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THE WHITE HOUSE

REPORT ON NICARAGUA

November 6, 1985

EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A SETTLEMENT
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND IN NICARAGUA*

It has been the consistent view of the United States that the domestic and foreign policies of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) are the root source of inter-state tensions in Central America. Sandinista policies are also the cause of the internal conflict in Nicaragua. Those policies have created a democratic resistance in Nicaragua. Those policies led the resistance to conclude that change in Nicaragua would be possible only through a resort to arms. Sandinista backing of insurgent groups, in the form of organization, command and control, training, communication and logistical support, has been the major factor in the level and duration of conflict elsewhere in the region, especially El Salvador. Both the domestic and foreign policies of the Sandinistas are at issue in the Contadora process, which is seeking a regional peace settlement among the five Central American states.

The United States seeks to change those policies in four ways that would benefit peace in Central America. We seek:

- termination of all forms of Nicaraguan support for insurgencies or subversion in neighboring countries;
- reduction of Nicaragua's expanded military/security apparatus to restore military equilibrium in the region;
- severance of Nicaragua's military and security ties to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba and the return to those countries of their military and security advisers now in Nicaragua; and
- implementation of Sandinista commitments to the Organization of American States to political pluralism, human rights, free elections, non-alignment, and a mixed economy.

The United States has sought to achieve these objectives in two principal ways:

- We have supported a verifiable and comprehensive implementation of the September 1983 Document of Objectives of the Contadora process as the best hope for achieving an enduring regional peace; and,

* Aspects of these efforts are also treated in Part III of United States Department of State Special Report No. 132: "'Revolution beyond Our Borders': Sandinista Intervention in Central America." September, 1985.

-- Consistent with Contadora principles*, we have urged the Sandinistas to enter into direct talks with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and civil opposition.

U.S. Support for Contadora

As Secretary of State Shultz informed the International Court of Justice in August, 1984:

The United States fully supports the objectives already agreed upon in the Contadora process as a basis for a solution of the conflict in Central America. The objectives of United States policy toward Nicaragua are entirely consistent with those broader agreed objectives and full and verifiable implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives would fully meet the goals of the United States in Central America....

By design of Contadora's participants, the United States does not take part in the Contadora process. In October 1982, three months before Contadora's inception, the United States and seven other democratic states of the region sought to engage Nicaragua in a multilateral diplomatic dialogue. But the Sandinistas declined to receive the Costa Rican Foreign Minister, acting as emissary for the group, on the grounds that a dialogue with a group including the United States would be structured to its disadvantage. When Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela subsequently initiated the Contadora process, they chose not to include the United States in order to meet this Sandinista concern. Informed of this decision through diplomatic channels, we indicated our understanding and support for this initiative.**

The means available to us to support these regional negotiations as a result are necessarily indirect. Our support has taken various forms. Since Contadora began, we have made it clear repeatedly, both publicly and privately, that we support Contadora objectives. The President expressed that support authoritatively on April 27, 1983, before a Joint

* The Document of Objectives and all three drafts of a Contadora agreement provide for dialogue to promote national reconciliation.

** Ironically, Nicaragua in time objected to Contadora on the grounds that the United States was not a participant. This was a major reason why the Manzanillo talks were undertaken. President Ortega is reported to have suggested U.S. participation in the Contadora process during meetings with other Latin American leaders in New York, in October, 1985.

Session of the Congress.* Shortly thereafter the President created the position of United States Special Envoy for Central America to give focus to that support and make it more effective.

Former Senator Richard Stone served as Special Envoy from May 1983 to February 1984. Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman was appointed U.S. Special Envoy in March 1984 and has served continuously since that time. In twenty months Ambassador Shlaudeman has made 34 trips abroad and held 179 separate exchanges with ranking officials.

The United States sought to support Contadora directly during nine rounds of bilateral talks with the Government of Nicaragua June-December 1984. Those talks were undertaken at the request of the Contadora Group for the express purpose of facilitating a successful outcome of the Contadora process. Nicaragua sought to use the talks to negotiate a bilateral settlement with the United States in lieu of a Contadora agreement. In January 1985 the United States declined to schedule further discussions pending demonstration that Nicaragua was prepared to negotiate seriously within the Contadora framework.**

U.S. Support for National Reconciliation in Nicaragua

National reconciliation through dialogue in countries with armed insurgencies is a fundamental principle of the Contadora process. It was explicitly accepted by all five Central American states, Nicaragua included, in the September 1983 Document of Objectives. Although they signed the Document of Objectives, the Sandinistas have consistently rejected dialogue with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.*** The Sandinistas seek instead to portray the crisis in Central America as deriving from United States hostility toward the Nicaraguan revolution. We believe that the Sandinistas' refusal to deal directly with their own people and with the legitimate concerns of their neighbors constitutes a major roadblock to peace in Central America.

* The President stated U.S. support again in a July 23, 1983 letter to the Presidents of Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela -- the four Contadora Group countries.

** See "Revolution Beyond Our Borders," pages 29-30.

*** The following statement by Tomas Borge, quoted in Daily Barricada, June 27, 1985, is characteristic: "We will negotiate with the Contras on the day the right wing parties and COSEP count all the grains of sand in the sea and all the stars in the sky. When they finish we will ask them to count them all again."

Both the internal and external opposition have proposed dialogue. On February 22 the internal opposition set forth the conditions under which a national dialogue could be successfully conducted. These included the lifting of the state of emergency*; freedom of expression; a general amnesty and pardon for political crimes; restoration of constitutional guarantees and the right of habeas corpus; guarantees of the safety of members of the resistance movement who participate in the dialogue; and the implementation of these measures under the supervision of guarantor governments.

On March 1 the externally-based opposition (including representatives of the FDN, the Miskito group MISURA, ARDE, and prominent democratic civilian leaders such as Arturo Cruz) proposed a national dialogue to be mediated by the Nicaraguan Catholic Church. It included a mutual in situ cease-fire and acceptance of Daniel Ortega as President until such time as the Nicaraguan people decided on the matter through a plebiscite. On March 22, the Nicaraguan Catholic Church hierarchy (Episcopal Conference) issued a communique reiterating its support for a national dialogue and declaring its willingness to act as a mediator.

President Reagan on April 4 undertook an initiative to support these possibilities. A key feature was the offer to refrain from providing military assistance to the democratic resistance if the Sandinistas accepted the March 1 offer. Although the Sandinistas rejected (and continue to reject) dialogue with the democratic resistance, the President's initiative did serve to focus attention on this fundamental issue.**

In the context of Congressional consideration of the Administration's request for humanitarian assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, the President in a June 11 letter to Representatives Robert Michel (R-Ill.), Dave McCurdy (D-Ok.), and Joseph McDade (R-Pa.) stated that:

* First imposed in March, 1982; additional civil liberties were suspended October 15, 1985.

** The President's April 4 initiative is described in: (1) "President Reagan Supports Nicaraguan Peace Process," United States Department of State Current Policy No. 682, April 4, 1985; (2) "U.S. Support for the Democratic Resistance Movement in Nicaragua," April 10, 1985: Unclassified Excerpts from the President's Report to the Congress Pursuant to Section 8066 of the Continuing Resolution for FY-1985, PL 98-473; (3) "The New Opportunity for Peace in Nicaragua," April 17, 1985: Prepared Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne A. Motley, before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; and (4) "The Nicaraguan Peace Process: A Documentary Record," Department of State Special Report 126, April 1985.

I recognize the importance that you and others attach to bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua. It is possible that in the proper circumstances, such discussions could help promote the internal reconciliation called for by Contadora and endorsed by many Latin American leaders. Therefore, I intend to instruct our special Ambassador to consult with the governments of Central America, the Contadora countries, other democratic governments, and the United Nicaraguan Opposition as to how and when the U.S. would resume direct bilateral talks with Nicaragua. However, such talks cannot be a substitute for a church-mediated dialogue between the contending factions and the achievement of a workable Contadora agreement. Therefore, I will have our representatives meet again with representatives of Nicaragua only when I determine that such a meeting would be helpful in promoting these ends.

Ambassador Shlaudeman conducted such consultations with the governments of Central America and the Contadora Group in visits to the region in late June and early July, and in early September with the governments of the Contadora Support Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay). The Contadora Group and Support Group governments generally favored resumption and the Contadora Group publicly called on the United States to do so on July 22. Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador did not favor such a course (Guatemala did not express a strong view one way or the other). These Central American countries argued that the Manzanillo talks had distracted from and undermined the primacy of Contadora talks where they are the negotiators; that U.S.-Nicaraguan bilateral talks legitimized Sandinista efforts to portray the Central American crisis as a U.S.-Nicaraguan conflict amenable to full resolution through arrangements between those two countries; and that it would be particularly inappropriate for the United States to resume such talks in the aftermath of Nicaragua's disruption of Contadora negotiations in June.* Ambassador Shlaudeman also discussed the question with the leadership of the United Nicaraguan Opposition, which opposed resumption in the absence of the Sandinistas undertaking a serious dialogue with UNO. The subject was also regularly discussed in meetings with other interested governments during this same period.

On July 26, 1985, in Mexico City, Secretary Shultz explained the U.S. attitude toward national reconciliation and a resumption of bilateral talks with the Sandinistas as follows:

* See discussion of June Contadora meeting below.

Nicaragua's purpose [in the Manzanillo talks], as now, was to negotiate bilateral accords dealing on a priority basis only with its security concerns. The Nicaraguan communists refused then, as they refuse now, even to consider dialogue with the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. These conflicting purposes were never reconciled and hindered progress from the start.

The United States ultimately concluded that the talks were detracting from instead of contributing to a comprehensive Contadora settlement. In deciding in January of this year not to schedule further meetings we made it clear that we were not closing the door to their possible resumption under appropriate conditions. On June 11 the President made public his readiness to have United States representatives meet with representatives of Nicaragua when such a meeting would promote a church-mediated dialogue between the contending factions in Nicaragua and a workable Contadora agreement....

We will continue to consult closely with all parties with a view to judging the appropriateness of a resumption of bilateral talks. We strongly urge Nicaragua to begin a church-mediated dialogue as proposed by the United Nicaraguan Opposition and to return to multilateral negotiations within the Contadora Process to continue work on a comprehensive and verifiable regional accord.

The Contadora Process in 1985

As 1984 came to a close, two draft agreements were under consideration within the Contadora process: a September 1984 revision of a June 1984 draft; and an October 1984 draft (the "Tegucigalpa" draft) that defined the position of Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador. Following a period of private consultations among the participating governments, the Contadora Group scheduled a resumption of negotiations for mid-February. Nicaragua's refusal to respect the right of asylum, however, created a dispute with Costa Rica that prevented the February meeting from taking place. The dispute was resolved in March 1985 through Contadora Group mediation, and negotiations among Central American plenipotentiaries resumed in April.

The April 11-12 meeting resulted in agreement in principle on revised verification procedures. All five Central American governments reserved the right, however, to propose modifications. A second meeting, May 16-18, was devoted primarily to discussion of approaches suggested by the Contadora Group for resolving outstanding security issues. The May meeting focused in particular on those elements of the October 1984 "Tegucigalpa" proposals of Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador that the Contadora Group judged could be

incorporated into the September 7 draft without difficulty. There reportedly was consensual acceptance of some of these non-controversial suggestions, particularly in the preambular section of the working draft.

At the conclusion of the May meeting, the Contadora Group governments circulated a proposal to resolve the more difficult security issues for consideration at the next meeting, in June. When the June meeting convened, the Nicaraguan delegate insisted that Contadora discuss renewed U.S. support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance and refused to discuss the Contadora compromise proposal. Contadora Group efforts to have the Nicaraguan delegation reconsider were unsuccessful. In this situation, the June meeting was adjourned.

Nicaragua's disruption of the June meeting caused a suspension in the plenipotentiaries' negotiations that was to last four months. In July, the Contadora Group foreign ministers met in Panama to consider how the damage could be repaired. In a July 22 communique the Contadora Group Foreign Ministers announced their intention to consult bilaterally with each of the Central American governments in lieu of resuming talks.

The foreign ministers also called on Nicaragua and the United States to resume bilateral talks and on Costa Rica and Nicaragua to initiate a bilateral dialogue on a continuing series of Sandinista Army incursions into Costa Rican territory. After protesting innumerable such incidents in bilateral channels in vain, Costa Rica was prompted by a May 31 incident in which two Costa Rican Civil Guardsmen were killed on Costa Rican soil to seek an OAS investigation and condemnation of Nicaragua. The investigation established the facts, which pointed to Sandinista Army responsibility for the deaths. The OAS report refrained from stating that conclusion explicitly, however, and the OAS resolution deplored the incident instead of condemning Nicaragua and endorsed Nicaraguan and Costa Rican bilateral border talks within the Contadora framework. Costa Rica, which has relied on the Inter-American System for its national security, felt let down by the lack of forceful action and has been unwilling to hold the talks unless the Sandinistas satisfactorily explain the incident. Further incidents -- in which Sandinista planes dropped bombs and fired a rocket into Costa Rican territory -- took place on July 26 and August 21.

Three of the Central American governments -- Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador -- on August 1 welcomed the visit of Contadora Group vice ministers and jointly proposed that the negotiations among plenipotentiaries should be reconvened as a prior step to developing a third draft. They proposed that the talks be strengthened by meeting in more prolonged sessions

that would give the meetings a "permanent character." Following consultations August 3-8 between the Contadora Group vice ministers, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador formally reiterated this proposal September 4. The three governments also stated their view that the key remaining issues to be resolved were national reconciliation, arms and troop level reductions, and verification.

Nicaragua's disruption of the June meeting and the suspension of plenipotentiaries' talks produced generalized concern that the Contadora process was in difficulty. Special Envoy Shlaudeman consulted with the Contadora Group and democratic Central American governments following the aborted meeting in June to urge that the meetings of plenipotentiaries be reconvened. Ambassador Shlaudeman also expressed the U.S. view that any procedural or substantive inducement to Nicaragua to return to the process would invite further disruption and counseled patience. Ambassador Shlaudeman was asked by one Contadora Group government if the United States would, at an appropriate opportunity, publicly reaffirm its support for the Contadora process. The Secretary of State Shultz did so on July 26, in Mexico City:

The United States fully supports efforts to achieve a political solution to the Central American crisis. We have given strong support to the efforts of the Central Americans themselves, assisted by the Contadora Group, to achieve a negotiated settlement. In our view, there exists in the Contadora Document of Objectives a fair, comprehensive and balanced framework for such an outcome. We expressed our support for a comprehensive and verifiable implementation of the Document of Objectives when it was agreed in September 1983. We reaffirm that support today.

The suspension of talks prompted expressions of support for Contadora from other governments as well. Following consultations with the Contadora Group governments, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay on July 28 formed a "Contadora Support Group." The foreign ministers of these governments met with the Contadora Group foreign ministers in Cartagena, Colombia August 23-25 to consult on how that support could be provided most effectively. A joint communique issued by the eight governments stated that there would be regular consultations among the governments in support of the negotiating process but did not, by mutual agreement, contemplate the direct participation of the Support Group governments in Contadora deliberations.

Ambassador Shlaudeman visited Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Brasilia, and Lima, the four Support Group capitals, September 10-13 to convey U.S. support for Support Group activities. The Department of State had made an official

statement on August 26 welcoming formation of the Support Group, following the meeting in Cartagena. In his discussions, Ambassador Shlaudeman suggested it would be useful for the Support Group to consult directly with all the Central American governments; to urge the Sandinistas to accept the proposal of the United Nicaraguan Opposition for a church-mediated dialogue; and to meet directly with UNO leaders to form first-hand judgments as to their purposes and programs. He also briefed the Support Group governments on the Manzanillo talks and outlined United States views on the requirements for an effective and lasting peace in the region.

Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador jointly requested a meeting with the Support Group governments during a September 12-13 meeting of Contadora process foreign ministers in Panama. The Support Group foreign ministers declined the request, however, out of concern that such a meeting not interfere with the Contadora process itself.

The four Contadora Group foreign ministers presented the five Central American foreign ministers a third draft of a Contadora agreement at a meeting in Panama September 12-13. The nine ministers agreed to convene negotiations on October 7, 1985 with the aim of reaching final agreement in a period not to exceed 45 days.* It was also agreed that discussion would be devoted exclusively to the timing of entry into effect and duration of commitments; control and reduction of armaments; verification in security and political matters; military exercises; and operational matters that must be addressed in order to implement an agreement. It was further agreed that incidents or developments in the region would not be discussed in the meetings or condition the participation of any delegations. The Contadora Group ministers stressed that the Central American states have exclusive responsibility for reaching agreement.

The first round of talks were held October 7-11, 1985 on Contadora Island, off the coast of Panama. A second round of talks was held October 17-19**. A third round is currently scheduled for November 6-9. While various delegates have characterized the talks in comments to reporters, the participating governments have refrained from issuing any joint statements or communiques.

* It has been suggested by some Contadora Group government officials that this refers to negotiating, not calendar, days.

** Several delegations noted the presence on Contadora Island during the talks of German Sanchez, an official of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party.

U.S. Diplomatic Contacts with Nicaragua

The United States has continued, since declining to schedule further meetings in the Manzanillo talks, to have diplomatic contacts with Nicaraguan government officials, in Managua, Washington and other capitals. Secretary Shultz, for example, met with Nicaragua President Ortega March 2 in Montevideo, during the inauguration of President Sanguinetti. Vice President Bush spoke with President Ortega during the inauguration of President Sarney of Brazil March 16. There have been a number of contacts between Ambassador Bergold and Sandinista Government officials, as well as contacts at a lower level. In Washington, there have been meetings between Nicaraguan Ambassador Tunnermann and National Security Council officials and with Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams.

The United States sought a meeting for Ambassador Shlaudeman with a high-level Nicaraguan official on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly this fall. The Nicaraguan Government initially accepted a meeting between Ambassador Shlaudeman and Assistant Secretary Abrams and Foreign Minister D'Escoto. The Nicaraguan Government then proposed, however, to send a lower ranking official to the proposed meeting. Ultimately, Nicaragua accepted the U.S. suggestion that Ambassadors Shlaudeman and Tunnermann meet in Washington. The two ambassadors met on October 29 and October 31, 1985.

In the October 29 meeting Ambassador Shlaudeman informed Ambassador Tunnermann that the United States would be prepared to resume bilateral talks if the Sandinistas were to accept the March proposal of the United Nicaraguan Opposition for a church-mediated dialogue and cease-fire. Ambassador Shlaudeman said that progress in this dialogue would make it possible to resolve U.S.-Sandinista bilateral problems. Ambassador Tunnermann responded on October 31 that the Government of Nicaragua rejects dialogue with the democratic resistance.

The President's Initiative on Regional Conflicts and the U.S.-Soviet Experts' Talks

On October 24, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, President Reagan presented an initiative on regional conflicts that is intended, in part, to support the Contadora process and an end to the conflict in Nicaragua.

President Reagan's initiative aims at achieving peace and internal reconciliation, ending foreign military involvement, and fostering economic reconstruction in five of the most pressing international conflicts: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

The President's plan sets forth a comprehensive and flexible framework for cooperation toward these goals among the warring parties themselves, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and among other interested parties. The plan, which would complement and bolster existing peace-making efforts, involves action at three levels:

-- The starting point is a process of negotiation among the warring parties themselves. "The form of these talks may and should vary," the President explained, "but negotiations -- and an improvement of internal political conditions -- are essential to achieving an end to violence, the withdrawal of foreign troops and national reconciliation."

-- The second level involves joint U.S.-Soviet talks about how best to support the ongoing talks among the warring parties, when those negotiations make genuine progress. "In every case," the President said, "the primary task is to promote this goal: verified elimination of the foreign military presence and restraint on the flow of outside arms."

-- The third level entails an international effort to welcome these countries back into the world economy. The President pledged the United States would respond generously to their democratic reconciliation with their own people, their respect for human rights, and their return to the family of free nations.

This plan puts the primary responsibility on the parties in conflict themselves to reach accommodation; as the President points out, it is not for the United States or the Soviet Union to impose solutions. Yet it also provides a framework for the Soviet Union to cooperate with the United States in helping to bring peace to Nicaragua.

Pursuant to a 1984 presidential proposal, the United States and the Soviet Union held experts' talks on Central America and the Caribbean October 31 - November 1 in Washington. The talks were the fifth in a series of such exchanges on regional issues. Previously experts' meetings (at the level of Assistant Secretary) treated East Asia, Afghanistan, the Middle East and Southern Africa.

The purpose was to clarify U.S. policy, making it clear that the United States intends to defend its interests, and thereby reduce the possibilities of unnecessary conflict. The talks held so far have been useful in understanding the Soviet position and making the Soviets understand the U.S. position.

As the foregoing indicates, the experts' meetings were held under the rubric of the President's 1984 proposal, not the 1985 initiative on regional conflicts, and were in no sense negotiations.

Economic and Trade Measures

Both the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America and the Congress have recommended use of trade and economic measures to promote a resolution of the conflict in Central America and Nicaragua, and we have regularly consulted with our trading partners and allies on this question. Positive economic incentives for Nicaragua to resolve its internal conflict have formed an integral part of every proposal the United States has made to the Sandinistas since they came to power in 1979. The President's October 24 initiative on regional conflict (see above) proposes generous economic aid where democratic national reconciliation takes place.

Even prior to the United States embargo imposed in May, 1985, Nicaraguan trade with the United States, Latin America, and other traditional trading partners had been declining because of Nicaragua's lack of creditworthiness. The composition of foreign aid to Nicaragua had also changed dramatically, with the Soviet Bloc replacing the West as primary credit suppliers and as aid donors. Any increased aid from Western donors is likely to go to regional institutions such as the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). Neither CABEI nor most of the multilateral financial institutions are presently approving new loans to Nicaragua owing to its serious payment arrearages to many of these institutions. Nicaragua's dependence on the Soviet Union and its allies is expected to continue to increase, although not at levels sufficient to offset its economic decline.

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

The Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance

The Sandinista regime's intolerance of dissent has resulted in a growing democratic resistance movement in Nicaragua. The most prominent leaders of this movement had been leaders of democratic sectors in the broad coalition which eventually overthrew former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. They were forced into opposition by the Sandinistas' betrayal of the promise of a pluralistic system, one of the principal goals for which the 1979 revolution was fought. Refusing to pursue internal reconciliation, the Sandinistas instead have taken increasingly repressive measures to silence the democratic opposition and consolidate a totalitarian system. As a result, increasing numbers of Nicaraguans from all walks of life have felt compelled as a last resort to take up arms against the regime. Today, the democratic resistance has approximately 18,000 men and women under arms and shows every indication of continuing to grow in strength.

Resistance forces have been charged by the Sandinista regime with a wide range of human rights abuses, from forced recruitment to rape and summary execution. These allegations have received broad coverage in the government-owned media and have been disseminated abroad through international human rights organizations and foreign groups active in Nicaragua and sympathetic to the Sandinista regime. Many of these allegations are either false or greatly distorted. Some excesses, however, including instances of forced recruitment and summary execution of military prisoners or, in certain cases, Sandinista officials and regime informers, may well have occurred. It is also clear that individual soldiers in the course of combat have committed random abuses or atrocities. Such violations are unacceptable, and resistance leaders are keenly aware of the necessity of improving the performance of their troops in this area. The principal resistance group, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), has taken measures to eliminate human rights violations committed by soldiers subordinate to its direction.

As in any conflict, there has been a serious lack of reliable information on human rights abuses that occur in isolated combat zones. While UNO has begun to record instances of abuse by its personnel, as well as remedial or punitive measures taken in response, such information was not in the past collected on a systematic basis.

Heretofore, the only regularly received allegations of resistance violations have come from Sandinista sources. These allegations have been biased, grossly exaggerated and often false. This conclusion is supported by residents in communities where atrocities allegedly have been committed and by the testimony of Sandinista defectors who were directly involved in implementing official policy. A key element in the Sandinista campaign has been the fabrication of charges of human rights abuses and, in some cases, attribution to the resistance of atrocities actually committed by Sandinista forces. The following cases illustrate these tactics:

-- In April 1985 U.S. Embassy personnel in Honduras, seeking information concerning resistance abuses, interviewed a number of Nicaraguan refugees. One woman related that a Cuban operating with Sandinista troops had executed seven farmers in her home village in December 1983 after an attack by the resistance. The farmers were considered resistance sympathizers by the authorities. The murders were publicly attributed by the authorities to the resistance. The true facts were later circulated by residents who had witnessed the killings.

-- In a complaint filed through his mother in the summer of 1985 with the independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights, a Sandinista soldier stated that he had been severely pressured by military authorities to issue statements claiming he had been abused while held captive by the resistance. He said that although he had been exposed to resistance political views, he had been well treated and given medical assistance. He was asked if he wanted to join the resistance, but when he refused was escorted some distance from the camp and released. The soldier refused to make the statements sought by the authorities. He was then beaten badly and turned over to State Security. The soldier stated that he had been warned that he would be held in jail until he cooperated with the authorities in their disinformation campaign.

-- A Sandinista Army deserter, now fighting with the resistance, said he decided to go over to the other side when his unit carried out orders to execute two campesinos specifically for the purpose of blaming yet another atrocity on the "contras."

-- According to those on the scene, a government press story that FSLN and neighborhood defense committee members had been brutally murdered in an August 1, 1985 "contra" attack on Cuapa was false. Witnesses said the encounter was a military-to-military engagement which left a number of Sandinista soldiers dead; there were no civilian casualties. Following the fight, the resistance

troops held a town meeting with residents, after which they left. Nevertheless, there were press reports that the "contras" had not only murdered innocent civilians, but skinned their faces. It appears that the Sandinistas mutilated the bodies of some of their own casualties to substantiate such a charge.

The incidents cited above represent cases where available information suggests that the facts have been purposely distorted by the Sandinista regime. In most instances, however, it is not possible to confirm or deny allegations presented by the regime, a situation that should be partially remedied by more complete information being collected by UNO.

There is reason to believe that the resistance has in the past abducted civilians. Statements from a number of sources who have themselves been taken by the resistance indicate a pattern in which civilian prisoners, under reasonably humane circumstances, are exposed to "political indoctrination" (i.e. lectures on resistance goals, abuses of authority by the Sandinistas, etc.), given food and medical treatment, and offered one of three choices: joining with the resistance; accepting refugee status in another country; or returning to their homes.

An example is provided in the case of seven members of Sandinista "education brigades" -- squads of young adults who provide basic education in rural areas -- who were taken prisoner by the resistance at various times and places. Rather than return home, they have chosen to remain with the armed opposition. In letters sent to their families through the Red Cross in April 1985, the former brigadistas speak openly of their opposition to the policies of the Sandinista regime and their desire to see a free and democratic Nicaragua. Several of them vociferously reject allegations of opposition abuses. The Sandinistas continue to use the "kidnapping" of these and other brigadistas in propaganda charges against the resistance.

There have been civilian casualties from resistance attacks, in some cases as a direct result of the Sandinista policy of placing civilians in situations in which they are likely to be endangered during attacks on legitimate military targets. This was true, for example, in the July 1985 deaths of eight women who were being transported in a military vehicle, along with soldiers, to visit their sons at the front.

There is no reliable information to confirm that military prisoners have been executed by resistance forces, although such executions may have occurred. Summary executions are contrary to accepted rules of conflict, regardless of the circumstances contributing to the practice.

Since its establishment in June 1985, UNO has taken steps to prevent human rights violations by establishing an office of human rights to educate troops on proper conduct towards both civilians and prisoners of war. During their basic military training, UNO troops receive one hour of instruction daily on human rights based on the Geneva Conventions, the American Convention on Human Rights, UNO's "Code of Conduct," and the "Manual of the Combatant." The "Manual of the Combatant" emphasizes humane treatment of enemy prisoners and wounded and respect for the property and well-being of innocent civilians. UNO's "Code of Conduct" sets forth specific punishments for criminal acts, including those against civilians.

Arturo Cruz, a member of the UNO Directorate, has been assigned special responsibilities for overseeing measures to promote respect for human rights by UNO forces. Ismael Reyes, the former President of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, has been named head of the UNO Human Rights Commission. UNO has also created a "red cross" society to promote the humane treatment of military prisoners. In establishing this informal "red cross" society, UNO leaders have emphasized in communications with the International Committee of the Red Cross the organization's intent to abide by the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, in particular those regarding the humanitarian treatment of prisoners, enemy wounded and civilians.

UNO/FDN also has corresponded with the International Committee of the Red Cross to institute a regular mechanism under which prisoners can be released and/or exchanged. Although a decision is pending on the UNO/Nicaraguan Democratic Force (UNO/FDN) request for assistance in this endeavor, a number of prisoners have already been released. On May 13, 1985, 17 prisoners were released in the presence of witnesses in the towns of La Batea, El Espabel and El Cacao. Another nine were set free on September 19, again in the presence of witnesses, in the Somotillo/Rio Negro area of Chinandega Department. While comprehensive information is lacking concerning conditions of imprisonment, it is possible to confirm that some, such as the Sandinista soldier mentioned earlier, are detained under humane conditions.

UNO has provided Red Cross offices lists of Sandinista prisoners and dead and information regarding persons reported missing. It has forwarded letters from Sandinista prisoners. UNO has also invited the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to send a representative to observe the conduct of its forces in the field.

A recent report prepared by the Director of the UNO Commission of Human Rights reviews twenty-one cases in which members were accused under the "Code of Conduct" of crimes ranging from theft to homicide and lists punishments accorded those found guilty. Of the 21 persons whose court-martials are addressed in the report, 19 were convicted and two found innocent. The two murder cases were a case of accidental shooting and a "crime of passion" involving only members of the FDN. In one of the cases, the defendant had stolen a horse and a pistol from a Nicaraguan civilian. Because of his mistreatment of a civilian, the normal two-year sentence was doubled.

Nineteen UNO/FDN combatants are reported currently held in detention facilities at resistance camps, serving sentences imposed in accordance with the "Code of Conduct." Resistance members have also been expelled from the movement for criminal actions which may have involved human rights abuses. The punitive measures taken against human rights offenders and the efforts underway to improve the resistance record clearly indicate that the resistance leadership does not condone human rights violations and has taken positive action to prevent their occurrence.

The Sandinista Regime

On October 15, Daniel Ortega announced a new State of Emergency suspending virtually all civil liberties in Nicaragua. The decree signaled an escalation in the assault on basic freedoms, providing further legal underpinning to the consolidation of a totalitarian regime. The 1982 State of Emergency was partially lifted in 1984 as part of pre-election atmospherics; in reality, the policy of intolerance towards dissent continued in force through arbitrary arrests, detentions, and interrogations and the forcible disruption of religious, political, private sector, and labor activities. The new decree suspends the following rights and freedoms:

- freedom of expression;
- freedom of the press;
- the right of assembly;
- the right to trial by jury;
- the right to be considered innocent until proven guilty;
- the right of habeas corpus;

- freedom from arbitrary imprisonment;
- freedom of movement;
- the right to form labor organizations and to strike;
- the right to found and advance community, rural and professional organizations; and
- the right to found and advance cooperatives.

It was subsequently clarified in the National Assembly on October 30 that certain rights are to remain in effect -- the right to a jury, the right to an attorney, and the right to habeas corpus -- but only for those not accused of crimes against "the security of the nation and public order." The decision as to what constitutes a crime against national security or public order rests with the Sandinista authorities, and it is apparent that ordinary political and civic activities are being placed in that category.

The Sandinistas have offered several rationales for the further oppression of the Nicaraguan people, among which they include the need to protect the public against the armed resistance. There would seem to be a striking inconsistency in attempting to close ranks against an opponent -- particularly one allegedly enjoying little or no public support and whose defeat, according to the regime, is imminent -- by launching an assault on the public at large. Analysis of the rising level of domestic unrest in the months preceding the announcement suggests that the actual motive was a sense that diminishing public support for regime policies had reached a dangerous level.

The crackdown was particularly directed at the Catholic Church, traditionally one of the strongest institutions in Nicaragua. The October 15 decree followed a series of Sandinista actions against the Catholic Church, including the forced induction of eleven youths preparing for the priesthood; armed raids on the broadcasting facilities of Radio Catolica and disruption of transmissions of Cardinal Obando y Bravo's homilies; confiscation of the newly-published Church newspaper La Iglesia and seizure of the printing equipment used in its publication; and occupation of the Church Curia Social Services offices. The authorities have now intensified the attack not only on the Church -- some of the most prominent leaders of which have been vilified as counterrevolutionaries in the government press -- but on virtually all other sectors of the opposition.

Agents of State Security have rounded up leaders of political, private sector, labor, and Church organizations, subjecting them to interrogations and threatening further action should they fail to observe the new prohibitions. One labor group, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN) -- associated with the Social Christian Party -- has been closed down and three of its officials arrested and interrogated; political leaders have been warned against the issuance of public statements or holding of political meetings; and thousands of worshippers have been prevented by force from attending masses given by Cardinal Obando. Over a hundred persons have been rounded up and paraded as the centerpiece in the Sandinista campaign against the "internal front," another justification offered by the Sandinistas for their actions against the public. The policies now in force are clear evidence of the regime's totalitarian goals, and underscore the growing level of popular alienation from the regime.

A sinister backdrop to these actions has been provided by the revelations of a recent Nicaraguan defector, Jose Alvaro Baldizon. The former chief investigator of the Special Investigations Commission, an immediate subordinate to Interior Minister Tomas Borge, Baldizon has offered detailed information, as well as supporting documents, indicating that the Sandinista regime engages in massive violations of human rights as a matter of policy. According to investigations carried out by Baldizon himself, the regime has sanctioned the summary execution of hundreds of Nicaraguans perceived to be "potential enemies of the revolution."

Specific cases investigated by Baldizon concern the application of "special measures" (execution) to 150 Miskito Indians and 300 campesinos, religious activists and political opponents. The most well-known of the Sandinistas' victims was Jorge Salazar, former Vice President of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise (COSEP), who was gunned down by State Security in 1980. Baldizon stated that weapons were placed in Salazar's vehicle after he was killed to lend credence to the charge that Salazar was planning armed insurrection in Managua. Baldizon further states that the policy of assassination has now been codified in a strict and highly-secret system of regulations governing the selection and execution of "potential enemies," authorization for which must be obtained in writing from Interior Minister Borge or his first deputy, Luis Carrion.

Baldizon's charges do not stand alone. They are complemented by a considerable body of information concerning Sandinista atrocities, some of which confirms the specific cases cited by Baldizon. The following examples represent only a small part of the information available on such abuses:

-- On April 16, 1985, forces of the armed resistance attacked the Atlantic Coast town of Bluefields, during the course of which they freed prisoners held at the local garrison. While some of those freed fled with the resistance when the Sandinistas counterattacked, about 20 unarmed youths took shelter under a building. The Sandinista Army took the prisoners into custody. Town residents testify that the bodies of all of the youths were subsequently seen in a pile of "contra" corpses put on display as an example to local residents.

-- The Sandinistas have carried out extensive mining of border areas and around villages vacated at their orders. Although the ostensible purpose of the mining is to deny use to resistance forces, in fact many of the victims have been persons fleeing to the safety of Honduras. Indian villages in Mosquitia were similarly mined, and Indian guerrillas have stated that at least six persons have been killed by the mines when returning to their homes under Sandinista auspices.

-- According to a complaint filed with the Sandinista-sponsored human rights commission, several persons at the Carcel Modelo at Tipitapa went on a hunger strike in January 1985 to protest their continued detention on charges of which they were innocent and the conditions under which they were being held. As a result, they were brutally beaten, tortured, and held in isolation. There are other reports of mass executions of prisoners, including eight who headed an uprising at the Zona Franca prison in 1981.

-- Another complaint, filed with the independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights, relates the torture of Sofonios Cisneros Leiva, a 60-year old engineer and community leader, at State Security facilities. Cisneros was arrested the night of May 14, 1985, following a meeting he organized to discuss parental concerns over the forced Marxist indoctrination of their Church-schooled children. Cisneros was tortured by Lenin Cerna, head of State Security, who threatened to kill Cisneros, warned him to remain silent concerning his arrest, and had him dropped off naked on the Masaya highway.

-- According to residents in several villages, Sandinista troops have conducted deliberate attacks on civilians in order to attribute the atrocities to the resistance. For example, in March 1985 a hand grenade was thrown by Sandinista troops into a house at Los Cerritos, killing a husband and wife and their two children. In other cases, the forcible relocation of families from

areas of popular support for the resistance has been accompanied by the burning of family homes and possessions, slaughter of livestock, and physical brutality against those reluctant to depart. There have been reports that persons who have refused to leave have been shot as an example to others. Resistance forces frequently report the use of indiscriminate fire by the Sandinistas in counterattacks, leading to the deaths of numerous civilians.

-- A Nicaraguan employee of the United Nations, Javier Ivan Blandon, disappeared while on a visit to Managua in January 1985. We understand he had come into conflict with the Sandinistas over his travel documents. Blandon's body was later returned to his family in a sealed coffin, with the official explanation that he had been killed in an Air Cubana crash. His name was on a passenger list shown to the family. Baldizon states that Blandon was murdered by State Security, and that the cooperation of the Cubans was enlisted in having his name added to the passenger list of a recent airline crash.

-- Martha Lidia Murillo Vallejo, a nine-year old from Jinotega, related to Honduran authorities that her father was shot by the Sandinista military in November 1984 while he and the family were picking coffee. The reason: he had refused to join the military. The rest of the family, including children, fled from the scene and were also killed. Martha escaped and hid with her uncle, who later took her to the Honduran border. There he was shot by Sandinista soldiers, and Martha was bayoneted in the neck. When she regained consciousness, she was hit in the head with a rifle butt and left for dead. She was found by resistance forces, who carried her to a nearby home. The facts of the massacre were confirmed by an official from Jinotega.

-- In July 1985, Sandinista soldiers near San Isidro reportedly tortured to death Ismael Cantarero because he refused to join the Patriotic Military Service. Cantarero's hands and feet were cut off.

Although the incidents related above represent only a fraction of the evidence available concerning the deliberate violation of basic human rights by the Sandinistas, there has been remarkably little publicity given to these abuses. Indeed, several reports from private human rights organizations and activists either ignore entirely Sandinista abuses or dramatically understate the significance of those abuses. Statements by Baldizon and other Sandinista defectors indicate that this imbalance is at least partially a result of a skillful, highly-organized official disinformation program.

Mateo Guerrero, a former Executive Director of the Sandinista-sponsored human rights commission (CNPPDH) who has received asylum in the United States, has publicly discussed the way in which that organization has evolved into a propaganda tool for the regime. While the CNPPDH has always faced serious restrictions on its ability to investigate allegations of official abuses, in January 1985 CNPPDH was specifically ordered by the Foreign Ministry to cease any further efforts to do so. Guerrero further states that on several occasions reports actually written by the Foreign Ministry were published as CNPPDH documents. CNPPDH was instructed to lend full assistance to persons or groups favorably disposed to the regime who were preparing human rights reports.

In the case of Reed Brody, a New York attorney, this assistance included the payment of all expenses, including food and lodging, provision of a chauffeured car, arrangement of all interviews and provision of a list of "appropriate" cases for investigation. Mr. Brody nevertheless explicitly stated in his introduction to the study "Attacks by the Nicaraguan 'Contras' on the Civilian Population" that, although the idea for the report was conceived by the law firm of Reichler and Appelbaum (a registered agent of the Sandinista regime), neither he nor any other member of the investigations team received any form of compensation or reimbursement for their expenses, travel and living expenditures having been paid by the team members themselves. Brody's disclaimer conceded only that the team stayed in a house belonging to the regime for "part" of the visit and had used office space provided by CNPPDH. Another defector has stated that Brody selectively edited his evidence to eliminate any statements supportive of or favorable to the resistance. As a rule, inquiries to the CNPPDH and other official agencies from human rights organizations concerning allegations against the regime are satisfied by providing deliberately false information deflecting or significantly mitigating the charges.

In an effort to ensure the "correct" ideological perspective within CNPPDH, two purges of membership have been engineered by the regime. By 1982, many of the original members were replaced, in some cases because their defense of human rights per se was too vocal and too independent. Edgar Macias, a leader of the Popular Social Christian Party, went into exile after being labeled a "U.S. intelligence agent." He was followed by Ismael Reyes Rojas, president of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, whom the Sandinistas accused of embezzlement and counterrevolutionary activity. In July 1985, following Guerrero's defection, the entire membership was changed. The new members were all staunch supporters of the FSLN.

In further illustration of the CNPPDH's role as a propaganda arm, we note that in 1984 only two reports were issued, both of which addressed only allegations of resistance abuses. Concerning the regime, the documents stated only that it "was operating under a declared state of emergency." In 1985, no reports had been issued as of August. On the other hand, if the CNPPDH does not carry out investigations into abuses, it does play a vital role in meeting with foreign delegations for the purpose of denouncing the resistance. In January 1985, Alejandro Bendana of the Foreign Ministry announced to CNPPDH members that he would personally direct the group's activities in order to promote an international offensive by the Sandinistas to denounce alleged abuses of the resistance.

Baldizon adds counterpoint to Guerrero's report, stating that the CNPPDH was routinely denied access to any information concerning official abuses. He explained that his own extensive investigations were used to create elaborate cover stories, precise to the detail, which explained away Sandinista atrocities by showing the victims had fled to other countries, been killed by the resistance, or been killed while escaping. In a few instances, for the sake of credibility, individual soldiers were "found guilty" of abuses and brought to justice in show trials at which they received lengthy prison terms. (Baldizon states that these men were later quietly released, after attention had subsided, and sometimes were given government jobs in other areas of the country.) Such disinformation has been regularly disseminated to international human rights organizations.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
FOR THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

On August 29, 1985, the President signed Executive Order 12530 creating the Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) for the purpose of disbursing \$27 million in humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. On September 9, the President designated Ambassador Robert W. Duemling as Director of NHAO.

The NHAO staff consists of the Director, five supervisory and two clerical personnel, all detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from federal agencies (State, AID and USIA), with the exception of the Director, whose salary is reimbursed to State from the humanitarian assistance program funds. Office space in a government-leased building is charged to program funds, but furnishings and equipment have been borrowed at no charge. Administrative support, including legal advice from the Office of the Legal Adviser, is provided by the Department of State.

The Executive Order assigned responsibility for policy guidance to the Secretary of State and his designees. The Secretary has established a Senior Inter-Agency Group, chaired by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, to establish basic policy and exercise oversight of NHAO activities; policy guidance for day-to-day NHAO operations is provided by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, who chairs an inter-agency group that assures effective coordination.

As a matter of policy, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was designated to be the initial recipient for humanitarian assistance distributed by NHAO. UNO is an umbrella organization which brings together the largest number of anti-Sandinista political and paramilitary elements. It is led by Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo; its principal components include the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (UNO/FDN), the Armed Forces for Revolution in Nicaragua (UNO/FARN), and a coalition of Atlantic Coast Indians and Creoles (UNO/KISAN). Using UNO as a conduit for assistance serves the policy objective of encouraging cohesion within the democratic resistance; it also simplifies administrative procedures and restrains administrative costs.

METHOD FOR FUNDING

NHAO is disbursing funds for four basic categories of goods and services: food, clothing, medicine and medical care, and equipment. NHAO also provides funds for transporting supplies to the field.

Funds for these goods and services are being provided to UNO through a series of grants, each of which obligates a fixed amount of humanitarian assistance funds for the use of UNO, subject to certain terms and conditions. While the grant gives UNO a conditional legal entitlement to the funds, NHAO retains actual possession of the funds and administers their disbursement. To date, three major grants totaling \$5.5 million and a smaller grant of \$25,000 have been issued. Once a grant has been issued, UNO identifies the goods or services it needs and a suitable vendor, and negotiates the terms of a proposed sale to UNO. These terms are set forth on a pro forma invoice which UNO submits to NHAO. The pro forma invoice is reviewed by NHAO to ensure that the goods or services are humanitarian assistance within the meaning of the law, and that the payment requested is appropriate for value received. NHAO also monitors the quantity of items, to assure against an oversupply so substantial as to suggest a possible risk of diversion. If the proposed purchase is approved, NHAO authorizes UNO to make the purchase. NHAO signals its approval to the vendor through issuance of a letter of commitment. After shipment or delivery has been verified, NHAO pays the vendor directly from UNO grant funds.

Monitoring and verification of procurement and delivery take several forms, depending on location. Within the United States, NHAO representatives are able to make on-site inspections of supplies as they are aggregated for shipment to the field. To monitor supplies and services contracted and delivered abroad, NHAO relies on reports from all available sources to confirm that actual transactions conform to the relevant documentation.

DELIVERY INCIDENT

On October 10, an UNO charter flight paid for by NHAO and carrying supplies purchased under NHAO auspices landed apparently without permission in Tegucigalpa, causing the Honduran Government to take custody of the cargo. Discussions between the American Embassy and the Honduran Government resulted in the cargo being released and returned to the United States.

SUMMARY OF PAYMENTS

Following is a summary of NHAO disbursements and commitments to pay, through October 31, 1985.

1. NHAO Grants to UNO (to be disbursed through letters of commitment)

Grant 601 - \$1,000,000 (Issued October 3, 1985)
Grant 602 - \$1,500,000 (Issued October 15, 1985)
Grant 603 - \$3,000,000 (Issued October 29, 1985)
Total - \$5,500,000

In addition to the above three grants for food, clothing and medical supplies, NHAO issued a small fourth grant signed October 17, 1986 for \$25,000 (Grant 641-001) to fund an UNO office in Washington, D.C. The grant stipulates that the activities of that office must be strictly limited to the provision of liaison services between UNO and NHAO to facilitate the operation of the program. This liaison office grant differs from the other three in that it permits UNO to receive a small advance payment of cash to cover administrative expenditures, which expenditures must be documented and justified before further cash advances are made.

2. UNO EXPENDITURES FROM GRANTS THROUGH 10/31/85

Total Humanitarian Assistance.....\$4,660,928

Food	\$1,257,189
Clothing	\$2,070,807
Medical	\$553,421
Equipment	\$639,561
Transport	\$139,950

Total UNO Liaison Office Expenses.....\$7,500

NHAO EXPENDITURES THROUGH 10/31/85

Total Administrative Expenses.....\$23,640

Direct Personnel Costs	\$13,374
Travel	\$4,800
Office Rent	\$3,666
Telephone toll calls	\$1,200
Miscellaneous	\$600

GRAND TOTAL.....\$4,692,068



Special Report No. 132

United States Department of State

September 1985

“Revolution Beyond Our Borders”

Sandinista Intervention in Central America

*“This revolution goes
beyond our borders.”*

Tomas Borge
July 19, 1981

“Revolution Beyond Our Borders”

Sandinista Intervention in Central America

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CENTRAL AMERICA: MAJOR LOCATIONS MENTIONED IN TEXT



I. What the Controversy Is About

A nation that provides material, logistics support, training, and facilities to insurgent forces fighting against the government of another state is engaged in a use of force legally indistinguishable from conventional military operations by regular armed forces. As with conventional uses of force, such military action is permissible under international law if it is undertaken in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense in response to an unlawful use of force.¹ But such action is unlawful when it constitutes unprovoked aggression.

A striking feature of the public debate on the conflict in Central America is the degree to which all parties concerned accept these propositions. As Nicaragua has stated to the World Court:

... There is now a substantially unanimous modern view concerning indirect use of force through armed groups of mercenaries or irregulars. Whatever legal doubts may have existed prior to World War II were dispelled by the events of the post-war period. If the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4) [of the U.N. Charter] was to have any meaning, it would have to cover this new and dangerous mode of military activity...²

The critical element of the debate, therefore, is not the identification of the applicable legal standard but the determination of the facts to be measured against that undisputed legal standard. In determining the facts, it is important to assess both the evidence of what has been done and the credibility of what has been said.

I am aware of the allegations made by the government of the United States that my government is sending arms, ammunition, communications equipment and medical supplies to rebels conducting a civil war against the government of El Salvador. Such allegations are false, and constitute nothing more than a pretext for the U.S. to continue its unlawful military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua intended to overthrow my government. In truth, my government is not engaged, and has not been engaged in, the provision of arms or other supplies to either of the factions engaged in the civil war in El Salvador. [Emphasis added]

Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, in an affidavit filed before the International Court of Justice dated April 21, 1984³

Nicaragua charges that, since at least 1982, the United States has used force against Nicaragua in the form of assistance to Nicaraguans fighting against the Sandinista regime. Any such actions, Nicaragua argues, are illegal and improper since Nicaragua has never taken any action against neighboring countries that would give them or their ally the United States the right to act against Nicaragua in self-defense. The fighting in El Salvador and the violence in Honduras and Costa Rica are, the Sandinistas say, entirely the work of home-grown movements with which Nicaragua has immense sympathy but to which it has provided no material assistance.

Nicaragua's case thus rests on statements by Sandinista represen-

tatives, such as that quoted above from Foreign Minister D'Escoto's affidavit filed with the World Court, denying any involvement in insurgencies and subversion in neighboring countries.⁴ But, as the U.S. Congress, the executive branch, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and others who have studied the facts have repeatedly found, the Sandinista leaders have, since at least 1980, engaged in a carefully concerted use of force against its neighbors. A leading critic of U.S. Nicaragua policy, Congressman Edward P. Boland, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, stated in March 1982:

There is . . . persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms

¹Other lawful bases for the use of force include actions taken by a state pursuant to decisions of the UN Security Council or at the invitation of another state within its territory.

²Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. the United States of America), International Court of Justice, p. 126. The Sandinistas espouse these principles to Western audiences while internally extolling their commitment to "revolutionary internationalism": the asserted right to aid "national liberation" movements elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to judge their actions by the standards which they use to judge others and which they claim to apply to themselves.

³Affidavit of Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, Nicaraguan Exhibit II submitted to the International Court of Justice at its public sitting of April 25-27, 1984, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), p. 1. Resubmitted to the Court as Annex B to Nicaraguan Memorial (Merits), April 30, 1985.

⁴The only concession the Sandinistas make to the argument that their actions justify a response against them is their claim that the United States would act against them in any event and hence has forfeited any right to assist in the defense of neighboring states. This argument has nothing to do with the facts of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua since 1979. It also has no basis in law—a person who wrestles a gun from the

hands of an attacker cannot himself be charged with assault (nor can the gunman's action itself be excused) on the basis of speculation that he would "no doubt" have struck the gunman even had the gunman not attacked first. The fact that Nicaragua has offered no serious alternative argument constitutes implicit recognition by the Sandinistas that they have no case once it becomes apparent that they have engaged in acts of aggression against their neighbors. In these circumstances, their neighbors and the United States have the right to respond.

and financial support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further providing the insurgents bases of operations in Nicaragua. . . . What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insurgency. That support is such as to greatly aid the insurgents in their struggle with government forces in El Salvador.⁵

The full Congress has on repeated occasions made formal findings concerning Sandinista aggression:

. . . by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical, command and control, and communications facilities) to groups seeking to overthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government . . . of Nicaragua has violated article 18 of the Charter of the [OAS] which declares that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . .⁶

That the Sandinistas have engaged and continue to engage in aggression is not in doubt to Nicaragua's neighbors in Central America. There is no need to prove to these countries what they are experiencing on a daily basis. Nor are the Contadora countries⁷ in doubt about the nature of Nicaragua's behavior. Indeed, as El Salvador informed the International Court of Justice last year:

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, when pressed at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Contadora group in July 1983 . . . on the issues of Nicaraguan material support for the subversion in El Salvador, shamelessly and openly admitted such support in front of his colleagues of the Contadora group.⁸

The purpose of this study is to address the reality and consequences of Nicaragua's longstanding and continuing intervention against its immediate neighbors and to do so by focusing on

the factors that are relevant to the legality and morality of the use of force: aggression and self-defense.

The record is documented in this study. It demonstrates that:

- Almost precisely a year after the fall of Somoza in July 1979, the Sandinistas began a major effort to help guerrilla forces overthrow the Government of El Salvador by repeating the strategy followed by the Sandinistas in their own final offensive against Somoza. As a direct result of support by Nicaragua and by other states using Nicaragua as a conduit, the Salvadoran guerrillas were transformed from terrorist factions that had been limited to robberies, kidnappings, and occasional street violence into an organized armed force able to mount a coordinated nationwide offensive, inflicting significant loss of life and economic damage on El Salvador. Although this first intervention failed in January 1981, the Sandinistas have continued to ship and store arms and to provide training, headquarters, and coordination on Nicaraguan territory for a new "prolonged war" strategy. As of early September 1985, Sandinista support continues to be an essential element in the training, communications, and logistics systems of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

- Sandinista security services have, both directly and indirectly, through training, supply, and support of subversive groups in Honduras and Costa Rica, engaged in bombings, assassinations, and other unlawful attacks against the people and institutions of those nations. In Honduras, they supported "vanguard" groups first to supply the attack on El Salvador, then to engage in kidnapping, hijacking, and more recently in efforts to establish guerrilla fronts in the Honduran Departments of Olancho (in 1983) and El Paraiso (in 1984 and 1985). In Costa Rica, the Sandinistas redirected alliances established during the anti-Somoza struggle to support the expanded insurgency in El Salvador,

provided covert support and training for the paramilitary wings of far left groups, and supported several terrorist actions.

- Finally, the Sandinistas' military buildup threatens Nicaragua's neighbors. It has emboldened the Sandinistas to engage in military incursions into the territories of Honduras and Costa Rica, incursions in which citizens of these and other countries have died as a direct result of Nicaraguan military actions.

From the outset the United States has been aware of Nicaraguan aggression and has sought to help end it peacefully, using diplomatic appeals and economic and political measures. Notwithstanding the Sandinistas' claims that the United States has consistently sought for its own purposes to overthrow their regime and has only recently "manufactured" a collective self-defense rationale for its actions, the diplomatic and public record clearly shows that after July 1979 the United States assisted the new government in Nicaragua and tried to develop friendly bilateral relations.

The record shows as well that the United States responded in a measured and graduated fashion when the Sandinistas refused to cease their intervention against other states in Central America. And the record shows that the Sandinistas themselves, through persistent aggression and refusal to participate seriously in efforts to address the regional conflict through peaceful means, bear the primary responsibility for the distrust and resentment of the Sandinistas that is found throughout Central America and for the current strife within Nicaragua itself.

⁵Press release dated March 4, 1982, by Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, p. 1. (See also Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on H.R. 2760 [Amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1983], H.R. Rep. 98-122, p. 5.)

⁶Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984 (P.L. 98-215), Section 109(a). See also Section 722(c)(2)(C) of the International Security and

Development Cooperation Act of 1985, approved August 8, 1985, which expresses the finding of Congress that "the . . . Government of Nicaragua . . . has flagrantly violated . . . the security of the nations in the region, in that it . . . has committed and refused to cease aggression in the form of armed subversion against its neighbors . . ." (P.L. 99-83).

⁷See Appendix 1, Glossary.

⁸Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), submitted to the International Court of Justice, August 15, 1984, pp. 10-11.

II. The Praxis of Intervention

The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in July 1961, at a meeting among Tomas Borge, Carlos Fonseca, and Silvio Mayorga. All had been student activists in Nicaragua; all had participated in preliminary meetings in Cuba; all identified with the Cuban revolution and with armed conflict. The first armed FSLN guerrilla units entered Nicaragua from Honduras in 1962 carrying Cuban-supplied weapons.¹

By the time the FSLN was founded, internationalism and guerrilla warfare had already been united in Sandinista praxis in the form of the "Rigoberto Lopez Perez" Column. This guerrilla group had been organized in mid-1959 with advice from Ernesto Che Guevara and supplied by Cuba. The 55 Nicaraguans, Cubans, and other internationalists who belonged to it were dispersed by the Honduran Army before they could enter Nicaragua.²

The FSLN suffered repeated defeats in its armed opposition to the Somoza dynasty, which after 1967 was headed by Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Fifteen years after their opening attacks, Fonseca and Mayorga were dead and FSLN forces had no more than 300 guerrillas belonging to three feuding factions.³

A new strategy to gain alliances beyond the borders of Nicaragua,

The foreign policy of the Sandinista People's Revolution is based on the full exercise of national sovereignty and independence and on the principle of revolutionary internationalism.

FSLN "72-hour Document,"
September 1979⁴

This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought [his first battle].

Tomas Borge
July 19, 1981⁵

We cannot cease being internationalists unless we cease being revolutionaries.

Bayardo Arce
May 6, 1984⁶

especially with non-Marxist states and organizations, gradually developed in the wake of a failed October 1977 campaign against Somoza. Events soon gave

the FSLN the opportunity to develop alliances with moderate and democratic groups and individuals who previously would have shunned the FSLN because of its Cuban ties and penchant for violence. In January 1978, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the editor of *La Prensa*, Nicaragua's leading newspaper, was murdered by assailants widely believed to be associated with Somoza. Chamorro was Somoza's leading critic and a strong democrat. His death set off the national revolution that eventually destroyed Somoza.

Throughout 1978, while Nicaraguan business, religious, and civic leaders were moving irrevocably into opposition to Somoza, Armando Ulises Estrada, a high-ranking member of the America Department of the Communist Party of Cuba, made numerous secret trips seeking to unify the three major factions of the FSLN. In March 1979, the three Sandinista factions entered into a formalized alliance with Fidel Castro's support.⁷ Once unity was achieved, Cuba increased covert support operations, providing weapons, training, and advisory personnel to the FSLN. Estrada and Julian Lopez Diaz, later Cuba's first ambassador to Sandinista Nicaragua, concentrated on building a supply network for channeling arms and supplies to Sandinista guerrilla forces.⁸ By May

¹Claribel Alegria and D.J.F. Falkoll, *Nicaragua: la revolucion sandinista* (Serie Popular Era) Mexico, 1982, quote Borge on the establishment of the FSLN and its 1962 operation on pp. 166-168. The organization established in Honduras in July 1961 was originally to be named simply the National Liberation Front. "Sandinista" was added because of Fonseca's belief in the need for a historic Nicaraguan symbol. In this way, Augusto Sandino, a nationalist, became the symbol of an internationalist movement.

²The defeat brought a wounded Fonseca to Havana where he made personal contacts with the Cuban leader that contributed to the founding of the FSLN. In 1960, Borge also met with Che Guevara in Havana.

³Leaders of the three factions were: Tomas Borge, "Prolonged Popular War," Humberto and Daniel Ortega, "Third Force" or "Insurrectionist," and Jaime Wheelock, "Proletarian." The factions are described in George Black, *Triumph of the People: The Sandinista Revolution in Nicaragua* (London, Zed, 1981), pp. 91-97.

⁴*Análisis de la coyuntura y Tareas de la Revolución Popular Sandinista (Tesis Políticas y Militares Presentadas por la Dirección Nacional del Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional en la Asamblea de Cuadros "RIGOBERTO LOPEZ PEREZ" celebrada el 21, 22 y 23 de Septiembre de 1979)*, Managua, October 1979, p. 24 (often referred to as the "72-Hour Document").

⁵At a military ceremony broadcast on Managua domestic service, as reported by *FBIS* on July 21, 1981.

⁶*Comandante Bayardo Arce's Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)*, Department of State Publication 9422, Inter-American Series 118 (Washington, D.C., March 1985), p. 4, translated from the text published in *La Vanguardia*, Barcelona, August 23, 1984.

⁷Cuban radio announced as early as December 1978 that the three factions had agreed to merge. Also see Richard L. Millett, "Historical Setting," in *Nicaragua: A Country Study* (Washington, 1982), p. 51. Black (*op. cit.*), pp. 142-148, discusses unification without mentioning Cuba.

⁸Cuba today has an extensive intelligence and training apparatus, modern military forces, and a large and sophisticated propaganda network. Making Che Guevara's attempts look amateurish, the Castro government is now able to utilize agents and contacts nurtured over 20-25 years. Most of the covert operations in Nicaragua were planned and coordinated by the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party. Headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, the America Department emerged in 1974 to centralize operational control of Cuba's covert activities in the Western Hemisphere. The department brings together the expertise of the Cuban military and the General Directorate of Intelligence into a farflung operation that includes secret training camps in Cuba, networks for covert movement of personnel and materiel between Cuba and abroad, and sophisticated propaganda support. (See *Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America*, Department of State Special Report No. 90, December 14, 1981.)

1979, these supply and support operations reached levels that helped neutralize the conventional military superiority of Somoza's National Guard and permitted the launching of a "final offensive."

Within weeks of Somoza's fall in July 1979, the FSLN was reaffirming its "internationalism" and solidarity with guerrillas elsewhere in Central America. Using their ties with Cuba, the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc nations, the FSLN began to develop a monopoly hold on domestic power and to convert Nicaragua into an operational center of "revolutionary internationalism."⁹ FSLN leaders in Managua quickly confirmed relationships of mutual support with the leaders of various armed movements throughout Central America. Contacts were also established with organizations and political movements that were not directly engaged in armed struggle but that could become, or were already, part of a regional support network for armed revolutionary activities in Central America.

In 1979, the FSLN's program, which declared that the "principle of revolutionary internationalism" was one of the

keys to Sandinista foreign policy, had been discussed and approved without publicity.¹⁰ By 1981, the Sandinistas felt confident enough to reissue their 1969 program, which was more specific. The FSLN called for "authentic unity" of Central America to "lead the way to coordinating the efforts to achieve national liberation."¹¹

To coordinate "national liberation" efforts, the Sandinistas developed by mid-1980 the apparatus to sustain regionwide guerrilla operations and to give them political as well as military support. With the assistance of the Cubans, Soviets, and East Europeans, the Sandinistas created two institutions essential to such operations: the Department of International Relations (DRI) of the FSLN, and the Fifth Directorate of Intelligence associated with the government's General Directorate of State Security (DGSE).¹²

The Sandinistas' practice of revolutionary internationalism is implemented largely through these two organizations. The DRI, which is closely modeled after the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party, provides administrative support for political trainees from Central America. Headed by Julio Lopez Campos, it reports directly to the FSLN National Directorate and is responsible for establishing and main-

taining support networks for the DGSE and the Fifth Directorate of Intelligence. The Fifth Directorate has been headed since its creation by Renan Montero Corrales (former name, Andres Barahona Lopez), a Cuban-born naturalized Nicaraguan who was with Che Guevara in Bolivia. It provides the operatives and the liaison necessary to maintain the clandestine links and support networks for activities on behalf of the guerrilla organizations in the Central American region.

Sandinista success in mediating differences among four Guatemalan guerrilla groups in November 1980 made clear Nicaragua's new role. Unlike the similar previous Nicaraguan (1979) and Salvadoran (1980) guerrilla unity agreements, which were forged in Cuba, the statement of "revolutionary unity" among the Guatemalan guerrilla organizations was signed and dated in Managua.¹³

Those attending the signing epitomize the apparatus: members of the FSLN National Directorate, delegates from the Cuban Communist Party, including America Department chief Manuel Pineiro, and the Managua representatives of the Salvadoran Unified Revolutionary Directorate, the DRU.

⁹In this, of course, the Sandinistas are squarely in line with Cuban doctrine and practice. Article 12 of the Cuban Constitution "espouses the principles of proletarian internationalism and of the combative solidarity of the peoples." Section (c) states that "help to . . . peoples that struggle for their liberation constitutes . . . [an] internationalist right and duty." Between mid-1979 and mid-1981, the period in which the FSLN effectively drove out the other members of the national coalition that defeated Somoza, Cuban involvement in the daily affairs of the Nicaraguan Government became comprehensive and direct. Cuban military, security, and intelligence advisers served in many key roles in such ministries as Defense and Interior.

¹⁰See footnote 4, p. 3.

¹¹From "The Historic Program of the FSLN" in Resset and Vandermeer, *The Nicaragua Reader* (New York, Grove Press, 1983), p. 145. 1981 was also the year in which Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega declared in a private meeting with army and militia officers that:

"Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our Revolution, the in-

strument of analysis of our Vanguard for understanding its historic role and for carrying out the Revolution; . . . Without Sandinismo we cannot be Marxist-Leninists, and Sandinismo without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary; that is why they are indissolubly linked and that is why our moral force is Sandinismo, our political force is Sandinismo, and our doctrine is Marxism-Leninism." (From the text printed October 9, 1981, in *La Nacion*, Tegucigalpa, using the edition of the speech circulated on August 25, 1981, by the Political and Cultural Training Section of the Sandinista People's Army.)

¹²According to Miguel Bolanos Hunter, who served in Nicaraguan counterintelligence 1979-1983, in 1983 the 2,800-3,000 Nicaraguans in the state security services were supplemented by about 400 Cubans, 70 Soviets, 40-50 East Germans, and 20-25 Bulgarians. He added that many of the Cuban military advisers were posing as civilian teachers. (Don Oberdorfer and Joanne Omang, "Nicaraguan Bares Plan to Discredit Foes," *Washington Post*, June 19, 1983, p. A1).

¹³See the unity statement entitled, *Principios Generales y Acuerdos de la Unidad de las Organizaciones Revolucionarias EGP, FAR, ORPA y PGT* (Managua, Nicaragua, November 2, 1980). According to one of the Guatemalan participants, the four guerrilla groups accepted an invitation from the FSLN to unify "the optimal conditions of security [in Nicaragua] . . . so that they could dedicate themselves to the process of unity." The plan was to negotiate in Managua and then fly to Havana to sign the document of unity in the presence of Fidel Castro, members of the Cuban Communist Party, representatives from the FSLN and the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) of El Salvador. However, a decision was made to sign the document in Managua to reaffirm "the coordination and unity of Central America's revolutionary vanguard forces" and to be the first revolutionary organizations to unify on Central American soil. (Drawn from a tape-recorded account entitled *Informe de Manolo* [Manolo's Report] and obtained by Guatemalan security forces in March 1981.)

The featured speaker was Bayardo Arce, who spoke on behalf of the FSLN and promised "unconditional assistance to the revolutionary process in Guatemala and El Salvador."¹⁴

To ensure that they would be invulnerable to retaliation from their neighbors for their expanding internationalist role, the Sandinistas undertook a substantial increase in Nicaragua's conventional military power.¹⁵ By the end of 1980, Nicaragua's armed forces were twice as large as the Somoza National Guard at its height. The Sandinista People's Army doubled in size again by the end of 1982.¹⁶

The country studies that follow illustrate the practical content the Sandinistas give to "revolutionary internationalism."

¹⁴*Informe de Manolo*, pp. 18-22.

¹⁵Concern about "counter-revolutionary" activities by former National Guardsmen and other opponents of the regime was expressed from the earliest days (e.g., in the "72-Hour Document" cited in note 4, p. 3.). But the Sandinistas do not assert that the armed resistance had reached dimensions requiring a military buildup before 1982. (See *Contrarrevolucion, [sic]: Desarrollo y Consecuencias, Datos Basicos 1980-1985*, Managua, 1985). In addition to attempting to preclude military action by their neighbors in response to the Sandinistas' intervention in their affairs, the explanation for the early focus on developing a large military establishment also may be found in the capacity it gave the FSLN to exercise control over Nicaraguan society. The country's new armed forces were organized around the FSLN's armed elements, which numbered some 5,000 by July 1979. Significantly, they were denominated the Sandinista People's Army and had an explicitly political, FSLN-related function as well as the customary duty of protecting Nicaragua from attack. The police forces were also organized by the FSLN. The party (with the Ministry of Interior troops commanded by FSLN Directorate member Tomas Borge and other smaller FSLN-controlled forces) thus had a monopoly on force within Nicaragua exercised through highly politicized bodies.

¹⁶According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Nicaragua's regular armed forces numbered 7,100 men and 4,000 paramilitary forces in 1977, just before the civil war heated up in 1978-9. (See *The Military Balance 1977-1978*, London, 1977, p. 74.) By 1982, the Sandinista armed forces numbered 21,500 and its paramilitary forces around 50,000. (See *The Military Balance 1982-1983*, London, 1982, pp. 104-106.) By 1984, the Sandinista People's Army numbered 61,800 regular troops. (See *The Military Balance 1984-1985*, London, 1984, p. 123).

A. El Salvador

Before the Sandinista Directorate took power in Managua, there were guerrillas in El Salvador but no guerrilla war. Extremist forces of El Salvador's left were violent but fragmented into competing factions. They had neither a unified organization nor the heavier, more destructive modern weaponry. To use Carpio's imagery (see p. 6), the Sandinistas were decisive in uniting the internal Salvadoran struggle with a broader international conflict.

Building on a base of solidarity in exile and armed opposition,¹ Sandinista support for violent warfare in El Salvador falls into two distinct periods:

- An attempt to repeat in El Salvador the pattern of the Sandinistas' own final military offensive against Somoza; and
- "Prolonged war" against El Salvador's economy, elections, and institutions after the first approach failed.

¹During the war against Somoza, several Salvadoran groups on the extreme left provided support to the FSLN, but Carpio and his FPL and the Prolonged Popular War faction of the FSLN (FSLN/GPP) headed by Tomas Borge probably had the closest links. Carpio and Borge were cut to similar patterns: both formed militant splinter groups; both were rigidly partisan in their revolutionary philosophies, espousing prolonged armed struggle from a rural support base; and both were committed "internationalists." Part of the estimated \$50-100 million accumulated in 1977-79 by leftist extremist groups in ransom and protection payments was invested in the Sandinista revolution next door. Salvadoran radicals engaged in acts of "revolutionary solidarity" such as the February 14, 1978, People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) attack on the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Salvador, proclaimed as an "act of repudiation against Somoza" (*FBIS*, February 15, 1978).

Mobilizing for a "Final Offensive"

On July 21, 1979, 4 days after Somoza fled from Nicaragua, both Carpio's Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and Borge's GPP faction of the FSLN were present at a meeting in Managua to discuss Sandinista support for armed struggle in El Salvador. The mobilization of external support did not get fully underway, however, until a meeting held in Havana in December 1979 produced agreement among the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES), the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), and the FPL to form a trilateral coordinating body.² During 1980, the original three were joined by two additional groups, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) to form the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which, with its political arm, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), has served as the umbrella organization for the Salvadoran guerrilla movement.

²Detailed information on these meetings, the subsequent trip of Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) Secretary General Jorge Shafik Handal to the Soviet bloc, and the specifics of the supply routes through Nicaragua, was contained in PCES documents obtained in November 1980, and ERP documents collected in January 1981. This information was published in the State Department's Special Report No. 80, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, February 23, 1981. Facsimiles of 19 documents were also released that same day: Department of State, *Communist Interference in El Salvador: Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency*, February 23, 1981 (cited hereafter as *Documents*). The authenticity of these documents and of the story they tell have since been corroborated by new intelligence sources and defectors. (See also "Response to Stories Published in the *Wall Street Journal* and the *Washington Post* about Special Report No. 80," Department of State, June 17, 1981, which contains a 25-point response to the factual criticisms of the February 23 report.)

Redirecting the Costa Rican Networks. The first step was to revitalize the networks originally established in Costa Rica during the struggle against Somoza to support armed struggle in El Salvador. Aided by a few Costa Rican officials, the Cubans arranged for the collection of Sandinista arms still in Costa Rica. Modest amounts of arms were infiltrated into El Salvador by Costa Rican and Panamanian pilots. On June 15, 1980, a twin engine Aero Commander crashed in El Salvador. The weapons and ammunition on board were recovered by the Salvadoran military. Arms from Costa Rican caches were also smuggled overland assisted by the FSLN and the Communist Party in Honduras.³

Nicaragua Becomes the Hub. During the second half of 1980, Nicaragua became the center of the clandestine arms flow. Unlike Costa Rica and Honduras, Nicaragua provided a favorable environment, including secure communications and transportation links to Cuba by both sea and air.

In late May 1980, after negotiations in Havana, the ERP joined the guerrilla coalition. The new coalition, known as the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), issued a press release in Havana announcing the broadened alliance. During this visit, the DRU leaders met three times with Fidel Castro and discussed military plans with the Cuban Directorate of Special Operations—the same covert operations/special forces unit that had organized Cuba's intervention in Angola.⁴

After the Havana meetings, DRU leaders went to Managua to meet with Sandinista officials. One Salvadoran par-

They say that we are sending weapons to El Salvador but they have not offered any real proof. But let us suppose that weapons have reached El Salvador from here. This is possible. More than that, it is possible that Nicaraguan combatants have gone to El Salvador, but this cannot be blamed on any decision of ours.

Tomas Borge
April 1981⁵

One thing is evident, the members of the [Sandinista] Directorate and all its working teams, some inside the country and others outside the country, are steadfastly at work fully aware of the need to unite the internal struggle with international solidarity and with the struggle of all peoples for the liberation of Central America and El Salvador . . . The Central American peoples' struggle is one single struggle. [Emphasis added]

Salvadoran Guerrilla Leader
Salvador Cayetano Carpio
Managua, April 9, 1983⁶

ticipant reported that, in the first week of June, the FSLN Directorate offered a headquarters ("sede") in Nicaragua for the DRU with "all measures of security," that it was "disposed to contribute in material terms," and that it "assumes the cause of El Salvador as its own."⁵

Transshipping Weapons From the Soviet Bloc. While other DRU leaders went to Managua, Salvadoran Communist Party leader Jorge Shafik Handal left Havana for Moscow. In early June, Shafik Handal met with Mikhail Kudachkin, an official of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. The Soviets suggested that Shafik Handal travel to Vietnam to seek arms. In Vietnam, Shafik Handal was received by

Le Duan, the Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, and other high-ranking party and military officials. The Vietnamese agreed as a "first contribution" to provide 60 tons of arms—overwhelmingly of U.S. manufacture, including 1,620 M-16 automatic rifles with 1,500,000 rounds of ammunition, enough to equip an entire combat infantry battalion.⁶

Managing the Weapons Flow in Nicaragua. FSLN Directorate member Bayardo Arce met with members of the DRU General Staff in July 1980 to review the logistical infrastructure for the guerrilla war in El Salvador. Arce

³A Special Commission established in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature confirmed that the clandestine arms-supply link between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, established in the fight against Somoza, continued to function between Costa Rica and El Salvador after July 1979. According to the Commission's report, "arms trafficking, originating in Costa Rica or through Costa Rican territory, [began] toward El Salvador, directly or using Honduras as a bridge." The quotation is from the Commission's Report, which was excerpted May 15, 1981 in *La Nación*, San Jose, and reprinted by *FBIS* on June 12, 1981.

⁴"Informe de Eduardo/Viaje de 5 de Mayo al 8 de Junio/80" (Report of trip of Eduardo from May 5 to June 8, 1980), *Documents*, D, pp. 2-3.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁶*Bohemia*, Caracas, April 20-26, 1981.

⁷The senior FMLN *Comandante* until his suicide, Carpio was speaking at funeral services in Managua for murdered FPL *Comandante* Ana Maria, as transmitted by Managua domestic service, April 9, 1983, and by *FBIS*, April 11, 1983. The murder, funeral, investigation, and suicide were all covered in great detail in the FSLN newspaper, *Barricada*, during April 1983.

⁸See Appendix 5. From June 19 to July 3, 1980, Shafik Handal visited the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary. His requests produced several promises of arms and military equipment. The East Germans told Handal that they would be willing to divert some medical supplies they had already sent to Nicaragua, and that they would train Salvadoran guerrillas. Because they did not possess suitable Western arms, both East Germany and Hungary raised the possibility of exchanging communist for Western-manufactured arms with either Ethiopia or Angola. The Czechs promised Czech-made arms, of types already available in the West so as to maintain plausible denial.

questioned the DRU's military and political preparations but agreed to furnish ammunition, arrange meetings with the FSLN military commission to discuss military matters, and suggested that they might provide Western-manufactured weapons from FSLN stocks.⁹ By that time, the Nicaraguan security forces had already begun to receive weapons from the Soviet bloc. As bloc weapons were absorbed, the Sandinistas transferred some Western arms in their inventories to the Salvadoran insurgents.

By mid-September 1980, the arms promised to Shafik Handal during his earlier travels were en route to Cuba and Nicaragua. In September and October, aircraft flight frequencies and intelligence reporting both indicated a sharp increase in the flow of military equipment into Nicaragua from Cuba. Sandino International Airport was closed for normal traffic between 10:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. for several weeks to accommodate cargo planes ferrying arms and other equipment from Cuba.

In late September, the United States made strong protests to the Nicaraguan Government about the arms flow from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Fearful that discovery would jeopardize the recently approved \$75 million in economic support funds from the United States, the Sandinistas held up transshipment of the arms for 1 month—despite Salvadoran guerrilla appeals to move these weapons onward. To the U.S. demarche, the Nicaraguan Government responded that while some Nicaraguans, including individual officials, might be involved in arms shipments, the government itself was not responsible.¹⁰

In mid-October, Havana was the site of a meeting at which representatives of the Communist parties of Central America, Mexico, and Panama agreed to

set up a commission to oversee the provision of material aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Originally scheduled for Managua, the meeting was shifted to Havana at the request of the Sandinistas so as to obscure their involvement.

At the end of October 1980, immediately after the second tranche of a specially enacted \$75 million program of U.S. aid to Nicaragua was authorized for disbursement, the Nicaraguans provided the Salvadoran guerrillas with a new delivery schedule and resumed weapons deliveries by sea and air on an even larger scale than before the suspension. Also in late October, the Salvadoran guerrillas decided to operate a clandestine radio station with the

The Salvadoran revolutionaries do not have military bases here. If they have bases outside of El Salvador, they are in Guatemala and Honduras.

Daniel Ortega
June 1983¹¹

technical help of the Cubans and Nicaraguans.¹² On December 15, *Radio Liberacion* began to broadcast from Nicaragua. A second clandestine station, *Radio Venceremos*, subsequently began broadcasting in the vicinity of the Honduras-El Salvador border.

On November 1, 1980, the DRU logistics coordinator in Managua informed the guerrilla General Staff that approximately 120 tons of military

equipment were still in Nicaragua awaiting shipment to El Salvador. He added that approximately 300–400 tons of weapons and materiel would be in Cuba by mid-November, ready for transfer to Nicaragua and then to El Salvador. The DRU coordinator urged the armed groups in El Salvador to work harder to absorb more arms shipments, noting that some communist countries had doubled their promised aid and adding that: "This is the first revolution in Latin America to which they have committed themselves unconditionally with assistance before the seizure of power."¹³

Air Routes From Nicaragua. Existing land infiltration routes could not move this growing volume of arms in time for the planned FMLN offensive of early 1981. Accordingly, Nicaragua—with Cuban support—assumed a more direct role and began airlifting arms from airfields in Nicaragua. This airlift was directed by the Commander of the Nicaraguan Air Force, Raul Venerio Granera, and a Cuban adviser.

The principal staging area came to be an airfield at Papalonal. The pattern and speed of construction at Papalonal, which is in an isolated area 23 nautical miles northwest of Managua, lacking adjacent commercial or economic activity, made clear its military function. In late July 1980, this airfield was an agricultural dirt airstrip approximately 800 meters long. By December, photography revealed a lengthened and graded runway with hard dispersal areas and storage buildings under construction. By January 1981, the strip had been lengthened to 1,200 meters. A turnaround had been added at each end. A dispersal parking area with three hardstands had been constructed at the west end of the runway. Three parking aprons had been cleared, and three

⁹"Informe Sobre Viaje" (Trip Report), *Documents*, G, p. 3. The meeting with Arce took place on July 23, 1980.

¹⁰The diplomatic exchange is discussed below in Section III. The guerrillas discuss their logistics problems in *Documents*, J, K, L, M, N, and O.

¹¹*Time*, June 6, 1983, p. 18.

¹²*Documents*, P, transmits an "official" FMLN request for both a permanent clandestine station in Nicaragua and a mobile radio unit to overcome the success Duarte was having in "confusing" the people.

¹³"Informe #4" (Report #4) addressed to "Joaquin, Jacobo, Marcial, DRU del FMLN,"

Documents, K, p. 2. This hand-written letter-report from the PCES files adds that: "It is impressive how all countries in the socialist bloc fully committed themselves to meet our every request and some have even doubled their promised aid."

hangar or storage buildings, each about 15 meters wide, had been constructed on the aprons.¹⁴

On January 2, 1981, a C-47 was observed at Papalonal for the first time. Two C-47s were observed in February. These C-47s and DC-3s (the civilian version) were used to ferry larger cargoes of arms from Papalonal to areas of guerrilla infiltration in southeastern El Salvador. Several pilots were identified in Nicaragua who regularly flew the route into El Salvador. Radar tracking also indicated flights from Papalonal to southeastern El Salvador.

On January 24, 1981, a C-47 dropped arms by parachute in the vicinity of a small strip in southeastern El Salvador. On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from Nicaragua crashed upon takeoff after unloading passengers at an airfield in El Salvador close to where the C-47 air-drop occurred. A second plane, a Piper Aztec, sent to recover the downed crew, was strafed on the ground by the Salvadoran Air Force. The pilot and numerous weapons were captured. The pilot stated he was an employee of the Nicaraguan national airlines, LANICA, and that the flight originated from Sandino International Airport in Managua.¹⁵



In one of several photographs taken beginning in mid-1980, two C-47/DC-3 cargo planes are parked next to sheds at the Papalonal airstrip. Note that fresh grading appears in a lighter tone on this photograph, which was taken on March 12, 1981.

¹⁴Following is an extract from an intelligence summary prepared for the White House on January 9, 1981, the day before the "Final Offensive" was launched. The analysis appears on pages 2 and 3 of a classified memorandum entitled "Nicaragua-Cuba: Increasing Support for Central American Insurgents." It was confirmed by subsequent events and information in virtually every respect although the volume of weapons, estimated below at about 60 tons by December, proved larger than this contemporary analysis suggested.

"Nicaragua has taken a more direct role in supplying arms and materiel to the Salvadoran left, which is now receiving larger quantities of sophisticated weapons. Multiple sources previously had reported Sandinista arms shipments to El Salvador—by boat across the Gulf of Fonseca, by land via Honduras, or by air with the collaboration of Panamanian and Costa Rican gunrunners. Recent reporting, however, indicates that by last November the FSLN had begun airlifting weapons directly from Nicaragua to El Salvador.

"Four separate sources have reported on such flights or related preparations. In November, a Costa Rican arms trafficker made a "paper sale" of several planes to a Honduran aviation company to conceal acquisition of the aircraft by the FSLN. A second source identified two of the same planes making clandestine flights from the isolated Papalonal airstrip in

Nicaragua to Lempa and Santa Teresa airstrips in El Salvador. Costa Rican pilots in the pay of the Nicaraguan Government conducted six flights during November, delivering an estimated 5,000 pounds of arms—FAL and Galil rifles, ammunition, grenades, and dynamite. The clandestine night flights were coordinated with Salvadoran leftists who secured and lit the airfields and unloaded the aircraft in minutes. A Nicaraguan Government official and a Cuban adviser reportedly oversaw the operations. By December, some 60 tons of weapons had been stockpiled in Nicaragua for transfer to El Salvador.

"Following the crash of one of the planes at Santa Teresa on 25 November, FSLN authorities ordered a halt to further flights until mid-December; at the pilots' request, the stand-down was extended until after the holiday season. Plans call for at least four flights per week from both Papalonal and Rosario airstrips, with daily flights once the Salvadoran insurgents begin a general offensive . . .

"In addition, a Nicaraguan Government C-47—piloted by a Sandinista Air Force (FAS) officer and with a joint Nicaraguan-Cuban crew—was to begin ferrying arms to El Salvador in mid-December, according to detailed information provided by two separate sources. The flights, under the supervision of Col. Carlos Rodriguez, Cuban adviser to the FAS, were to originate from an unnamed airstrip in the same area as Papalonal.

"Recent imagery [aerial photography] substantiates this reporting. Papalonal airstrip was lengthened and new hangars and parking aprons were constructed late last year. Moreover, imagery also confirms the presence of a new C-47 at Managua's Sandino Airport on dates when our sources reported the planes' acquisition and the December training flights; imagery also subsequently showed a C-47 at Papalonal in early January at the same time there was a return to the normal inventory of C-47 planes in Managua . . .

"There are indications of more widespread Nicaraguan support operations in the offing. A camouflaged communications intercept site has been reported in extreme northern Nicaragua across the bay from El Salvador, and its presence appears confirmed by imagery. It will reportedly be augmented with additional equipment in the near future. This area was earlier reported to be the planned staging ground for a future Nicaraguan-supported assault by Salvadoran insurgents against a coastal Salvadoran target."

¹⁵The *FBIS* for January 27 and 28, 1981 carries accounts of this incident from *ACAN*, *ACAN-EFE*, *Latin*, and *La Prensa Grafica*, San Salvador, January 26, 1981.

Land and Sea Shipments From Nicaragua. While air resupply was playing a key role, infiltration was also taking place by land and sea. Overland arms shipments reached El Salvador through Honduras from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Small launches operating out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports crossed the Gulf of Fonseca at night, carrying arms, ammunition, and personnel.¹⁶

In mid-January 1981, Honduran security forces intercepted a trailer truck in Comayagua that was part of an arms supply network run by FPL guerrillas working through Nicaragua. The truck contained weapons and ammunition in a false compartment in the roof. This one truck contained over 100 M-16/AR-15 automatic rifles, 50 81mm mortar rounds, approximately 100,000 rounds of 5.56mm ammunition, machinegun belts, field packs, and first aid kits. Over 50 of these M-16/AR-15 rifles were traced to Vietnam where they had been left when U.S. troops departed.¹⁷

In May 1981, a Salvadoran defector from the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), Luis Alvarado Saravia, made a lengthy statement to the Salvadoran press. He detailed how the Nicaraguan Government provided food, transportation, and false documents to enable him to train in Cuba. He also described movements of guerrillas and arms from Nicaragua into El Salvador days prior to the January 1981 offensive. The arms and supplies he described included 2,200 rifles (FALs, M-1s, and M-2s), two radio transmitters, ammunition, grenades, more than 15 rocket launch-

ers, at least three .50 caliber and one .30 caliber machineguns, 125 boxes of TNT, and 10 M-79 grenade launchers.

Impact of Nicaraguan Aid. By December 1980, the guerrillas were employing weapons never before used in El Salvador. Among them were U.S.-made M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers. Unlike the M-1s and the G-3s used by the Salvadoran military, most of these weapons were not available in the quantities involved in the FMLN offensive either locally or on the Central American black market. They were a far cry from the handguns, hunting rifles, shotguns, and homemade explosives which until mid-1980 had been the basis of the guerrilla arsenal in El Salvador.

Before January 1981, no nationwide or even departmentwide offensive had been launched by the guerrillas. In fact, the DRU and the FMLN, and even the FAL, one of their key components, were all founded only *after* the FSLN had demonstrated its willingness to help.

The "Final Offensive." On January 10, 1981, broadcasting from a clandestine radio station located inside Nicaragua, the guerrillas proclaimed that "the decisive hour has come to initiate the decisive military and insurrectional battles for the seizure of power."¹⁸ Radio Managua took up the call, broadcasting: "A few hours after the FMLN General Command ordered a final offensive to defeat the regime established by the military-Christian Democratic junta, the first victories in the combat waged by *our* forces began being reported."¹⁹

Within the first hours of January 10, four San Salvador radio stations had

been captured; the guerrillas broadcast a tape to rally support, announcing that the assassination of Jose Napoleon Duarte and other Salvadoran leaders was imminent. Using the weapons smuggled from Nicaragua, guerrilla units struck at 40-50 locations throughout El Salvador, downed two helicopters, and overran a National Guard post. Hit-and-run street actions were everywhere. In the cities, buses were burned; in the countryside, guerrillas boarded buses and exhorted surprised passengers to take up arms. The cities of San Salvador, Santa Ana, Chalchuapa, Chalatenango, and Zacatecoluca came under especially heavy fire. The governor of Santa Ana described the city as "under siege." Both airports were closed, their access roads cut.²⁰

The guerrillas had hoped for a popular insurrection, which, with their armed attacks, would result in a total breakdown of the government and lead to an immediate victory. This did not happen because the overwhelming majority of El Salvador's population ignored the guerrillas' appeals. Although four army officers joined the guerrillas, the army remained basically united and fought back.

The costs of this Nicaragua-based assault on El Salvador's society were heavy. They were all the more tragic in that by 1981 the Salvadoran Government was beginning to address the serious political, social, and economic problems that most concerned the people of El Salvador. In its commitment to reform, the Christian Democratic/armed forces junta of El Salvador had the full political support of the United States. On January 16, 1981, President Carter reacted to Sandinista

¹⁶Arquimedes Canadas, alias Alejandro Montenegro, described these routes in detail after his arrest in Honduras in August 1982. (See Appendix 3 and Hedrick Smith, "A Former Salvadoran Rebel Chief Tells of Arms from Nicaragua," *New York Times*, July 12, 1984, p. A10.) An individual account of this same period was provided by Salvadoran guerrilla Santo Salome Morales, who defected in Honduras in September 1981, reported that he and 12 others went from El Salvador to Nicaragua via a point near the Gulf of Fonseca in May 1980. From Managua, they proceeded to Cuba where they received extensive military training,

together with over 900 other Salvadorans. Morales said he was trained in underwater demolition.

¹⁷ACAN-EFE reported the seizure on January 21, 1981 with a Tegucigalpa dateline (*FBIS*, January 22, 1981). (See also Appendix 5.) Although many weapons only have lot numbers that do not allow definitive traces, M-16s can be individually traced once corresponding records of serial numbers are located. Most of the M-16s in the truck referred to above were traced to Vietnam.

¹⁸See "A Call by the General Command of the FMLN to Initiate the General Offensive," reproduced on pp. 82-83 of the FMLN-FDR booklet *El Salvador on the*

Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory, distributed in the United States in English during February-March 1981.

¹⁹The next day, January 11, 1981, the FSLN paper *Barricada* published an Extra that bannered "The final offensive has begun," complete with photographs of advancing guerrillas.

²⁰The FMLN's own summary of its actions as of January 21, 1981, is reprinted in Appendix 6; also see "El Salvador's Civil War," *Newsweek*, January 26, 1981. By the time fighting slowed, some 10 days after the offensive began, about 400 people were dead and 800 injured.

arms supply activities by authorizing a modest resupply of ammunition.²¹ Except for transportation and communication equipment and other non-lethal items, the United States had provided no military aid, and no weapons or ammunition, to El Salvador since 1977.

Prolonged War

The failure of the "final offensive" produced a decision to carry on a prolonged war of attrition and economic sabotage while drawing on Nicaragua to increase the military strength of the guerrillas.²² Although the FMLN was generally rejected by the population at large, guerrilla numbers continued to increase for some time after the "final offensive." The sophistication of their military equipment and strategy also improved.

Seeking to compensate for the failure of the "final offensive," the FMLN launched a series of terrorist attacks starting in late February 1981. The American Embassy in San Salvador was rocketed twice and strafed five times in March and early April. Guerrilla attacks against the economic infrastructure reached higher levels, as they increasingly targeted power towers, water pumping stations, electrical generators, highways, and productive facilities such as farms and businesses.

In October 1981, in a sophisticated attack displaying better training than they had previously shown, a large guerrilla contingent succeeded in destroying the major Puente de Oro bridge over the Rio Lempa. By that time, the strategy of attacks aimed at targets leading to a rapid popular uprising, as hoped for in the "final offensive," had given way to the attrition and economic starvation inherent in the "prolonged war" concept.

The prolonged war concept was continued in 1982, with two noteworthy

exceptions—the highly sophisticated and successful attack on Salvadoran military aircraft at the Ilopango Airbase early in the year and the nationwide, coordinated, guerrilla offensive against the March 1982 elections, which failed in its goal of preventing the vast majority of voters from going to the polls. In the countryside, the guerrillas were massing, operating in larger numbers, utilizing more sophisticated communications equipment and weaponry and, in isolated areas, conducting operations more typical of a conventional war than a guerrilla conflict. These tactics continued through 1983, a year marked by an attack on the military headquarters of the 4th Brigade in El Paraiso, Chalatenango Department and destruction of the Cuscatlan Bridge on the Pan American Highway in December and January 1984.

Damage Caused by the Guerrillas.

As of early 1983, some of the most fertile land could not be cultivated because of guerrilla attacks. Guerrilla actions had destroyed 55 of the country's 260 bridges and damaged many more. The national water authority had to rebuild 112 water facilities damaged by guerrilla action; 249 attacks on the telephone system caused millions of dollars in damage. In the 22-month period ending November 1982, the guerrillas caused over 5,000 interruptions of electrical power—an average of almost eight a day. The entire eastern region of the country was blacked out for over a third of the year in both 1981 and 1982. The guerrillas destroyed over 200 buses in 1982 alone. Less than half the rolling stock of the railways remained operational by early 1983.

In short, unable to win the uncoerced loyalty of El Salvador's people, the guerrillas set out deliberately and systematically to deprive them of food, water, transportation, light, sanitation, and work.

Continuing Patterns of Nicaraguan Support

Continued Sandinista backing for the FMLN's military strategy consisted of three major components: arms and other logistical supplies, training, and command and control. Levels of material support have fluctuated occasionally. The most notable declines took place during 1981 in the disorganization that briefly followed the defeat of the January offensive and again in late 1983 after the U.S.-Caribbean action in response to the collapse of the New Jewel government in Grenada. This continuing Nicaraguan aid was what allowed the Salvadoran guerrillas to continue their operations on a large scale.

Arms Supplies. With Cuba as a main source,²³ Nicaraguan supplies of arms to FMLN units were stepped up to make possible an offensive to disrupt a peaceful vote in the March 28, 1982, Constituent Assembly elections.

In the first 3 months of 1982, shipments of arms into El Salvador reached the highest overall volume since the "final offensive" in 1981. The Nicaraguan-based arms flow into El Salvador utilized both sea and overland routes through Honduras. In February 1982, for example, a large shipment of arms arrived by sea from Nicaragua to the Usulután coast. Early in March 1982, a guerrilla unit in El Salvador received several thousand sticks of TNT and detonators (five sticks of TNT are sufficient to blow up an electrical pylon).

In addition to small arms and vitally needed ammunition, guerrilla supply operations in 1982 provided greater quantities of heavier weapons, including 57mm recoilless rifles and M-72 antitank

²¹By mid-January 1981, enough information was available to make the Nicaraguan link clear to the Carter Administration, which undertook the private demarches noted in Section III and the Chronology. In an interview with editors of the *Washington Post* published January 30, 1981, newly departed Secretary of State Edmund Muskie said that arms and supplies being used in El Salvador's bloody civil war were flowing through

Nicaragua "certainly with the knowledge and to some extent the help of Nicaraguan authorities."

²²The decision was probably joint. The Salvadorans needed Nicaraguan help. The Sandinistas saw the war in El Salvador as a means of diverting attention from Nicaragua. In that period, Daniel Ortega told Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O. Enders that the FMLN was "nuestro escudo"—Nicaragua's "shield." ("Building the Peace in

Central America," *Current Policy* No. 414, U.S. Department of State, August 20, 1982, p. 3).

²³In a Bonn press conference on June 19, 1981, German Social Democratic leader Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski reported that when he had personally confronted Castro with State Department contentions that Cuba had shipped weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas, Castro had admitted it was true.

weapons, thus significantly increasing guerrilla firepower. Individual units also regularly received tens of thousands of dollars for routine commercial purchases of supplies.

On March 15, 1982, the Costa Rican Judicial Police announced the discovery of a house in San Jose with a sizable cache of arms, explosives, uniforms, passports, documents, false immigration stamps from more than 30 countries, and vehicles with hidden compartments—all connected with an ongoing arms traffic through Costa Rican territory to Salvadoran guerrillas. Nine people were arrested: Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, an Argentine, a Chilean, and a Costa Rican. Costa Rican police also seized 13 vehicles designed for arms smuggling. Police confiscated some 150–175 weapons from Mausers to machineguns, TNT, fragmentation grenades, a grenade launcher and ammunition, and 500 combat uniforms. One of the men captured told police that the arms and other goods were to have been delivered to the Salvadoran guerrillas before March 20, “for the elections.”²⁴

The flow of supplies from Nicaragua continued at high levels into 1983.

According to Napoleon Romero, formerly the third-ranking member of the largest guerrilla faction in the FMLN who defected in April 1985, his group was receiving up to 50 tons of material every 3 months from Nicaragua before the reduction in deliveries after the U.S.-Caribbean action in Grenada. Romero gave a detailed description of just how the logistics network operated. The first “bridge” implemented for infiltration was an air delivery system. Romero stated that arms would leave Nicaragua, from the area of the Cosiguina Peninsula, for delivery to the coast of San Vicente Department in El Salvador. He described the first such delivery as consisting of 300 weapons infiltrated at the end of 1980 in preparation for the January 1981 “final offensive.” Romero claimed that air routes were suspended when the Salvadoran Armed Forces succeeded in capturing a large quantity of arms that came by air from Nicaragua. It was at this point in 1981, he continued, that seaborne delivery became—as it continues to be—the primary method of infiltration.

Romero described the sea route as departing from Nicaragua’s Chinandega Department or islands (like La Concha²⁵) off its coast, crossing the Gulf

of Fonseca, and arriving at the coast of El Salvador’s Usulután Department. Thousands of rounds of ammunition translate into relatively small numbers of boxes, easily transported by man, animal, or vehicle over multiple routes. The lack of constant government presence, and the relatively short distances from the coastline to all major guerrilla fronts, reduce the difficulties of providing the guerrillas with certain types of logistics support from Nicaragua.²⁶

Training. The Sandinistas also provided training to the Salvadoran insurgents and served as a transit point to other external training locations. Nicaraguan and Cuban political and military training created the basic framework for the use of the arms by the guerrillas within El Salvador. The two countries coordinated the training efforts, with Cuba providing most specialized training for sabotage and demolition operations.²⁷ The Sandinistas, for their part, trained Salvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, weapons

²⁴*La Nación*, San Jose, March 16–21, 1982.

²⁵In 1983, reporters visiting La Concha found that: “A radio-equipped warehouse and boat facility, disguised as a fishing cooperative on an island in northwestern Nicaragua, has served for three years as a transshipment point for smuggling arms to El Salvador, numerous residents here say.” (Sam Dillon, “Base for Ferrying Arms to El Salvador Found in Nicaragua,” *Washington Post*, September 21, 1983, p. A29.)

²⁶Guerrillas defecting or captured as late as 1985 stated that the Department of Usulután, especially the area around Jucuarán and the coastline from Isla el Arco to Playa el Cuco, continues to be essential for the distribution and transshipment of materials arriving in El Salvador from Nicaragua. While deliveries by land through Honduras and Guatemala continue, and time-sensitive air deliveries (including essential documents, personnel, and medicines) also take place sporadically, the largest volume of arms, munitions, and materials from Nicaragua arrives by way of the Usulután coastline and interior transit points which lead to all the major guerrilla fronts in El Salvador.

The basic system, which continues into 1985, is as follows: boats or large canoes deliver the materials along the coastline where they are picked up and transported by animals, persons, or small vehicles into the Jucuarán region of southern Usulután to the several dozen guerrilla logistics basecamps. From Jucuarán, the supplies are transported along four major “corridors,” within which there are dozens of routes depending on the method of transportation, the presence of Salvadoran security forces, and the weather. These routes lead west out of Jiquilisco-Tres Calles, northwest via Tapesquillo Alto, north to El Brazo, and northeast to Tierra Blanca-Bolívar. All major guerrilla fronts receive supplies through the Usulután logistics network.

Within the Jucuarán area and along the four “corridors” and the dozens of roads, trails, and rivers are located a series of storage facilities, usually natural caves or underground bunkers that have been fortified and concealed. Once materials are off-loaded along the coastline, they seldom remain in one location for more than 72 hours—reflecting both security precautions and the pressing need to sustain FMLN operations.

Napoleon Romero, the former FPL commander, estimated that this supply

infrastructure was able to provide some 20,000–30,000 rounds of ammunition per month for the FPL alone. Some 300 guerrillas could be provided 100 rounds each (the usual load carried by a combatant), or 150 guerrillas could be provided with 200 rounds for a major battle. Such a delivery would weigh about 1,300 pounds and be packaged in about 34 metal boxes which could be easily transported by 15–20 men, six pack animals, or one small pickup truck. Given El Salvador’s small size and the short distances involved, material entering along the Usulután coastline could arrive at any of the guerrilla fronts in about 1 week under optimal conditions.

²⁷Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez confirmed that Salvadoran guerrillas are trained in Cuba in at least two interviews (*Der Spiegel*, September 28, 1981 and *El Diario de Caracas*, October 29, 1981). The “Nidia Diaz” PRTC documents captured in April 1985 show that the Salvadoran guerrillas continue to receive training throughout the Soviet bloc. (See “Captured Salvadoran Rebel Papers List Training Classes Overseas,” *New York Times*, May 21, 1985.)

use, communications, and explosives at temporary training schools scattered around the country and on Sandinista military bases.

Training in Cuba and Nicaragua included rehearsing for attacks on specific targets in El Salvador—including the Puente de Oro Bridge in October 1981, the Ilopango Air Base in January 1982, and the 4th Brigade Headquarters in December 1983. Adin Ingles Alvarado, formerly a commander of the special forces unit of the FPL and a guerrilla from 1977 until his defection this year, recently acknowledged publicly that he and 27 others rehearsed in Cuba the December 30, 1983, attack on the 4th Brigade, making simulated assaults using a mockup of the 4th Brigade garrison constructed from sketches. Ingles also stated that the materiel used in the actual attack—explosives, machineguns, and ammunition—came in via Nicaragua.

Command and Control. As noted above, Salvadoran guerrilla actions were coordinated first by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), then by the FMLN, using a general staff consisting of three members from each of the guerrilla groups active in El Salvador.²⁸

Planning and operations were (and to a large extent continue to be) guided from Managua, where Cuban and Nicaraguan officers provide advice. The guidance is radioed to guerrilla units throughout El Salvador. DRU/FMLN officials coordinate logistical support for the insurgents, including food, medicines, clothing, money and, most

importantly, weapons and ammunition. Although some "free-lancing" takes place in the field as targets of opportunity appear, decisions on locations to be attacked and supply deliveries have generally been coordinated with Managua.²⁹

The FMLN General Command was in Managua from 1981 until late 1983, when the FMLN, in conjunction with Cuban advisers and the Sandinistas, decided that the FMLN military leadership should relocate to El Salvador, in particular to Morazan and Chalatenango Departments. The changes were apparently due to Sandinista desires to maintain a lower profile in their support for the Salvadorans in the wake of the U.S.-Caribbean action in Grenada.

Romero points out that, despite these changes, a "secondary directorate" remains in Managua providing, via radio communications, all the "suggestions" of the Cubans and Sandinistas to the FMLN General Command in El Salvador. In addition to the "secondary directorate," the Sandinistas and the Cubans have created special logistics organizations in Managua to coordinate arms smuggling.

Holding On: 1984-85

The increasing political sophistication and military professionalism of the Salvadoran Armed Forces has forced the guerrillas to forego movement in

large numbers and has impeded their massing for a major attack. In response, they have maintained the assault on the economic infrastructure and have returned to small-group tactics and urban terrorism. Again, their weaponry has improved; use of contact-detonated and command-detonated mines has made guerrilla ambushes, even with relatively few personnel, more lethal and has increased collateral damage to civilians.³⁰

Although the FMLN probably achieved its greatest military strength in late 1983, and thereafter increasingly lost the little popular support it had been able to maintain until then, the guerrillas have continued to operate in 1984 and 1985 as an effective fighting force. Guerrilla numbers may be down to about two-thirds of their 1983 levels. The strategic focus increasingly shifted to acts of terrorism and economic sabotage, as acknowledged by senior guerrilla leaders in recent interviews with the Western press.

Little has changed in the Nicaraguan support system. Although Romero noted that the level of aid dropped after Grenada in October 1983, supplies have continued to come in from the warehouses in Managua. Romero said that his faction still receives about three-quarters of its ammunition supplies from Managua and virtually all its supply of explosives. The Sandinistas continue to control the distribution of the supplies, approving or disapproving the requests from individual guerrilla groups on the basis of the tactical

²⁸Public indications of centralized control come from the guerrillas themselves. On March 14, 1982, the FMLN clandestine *Radio Venceremos* located in El Salvador broadcast a message to guerrillas in El Salvador urging them "to maintain their fighting spirit 24 hours a day to carry out the missions ordered by the FMLN general command" (emphasis added).

²⁹Notes kept by Roberto Roca of the PRTC on meetings in Managua in March 1983 with "Simon," the pseudonym of the FMLN representative in Managua, refer to talks with the "Sandis" telling them of Salvadoran guerrilla needs and making the Nicaraguans aware of two successful operations in El Salvador—Calle Nueva and La

Esperanza. He states that the Sandinistas encouraged the FMLN to stay in Guazapa, and mentioned that he had presented a logistics plan that was approved. Discussions were held with representatives of the General Command. He observes that "as long as the General Command remains inactive in the interior, it is necessary to participate in this representation at the maximum level, otherwise we would remain ignorant of important decisions and we would lack information of great importance." In a letter from "Simon" to Roberto Roca, leader of the PRTC, the former discusses the need to communicate with "Fidel" (presumably Fidel Castro) concerning logistics and operational problems with the "Sandinos."

³⁰Economic damage is now estimated at well over \$1 billion. *Radio Havana* reported on August 27, 1985, that in 1985 alone guer-

rilla action has inflicted \$120 million on the owners of the transport industry and \$20 million on the National Association of Private Industries. In an interview in Perquin, El Salvador, top guerrilla leader Joaquín Villalobos told the Western press that the FMLN "proposes a policy of attacking basic commerce, electrical energy, the roads, with frequent paralyzation of transport, railroad lines, telephone communication, export crops like sugar, cotton and coffee—aimed at breaking the war economy and the regime." (Quoted by Dan Williams, "Salvadoran War Will Widen, Rebel Warns," *Los Angeles Times*, July 7, 1985.) Guerrilla spokesmen frequently state that 60,000 persons have been killed since 1979. Whatever the number, it is certain that the guerrilla war continues directly to claim many victims and to impede consolidation of political and economic reform.

soundness of their planned operations. Weapons continue to be infiltrated by land and sea.³¹

The Sandinistas also continue to provide training for the Salvadoran guerrillas. From March to June 1984, for example, 100 ERP members received a self-defense course at Cerro Chiribiquira in Leon Department at kilometer 28 on the Old Leon Highway.³² Alfredo Fernandez Flores, an ERP member captured in early August 1985, indicated during his debriefing that Nicaragua continues to provide ERP with combat training. Fernandez said that he spent 15 days in May 1985 in Nicaragua's Matagalpa Department fighting with the Sandinista People's Army (EPS) to gain combat experience. Eight other Salvadorans also participated in this fighting.³³

³¹On August 27, 1985, Salvadoran authorities apprehended a pickup truck entering El Salvador from Honduras at the El Poy checkpoint. The truck was carrying 84 50-round boxes of assorted pistol and rifle ammunition of U.S. manufacture in a concealed compartment.

³²Santos Enrique Garcia, who was a member of ERP in Nicaragua from 1981 until March 1985 and trained in Cuba, was captured by the National Police in July 1985 after he had returned to El Salvador. During Garcia's stay in Nicaragua, the ERP had approximately 150 members in Nicaragua. According to Garcia, as of March 1985, approximately 75 of those members had left the ERP, complaining of poor treatment and a lack of monetary compensation for their work.

³³Debriefing of Alfredo Fernandez Flores, August 1985.

B. Honduras

Immediately after July 1979, the Sandinistas and the Cubans paid little attention to "solidarity" activities in Honduras. Radical leftists in Honduras had never been particularly effective and in 1979 were not yet in a position to carry out serious subversive activities.¹ Honduran territory, however, was, from the start, of primary importance as a transit route for the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran insurgency and, to a lesser extent, to guerrillas active in Guatemala. In 1980 the Sandinistas also began to provide logistical support, training, and advice for the proliferating Honduran factions seeking the violent overthrow of the Honduran Government.

Transfer of Arms to El Salvador and Guatemala

Honduran territory and radical cadres became part of the logistics network for the transfer of arms to Salvadoran insurgents. The operations were done in ways to minimize actions that might provoke the Honduran Government into abandoning the passivity it had previously displayed toward Sandinista operations against Somoza. Indeed, it was some time before the Honduran Government was able to move effectively against the supply routes operating through Honduras.

In January 1981, Honduran authorities made their first major interdiction of supplies headed for the rebels in El Salvador when they discovered the arms trafficking network in the Honduran town of Comayagua.² In April 1981, the Hondurans intercepted a

second shipment in a tractor-trailer. This truck had entered Honduras at the Guasaule crossing from Nicaragua and was apparently heading for Guatemala. Ammunition and propaganda materials were hidden in the side walls of the trailer. The same arms traffickers operated a storehouse in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, with a false floor and a special basement for storing weapons.³

Honduran territory was also the likely conduit for the arms caches captured by Guatemalan security forces at safehouses in Guatemala City in April and July 1981. As with arms captured in January in Honduras, traces made on the serial numbers of individual U.S.-manufactured weapons seized in Guatemala revealed that 17 M-16/AR-15s had originally been shipped to American units in Vietnam. Several of the vehicles captured at the Guatemala City safehouses bore recent customs markings from Nicaragua.⁴

The discoveries pointed to the greater effectiveness of Honduran security operations along the border with Nicaragua. In response, the level and size of arms shipments passing through Honduran territory began to fall off. They did not cease, however. A former guerrilla commander of the Salvadoran People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), Alejandro Montenegro, stated that guerrilla units under his command in 1981-82 received monthly shipments of arms from Nicaragua, mostly via the overland route from Honduras.⁵ More recently, another senior

¹In the November 1981 national elections, the two traditional parties received 96% of the popular vote from a high turnout of 80% of eligible voters (see "Liberal Party in Honduras Takes Big Lead in Vote," *New York Times*, November 30, 1981; "Honduran Victor in Overture to Foes," *New York Times*, December 1, 1981).

²See text and footnote 17, p. 9.

³Intelligence on the first major interdictions of arms shipments by the Honduran security forces was declassified and presented by the Honduran delegation to the XIV Conference of the American Armies in 1981 (see also broadcast by *Radio America*, Tegucigalpa, April 9, 1981, as reported in

FBIS, April 10, 1981.) In May and June 1982 the security forces discovered three more safehouses in Tegucigalpa, including caches of arms believed to have come from the Sandinistas (see State Department unclassified cable *Tegucigalpa* 4821, June 9, 1982).

⁴The discovery of the safehouses was reported by ACAN-EFE, July 21, 1981, *Radio Nuevo Mundo*, Guatemala City, and *Radio-Television Guatemala*, July 21 and 22, 1981, as reported in *FBIS* July 24, 1981.

⁵"A Former Salvadoran Rebel Chief Tells of Arms From Nicaragua," *New York Times*, July 12, 1984, p. A10.

Salvadoran guerrilla leader, Napoleon Romero, confirmed after his defection in April 1985 that Honduras continues to be an important transit route for arms from Nicaragua. His group, the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), brings supplies overland from Nicaragua to Tegucigalpa whence they are transferred to Chalatenango Department in northern El Salvador. He has stated that most shipments now, in contrast to earlier years, are small so as to minimize the danger of discovery.⁶

Armed Struggle: 1981-83

Prospects for vanguard activism in Honduras itself began to change in late 1981 when the country's small Marxist parties fragmented. The splits were often generational in nature and took the form of differences over the road to power. Almost invariably the new younger factions—inspired by Sandinista success—favored armed struggle over the gradual methods favored by the older generation.

By 1981 the Sandinistas were working closely with the new groups. In an October 1981 interview in the pro-government Nicaraguan newspaper *El Nuevo Diario*, the Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras (FMLH), founded in 1979, was described by "Octavio," one of its leaders, as a political-military organization formed as part of the "increasing regionalization of the Central American conflict." On November 17, 1981, the Honduran police raided a safehouse in Tegucigalpa belonging to the Honduran Front for Popular Liberation (FHLP).⁷ Police ultimately captured several members of this group, including a Honduran, a Uruguayan, and several Nicaraguans. The captured terrorists told Honduran

authorities that the Nicaraguan Government had provided them with funds for travel expenses and explosives.

Documents captured in the raid and statements by the detained guerrillas further indicated that:

- The group was formed in Nicaragua at the instigation of high-level Sandinista leaders;
- The group's chief of operations resided in Managua; and
- Members of the group received military training in Nicaragua and Cuba.

The documents included classroom notes from a 1-year training course held in Cuba in 1980. Other documents revealed that guerrillas at one safehouse were responsible for transporting arms and munitions into Honduras from Esteli, Nicaragua.

At no time has there been any attack on Honduran territory from Nicaragua . . .

Nicaraguan Foreign
Ministry Communique
June 22, 1983⁸

During 1981 other "post-Nicaragua" groups made their presence felt. The most formidable was the People's Revolutionary Union/Popular Liberation Movement (URP/MLP). It was more popularly known as the "Cinchoneros." In March 1981 Cinchonero members hijacked a Honduran Airlines flight and diverted it to Managua. Tellingly, they demanded the release of 10 Salvadoran guerrillas who had been captured in Honduras while smuggling arms to the FPL in El Salvador. Sandinista officials refused to cooperate with Honduran

authorities—to the point of refusing them access to the control tower to communicate directly with the hijackers. The Hondurans were forced to accede to the terrorist demands, freeing the Salvadorans and flying them to Cuba.⁹

In September 1982, the Cinchoneros seized control of the Chamber of Commerce in San Pedro Sula (Honduras' second largest city), holding 107 prominent businessmen and three Cabinet ministers hostage. The demand once again centered on the release of captured Salvadorans and other imprisoned guerrillas. The Cinchonero attackers finally ended the hostage incident without achieving any of their demands except safe passage to Cuba on September 28, 1982.¹⁰

Another armed Honduran group, the Popular Revolutionary Forces (FPR), carried out an airplane hijacking on April 28, 1982. They demanded the release of over 50 prisoners but again settled for safe passage to Cuba on May 1, 1982.¹¹ The FPR was also responsible for a number of bombings and attacks on the offices in Honduras of U.S. companies in 1982.¹² On July 4, 1982, they sabotaged the main power station in Tegucigalpa.¹³ In roughly the same time period as the attacks, the FPR was also training cadres in Nicaragua and Cuba for a future "invasion" of Honduras.

Olancho 1983, El Paraiso 1984-85

The extent to which the Sandinistas back subversive movements inside Honduras became apparent when Honduran guerrillas—trained and supplied by Nicaragua and Cuba—attempted to establish guerrilla bases in the Olancho

⁶Debriefing of Napoleon Romero, April and May 1985 (see also "Salvadoran Rebels Change Tactics," *Washington Post*, May 17, 1985; "New Sources Describe Aid to Salvadoran Guerrillas," *Washington Post*, June 8, 1985).

⁷Official Informe sobre la Captura y Desmantelamiento del Grupo Subversivo Auto-denominado "Frente Hondureño de Liberación Popular," Tegucigalpa, December 2, 1981.

⁸As reported by Managua domestic service, *FBIS*, June 23, 1981.

⁹See "Honduran Plane is Hijacked and Lands in Managua," March 28, 1981; "Hostages Released from Honduran Jet," March 29, 1981; and "Panama Plane Will Fly Captives from Honduras," *New York Times*, March 30, 1981.

¹⁰See *Agence France Presse* (AFP), *El Tiempo* (Tegucigalpa), *La Prensa* (San Pedro Sula), *El Heraldo* (Tegucigalpa), ACAN-EFE, as reported in *FBIS*, September 22-24, 1982.

¹¹An extremely detailed account of the hijacking, including government and guerrilla statements, as reported by *Radio Cadena Audio Video*, Tegucigalpa, AFP, and ACAN-EFE, is reported in *FBIS*, April 29-May 3, 1982 (see also "Hijackers Release Hostages, Fly to Cuba," *New York Times*, May 2, 1982).

¹²For the company bombings, see State Department unclassified cable *Tegucigalpa* 6502, August 6, 1982. The cable provides a translation of the FPR communique claiming credit for the attacks on the U.S. firms.

¹³For the July 4 bombing, see State Department unclassified cable *Tegucigalpa* 5564, July 7, 1982; see also broadcast by *Cadena Audio Video*, Tegucigalpa, July 11, 1982, as reported in *FBIS*, July 12, 1982.

Department of Honduras in 1983 and in El Paraíso in 1984.¹⁴

The two Honduran groups involved in the attempted "invasions" were the Honduran branch of the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC) and the aforementioned FPR. The PRTC was then led by Jose Maria Reyes Mata, a radical activist since the 1960s who had accompanied "Che" Guevara on his ill-fated adventure in Bolivia.¹⁵ In April 1980, in the month when Honduras was holding democratic elections for a constituent congress, Reyes Mata was arrested in connection with a wave of pre-election violence and the kidnapping of a Texaco executive. He was freed after a general amnesty decree and moved to Nicaragua later the same year.

Once in Nicaragua, Reyes Mata began planning to open a front inside Honduras with Sandinista support. In 1981 he conducted an active recruitment campaign inside Honduras, and the first recruits departed via Managua for military training in Cuba. The trainees returned to Nicaragua in late 1982 and early 1983 and fought alongside Sandinista army units against the Nicaraguan resistance to gain combat experience.

In July 1983, Reyes Mata and his 96-man force, armed by the Sandinistas, entered the isolated and underpopulated Department of Olancho in eastern Honduras. The operation was structured as a vanguard action for other groups. The other forces were never infiltrated,

however. The "invasion" was foiled by Honduran security forces, and Reyes Mata was killed. Many of the participants captured by the Honduran Army gave detailed descriptions of their training in both Nicaragua and Cuba.

In July 1984, a similar effort was made to establish the base for a rural insurgency with the attempted infiltration of 19 FPR guerrillas into the El Paraíso Department along the border between the two countries. As was the case with the Olancho group, the FPR cadre received training at Pinar del Rio in Cuba and afterward trained in Nicaragua fighting the armed opposition to the Sandinistas. Again the operation was contained by the Honduran Army. Afterward, members of the group led Honduran authorities to several arms caches and subversive groups in the Comayagua area.

In April 1985, the Sandinistas were again caught trying to provide support for the Honduran guerrilla groups, but this time the operatives arrested were Nicaraguans. Between April 11-14, seven Nicaraguans were arrested in El Paraíso Department trying to infiltrate arms to Cinchoneros based in Olancho Department. One of them was a member of the Nicaraguan Directorate of State Security (DGSE) who stated that he had coordinated similar arms infiltrations since November 1984.¹⁶

The leadership of Honduran guerrilla groups continues to reside in Nicaragua,

and U.S. intelligence reports current training of Honduran guerrillas in Managua.

Intimidation

The Sandinista government, in addition to supporting subversive movements inside Honduras, has engaged in a campaign apparently devised to intimidate the Honduran Government and keep it from effectively controlling its borders.

Border incursions by the Sandinistas have soured relations between the two countries almost from the moment Somoza fell in July 1979. The first of nearly 300 border incidents through mid-1985 occurred on July 22, 1979—3 days after the Sandinistas entered Managua.¹⁷ Before the year was out, there were at least a dozen more incidents. While the early missions were usually characterized by small units operating with light weaponry, by 1985 the Sandinistas were employing 120mm mortar rounds. Heavy shelling from Nicaraguan territory by rockets and heavy artillery has also occurred.

The Sandinistas, in addition, have placed antipersonnel land mines along both sides of the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. Although the mines are justified by the Sandinistas as self-defense against incursions by Nicaraguan resistance forces, the net effect is to endanger the resident rural population in the border areas. In June 1983, two American journalists were killed when their car hit a Czechoslovakian-manufactured mine on a Honduran road.¹⁸

¹⁴Most of the information on the two operations was provided by defectors and/or captured guerrillas. (For Olancho, see State Department unclassified cable *Tegucigalpa* 10769, October 11, 1983. See also "Honduran Army Defeats Cuban-Trained Rebel Unit," *Washington Post*, November 22, 1983. For El Paraíso, see statement made by Department of National Investigation as broadcast by *Voz de Honduras*, Tegucigalpa, October 29, 1984, as reported in *FBIS*, November 1, 1984. See Appendix 3. Also see detailed unclassified account released in November 1984 by the U.S. Southern Command, *Cuban-Nicaraguan Support for Subversion in Honduras: El Paraíso, July 1984*.)

¹⁵The PRTC is a regional group with branches in several countries. A history of the connections between the various factions is given in an undated "Brief Historical Overview of the PRTC," captured on April 18, 1985, by Salvadoran security forces, which states that by 1979 "the PRTC had developed an organized structure in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica." The Salvadoran branch of the PRTC was responsible for the June 19, 1985, attack on a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador which left six Americans and seven Latin Americans dead (see *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, late June 1985, *passim*). On Jose Reyes Mata's 1980 arrest, see ACAN-EFE, Tegucigalpa, May 8, 1980, and

statement by public relations department of the Public Security Forces, May 9, 1980, as reported by *FBIS*, May 12, 1980.

¹⁶State Department unclassified cable *Tegucigalpa* 6152, May 8, 1985.

¹⁷*Incidentes Protagonizados por La Republica de Nicaragua en Perjuicio de Honduras*, annual reports from 1982 onwards. Also *Resumen de las Principales Actividades del Ejercito Popular Sandinista en la Frontera con Honduras desde Enero 1984 hasta 1 Junio 1985*, Estado Mayor Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas (Honduran Armed Forces).

¹⁸News Conference by Foreign Minister Edgardo Paz Barnica, broadcast June 22, 1983, as reported by *FBIS* the same day.

C. Costa Rica

Costa Rican support was essential to the success of the struggle against Somoza. In November 1978, the Costa Rican Government severed diplomatic relations with the Somoza regime and over the next 8 months allowed Costa Rican territory to be used as a conduit for arms and supplies to the anti-Somoza war effort on its northern border.

In the process of aiding the insurrection, however, Costa Rica's stable democracy unwittingly opened the door to future troubles directly related to the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas' disdain for what Defense Minister Humberto Ortega referred to as a "bourgeois democracy in the hands of the rich," soon made itself apparent.¹ Costa Rican territory was used to transfer weapons to the Salvadoran rebels, and groups inside Costa Rica were armed and given military training. Terrorism became a persistent problem from 1981 on, and Nicaraguan opponents of the Sandinistas became targets of assassination attempts. Tensions with Nicaragua increased in general with the growth of internal opposition to the Sandinistas and recurring border incidents.

Early Ties to the Sandinistas

Costa Rica has long accepted the democratic participation of socialist and Marxist parties in its political life.² With

the advent of the Sandinista regime in Managua in July 1979, however, the tactical allegiance to democracy of some of the radical groups in Costa Rica began to shift. A peaceful political process could no longer be taken for granted.

The orthodox Communist Party in Costa Rica, then called the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) and led by Manuel Mora Valverde, contributed cadres to Sandinista units to fight against Somoza and to accelerate the

In 40 years of Somocismo, we never had the threat that we have in 4 years of Sandinismo.

Luis Alberto Monge,
President of Costa Rica
December 1983³

PVP's military preparedness in the event conflict broke out later in Costa Rica.⁴ By early 1979, the PVP had several hundred combatants in Nicaragua.

The PVP maintained its force in Nicaragua after the Sandinistas came to power. Major elements of it remain there today and provide permanent training for paramilitary cadres who return to Costa Rica. The unit did not act in isolation. From the start, it maintained close contact with the Sandinista

army and over the years became an integral part of Sandinista defenses along the border with Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan Government supplies the unit with training, uniforms, arms, and food, and in return, the unit carries out military actions against Nicaraguan resistance forces operating along the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border.

Arming for the Revolution

While Panama and Venezuela were providing aid to the anti-Somoza opposition through Costa Rica in 1979, Cuba—with the aid of corrupt Costa Rican officials—established its own clandestine arms supply network for the Sandinistas. This network was later used to supply the Salvadoran insurgency and internal Costa Rican leftist groups.

The circumstances surrounding these shipments were established by a special commission created in June 1980 by the Costa Rican legislature to investigate charges then circulating that after the Nicaraguan civil war, a black market had developed in connection with war materiel left behind in Costa Rica.⁵ During the course of its investigation, the commission discovered the shipments from Cuba. Then-President Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica first denied that the flights had occurred when questioned by the commission on November 4, 1980, but later admitted them. On March 25, 1981, five Costa Rican pilots publicly admitted their participation in

¹Humberto Ortega, Secret Speech, reproduced in *La Nacion*, San Jose, October 10, 1981. Among other things, he observed that "the Costa Ricans . . . very intelligently have maintained [but softened] the exploitation of man by man . . . [T]hat is the kind of democracy [our opposition] wants . . . that we the Sandinistas be like the left in Costa Rica—a group which mobilizes politically and puts out its own newspaper but where the bourgeois controls power."

²The Costa Rican Marxist left is made up of several parties, foremost of which is the Costa Rican People's Party headed by Mora Valverde. Until 1984 his party was known as the Popular Vanguard Party (PVP). In 1948 military cadres of the PVP supported the unsuccessful efforts by the incumbent government to thwart the outcome of democratic elections (see Ralph L. Woodward, *Central*

America: A Nation Divided, New York, 1976, pp. 223-224). For the 1978 and 1982 elections, the radical parties formed coalitions in an effort to expand their representation at the national level. They received 7.3% of the vote in 1978 and less than 4% in 1982 (see Harold D. Nelson, ed., *Costa Rica: A Country Study*, Washington, 1984, pp. 216-218).

³Georgie Anne Geyer, "Taking the Sandinistas at Their Word," *Wall Street Journal*, August 23, 1985, p. 15.

⁴Many scattered reports confirm the brigade's presence in Nicaragua. In 1982 a newspaper article referred to 700 Costa Rican leftists training in Nicaragua (*La Republica*, Panama City, February 7, 1982, as reported in *FBIS*, February 9, 1982). A former Nicaraguan official, who defected in July 1985, recently gave details on a group of PVP militants being trained in Nicaragua during 1983. One of the Hondurans captured in connection with the infiltration of El Paraiso in July 1984 spoke of training with a PVP cadre in the "internationalist" brigade

in 1983. In March 1985, *La Republica* in San Jose ran a story of 100 Costa Ricans training in Cuba and Nicaragua and quoted Security Minister Benjamin Piza as saying "we have always heard of the possibility that there are groups harboring such a line of operation. We will do everything possible to neutralize them" (see *La Republica*, San Jose, March 14, 1985, as reported by *FBIS*, March 25, 1985). In May 1985, *La Nacion* in San Jose quoted MRP leader Sergio Erik Ardon that "there are presently Costa Ricans fighting at the side of the Sandinista forces, just as there are in the counterrevolutionary groups."

⁵Report on arms trafficking issued by a special Costa Rican legislative commission on May 14, 1981. The report is the basis for the following comments (*La Nacion*, May 15, 1981, as reported by *FBIS*, June 2, 1981). Also see "Arms Scandal is Charged in Costa Rica," *New York Times*, May 21, 1981.

the transshipment of arms from Cuba and gave details of the operations and the names of the Cuban and Costa Rican officials involved in supervising the clandestine flights.⁶ The commission established that at least 21 such flights had been made, most of the shipments arriving at a secondary airport, in Liberia, removed from public scrutiny.

Many of the weapons flown in by the Cuban airlift were diverted to the insurgency in El Salvador. The pilots, in their March 25 statement, recalled that on one of the trips to Cuba, Manuel Pineiro of the Cuban Communist Party's America Department asked whether they would be willing to fly arms to El Salvador.⁷ The legislative commission traced three shipments to El Salvador through Costa Rican territory in 1980 and 1981.

Importantly for the Costa Ricans, the commission confirmed that a substantial number of these weapons remained in Costa Rica after the fall of Somoza. The Minister of Public Security in 1979 was Juan Jose Echeverria Brealey—a man with close ties to Cuba and now the leader of the Radical Democratic Party. The commission in its May 1981 report held Echeverria responsible for the fact that “there were no controls over the war materiel that entered the country” and for the “disappearance” of war materiel from state arsenals, including 2,018 firearms.

The commission concluded that the imported weapons had been widely distributed inside Costa Rica. It reported that “weapons of war” had been confiscated from various private homes, including properties owned by Echeverria. Nine months later, on March 25, 1982, another cache of arms was found in the house of Mora Valverde, the leader of the PVP. At the time of the seizures, he claimed that the weapons were for “self-defense.”⁸

The supply network, once in place, continued to operate for some time after the air shipments from Cuba had ceased. In March 1982, Costa Rican security forces raided a safehouse in San Jose, arresting nine persons, including two Nicaraguans, in connection with an arms trafficking operation to El Salvador. About 175 weapons were seized, including 70 M-16s, 50 of which were traceable as rifles originally shipped to Vietnam.⁹

Terrorism: 1981-85

The new orientation of Costa Rican radical groups helped set off a wave of violence inside the country over the next few years. Many of the terrorist acts, however, were attributable to external forces. While hiding behind a screen of legitimate international relations, Nicaragua took actions which were clearly meant to intimidate the Costa Rican Government.

The initial terrorist act took place in March 1981: an attack on a vehicle car-

rying a Costa Rican driver and three U.S. Embassy security guards. It was followed in June 1981 by the killings of three policemen and a taxi driver. Both attacks were traced to a radical splinter group from the Marxist People's Revolutionary Movement (now known as the New Republic Movement), whose leader—Sergio Erik Ardon—has close ties to Cuba and Nicaragua and who at the time of the attacks stated that the terrorism could be explained, if not justified, in terms of the injustices of Costa Rican society. Ardon was the only Costa Rican political leader not to condemn the attacks as terrorism.¹⁰

Actions more clearly linked to external support followed.

- Six armed persons—including Nicaraguans affiliated with the Sandinistas—were arrested in July 1981 crossing the Nicaraguan border into Costa Rica on a mission to seize the Guatemalan Embassy in San Jose and demand the release by Guatemala of convicted terrorists.¹¹

- On January 19, 1982, two Salvadoran PRTC members—Jose Marroquin and Jonathan Rodriguez—were arrested in Costa Rica in connection with an attempted kidnapping of a Salvadoran businessman. They later told Costa Rican police that they passed first through Nicaragua, where they and others were provided with false identity documents to enter Costa Rica. Marro-

⁶ACAN-EFE, March 24, 1981, as reported in *FBIS*, March 26, 1981. During the months leading up to the overthrow of Somoza in July 1979, a group of officers of the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party played a major role in the Nicaraguan revolution. A number of America Department officers were assigned to Costa Rica and were responsible for moving arms and men into Nicaragua from Costa Rica. This group was headed by Julian Lopez Diaz, a senior intelligence officer, who became Cuba's Ambassador to Nicaragua less than 2 weeks after Somoza's fall. Lopez and his associates moved freely throughout Costa Rica during this period, thanks to safe-

conduct passes issued them by Minister of Public Security Juan Jose Echeverria Brealey.

⁷It became public knowledge that, with Cuban financial support and guidance and assistance from Fernando Comas, an America Department officer assigned as a consular official in Costa Rica, the Chilean Fernando Carrasco (a member of Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left—MIR) became the leading figure in a sophisticated air support operation to provide arms and ammunition to insurgents in El Salvador. By virtue of his position as the head of several air express companies, including one based in Costa Rica, Carrasco handled logistical details for supply missions. Carrasco initially based his operation in Costa Rica and later changed the venue to Nicaragua.

⁸Nelson, op. cit., p. 254. The police found firearms, dynamite, and fragmentation grenades in his possession.

⁹*La Nacion*, San Jose, March 16-21, 1982, *passim*.

¹⁰The activities of the group attracted considerable media coverage in Costa Rica. For details on the police investigation of the group, see broadcasts of *Radio Reloj*, San Jose, as reported in *FBIS*, June-August 1981, *passim*. The terrorists had connections to Uruguayan Tupamaros, Cinchoneros, and the FMLN.

¹¹*Radio Reloj*, San Jose, July 6, 1981, as reported in *FBIS*, July 8, 1981.

quin told a Costa Rican court on February 4, 1982, that he "received military and political training" during the several months he spent in Nicaragua.¹²

- In November of the same year, members of the Costa Rican branch of the PRTC seriously wounded a Japanese businessman—who later died—in a botched kidnaping attempt. Two Salvadorans, a Honduran, and two Costa Ricans were arrested in connection with the attempted kidnaping.¹³

- Three Nicaraguan Embassy officials were expelled from Costa Rica on July 28, 1982, for their involvement in the July 4 bombing of the San Jose offices of SAHSA, the Honduran national airline. Costa Rica's investigation of the case implicated a Colombian terrorist recruited by Nicaraguan Embassy officials in Costa Rica. One of the three Nicaraguan diplomats was arrested at a clandestine meeting with the Colombian.¹⁴

- Terrorist actions on Costa Rican soil peaked in 1982 but did not end. Members of the New Republic Movement were responsible for a major bank robbery in Guanacaste Province in February 1985. When they were arrested, they were found to have collected information on the movements of U.S. Embassy personnel in Costa Rica as well as those of Costa Rican officials and other foreign diplomats.¹⁵

Attacks on Nicaraguans in Costa Rica

Much of the terrorism experienced by Costa Rica was directed at elements of the Nicaraguan opposition who have sought refuge in Costa Rica. In February 1982, an attempt was made to assassinate Fernando Chamorro, formerly a prominent anti-Somocista, now an anti-Sandinista.¹⁶ The principal suspect in the case was the Nicaraguan consul in the town of Liberia, but by the time police sought him out, he had returned to Nicaragua. On October 6, 1982, an Argentine associated with the Nicaraguan opposition was kidnaped off the streets in Costa Rica. He later appeared on Nicaraguan television for a public "confession." He was never heard from again.¹⁷

In April 1983, a Basque terrorist infiltrated from Nicaragua was arrested in connection with a plot to kill Eden Pastora, a former Sandinista commander.¹⁸ On June 29, 1983, one FSLN member was killed and another Nicaraguan injured in San Jose when a bomb they intended for the opposition leaders exploded prematurely.¹⁹ In November 1984, an attempt was made on the life of another opposition leader, Alfonso Robelo, with a fragmentation grenade.²⁰

Attempted Intimidation

Not surprisingly, Costa Rica's relations with Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1979. Consular relations with Cuba were severed in May 1981. In November 1982, the

Monge administration asked Moscow to withdraw 17 of the 25 officials at its Embassy in San Jose. The Soviets had been active promoting labor strife inside Costa Rica since 1979.²¹

In the case of Nicaragua, approximately 90 incidents involving diplomatic protests were recorded before Costa Rica ordered Nicaragua, on February 19, 1985, to reduce its Embassy personnel from 47 to 10.²² The Sandinista attempts to intimidate the Costa Rican Government began as early as 1980, 2 years before former Sandinista Eden Pastora began his armed resistance to the regime on its southern borders. In October 1980, Sandinista forces fired on Costa Rican vessels engaged in medical missions on the San Juan River, which partially divides the two countries. In 1982 Nicaragua's challenge to Costa Rica's rights on the San Juan became more sustained, and in June and July 1982 several tourist boats on the river were intercepted. In 1983 units of the EPS began regular incursions into Costa Rican territory.

The seriousness of the incidents between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, if anything, has deepened this year. On May 31, 1985, a Costa Rican Civil Guard unit on border patrol was fired on by Sandinista army troops; two guards were killed and nine were injured. Sandinista units continued to bombard the area well after their unprovoked attack, making it difficult to retrieve the bodies.²³

¹²State Department unclassified cable *San Jose* 5710, August 23, 1982.

¹³Broadcast by *Radio Reloj*, San Jose, November 9, 1982, as reported in *FBIS*, November 10, 1982. Also see State Department unclassified cable *San Jose* 7701, November 12, 1982.

¹⁴Broadcast by *Radio Reloj*, San Jose, July 28, 1982, as reported in *FBIS*, July 29, 1982; also included in *Calendario de Incidentes Entre el Gobierno de Costa Rica y el Gobierno de Nicaragua*, February 1985.

¹⁵Classified diplomatic correspondence.

¹⁶State Department unclassified cable *San Jose* 4835, June 23, 1984.

¹⁷*La Nacion*, San Jose, various stories October-December 1982.

¹⁸"Cien Etarras en Nicaragua," *Cambio 16*, Madrid, October 3, 1983, p. 22.

¹⁹"Bomb Kills Nicaraguan in Costa Rica," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1983, p. A35.

²⁰See President Monge's condemnation of the attack as recorded by *Radio Impacto*, San Jose, November 5, 1984, as reported by *FBIS*, November 8, 1984.

²¹For the break with the Soviets and the Cubans see Nelson, *op. cit.*, pp. 238-239.

²²The downgrading of relations with the Sandinistas was precipitated by the violation of the immunity of Costa Rica's Embassy in Managua on December 24, 1984, when a Nicaraguan citizen was abducted from Embassy grounds (see *Calendario de Incidentes* cited in footnote 14 on this page).

²³The incident received international media coverage and was considered serious enough by the OAS to merit an investigation.

III. The Collective Response

The five Central American countries have agreed on the following objective: *"to promote national reconciliation efforts whenever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law."*

Contadora Document of Objectives
Panama City, September 9, 1983

July 1979

The July 19, 1979, assumption of power by the junta of the Government of National Reconstruction changed the Central American scene. Several neighboring governments were concerned at the collapse of Nicaraguan institutions and the looming power struggle within the coalition which had led the uprising that removed Somoza from power. The more general attitude in the hemisphere, however—particularly among those states which had contributed materially to the effort to remove Somoza—was one of deep satisfaction at the replacement of the Somoza dictatorship with a popularly supported coalition publicly committed to a program of democratic reform.

Concerns about the role to be played by the Sandinistas in the new government were largely set aside in the interest of providing the support and assistance needed to reconstruct Nicaragua after the civil war.¹ Latin

American countries and the United States were determined to cooperate in the rebuilding of Nicaragua and the reintegration of that country—in accordance with its promises to the OAS—into the inter-American system that had played an essential role in the removal of the Somoza regime.²

Nicaragua's Neighbors. Of Nicaragua's immediate neighbors, only Costa Rica reacted in a fully positive manner to the removal of Somoza. Costa Rican territory had been available for the supply of weapons from Cuba, Panama, Venezuela, and other foreign sources to the anti-Somoza rebels. Costa Ricans hoped that the advent of a popular, democratic government in Nicaragua had finally freed Costa Rica from a longstanding military threat to its democratic, unarmed status and given it a new partner in the protection and advancement of democracy in Central America.

The reactions of the governments in Honduras and El Salvador were cautious. Neither had opposed the OAS resolution which stripped the Somoza regime of its legitimacy. But the strong position of the FSLN, which they saw as an agent of "International Communism," was a source of real fear. The Government of El Salvador, in particular, feared the influence and impact of the Sandinistas on El Salvador's troubled internal situation.

The United States. Contrary to many popular misconceptions, the United States had directed its efforts since mid-1978 toward facilitating a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Hoping to ensure that Somoza would not be followed by an equally repressive regime, the United States participated actively in an OAS-endorsed mission that sought to avoid violence.

Consistent with this policy goal, the United States viewed with concern the role of the Sandinista front in the military events culminating in Somoza's ouster. Nonetheless, the presence on the five-member junta of Violeta de Chamorro (widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of *La Prensa*) and prominent businessman Alfonso Robelo, both of whom were unquestionably committed to democracy, gave the United States and other countries of the hemisphere reason to believe that the junta's announced program and its promises to the OAS would be honored.

1979-80

The fall of Somoza increased the appreciation in neighboring countries of the need for substantial reform. At the same time, however, actual and potential guerrillas throughout Central America were encouraged by the Sandinista example to believe that they too could, with sufficient external support, succeed in shooting their way into power. This was particularly the case in El Salvador and Guatemala. The United States, despite major misgivings about developments in Nicaragua, embarked

¹The United Nations estimated that 45,000 people had been killed, 160,000 wounded, and 40,000 orphaned in the fighting in Nicaragua, the great majority in the 10 months preceding Somoza's fall. It estimated as well that 1 million Nicaraguans were in need of food and 250,000 of shelter. Economic losses approached \$2 billion, and the Nicaraguan economy was completely disrupted (statement by Assistant Secretary of State Viron Vaky before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 11,

1979, *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980*, pp. 1321, 1323). The OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights provided estimates which, though slightly lower, confirmed the massive scale of death and destruction. It estimated 35,000 deaths (80% civilian), 100,000 wounded, and 40,000 orphaned. By its estimates, 40% of the country's population was dying of starvation (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Nicaragua*, June 30, 1981, p. 155).

²The junta conveyed its July 9 program to the OAS on July 12. It included com-

mitments to democracy, pluralism ("full participation. . . [of] all sectors of the country. . . in the political structures. . . of the nation. . ."), a mixed economy, a nonaligned foreign policy, full observance of human rights, and the holding of free municipal and national elections. That these undertakings were made directly to the OAS as well as to the Nicaraguan people was especially appropriate in light of the unprecedented OAS action, joined in by the United States, depriving the Somoza government of legitimacy even before Somoza had abandoned the instrumentalities of power (Resolution II, 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, June 23, 1979).

on a major program of economic assistance to Nicaragua.³ The inter-American and international communities as a whole took a similar approach of large-scale assistance to enable the new regime to overcome the destruction of the civil war.

Nicaragua's Neighbors. On October 15, 1979, a coup led by reformist officers overthrew the regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero in El Salvador. Three months later a new junta was formed, with the participation of the Christian Democratic Party. By March 1980, a civil-military junta, headed by Jose Napoleon Duarte, had begun a series of major social and political reforms designed to address ills which seemed to justify the violence of the antigovernment guerrillas. Duarte's purpose was to demonstrate that serious and effective reform could be achieved without civil war. These reforms encompassed land redistribution, basic changes in the banking and commercial sectors, and opening the political system. The junta committed itself to the holding of free elections for a constituent assembly.⁴ Disturbances by groups encouraged by the Sandinista success peaked in the spring of 1980, but by summer, as the newly united guerrilla forces began to prepare for their January offensive, the reforms began to take hold, and several strike calls received only limited support.

Honduran social and political tensions, while significant, were less explosive than in El Salvador or Nicaragua, and the military government did

not abuse civil rights. There had not yet developed a pattern of violent political extremism or armed antigovernment activity. The first step in the return to democratic civilian rule announced by the Honduran military government was the popular election of a Constituent Assembly in April 1980.

The United States. Between July 1979 and January 1981, the United States provided more than \$100 million in economic assistance to Nicaragua. It encouraged other Western countries to provide major assistance as well and urged private banks to reach a re-scheduling agreement with Nicaragua. It offered to reinstate a Peace Corps program to assist in Nicaraguan reconstruction and to help meet that country's need for teachers and medical care,⁵ as well as a military training program to assist in the professionalization of its armed forces following the dissolution of the National Guard. Both offers were refused, as was a Costa Rican offer of teachers. The Sandinistas gave priority to obtaining both teachers and military assistance from Cuba.⁶

In late 1979, the Administration proposed a special appropriation of \$80 million in assistance for Central America; \$75 million—over 90%—of this assistance was to be provided to Nicaragua. Concerns in Congress about Sandinista activities led to a requirement that, before disbursing assistance to Nicaragua, the President certify that Nicaragua was not "aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries."⁷

In the middle of 1980, the United States began to receive reports of Sandinista involvement in logistical support—including provision of arms—

for guerrillas in El Salvador. While these reports were at first fragmentary and difficult to confirm, they gave rise to increasing concern about the role the Sandinistas intended to play in Central America. The U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua was instructed to raise this issue with the Government of Nicaragua and to urge that any material support for the FMLN cease.⁸ Nicaraguan officials denied any "governmental" involvement but asserted that the Government of Nicaragua could not be held responsible for the activities of individual Nicaraguans.⁹

Despite reports of involvement by high-ranking and individual FSLN members in furnishing arms and training to Salvadoran guerrilla groups, on September 12, 1980, the President made the certification required by the legislation providing the special assistance. This decision was taken on the basis that the information then available was not "conclusive" as to Nicaraguan Government involvement in terrorist activities.¹⁰ While some officials believed that the accumulation of evidence was such as to preclude certification, the fact that the evidence was not conclusive was seen as contributing to the U.S. interest in attempting to retain a positive relationship with the new government in Nicaragua. The resulting certification made possible disbursement of \$75 million in economic assistance to Nicaragua.

The decision to certify was accompanied by a decision to send the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central America to Managua to ensure that the Government of Nicaragua was aware that continuation of the support for the

³The United States had provided 732 tons of food and a large supply of medicine to the Nicaraguan Red Cross by the time the White House announced, on July 27, a further program of emergency food and medical assistance to Nicaragua. The United States provided a total of \$48 million in assistance to Nicaragua by the end of 1979. As noted below, a further \$75 million was provided in special legislation proposed by the President in November 1979. (For a more extensive account of the efforts made to develop close relations with Nicaragua following the July 19 takeover, see Lawrence E. Harrison, "We Tried to Accept Nicaragua's Revolution," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1983, p. A27.)

⁴On October 15, 1980, 1 year after taking power, the junta announced a schedule for constituent assembly and presidential elections. Implementation of this schedule

culminated in the election of President Duarte in 1984 and by legislative and municipal elections in March 1985.

⁵Details of diplomatic exchanges described below are drawn in part from classified cable traffic and other records of the Department of State.

⁶The first Cuban military advisers arrived in Managua in July 1979. By the end of the year, there were some 1,400 Cuban teachers and medical personnel and over 200 Cuban military and political advisers in Nicaragua. By mid-1981, U.S. intelligence indicated there were no less than 5,000 Cubans in Nicaragua, of whom 600-800 were military and security advisers and the rest teachers, doctors, and "internationalist" workers.

⁷Sec. 536(g) of the Special Central American Assistance Act of 1979, P.L. 96-257, approved May 31, 1980. Section

536(g) was later redesignated as Section 533(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

⁸Classified diplomatic correspondence.

⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁰The operative portion of the President's certification stated simply:

"I hereby . . . certify, pursuant to section 536(g) of the Act and on the basis of an evaluation of the available evidence, that the Government of Nicaragua has not cooperated with or harbors any international terrorist organization or is aiding, abetting, or supporting acts of violence or terrorism in other countries' . . ." (Presidential Determination No. 80-26, September 12, 1980, 45 *Federal Register* 62779).

Salvadoran guerrillas would have a negative impact on U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. He emphasized the U.S. desire to preserve good relations with Nicaragua but made clear to his interlocutors that provision of support to Salvadoran guerrillas could force the United States to terminate the assistance program. The officials with whom he met, including Daniel Ortega and other members of the junta, Foreign Minister D'Escoto, and Comandantes Bayardo Arce, Humberto Ortega, and Jaime Wheelock, promised that all steps would be taken to ensure that such activities did not occur.¹¹

1981-82

The "final offensive" of January 1981 in El Salvador was premised on overwhelming the Salvadoran Armed Forces at a time when the United States was in transition between the Administrations of President Carter and President Reagan. (Indeed, on January 9 *Radio Liberacion*, an FMLN radio station operating out of Nicaragua, boasted that the new U.S. President would come to office too late to stop the guerrilla victory.¹²) On January 17, the Carter Administration announced a package of \$5 million in military assistance to El Salvador. The United States also suspended assistance to Nicaragua because

of intelligence information demonstrating Nicaraguan supply to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

Nicaragua's Neighbors. Following the failure of the "final offensive," the Salvadoran junta continued political and social reforms along with the military effort against the FMLN. The military assistance provided by the United States was subject to severe restrictions and conditions designed to encourage the security forces to professionalize themselves and to end human rights abuses.¹³ Elections for a Constituent Assembly were held in March 1982. Parties associated with the FMLN refused to participate in the elections. The FMLN tried to disrupt the elections by destroying voting records, intimidating voters, mining roads, and burning buses.

Honduras held legislative and presidential elections in November 1981. The transition to democratic government culminated in the inauguration of an elected, civilian president in January 1982. Honduran concerns focused on the alarming Nicaraguan military buildup¹⁴ and continuing Sandinista army operations across the border in Honduras.¹⁵ Honduran efforts to close down the land arms-trafficking route from Nicaragua to El Salvador removed a major incentive for Nicaragua's earlier relative restraint toward Honduras and increased the threat of direct attacks against Honduras by the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.

At the same time, Honduras realized the threat to its own institutions posed by the Sandinistas and by the Sandinista-supported terrorist groups becoming active within Honduras. The United States expanded assistance to the Honduran Government to develop the capacity of its armed forces to defend Honduras against a Sandinista military attack.¹⁶

Costa Rica became increasingly concerned by the progressive takeover of the Nicaraguan Government by the Sandinistas and the crackdown on opposition groups. Nicaraguan forces increased the frequency and seriousness of their border incursions, against which Costa Rica—which has a small, lightly armed civil and rural guard force—realized it could offer no effective military defense on its own.

The United States. In January 1981 and the months that followed, the United States, on repeated occasions, insisted through diplomatic channels that Nicaragua cease its material support for the FMLN.¹⁷ In repeated approaches to Nicaraguan leaders, the United States stressed that, while it understood Nicaraguan sympathies for the Salvadoran guerrillas, good relations with the United States depended on an immediate halt to the provision of material and logistical assistance to the FMLN. The United States identified specific support activities within Nicaragua, in-

¹¹Classified diplomatic correspondence.

¹²The clandestine *Radio Liberacion* broadcast from Nicaragua its attack on the incoming "cowboy president" of the United States on January 9, 1981 (as reported by *PHIS*, January 12, 1981).

¹³In fiscal years 1981 and 1982, U.S. economic and development assistance (development assistance, P.L.-480 food aid, and economic support funds) totaled \$290 million. Security assistance (military assistance program, foreign military sales, and international military education and training) totaled \$117 million for the same 2 years.

Economic support funds (ESF) are classified in the budget as security assistance rather than development aid. The principal criterion for their use is the strategic importance of the recipient to the United States, a criterion differing from the standards applicable to distribution of development assistance. ESF is used almost exclusively for balance-of-payments support and other nonmilitary economic support purposes.

¹⁴By early 1982, the Sandinista People's Army was dominant in any direct comparison

of Nicaraguan and Honduran forces; Honduras preserved an advantage only in air power. By 1982, Nicaraguan active duty military personnel numbered 21,500, with an additional 50,000 border, militia, and reserve personnel; the Honduran Armed Forces numbered 12,000, with a 3,000-member security force. By late 1981, the Sandinista armed forces had acquired 152mm and 122mm long-range artillery, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles. The Honduran Armed Forces had no long-range artillery, no modern tanks, and no anti-aircraft missiles. The Sandinista advantage has continued to grow since that time, despite substantial U.S. assistance to Honduras and an expansion of Honduran military forces.

¹⁵Nicaragua made no pretense that these incursions were errors, but rather justified them as pursuit of "Somocista ex-Guardsmen." According to Honduran Government records, the Sandinista People's Army crossed Honduras' borders 35 times in 1981 and 68 times in 1982.

In March 1982 Honduras proposed a Central American peace plan in the OAS. Its principal elements, reflecting Honduras' own

experience with the Sandinistas in the 3 years since the ouster of Somoza, were (1) reduction in arms and foreign military advisers; (2) respect for nonintervention; and (3) international verification of commitments. This plan drew only limited support at the time, but its three elements were reflected as key objectives in the Contadora Document of Objectives adopted on September 9, 1983.

¹⁶U.S. military assistance to Honduras rose from \$8 million in fiscal year 1981 to \$51 million in fiscal year 1982.

¹⁷On January 9, the eve of the "final offensive," the U.S. Ambassador reminded Borge of the government's promises not to become involved in the Salvadoran conflict, warning that the first casualty of any such action would be U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. He was assured that that policy had not changed. Borge acknowledged the possibility that some arms might have passed through Nicaragua and some people connected with the government might have assisted in some way but insisted that Nicaragua was acting responsibly and had even recently intercepted a truckload of arms passing from Costa Rica to El Salvador (classified diplomatic correspondence).

cluding use of the Papalonal airstrip and Sandino airport to supply the FMLN and support for *Radio Liberacion*.

At the same time, the United States offered Nicaragua "a way out" of the difficult situation created by its assistance to the FMLN, should it demonstrate that it was, in fact, cutting off that support. While frequently insisting that they could not control activities by every individual Nicaraguan, junta members and other Nicaraguan officials stated that they were taking "strong measures" to prevent the "funny business" at the airfields and other "unofficial activities" and were pursuing the *Radio Liberacion* problem.¹⁸

In mid-February 1981, on instructions from Washington, the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua again reviewed the situation with junta members Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramirez. He noted that evidence available to the United States confirmed that supply to the FMLN was continuing despite previous clear promises by the Sandinistas. He made clear—in view of the fact that Nicaragua's previous assurances that it would not support the FMLN had proven false—the U.S. intention to monitor the situation to ensure that these actions were taken. He stated that the United States would expect the Nicaraguans to provide evidence that they had carried out their undertakings. He specifically identified a number of actions, the taking of which the United States would consider evidence of Nicaraguan good faith.

The Nicaraguans were informed that the United States had decided to withhold new disbursement of U.S. assistance until it was satisfied that San-

dinista supply to the FMLN had halted. This decision constituted, in effect, a provisional determination that the certification requirement of the assistance legislation was no longer met. The U.S. decision as to whether Nicaraguan actions would permit the continuation of aid would be based on the situation in 1 month's time; if the Nicaraguan responses were not satisfactory, a public determination leading to a formal cutoff of assistance would be forthcoming.

In reply, junta members Ortega and Ramirez replied that the FSLN Directorate had authorized them to state that they understood U.S. concerns about El Salvador, would not "risk our revolution for an uncertain victory in El Salvador," and had taken a firm decision not to permit Nicaraguan territory to be used for transiting arms to El Salvador. Orders had been given to interdict the arms flow. Ortega acknowledged that the credibility of the Nicaraguan Government was at stake and that the Sandinista front understood the consequences of the commitments it had made. These promises were reiterated later in February and in early March 1981.¹⁹

In the immediate aftermath of these meetings, U.S. intelligence indicated that arms traffic through established routes, particularly by air, from Nicaragua to El Salvador had slowed if not stopped but that other routes from Nicaragua were being sought. The United States continued to press for concrete and verifiable actions. Intelligence reporting and evidence con-

tinued to mount that the FSLN was engaged in continuing supply efforts as well as accumulating in Nicaragua arms for the FMLN.

Faced with this additional evidence, the United States concluded that it could no longer certify that Nicaragua was not engaged in support for terrorism abroad. On April 1, 1981, the President made a determination to that effect, thereby formally suspending disbursement of the final \$15 million in assistance made available the previous year. Even then, however, in the interest of preserving the best possible relations under the circumstances, the President waived the provision of law which would otherwise have required the immediate repayment of all economic support fund loans made to Nicaragua.²⁰

With these events, U.S.-Nicaraguan relations entered a new stage. While Sandinista actions had forced the United States to cut off assistance to Nicaragua, the United States continued efforts to reach an accommodation with the Sandinista regime which would halt Nicaragua's supply of arms and other support to the Salvadoran guerrillas.

In August 1981, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs presented Nicaragua with a five-point proposal for improved relations. This proposal was designed to meet Nicaragua's concerns with U.S. policy, including its expressed fear of a U.S. invasion and desire that Nicaraguan exile groups in the United States and elsewhere should be tightly controlled, while also addressing the Nicaraguan ac-

¹⁸It is significant that these high-ranking officials no longer, as during the previous fall, attempted to deny the activities taking place in Nicaragua or to suggest that they were unable to control them.

¹⁹On February 17, Ortega promised that "not a single round" would transit Nicaragua thereafter and acknowledged that the FSLN had theretofore been "very permissive in allowing the FMLN to mount operations in Nicaragua." He asserted in early March that the FMLN had been told of the FSLN decision to end its involvement. While acknowledging that U.S. economic assistance would probably not continue, the Sandinistas ex-

pressed a desire to preserve a cordial relationship with the United States (classified diplomatic correspondence).

²⁰On April 1, the Department of State released a statement announcing the President's decision to terminate economic support fund assistance under the law. Nicaragua was informed of this decision at the same time. Citing "recent favorable trends" with respect to Nicaraguan support for the FMLN and the importance of continuing assistance to moderate forces within Nicaragua, the official Department of State statement held out the further possibility of resuming P.L.-480 food assistance, development assistance and economic support funds should the situation in Nicaragua improve (*American Foreign*

Policy: Current Documents, 1981, p. 1298). The President's formal determination was made on April 14 (Presidential Determination No. 81-5, April 14, 1981, 46 *Federal Register* 24141). A 1982 U.S. offer of some \$5 million in assistance for nongovernmental organizations was rejected by the Government of Nicaragua in August of that year.

tions most troubling to the United States. The U.S. proposal, based upon an end to Sandinista support for guerrilla groups, called for both sides to make public declarations of nonintervention in Central America; a U.S. statement on the enforcement of U.S. law pertaining to the activities of Nicaraguan exile groups in the United States;²¹ an end to the Nicaraguan military buildup; reestablishment of U.S. economic assistance; and expansion of cultural ties between the two countries.²² In October, the Sandinistas rejected this proposal as "sterile," at the same time renewing their assertions that the Nicaraguan Government was not supporting the FMLN.²³

At the urging of the President of Mexico, the United States made a second attempt in April 1982. The previous five points were expanded to call for: (1) an end to Nicaraguan support for insurgencies in other countries; (2) a U.S. pledge to enforce laws pertaining to exile activities in the United States; (3) a joint pledge of noninterference in each other's affairs or in the affairs of others in the region; (4) a regional, reciprocal ban on imports of heavy offensive weapons; (5) a reciprocal reduction of foreign advisers in the region; (6) international verification of the foregoing points; (7) exchange of cultural groups; and (8) the reaffirmation by the

Sandinistas of previous commitments to pluralism, free elections, nonalignment, and a mixed economy. The United States made clear that a halt to Sandinista support for subversion beyond Nicaragua's borders was the *sine qua non* for achieving results on the other elements of the proposal.²⁴

Nicaragua responded by taking refuge in procedure, demanding that the talks take place at a higher level and that the Mexican Government be drawn into the dialogue but avoiding any comment on the substance of the proposals. Building on continued denials by Nicaragua of involvement in El Salvador and assertions that Nicaragua wished to "fulfill its international obligations," the United States also requested that Nicaragua demonstrate its desire to engage in serious efforts to resolve regional problems by closing down the command and control center of the FMLN operating in Nicaragua.

The U.S. response during this period was not confined to its continuation of diplomatic approaches to Nicaragua. Expanded economic assistance and support for strengthened defense efforts were provided to both El Salvador and Honduras. At the same time, the Sandinistas' repeated rejection of U.S. diplomatic efforts led to concern by the United States that a policy confined to diplomatic representations could not be effective in modifying Nicaraguan behavior and forced consideration of alternative means of achieving that objective.

Resistance forces²⁵ began to take on importance for the broader effort to counter Sandinista "internationalism." For those concerned with Nicaragua's intervention in neighboring countries, the significance of the resistance groups lay in the pressure that their operations could bring on the Sandinistas to turn their attention away from subversion beyond Nicaragua's borders and reduce the availability of material to be sent to the FMLN. The growth of armed resistance by other Nicaraguans would make clear to the Sandinistas that they could no longer count on conducting paramilitary and military operations outside Nicaragua without feeling the consequences within Nicaragua.

The San Jose Declaration. In October 1982, under Costa Rican leadership, a new, multilateral approach was undertaken by seven democracies from the region, including the United States.²⁶ The Declaration of San Jose reflected the growing conviction of these countries that the Central American conflict could not be addressed effectively without dealing with the full range of underlying problems which gave rise to the crisis. The declaration set forth a series of simple principles describing

²¹Nicaragua had expressed concern about antigovernment activities of Nicaraguans who had fled to the United States and countries neighboring Nicaragua. By this date, it is clear that some such groups, unvaryingly characterized as "Somocista" regardless of the actual views of their members, were engaging in preparations for armed activity against the Sandinista regime. The preparations had not yet led to significant attacks in Nicaragua, however.

²²The description later given of Assistant Secretary Enders' demarche by Arturo Cruz, then Nicaragua's Ambassador to the United States, is instructive:

"In August of 1981, . . . [Enders] met with my superiors in Managua, at the highest level. His message was clear: in exchange for non-exportation of insurrection and a reduction in Nicaragua's armed forces, the United States pledged to support Nicaragua through mutual regional security arrangements as well as continuing economic aid. His government did not

intend to interfere in our internal affairs. However, 'you should realize that if you behave in a totalitarian fashion, your neighbors might see you as potential aggressors.' My perception was that, despite its peremptory nature, the U.S. position vis-a-vis Nicaragua was defined by Mr. Enders with frankness, but also with respect for Nicaragua's right to choose its own destiny. . . . When the conversations concluded, I had the feeling that the U.S. proposal had not been received by the Sandinistas as an imperialist diktat. However, nothing positive developed . . ." (Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1983, pp. 1031, 1041-42).

²³Barely 1 month earlier, however, Directorate member Bayardo Arce had stated to the U.S. charge d'affaires in Managua that the United States "had better realize that nothing you can say or do will ever stop us from giving our full support to our fellow guerrillas in El Salvador." At the same time, Arce expressed concern about the "Halcon Vista" exercise announced in September. "Halcon Vista" that year involved 400 U.S.

personnel and was held October 7-9, 1981, off the Caribbean coast of eastern Honduras. It was the latest in a series of many years' standing in which U.S. and Latin American military forces cooperated in small-scale exercises.

²⁴These proposals were discussed in a State Department background press briefing (*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1437).

²⁵The goals of the resistance groups varied but were identical in their adherence to the key elements of the original program on which the Government of National Reconstruction had come to power (see Appendix 4). Some of the groups in Zelaya Province were drawn largely from indigenous Indian and Creole populations, and their goals emphasized retention of the autonomy and traditional systems that were being threatened by Sandinista policies.

²⁶The declaration was issued by Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, and the United States (text of Final Act reprinted in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, 1982, p. 1470).

conditions necessary for an effective peace agreement in Central America:

(1) To free the area from East-West competition, foreign military advisers and trainers should be removed;

(2) To free Central American countries from fear of each other's aggression, the import of heavy weapons should be banned, support for insurgency on neighbors' territory should be prohibited, and frontiers should be subject to international surveillance; and

(3) Democratic institutions open to opposition elements should be established.

President Reagan personally endorsed these proposals in San Jose in 1982 and before a joint session of Congress on April 27, 1983.

The seven countries asked Costa Rica's Foreign Minister to present these principles to Nicaragua as a basis for dialogue, but the Sandinista government insisted that it would receive the Foreign Minister only if the discussions were confined "exclusively" to bilateral issues.

1983-85

The polarization of Central America between Nicaragua and its three immediate neighbors grew more intense during the next 3 years. Armed opposition within Nicaragua, generated by the policies of the Sandinistas, continued to grow. Nicaragua's neighbors, by contrast, continued to open their political and social systems and succeeded in reducing internally generated violence.

Nicaragua's Neighbors. Despite the FDR refusal to participate in elections, and guerrilla efforts to derail them, El Salvador carried out four national elections resulting in an elected president, assembly, and municipal officials. The level of political violence from both the extreme left and right declined significantly; death squad activities from the right were at the lowest levels in many years. The newly elected Duarte government declared its readiness to conduct a dialogue with the FMLN. In October 1984, consistent with the Contadora goal of encouraging national reconciliation, President Duarte opened a dialogue with leaders of the FMLN-FDR at La Palma; a followup meeting aimed at continuing the dialogue failed due to FMLN-FDR insistence on unconstitutional powersharing rather than participation in the electoral process. The FMLN launched an unsuccessful fall offensive in 1983 but did not even attempt one in 1984. As part of its openly acknowledged policy of making it impossible to govern the country, the FMLN strategy now focused almost exclusively on destruction of democratic institutions and economic targets. The Salvadoran Government has repeatedly held Nicaragua responsible for sustaining the FMLN's ability to continue its attacks, in particular the attacks on dams and bridges.²⁷

Honduras overcame two major Sandinista efforts to initiate guerrilla activity within its borders, as well as constant cross-border attacks by the Sandinista military. To demonstrate U.S. resolve and willingness to support its regional allies, improve the readiness of U.S. forces with contingency missions in Latin America and elsewhere, and reduce Honduran anxiety over tension

on the border with Nicaragua, the United States and Honduras carried out Big Pine I, the first of a series of joint exercises in Honduras, in February 1983.²⁸ With U.S. assistance, a Regional Military Training Center (RMTC) for Salvadoran and Honduran military personnel and Costa Rican civil guardsmen was established in Honduras in 1983; the RMTC was closed in mid-1985. Costa Rica was forced by Nicaraguan border incursions to expand and modernize its modest rural and civil guards. It made clear, however, its expectation of assistance under the Rio Treaty in the event of overt Sandinista attack.²⁹

The United States. With the steady political and military progress in El Salvador, controversy sharply declined within the United States over providing major support to the countries of the region.³⁰ The January 1984 recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, chaired by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, for adoption of a long-term program of economic and security assistance for the region were accepted and largely enacted into law by the U.S. Congress.³¹

Increasingly U.S. policy attention concentrated on Nicaragua, which appeared unwilling or unable either to address its internal problems or to cease its efforts to intervene in the affairs of its neighbors. While there has been disagreement over how to induce Nicaragua to modify its aggressive policies, the Congress and the executive, for several years, have been in agreement that Nicaragua has made possible the continuation of the FMLN's war effort through provision of substantial

²⁷Declaration of Intervention of the Republic of El Salvador, Intervention Pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), August 15, 1984, pp. 12-13.

²⁸The United States has conducted joint exercises with Honduras for two decades. Since the Big Pine I exercise, eight joint exercises have been held involving U.S., Honduran, and, on occasion, Salvadoran land and sea forces. The largest of these exercises, Big Pine II in 1984, involved 5,000 U.S. and several thousand Honduran troops.

²⁹Nelson, *op. cit.*, discusses Costa Rica's security concerns on pp. 244-57 and 274.

³⁰The Congressional findings contained in Section 702 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), demonstrate the change from the time when assistance to El Salvador was considered by many to be support for a corrupt and brutal military dictatorship. Section 702(a)(2), for example, expresses the

"sense of Congress that —

(A) President Duarte is to be congratulated for his outstanding leadership under difficult circumstances and for his efforts to foster democratic government and institutions in his country . . . ; and

"(B) the armed services of El Salvador are to be congratulated for their improved performance and professionalism in defending Salvadoran citizens and their democratically-elected government from attack by armed insurgents. . . ."

³¹A substantial portion of the funds requested in support of the Commission's recommendations for 1984 and 1985 was approved by the Congress in the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 1984 (P.L. 98-396), the Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Department of Agriculture for 1984 (P.L. 98-322), and the Fiscal Year 1985 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 98-473). In the recently enacted International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-83), Congress authorized additional appropriations for fiscal years 1986-89 to carry out the long-term plan recommended by the Commission.

support for the FMLN and has fostered and conducted terrorist activities in Honduras and Costa Rica as well.³²

While the United States repeatedly made clear that it would respond to concrete and meaningful actions by the Sandinistas with similar action on its own

part, U.S. policy also included a variety of pressures in response to continuing Sandinista aggression. Some of these were economic in nature. In May 1983, Nicaragua's sugar quota was sharply reduced in response to the Sandinistas' continued destabilization of their neighbors. In response to Nicaragua's continued aggressive behavior, as well

as congressional desires that no form of peaceful pressure be left untried before further assistance was provided to the armed resistance, a trade embargo was imposed in May 1985. Bilateral approaches to Nicaragua also continued, but within the context of the comprehensive approach to regional problems proposed by the Contadora group

³²On March 4, 1982, Chairman Boland of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence stated:

"The Committee has received a briefing concerning the situation in El Salvador, with particular emphasis on the question of foreign support for the insurgency. The insurgents are well-trained, well-equipped with modern weapons and supplies, and rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua for command and control and for logistical support. The intelligence supporting these judgments provided to the Committee is convincing.

"There is further persuasive evidence that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua is helping train insurgents and is transferring arms and financial support from and through Nicaragua to the insurgents. They are further providing the insurgents bases of operation in Nicaragua. Cuban involvement—especially in providing arms—is also evident.

"What this says is that, contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insurgency. That support is such as to greatly aid the insurgents in their struggle with government forces in El Salvador" (Press Release, March 4, 1982).

In the committee's May 13, 1983, report on H.R. 2760 (the "Boland amendment"), this conclusion was reaffirmed:

"At [this] time, the Committee believes that the intelligence available to it continues to support the following judgments with certainty:

"A major portion of the arms and other material sent by Cuba and other Communist countries to the Salvadoran insurgents transits Nicaragua with the permission and assistance of the Sandinistas.

"The Salvadoran insurgents rely on the use of sites in Nicaragua, some of which are located in Managua itself, for communications, command-and-control, and for the logistics to conduct their financial, material and propaganda activities.

"Nicaragua provides a range of other support activities, including secure transit of insurgents to and from Cuba, and assistance to the insurgents in planning their activities in El Salvador.

"In addition, Nicaragua and Cuba have provided—and appear to con-

tinue providing—training to the Salvadoran insurgents.

"Cuban and Sandinista political support for the Salvadoran insurgents has been unequivocal [sic] for years. The Committee concludes that similarly strong military support has been the hidden complement [sic] of overt support. . . .

"Another area of serious concern to the Committee is the significant military buildup going on within Nicaragua. . . . Considering the small population of Nicaragua—two and one half million people—and its weakened economic status—such a buildup cannot be explained away as solely defensive. Within the Central American isthmus, it poses a potential threat to its neighbors. The substantial Nicaraguan support for the Salvadoran insurgents offers no assurance that the Sandinistas will constrain their growing military might within Nicaragua's own borders" (Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report to accompany H.R. 2760 [H.R. Rep. 98-122, Part 1, May 13, 1983], pp. 5, 6).

The 1983 findings are particularly significant because they were made by the committee in the context of recommending approval of a bill opposing the executive branch's policy toward Nicaragua.

In congressional debate on the fiscal year 1985 intelligence authorization bill, Chairman Boland confirmed that the findings remained as "true today, as . . . at the time of that [May 1983] report" (*Congressional Record*, August 2, 1984, pp. H 8268-69). The resulting bill contained the following congressional findings:

"(1) the Government of . . . Nicaragua has failed to keep solemn promises, made to the [OAS] in July 1979, to establish full respect for human rights and political liberties, hold early elections, preserve a private sector, permit political pluralism, and pursue a foreign policy of nonaggression and nonintervention;

"(2) by providing military support (including arms, training, and logistical, command and control, and communications facilities) to groups seeking to overthrow the Government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government . . . of Nicaragua has violated article 18 of the Charter of the [OAS] which declares that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for

any reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state. . . ." (Intelligence Authorization Act for 1984 [P.L. 98-215], section 109(a)).

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, in its January 1984 report, concluded:

"Whatever the social and economic conditions that invited insurgency in the region, outside intervention is what gives the conflict its present character. . . .

"Propaganda support, money, sanctuary, arms, supplies, training, communications, intelligence, logistics, all are important in both morale and operational terms. Without such support from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, neither in El Salvador nor elsewhere in Central America would such an insurgency pose so severe a threat to the government. . . . With the victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the levels of violence and counter-violence in Central America rapidly increased, engulfing the region" (*Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America*, January 10, 1984, pp. 87-88).

Most recently, in the 1985 foreign assistance legislation Congress found that, having

"formally accepted the June 23, 1979 [OAS] resolution as a basis for resolving the Nicaraguan conflict in its [plan] . . . submitted to the [OAS] on July 12, 1979, . . . the Government of Nicaragua . . . has flagrantly violated the provisions of the June 23, 1979, resolution, the rights of the Nicaraguan people, and the security of the nations in the region . . ." (International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 [P.L. 99-83], section 722(c)(2)(A) and (C)).

The legislation cites a variety of events in support of this finding, including that Nicaragua

"has committed and refuses to cease aggression in the form of armed subversion against its neighbors in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and the 1965 United Nations General Assembly Declaration on Intervention . . ." (Section 722(c)(2)(C)(vi)).

and expressly agreed to by Nicaragua and the other four countries of Central America.³³

While exercising the full range of nonforceful measures available to it, however, the United States in addition continued to believe that more direct pressures were crucial to stopping Nicaraguan aggression.³⁴ Congress established limits on the provision of funds for the armed resistance in late 1982.³⁵ In fiscal year 1984, \$24 million was provided to the resistance.³⁶ A desire to demonstrate to Nicaragua that the United States was prepared to relieve the military pressure should the Sandinistas modify their behavior, among other factors, led to a withholding of support for a year.³⁷ Sandinista support for the FMLN, its military buildup, and its refusal to respond to calls by the Catholic bishops and by virtually every opposition group to enter into a dialogue contributed to a resumption of humanitarian assistance to the democratic resistance.³⁸

Contadora. Since 1983 diplomatic activity aimed at resolving Central America's problems has focused on the mediation effort begun on Contadora Island in January 1983 by the Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela. To allay expressed Sandinista concerns that a multilateral effort involving the United States would be unfairly weighted against Nicaragua, outside parties (including the United States) were excluded from this Latin American mediation effort. Approached privately by Contadora group countries to request its understanding and support, the United States gave the mediation effort its encouragement.

The thesis of the Contadora group, like that underlying the earlier San Jose initiative, is that any hope of reaching a lasting and solid peace both among and within the Central American countries requires that fundamental causes of conflict within and among countries of the region be addressed.³⁹ The Contadora

initiative, therefore, has taken a comprehensive and integrated approach toward the social, economic, political, and security problems underlying the conflicts in Central America.

Although meetings among the Contadora mediators and the five Central American countries took place in April and May 1983, Nicaragua refused to participate in formal multilateral discussions. Preferring to deal with its neighbors and with the United States on a bilateral basis, Nicaragua resisted the concept of developing a single, all-encompassing peace treaty dealing with all aspects of the regional crisis. On July 17, 1983, the Contadora chiefs of state, in the Cancun Declaration on Peace in Central America, called for renewed efforts to continue the peace process. This appeal, sent to the United States and Cuba as well as the five Central American states, was responded to favorably by the United States and the other four Central American states.

On July 19, Nicaragua also officially accepted Contadora's multilateral

³³Bilateral diplomatic contacts with ranking Nicaraguan officials were conducted by Assistant Secretary Enders in August 1981; by Ambassador Quainton in April 1982; by Presidential Special Envoy Richard Stone between June 1983 and January 1984; by Stone's successor, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, in April 1984 and on repeated occasions (including eight meetings in Manzanillo) later that year; by Enders' successor, Assistant Secretary Langhorne Motley, in December 1983, April 1984 (with Shlaudeman), and October 1984; and by Secretary of State Shultz in June 1984 and March 1985.

³⁴Public confirmation that assistance to the armed resistance has been effective was provided by President Duarte of El Salvador in a letter supporting the U.S. Administration's April 1985 proposal to provide assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance:

"We remain concerned . . . by the continuing flow of supplies and munitions from Nicaragua to guerrilla forces . . . which are fighting against my government and our programs of reform, democracy, reconciliation, and peace. . . . [W]e deeply appreciate any efforts which your government can take to build a broad barrier to such activities—efforts which a small country like El Salvador cannot take in its own behalf" (Letter to President Reagan, April 4, 1985).

³⁵After lengthy debate, Congress approved carefully crafted legislation prohibiting use of funds only if destined "to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for military activities, . . . for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua or provoking a

military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras" (Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 1983 [P.L. 97-377], section 793).

³⁶The funding was cast in terms of a ceiling of \$24 million "for the purpose or which would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual" (Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 1984 [P.L. 98-215], section 108; relevant congressional findings contained in that act are quoted in footnote 32, p. 25). Identical language was contained in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1984 [P.L. 98-212], section 775.

³⁷The Continuing Appropriations Act of 1985 [P.L. 98-473], section 8066, and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1985 [P.L. 98-618], section 801, contained absolute prohibitions phrased in terms identical to the limitation quoted in the preceding note. Those laws permitted the President, after February 1985, to request renewed funding for the armed resistance of up to \$14 million following submission of specific findings and congressional approval of the request. Reflecting continued concern about Nicaraguan subversion, the first of the required findings on the basis of which Congress indicated a readiness to consider renewal of funding was that "the Government of Nicaragua is providing materiel or monetary support to anti-government forces engaged in military or paramilitary opera-

tions in El Salvador or other Central American countries" (Section 8066(b)(1)(A)). The President made such a request on April 3.

³⁸\$27 million was approved for provision to the anti-Sandinista resistance of food, clothing, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance; a prohibition on provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition or other equipment, vehicles, or material usable to inflict injury or death remained in effect (International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 [P.L. 99-83], section 722(g); Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1985 [P.L. 99-88], Title I, Chapter V). The findings relating to Nicaragua made in P.L. 99-83 are quoted in part in footnote 32, p. 25.

In the same statutes, \$2 million was made available to help defray immediate expenses of implementation of a Contadora agreement (Section 722(h); Title I, Chapter V).

³⁹Although stated more clearly on some occasions than on others, this thesis has been at the heart of every approach to the Central American crisis since the OAS first called for Somoza's replacement by a pluralistic, democratic government. The junta's program reflected a similar balancing of values, and U.S. policy in Central America as a whole and toward Nicaragua in particular has been based, through both the Carter and the Reagan Administrations, on implementation of a range of measures directed at the root problems of the crisis in the region. Despite its ostensible acceptance of the goal of national reconciliation, in its actions Nicaragua has consistently opposed this approach.

framework. On that date, however, Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega announced a diplomatic proposal calling for cessation of all outside assistance to "the two sides" in El Salvador (thus implicitly acknowledging the outside assistance it had been providing) as well as external support to paramilitary forces in the region. The plan proposed a prohibition on foreign military bases and exercises in the region, a Nicaraguan-Honduran nonaggression pact, noninterference in internal affairs, and an end to economic discrimination. The proposal ignored the issues of foreign military advisers⁴⁰ and the Nicaraguan military buildup.

Democratization, national reconciliation, and effective verification, all central to the Contadora approach, were also ignored by the Nicaraguan pro-

posal. Two days later, however, the other four Central American countries joined in presenting a plan emphasizing the importance of democratization to the restoration of peace and stability in the region.

On September 9, 1983, Contadora's most significant achievement to date occurred when the Foreign Ministers of all five Central American states agreed to a 21-point Document of Objectives. This document comprehensively addresses the root problems, as well as the major specific concerns, of the countries of the region. In the document, the participants committed themselves to an agreed set of objectives, including political, economic, and security concerns, to be reflected in a definitive treaty. In the security field, the Docu-

ment of Objectives called, *inter alia*, for verifiable steps to end support for external subversion, reductions in the numbers of foreign military and security advisers, a halt to illegal arms trafficking, and controls on armaments and troop levels. It emphasized the need for greater regional cooperation in social and economic matters and assistance to refugees. Democratization, national reconciliation, and respect for human rights were central elements of the political objectives, which call for establishment throughout the region of democratic, representative, and pluralistic systems ensuring fair and regular elections.⁴¹

⁴⁰By this time, there were more Cuban military and security personnel in Nicaragua than similar U.S. personnel in Honduras, El Salvador, and Costa Rica combined.

⁴¹The text of the 21 objectives is as follows:

[1] "To promote detente and put an end to situations of conflict in the area, refraining from taking any action that might jeopardize political confidence or prevent the achievement of peace, security and stability in the region;

[2] "To ensure strict compliance with the aforementioned [in a preamble] principles of international law, whose violators will be held accountable;

[3] "To respect and ensure the exercise of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious and cultural rights;

[4] "To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;

[5] "To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law;

[6] "To create political conditions intended to ensure the international security, integrity and sovereignty of the States of the region;

[7] "To stop the arms race in all its forms and begin negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of armed troops;

[8] "To prevent the installation on their territory of foreign military bases or any other type of foreign military interference;

[9] "To conclude agreements to reduce the presence of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements involved in military and security activities, with a view to their elimination;

[10] "To establish internal control machinery to prevent the traffic in arms from the territory of any country in the region to the territory of another;

[11] "To eliminate the traffic in arms, whether within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries;

[12] "To prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or permit them to receive military or logistical support;

[13] "To refrain from inciting or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries in the area;

[14] "To establish and co-ordinate direct communication systems with a view to preventing or, where appropriate, settling incidents between States of the region;

[15] "To continue humanitarian aid aimed at helping Central American refugees who have been displaced from their countries of origin, and to create suitable conditions for the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, in consultation with or with the co-operation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies deemed appropriate;

[16] "To undertake economic and social development programmes with the aim of promoting well being and an equitable distribution of wealth;

[17] "To revitalize and restore economic integration machinery in order to attain sustained development on the basis of solidarity and mutual advance;

[18] "To negotiate the provision of external monetary resources which will provide additional means of financing the resumption of intra-regional trade, meet the serious balance-of-payments problems, attract funds for working capital, support programmes to extend and restructure production systems and promote medium- and long-term investment projects;

[19] "To negotiate better and broader access to international markets in order to increase the volume of trade between the countries of Central America and the rest of the world, particularly the industrialized countries, by means of a revision of trade practices, the elimination of tariff and other barriers, and the achievement of the price stability at a profitable and fair level for the products exported by the countries of the region;

[20] "To establish technical co-operation machinery for the planning, programming and implementation of multi-sectoral investment and trade promotion projects.

"The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Central American countries, with the participation of the countries in the Contadora Group, have begun negotiations with the aim of preparing for the conclusion of the agreements and [21] the establishment of machinery necessary to formalize and develop the objectives contained in this document, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification and monitoring systems. To that end, account will be taken of the initiatives put forward at the meetings convened by the Contadora Group" (UN Document S/16041**, October 18, 1983 [UN translation], numbers have been inserted for easier reference).

Signature of the document by the Foreign Ministers of the five Central American countries reflects their adoption of the view that *all* of the matters addressed in the 21-point Document of Objectives must be addressed in order to resolve the problems giving rise to conflict in the region and that they must be addressed in a framework of mutual, binding, and verifiable reciprocal commitments. The United States has repeatedly made clear, both publicly and in private, that full implementation of the 21 objectives would meet all U.S. policy goals for the region.⁴²

Although Nicaragua signed the document, its discomfort with many of the objectives has led the Sandinistas repeatedly to undercut the process by pursuing their own agenda in other fora. On several occasions, the Sandinistas have sought to involve the organs of the United Nations in Central American issues, anticipating a friendlier hearing there than in Contadora or the OAS. For example, in October 1983, 6 weeks after agreeing to the Document of Objectives, Nicaragua introduced the Central American issue before the UN Security Council, breaking an explicit commitment to the Contadora group that it would not do so.

On October 20, Nicaragua elaborated its July 19 proposal by presenting four draft peace treaties covering Honduran-Nicaraguan relations, U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, relations among the five Central American states, and the conflict in El Salvador. The treaties were revealing. They studiously ignored the issues

of national reconciliation on the basis of democratic principles which the Sandinistas had earlier accepted in the Document of Objectives. They disregarded the issue of restoring military balance in Central America and deferred treatment of foreign military advisers and the Nicaraguan arms buildup. They denied the legitimacy of the Government of El Salvador by treating it as coequal with the FMLN. They made no serious proposals for verification. Finally—although the Sandinistas asserted that these treaties were a good-faith effort to advance the Contadora process—the proposals directly contradicted Contadora by attempting to deal with Nicaragua's neighbors and the United States through a series of bilateral, disconnected documents.

In the fall of 1983, resolutions of both the United Nations and the OAS, confirmed by unilateral statements of support from virtually every country of the world, endorsed Contadora as the most promising hope of achieving peace in the region. Slow but measurable progress was made in reducing the 21 objectives to concrete commitments. In January 1984, the parties agreed to a timetable and conceptual approach for the negotiations. Nonetheless, Nicaragua continued to press its agenda outside the Contadora framework. In April 1984, it once again brought before the United Nations specific complaints against the United States. In that same month it brought before the International Court of Justice identical complaints of U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance.

The United States, however, continued to support the regional peace effort. In June 1984, at the request of the Contadora group, the Secretary of State visited Managua and initiated bilateral discussions held in Mexico during the second half of that year. At the same time, the United States provided technical support for its friends in Central America as they grappled with the complex and difficult issues—such as effective verification—involved in a peace treaty.⁴³

In early June 1984, the Contadora mediators presented a draft "Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America." This draft included Contadora group proposals in those areas where the "working commissions" established in January had been unable to reach consensus. Following discussions, a revised version of that treaty was issued on September 7, 1984. Several Central American governments offered initial favorable reactions, while making clear that further negotiations would be necessary.

Nicaragua then announced, on September 21, its readiness to sign the draft treaty—provided that no substantive changes were made in its text. This unexpected announcement attempted to freeze negotiations at a moment of advantage for Nicaragua. Entry into force of the draft presented in September would have resolved the problems high on the Sandinista agenda.⁴⁴

⁴²In his affidavit filed with the International Court of Justice in August 1984, the Secretary of State stated that

"The United States fully supports the objectives already agreed upon in the Contadora process as a basis for a solution of the conflict in Central America. The objectives of United States policy toward Nicaragua are entirely consistent with those broader agreed objectives and full and verifiable implementation of the Contadora document of objectives would fully meet the goals of United States policy in Central America as well as the expressed security concerns of Nica-

ragua" (Affidavit of Secretary of State George P. Shultz dated August 14, 1984, Annex 1 to U.S. Counter-Memorial (Jurisdiction), Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of America).

⁴³Despite Nicaragua's ready acceptance of the September 7 draft without change, the fact is that verification of the security and political commitments described in that draft would be extremely difficult. Central America is a mountainous, swampy, underdeveloped area larger than East and West Germany together. Verification that arms are not being smuggled or that certain kinds of weapons are not being acquired raises questions which cannot readily be answered or treated *ad hoc*.

⁴⁴It would have prohibited international military exercises 30 days after signature. Foreign military schools and bases were to be eliminated in 6 months. Withdrawal of foreign military and security advisers was left to future negotiation. By eliminating all support for groups fighting the government in any Central American country without also providing for adequate verification, it would have, as a practical matter, terminated U.S. support for the opposition in Nicaragua while allowing Nicaraguan-supported groups to continue to receive clandestine supplies.

Resolution of issues of concern to its neighbors, however, such as the Nicaraguan arms and troop buildup and commitments relating to national reconciliation, refugees, and democratization, was left to negotiations and unilateral implementing actions *following* entry into full force of the commitments in which Nicaragua was interested. Nicaragua's neighbors were being asked to rely on Sandinista good faith in subsequent actions.

The other Central American states proposed limited modifications to the text to meet their own concerns more adequately. Amendments proposed jointly by Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras in Tegucigalpa on October 20 maintained all of the substantive commitments of the September 7 draft but amplified the verification mechanisms in the security and political spheres and provided protection for the other parties in the event Nicaragua failed to negotiate in good faith on the key issues of military limits.⁴⁵

The Contadora mediators acknowledged the validity of these concerns. Since the fall of 1984, the talks have concentrated on completing negotiation of these points on the basis of the September 7 and October 20 drafts. Nicaraguan participation in these discussions has been erratic, ranging from apparent readiness to negotiate on some occasions to—at the June 18–19, 1985, meeting—complete refusal to discuss the draft treaty unless Nicaragua's current complaints against the United States were first addressed and supported by the group.⁴⁶

Manzanillo. In a reversal of the concern that had led to exclusion of the United States from the Contadora initiative, Nicaragua began to assert in 1983 and 1984 that no truly effective arrangements could be agreed on in Contadora in the absence of the United States. At Contadora request, in June 1984 the United States initiated a series of bilateral discussions with the agreed objective of facilitating the Contadora process. Over the next 5 months, nine rounds of talks were held, all but one in Manzanillo, Mexico.⁴⁷ The United States entered the discussions prepared to reach bilateral understandings that, channeled into the multilateral process, would facilitate conclusion of a comprehensive Contadora regional agreement. The Sandinistas' purpose, it became clear, was to negotiate bilateral accords dealing exclusively with their own security concerns.

Consistent with the Document of Objectives, the initial U.S. proposal was to develop jointly a calendar of reciprocal actions addressing the key aspects of the regional crisis. In order to build confidence, the actions were to be carried out in phases and to be independently verified. Nicaragua once again, as in October 1983, proposed a series of bilateral and multilateral treaties that would deal on a priority basis with U.S. support for what Nicaragua termed "counterrevolutionary, mercenary forces" and the U.S. military presence and exercises in the region.⁴⁸

In late September, the United States offered to limit the size, frequency, and duration of its military exercises to reflect progress made in other areas. It proposed a common, low ceiling on foreign advisers in the region and a staged process for negotiations on arms and force levels among the Central American states. To meet Nicaragua's contention that it could not reduce its military establishment while facing an internal insurgency, the United States suggested that adjustment down to agreed limits might take place in phases, after steps were taken to end support for insurgency.

At the same round, Nicaragua adopted the Contadora draft agreement of September 7 as its negotiating position. It consistently refused, however, to contemplate any substantive modification to that draft. It also refused to discuss the commitments relating to reconciliation and democratization contained in its text. This refusal to consider modifications was maintained even after the Contadora mediators accepted the need for changes to meet the concerns reflected in the October 20 Tegucigalpa draft.

At a subsequent meeting, the United States attempted to open up the Sandinista position by offering to discuss bilateral assurances that would meet specific Nicaraguan concerns about modifications of the draft. It proposed, for example, that in exchange for Nicaraguan agreement to the continuation of international military exercises, the United States would unilaterally limit exercises to levels worked out with Nicaragua.

⁴⁵The October 20 draft was substantially the same as the September 7 draft. Its commitments would enter into force following ratification by all five parties instead of providing for implementation of some provisions before ratification. It would regulate rather than prohibit international military exercises. It would, by providing an international corps of inspectors and a budget, strengthen the verification commission referred to in the September 7 draft. It would simplify the postsignature negotiation of agreements on arms and troop ceilings, military installations, and advisers. Where the September 7 draft required a freeze on arms acquisitions

throughout the negotiating period, the October 20 draft would limit the freeze to 60 days (the period during which the September 7 draft envisaged the negotiations would be concluded).

⁴⁶Nicaraguan "reasonableness" in its negotiating posture is notably high at sessions—for example, the April 11–12, 1985, meeting at which verification procedures were agreed in principle—immediately preceding significant votes in the U.S. Congress. In the subsequent May session, Nicaragua reneged on key elements of the procedures agreed upon in April.

⁴⁷The second round, to establish ground rules, was held in Atlanta. As part of the ground rules of the talks, both sides agreed

to summarize the content of the discussions with the Mexican Secretary of Foreign Relations following each round. Only the United States and Nicaragua were physically present at the negotiating sessions.

⁴⁸Nicaraguan statements that U.S. forces will be used against them are recurrent. The most famous of the many inaccurate Sandinista predictions of U.S. invasion was made by Junta Coordinator Ortega at the United Nations on October 2, 1984, when he declared that the United States would invade Nicaragua on October 15, 1984 (UN Doc. A/39/PV. 16).

After requesting time to consider the proposal, Nicaragua rejected it at the ninth and to date final Manzanillo round, reiterating its position that any approach involving substantive changes to the September 7 draft was unacceptable. Nicaragua did hint at a willingness to make concessions in the security sphere but only in a bilateral agreement reached outside the Contadora framework—thereby freeing it from any obligation to address the issues of democratization, national reconciliation, and regional arms reductions.

Given the Sandinista position, agreement would have been possible only if the United States approved the September 7 draft without change, despite the imperfections acknowledged by Contadora participants, or disregarded Contadora entirely and entered into purely bilateral negotiations. Neither alternative was acceptable, and the United States declined to schedule further discussions pending demonstration that Nicaragua was prepared to negotiate seriously within the Contadora framework. The United States made clear that it does not rule out a resumption of bilateral talks but that they must promote a comprehensive Contadora agreement and national reconciliation in Nicaragua.⁴⁹

September 1985

Six years after the overthrow of Somoza, earlier hopes for peace and democratic development in Nicaragua have not been realized. The ruling Sandinista regime has continued its aggressive behavior toward its neighbors, taken ever stronger control over the state and—despite its OAS and Contadora commitments—refused any dialogue with the Nicaraguan opposition as a whole.

Costa Rica's initial favorable response to the 1979 revolution and readiness to develop close relations with Nicaragua have shifted. Costa Rica now faces a country engaged in subversion and intimidating direct military attacks, creating a pervasive climate of fear and uncertainty. In the Sandinistas, it sees a regime which has betrayed the revolution for which Costa Rica had such high hopes and which is even more aggressively hostile to Costa Rican democracy than was Somoza. In Honduras, democratic reforms have taken hold, but an increasing proportion of that country's resources has had to be devoted to defense against the conventional military threat of the Sandinista People's Army and the FSLN's repeated attempts to initiate guerrilla war in Honduras. In El Salvador, political and economic reforms are being carried out by a popular government now strong enough to command the allegiance of a previously apathetic population in the war against the FMLN. At the same time, however, a weakening guerrilla movement, increasingly dependent on the FSLN's continued support, has focused its attacks on the destruction of the country's economic and political infrastructure—a strategy based on exhausting the government and population to the point that power could eventually be seized by armed force.

The United States has tried a variety of approaches to the Sandinistas. U.S. policy throughout has been based on implementation of the Sandinistas' own 1979 promises of democratic pluralism, a mixed economy, and nonalignment—promises which the Contadora Document of Objectives ratified as essential to achieving peace in the region—and on a refusal to stand aside in the face of Sandinista aggression against its neighbors. Despite determined efforts, from 1979 through 1981, to maintain and develop a positive rela-

tionship with the regime, Sandinista support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and attacks on its other neighbors required a termination of assistance. Subsequent efforts to reach a bilateral accommodation, particularly in August 1981 and April 1982, failed. U.S. support for the Contadora negotiations, most notably through the Manzanillo talks, has been met only by efforts to undercut that multilateral process and to narrow the issues to those of immediate interest to the Sandinistas. The United States has provided assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance in an effort to make clear to the Sandinistas that they cannot export their "internationalism" with impunity. Termination of that assistance for a year not having resulted in any softening of Sandinista intransigence, assistance in the form of non-lethal aid has been approved and will begin in the immediate future.

Nicaragua's neighbors, with U.S. economic and security assistance, have persisted in addressing conditions that contribute to internal conflict through programs of internal reform and democratization. At the same time, they have sought, through a combination of collective defense efforts and participation in the Contadora negotiations, to respond to Nicaragua's continued military attacks, support for subversion and destabilization, and intimidating military buildup. Despite the substantial progress made during this period, however, they remain under a cloud created by a regime unyielding to the needs of its neighbors, the resistance of its own people, or the efforts of other states in the hemisphere to assist it in addressing the problems it increasingly creates for itself.

⁴⁹U.S. support of Contadora was authoritatively reaffirmed by the Secretary of State in Mexico City on July 26, 1985.

IV. Conclusion

There is a vast gulf between Sandinista claims and the reality of the situation in Central America. Far from being innocent victims of outside forces seeking to bring about their overthrow, the Sandinistas have engaged in a sustained effort to overthrow or intimidate other governments through the threat and use of force. And, the record shows, the pressures on the Sandinista regime are not the product of a conspiracy to prevent the peaceful development of Nicaragua but rather a collective response to specific acts of aggression.

The arguments the Sandinistas have made are revealing. They have sought to characterize their military expansion—with the Sandinista People's Army now dwarfing in size, sophistication, and firepower those of their neighbors—as a necessary response to an externally supported insurgency and threat of invasion.¹ They have not even attempted, however, a similar effort to explain away their own involvement in arming and supporting guerrillas in neighboring countries. They have not alleged that their use of force against El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica responds to any threat to Nicaragua from those countries. Rather, they have denied, flatly and publicly, their own aggression and questioned the legitimacy of the collective response by speculating that that response would have taken place regardless of their own interventions.

The Sandinista strategy of diverting attention from their own illegal actions by accusing others of abusing the norms they themselves have violated has been reasonably successful as a propaganda exercise. But for those who have scrutinized the record, the facts speak for themselves.

The Sandinistas can no longer deny that they have engaged and continue to engage in intervention by:

- Providing the arms, training areas, command and control facilities, and communications that transformed disorganized factions in El Salvador into

a well-organized and -equipped guerrilla force of several thousand responsible for many thousands of civilian casualties and direct economic damages of over \$1 billion.

- Equipping, training, organizing, and infiltrating Honduran guerrillas, as well as clandestine Nicaraguan security personnel, into Honduras in an attempt to foment insurgency, as well as engaging in shelling, mining, and other conventional military incursions into Honduran territory.

- Using their diplomatic presence in Costa Rica to conduct bombings and assassinations; financing, equipping, and training Costa Rican citizens in subversive activities; and using their overwhelming conventional military might to conduct cross-border incursions and to intimidate a nation that has been without a military establishment for 35 years.

Yet the record shows that all of these patterns of aggression were well-established long before the Sandinistas alleged any significant threat to Nicaragua's own security from the United States or any other country.

Similarly, despite Nicaragua's efforts to characterize the United States' role in Central America as driven by unmitigated and ideologically motivated hostility to the very existence of the Sandinista regime, the facts show that:

- Immediately after July 1979, the United States became the single largest contributor of economic assistance to the new Government of Nicaragua.

- When the evidence of Nicaraguan material and other support for insurgency in El Salvador began to mount in 1980, the United States expressed its concerns privately in diplomatic channels and sought, while continuing economic assistance, to persuade the Sandinistas to cease such unlawful behavior.

- When Sandinista assurances to the United States were demonstrably violated at the time of the "final offen-

sive" in El Salvador in January 1981, the United States suspended assistance to Nicaragua and renewed military assistance to El Salvador to assist in its defense.

- In the spring of 1981, the United States offered to resume assistance to Nicaragua on the condition that it cease its intervention against its neighbors and discussed concrete steps by which Nicaragua could demonstrate its good faith in this respect.

- Only when Nicaragua refused to take serious steps to end its intervention was U.S. bilateral assistance terminated—and then with indications that it would be renewed if intervention ceased.

U.S. actions clearly are not the acts of one government determined to destroy another. Nor are they the acts of a government seeking only to create a pretext for intervention. They are actions concerted with allies in an effort to persuade an aggressor government to cease its unlawful acts in the interest of regional peace and security.

Most significantly, by the Sandinistas' own accounts, no military response by any of its neighbors or by the United States was undertaken until well after the pattern of Nicaraguan intervention was established and flourishing.

U.S. efforts to assist the nations of Central America in their defense against Nicaragua's actions have involved several interrelated elements, including:

- Bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to secure a peaceful resolution based on objectives agreed to by the Central American parties themselves in the Contadora process;

- Economic and military assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors to sustain their economies and provide for national defense in the face of Sandinista intervention;

- Economic measures, including a reduction of Nicaragua's sugar quota and a cessation of most bilateral trade,

¹As noted in the text and footnotes 15 and 16 to section II, p. 5, of this study, the growth in armed forces and acquisitions of major weapons systems were planned and,

for the most part, implemented well before the time the Sandinistas allege any significant security threat existed.

to demonstrate U.S. concern and to give the Sandinistas an incentive to cease their unlawful acts and participate in comprehensive and stable arrangements for resolving the conflict in the region;

- An increase in the size and frequency of joint military exercises with the forces of neighboring states to enhance the defense capabilities of those armed forces and to deter major conventional military assaults by the Sandinista army against them; and

- Assistance to Nicaraguans resisting the repressive and interventionist policies of the Sandinista regime.

This last element of the collective response to Nicaraguan aggression has been the principal focus of Sandinista complaints. The Sandinistas have sought to imply that such assistance is

unlawful—even as a response to aggression—because many of the details concerning this program are “covert.” But the lawfulness of a use of force has nothing to do with the degree of secrecy maintained.

The simple fact is that Sandinista intervention, including support for guerrilla forces in other countries, induced a collective response. A nation engaged in the unlawful use of armed force against another becomes the proper object of necessary and proportionate action by the victim and its allies in exercise of their right of individual and collective self-defense. An aggressor cannot evade responsibility for its unlawful use of force, nor can it deprive its victims of their inherent right of self-defense. The Sandinista protestations of innocence cannot alter the fact of their continuing, unprovoked aggression against their neighbors. Nicaragua cannot claim the protection of the very principles of international law it is itself violating.

The Sandinistas’ relief from the collective response to their behavior lies not in continued efforts to present themselves as the victims of an international conspiracy or in attempts to hide their continued intervention against Nicaragua’s neighbors. The other nations of Central America and the United States have made clear that a serious effort on the part of the Sandinistas to implement the agreed comprehensive framework for ending the conflict that they began will be reciprocated. A genuine mechanism for ending aggression and bringing about reconciliation is the only way to bring a just and lasting peace to Central America. This reconciliation remains where it has been from the outset—in the hands of the Sandinistas.



APPENDICES

1. Glossary

Ahuas Tara: The "Big Pine" series of joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises begun in February 1983.

America Department: A section of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party which handles relations with leftist organizations throughout the Western Hemisphere.

ARDE: Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, *Alianza Revolucionaria Democrática*, a coalition of anti-FSLN organizations founded in 1982.

Cinchoneros: See URP.

Contadora Group: Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met in January 1983 on the Panamanian island of Contadora and formed the Contadora Group for the purpose of facilitating a peaceful settlement to the Central American crisis.

Contadora Document of Objectives: Adopted September 9, 1983. Document agreed to by all nine Contadora participants (the Contadora Group and the five Central American countries). Sets forth 21 objectives to resolve the Central American crisis. Has served as the basis of discussion in all subsequent negotiations.

Coordinadora: Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinating Board, *Coordinadora Democrática Nicaraguense*, a coalition of political parties, labor confederations, and private sector organizations opposed to FSLN policies.

Declaration of San Jose: Adopted October 4, 1982, by seven democratic governments including the United States. Sets forth the conditions necessary for a regional peace settlement.

DGSE: The General Directorate of State Security, *Dirección General de Seguridad del Estado*, of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior.

DRI: The FSLN's Department of International Relations, *Departamento de Relaciones Internacionales*, closely modeled after the America Department of the Cuban Communist Party.

DRU: The Unified Revolutionary Directorate, *Dirección Revolucionaria Unificada*, was the coalition of Salvadoran guerrilla groups formed in May 1980 in Havana. It preceded the FMLN.

EGP: The Guerrilla Army of the Poor, *Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*, a Guatemalan guerrilla group, became a member of the URNG, the umbrella organization formed in Managua on November 2, 1980.

ERP: The People's Revolutionary Army, *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo*, a Salvadoran revolutionary group, formed after a split within the FPL in 1972. It is led by Joaquín Villalobos.

FAL: The Armed Forces of Liberation, *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación*, the Salvadoran Communist Party's guerrilla wing formed by Jorge Shafik Handal in 1979.

FAO: The Broad Opposition Front, *Frente Amplio Opositor*, formed in mid-1978 by an alliance of 16 non-FSLN organizations including opposition political parties and labor confederations. In August 1978 FAO presented a 16-point plan for the democratization of Nicaragua—including the departure of Somoza.

FAR: The Rebel Armed Forces, *Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes*, is a Guatemalan guerrilla organization and a member of the URNG.

FARN: Armed Forces of National Resistance, *Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional*, Salvadoran revolutionary group that splintered from the ERP in 1975.

FDN: Nicaraguan Democratic Force, *Fuerza Democrática Nicaraguense*, the largest of the anti-FSLN resistance groups, founded in 1982.

FDR: The Democratic Revolutionary Front, *Frente Democrático Revolucionario*, is the political wing of the FMLN. It was created on April 1, 1980, by three small Salvadoran political parties and urban organizations to serve as the civilian arm of the guerrillas.

FMLH: The Morazanist Front for the Liberation of Honduras, *Frente Morazanista para la Liberación de Honduras*, is a Honduran guerrilla organization.

FMLN: The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, *Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional*, is an umbrella organization formed in November 1980. Consists of five Salvadoran guerrilla groups—ERP, FAL, FARN, FPL, and PRTC.

FMLN-FDR: FMLN and the FDR—the Salvadoran guerrilla umbrella organization and its political front.

FPL: Popular Liberation Forces, *Fuerzas Populares de Liberación*, the largest of the original Salvadoran guerrilla organizations that formed the FMLN. The FPL, founded in 1970 by Cayetano Carpio after he left the Communist Party of El Salvador, has long been linked to Cuba. The leadership was taken over by Leonel Gonzales upon Carpio's death.

FPR: The Popular Revolutionary Forces, *Fuerzas Populares Revolucionarias*, is a Honduran guerrilla organization.

FSLN: The Sandinista National Liberation Front, *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*, is a politico-military organization founded in 1961. After playing the key military role in the overthrow of Somoza, the FSLN displaced other members of the anti-Somoza coalition and monopolized power.

GRN: Government of National Reconstruction, *Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional*, the official designation of the Government of Nicaragua from July 1979 until January 1985, when Daniel Ortega formally became president.

Manzanillo: Mexican coastal city where bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua were held in 1984.

National Directorate: The nine-member directorate of the FSLN, formed in March 1979, with three representatives from each of the three main factions within the FSLN: Prolonged Popular War (*Guerra Popular Prolongada*—GPP) is represented by Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Bayardo

Arce; Proletarian Tendency (*Proletarios*) by Jaime Wheelock, Carlos Nunez, and Luis Carrion; and the Insurreccionalist (*Terceristas*), by Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, and Victor Tirado.

NBCCA: National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, better known as the "Kissinger Commission." Formed in July 1983, the Commission issued a report in January 1984 that led to increased U.S. economic and military assistance for the promotion of democracy and development in Central America.

New Republic Movement: Costa Rican political party. Some of its members have fought anti-Sandinista guerrillas in Nicaragua.

Olancho: A political subdivision in eastern Honduras where Sandinista-supported guerrillas were defeated in July 1983.

OAS: Organization of American States.

ORPA: Organization of the People in Arms, *Organizacion del Pueblo en*

Armas, a Guatemalan guerrilla group which is a member of the URNG.

PCES: Communist Party of El Salvador, *Partido Comunista de El Salvador*, is the oldest Marxist party in El Salvador. Its military wing is the FAL guerrilla group.

PGT: Guatemalan Labor Party, *Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo*, the Moscow-line Communist Party of Guatemala.

PRTC: Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party, *Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centroamerica*, organized and led by Roberto Roca, who formed the party in El Salvador in 1976. This Trotskyite offshoot of the Communist Party has counterpart parties in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala.

El Paraiso: (1) A political subdivision in Honduras where Sandinista-supported guerrillas were defeated in 1984. (2) Also the name of the location in El Salvador where the headquarters of the 4th Brigade was attacked by guerrillas in December 1983.

Papalonal: Site of airfield in Nicaragua used to fly weapons to Salvadoran guerrillas during 1980-81.

PVP: The Popular Vanguard Party, *Partido de la Vanguardia Popular*, is a Costa Rican political party some of whose members fought alongside San-

dinista units prior to the overthrow of Somoza. It was a Moscow-line communist party until it split in 1984; the faction now bearing the name is the more radical.

RMTC: Regional Military Training Center established in Honduras in June 1983 for training of Honduran, Salvadoran, and Costa Rican military and security forces. (It closed in June 1985.)

UNO: Unified Nicaraguan Opposition, *Unidad Nicaraguense Opositora*, an umbrella coalition of anti-FSLN resistance groups and exile political, labor, and private sector organizations formed in June 1985.

URP: Popular Revolutionary Union, *Union Revolucionaria del Pueblo*, a Honduran revolutionary organization also known as the "Cinchoneros."

URNG: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*, is an umbrella organization, patterned after the FSLN and the FMLN, the membership of which includes four Guatemalan guerrilla organizations: EGP, FAR, ORPA, and PGT. Created in Managua on November 2, 1980.

2. Chronology

January 1978

- 10 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro assassinated in Managua.

August 1978

- 21 The non-FSLN Broad Opposition Front (FAO), calling for Somoza's departure, presents a 16-point plan for democratization of Nicaragua.
- 22 Eden Pastora, known as Commander Zero, leads successful FSLN raid on the National Palace in Managua.

September 1978

- 23 17th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States (OAS) considers the situation in Nicaragua.

October 1978

- 6 Under the auspices of the OAS, the United States, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic begin a 3-month-long attempt to help reconcile the differences in Nicaragua.

January 1979

- 17 OAS mediation effort ends without resolving the Nicaraguan conflict.

February 1979

- 8 United States formally terminates military aid to Nicaragua (already suspended for several months), suspends new economic aid, withdraws military assistance group and Peace Corps volunteers, and reduces size of embassy staff by one-half.

June 1979

- 16 Provisional Junta of the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) formed in Costa Rica to replace the Somoza regime in Nicaragua.
- 21 At U.S. request, the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers of the OAS reconvenes to consider situation in Nicaragua.
- 23 OAS approves a Venezuelan resolution calling for the immediate replacement of the Somoza regime by a democratic government.

July 1979

- 12 GRN Junta sends telex enclosing its program and promising free elections to the Secretary General of the OAS.
- 17 Somoza resigns and interim government announced.
- 19 Collapse of interim government as FSLN military forces arrive in Managua and GRN assumes power.
- 21 Salvadoran guerrilla leaders and Sandinista leaders meet in Managua to discuss FSLN support for Salvadoran insurgent organizations.
- * Cuban civilian and military advisers arrive in Managua.
- 27 United States announces airlift of food and medical supplies.

September 1979

- 21- FSLN party meeting approves
- 23 "72-hour Document" committing Sandinistas to revolutionary internationalism.
- 24 Nicaraguan Government delegation headed by Daniel Ortega received at White House by President Carter, who offers substantial aid and cautions against interference in neighboring states.

October 1979

- 15 General Romero is overthrown in El Salvador by military coup promising extensive political, social, and economic reforms.

November 1979

- 9 President Carter asks Congress to provide an emergency \$75 million "to restore confidence, private initiative, and popular well-being in Nicaragua."

December 1979

- 16 Leaders of three Salvadoran organizations write to Fidel Castro that "thanks to your help" they have signed in Havana a unity pact to "advance the fight" for peace and socialism.

March 1980

- 3 Junta member Alfonso Robelo informs United States of GRN policy of noninvolvement in Salvadoran internal politics but warns that a "few individuals" may be fighting with the Salvadoran guerrillas.
- 6 Agrarian reform begins in El Salvador.
- 19 Agreement signed in Moscow establishing party-to-party ties between FSLN and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
- * Cuba makes large-scale weapons deliveries to Managua, including antiaircraft and antitank guns and artillery.

April 1980

- 16 Council of State is expanded to ensure FSLN control.
- 19 Violeta de Chamorro resigns from GRN.
- 22 Alfonso Robelo resigns from GRN.

May 1980

- * Four Salvadoran guerrilla factions meet under Cuban sponsorship in Havana, form Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).
- 31 President Carter signs legislation providing \$75 million in assistance to Nicaragua, requiring certification that Nicaragua is not supporting terrorism.

June 1980

- * FSLN Directorate offers DRU headquarters in Managua, along with advice, materiel, and a promise to assume "the cause of El Salvador as its own."
- * Salvadoran Communist Party leader Jorge Shafik Handal leaves Cuba for the Soviet Union and Vietnam seeking arms.
- 23 FSLN Directorate member Bayardo Arce meets with delegation of Salvadoran guerrillas; agrees to provide ammunition, training, and other support.

*Specific day not applicable or not known.

August 1980

- 23 Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announces postponement of elections until 1985.

September 1980

- 25- United States warns privately that
26 continued Sandinista support for Salvadoran guerrillas jeopardizes U.S. aid. Nicaragua responds that its government is not involved.

October 1980

- * Venue for meeting of Central American communist parties switched in mid-October from Managua to Havana at request of Nicaragua.

October-November 1980

- * FSLN begins airlift of supplies for Salvadoran guerrillas from Papalonal airstrip northwest of Managua.

November 1980

- 2 URNG, Guatemalan guerrilla umbrella organization, formed in Managua.
17 Private sector leader Jorge Salazar murdered by Nicaraguan State Security (DGSE) agents.

December 1980

- 15 *Radio Liberacion*, Salvadoran guerrilla clandestine radio, begins transmissions from Nicaragua.

January 1981

- 10 Salvadoran guerrillas announce beginning of "final offensive" on clandestine broadcast from Nicaragua.
14 United States warns Nicaragua that continued support for Salvadoran guerrillas could result in termination of aid programs and possibly even a demand for repayment of loans.
14 United States renews nonlethal military aid to El Salvador.
17 United States provides El Salvador with ammunition for first time since 1977.

March 1981

- 11 In Hanoi FSLN Directorate member and Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega publicly thanks Vietnam for its support of the "bloody struggle" in El Salvador.

April 1981

- 1 United States announces suspension of economic assistance to Nicaragua but does "not rule out" its "eventual resumption."

August 1981

- * Text circulates of secret speech by Humberto Ortega to military cadres which asserts that Sandinista doctrine is Marxist-Leninist.

August-October 1981

- * United States initiates diplomatic exchanges with Nicaragua. United States offers bilateral nonaggression agreement and renewed economic assistance if Nicaragua stops aid to Salvadoran guerrillas and limits its military buildup. Nicaragua labels U.S. offer "sterile."

March 1982

- 14 First major armed resistance actions in Nicaragua take place when the Negro and Coco River Bridges are seriously damaged with explosives.
15 Nicaraguan Government declares state of emergency, formally imposing prior censorship and suspending certain civil rights.
15 Honduras proposes Central American peace plan in the Organization of American States to reduce arms and foreign military advisers, to respect nonintervention, and to provide for international verification of commitments.
28 El Salvador elects a Constituent Assembly.

April 1982

- 9 United States offers eight-point proposal to Nicaragua. Nicaragua demands high-level meeting in Mexico.
15 Eden Pastora publicly announces his opposition to the FSLN regime, accusing it of betraying the anti-Somoza revolution.

July 1982

- 28 Costa Rica expels three Nicaraguan diplomats linked to terrorist activities.

October 1982

- 4 In Costa Rica seven democratic governments sign the "Declaration of San Jose" outlining conditions for regional peace settlement.
8 Nicaragua refuses to receive Costa Rican Foreign Minister as emissary of group.

January 1983

- 8 Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, and Panama meet on Panama's Contadora Island, issue declaration recommending dialogue and negotiation.

January-April 1983

Nicaragua resists meeting in multilateral setting, opposes idea of comprehensive agreement dealing with all interrelated issues.

February 1983

- 1 "Big Pine," also known as Ahuas Tara, joint U.S.-Honduran military exercises begin.
28 El Salvador Peace Commission, including a representative from the church, established. Efforts focused on promoting the participation of all social and political sectors in the democratic process.

April 1983

- 6 Salvadoran guerrilla leader Melida Anaya Montes ("*Comandante Ana Maria*") is murdered in Managua.
12 Salvador Cayetano Carpio, founder of the FPL and leader of the FMLN, commits suicide in Managua after being accused of ordering Ana Maria's assassination.
15 Eden Pastora, "Commander Zero," announces he will begin military operations with his Sandino Revolutionary Front in southern Nicaragua on May 1.
27 President Reagan announces appointment of a Special Envoy for Central America for purpose of facilitating internal dialogue in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.

June 1983

- 6 Nicaragua expels three U.S. diplomats on false charge of plotting to assassinate the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister; U.S. responds by closing all Nicaraguan consulates outside Washington, D.C.
- 29 RMTC begins training of Honduran and Salvadoran military personnel in Puerto Castilla, Honduras.

July 1983

- 17 Declaration of Cancun of the presidents of the Contadora Group calls for renewed efforts to continue peace process. Declaration sent to President Reagan, Central American chiefs of state, and Fidel Castro.
- 19 Sandinistas announce six-point peace plan, including acceptance of multilateral talks.
- 21 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras propose peace plan drawing on Honduran plan of March 1982 and emphasizing relevance of democratization to peace and stability of region.
- 22 U.S. begins increased naval presence off the Pacific and Caribbean coasts of Central America.
- 23 President Reagan supports Contadora principles in letter to Contadora Group presidents.
- * Honduran PRTC guerrilla force trained in Nicaragua and Cuba infiltrates into the eastern Honduran Department of Olancho.

September 1983

- 9 Contadora Document of Objectives approved by the five Central American states. It sets goals for regional negotiations, including democratic pluralism, national reconciliation, cessation of support to paramilitary forces, arms control, withdrawal of foreign advisers, and verification.

October 1983

- 20 Nicaragua proposes four treaties to implement its July six-point plan, but proposals do not address Contadora objectives of democratic national reconciliation, reductions in arms, and foreign advisers.
- 25 United States and Caribbean nations land military forces on Grenada.

December 1983

- 24 Nicaraguan opposition *Coordinadora* issues communique calling for dialogue leading to open elections.

January 1984

- 10 National Bipartisan Commission on Central America reports to President.

March 1984

- 25 First round of presidential elections held in El Salvador.

April 1984

- 9 Nicaragua files complaint against United States in the International Court of Justice.
- 22 Easter pastoral letter of the Nicaraguan bishops calls for dialogue, including with the armed resistance.

May 1984

- 6 Jose Napoleon Duarte elected President of El Salvador in runoff election.

June 1984

- 1 U.S. Secretary of State Shultz visits Managua to launch bilateral talks in support of reaching a comprehensive Contadora agreement.
- 8-9 Contadora Group submits first draft Contadora agreement to Central American governments for comment by July.
- 25 First of nine rounds of bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua held at Manzanillo, Mexico.

July 1984

- * A 19-member vanguard unit of the Honduran Popular Revolution Force "Lorenzo Zelaya" enters from Nicaragua in an effort to establish a guerrilla network in the Honduran Department of El Paraiso.

September 1984

- 7 Contadora Group submits, for Central American comment by mid-October, revised draft Contadora agreement.
- 21 Nicaragua states willingness to sign September 7 draft on condition that it is approved without modification.
- 25 6th round of Manzanillo talks. Nicaragua adopts September 7 Contadora draft as its negotiating position but rules out any substantive modification.

September-October 1984

- * International and regional efforts fail to induce Sandinistas to allow open, fair competition for November 4 elections.

October 1984

- 2 Daniel Ortega announces at the United Nations that the United States will invade Nicaragua on or after October 15.
- 7 Daniel Ortega, in Los Angeles, California, states that Nicaragua would feel more secure if it became a member of the Warsaw Pact.
- 8 Salvadoran President Duarte at UN General Assembly calls for dialogue with armed opposition; meetings between government and FMLN take place October 15 at La Palma and November 30 at Ayagualo.

November 1984

- 4 Nicaraguan elections held for president and National Assembly without participation of *Coordinadora*, the democratic alliance of the political opposition.
- 19 8th round of Manzanillo talks. United States offers bilateral assurances in return for Nicaraguan acceptance of modifications to September 7 Contadora draft.

December 1984

- 10 9th round of Manzanillo talks. Nicaragua definitively rejects U.S. proposal; proposes bilateral accords in lieu of Contadora, addressing security issues only.

January 1985

- 10 Daniel Ortega sworn in as President of Nicaragua.
- 18 United States suspends Manzanillo meetings pending further developments in the Contadora process.

February 1985

- 22 Statement calling for church-mediated dialogue issued in Managua by the *Coordinadora*.

March 1985

- 1 In San Jose, Costa Rica, the Nicaraguan resistance issues document calling for national dialogue.
- 22 Communique of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference accepting mediation role in dialogue.
- 31 Legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador; fourth free election in 3 years.

April 1985

- 4 President Reagan calls on Nicaraguan Government to accept dialogue.
- 11-12 First meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries reaches agreement in principle on revised verification procedures.

May 1985

- 1 United States announces selective trade embargo of Nicaragua.
- 14 Second meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries. Nicaragua reneges on international corps of inspectors for verification which was agreed to in April.
- 31 Sandinista mortar fire into Costa Rica kills two Costa Rican Civil Guard members. The OAS establishes a special commission to investigate.

June 1985

- 18 Third meeting of Contadora plenipotentiaries disrupted when Nicaragua refuses to consider Contadora Group compromise proposal.

July 1985

- 22 Contadora Group Foreign Ministers announce consultations with each Central American government in lieu of negotiations among plenipotentiaries.

3. Former Guerrillas

This appendix summarizes the careers of individual guerrillas representing four different groups and two officials of Nicaragua's General Directorate of State Security. Each has been involved directly with insurgency against the Governments of El Salvador and Honduras. Their histories give a human picture of the secret involvement of Nicaragua and its allies in supporting revolution in El Salvador and Honduras. About half deserted; the others were captured. Most were active into 1985.

GUERRILLAS

Salvadorans

Marco Antonio GRANDE Rivera defected on May 25, 1985, to Salvadoran security forces in Jucuaran, Usulután. Grande was a political leader and propaganda officer in the "Francisco Sanchez Southeastern Front" of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES/FAL). In 1980, the party awarded Grande a scholarship to study international relations in the Soviet Union. In September 1982, he went from the U.S.S.R. to Cuba for 6 months of military training. In June 1983, he and four other Salvadorans were given Nicaraguan documents and flown to Managua. There, they were taken to a safehouse, which Grande described as a way-station for Salvadoran guerrillas en route to and from El Salvador. Before leaving Nicaragua for El Salvador, Grande and others in the house were visited by various PCES leaders including Shafik Handal. In late July 1983, Grande reentered El Salvador by way of Guatemala.

Napoleon ROMERO Garcia, alias Commander "Miguel Castellanos," was the third-ranking commander of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) until his defection on April 11, 1985. He was responsible for organizing cadres and reviewing political plans, ideological statements, and proposals for military and propaganda action. Since 1979, he had been a member of the FPL Central Committee and Chief of the FPL's Metropolitan Front (San Salvador). He participated in meetings of the committee each year and in its 1983 congress, which took place in Managua. In early October 1983, Romero traveled to

Managua, Havana, Moscow, and Vietnam. In Managua, he spent a week with "Valentin," the FPL chief in Managua. Romero described in detail the logistical network for supplying FMLN guerrillas. He has characterized Nicaragua as the FMLN's "strategic rear guard."

Arquimedes CANADAS, alias Commander "Alejandro Montenegro," was a member of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). He was arrested in August 1982 in Tegucigalpa while en route to Managua. As commander of the Guazapa Front, he twice met Joaquín Villalobos, the ERP commander, at the FMLN command post in Managua. He has described the logistical system for delivering weapons, ammunition, and explosives from the Nicaraguan-Honduran border area of Las Manos across the Honduran-Salvadoran border area of Amatillo to his headquarters at Guazapa. He coordinated the special commando group that attacked the Ilopango military airbase in January 1982. In mid-September 1982, the Honduran guerrillas known as "Cinchoneros" demanded, among other things, Canadas' release in exchange for three Cabinet ministers and more than 100 civilians held hostage.

Domingo BARRERA Castro, alias "Victor," deserted the FPL in December 1982. He had been active in the Popular Revolutionary Bloc and, in January 1980, was sent from an FPL camp in Chalatenango to Cuba for training. He secretly left El Salvador, taking a small boat at night across the Gulf of Fonseca to Nicaragua. From Nicaragua, he flew to Cuba. There, he took a 6-month basic military training course in tactics and the use of weapons and explosives. Later, he attended a 6-month leadership course. After completing his training, he returned to Managua and flew to Guatemala where he took a bus to El Salvador. In Chalatenango, he became an instructor for the FPL and, in December 1981, was named chief of the FPL's Northern Front "Apolinario Serrano." During 1982, Barrera became disillusioned with the war and with the FMLN's treatment of the population and deserted.

Jorge Eduardo PANIAGUA

Verganza was captured by Salvadoran authorities on June 18, 1985. He had been recruited into the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), the armed wing of the Communist Party of El Salvador, in July 1982. He initially drove pickup trucks with secret compartments holding arms and munitions for guerrilla units. The arms had been transported overland from Nicaragua through Honduras into El Salvador. When the Salvadoran security forces broke up this network in April 1983, Paniagua became inactive. He resumed his work for the FAL in July 1984, and 2 months later was assigned to the Metropolitan Front in San Salvador.

William Daly RAMOS Orellana, arrested by Salvadoran authorities on August 9, 1984, was recruited for the FPL in 1978. In July 1982, he traveled to Costa Rica and then to Nicaragua, where he stayed for nearly 2 weeks before flying to Cuba. In Cuba, he attended a 3-month course in recruiting techniques and methods for organizing "masses." He then returned to El Salvador where he became a recruiter for the FPL's "Clara Elizabeth Ramirez" Front (CERF).

Maria Elsy QUIJADA Valle, alias "Delmy," was captured by the Salvadoran National Police in September 1984. She had joined the FPL in May 1979. In September 1980, she traveled by bus to Guatemala and then flew to Nicaragua. After 2 weeks in Managua, she flew to Cuba for a military training course. In January 1981, she returned to Nicaragua and then traveled overland through Honduras to El Salvador.

Felicitó MENJIVAR Briones, alias "Monico," surrendered to Salvadoran authorities on January 30, 1985. He was an activist in the Popular Revolutionary Bloc before being recruited into the FPL. In May 1980, he was sent from an FPL camp in Chalatenango to Cuba. He left El Salvador for Nicaragua on the La Unión-Potosí ferry. From Nicaragua, he flew to Cuba for a 6-month basic military course in weapons, explosives, and tactics. He spent 6 months in Nicaragua working with some 300 Salvadorans from all five factions of the FMLN. In 1981, he flew from Managua to Guatemala and traveled by bus to El

Salvador. He became a squad leader for an FPL platoon, serving first near Jucuaran and later Chalatenango. During an operation to disrupt the March 1984 elections, he was seriously wounded.

Ramon Aristides CHICAS Claros, alias "Tilo," defected on April 8, 1984. He was recruited into the ERP in May 1981. He spent his first year growing food for guerrilla units in Morazan. He made five trips to Santo Domingo, Honduras, to pick up supplies. In August 1982, Chicas was transferred to a guerrilla camp at Guarumas. The camp was supplied with arms, munitions, and uniforms from Cuba by sea from Nicaragua. In December 1982, he became a bodyguard for the commander of the "Rafael Arce Zablah" Brigade (BRAZ).

Santos Enrique GARCIA Chilulo, alias "Quique," was an ERP member from 1981 until his capture by Salvadoran security forces on July 27, 1985. He joined the ERP in August 1981 while he was living in Chinandega, Nicaragua. In January 1982, he was sent to Cuba for a weapons training course, which also was attended by several dozen Salvadorans. In May 1982, he returned to Nicaragua where in September he began 6 months' training in combat tactics at Montelimar. When not in training overseas, Garcia lived in ERP safehouses in Managua. According to Garcia, ERP units in Managua include a special forces group and a propaganda team, which prints fliers and counterfeit documents and recruits from among the estimated 20,000 Salvadoran refugees now living in Nicaragua.

Jose Juan MENJIVAR was a member of the FPL from December 1982 until he defected in January 1985. In 1981, he spent several months in a refugee camp in Honduras before entering Nicaragua with false documents in August 1981. He was arrested by Sandinista security forces and held for 2 months as a suspected spy for the Honduran Government. On his release in October 1981, he was sent to a refugee camp in Leon Department where he lived for more than a year. In December 1982, he was recruited by a Salvadoran working for the FPL in Nicaragua and reinfilitrated into El Salvador.

Adin INGLES Alvarado, alias "Vidal," the second-ranking member of the special forces of the FPL, defected to the Salvadoran Armed Forces on May 19, 1985. The special forces group was formed in February 1983 as an elite combat unit for special missions. Nicaragua provided explosives and other equipment. The original 28 members were sent to Cuba to train and to develop operations plans. While in Cuba, they rehearsed an attack against the military headquarters of the 4th Brigade at El Paraiso in Chalatenango Department. They successfully carried out the attack in December 1983. When Ingles defected, 12 new recruits were in training programs abroad.

Maria Marta Concepcion VALLADARES de Lemus, alias "Nidia Diaz" or "Claudia Novale," was a guerrilla commander of the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC). During President Duarte's first discussion with guerrillas on October 15, 1984, in La Palma, Diaz was one of three FMLN commanders present. Among the documents captured with her on April 18, 1985, were archives of the PRTC, including correspondence between the FMLN and the FSLN, notes of meetings, and other PRTC and FMLN documents.

Hondurans

Jorge Alberto GALVEZ, alias "Manuel," was captured in El Salvador on June 28, 1985, in the course of government efforts to solve the murder of 13 people at a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador on June 19, 1985. He was a Honduran member of the Salvadoran PRTC guerrilla organization. Galvez was born in Tegucigalpa and graduated from the Honduran national university in 1983. In late July 1983, he flew to Managua where he worked with seven other Hondurans and Nicaraguans at the Center for Economic Studies of Honduras. In November 1984, a Salvadoran member of the PRTC recruited Galvez to work inside El Salvador. In December 1984, Galvez flew to El Salvador's international airport at Comalapa and was taken to a PRTC camp in the Cerros de San Pedro.

Hondurans involved in the El Paraiso operation and captured between July and October 1984 by the Honduran Armed Forces: Arnulfo Montoya Maradiaga, alias "Felipe" or "Elias"; Gregorio Pinto Arevalo, alias "Guilberto Lopez Aballero" or "Jose Maria Reconco Zuniga" or "Ruben

Agapito"; Pedro Antonio Ginon Reyes, alias "Rolando"; Ricardo de Jesus Ramirez Lemus, alias "Hector Caballero Chavez" or "Mario"; and Ana Rosa Rivera Perla, alias "Betty." All were members of the Popular Revolutionary Force "Lorenzo Zelaya" (FPR-LZ). Operationally, they were part of the 19-member Popular Revolutionary Committee "Camilo Torres," which began infiltrating into Honduras from Nicaragua in July 1984 to establish a guerrilla network.

They have identified the FSLN's Department of International Relations (DRI) as essential in providing food, lodging, transportation, and training while in Nicaragua. They also stated that they were members of an "International Brigade" led by Sandinista military officers that fought Nicaraguan armed resistance forces in the Jalapa area of northern Nicaragua. They reported that the same "brigade" included some 50 Costa Rican members of the Popular Vanguard Party.

NICARAGUAN SECURITY PERSONNEL

Miguel BOLANOS Hunter was a member of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). A Sandinista since 1978, he defected in May 1983. For 4 years, Bolanos worked in the F-7 (Mass Organizations) and F-2 (Foreign Diplomats) sections of the DGSE. He described the FMLN logistics structure established by the Sandinistas in Managua. According to Bolanos, members of the FSLN Directorate, the DRI, the Fifth Directorate, the Ministry of Interior, and the armed forces oversee the deliveries to the FMLN.

Reymundo MUNOZ Diaz and six other DGSE agents were arrested by Honduran security services in April 1985. While a member of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), he commanded a group of DGSE agents whose mission was to smuggle weapons to the "Cinchoneros" in Honduras. Beginning in November 1984, Munoz made three trips to Honduras transporting M-16 rifles and other weapons by hiding them in corn-filled gunnysacks carried by mules.

4. Nicaraguans in Exile

Sandinista internationalism has victimized Nicaraguans as well as Nicaragua's neighbors. Part of the problem arises from the irony that the movement that bears the name of Sandino, a nationalist who rejected communist ties, has sacrificed Nicaraguan nationalism to internationalism.¹ This has intensified the suffering of ordinary Nicaraguan citizens. In the political arena, many of those who opposed Somoza and supported the Sandinistas in 1979 were forced into exile as the prospects of an open, democratic system of government emerging in Nicaragua faded.

Fears that the FSLN's new men with guns would be dominant were initially discounted in the hope that the Sandinistas would understand that governing a country demanded a different approach from that required to overthrow a dictator. Indeed, the pro-

grams and early legislation of the new Government of National Reconstruction (GRN) gave the Nicaraguan people, its neighbors, and the international community as a whole reason to hope that the dictatorial patterns of the past had been broken.²

Within a year, however, Violeta de Chamorro³ and Alfonso Robelo,⁴ two non-Sandinista members of the GRN junta, resigned in protest at Sandinista actions. Nonetheless, the Sandinistas retained a facade of pluralism by appointing non-Sandinistas in their place.⁵ Nicaragua kept good relations with Western countries and received substantial amounts of assistance for the reconstruction of Nicaraguan society.

Sandinista intentions regarding the future direction of Nicaraguan society became more explicit in mid-1980 when Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announced the postponement until 1985 of the elections promised in the junta's program. Controls over the press and the private sector were expanded substantially.⁶ A "State of Economic and Social Emergency" was declared which, among other things, made it a crime to spread "false" economic news or to engage in strikes.⁷ Sandinista Defense Committees, block organizations following a Cuban model, served as the "eyes and ears" of the FSLN in detecting antiregime sentiment and organizing support for Sandinista activities.⁸ After rationing began, they assumed a role in the distribution of some food and other essential goods to party members and nonmembers alike.

¹FSLN leaders claim the problem does not exist because their situation is unique. "Ours is one of the few revolutions, perhaps the only one, that achieved the formation of a vast alliance, internal as well as external" (Victor Tirado Lopez, *Barricada*, December 17, 1984).

²Among many other explicit undertakings, the junta promised:

- Full respect for enumerated human rights, including freedom of the press and of thought, conscience, and worship;
- The unrestricted functioning of political parties regardless of ideology;
- An independent and nonaligned foreign policy;
- A mixed economy and support for Central American integration;
- Establishment of union rights and guarantee of the right to strike; and
- A "minimum" permanent military establishment.

These promises and many others were set forth in the July 9 program provided to the OAS, the July 20 Fundamental Statute, and the September 17 Law on Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans.

³"When after a few months I realized that the course promised did not correspond to what was being done, I left the Junta . . .

The principles for which we all fought until we won the departure from power of Anastasio Somoza Debayle have been flagrantly betrayed by the party in power, that is, the Sandinist Front of National Liberation . . ." Violeta B. de Chamorro, August 13, 1985 (letter addressed to the Honorable Joao Baena Soares, OAS Secretary General, Washington, D.C.).

⁴"I withdrew from the government junta on 22 April 1980 after very serious disagreements with the Sandinist National Liberation Front . . . [which] because it had the arms, imposed some Marxist-Leninist deviations. . . I knew that there were Marxists within the Sandinist Front. I was not aware that there was complete Marxist-Leninist control . . ." (Alfonso Robelo, February 1981, in an interview by Francisco Talavera in Managua, Nicaragua, as published by *ABC*, Madrid, March 12, 1981, pp. 8-9). Other prominent Nicaraguans who left official positions in the government include: Jose Francisco Cardenal, named Vice President of the Council of State in 1980 but resigned soon after his appointment; Edgard Macias, anti-Somoza militant, head of the Popular Social Christian Party and former Vice Minister of Labor in the GRN; Jaime Montealegre, former Vice President of the Council of State; and Alvaro Taboada, former Sandinista ambassador to Ecuador.

⁵Among the factors precipitating the departure of Chamorro and Robelo was the FSLN's consolidation of its effective control over the government by modifying the composition of the Council of State to ensure a

majority would represent Sandinista organizations. Only then was the council, a representative "revolutionary" body in theory coequal with the junta, convened for the first time. Despite efforts by Sandinista authorities to distinguish between them, from this date the FSLN and the Government of Nicaragua must be considered as essentially identical.

⁶By 1979 the FSLN had decided that "In July 1979, pressures . . . to preserve the bourgeois democratic approach . . . failed" ("*72-Hour Document*," p. 12—see footnote 4, p. 3). The FSLN rapidly took over almost all press outlets, in the end leaving only *La Prensa*, a symbol of resistance to Somoza and of the regime's "commitment" to pluralism, any degree of independence. Censorship "regarding matters that relate to the country's domestic security" was first instituted by Decree 512, issued in August 1980. It has been expanded on several occasions since then. The private sector has been intimidated and its independence curtailed through constant political attacks, regulation, and control of raw materials and foreign exchange.

⁷*La Gaceta*, September 10, 1981. These rights were further limited in 1982 by the "Law of National Emergency" (*La Gaceta*, March 20, 1982).

⁸Robert S. Leiken, "Nicaragua's Untold Stories," *The New Republic* (October 8, 1984), pp. 46, 50.

By 1982, the Sandinistas were openly abandoning the program on the basis of which the GRN had taken power in 1979. Civil rights were suspended in March 1982, when the GRN declared a state of emergency. The government moved against independent trade unions, intimidated business leaders, and began in January 1982 the well-publicized relocation of the Miskito Indians from their traditional homelands on the Atlantic coast. The Sandinistas were also by this time encouraging the development of the "people's church" against the established church hierarchy. The latter, including Archbishop (now Cardinal) Miguel Obando y Bravo, had initially been among the Sandinistas' most important allies in the battle against Somoza.

By November 1984, when the Sandinistas held elections earlier than previously announced, the prospects for peaceful opposition to their rule had been considerably diminished. All the major communications outlets, with the exception of *La Prensa* and a few private radio stations, were in the hands of the Sandinistas. All government bureaucracies and key ministries were in FSLN control. The Sandinista Workers Central had undermined the strength of non-Sandinista trade unions, such as the Nicaraguan Worker's Central (CTN) and the Confederation of Labor Unification (CUS). The party's youth and women's wings in conjunction with the Sandinista Defense Committees had effective control over mass mobilization. The state share of GNP had risen from roughly 15% in 1978 to more than 40%, and Sandinista efforts to expand their economic control were continuing.⁹

In this context, the November 1984 elections were another step in the anti-democratic direction set by the FSLN. Although an Independent Liberal Party (PLI) and a conservative group won substantial voter support, the main opposition, the *Coordinadora Democrática*, refused to participate in the elections when it became clear that the FSLN was doing everything possible to prevent the mounting of an effective campaign by the democratic opposition.

Those measures included mob violence against rallies, party candidates, and headquarters; rationing of campaign resources and media time to ensure that the well-established FSLN organizational resources and media dominance were preserved; and reduction of the voting age to 16 to expand the voting lists with persons educated only under Sandinista rule.¹⁰

Not surprisingly, concern over the Sandinistas' progressive abandonment of the original program of the revolution

These will not be elections to decide who is in power, because the people hold power through their vanguard, the Frente Sandinista.

Humberto Ortega
August 1980¹¹

led to disagreements among those in the government who had joined in alliance with the FSLN and among some members of the FSLN itself. The departure of Chamorro and Robelo from the junta in 1980 presaged the 1981 resignation of the former Vice Minister of Defense and Sandinista war hero Eden Pastora, who, in April 1982, declared that the revolution had betrayed its ideals.

As the opportunities for effective and peaceful political opposition diminished, armed resistance to the regime began to evolve to include a broader base of leadership, recruitment, and support. Both Pastora and Robelo began armed opposition in 1983. The Sandinistas have maintained an unwavering policy of refusing to enter into a dialogue with the resistance, many of whose leaders came together in the summer of 1985 to form the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO).

Selected Biographies

Arturo Jose CRUZ Porras, a longtime member of the Conservative Party, is an economist who holds graduate and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University. He has specialized in development banking and has worked for the Inter-American Development Bank. He was jailed twice by Somoza, once for 3 months and later for 11 months. In 1977, Cruz was invited by the Sandinistas to be one of "The Group of 12," prominent Nicaraguans who would serve as a bridge between the Sandinistas and other groups in the civil opposition to Somoza. Following the revolution, Cruz served as president of the Central Bank in 1979-80, as a member of the governing junta from May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States from June 1981 until his resignation in December in protest over Sandinista policies. Cruz was the presidential candidate of the unified opposition in the November 1984 elections but refused to register his candidacy in protest over the Sandinista government's refusal to permit a fair electoral contest. He helped found UNO in 1985.

Alfredo CESAR Aguirre earned a B.S. degree in industrial relations from the University of Texas and an M.B.A. from Stanford University. After serving as general administrator of the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, he joined the Sandinistas in 1978 and was tortured and imprisoned by the government during Somoza's last year. After Somoza fell in 1979, Cesar became executive director of the International Reconstruction Fund. In 1980-81 he was executive director of the Banking Superior Council. In 1981-82 he was president of the Central Bank. After breaking with the Sandinistas, Cesar went into exile in Costa Rica and became an adviser to the Costa Rican Government specializing in external debt. In mid-1985 he became the most prominent of six founding members of the Southern Opposition Bloc.

⁹See H. W. Krumwiede, "Sandinist Democracy: Problems of Institutionalization," in Grabendorff, Krumwiede, et al., *Political Change in Central America: Internal and External Dimensions* (Boulder and London, 1984), pp. 70-72.

¹⁰The formal correctness of the elections themselves was reminiscent of Somoza's 1974 charade which Nicaragua's Catholic bishops characterized as "legal war." Also see "Sandinistas Claim Big Election Victory," *New York Times*, November 6, 1984; "Nicaraguans Go to the Polls," *Washington Post*, November 5, 1984.

¹¹Quoted from "This Week: Central America and Panama," September 1, 1980, and cited by Thomas A. Anderson, *Politics in Central America* (New York, 1982), p. 179. Ortega was referring to the elections scheduled for 1985, actually held in 1984.

Adolfo CALERO Portocarrero, a lifelong opponent of Somoza, has been president of the National Directorate and commander in chief of the armed forces of the FDN since December 1983. Calero graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1953, did graduate work in industrial management at Syracuse University, and holds a law degree from the University of Central America in Nicaragua. He began his political career in the 1950s as an activist in the Conservative Party. In 1959 he helped organize managerial strikes in support of an insurrection headed by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily *La Prensa*. In 1978, Calero served as his party's representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), and was jailed for initiating a general strike against Somoza. After attempting to cooperate with the Sandinistas, Calero went into exile at the end of 1982. He helped found UNO in 1985.

Enrique BERMUDEZ Varela is the military commander of the FDN armed forces. He served in the National Guard under Somoza and was assigned to Washington as defense attache in 1977. In December 1982, he was cleared of "war crimes" by the FSLN's chief press spokesman. He has described himself as a professional soldier and, under Somoza, apolitical. He is a graduate of the Nicaraguan Military Academy and received training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army School of the Americas. He also received military training in Brazil.

Alfonso ROBELO Callejas, political coordinator of ARDE and head of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), was trained as a chemical engineer. He served as director of the University of Central America from 1970 to 1972 and was president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce until 1975. He then headed the development institute INDE. Following the assassination of *La Prensa* editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, Robelo founded the MDN, a moderate, democratic-oriented political party of businessmen, industrialists, and professionals opposed to the Somoza

I am an internationalist because I am a free man and I want to contribute to the liberation of all men . . . [But] in this moment, I express the sentiments of the majority of Nicaraguans when I say that the hour has arrived when they [the internationalists] should leave us alone—those who are not involved in activities that contribute to health and education. As someone who loves my people I take honor, like Sandino, in calling for all Nicaraguans to put themselves on a war footing as long as there is a foreign soldier on the native soil.

Eden Pastora, April 15, 1982¹²

I joined the Revolutionary Government with . . . the conviction that the Revolution would be good, first and foremost, for Nicaragua. My experience has disillusioned me: dogmatism and adventurism seem to have wiped out the democratic and pluralistic ideals which, in 1979, united all Nicaraguan advocates of freedom. . . . Certain Sandinista revolutionary leaders . . . [profess] allegiance to an internationalist ideology . . . at the expense of the basic interests of the nation-state of Nicaragua. [Emphasis in original]

Arturo Cruz, 1983¹³

regime. After the revolution Robelo was one of the five members of the original 1979 junta. He resigned in 1980 because of Marxist tendencies in the FSLN-dominated government and the growing Cuban influence in the country. Harassed by the FSLN after his resignation, he was finally forced into exile in 1982, at which time he and Eden Pastora founded the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, ARDE. In 1985, Robelo helped found UNO.

Eden PASTORA Gomez, the legendary Commander Zero and leader of the FRS (Sandino Revolutionary Front), was the Sandinistas' most popular hero and a senior official of their government until he distanced himself from them in 1981. In August 1978 Pastora led the unit that captured the National Palace in Managua. That operation gained the release of 59 political prisoners, but its lasting significance was that it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people and enabled the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to Somoza. After the fall of Somoza,

Pastora became Vice Minister of Interior and then Vice Minister of Defense. In April 1982 he announced his opposition to the Sandinista regime. That same year he was cofounder of ARDE. In April 1983 he took up arms against the Sandinistas in southern Nicaragua.

Wycliffe DIEGO is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic coast town of Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian pastor and an active member of the Miskito organization ALPROMISU. He was jailed by Somoza in 1971 for allegedly being a communist. When MISURASATA was formed in 1979, Diego served as a member of its executive board. Reacting to the Sandinista mistreatment of Nicaragua's indigenous population, Diego went into exile and helped found the armed resistance group MISURA. He was wounded in a Sandinista-engineered 1982 assassination attempt.

¹²Statement read in San Jose, Costa Rica, announcing his break with the FSLN and reported in *FBIS*, April 16, 1982. The translation used here is that of Shirley Christian, *Nicaragua, Revolution in the Family* (New York, Random House, 1985), p. 321.

¹³Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1983), pp. 1031-1032.

5. Rifles From Vietnam

In June 1980, the Secretary General of the Communist Party of El Salvador, Jorge Shafik Handal, visited Vietnam in search of weapons. He was promised 60 tons of arms and ammunition, including M-16 automatic rifles.¹

The U.S. Government has, since early 1981, traced the serial numbers of almost 1,600 M-16s² captured from Salvadoran guerrillas, turned in by defecting guerrillas,³ or, on the basis of captured guerrilla documents, still in guerrilla hands.

The traces show that 66% of these arms can be positively identified as having been shipped directly to South Vietnam,⁴ to depots involved in shipment to Southeast Asia during the Vietnam conflict, or as having been manufactured by U.S. companies contracted only for materiel for the Vietnam war.⁵ The 34% unrelated to Vietnam include 27% made up of weapons originally shipped to the

Last Delivery Point in U.S. Records

Delivery Point	No. of Weapons
Vietnam	581
U.S. military units during the 1960s with prob- able delivery to Vietnam	237
Unknown, but probably Vietnam	236
El Salvador	433
Other	101
TOTAL	1,588

Salvadoran Armed Forces⁶ and 7% traceable to other destinations.

In March 1981, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, Sandinista Directorate member Humberto Ortega, traveled to Hanoi. In a speech given there March 11, Ortega said:

We sincerely thank the Vietnamese people and highly value their support for the heroic Salvadoran people . . . the fierce and bloody struggle in El Salvador requires the support of all progressive nations and forces throughout the world.⁷

Also in 1981, William Shawcross traveled to Vietnam and asked:

Had Vietnam been distributing any of the vast pile of weapons left by the Americans? Colonel Bui Tin acknowledged, in effect, that it had. In Salvador? "It's not fair to say the U.S. can help the junta but we cannot help our friends. We do our best to support revolutionary movements in the world . . ."⁸

¹"Vietnam. From 9 to 15 June. Received by [high-ranking party and military leaders] . . . They agreed to provide aid in weapons, the first shipments consisting of . . . 1,620 AR-15 rifles . . . one and one half million AR-15 cartridges . . . approximate weight of the entire shipment: 60 tons . . . The above-mentioned materiel will be ready for shipment during the first five days of September" (quoted from "Gira por los paises socialistas, Asia y Africa" [Trip to the Socialist Countries, Asia, and Africa], *Documents*, E, p. 1).

² Some guerrilla documents refer to M-16s as AR-15s. Both nomenclatures describe the same automatic rifle. The original manufacturer, the Armalite Division of Fairchild Industries, designated the rifle the AR-15. The U.S. Army subsequently designated it the M-16. Colt Industries manufactured the definitive M-16 model, currently priced at \$446 each.

³Under a Salvadoran Government program, guerrillas who turn in weapons, or pro-

vide information leading to the capture of weapons, are given monetary rewards commensurate with the type and number of weapons turned in.

⁴The sample below illustrates this category. Colt Industries, Hartford, Connecticut, manufacturers of M-16 rifles, furnished the following information on the disposition of weapons identified individually by their serial number:

WSN 725668, shipped 10 May 67, M/F USA Support CMD, SAIGON, Vietnam.

WSN 1209738, shipped 2 Oct 68, M/F Naval Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam.

WSN 1237980, shipped 29 Oct 68, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam.

WSN 1396129, shipped 19 Feb 69, M/F 250 ORD SVC CTR, NHA TRANG, Vietnam.

WSN 1207644, shipped 3 Oct 68, M/F USN Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam.

WSN 1181866, shipped 16 Sep 68, M/F 241 ORD CO, CAN THO, Vietnam.

WSN 1237618, shipped 27 Oct 68, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam.

WSN 1558102, shipped 31 May 69, M/F 230 ORD SVC CTR III ALC, SAIGON, Vietnam.

WSN 961419, shipped 19 MAR 68, M/F USA depot, CAM RANH BAY, Vietnam.

WSN 728973, shipped 10 May 67, M/F USA SPT CMD, SAIGON, Vietnam.

WSN 1498058, shipped 23 Apr 69, M/F 241 ORD SUP CO, CAN THO, Vietnam.

WSN 1208988, shipped 3 Oct 68, M/F USN Support Act, SAIGON, Vietnam.

⁵General Motors manufactured the 3,000,000 series in the 1960s, and records on these weapons have since been destroyed; however, the large majority of these weapons were shipped to Vietnam.

⁶The first shipment of M-16s to El Salvador from the United States began after January 16, 1981, in response to the realization that the FMLN's "final offensive" was being supplied through Nicaragua.

⁷Hanoi VNA in English, March 11, 1981 (reported in *FBIS*, Vol. IV (Asia and Pacific), March 12, 1981, p. K8).

⁸*New York Review of Books*, September 14, 1981.

6. FMLN Evaluation of the 1981 Offensive¹

FARABUNDO MARTI FRONT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION

TO THE SALVADOREAN PEOPLE

TO THE PEOPLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA
AND THE WORLD

The General Command of the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) declares to all its sister peoples—those of Central America and of all the world—that the great operation comprised in the plan for the launching of the general revolutionary offensive, begun on the 10th of January, was carried out with success by the regular units, guerrilla and militia units of our popular revolutionary army.

Since the 10th of January, when this General Command of the FMLN issued the orders for the offensive 1 and 2, the revolutionary armed forces carried out the following actions.

In the Central Front— Modesto Ramirez

- Seige of the barracks of Chalatenango and the capture of the city during the 10, 11 and 12th days of January.
- Seige of the barracks of Paraiso and control of the access routes between this point and the city of Chalatenango during the 10th, 11th and 12th days of January.
- Attacks at enemy garrisons in the towns of San Antonio La Cruz, Arcatao, La Palma Patanera, San Francisco Morazan, San Antonio Los Ranchos, all in the province of Chalatenango.
- Taking of Suchitoto and seige of the enemy garrison on January 11 and 12.
- Capture of the city of Apopa on the 10th of January.
- Control of the communication routes between the Troncal del Norte highway and the towns of Aguilaes, Suchitoto and San Jose Guayabal.

In San Salvador

- The capture of three radio stations on the 11th of January.
- Attack on the Air Force. The Air Force was unable to take off for several days.
- The taking of Soyapango, Mejicanos, Cuscatancingo, and fighting in Ciudad Delgado, Tonacatepeque.
- Control of the highways of San Marcos, Santo Tomas and Comalapa.
- Harassment of the barracks of the National Guard and of the Rural Police.

Western Front—Jose Feliciano Amas

- Attack against the 2nd Infantry Brigade in the city of Santa Ana, a unit in which a company of soldiers led by two officers rose up and went over to fight with the people and the FMLN on the 10th of January, after burning the arsenal of the garrison.
- Attacks against the barracks of the National Police, the National Guard and the Rural Police, on the 10th, 11th and 12th of January in Santa Ana.
- Attack on the enemy garrisons in Metapan, in the province of Santa Ana, and the capture of the city on the 12th and 13th of January.
- Attack on the enemy barracks and popular insurrection in the city of Chalchuapa, the second largest in the province of Santa Ana; attacks on the enemy garrisons in San Julian, Armenia, Acajutla, Sonsonate, Cara Sucia and Bola de Monte.
- Attack on the Border Police, the 10th of January in Santa Ana.

In the Nearcentral Front— Anastacio Aquino

- Attack and harassment of the National Guard barracks of Villa Victoria.
- Capture and annihilation of enemy military units in Cinquera in the province of Cabanas on January 12th.

- Harassment of enemy forces in Jutiapa the 14th of January.
- Capture of Santa Clara, on January 11th.
- Continuous attacks in Tecoluca between the 10th and 15th of January.
- Harassing actions against the barracks of the city of San Vicente from the 11th of January on.
- Control of the Pan American Highway, from San Rafael Cedros to Apastepeque.
- Control of the coastal highway from Puente de Oro to Zacatecoluca.

Eastern Front—Francisco Sanchez

- Occupation of the city of Perquin and assault on the enemy garrison on the 11th of January, in the province of Morazan.
- Occupation of the city of Osicala, Morazan on January 13th.
- Occupation of the cities of El Rosario, Corinto, Nueva Esparta, Santa Rosa de Lima on the 12th of January (provinces of Morazan and La Union).
- Seige and assault on the barracks at Gotera during the 13, 14 and 15 of January.
- Ambush at the top of Rio Seco of a powerful column of reinforcements marching to Gotera from the Central Barracks of the Infantry Brigade stationed in San Miguel. This column, which included armored vehicles and artillery, was stopped and in large part disorganized.
- Ambush of reinforcements that were going from La Leona to the city of Puerto de La Union.
- Diversionary actions were carried out in the city of San Miguel.
- Control of the highways between San Miguel and Gotera, between San Miguel and Usulután and El Delirio.

¹Appendix 12, "Evaluation by the General Command of the FMLN Upon the First Phase of the General Offensive," pp. 84-88 of the FMLN-FDR booklet, *El Salvador on the Threshold of a Democratic*

Revolutionary Victory, distributed in the United States in English during February-March 1981 (complete text and spelling as in original).

The high degree of coordination of those actions in the four war fronts, the strength of the attacks, the high moral of our fighters—demonstrate clearly the high military capacity of our forces.

During several days, they managed to annihilate numerous positions, lay siege to and contain strategic military units of the genocidal Junta, stop its communications and supplies, intercept the reinforcements that were sent in the majority of the few cases where the enemy high command was able to move troops in the national territory.

The impact of the initial phase of the general offensive on the ranks of the puppet and assassin army, managed to draw from its ranks patriotic officers and soldiers of our people who are today fighting with their brothers, directing their arms against the real enemies of our people, a valient attitude that is a vibrant call to those decent officers and soldiers who still remain within the structures of the fascist command.

Today, the Salvadorean workers, the entire people, can have proof that their vanguard, the FMLN, has known how to forge the instruments that will bring about a total revolutionary victory.

In San Salvador, where the elite strategic forces of the enemy are concentrated and where the massacre that the fascist dictatorship has carried out for several years reached its highest volume in 1980, the working masses most conscious carried out with great valor the call for the strike. The FMLN recognizes that, except for the attack on the central base of the Air Force, it did not manage to strike the forceful military blows in the capital that were needed to sustain the full development of the strike and to set off the popular insurrection.

The genocidal government has tried to take advantage of this fact through its delirious and lying propaganda. Other voices have also been heard making superficial judgements about the

supposed refusal of the popular masses in the capital to take the road of revolution. We are absolutely certain that the heroic and combative people of San Salvador will give full lie to such speculations and we call upon them to prepare for the coming battles, at the same time that we call upon the ranks of our member organizations of the FMLN and their revolutionary armed forces to organize in all details the coming great revolutionary actions in San Salvador.

The Junta has had no recourse but to seek the support of mercenaries and launch a lying campaign of propaganda, backing itself with the muzzling of the means of communications, including permanently tying together all the radio stations.

But this will not permit it to make up for its losses, nor recover the initiative in the war. Our forces, within the context of the general offensive, are now carrying out a necessary and previously planned movement that guarantees the continuation of the offensive to new and higher phases.

The military-Christian Democratic Junta and its murderous armed forces were rocked by the energetic initiation of our general offensive. Desperately, they seized upon the intensification of the repressive terror against an unarmed population as other rotten dictatorships had done as their end approached. They established the curfew and the Martial Law with this end to this end.

The government of the United States rushed to facilitate and increase the sending of military advisors, arms and ammunition to help the Junta maintain itself and extend the massacre against our people. At the same time, the imperialists are threatening the Nicaraguan people and, with the new interventionist steps they have taken, are shaping up the serious danger of the extension of the conflict to all of Central America, thus threatening the peace of the world.

The FMLN, at the head of the heroic Salvadorean people, will continue advancing in its struggle to the final liberation of our people, without taking fright before the stubborn imperialist intervention.

The people of Sandino, who opened the future of Central America, will not kneel before the imperialists. The people of Central America, who are now living in the most important hour of their history, will close ranks to prevent the sad murderous designs of imperialism from coming to pass.

Nine of every ten U.S. made bullets that come into the hands of the Junta go directly to spill the blood of the unarmed population, and are designed to kill children, women and the elderly. Each new step that imperialism takes in its military escalation against the Salvadorean people, increases the threat against the Nicaraguan revolution and against peace in Central America and the Caribbean, and threatens the peace of the world.

We are sure that the peoples of the world and the governments that love peace and defend the principles of self-determination, will raise their powerful voices and set in motion their actions of solidarity to hold back the military escalation of U.S. imperialism against the Salvadorean people.

Forward fighters, forward guerrillas and militias, forward companeros workers and patriotic soldiers, continue the battles that will bring peace, justice, liberty and true independence to our native country.

**UNITED IN THE FIGHT
TO THE FINAL VICTORY!
REVOLUTION OR DEATH,
WE WILL WIN!**

**SALVADOR CAYETANO CARPIO
(MARCIAL)**

SCHAFIK JORGE HANDAL

ROBERTO ROCA

**IN REPRESENTATION OF JOAQUIN
VILLALOBOS—JUAN RAMON MEDRANO**

FERMAN CIENFUEGOS

January 21, 1981

7. Sources

Many of the materials used in this study are readily available in major libraries. In addition to magazines and newspapers, examples of such readily available materials include the *Daily Report* (Vol. VI, Latin America) of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (cited herein as *FBIS*), which records in English translation significant news items from throughout the world. Also widely available are the annual volumes of *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents*, published by the Office of the Historian, Department of State, Washington, D.C., and other U.S. Government publications.¹

Unfortunately, many other primary sources for the study of contemporary history are not as readily available. As the Central American conflict has continued, however, the number of people who have discussed their experiences and direct participation in the conflict has increased. Two separate appendices to this study are dedicated to such people—frequently among the most valuable contributors to the understanding of contemporary events (see Appendices 3 and 4).

Then there are written records. Between the day in November 1980 when Salvadoran police found a cache of documents hidden in the walls of the home of the brother of the Secretary General of the Salvadoran Communist Party, and the day in April 1985 when Salvadoran Army units captured Commander Nidia Diaz along with archives of the Central Committee of the PRTC after a battle near a regional command post, literally thousands of Salvadoran guerrilla documents—including letters, diaries, travel records, weapons inventories, and related papers—have been captured. These now include, in addition to the PCES and PRTC files mentioned above, major records of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) captured in January 1981. Three of the five major components of the FMLN may, therefore, be studied through their own words and records.

These FMLN documents constitute an invaluable original source and will be made available to scholars and other interested analysts in a manner similar to that of the documents obtained in Grenada which were deposited in the National Archives.²

Finally, some sources have been consulted but cannot be released to the public for reasons of national security. They include:

- Telegrams, memoranda, reports, and other records retained by the Foreign Affairs Information Management Center (A/FAIM) and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA), Department of State.

- Telegrams to and from U.S. diplomatic posts in Central America, especially Nicaragua, including restricted-distribution records, as maintained in the Information Management Section of the Executive Secretariat (S/S-I), Department of State.

- Records of the U.S. intelligence community with both technical and human source reporting, including information from Nicaraguans from all walks of life, members of the Nicaraguan intelligence and security organizations, as well as full debriefing by various security services in the region of captured insurgents and defectors.

One final caveat—the fact that an open citation is given for a particular event does not imply the absence of corroborating classified information. In some cases, unclassified sources were sought out to protect classified ones.

¹Examples of recent publications related to this one include:

Sustaining a Consistent Policy in Central America: One Year After the National Bipartisan Commission Report, report to the President from the Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Special Report No. 124, April 1985.

The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C., March 1985.

"News Briefing on Intelligence Information on External Support of the Guerrillas in El Salvador," U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Thomas R. Pickering and Gen. Paul F. Gorman, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command, at the State Department, Washington, D.C., August 8, 1984.

Background Paper: Nicaragua's Military Build-up and Support for Central American Subversion, Departments of State and Defense, Washington, D.C., July 18, 1984.

²Copies of 19 documents from the PCES and ERP caches were made available to the press by the Department of State, accompanied by English translations on February 23, 1981 (see footnote 2, p. 5 of this study).

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