

## 15 OF SEPTEMBER

- ★ Luis Fley Gonzales, "Jhonson," commander, *EPS soldier* (since identified as Task Force Raul Arroliga commander).
- ★ Simeon Aguirrez Torrez, "Kaliman," executive officer, *Department of State Security (DGSE) official* (since identified as Task Force Armando Blancher commander).

### Task Force Raul Arroliga

- Rafael Amador Altamirano, "Canario," commander (since identified as executive officer), *farmer*.
- ★ Melido Tinoco Villagra, "Wilmor," executive officer, *EPS sergeant* (not listed since November).

### Task Force Armando Blancher

- Santos Ramon Zeledon Rivera, "Wilfredo," commander (since identified as executive officer), *farmer*.
- Cosme Castillo Moran, "Ronald," executive officer, *farmer* (not listed since November).

## OPERATIONAL COMMANDS

### Rafaela Herrera

- ★ Encarnacion Baldivia Chavarria, "Tigrillo," commander, *EPS sublieutenant*.
- ★ Rufo Cesar Zeledon Castilblanco, "Rolando," executive officer, *EPS sergeant* (not identified at time of November survey).

### Task Force San Miguel

- ★ Rufo Cesar Zeledon Castilblanco, "Rolando," commander (see above).
- Eduardo Vargas Callos, "Wilfredo," executive officer, *chauffeur*.

### REGIONAL COMMAND JUAN CASTRO CASTRO

- ★ Jose Danilo Galeano Rodas, "Tiro al Blanco," commander, *EPS soldier*.
- ★ Amadeo Rivera Marin, "Ismael Antonio," executive officer, *EPS soldier* (not identified at time of November survey).

### Task Force Francisco Rodriguez

- ★ Jose Santos Aguilera Sanchez, "Gavilan," commander, *farmer* (identified since November as having served in the Sandinista army or militia).

### Task Force Pablo Ruiz

- Francisco Ruiz Garcia, "Camaron," commander, *farmer*.

### Task Force Felipe Cornejo

- Commander position is vacant (filled since November by Thomas Luis Manzanares Torrez, "Leoncillo," *farmer*).
- Francisco Palma Salinas, "Perdido," executive officer, *GN soldier*.

### REGIONAL COMMAND ALONSO IRIAS

- ★ Abelardo Zelaya Chavarria, "Ivan," commander, *EPS soldier*.

### Task Force Matilde Cruz

- Santiago Silas Zamora, "Lobo," commander, *farmer* (not listed since November).
- Antonio Moncada Blandon, "Gato Negro," executive officer, *GN private* (identified since November as commander).

### Task Force Albino Molina

- ★ Dionisio Benavidez Lopez, "Solin," commander, *EPS soldier* (since promoted to executive officer of Regional Command Alonso Irias).
- "Catala" (true name unknown in November, identified since as Santos Rojas Torrez, "Catalita") executive officer (since promoted to commander), *farmer*.

### REGIONAL COMMAND ANDRES CASTRO

- ★ Francisco Baldivia Chavarria, "Dimas de Tigrillo," commander, *EPS soldier*.
- Isidro Hermes Garcia Gonzalez, "Pata de Fierro," executive officer, *MPS soldier* (since identified as *farmer*).

### Task Force Mercedes Benavides

- ★ Jose Fausto Picardo Castillo, "Richard," commander, *MPS soldier* (since identified as *EPS soldier*).
- Pablo Fajardo, "Selva," executive officer, *farmer*.

### Task Force Juan Flores

- Candelario Rivas, "Marlon," commander, *EPS soldier* (since identified as *farmer*).
- Monica Mercedes Rivas, "Ivan," executive officer, *EPS soldier* (since identified as *farmer*).

### Task Force Leonardo Palma

- ★ Santos Ricardo Aguilar Cornejo, "Leoncillo II," commander, *farmer* (since identified as having served in the *MPS*).
- Juan Pastor Salgado Cornejo (or Aguilar), "320," executive officer, *farmer*.

### Task Force Alonso Ramos Castro

- Cruz Matey Olivas, "Augusto," commander, *farmer*.
- Evernet Arauz Tinoco, "Dumas," executive officer, *farmer*.

### Diriangen

- Luis Alfonso Moreno Payan, "Mike Lima," commander (see Strategic Command).
- Denis Pineda Carcamo, "Benny," executive officer (see Strategic Command).

### Task Force Larry McDonald

- ★ Fremio Isabel Altamirano Montenegro, "Jimileo," commander, *farmer* (since identified as *EPS soldier*).
- Maximo Rodriguez Martinez, "Wilmer," executive officer, *GN corporal*.

### REGIONAL COMMAND SALVADOR PEREZ

- ★ Oscar Manuel Sobalvarro Garcia, "Ruben," commander, *EPS soldier*.
- ★ Concepcion Anibal Rivera Arauz, "Isaias," executive officer, *EPS soldier*.

### Task Force Maritza Zeledon

- Julio Cesar Sobalvarro Garcia, "Danilo," commander, *farmer* (since identified as *businessman*).

### Task Force Miguel Pineda Rizo

- ★ Jacinto Tercero, "Campeon," commander, *EPS sublieutenant*.

### Task Force Fermin Espinoza

- ★ Luis Armando Sobalvarro Garcia, "Jhonny," commander, *Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) political delegate* (since identified as *coffee grower*).
- Juan Angel Rivera Huete, "Jubenal," executive officer, *student*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND SANTIAGO MEZA

- Justo Pastor Meza Aguilar (or Peralta), "Denis," commander, *farmer*.
- Rito Perez Mejia, "Hombrito" or "Fonor," executive officer, *farmer*.

### Task Force Macondo

- Pedro Leonardo Cardenas Olivas (or Martinez), "Deglis," commander, *farmer*.

### Task Force Julio Meza

- Cristobal Meza Peralta, "Omaro," commander, *farmer* (or *cattleman*).
- Apolinas Bustamante, "Cain," executive officer, *farmer*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND PEDRO JOAQUIN GONZALEZ

- ★ Rudy Zelaya Zeledon, "Douglas," commander, *EPS soldier*.
- Juan Ramon Medina Ramos, "Medina," executive officer, *farmer* (since identified as *businessman*).

### Task Force Managua

- Juan Agustin Blandon Carbajal, "Bladimir," commander, *farmer*.
- Benicio Gonzalez Perez, "Gorgojo," executive officer, *farmer*.

### Task Force Yorlan Ubeda

- Jose Balladares, "Chepito," commander, *farmer*.
- ★ Horacio Castro Salgado, "Fernando," executive officer, *EPS soldier*.

### Jorge Salazar

- Juan Rivas Romero, "Quiche," commander, *GN sergeant*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR I

- Tirzo Ramon Moreno Aguilar, "Rigoberto," commander, *student*.
- Antonio Chavarria Rodriguez, "Dumas," executive officer, *evangelical pastor*.

### Task Force Tipitapa

- Jhonn Santiago Lopez Lopez, "Honda Lopez," commander, *GN corporal*.

## Task Force Chontales

- Felix Garcia Hernandez, "Alis," commander, *farmer* (since identified as *evangelical pastor*).

## Task Force Masaya

- Denis Galeano Cornejo, "Jhonny," commander, *farmer*.

## Task Force Emanuel Mongalo

- Rafael Leontes Areas Bolano, "Atila," commander, *GN private*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR II

- Israel Galeano Cornejo, "Franklin," commander, *farmer*.
- ★ Angel Soza, "Emiliano," executive officer, *EPS soldier*.

## Task Force Filemon Membreño

- Angel Soza, "Emiliano," commander.

## Task Force Salvador Mendieta

- Guadalupe Vallecillo, "Capulina," commander, *previous occupation unknown*.

## Task Force Hermenegildo Gonzalez

- Alfredo Galeano Cornejo, "David," commander, *farmer*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND JORGE SALAZAR III

- Diogenes Membreño Hernandez, "Fernando," commander, *evangelical pastor*.

## Task Force Camoapa

- "Jose," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown*.

## Task Force Jose Santo Morales

- "Oliver," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown*.

## Task Force Jeane Kirkpatrick

- "Oswaldo," true name unknown, commander, *previous occupation unknown*.

## REGIONAL COMMAND JOSE DOLORES ESTRADA

- Marcos Orlando Navarro Carrasco, "Dimas Negro," commander, *GN sergeant* (since identified as *private*).

- Jose Abel Hernandez Gutierrez, "Orion," executive officer, *GN corporal* (since identified as *private*).

## Task Force Commandante Rudy

- Gumercindo Lopez Rojas, "Principe," commander, *GN soldier*.

## Task Force Oscar Montenegro

- ★ Noel Gomez Jimenez, "Jaguar," commander, *EPS sublieutenant*.

## Tactical Operations Command

- Walter Calderon Lopez, "Tono," commander, *GN lieutenant*.
- Victor Sanchez Herdocia, "Licenciado," executive officer, *graduate in business administration*.

## Task Force Grupo Griego

- Guillermo Lopez Arguello, "Poffi," commander, *GN sublieutenant*.

## Task Force Grupo Oswaldo

- Francisco Orozco Gutierrez, "Naval," commander, *GN soldier*.

## Task Force Grupo Gamaliel

- ★ Marcos Benavidez, "Tapada," commander, *EPS soldier*.

## Task Force Grupo

- Miguel Angel Rodriguez

- ★ Pastor Palacios Zamora, "Indio," commander, *EPS soldier*.

## Independent Task Forces and Groups

### Task Force Quilali

- ★ Freddy Montenegro Gadea Zeledon, "Coral," commander, *EPS soldier*.
- Roberto Alonso Martinez Noboa, "Nolan," executive officer, *student*.

### Task Force Independencia

- Rodolfo Ernesto Ampie Quiroz, commander (see Strategic Command)
- Filadelfo Rivas, "Jose," executive officer, *GN sublieutenant*.

### Task Force Military Police

- Mariano Esteban Morales Canales, "Leo," commander, *GN sergeant*.
- Rene Danilo Jarquin Icabalzeta, "Honda 2," executive officer, *primary school teacher*.

#### Grupo Comandante Griego

- Jose Quintin Espinales Guevara, "0-3," commander, *GN sergeant*.
- Raul de Jesus Ortez Sandres, "Kaibil," executive officer, *farmer*.

#### Special Operations Command

- Carlos Jose Guillen Salinas, "Gustavo Pajarito," commander (see Strategic Command).
- Denis Diaz Alfaro, "Isaac," subcommander, *engineering student*.

#### Artillery Unit


- Erick Bohnenblust, "Roberto," commander, *GN sublieutenant*.

#### Naval Force (Riverine)

- ★ Tito Antonio Baldivia Zelaya, "Abel," commander, *EPS soldier*.

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## MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE: 1984-1985\*

 General Operational Area  
 Primary Conflict Zone



\*Area delineations are approximations based on the 1984-1985 military operations of UNO/FDN, UNO/KISAN, UNO/FARN, ARDE/FRS, MISURASATA, and Creole units.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

REPORT ON NICARAGUA

February 4, 1986



EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT  
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN NICARAGUA

Summary:

The only Contadora negotiations on a regional treaty during this period were held November 19-21. Those talks, involving all nine participating governments, reportedly resulted in some progress on verification and related issues and the five Central American delegations recommended that the negotiations be continued. On December 3, however, Nicaragua asked that they be suspended until May, 1986. The United States, the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), Contadora Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay), and the four democratic Central American states have publicly urged their resumption. On January 15, Nicaragua endorsed a call by the Contadora Group and Support Group to resume talks, but appeared the following day to condition resumption upon a number of prior actions. At this writing, there are unconfirmed reports that negotiations may resume February 14-17. Whether Nicaragua merely takes a seat at the negotiating table or negotiates seriously remains to be seen.

This period witnessed increased international recognition of the fundamental importance of democratic national reconciliation to a regional solution. On January 12, the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and Support Group, meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela, issued a statement emphasizing democratic pluralism and pledged their good offices to "promote new steps" of national reconciliation. Recalling our pledge to renew bilateral talks with Nicaragua if the Sandinistas accepted a Church-mediated dialogue with the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), the United States on January 17 expressed strong interest in the Caraballeda statement. To explore possibilities for diplomatic progress Central American Special Envoy Shlaudeman consulted with several Contadora Group and Central American states January 19-23; Secretary of State Shultz has invited the eight foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and Support Group to a meeting February 10 in Washington.

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Continuing attempts to circumvent Contadora that became apparent in late 1983 and even more obvious in 1984 and 1985,<sup>1</sup> Nicaragua during the last ninety days has tried repeatedly to derail negotiations aimed at producing a final comprehensive Contadora treaty.

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<sup>1</sup>See the November 6, 1985 Report on Nicaragua.

Following two rounds of talks in October, on November 11 Nicaragua made public a letter from President Ortega to the presidents of the eight Contadora Group and Support Group governments setting forth objections to the September 12, 1985 draft agreement tabled by the Contadora Group governments. Nicaragua argued that it could not assume the obligations of a Contadora agreement unless it reached a prior accommodation with the United States. Among other demands, it insisted that the United States sign a special protocol to a Contadora agreement pledging itself to a permanent policy of non-aggression toward Nicaragua, in effect a pledge that we would not respond to Sandinista actions regardless of what they do. Nicaragua also objected to the September draft's provision that one international military exercise per year<sup>2</sup> could be held until the parties to an agreement adjusted their military inventories and troop levels to agreed limits.<sup>3</sup>

On November 19-21, plenipotentiary negotiators of the Central American and four Contadora Group governments met for a third round of talks. Progress reportedly was made on verification and the question of when treaty obligations would enter into effect, but the previously agreed 45-day self-imposed period for completing negotiations expired on November 20 without agreement. The delegates nonetheless continued meeting for another day and unanimously recommended to their governments that negotiations be extended indefinitely.

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<sup>2</sup>The one exercise per year would be subject to the following, additional restrictions: a ceiling of 3,000 combined national and foreign troops, with foreign troops not to exceed national troops; a maximum duration of 15 days; 90-days prior notice; and a prohibition on exercising within 50 kilometers of non-consenting states.

<sup>3</sup>The Nicaraguan letter of November 11 was released, inexplicably, as the foreign ministers of the European Communities, Spain, and Portugal met November 11-12 in Luxembourg with the foreign ministers of Central America and the Contadora Group. The ministers approved an EC-Central American economic agreement that is intended to provide the framework for increasing EC economic assistance to Central America. The ministers' political communique supported the Contadora process and emphasized democratic pluralism and, significantly, in light of Nicaragua's suspension of civil liberties on October 15, individual civil liberties. While the EC-Central American meeting was seen as improving the atmosphere for Contadora talks, the Nicaraguan letter introduced a strong element of pessimism.

On December 2, in Cartagena, Colombia, at the OAS General Assembly, Secretary of State Shultz met with the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group governments to review the status of negotiations. At that time, it was assumed that Contadora negotiations would resume, possibly before Christmas, even though Nicaragua had the day before announced that it would not take part in any Contadora meetings during the OAS General Assembly. (Nicaragua sent a third-level foreign ministry official to the December 2 meeting of OAS foreign ministers.) On December 3, however, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega formally requested a suspension in Contadora negotiations until May, 1986. Nicaragua based its request on the grounds that Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala were not in a position to negotiate owing to their presidential elections.

Reserving the right to speak for themselves, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala joined 25 other OAS member states in voting for a resolution at Cartagena that simply urged continuation of negotiations. Only Nicaragua voted against. Approval of the resolution followed submission of a status report by the Contadora Group foreign ministers to OAS Secretary General Baena Soares recording their view that talks should continue. Nicaragua's refusal to resume Contadora talks was a major factor in the failure, in the United Nations General Assembly, to achieve consensus on a resolution of support for the Contadora process.

Diplomatic activity during the month after the OAS General Assembly consisted of informal consultations as to how the negotiating process might be resumed. Several Contadora Group foreign ministers, including Venezuela's Consalvi and Mexico's Sepulveda, publicly regretted the suspension of talks and expressed concern that a suspension in talks would create a diplomatic vacuum.

Meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela, January 11-12, the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and the Support Group issued a joint statement intended to get talks going again. This "Message of Caraballeda" reiterated basic Contadora principles; urged a series of actions to create a climate in which negotiations could succeed (including, as the first step listed, resumption of talks); and offered Contadora Group and Support Group good offices both to "promote new steps of national reconciliation" and to encourage resumption of U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.

On January 15, at the inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo as President of Guatemala, the foreign ministers of the five Central American states, including Nicaragua, signed the "Declaration of Guatemala," endorsing the Caraballeda Message. (It was also agreed that the five Central American presidents

would hold a summit in May in Esquipulas, Guatemala.) The Sandinistas reportedly agreed to the Caraballeda message after extended discussions with the foreign ministers of the Contadora Groups, and with President Betancur of Colombia, as to its precise meaning.

While its endorsement of Caraballeda was encouraging, Nicaragua issued a press communique the next day that appeared to hedge its acceptance. While noting its "total adherence" to the Caraballeda Message, the January 16 statement characterized the various actions suggested in the Caraballeda Message as prerequisites to resumption of Contadora negotiations. It also reaffirmed the Nicaraguan position of November 11 objecting to the Contadora draft agreement. On the other hand, there are now reports that a meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries will be held February 14-17. The key question, assuming talks are resumed, is whether Nicaragua is returning to negotiate in good faith or is merely taking a seat at the table to escape further blame for thwarting the peace process and to influence international opinion.

The United States on January 17 welcomed the prospect of renewed negotiations.<sup>4</sup> Our statement noted that Sandinista acceptance of Caraballeda, which emphasized "new steps" to promote national reconciliation, was an interesting development. We reaffirmed our public commitment to resume bilateral talks with Nicaragua if the Sandinistas accept the March 1985 dialogue proposal of the democratic resistance<sup>5</sup> and stated our interest in exploring the possibilities presented by the Caraballeda initiative. Special Envoy Shlaudeman visited three of four Contadora Group countries January 19-23 for that purpose and Secretary of State Shultz has invited the foreign ministers of the eight Contadora Group and Support Group governments to Washington for a meeting February 10 for further consultations.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>See Annex A.

<sup>5</sup>The principal provisions of the March proposal called for Roman Catholic Church mediation, a cease-fire, and suspension of the State of Emergency.

<sup>6</sup>A complete chronology of diplomatic events during the period covered by this report is provided in Annex B.

ANNEX A

January 17, 1986

Department of State Statement on Contadora

ON JANUARY 12 THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE CONTADORA GROUP AND CONTADORA SUPPORT GROUP, MEETING IN CARABALLEDIA, VENEZUELA, ISSUED A "MESSAGE FOR PEACE, SECURITY, AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA." THE AMBASSADORS OF THESE EIGHT GOVERNMENTS REQUESTED A MEETING WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO PRESENT THE DOCUMENT AND THAT MEETING WAS HELD YESTERDAY, JANUARY 16.

IN THIS MEETING THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED OUR STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE PEACE EFFORTS OF THE CONTADORA GROUPS AND SAID WE WELCOMED CONTINUATION OF THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IN OUR VIEW NICARAGUA'S BEHAVIOR, IN PARTICULAR ITS REPEATED FAILURE TO KEEP ITS WORD, IS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM AND THAT, FOR THIS REASON, WE LOOK AT PROSPECTIVE AGREEMENTS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WORKABILITY.

THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD GIVE THE CARABALLEDIA MESSAGE VERY CAREFUL STUDY AND THAT IF THERE IS ANY WAY IN WHICH WE THINK WE CAN CONTRIBUTE, WE WILL DO SO. IN THIS RESPECT, WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE CONTADORA GROUP AND CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND WEEKS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES CONTAINED IN THIS MESSAGE. AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN WILL BE VISITING THE REGION NEXT WEEK FOR THIS PURPOSE.

AS IS KNOWN, OUR POSITION ON RESUMING BILATERAL TALKS WITH NICARAGUA HAS BEEN THAT WE WILL RESUME TALKS IF THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA ACCEPTS THE MARCH 1985 PROPOSAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE FOR A CHURCH-MEDIATED DIALOGUE, CEASE-FIRE, AND SUSPENSION OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY.

THAT COMMITMENT STILL STANDS. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NICARAGUA HAS ENDORSED THE CONTADORA COMMUNIQUE, WHICH HEAVILY EMPHASIZES NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND WHICH PROMISES "NEW STEPS" TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. WE ARE VERY INTERESTED IN EXPLORING WHAT THIS MEANS.

ANNEX B

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY DIPLOMATIC EVENTS  
November, 1985 - January, 1986

1985

November 11-12: Foreign ministers of the nine Central American and Contadora Group governments meet with the foreign ministers of the EC-10, Spain, and Portugal, in Luxembourg. EC-Central American economic agreement is signed; political communique supports Contadora and stresses democratic pluralism and civil liberties.

November 11: Nicaragua publishes letter to Contadora Group and Support Group presidents detailing objections to the Contadora Group's September 12, 1985 draft of a final agreement. Nicaragua's position, in essence, is to insist on an accommodation with the United States prior to a Contadora agreement.

November 19-21: Third round of negotiations among Contadora "plenipotentiaries" held in Panama. Some progress on verification and related issues is achieved. All delegations recommend extending 45-day deadline for final agreement.

November 22: U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Walters addresses the General Assembly on continued US support of the Contadora process.

December 1: Nicaragua announces that it will not take part in the Contadora meetings to be held on the margins of the OAS General Assembly meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, December 2-5.

December 2: Secretary of State Shultz meets with Contadora Group foreign ministers at the OAS General Assembly in Cartagena.

December 3: Nicaragua submits formal request for suspension of Contadora peace negotiations until May, 1986.

December 6: Contadora Group submits report to OAS Secretary General expressing hope that negotiations will continue.

December 7: Nicaragua reiterates its request for suspension of Contadora talks at a SELA (Latin American Economic System) meeting in Caracas, Venezuela.

December 9: OAS General Assembly Resolution, opposed by Nicaragua only, urges continuation of Contadora talks.

December 10: Venezuelan officials publicly oppose suspension of talks.

December 17-18: Contadora Group governments consult informally in Montevideo.

1986

January 8: Nicaragua publishes letter from President Ortega to the presidents of the Contadora Group and the Support Group proposing a scaled-down treaty of general principles (in lieu of a comprehensive Contadora treaty) and a series of bilateral talks, including U.S.-Nicaraguan talks.

January 11-12: Eight foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and Support Group governments, meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela, issue the "Message of Caraballeda." It reiterates basic Contadora principles; urges actions to create climate for negotiations, including resumption of Contadora talks; and offers Contadora good offices to "promote new steps of national reconciliation" and renewal of U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks.

January 14: Vice President Bush leads United States delegation to inauguration of Guatemalan President Vinicio Cerezo.

January 15: Foreign ministers of the five Central American states sign the "Declaration of Guatemala" endorsing the "Caraballeda Communique."

January 15: Central American presidents agree to hold summit in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in May.

January 16: Central American presidents issue statement expressing satisfaction that their foreign ministers have endorsed the Message of Caraballeda.

January 16: Nicaragua publicly reaffirms its position on Contadora, as set forth in its November 11 statement, and describes actions called for in the Caraballeda Message as prerequisites to Contadora talks.

January 16: Secretary Shultz receives the Caraballeda Message from Washington ambassadors of the Contadora Group and Support Group governments and promises to give it careful study.

January 17: US statement on Caraballeda announces visit of Ambassador Shlaudeman to Central American and Contadora Group countries to explore possibilities in the Caraballeda Message.

HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ARMED RESISTANCE

Since the submission to Congress of the previous report, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) has continued and expanded its efforts to improve its forces' record on human rights. Toward that end, UNO has established an autonomous Human Rights Commission (UNO-CDH), based in Costa Rica; the fundamental objective of this organization is the promotion, protection, and defense of human rights in Nicaragua. The central concern of UNO-CDH will be the observance by both parties to the civil conflict of the basic principles of human rights. UNO-CDH is currently processing information on charges received concerning alleged abuses committed by both resistance and Sandinista forces. The Commission and prosecutors from various UNO armed elements are also reviewing cases investigated by the prosecutors and the punitive measures taken, where appropriate, against those responsible.

Ismael Reyes, former president of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, presides over the new Commission's Executive Council, other members of which are Santiago Anitua (a Jesuit priest), Lucia Salazar -- the widow of slain private sector leader Jorge Salazar --, and Wycliffe Diego of the Indian-Creole organization KISAN. The Executive Director is Roberto Ferrey, an attorney and founder of the Social Christian Youth Front, which actively opposed former dictator Anastasio Somoza. Following a period of exile from 1976-79, he served as a legal advisor to the Minister of Justice in the post-revolutionary period. He left the country again in 1983, disillusioned by mounting repression inside Nicaragua. Antonio Ruiz, a human rights activist and one of the original members of Nicaragua's Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), serves as Assistant Executive Director. The Commission's Legal Department will be headed by Alberto Gamez Ortega, a former Vice Minister of Justice in the post-revolution government.

The Legal Department will supervise two subsections, one responsible for investigations and one for publications. Mateo Guerrero, former Executive Director of the Sandinista-sponsored human rights commission CNPPDH, and Alvaro Baldizon, formerly an investigator with the Ministry of Interior, will handle the investigative duties.

Two other elements of the Commission will be an Education and Training Department, directed by Fr. Santiago Anitua, who was expelled from Nicaragua in 1985 by the Sandinista regime, and a Refugee Department, the supervisor of which has not yet been named.

January 17: President-elect Jose Azcona of Honduras visits Washington for consultations. At National Press Club, Azcona opposes resumption of U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks as detracting from Contadora.

January 19-23: Ambassador Shlaudeman visits Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Colombia and Venezuela.

January 25: Secretary of State Shultz invites foreign ministers of the Contadora Group and Support Group governments to Washington for February 10 consultations.

January 26-27: Vice President Bush leads United States delegation to inauguration of Honduran President Azcona, meets with several Contadora and Central American presidents and foreign ministers.

The new Commission is working closely with the prosecutors attached to each of UNO's armed elements, who provide necessary information to UNO-CDH and conduct investigations and prosecutions within their respective jurisdictions.

During this period, UNO human rights officers continued efforts to arrange a system for prisoner exchanges through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and regional Red Cross Societies and to reach a bilateral agreement with the Sandinistas, through the Red Cross, for the mutual observance of human rights. UNO also has continued to provide these organizations with information concerning Sandinista casualties and prisoners. In order to promote contact with ICRC, UNO in November opened an office in Geneva. According to Dr. Carlos Icaza, prosecutor for the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces, the Sandinista regime for the last year has refused to cooperate in this endeavor, rejecting any prisoner exchanges on Nicaraguan territory. This refusal is attributed in part to a concern that such exchanges would constitute an admission by the regime that the resistance operates within the country and a tacit legitimization of the resistance.

In November, UNO/FDN reported that sixty officers were in training to assume responsibility as human rights officers with the regional commands and task forces. Troops continued to receive general human rights instruction as part of their basic military training, and UNO/FDN plans to expand this instruction to cover all members of the FDN military forces. UNO/CDH held a seminar from January 15-18 on human rights and humanitarian law with 23 leaders of KISAN and 18 civilian Indian leaders from the Council of Elders.

UNO human rights officers have assumed responsibility for monitoring the welfare of those captured during combat. Forces reporting the capture of enemy troops are reminded by headquarters of their responsibility to ensure the prisoners' physical security and to observe internationally recognized standards for their treatment in captivity. In one instance, rather than abandon a 14-year old Sandinista combatant wounded in a January engagement at Copernal, the boy was taken with the FDN forces, given medical treatment by field personnel, and released.

UNO's commitment to human rights has been set forth unambiguously in a statement of principles and objectives presented to the public on January 22, 1986. Undertaking in that document "the unrestricted observance of the human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception," UNO pledges to respect the ethnic, cultural and religious values of Nicaragua's people; to establish a rule of law which assures the equality

of citizens and the full exercise and development of human rights based on an independent judiciary; to guarantee all basic freedoms; and to adhere strictly to the obligations assumed under international agreements. UNO further pledges to respect the activities within Nicaragua of human rights organizations.

Abuses by Resistance Forces

Among the abuses attributed since November 1 to the armed resistance by Sandinista authorities were the murders of 32 school children and the "assassination" of farmers, although no number or details concerning the latter offense were offered. We have no other evidence that those assassinations actually occurred. Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto publicized the alleged murder of school children while in Canberra, claiming that resistance forces had opened fire on the students while they were at school. When the issue was raised with Sandinista officials in Managua, however, it was learned that the incident in question actually involved an attack on a military training center, in which 30 members of the Sandinista militia were killed.

According to the Sandinista press, during this period the armed resistance killed eleven civilians, injured 21, and kidnapped at least forty-seven. It was also implied that 18-20 unidentified bodies found in a mass grave were victims of the resistance, although that charge was not specifically made. The press further reported that a total of 81 persons allegedly kidnapped by the resistance had been "rescued" and had requested and been granted amnesty by the Sandinistas. Eighteen of those allegedly kidnapped admitted they received military training with the resistance during their four months of "captivity," and asserted that they had been forced to work under duress. The granting of amnesty suggests that those involved may have been deserters from the armed resistance or persons captured during military operations. This suspicion is strengthened by reports in the Sandinista press that 44 persons granted amnesty in January were draft evaders and "contra deserters."

In most cases, information provided by the Sandinista press can be neither confirmed nor refuted by independent information, either because of the areas in which the incidents are said to have occurred or because of a lack of precise details. In one instance, however, Embassy personnel visited the site of a reported "contra" attack to determine the facts. According to the FSLN daily Barricada, on January 25 the town of San Pedro de Lovago was attacked by "hundreds" of contra and the attack repelled by eight Sandinista soldiers. It was also

claimed that the contra wounded two civilians, and one of the attackers was killed. He was identified by Barricada as "jefe," Felix Matus, a former resident of the town known to residents as a cattle thief.

Embassy officers were unable to find any signs of the heavy firing in the plaza described by Barricada; there was no damage to the Church or houses in the vicinity of the attack. Residents with whom the officers spoke, including four witnesses, stated that the attack began at about 10:30 pm, and firing lasted about 30 minutes. In the morning, it was discovered that a member of the resistance had been killed and two civilians, including a ten-year old girl, had been wounded. Of the people questioned, no one had any idea how many persons had attacked, except for one Sandinista official who stated that 100-150 were involved. Another Sandinista official claimed that many of the attackers had been wounded. The two wounded civilians could not be located, but neighbors said that they lived in houses facing the site of the attack and to the rear of the position held by the attackers where the dead body was found. Both were said to have been wounded by shrapnel from a grenade. The only person cited by witnesses and the Sandinista press as having thrown a grenade was a member of the Sandinista militia. Neighbors stated that the man was wounded in the ankle, and no one knew the injuries of the girl. Neither had been taken to the hospital.

Concerning the identity of the "jefe," residents, including the two officials, denied any knowledge of the man. All who were shown the Barricada article agreed that Felix Matus was not from San Pedro de Lovago.

The distinction between civilians and military personnel is increasingly blurred in the Nicaraguan conflict as the Sandinistas continue their policy of arming persons in civilian occupations and tasking them with military responsibilities. FSLN coordinator Carlos Zamora, according to a December 28 Barricada report, announced that half of the 10,000 coffee pickers in Military Region VI had been armed and had received military training. Armed harvesters included members of the Sandinista Youth described as occupying the "second defensive echelon...after the irregular warfare troops...the permanent territorial troops and the territorial militia." Newspapers also have printed photographs of uniformed and partially-uniformed members of "harvest brigades" who are virtually indistinguishable from regular army troops. On January 11, Daniel Ortega distributed land titles for communal farms. At the same time, he distributed rifles to the farmers. On January 12, El Nuevo Diario reported the formation of the Manuel Escobar Shock Brigade, which will be sent to build bridges and roads in Northern Zelaya. The youths

pictured in the article were uniformed, and brigade members were described as members of the Army reserve, militarily experienced, and "ready to work with a rifle at their shoulder." The sixty-one members were said to be prepared to act as "soldiers" if necessary. By arming persons engaged in what are normally civilian occupations and placing them in war zones, the Sandinista regime compromises the protections accorded civilians under internationally-recognized rules of conflict. The Sandinista press does not explicitly acknowledge the deaths of persons in this category in its reporting. Those the Sandinista press reported killed by the armed resistance between November 1 and January 31 included only the military, the militia, the police, and civilians. The press did not report how many of these alleged civilian casualties involved persons acting in a military or paramilitary capacity.

The most highly publicized charge of atrocities during this period was made by Maria Mercedes Obregon Rivas at a press conference in Managua on November 13. A member of the "50th Anniversary Brigade" -- a group that provides basic education in rural areas and that is also normally tasked with military responsibilities, according to Sandinista publications -- Obregon and eight others were taken prisoner by the resistance in late 1984. According to a report filed by a Reuter correspondent present at the press conference, Obregon claimed to have escaped at great risk from an FDN camp and to have been raped and tortured during her captivity. She also reportedly stated that she had "no idea" what had happened to the others taken prisoner with her. Nevertheless, the Sandinista press reported on November 14 that Obregon charged the resistance with the rape and murder of Ana Julia Cortes Martinez and the "assassination" of three other companions in her group. She claimed to have learned of their deaths only indirectly, having been separated from the other prisoners immediately after her capture.

Information provided to the ICRC by UNO/FDN in response to a specific inquiry, well before Obregon's reappearance in Managua, offered a different version. According to UNO/FDN, Maria Obregon worked as a volunteer with the FDN after her capture, operating in a task force commanded by "El Tigrillo." After several months, she left the FDN and began living with another ex-FDN combatant, "Gato Negro," in Danli, Honduras, where she worked as a waitress in the El Rodeo restaurant. She later legally departed Honduras, which departure was recorded with Honduran Immigration.

While the question might arise whether Obregon, if she did cooperate with the FDN, did so for fear of retribution, it should be noted that another of those taken prisoner with Obregon chose not to work with the FDN and remains in an FDN

prison awaiting exchange or release. Obregon admitted to having seen this woman, and made no claims that she was being mistreated. Obregon did not mention another of the nine prisoners, Marcia Chamorro, who has been active with the resistance since being taken captive by the FDN, and who has made several addresses on Radio 15 September.

UNO reports that it has eleven pending cases involving various human rights abuses. One of the cases, involving a task force commander charged with several counts of rape, has resulted in conviction. He is currently under detention and his sentence is due to be announced shortly. A denunciation of these crimes by members of his own command was the initiating cause for investigation.

In a second case, another task force commander is now under restriction, charged with plotting the murder of one man and then murdering the person whom he convinced to commit the crime. The actual facts of the crimes, however, remain unresolved, as another person has been denounced as the actual perpetrator of the murders. The investigation of the case is still underway.

HUMAN RIGHTS: THE SANDINISTA REGIME

The human rights situation in Nicaragua, which has steadily deteriorated during the period of Sandinista rule, has worsened markedly since the promulgation of the renewed State of Emergency on October 15. In an ominous series of tactical moves against the civil opposition, the chief victim of which has been the Catholic Church, the Sandinista regime has acted forcefully to use the vastly expanded powers it assumed under the decree to silence dissent and extend its control over all sectors of the population. The following citation from an interview with Tomas Borge, printed in Mexico's Excelsior November 16, captures the Sandinista view of "political pluralism":

"Our enemies have organized to disown the state institutions and validate the counterrevolution. Certain sectors have organized and are shielding themselves behind religious organizations -- the Catholic Church -- or some rightist institutions to plant the position of the U.S. administration in the conscience of our people as something natural...The newspaper LA PRENSA was censored on various occasions, but failed to comply with the censorship. On many occasions, Mr. Bismarck Carballo, director of a radio station which is linked to the country's most reactionary religious sector, disobeyed numerous orders from the Communications Media Directorate. They met in churches and private places to justify counterrevolutionary activity. Leaders of the Council for Private Enterprise have repeatedly called for identification with the counterrevolutionary armed struggle. In the same vein, in the church, some priests have openly proclaimed their identification with the counterrevolution. That is, the permanent drizzle on the conscience of the people...confused a sector of the population. We cannot afford to let the enemies of the people take advantage of the weaknesses that are characteristic of the revolution...to sow discord and distrust, and to misguide and divide the people."

The intensified assault on the Catholic Church, begun in September 1985, continued and sharpened during the past three months. As the country's leading spiritual authority and staunch defender against depredations on the basic rights of the Nicaraguan people, both now and during the Somoza regime the Church constitutes the single greatest impediment to the consolidation of Sandinista one-party rule. It is not surprising, therefore, that the regime has focused its efforts on the Church as the main target of oppression.

Between November 1 and January 31, actions taken by the Sandinista regime to undermine the Church included the following:

- arrests, interrogations, and in some cases imprisonment of Catholic lay workers;
- interrogation of priests, in at least two instances involving physical abuse, and warnings of possible expulsion of foreign priests;
- censorship of Church-related news from La Prensa;
- arrest and deportation of a Salvadoran technician employed by the now-occupied Curia Social Services Offices (COPROSA), on charges of "counterrevolutionary activities" and confiscation of his home;
- declaration of COPROSA as "illegal" by the Ministry of Justice;
- closure of Radio Catolica;
- denial of permission for Cardinal Obando to deliver the traditional Christmas mass for patients at a health center;
- escalation of virulent media attacks on Nicaraguan Church leaders and Pope John Paul II by high-ranking Sandinistas, including Daniel Ortega, Sergio Ramirez, Tomas Borge, Omar Cabezas, and Miguel D'Escoto.

Based on actions taken to date and statements by Sandinista leaders, the Sandinista strategy against the Catholic Church appears to have two goals: decimation of the ranks of traditional clergy and the isolation of the Church from its worshippers. The forced draft of Nicaraguans studying for the priesthood, continuing threats to expel foreign priests loyal to the Church, and the regime's recently announced decision to deny entry to "new foreign priests" to replace those expelled clearly indicate the methods to be used to implement the first element of the strategy.

The media campaign against other Church leaders, who fall neither into the draft-age nor foreign-born groups, suggests that other actions are intended to deal with them. The thrust of the statements by Sandinista leaders is that the Pope, Cardinal Obando, and such Church leaders as Monsignor Bismarck Carballo are direct agents of the counterrevolution and the CIA

and thus fall beyond the protection normally afforded members of the Church. The latest salvo in this attack came in late January. El Nuevo Diario on January 24 published several articles condemning the Cardinal's January visit to the United States and asserting that the purpose of the trip was to lobby in favor of military assistance to the counterrevolution. The newspaper also published a letter purportedly from a "voluntary coffee picker" demanding to know why Cardinal Obando was being allowed to reenter Nicaragua. This theme was repeated in the following days, and a new suggestion raised that the Cardinal had left himself open to arrest and trial by his actions in the United States.

On January 25, Sandinista media announced the apprehension of members of an "internal front" who allegedly were preparing

On October 31, in an incident suppressed by the Sandinistas until January 9, evangelical minister Juan Pablo Pineda was murdered, ostensibly by two Sandinista soldiers whom the regime claims to have tried and sentenced for the crime. No details of the murder have been provided, but its coincidence with the round-up by State Security of other evangelical leaders raises serious questions about the reliability of the claim that the murder was a random act.

On November 1, State Security agents conducted an armed search of Campus Crusade for Christ headquarters, seizing all written and printed materials, as well as mimeograph machines.

Reverend Mendoza, having failed to observe the warning not to discuss his incarceration, was again arrested by State Security on November 11. His home was searched and his personal and professional papers confiscated, as was his automobile. Mendoza was released November 21, and has since declined to divulge any details concerning his imprisonment. In December Dr. Jimmy Hassan, of the Crusade of Students and Professionals for Christ, elected to leave Nicaragua permanently because of the severity of the harassment directed against himself and his family.

As of November 12, according to a member of the evangelical community, all those who had been arrested in October were being kept under constant surveillance at home, at work, and at church. Since the first wave of arrests on October 30, twelve other evangelicals have reportedly been arrested in Southern Zelaya.

As in the case of the Catholic Church, Sandinista spokesmen have dismissed the complaints of their victims and denied that the actions taken against them represent religious

extended because of his "frequent contradictions" and suggested that Mendoza was mentally ill, a familiar charge against the opponents of communist regimes.

Press Censorship

"The criticism from La Prensa, from Radio Catolica, and the whole lot of propaganda from abroad is intended to be destructive. Only constructive criticism is acceptable in a revolutionary process."

- Tomas Borge, Pensamiento Proprio  
June 1985

Censorship of Nicaragua's independent media increased in the wake of the October 15 State of Emergency. During the November 1-January 31 period, Radio Catolica was closed for repeated "violations of law;" the Permanent Commission on Human Rights was officially notified that henceforth all of its letters, communiquees, and reports must be submitted for censorship review; "Conservatism on the Move," a radio program of the Conservative Party, was suspended; publication of an irregularly-issued flyer "Prisma" was suspended and three of its editors -- two of whom are also La Prensa reporters -- were arrested for violating the "Law for the Maintenance of Order and Public Security;" Solidaridad, the official monthly magazine of the independent Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS) was suspended; and attacks on independent La Prensa escalated, bringing the conflict between the newspaper's editorial board and State Security to open confrontation.

Stringent censorship of La Prensa continued, with most news relating to the Catholic Church, as well as reports of attacks on evangelicals, deleted by censors. Despite regime claims that only sensitive military and economic information was subject to review, articles banned included reports on the formation of a Church human rights commission, a meeting of the Independent Liberal Party, the closure of a coffee plant due to material shortages, public dissatisfaction with the conduct of resident Cubans, the influx of migrants to Managua, arrests of civil opposition leaders, and clarification of currency laws. Censorship resulted in the gutting of the daily editions of La Prensa, affecting approximately 80% of the paper's material.

On November 5, in response to the increasingly severe censorship imposed on the paper, co-director Jaime Chamorro sent a letter to National Assembly President Carlos Nunez complaining of the failure of the Communications Media Directorate to observe the limits to its authority as stated in an amendment passed by the Assembly. Chamorro pointed out that the Directorate had gone so far as to censor La Prensa's report on the amendments made by the Assembly to the State of Emergency.

In lieu of a response to La Prensa's complaint, on December 2 the editorial board received notification from the Directorate that the continued distribution of censored articles -- regularly given to foreign journalists and members of the diplomatic community -- would result in actions against the paper's directors. Jaime Chamorro, to whom the letter was addressed, was warned that "the next violation will be rigorously sanctioned." La Prensa's board responded by cancelling the December 2 issue, and called a press conference to publicize the threats against the newspaper and its editors. Chamorro also filed a sworn statement with Managua's Appellate Tribunal rejecting the charges of illegal activity and requesting an injunction against the chief officer of the Communications Media Directorate. No action has yet been taken on Chamorro's complaints, nor is any remedial action expected. Instead, on December 6 the newspaper was prohibited from publishing for 48 hours in retaliation for continued distribution of censored articles.

Harassment of La Prensa personnel also continued. Following the murder of a regional vendor of the paper in September, who was killed by unknown assailants after several days of surveillance and intimidation by State Security agents, La Prensa's religion editor, Norman Talavera, was arrested on November 10. State Security raided his home and seized Talavera's personal and professional papers, photographs of Cardinal Obando, personal correspondence, and the family's passports. The home was then placed under constant surveillance. Talavera was taken to State Security prison El Chipote and held until November 15.

#### Other Civil Opposition

The narrow space for political activity to which Nicaragua's civil opposition has been confined diminished even further over the last 90 days. While the Sandinistas have continued to rely largely on arbitrary arrest and interrogation as the primary means of intimidation, the use of overt force and the threat of force to ensure compliance has become more prominent. More important to the long-term success of the totalitarian model being imposed by the regime is the use of nearly unfettered state power to control or confiscate the material resources essential to effective democratic dissent, and the revision or promulgation of laws to provide the legal basis for incapacitating it.

Included among the thirteen substantiated cases of political murders reported to CPDH in 1985 was an incident involving the brutal assault on two Social Christian Party youths in November, in which one boy was severely injured and the other tortured and killed. After resisting military

impressment, the two boys were taken away by force in a military vehicle. According to press reports and a complaint filed with CPDH, the family inquired the following day about the boys' whereabouts, and was told by military authorities that they had been shot while attempting to escape. One of the boys was later found, unconscious and badly beaten. Two days later, on November 11, the decomposing body of the second boy was discovered. His murderers had cut out his tongue, gouged out his eyes, and slashed his stomach.

In another case, four men aged 22-29 were killed after having been arrested on November 10 on what their families insist were trumped-up charges of assault and possession of illegal weapons. According to relatives, Ivan Enrique Garcia Lopez, Denis Jose Sanchez Gutierrez, Julio Alberto Lopez Lopez, and Wilmar Jose Navarro Garcia had refused induction prior to their arrest. Although an attorney stated that he had visited the four at the Palo Alto Prison on November 22, and a morgue employee claimed that the bodies were delivered on the evening of November 22, a Ministry of Interior Communiqué issued November 25 stated that all four had been killed that day in a shoot-out.

The majority of the remaining incidents reported by opposition sectors involved the use of arbitrary arrests, detentions of varying lengths of time, and interrogation; the conduct of armed raids on organizational offices and search and seizure of documents and property; and the banning of institutions and organizations as illegal.

In addition to the arrests previously mentioned, some forty-five persons active in the civil opposition were arrested or summoned for interrogation during this period. Among those arrested were members or employees of the Social Christian Party, Independent Liberal Party, Conservative Party, Superior Council of Private Enterprise, Cattlemen's Association, Union of Parents of Catholic School Children, Confederation of Professionals, Nicaraguan Private Development Institute (INDE), Nicaraguan Cotton Growers' Association, Social Christian Workers Front, Nicaraguan Workers Federation, and Lidia Maradiaga Peasants Trade Union. Lino Hernandez of the CPDH estimates that over 300 members of the opposition were interrogated between October 15 and mid-December.

The Sandinistas in November also summoned for interrogation Nicaraguans employed at several foreign missions. Included among those summoned to El Chipote's interrogation center for intense and abusive questioning were sixteen employees of the U.S. Embassy, and others from the Embassies of Venezuela and Honduras. The employees were put through what has now become the normal routine: weighing,

measuring, fingerprinting, photographing, and confinement in tiny, dark, airless cells for hours. Some were stripped; some were videotaped. All of them were subjected to interrogations lasting from 6-14 hours, during which they were probed concerning intimate details of their lives, their religious beliefs, and their political sympathies, and threatened with further actions against themselves and their families. They were also warned not to discuss with anyone the details of their detention.

To reinforce psychological intimidation, the Sandinistas have erected a legal structure -- prominent in which is the State of Emergency -- that gives them the authority to carry out virtually any action at will. Refinement of this legal facade appears to be emerging as a favored means of effecting the elimination of the opposition without having to resort to visible force. The monopoly on legislative authority has enabled the Sandinistas to pass laws stripping opposition parties of their legal recognition, and to close down as "illegal" organizations including the Curia Social Services Offices, the Institution for Unity and the Promotion of Democracy, and 12 affiliates of the Confederation of Labor Unification (the Professional Agricultural Workers Union, the Miskito Workers Union, the Dress Workers Union, the Casares Fishermen's Union, the Faustino Martinez Union, an office workers union, and six others not identified in the press report). There are indications that the Nicaraguan Private Development Institute is slated for similar treatment.

On January 27, the Ministry of Interior issued a communique setting forth further restrictions on political activity. Under the new regulations, political parties must notify the police one week in advance of any political "event," giving the time, place, and date, which event will be subject to authorization or denial by the police. All parties not represented in the National Assembly are prohibited from conducting any political activities or issuing any "propaganda" related to the drafting of a new constitution. The new regulations codified a situation already in effect: on January 26 the recognized faction of the Conservative Party, represented in the National Assembly, was denied permission by the police to hold an open meeting in the small town of Caterina to discuss the constitution. Assembly President Carlos Nunez, according to El Nuevo Diario, described the action as an isolated incident, and promised to speak with Interior Minister Borge.

The Sandinistas have also used FSLN-devised legislation to expropriate enterprises and lands from political enemies. In the latter case, existing legislation has proven inadequate to the task of completely crippling the private sector. As a

result, Daniel Ortega proclaimed on January 11 that the Agrarian Reform Law had been substantially revised. Explaining that the revisions had been made to avoid an appearance that the regime was "disrespectful of the law," Ortega announced that in future there will be no limit on the size of farms that can be confiscated. (Under the old law, farms under 1500 manzanas were immune from confiscation.) Now, any farm can be taken provided only that the confiscation is of some "social utility" or is in the "public interest." While the earlier law had made it possible to move against political opponents, even those whose lands were highly productive, the new version provides the regime unlimited powers of political retribution. According to Ortega, however, not everyone need worry. Those who "behave patriotically, who are not counterrevolutionaries, and do not support the counterrevolution's activities" are not at risk. Others are thus clearly forewarned, and it is generally accepted within the private sector that the coming months will see many in the opposition dispossessed of their holdings.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE  
FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

In its first five months of operation, the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) has obligated \$16.4 million of the \$18 million made available to date for humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. With submission of this report, the final \$9 million tranche of funds approved through 3/31/86 becomes available. Expenditures continue to be guided by the criteria set forth in the legislation, as clarified by subsequent expressions of Congressional intent (see below).

During the reporting period (November 1, 1985, through January 31, 1986), NHAO has continued to conduct operations in the same manner as described in the first Presidential Report to Congress (dated November 6, 1985) and with only a slightly increased staff. However, the pace of disbursements accelerated as the staffs of NHAO and the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) first developed and then gained experience with effective modalities for the provision of aid through NHAO.

NEW PROGRAMS

As indicated in the statistical summary, the overwhelming percentage of assistance to the democratic resistance continues to be in the form of food, medicine, clothing, equipment and transportation. However, there are three new programs worthy of special mention.

A. Human Rights Commission

NHAO began in December 1985 to fund UNO's newly-created Human Rights Commission (UNO/CDH). The objective of UNO/CDH is to defend and promote human rights, with particular emphasis on their protection during armed conflict. UNO/CDH will train UNO forces in a code of conduct, will investigate and monitor punishment of derelictions, and will also monitor and expose violations of human rights committed by the Sandinistas. This program is being directed by one of UNO's principal leaders, Arturo Cruz, assisted by Ismael Reyes, former head of the Nicaraguan Red Cross.

UNO/CDH has submitted to NHAO a budget projecting expenses of approximately \$950,000 during the period January - June 1986. To date, NHAO has provided \$125,000 in start-up money for this undertaking.

**B. Medical Care Facilities**

In addition to paying for pharmaceuticals and other consumable medical supplies, NHAO is providing funding for longer-term treatment in the United States of seriously wounded combatants requiring restorative surgery. This assistance takes the form of payment of hospital and doctors' bills and maintenance of a hospice (capacity approximately 15 persons) for patient lodging during the period of treatment and rehabilitation. NHAO made a separate grant to the Fundacion de Nicaragua, a Miami-based non-profit organization, to administer this program.

NHAO has also funded the enhancement or expansion of several UNO medical clinics within the Central American region, where the vast majority of UNO's medical needs are met. These funds cover construction costs, salaries of health-care personnel, and the purchase of medical equipment such as X-ray machines and refrigerators to store perishable pharmaceuticals.

**C. Vehicles**

During the initial phase of its operations, NHAO abstained from funding the purchase of vehicles (trucks, boats and aircraft) because the theoretical potential for dual use (to transport both humanitarian and lethal supplies, for example) could lead to controversy over compliance with the legislative guidelines. NHAO recognized nonetheless that without effective means of transport, NHAO-purchased supplies might not reach and thus could not serve their intended recipients. In light of this dilemma, the Department of State suggested to the Congress in November 1985 that the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1986 specifically provide that appropriated funds could be used for the purchase of vehicles. The conference committee chose, instead, to clarify NHAO's authority in the following statement:

The conferees note that they considered authorizing the intelligence agencies to provide transportation equipment to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, but determined not to authorize funds for such equipment because the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office established by Executive Order 12530 of August 29, 1985, pursuant to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83) and the Fiscal Year 1985 Supplemental Appropriations Act, already has the authority to provide transportation equipment as part of the humanitarian assistance program, and the provision of such equipment is not precluded by the definition of humanitarian assistance contained in those Acts so long as no modifications are made to the equipment designed to be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death. (Emphasis added.)

On this basis, NHAO has begun to consider requests for funding the purchase and maintenance of small trucks, boats and aircraft, provided their primary and predominant use is the delivery of humanitarian assistance commodities or the transport of the wounded, and provided no modifications designed to inflict serious bodily harm are made to such equipment. These conditions have been discussed in detail with the UNO leadership, which has fully accepted them, and been inserted in all grant documents pertaining to the purchase, maintenance and use of such vehicles.

OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL

**A. By the State Department's Inspector General**

In October 1985, the Inspector General of the Department of State initiated a two-week, informal audit of NHAO's operations and procedures, culminating in a report on November 8, 1985. The audit concerned itself primarily with the adequacy of NHAO's procedures for ensuring that assistance not be diverted for unauthorized purposes.

The audit report approvingly noted NHAO's adoption of operating procedures and controls similar to those used by AID disaster relief programs. However, the report suggested a number of refinements. Citing concerns about NHAO's ability to verify the bona fides of off-shore suppliers and the ultimate end use of supplies procured in both the United States and Central America, the report suggested that NHAO recruit and assign additional personnel to the monitoring function, while continuing to make maximum use of U.S. resources within the region to ensure proper use of NHAO-funded materiel. Finally, the report suggested that NHAO request that UNO develop budget projections for disbursing the balance of the funds appropriated for humanitarian assistance.

On December 20, 1985, NHAO responded to the Inspector General that NHAO concurred with all recommendations; as of the date of this report, they have been fully implemented.

**B. By the General Accounting Office**

On November 5, 1985, the General Accounting Office (GAO) notified the Department of State that at the request of the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, GAO was commencing a review and audit of NHAO operations. Representatives of GAO, NHAO and the State Department met on December 6, 1985, to discuss audit procedures; the audit has been in progress since that date.

TRANSPORTATION PROBLEMS

In mid-October 1985, a flight from the United States containing NHAO-purchased supplies was forced to return from the region without discharging its cargo. (This episode was included in the first report under the heading "Delivery Incident.") From that time, UNO's previously existing arrangements for the delivery of U.S.-sourced supplies to the region were suspended. NHAO has worked with UNO to devise alternate delivery arrangements, but to date has achieved only limited success.

One result of this development is that UNO has been obliged to rely more heavily on supplies purchased within the region than would otherwise have been the case.

SUMMARY OF GRANTS

NHAO Grants

1. Program Grants (to be disbursed through letters/memoranda of commitment, except Project Hope and Fundacion grants [see below])

<u>Grant 601 (UNO)</u> (issued 10/3/85)	\$1,000,000
<u>Grant 602 (UNO)</u> (issued 10/15/85)	\$1,500,000
<u>Grant 603 (UNO)</u> (issued 10/29/85)	\$3,000,000
<u>Grant 604 (UNO)</u> (issued 11/11/85)	\$3,000,000
<u>Grant 605</u> (Fundacion de Nicaragua) (issued 11/13/85)	\$1,000,000 <sup>a</sup>
<u>Grant 606 (UNO)</u> (issued 12/23/85)	\$3,000,000
<u>Grant 607 (Project Hope)</u> (issued 12/02/85)	\$3,750,000 <sup>b</sup>

2. Administration Grants

<u>Grant 641-001 (UNO Washington)</u> (issued 10/17/85)	\$ 50,000 <sup>c</sup>
<u>Grant 641-002 (IDEA, Inc.)</u> (issued 11/06/85)	\$ 50,675 <sup>d</sup>

3. Direct NHAO Obligations

<u>Grant 632-001 (Butler Buildings)</u> (issued 12/23/85)	\$ 28,000
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TOTAL.....\$16,378,675

NHAO Commitments

1. Against Program Grants through 1/31/86

Humanitarian Assistance.....\$14,131,860

Medical	\$ 5,111,180	(36.2%)
Food	\$ 3,665,589	(25.9%)
Clothing	\$ 3,064,254	(21.7%)
Equipment	\$ 1,399,747	( 9.9%)
Transport	\$ 766,090	( 5.4%)
Human Rights Program	\$ 125,000	( 0.9%)

2. Against Administration Grants through 1/31/86

Administration Commitments.....\$ 100,675

UNO Liaison Office	\$ 50,000
IDEA, Inc.	\$ 50,675

TOTAL NHAO COMMITMENTS.....\$14,232,535

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In-House NHAO Administrative Expenses through 1/31/86

NHAO Administrative Expenses.....\$ 66,953

Direct Personnel Costs	\$ 33,286
Office Rent	\$ 14,667
Travel	\$ 14,000
Telephone toll calls	\$ 3,000
Miscellaneous	\$ 2,000

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Notes

a. The program grant to the Fundacion de Nicaragua funds longer-term care in the U.S. and UNO's medical staff in the Central American region. At least initially, support for UNO's human rights program is also being channelled through the Fundacion.

b. Using information provided by NHAO staff, Project Hope produced a comprehensive program to meet both emergency and on-going health care supply needs. Pursuant to that program, the grant to Project Hope funds the purchase within the United States of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment.

c. The administration grant to UNO's Washington office stipulates that its activities must be strictly limited to providing liaison between UNO and NHAO so as to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. This grant permits UNO to receive a cash advance to cover administrative expenditures, which must be documented and justified to NHAO before further cash advances are made.

d. The administration grant to IDEA, Inc. funds administrative support services, including assistance to the regional medical program and to KISAN (the Indian/Creole component of UNO).