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SANDINISTA REPRESSION OF THE MEDIA: CENSORSHIP AND MONOPOLY

The Sandinista government, in its drive to establish totalitarian control over Nicaragua, has placed tight controls on the dissemination of information in Nicaragua by

- o direct control over television, radio, and print media.
- o strict censorship of the media.

Sandinista Information: Immediately following the revolution, the Sandinista party took over much of the electronic and print media and transformed them into mouthpieces for the FSLN party.

- o Nicaragua's two television stations were incorporated into the Sandinista Television System.
- o The Sandinistas seized a number of radio stations, a major means of communication in Nicaragua, and developed a national radio network called Radio Sandino.
- o The remaining independent radio stations are subject to censorship and are required to broadcast Sandinista material as "public service programs." Only Sandinista news programs may be broadcast.
- o The Sandinistas founded Barricada, the FSLN party newspaper, and subsidize El Nuevo Diario, another daily.

State of Emergency, 1982: In 1979, the only legal restrictions on freedom of the press were widely accepted prohibitions against pornography, alcoholic beverage advertisements, and sexual exploitation of women. Later, politically motivated restrictions on subjects related to national security and economic matters were enacted which, when broadly interpreted, permitted Sandinista censorship of virtually any news story.

Freedom of speech was first officially suspended by a State of Emergency enacted March 15, 1982. Since then, the government has exercised strict prior censorship over all electronic and print media. The Directorate of Communications Media within the Ministry of Interior enforces the censorship.

La Prensa: Since 1982, La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in Nicaragua, has been subject to the Sandinistas' prior censorship rule. Under its former editor, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, La Prensa opposed the Somoza dictatorship. Chamorro's assassination was a catalyst for the popular rebellion that led ultimately to the collapse of the Somoza regime.

State of Emergency, 1985: On October 15, 1985, the Sandinista government decreed an expanded State of Emergency restricting civil liberties including freedom of information. Later in the

church radio station, Radio Catolica. The church tried to officially register the newspaper and was refused. The church's printing press was confiscated.

Radio Catolica: As a result of the 1982 State of Emergency, Radio Catolica, the church radio station, has been required to submit for approval transcripts of all programs, including Masses and other religious activities, to the Directorate of Communications Media. After a period of relaxation, the Sandinistas renewed their persecution of the radio station, forbidding all live broadcasts, including transmission of the traditional Lenten "Stations of the Cross" procession in Managua.

- o Radio Catolica was raided twice in September 1985, and closed down once in October, for broadcasting pre-recorded homilies by Cardinal Obando y Bravo.
- o On January 1, 1986, the government closed Radio Catolica because it failed to broadcast President Ortega's year-end message.

¹ See Articles Censored from La Prensa, U.S. Department of State.

NICARAGUAN REFUGEE UPDATE

Shortly after the 1979 Sandinista revolution, the government's use of repressive measures to control the Nicaraguan public sparked an exodus of citizens from all social backgrounds, but predominantly urban laborers, farmworkers, and Miskito Indians--the people the revolution was supposed to benefit. Counting those who escaped to neighboring Central American countries, and those now residing in the United States, nearly 10 per cent of the Nicaraguan population has sought refuge from the harsh policies of the Sandinista government. Here is the current situation:

- o 15,000 officially registered Nicaraguans reside in Costa Rican refugee centers, while 80,000 others live off the economy as undocumented aliens, according to Costa Rican government estimates (September 1985).
- o 13,000 Nicaraguan refugees are registered in Honduran camps administered by the United Nations, 16,000 reside in Honduran border settlements assisted by Friends of the Americas, and 50,000 additional undocumented Nicaraguans live off the local economy (January 1986).
- o 60,000 undocumented Nicaraguan aliens are thought to be living in the Miami area alone, not to mention countless others residing in various cities in the United States (December 1985).

Laborers and farmworkers: Of the officially registered Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras, some 5,300 working class people from the north central and south central border regions of Nicaragua live in crowded tents and dusty one-room wooden shacks in the Jacaleapa and Teupasenti refugee centers in Honduras. An estimated 50,000 live off the rural economy along Honduras's southern frontier.

In Costa Rica there is no breakdown by ethnic background of the Nicaraguan refugees, but Hispanics make up most of the refugee population in three out of the four camps. Many of them appear to have been sympathetic to the armed opposition. As a result, their property and belongings were confiscated by Sandinista army and state security troops. Many were forced to live in relocation camps and to participate in political re-education campaigns. Hundreds who questioned the soldiers' authority were treated as counter-revolutionaries, jailed, and/or tortured before escaping across to Honduras or Costa Rica.

Miskito Indians: For centuries the Miskito, Rama, and Sumo Indians of eastern Nicaragua enjoyed an independent way of life--isolated from the dominant Hispanic society that occupied the central and western part of the country. In the nineteenth century they were influenced by British traders and Moravian missionaries who contributed much to their culture. Many Miskitos speak English in addition to their own language; many are Protestants, served by indigenous lay ministers.

At the time of the revolution, the Indian organization MISURASATA (Miskitos, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinistas United) expressed hope that the new government would allow them to keep their language, culture, and land free from outside interference. Those hopes were shaken when the government launched political re-education programs. Even Sandinista supporters within the Indian leadership were outraged. Next, fearing that some of the Indians would band together in an organized resistance, the Sandinistas tried to evacuate them from areas near both the Honduran and Costa Rican borders. The government forcibly relocated some 10,000 Miskitos, plus some Rama and Sumo Indians, into interior collective "camps." Incidents of torture and killing were documented, but not publicized, by the Ministry of Interior itself.

The first waves of several hundred Miskitos fled across the Coco River into Honduras in May 1981. Since then, there has been a continuing exodus, including the famous march of Catholic Bishop Salvador Schlaefer, who accompanied over 1,000 Indians fleeing Nicaragua during the Christmas holidays of 1983.

Despite UN-sponsored repatriation programs, which have persuaded several hundred Indians to go back to Nicaragua each year, the camps keep growing. In May 1985, the Sandinista government promised Indians forced into interior relocation camps that they could return to their homes near the Coco River. Since June 1985, an estimated 10,000 to 12,000 have gone back to find their homes burned, crops destroyed, and cattle slaughtered. At present, they subsist on handouts from refugees on the Honduran side of the river.

Assistance: In Costa Rica, all refugee centers are administered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through independent contractors such as the International Rescue Committee and the Costa Rican Red Cross. In Honduras, the UNHCR oversees the Jacaleapa and Teupasenti camps (primarily for Ladino refugees) and the Mocoron camp in eastern Honduras (for the Miskitos and other Indians). Friends of the Americas, a Louisiana-based private charity, assists perhaps the largest number of Indian refugees in settlements near the Coco River.

Outlook: In the recent past, some 100-200 Nicaraguan refugees crossed the borders into Honduras and Costa Rica monthly. In January, 1986, at least that many Miskito Indians sought refuge in Honduras every week. The migration will likely continue in such waves responding to changes in the Sandinista government's policy of repression.

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE:
NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES

On October 7 1985, the United States terminated its acceptance of the "compulsory jurisdiction" of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Review of the U.S. acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction was prompted by the case brought by Nicaragua alleging illegal military and paramilitary activities against Nicaragua.

Two separate issues, (1) the ICJ's jurisdiction, and (2) evidence of Nicaragua's support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, dominate the World Court case.

ICJ, or World Court: The ICJ is the judicial organ of the United Nations. The ICJ's jurisdiction derives from the consent of the states involved. States consent (1) by agreeing to limited jurisdiction over particular cases, or (2) by submitting a declaration accepting the Court's "compulsory jurisdiction" over cases concerning itself and other states that also accept compulsory jurisdiction.

- o The U.S. accepted compulsory jurisdiction in 1946.
- o Apart from the U.S., only 46 of 159 UN member states now accept compulsory jurisdiction.

States may make reservations to their declarations accepting compulsory jurisdiction, specifying any cases, or types of cases, they will not submit to ICJ adjudication.

- o Among other things, the U.S. reserved from the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction "disputes arising under a multilateral treaty unless . . . all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the court."
- o ICJ jurisdiction under treaties and agreements specifically providing for such jurisdiction is not affected by termination of the 1946 declaration.

Nicaragua v. United States: The U.S. contends that the ICJ has no jurisdiction to decide Nicaragua's claims because:

1. Nicaragua never validly accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and therefore cannot sue or be sued in the ICJ on that basis.
2. Before Nicaragua brought suit, the U.S. modified its acceptance to exclude for a period of two years matters related to Central America.
3. Nicaragua's claims affect treaty rights of its neighbors and fall under the "multilateral treaty reservation" in the U.S. declaration of 1946.
4. Nicaragua's claims concern collective security and self-defense matters which the UN Charter assigns to UN political bodies for resolution.

Despite strong evidence in support of these arguments, the ICJ held that it has jurisdiction and that Nicaragua's claims are appropriately settled in the Court.

Sandinista Intervention in El Salvador: The second key issue in the ICJ case is Nicaragua's claim that it "is not engaged, and has not been engaged in" support for Salvadoran guerrillas. Nicaragua alleges that U.S. support for the Nicaraguan resistance is illegal, and unprovoked because Nicaragua has never acted against its neighbors in any way that would give them or the United States the right to act against Nicaragua in individual or collective self-defense.

Congress, intelligence agencies, the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, and even many critics of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua have found that, "contrary to the repeated denials of Nicaraguan officials, that country is thoroughly involved in supporting the Salvadoran insurgency." (Press release, March 4, 1982, Congressman Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts) The Sandinistas have:

- o Smuggled Soviet-bloc arms and transferred weapons in their own inventory to the Salvadoran insurgents.
- o Trained Salvadoran guerrillas in military tactics, weapons, communications and explosives, and served as a transit point to guerrilla training camps in Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
- o Harbored and advised Salvadoran rebel military leadership.
- o Enabled guerrilla radio stations to broadcast from Nicaragua.
- o Supported terrorism and subversion against neighbor states.

Nicaragua's claim that it does not support the Salvadoran insurgents was undermined, for example, by:

- o Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto's admission of Nicaragua's support at a July 1983 meeting of the Contadora group.
- o Testimony at the ICJ by a witness for Nicaragua that "it could be taken as a fact that at least in late 1980/early 1981, the Nicaraguan government was involved in the supply of arms to the Salvadoran insurgency," and that the Sandinistas allow guerrilla communications, and command and control activities, to operate from inside Nicaragua.
- o Extensive evidence of Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras compiled in "'Revolution Beyond Our Borders': Sandinista Intervention in Central America," September 1985, U.S. Department of State.

Current Position of the U.S.: On January 18, 1985, the U.S. withdrew from further participation in Nicaragua v. U.S., but will continue to participate in ICJ proceedings that are consistent with ICJ functions as defined by the UN Charter, and based on specific agreement of the parties.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

The Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) was established under an Executive Order signed by the President on August 29, 1985. NHAO administers the \$27 million in assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance approved by Congress in July 1985. The President's request includes an additional \$30 million for humanitarian assistance to be administered by NHAO; \$3 million of which is to be used exclusively for strengthening the observance and advancement of human rights.

- o The Secretary of State was given responsibility for continuous supervision and general direction of NHAO's programs and activities.
- o The NHAO staff consists of the Director, six supervisory and two clerical personnel, all detailed from federal agencies (State, AID and USIA).
- o The umbrella group United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) was designated as the initial recipient of NHAO assistance.
- o During its first few months of operation, NHAO disbursed funds exclusively for four basic categories of goods and services: food, clothing, medicine and medical care.
- o These four categories continue to account for most of the assistance, but three new program expenditures have been added: funding for UNO's Human Rights Commission to monitor resistance forces' human rights performance, longer-term medical care for seriously wounded combatants, and vehicles for delivery of humanitarian assistance items.
- o Vehicle purchase was authorized after the Congress clarified that this was permissible if no modifications designed to be used to inflict serious bodily harm or death were made to the equipment.
- o The final \$9 million tranche of NHAO's funding became available after submission in February of the second 90-Day report to the Congress; these reports include a detailed accounting of NHAO disbursements.
- o NHAO had obligated virtually all of the \$18 million authorized up until submission of that report.
- o Supplies actually delivered to resistance forces in the region account for over half the total funds obligated; other supplies are in warehouses and are gradually being delivered to forces in the field.
- o Delivery of NHAO supplies has been handicapped by the unique nature of the program which operates on an overt basis in the United States but because of political sensitivities in the area must operate covertly overseas.

Voice of Nicaragua

January 1986

St. Charles, Missouri

No. 3

THE INVISIBLE CURTAIN

Many people in Nicaragua feel that they have fallen behind a curtain -- not an iron curtain or a bamboo curtain, but an invisible one. Behind the Invisible Curtain, the Sandinista commanders commit the most horrendous crimes without fear of retribution. Massacres of prisoners, for instance, as denounced by Ismael Reyes, former head of the Nicaraguan Red Cross, in a little-publicized but highly significant article titled "The Genocides Continue in Nicaragua," which we have translated from the Spanish and present here to our readers on pages 4-6.

Some of the threads forming the fabric of the Invisible Curtain are exposed by Reyes when he states that these shameful crimes were being committed by the Sandinistas with the passive acquiescence of the international institutions, the complicity of many pseudo-religious and political organizations, and the accessory silence of some news agencies.

THE RED CROSS REFUGEES

Reyes narrates how in 1979, in the early days of the Sandinista government, Commander Tomás Borge placed a number of dead bodies around the Red Cross refugee camps and staged a show before a group of foreign correspondents convened for the occasion, falsely accus-

AN ANALYSIS

ing the refugees of slipping out at night to murder Sandinistas. The "show" served to justify the Sandinista government as they safely and calmly broke their own promises in order to snatch the refugees from the Red Cross, send them to jail, and murder them.

Reyes recalls how the New York Times published his picture, with his countenance disfigured by anger as he protested against that shameful Sandinista action.

In effect, a picture of Borge and Reyes appeared on the NYT's front page, July 26, 1979, but the caption simply reads: "Tension in Managua: Tomás Borge, Nicaragua's Interior Minister, said defeated National Guardsmen use Red Cross Centers as hide-outs." No mention is made of the protest by Reyes. His voice had been suppressed, muzzled by the hidden fabric of the Invisible Curtain.

THE MASSACRES OF PRISONERS

The massacres of prisoners denounced by Reyes have been also denounced by other Nicaraguan voices, some of which are quoted here, translated from the Spanish, on page 7. These testimonies reveal that many prisoners were murdered in Sandinista

jails during the early months of their regime.

Yet, upon reviewing the New York Times indexes, we fail to find any mention of the killing of prisoners in 1979 or 1980. Instead, on August 1, 1979, Page 3, Column 2, we find an "Article on scene in Tipitapa, Nicaragua, prison, where many political prisoners say new revolutionary Government officials are friendly and are protecting their lives."

On August 16, 1979, Page 5, Column 2, we find that "International Committee of Red Cross says Nicaraguan Government has imprisoned about 5,000 people since it came to power but has promised to free all except war criminals; Red Cross delegate Carlos Bauverd says Government is treating prisoners humanely."

Yet at the very time, according to José Esteban González, head (1977-1981) of the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, the massacres of prisoners at Granada, Catarina, Palacagüina and many other Nicaraguan cities were piling up victims running into the hundreds, and eventually into the thousands.

THE ZONA FRANCA MASSACRE

The first and only report of any killing of prisoners

Continued on Page 2

INVISIBLE CURTAIN

Continued from Page 1

passed through the Invisible Curtain on June 29, 1981, when the following account of the Zona Franca Massacre appeared on Page 10, in the New York Times:

"19 PRISONERS KILLED IN NICARAGUA - Managua, Nicaragua, June 28 (AP) - Nicaraguan prison guards killed 19 inmates and wounded 28 after several guards were taken hostage in an escape attempt, the Interior Ministry said today. A statement said the prisoners, most of them former National Guardsmen loyal to the ousted dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, offered to exchange the guards for their freedom. Shooting

broke out after several hours of negotiations, the statement added."

This is only a Sandinista version, nicely tailored for the outside world. The "non-political prisoners" in the June 28 official communiqué to the Nicaraguan people (see below), have been transformed for the rest of the world into "former National Guardsmen, loyal to the ousted dictator." Moreover, grave internal contradictions in the original official document distributed inside Nicaragua, have been eliminated in the dispatch for external consumption.

Absent in the dispatch are those details that destroyed all credibility in the Sandinista version of the story,

to wit: The allegation that the prisoners had been killed by fellow prisoners who in turn didn't harm any of the guards taken hostage; the allegation that the prisoners had captured enough weapons to open a "barrage of fire" and that the army's "only alternative" was to strike back; yet, the army suffered no casualties while 15 prisoners were killed and 28 were wounded.

The indispensable testimony of the relatives of the victims, partially copied here on Page 3, did not reach the readers of the New York Times. The indisputable evidence furnished by the victims' mangled bodies had remained darkly buried behind the Invisible Curtain.

...ABC

THE ZONA FRANCA MASSACRE

The Zona Franca (Free Zone) was a clothing manufacturing complex near the Managua airport, used as refugee shelter by the Nicaraguan Red Cross during the civil war that brought the Sandinistas to power on July 19, 1979. The Sandinistas promptly converted the refugees into prisoners and turned the compound into a jail named "Rehabilitation Center." Since then, the "Center" has held between two and three thousand prisoners in 60 cells, some 40 inmates per cell, in subhuman conditions of overcrowding and enveloped by the stench of raw sewage due to the lack of hygienic toilet facilities. A massacre of prisoners occurred there on June 27, 1981 — Editor's Note.

THE SANDINISTA VERSION

English translation by NIC

COMMUNIQUE No.1 -- The Ministry of Interior informs the Nicaraguan people that on Saturday, June 27, a group of common [non-political] prisoners conniving with members of counter-revolutionary bands in wing #2 of the Rehabilitation Center ... attacked their guardians, took possession of their weapons, and held them hostage in an attempt to escape from the prison ... After several hours of deadlocked negotiations, they opened a barrage of fire and our only alternative was to strike back with lightning speed until our forces had totally controlled the situation ... When some inmates had decided to surrender, fellow prisoners opened fire against them and treacherously murdered them. The following inmates were wounded [28 names listed] ... The following were killed [15 names listed] ... The Sandinista Armed Forces suffered no casualties; only comrade Juan Francisco Martinez was wounded, and all the hostages were rescued, unharmed ... Managua, June 28, 1981.

"MININT Informa sobre sucesos de Zona Franca." La Prensa (Managua) June 29 '81, P.1

THE TESTIMONY OF THE VICTIMS

Depositions by next of kin of prisoners slain at the Zona Franca jail on June 27, 1981, duly certified and later published in Bulletin #5 by the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights. English translation by NIC -- Editor's Note.

MANAGUA OFFICE CLERK

... My nephew, Daniel Mena Gurdíán, 20, single, occupation Public Accountant, had been imprisoned in the Zona Franca jail for a year when he was killed on June 27, shot by the soldiers that guard the prison. His body showed several bullet wounds on the upper part of the head, and his fingernails had been pulled out, which establishes that he was tortured before they killed him. His teeth were broken and his face disfigured, the right cheekbone completely shattered, presumably smashed by blows with a rifle butt. It was easily ascertained that he wasn't killed while trying to flee, but obviously slain at close range and with malice aforethought...

William Gurdíán Lara
Managua, June 29, 1981

MANAGUA HOUSEWIFE

... My son, Ramón Ernesto García Luna, 30, occupation Truck Driver, had been a Sandinista fighter during the war against Somoza ... He was imprisoned on March 5 and killed on June 27 during the events at the Zona Franca ... His body was covered with grass, sand and blood. It showed a bullet wound that traversed the aorta. His fingernails were bruised and sections of skin had been peeled off both arms. There were abrasions and bruises all over his face ...

Josefa García Urbina
Managua, July 1, 1981

CHICHIGALPA HOUSEWIFE

... My son, Edwin Felipe Córdoba Díaz, 23, single, and former Sandinista militiaman, had been imprisoned on February 12 ... he remained in jail until he was killed during the events at the Zona Franca on June 27 ... his lifeless body showed large abrasions and bruises on the back and on the forehead and right flank, as if he had been dragged along the ground and severely beaten until he died, for there was no bullet wound anywhere on the body... I herein denounce that my son was brutally beaten to death.

Socorro Córdoba Romero
Managua, July 7, 1981

THE TRIAL

There has been no judicial investigation of the Zona Franca Massacre, because Sandinista "law" forbids the intervention of the civilian judiciary in criminal cases involving members of the Sandinista Armed Forces, "even when some of the participants or the victims are civilians." ("Ley de Organización de la Auditoría Militar..." Art. 18. Decree #591, Dec. 2, 1980).

Under Sandinista law, those responsible for the massacre will never be brought to trial -- Editor's Note.

NICARAGUA



THE GENOCIDES CONTINUE IN NICARAGUA

BY ISMAEL REYES

English translation by NIC of "Continúan los Genocidios en Nicaragua," Diario Las Américas (Miami) November 11, 1983. The author, Ismael Reyes, has been a prominent leader of the Nicaraguan Red Cross for many years, and was president of the institution during the civil war that brought the Sandinistas to power in 1979. He continued at the helm in Managua until Sandinista mobs took possession of the Red Cross facilities and forced him out in August, 1982 -- Editor's Note.

A few days ago, I read a news report in an influential American newspaper concerning many former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard, jailed at the Model Prison in Tipitapa, who had been murdered by the Sandinista commanders.

This is not the first time that this happened. It has been fully verified that on a previous occasion the Sandinistas took prisoners from the jail and murdered them, and such crime produced no reaction in most of the news media nor amongst the organizations entrusted with watching over human rights. It would seem that, in general, the press closes its eyes to the violations committed by communist regimes, and opens them only to magnify and denounce those that occur in the centrist or rightist democratic regimes.

When a terrorist kills ten human beings, it doesn't seem to bother or worry anyone. On the contrary, he is said to be a hero, a patriot; but to execute a terrorist is something very grave, a crime. To murder hundreds of Miskito Indians or hundreds of former Somocistas is not as important as killing a dog, for in the latter case we hear the protest of the Humane Society. And with this "revolutionary" ethics we go on distorting reality, we keep on changing and altering moral values, not because of lack of insight or intelligence, but because it has become quite fashionable to criticize anything democratic and to defend all that is colored red and anything

THE SANDINISTAS TOOK PRISONERS FROM JAIL AND MURDERED THEM... SUCH CRIME PRODUCED NO REACTION IN MOST OF THE NEWS MEDIA OR IN THE ORGANIZATIONS WATCHING OVER HUMAN RIGHTS

that has the odor of the radical, totalitarian Left.

Nobody protested when Commander Tomás Borge and his advisor, Dr. Rodrigo Reyes Portocarrero, current Secretary-Minister of the Ruling Junta, failed to fulfill the pledge they had made to Mr. Ulrich Bedert, chief delegate from the Red Cross International Committee. They had pledged that they would protect the refugees at the Zona Franca and provide them with safe conduct. Instead, they changed their status to that of prisoners of war, and then proceeded to prosecute them in those absurd and illegal tribunals called "Special Courts" and to condemn them to extended jail sentences for years on end.

It was in 1979, in the early days of the Sandinista government, Commander Tomás Borge, with his usual relish for the theatrical, placed a number of dead bodies around the refugee camps at the Zona Franca and staged a show before a large group of foreign correspondents convened for the occasion. He accused the refugees of slip-

ping out at night to murder Sandinistas, and justified with that "show" the act of changing their status.

Nobody protested for this historic crime, for this deception to a respectable institution like the Red Cross, performed by Commander Tomás Borge and Dr. Rodrigo Reyes Portocarrero. I here publicly name them and accuse them before History as the ones truly responsible for this criminal act.

I had had turbulent and heated discussions with the delegate from the Red Cross International Committee, trying to convince them that we should urgently remove all the refugees from the Zona Franca and transfer them to embassies, which I had already done with more than a thousand refugees. I was afraid that the Sandinistas would not keep their word, especially in view of the threats advanced by Commander Tomás Borge and some internationalists against the Somocista military personnel.

I asked the RCIC to provide tents in order to shelter the refugees on embassy grounds, since the buildings were already full in all the embassies even after having converted several private homes into annex embassy facilities.

Unfortunately, due to the prepotency and arrogance of the RCIC delegates when they deal with national Red Cross societies, I could not convince them to share my apprehensions. On the contrary, they removed over a hundred refugees that had taken shelter in our headquarters, and

transferred them to the Zona Franca.

The chief delegate of the Red Cross International Committee did not protest against that outrage perpetrated by Borge, although I insistently begged him to protest. He told me that Geneva specifically instructed him not to do it. Geneva considered that the government was legally empowered to change the status of the refugees, and that any protest would hurt the RCIC and would hinder its mission of visiting political prisoners in the jails of the country.

My voice was the only one raised against the decision by Commander Borge. I publicly denounced it "as a bitter draught to swallow for the Nicaraguan Red Cross that had served the people so well during the insurrection."

- We had served and had taken under our care all the hospitals in the country.

- We had fed over 850,000 persons each week.

- We had sheltered over 100,000 refugees in nearly a hundred centers, and had furnished them clothing, medical care and food.

- We had rescued the wounded, most of them Sandinistas, from the barricades, and turned our headquarters into a hospital where we treated and protected them.

- We had organized an airlift, with international help, to attend the needs of the population.

- We had rescued Sandinista partisans who had sought asylum in embassies and who had been detained by National Guardsmen on their way to the airport.

- Every day, we formed convoys to transport to the airport, and protect, those who were leaving the country in search of safety.

- We visited the Sandinista leaders in the embassies where they had sought asylum, etc.

The New York Times published my picture, with my countenance disfigured by anger as I protested against

this outrage that showed from the beginning the lack of sincerity of the Sandinista commanders, their disregard for their own pledges, and their baseness as human beings.

Since I was the one who protested, people thought that the Sandinistas had snatched the Zona Franca refugees from the Nicaraguan Red Cross, and not from the Red Cross International Committee.

I AM NOT DEFENDING SOMOZA. I AM COMPARING TWO VERY GRAVE EVILS THAT HAVE DIFFERENT DEGREES OF MONSTROSITY

I protested against the change in status of the Zona Franca refugees because the RCIC did not protest. It kept silent, as usual. I protested because for me there is only one Red Cross, and I felt the immense pain of the failure as if it were my own. I protested because of the bloody scorn towards a respected international institution and because, being a Nicaraguan, I understood what a thousand fellow Nicaraguans abandoned to their doom were then suffering and were yet to suffer at the hands of pitiless Sandinistas.

It was a perverse, diabolical, premeditated plan, prepared by Dr. Rodrigo Reyes Portocarrero, who sold his own conscience to Tomás Borge for a pot of pottage.

I know very well that the RCIC would have gained nothing by protesting, but it was their duty to protest. Since the RCIC didn't do it, I had to safeguard the prestige of our institution. To keep silent would have meant to accept this shameful Sandinista action, to justify the Sandinista government as they safely and calmly broke their own promises in order to

snatch the refugees from us, send them to jail, and murder them.

The Red Cross has no military or coercive force to impose its will over any government, but the Red Cross is a moral force, and, because of that, it had to exert it by protesting, otherwise it would lose its moral authority.

For the Nicaraguan people and for me, there is no difference at all between the Red Cross International Committee and the Nicaraguan Red Cross, for we make no distinction among the different societies that make up the Red Cross League. If any difference exists, it is in regards to ideals and individual persons. Individuals who labor in order to serve the people, and individuals who labor in order to serve themselves. Individuals who risk their lives voluntarily, without pay, and individuals who do it for a salary.

Annoyed by my protest, the Sandinistas tried, to discredit and destroy me by planting a rumor among the prisoners that I had given in to Tomás Borge in exchange for money. As the prisoners had not been taken from me nor from the Nicaraguan Red Cross, and I was conscious of the danger that this horrible slander posed for my personal safety, I asked the delegate of the Committee to deny it. They didn't dare do it.

They are prepotent with the little people, but humble and servile with those in power. They remained silent before Somoza when Somocista guards machine-gunned our Red Cross helpers, and they remained silent when the Sandinistas jailed the employees of our institution, condemned them to 30 years in prison for crimes they had not committed, and sicked the mobs on them, beating and wounding them.

The Sandinistas sent a RCIC employee to prison, after charging him with being a Somocista criminal; but as they accused me instead of

the RCIC, the Committee refused to assume its responsibility and would not deny the charges. I was told that Geneva considered that doing so would have blemished the good name of the International Committee. That is why I say that, for me, the biggest difference lies between those who cherish the Red Cross ideals and do their duty, and the Red Cross mercenaries whose only worry is to avoid problems in order to hold on to their salaries and to go on living like kings.

IN THE AMERICAN CONTINENT, THERE IS NO REGIME MORE BARBARIC AND SANGUINARY, NO REGIME THAT VIOLATES HUMAN RIGHTS IN A MANNER MORE CONSTANT AND PERMANENT, THAN THE SANDINISTA REGIME

Nobody protested in defense of the Somocista refugees, because Somoza was a criminal, a murderer, a monster. On the other hand, the Sandinista commanders can commit the most horrendous crimes without fear of retribution. Because they are not monsters; they are spotless spirits, angels, archangels.

Somoza, the monster, allowed me (as president of the Red Cross) to visit Sandinista leaders (Borge, Carrion, Nunez, Jaen) in the Model Prison and in the embassies where they had sought asylum (Cuadra, Coronel-Kautz, D'Escoto, Sergio Ramirez, Atha).

Somoza, the criminal, allowed me to visit Carrion in jail whenever his parents requested me to do it. He allowed me to visit Borge in jail for medical attention by one of our doctors and for his relatives to see him, etc. He allowed me to visit Nunez and attend to his tuberculosis treatment in

the jail; to visit Jaen and keep him informed about his mother who carried on a hunger strike in our institution.

Somoza, the murderer, allowed Tomas Borge to call me on the phone at night from the Model Prison, asking for favors. He allowed me to visit Colonel Larios in prison after he had led an unsuccessful insurrection in the army, and he allowed me to transfer a group of relatives of the Sandinista prisoners from the Nunciatura to the Red Cross headquarters, to take care of them and provide them medical attention during their hunger strike.

The Sandinista government never allowed me to see Colonel Larios (former Minister of Defense in the Sandinista Regime) in the Model Prison, and they would shoot dead any warden who allowed a prisoner to make a phone call, for they consider it a crime and treason.

I am not defending Somoza. I am comparing two very grave evils that have different degrees of monstrosity.

These same criminals are the ones who tricked the Red Cross, who deceived the OAS, the Andean Pact nations, the International community, the Church, and the Nicaraguan people; the same who now are trying to make use of the Contadora Group and the United Nations in order to continue enslaving the Nicaraguan people. They can promise everything, but they will keep none of their promises. And yet, there are naive souls who believe them, for instance, those representatives of the American people who are Democrats only in name, who want for us what they don't wish for themselves; who want us to live without religious freedom, without freedom of speech, without freedom of action, without political freedom, without freedom of commerce, and without a legal judicial framework to guarantee individual rights and property.

In the American Continent, there is no regime more barbaric and sanguinary, no regime that violates human rights in a manner more constant and permanent, than the Sandinista regime. It is time for all the organizations entrusted with watching over human rights (such as the OAS's Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, Amnesty International, the Red Cross International Committee) to investigate and expose this new genocide, to put a stop to these aberrations, and to force the Sandinistas to cease deceiving them. It is shameful that these crimes are being committed and not a single voice cries out to protest against them.

The unjust confiscations must be ended; the imprisonments, the tortures and murders, the bombing of Miskito villages, the attacks against the Church and her ministers, all of which are being committed with the passive acquiescence of the international institutions, the complicity of many pseudo-religious and political organizations, and the accessory silence of some news agencies.

This latest genocide has given me the opportunity to explain to the world, and particularly to the Nicaraguan people, some little-known aspects of the change in the "status" of the Zona Franca refugees. It has permitted me to allot responsibilities. Also to request that those institutions entrusted with watching over human rights, help curb the murders of political prisoners in Nicaraguan jails. Moreover, it has allowed me to publicly name the Sandinista commanders who are actually responsible for that bloody deceit practiced on the Red Cross. When more time is available, I will furnish further details and expand my review of these events, as a contribution to our History.

..ISMAEL REYES

NEW YEAR'S MESSAGE

When last August we decided to publish *Voice of Nicaragua*, we had several hundred names on our mailing list; now we have more than five thousand, including over 2,000 fellow Nicaraguans in the United States.

We have heard from more than 600 readers, and only four of them have said that they don't like what we are doing. The very large number and excellent quality of the positive responses has surpassed all expectations, and has strengthened our determination to continue exposing the truth of Nicaragua -- the evil nature of the Sandinista regime.

Financial help from our friends has also been generous. We thank the 131 persons who have sent us from one to one hundred dollars each, and we hope that many more will follow their example so that we may meet the growing costs of mushrooming circulation.

We also thank the many friends who have sent us articles, newspapers and books, invaluable for our task; among many others, the ten 1985 publications by Nicaraguans

listed on this page.

From Ligia Guillén's booklet of poems we have selected and translated into English a few lines that tell so well the painful Nicaraguan reality that we have glimpsed at in this issue:

*These are screams of pain
the screams of mothers, of wives and lovers
the screams of filial love,
hearing the screams of terror
the screams in prison
of all our brothers.*

(Original Spanish)

*Son gritos de dolor
gritos de madres, de esposas y amantes
grita el amor filial,
se oyen gritos de espanto
gritan en la prisión
todos nuestros hermanos.*

May God grant that the screams of terror shall cease this year.

...ABG

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VOICE OF NICARAGUA

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The Nicaraguan Information Center (NIC) is an Independent Not For Profit Corporation organized by Nicaraguans and U.S. citizens who have lived in Nicaragua

NIC's purpose is the dissemination in the United States of truthful information on Central America, particularly Nicaragua

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MASSACRES OF PRISONERS IN 1979

The Untold Story of the massacres of prisoners by the Sandinista regime in 1979, is beginning to be heard, as the screams of the Nicaraguan people are finally piercing the Invisible Curtain. We present four testimonies, below -- Editor's Note

September 1979. Captain Relancon, Spanish physician at the hospital in Estelí, tells me that upon arriving at Palacagüina he saw over a dozen corpses drilled with bullet holes, that appeared to have been dead for about a week. The townspeople told him that they were National Guardsmen executed by the Sandinistas...

Dr. Rafael Saavedra, Customs Collector, one of his sons, and a son-in-law, were captured by the Sandinistas. After trial by a Havana-style "people's court," they were all murdered...

Major Mauricio Romero, who at one time had been Somoza's aide-de-camp, was captured and held in one barracks after another. Those who should have inquired about him, didn't do it. When the Sandinistas felt like it, they killed him...

Harry Bodán-Shields, *Nicaragua*
-- *El Teatro de lo Absurdo*,
pp. 107, 240, 327.

During the first months, from July '79 until February 1980, the Sandinistas executed in jail no less than two thousand prisoners.

I went myself with several members of the Human Rights Commission to the town of Granada, some 40 kilometers from Managua, to see the common graves. In one of those common graves there were about 60 bodies; in another one there were between 80 and 100 bodies.

That is in only one town, and this situation occurred all over the country. But the Sandinistas succeeded in hiding this from international public opinion...

José Esteban González, President (1977-1981), Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights.
C- SPAN Interview, May 7, 1984.

Javier Torres and Rigoberto Wilford ... former agents of the dreaded DGSE [Sandinista Office of State Security], who secretly escaped from Nicaragua, granted an exclusive interview to *Nicaragua Hoy* in which they denounced the criminal practices of the Sandinista regime and its repressive apparatus against the people of Nicaragua...

According to Javier Torres, soon after the triumph of the revolution, when he was head of the investigation section of the DGSE ... he witnessed the atrocious murder of two prisoners of war, Franklin Montenegro and Francisco "El Chele" Aguilera, both former national guardsmen who were kicked and clubbed to death by Juan José Ubeda, Commander Tomás Borge, and Juan José Ubeda's younger brother whose pseudonym is "Pancasán"...

Nicaragua Hoy, (San José, Costa Rica), July 20, 1985, P.1

July 25, 1979, at dawn, ten prisoners, including a 47-year-old woman were executed at the jail in Catariña. Their names:

Juan Romero Gaitán
Juana Tardencilla de Romero
Mario José Tapia Pizzi
Antonio Ruiz Guerrero
Pedro Joaquín Ruiz Guerrero
Aarón Delgado Bermúdez
Gustavo Salguera Reyes
Silvio Maldonado Benavente
Aurelio Blas Calero
Emilio Duarte López

Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) Report, June 27, 1983.



BRIEFING PAPER

THE INSTITUTE ON RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY

September, 1985

No. 6

NICARAGUA'S STATE SECURITY: BEHIND THE PROPAGANDA MASK

an interview with

ALVARO JOSE BALDIZON AVILES

Alvaro Jose BALDIZON Aviles, 26, joined the Sandinista Police in April 1980, believing that he would be participating in a government based on "moral principles." In December of 1982, after attending a 10-month course on "criminology" in the Soviet Union, Baldizon became the chief investigator of internal abuses within the Special Investigation Commission of the Ministry of Interior, directly responsible to its Chief, Tomas Borge. In this sensitive position Baldizon learned how the Sandinistas deliberately commit brutal human rights abuses, including murder and torture, to control internal political opposition, and how these abuses are covered up with the approval and direction of Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion, currently the leader of Nicaragua's delegation to the World Court proceedings at The Hague.

Baldizon's charge that the Sandinistas have killed thousands of dissidents, mostly campesinos, through their so-called "special measures" program is the first time, to our knowledge, that so credible a source has charged that political murder is being used on this scale in Nicaragua (see page 8). At the very least this places a grave cloud of suspicion over the Sandinista government which should be carefully investigated. Until it is disproven it should cause all Christians and other persons of good will to suspend any further cooperation with the Sandinistas.

Baldizon is one of the highest ranking officials of the Sandinista Front ever to defect. In mid-1984 he became disillusioned and repulsed by the abuses and corruption he had uncovered and asked permission to leave the Ministry of Interior. He was told that, because of the sensitive information he had access to, he would have to spend time in a military detention camp before he could leave. Baldizon withdrew his request but, suspecting that he and his family might be marked for murder, he fled to Honduras in July of 1985. His wife and brother, however, were unable to complete their escapes and have been arrested and reportedly tortured in Nicaragua.

This interview was conducted by the IRD staff on September 19, 1985 in Washington, D.C.

— The Editors

DISILLUSIONMENT

IRD: Could you tell us why you left Nicaragua?

BALDIZON: I initially joined the Sandinistas because I thought that I would have the opportunity to participate in a government which would be quite different from the police state under Somoza -- one which would be based on moral principles. But in carrying out my work as head of the Department of Internal Investigations, where I was directly subordinate to Tomas Borge, I learned how corrupt the Interior Ministry and the Sandinista government were and how immoral the leaders of the Sandinista Front were. Borge himself ordered the killings of thousands of Nicaraguans in the mountains and Miskito Indians on the Atlantic Coast. He also has ties to the Colombian mafia and is involved in cocaine trafficking to the United States.

All of these things created a terrible conflict within me between the Christian principles by which I was raised and my loyalty to the Sandinista Front. Eventually my repugnance toward the Sandinistas' tactics won out.

RELIGION: A TWO-TRACK POLICY

IRD: Tomas Borge frequently has contacts with various North American groups which visit Nicaragua. What do you know about Sandinista efforts to influence these visitors, especially the religious delegations?

BALDIZON: In the eyes of the Sandinistas, those who believe in God are weak and reactionary: religion is the opiate of the people. However the Sandinistas will continue to treat religious people as allies for as long as that may be useful.

I have heard Borge boast to other officials of the Interior Ministry how clever he is at deceiving religious people and using them as propaganda tools. The Nicaraguan government really has two propaganda policies: one policy which is directed toward the Western world, and the real policy which is Marxist and which is directed toward socialist countries. These two policies are of vital importance to the Sandinistas' overall strategy. Borge, one of the architects of this strategy, is usually in charge of meeting with foreign religious, political and youth delegations. To carry out his charade, Borge has two different offices. One office is located in the Silvio Mayorga building where he meets with religious delegations and delegations from democratic political parties. In this office Borge has photographs of children, gilded carved crucifixes, and a Bible or two. Before Borge meets with religious delegations he usually memorizes Bible passages which he can quote and make the deception more complete. Borge's real office, where he fulfills his duties as Interior Minister, is located where he lives in Bello Horizonte in Managua. In that office there are no crucifixes or Bibles -- only Marxist literature and posters of Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

IRD: Can you describe other ways in which the Sandinistas influence the impressions visitors get of Nicaragua?

BALDIZON: All the people and delegations which visit Nicaragua see only part of the truth because the Sandinista Front controls the tours. The Sandinista Front, with an

enormous army and an extremely repressive security apparatus, has at its disposal many different mechanisms to project the image that it wishes a foreign delegation to perceive. Members of the Sandinistas' army dress as civilians, follow each delegation and are always present when the Nicaraguan people speak with members of the delegations. The Nicaraguan people know who the State Security officers are and therefore very few people dare to speak ill of the Sandinista regime. The Sandinistas prepare the terrain before the arrival of a delegation through what they call "preparacion defensiva" (defensive preparation). This consists of visiting the homes of opponents and threatening them. Every opponent is put under surveillance, has a file called the "potential enemy file" and receives periodic "preventive visits" from State Security officers. In Nicaragua everybody is afraid to talk because they run the risk of being kidnapped or lynched by the Sandinistas' mobs.

IRD: Would a delegation that goes to Nicaragua with an official invitation be certain always to have some undercover security people posing as citizens around them?

BALDIZON: Absolutely. There are always State Security officers dressed as civilians directing the networks of civilian collaborators scattered among the population at large.

At the end of May or beginning of June of this year the Sandinistas infiltrated an international assembly of Baptist youth at which Borge was scheduled to deliver a speech during the closing session. An hour before Borge was to speak 500 people from the Interior Ministry, including myself, were ordered to the square of the Interior Ministry. We were instructed to dress as civilians, to pretend that we were members of the evangelical sect and to participate in the closing ceremonies of the Baptist convention. Thus at the closing ceremony there were about 200 religious delegates at the front of the assembly and about 500 military men posing as evangelicals at the rear. We were there to create the impression that religion is more free and vital than it really is.

IRD: Were the Baptist officials aware of these State Security members?

BALDIZON: Yes, there were some Baptist officials who knew that there were members of the State Security present.

IRD: Do you know anything about the expulsion of the ten foreign priests in July of 1984 and the framing of Father Pena, the parish priest in the church of Bello Horizonte?

BALDIZON: I discovered that a person known as "the Fish," who had infiltrated the contra's, was instructed by the State Security to persuade Father Pena to hold meetings in his house where State Security had hidden cameras and microphones. These were then used to discredit Father Pena.

The ten priests were expelled from Nicaragua because in their homilies they criticized the activities and the human rights violations committed by members of the Sandinista Armed Forces. One of the ten priests, a Spanish priest, named Timoteo Molina, had a church in the department of Rio San Juan on the Costa Rican border. More than 200 families who had attended his church abandoned their homes and their property and fled to Costa Rica to escape repression. You can now see numerous abandoned houses along the San Juan river, especially in the towns of Raudal del Toro and Boca de Sabalos. This can be corroborated with some North Americans who recently took a trip along that river.

IRD: Could you comment on censorship of the church radio and whether there is censorship of church publications?

BALDIZON: In the Media Directorate of the Interior Ministry, under Captain Melba Blandon, there is a group of journalists from the Sandinista Front and four officials of F4, the ideological unit in State Security. In my working relationship with the Media Directorate and through my personal access to all the censored news that was sent to my office, I can affirm that the opposition media, oral as well as print, is censored sometimes as much as 70%. Towards the end of 1982 I was sent by Commander Walter Ferretti Fonseca as head of a group of policemen to occupy the independent Radio Corporacion and to prevent the dissemination of a speech by Monsignor Obando on Labor Day. We occupied it for a week.

IRD: Are you personally religious or a member of a church?

BALDIZON: Yes. I am Catholic. My parents brought me up according to Christian principles. I was baptized and confirmed, I had a church wedding, and I have always held to my Christian beliefs, even though I had to stop attending church when I was with the Sandinistas because that would have aroused suspicion. Given the position that I occupied and the sensitive information which I handled they could have applied some "special measures" against me. "Special measures" is a technical term the Sandinistas use for the physical elimination of human beings.

THE SANDINISTAS' ORGANIZATIONS

IRD: Do you know anything about Accion Permanente por la Paz (Witness for Peace)?

BALDIZON: Witness for Peace is an American organization which has a relationship with and often works with organizations such as The Nicaraguan Peace Commission (CONIPAZ). I have heard Borge state on various occasions that members of Witness for Peace can be very useful for the Sandinista Front's propaganda strategy towards Western countries. Borge has said in party meetings that nothing creates more problems for the U.S. government than religious people in the U.S. who are being used and the political myopia of the American people.

CONIPAZ, directed by Commander Aviles, is one of a number of organizations which were created as part of the propaganda apparatus of the Sandinista Front. These organizations are used to hide the abuses of the Sandinista Front from the Nicaraguan people and from the world. Among these organizations I would include the Comision Nacional de Promocion y Proteccion de los Derechos Humanos (the National Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), the Komite Nicaraguense de Solidaridad con los Pueblos (the Nicaraguan Committee on Solidarity with the Peoples), and the Komite de Madres de Heroes y Martires (the Committee of Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs). This last organization is composed of mothers of soldiers who have been killed in combat and is directed by Commander Monica Baltodano, as well as the mother of the two Ortega Commanders. I know that in this organization there are mothers who have suffered the loss of a son but I cannot condone the political objectives of the Sandinista Front in using them as propaganda tools.

At the Antonio Valdivieso Ecumenical Center the Sandinistas try to make the Marxist doctrine of revolution coincide with Christianity. The Center is composed principally of sympathizers and followers of liberation theology but there are also committed Marxists who interpret the Bible according to the interests of the Sandinista Front. The Director, Father Molina, a Marxist sympathizer, agrees with the ideological line of the Sandinista Front and meets regularly with Tomas Borge. In fact, Father Molina was recruited by Tomas Borge personally when both studied at the High School in Matagalpa in the 1950's. I believe that there are some people who participate for sound reasons and are guided by true Christian principles, but the ultimate purpose of the Nicaraguan government in having this Center is to use it for purely political ends.

IRD: Is Father Molina a member of the Sandinista Front?

BALDIZON: The Sandinistas will never admit publicly that he is a member of the front. But in terms of Father Molina's ideological principles he is a follower of the Sandinistas. Sixto Ulloa, Director of International Affairs at the Comité Evangelico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo (Committee for Development Aid, CEPAD), also follows the ideological line of the F4 Department of State Security.

IRD: CEPAD receives a great deal of support from U.S. churches. Can you tell us anything else about it and its leaders?

BALDIZON: I know about Sixto Ulloa's connections with CEPAD through Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales, who worked for me at State Security, and through my participation in some operations with the F4 organization of State Security. During the first few months of 1984 when a commission -- I am not sure whether it was the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights or some U.S. religious organization -- visited the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, the Interior Ministry included Lieutenant Raul Castro Gonzales in that commission, and introduced him as a nephew of Leonte Herdocia, at that time the coordinator of the Permanent Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Sixto Ulloa, who was traveling with this delegation, knew this was a lie and that the purpose for including Lieutenant Castro in the delegation was for him to find out beforehand which areas were to be visited so they could be properly "prepared" by the Sandinistas before the commission arrived.

IRD: Are there other examples of Sixto Ulloa co-operating with State Security?

BALDIZON: I cannot give you another specific example but I do know that Sixto Ulloa was obedient to the interests of the Sandinista Front where religion and human rights were concerned. He serves in the National Assembly as a member of the FSLN and has direct access to Tomas Borge. He is one of the more belligerent Militants of the Sandinista Front. Becoming a Militant of the Sandinistas is a very selective process -- you have to satisfy many requirements. One of the most fundamental requirements is denying the existence of God, because that is one of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism in which the Sandinista cadres are steeped.

IRD: Please tell us about the differences between the Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) and the National Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights established by the Sandinista Front.

BALDIZON: The CPDH opposed the Somoza regime and today opposes the Sandinistas. It is objective in its estimates of human rights violations in Nicaragua. The Commission

on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was established by the Sandinista government as a propaganda tool and is nothing more than a showcase for the Sandinistas. For almost three years I was chief of the Department of Internal Investigations, where I responded to complaints about missing persons from these organizations. It was mainly because of the complaints by the CPDH that the Sandinistas established the investigation unit in which I worked. We tried to determine the circumstances in which Nicaraguan citizens were killed and then fabricated reports to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights which exonerated the government of responsibility.

IRD: Can you tell us anything about Sister Mary Hartman, an American Maryknoll nun and co-director of the pro-government Commission?

BALDIZON: She is a naive instrument of the Sandinista Front. She acts with good intentions which are exploited by the Sandinistas. I seem to recall it was Sister Mary Hartman who brought in several color television sets and Betamaxes which had been donated by a European religious organization for the prisoners in Nicaragua. When she delivered these to Raul Cordon Morice, chief of the national prison system, a small ceremony was held for her and she was promised that they would be given to the prisoners. After she had left, however, Raul Cordon gave one television set and one Betamax to each of the officials present. Sister Hartman does not know this, of course, and she continues to work naively for human rights in Nicaragua.

STATE SECURITY AND THE COVER-UPS

IRD: How large is the State Security apparatus?

BALDIZON: The Interior Ministry, which is the internal repressive apparatus, has 16,000 employees, not counting the thousands of secret collaborators that they have placed in neighborhoods, in restaurants, in all places of entertainment, in workplaces, and even within the opposition political parties.

IRD: Could you tell us something about Cuban and Soviet and other East-bloc involvement?

BALDIZON: In the Interior Ministry and throughout almost the entire Nicaraguan government everything is done according to the instruction of the Cuban advisers. The Sandinista Front emulates Cuba in all respects and is trying to assimilate the whole Cuban experience. In the Interior Ministry there are more than 200 Cuban advisers: there is one (Cuban adviser) for every important official in the Ministry at four different management levels. In the army, of course, there are about fifteen times that many. There are even Cubans who participate directly in air raids against some villages in the mountains of Nicaragua.

IRD: Can you give us any specific examples where State Security officers persecuted religious people in Nicaragua?

BALDIZON: There is one particularly terrible case which I personally investigated. In July 1983 in the village of San Miguelito, in the department of Rio San Juan, a couple, Guillermo Lorio and Jamilett Sequeira, who were members of a Catholic organization called Delegates of the Word, were apprehended by three officers of the Interior

Ministry. Two were officers of State Security, named Guillermo Lugo Marengo and Moises Rivera, and the third was First Lieutenant Victor Romero, the chief of special troops in the Fourth Region. The couple was arrested in the early morning hours with a pickup truck that belonged to the Construction Ministry. The couple's three children, who were all less than ten years old, started to cry, whereby a neighbor, Juan Luz came to his doorway to see what had happened. As he was a witness to the kidnapping Luz was also taken away. The three officers drove the detainees to Los Pantanos, three miles from the village of San Miguelito, separated them, interrogated and tortured them. Moises and First Lieutenant Romero cut the throats of the two men, raped the woman and then cut her throat. After robbing the bodies, the three officers went to the village for shovels and returned at dawn to bury the bodies. When they returned Jamilett was still alive whereby Marengo cut her throat again and shot her with an AK-47 rifle.

I was able to prove that the crimes had been committed by confiscating personal belongings of the victims from the three officers and by obtaining their confessions. I prepared a report on the case of more than 100 pages containing the confessions, medical reports, and photographs. As no military authority wanted to take the responsibility, I and a doctor called Sequeira returned the three bodies to their families for burial ten days after their deaths. Much of the information on this case was censored in the Nicaraguan press. In fact, only when a Dutch commission asked the government of Nicaragua about this case did the government have the three murderers tried. A judge found the three officers guilty and sentenced them to 30 years for the triple murders. After the Dutch Commission left the country, however, the murderers were released and returned to duty in the Armed Forces by orders of Deputy Commander Saul Alvarez, a delegate of the Interior Ministry in the Fourth Region.

IRD: Wasn't this just an isolated incident?

BALDIZON: No, this was not an isolated case. Similar incidents have taken place many times before with the prior knowledge of delegates from the Interior Ministry. They occurred in different sections of the country, but particularly in the mountains of Matagalpa, Jinotega, in North and South Zelaya, in the central mountains of Chontales, and on the San Juan River. In the Pacific area where the cities are located, the Sandinistas have been more careful to do "better planning" -- kidnapping their victims mainly in sparsely populated areas where there would be no witnesses.

IRD: Are you aware that bodies in precisely the condition you have described are sometimes presented by the Sandinistas as examples of contra atrocities?

BALDIZON: Yes. The Sandinistas tried to blame the case I have just described on the contra group led by Robinson, the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (Revolutionary Democratic Alliance, ARDE), but the case was too obvious and there were too many witnesses to the kidnapping.

IRD: Do the Sandinistas often try to blame their own human rights abuses on the contras?

BALDIZON: I was present during the planning stages of a propaganda campaign in October of 1984 which was designed to discredit the human rights policies of the counter-revolutionaries. It was conceived in the Office of Multilateral Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, with the participation of Lieutenant Alfonso Valle, the legal adviser to the Interior Ministry, Deputy Commander Alvaro Guzman, chief of staff of the Interior Ministry, and two officials from the Foreign Ministry.

In 1981 when the first counter-revolutionary groups appeared in the mountains of Matagalpa and Jinotega in the north, the Special Troops Unit of the Interior Ministry established its own "counter-revolutionary" force in the same areas as the real contra groups, so as to infiltrate them. To gain credibility with the contras, the Sandinista groups burned cooperative farms and even killed some pro-Sandinista farmers. The Sandinistas were then able to learn the whereabouts of the real opponents of the government, attack them at night and thus eliminate many genuine counter-revolutionaries. If the Sandinistas are capable of killing pro-Sandinista farmers they are capable of anything. The head of this operation was Deputy Commander Marco Arevalo who is now second in command of State Security.

IRD: How did you hear about this?

BALDIZON: As chief of the Department of Internal Investigations I was charged with investigating all cases of missing persons and I had almost unlimited access to confidential and secret documents. Some of the farmers who had disappeared were those who had been killed by these false counter-revolutionary groups.

IRD: Could you give another example of how the State Security has treated the Nicaraguan peasants?

BALDIZON: In July 1983 I conducted investigations on the executions of thousands of peasants in the mountains of Matagalpa and Jinotega and discovered that the shootings had been ordered by Deputy Commander Javier Lopez Lowerli, the delegate from the Interior Ministry for the Sixth Region, and Commander Alonso Porras, Political Secretary of the Sandinista Front for the Sixth Region, with the approval of Luis Carrion Cruz, Vice-Minister of the Interior, who is now at The Hague. These executions were carried out under their "special measures" program. Of all the thousands of peasants gunned down, only 60 cases were mentioned in complaints by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

IRD: Why did they order these killings?

BALDIZON: They consider the application of "special measures" to be one of their main means of defense. Each chief of a region or each chief of a general directorate may ask the Interior Ministry or the First Vice-Minister of the Interior for the "application of special measures" against individuals they think have given aid, food or shelter to the contras, or who are simply suspected of having cooperated with the contras.

The government has carried out air raids against rural communities in the Sixth Region, in the First Region, in some places along the Atlantic Coast -- especially in La Cruz del Rio Grande and in neighboring communities.

IRD: Do you know anything about atrocities by the contras?

BALDIZON: I cannot say that all of the atrocities attributed to the contras have been fabricated. But I can say that they have been exaggerated by the Sandinistas for propaganda purposes. The abuses committed by the contras have usually been isolated cases done in retaliation for atrocities committed against their families by the Sandinistas, but these abuses are not in widespread practice among the contras. I know of cases in which the counter-revolutionaries have stopped vehicles and evacuated all the occupants before burning the vehicles -- even sparing the lives of armed militiamen. When civilians are being transported on a military vehicle or in a convoy and the contras stage an ambush,

of course, some civilians may be killed. Or civilians may be victims of crossfire if they happen to live in the line of fire but nobody can determine which of the two sides killed them. The government, of course, blames the contras. But these are not deliberate killings, they are the terrible costs of civil war.

In contrast, it is the policy of the Sandinista government to order the killing of citizens who oppose them. For every single abuse committed by the counter-revolutionaries, the Sandinista Front commits ten. Even under the current civil war situation, where neither of the two sides is exempt from committing an abuse, I reiterate that it is the Sandinista Front that with previous knowledge and planning commits the great majority of the abuses and murders.

STILL IMPRISONED

IRD: You mentioned earlier that Borge arrested your wife and your brother when you defected. Where are they now?

BALDIZON: My brother, Mario Baldizon Aviles, who was never involved in any crime, is still being held indefinitely in prison, illegally and without charges. My wife, Maria Del Socorro Vargas de Baldizon, was detained for three weeks and subjected to physical and psychological torture. Besides their usual forms of torture, the Sandinistas paraded a man whose face was swollen and bloody before my wife, telling her that it was me and that they would kill the man unless she implicated my brother as an accomplice in my defection. As a result of this torture and psychological pressure my wife tried to commit suicide in the prison, and the Sandinistas were forced to send her home under a year of house arrest. All of these actions were done without any charges or legal proof and without a hearing before a judge. This is just one more example of the torment being inflicted on the people of Nicaragua by the Sandinista regime.

IRD: Do you think that your family will get out of Nicaragua?

BALDIZON: I expect that the Sandinista Front will continue its cynical and hypocritical policy of covering up all human rights violations in order to maintain its international prestige. And as I have publicly denounced the arrest and torture of my family I think their treatment will become an embarrassment to the Sandinista regime and they will be forced to permit them to leave the country.

IRD: Such publicity doesn't seem to influence the Soviet Union these days.

BALDIZON: Yes, it doesn't influence the Soviet Union, but the Soviet Union has a completely consolidated Marxist system, with great historical momentum and a much more solid basis than Nicaragua. While the Nicaraguan government must violate human rights in order to stay in power, it still must cover-up those violations in order to keep the support of foreign religious and charitable organizations as well as the support of foreign governments, especially those of the European Economic Community. They still believe that the Nicaraguan government respects political pluralism and human rights.

IRD: If some church group went to Nicaragua and inquired about your wife, do you think it would help?

BALDIZON: Yes. The more persons or delegations from other countries who ask about her the more pressure the Nicaraguan government would feel to release her.

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*Crated
America*

March 24, 1986

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036

To the Editor:

Your March 20 editorial observes, "Of the millions who heard Mr. Reagan describe the 'desecrating and firebombing' of Managua's only synagogue, how many will catch up with the rejoinder, by Rabbi Balfour Brickner...? He says the building was abandoned during the street fighting in 1978, a year before the Sandinistas seized power. The rabbi's own investigation in Nicaragua failed to sustain Mr. Reagan's charge of virulent anti-Semitism."

Paraphrasing your editorial, one wonders how many will catch up with the rabbi's questionable assertion given such amplification in a Times editorial, yet.

When is anti-Semitism heaping "catsup and snake oil into the dish of disputation" as you assert, and when is anti-Semitism plain anti-Semitism?

We submit that President Reagan was accurate in his characterization of the Sandinista government as anti-Semitic.

It is anti-Semitism when the Sandinistas' Foreign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto publicly declares, "I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord." Biblical rhetoric? It's the very rhetoric that historically has fueled pogroms. Moreover, coming from the same Foreign Minister who, addressing the United Nations, has said of Israel's actions, "Never since the time of Hitler has such mass genocide been witnessed...", it becomes an official expression of anti-Semitism.

It is anti-Semitism when Nuevo Diario, the Managua newspaper which adheres closely to the government's line, charges "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power they control political power as now happens in the

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
March 24, 1986
Page Two

United States." Tell me, how's that different from the anti-Semitism that Goebbels broadcast and which today echoes in the Soviet Union?

It may not be overt anti-Semitism when early on in their victory the Sandinistas invited Yassir Arafat to Managua where he promised that the "way to Jerusalem lies through Managua." Jews have, however, sadly learned to hear the sound of danger in such messages.

An extensive citation of anti-Semitic statements and acts of Sandinistas is available from the Anti-Defamation League, including corrections of your statement that the Managua synagogue was abandoned a year before the Sandinistas seized power. To be sure, one statement, two statements, one desecration, two desecrations, do not necessarily suggest an official pattern of anti-Semitism. But we are not discussing aberrational happenings. We are discussing patterns. And the Times' sources to the contrary notwithstanding, Marcel Ruff, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America in May, 1984 said "Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua." What makes the New York based Rabbi Brickner a more compelling observer than the Jewish presence in Nicaragua and Central America?

The terms "major factor" and "though not the only one" merit attention. Why? Because the issue of anti-Semitism aside, Jews, like all people, are multidimensional. And so they left Nicaragua because being Jewish was dangerous; and they left because free speech too is dangerous in Nicaragua; and they left Nicaragua because businessmen there are an endangered species; in short they left because freedom is a risky business in a Marxist-Leninist society.

So are the Sandinistas anti-Semitic? Of course they are, and anti other forms of civilized life as well.

Sincerely,

Nathan Perlmutter
National Director
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

WASHINGTON POST 17 MARCH 1986 Pg.11

Jeane Kirkpatrick

Why the Big Debate?

Debate over aid to Nicaragua's contras is bitter and intense. One wonders why, of the \$15-plus billion in economic and military assistance that the United States provides annually to diverse governments in Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America, this particular \$100 million is so hotly contested.

Such opponents as Arizona's Democratic Gov. Bruce Babbitt say it is because "Nicaraguan rebels are not democrats," but that is demonstrably wrong. The contra leadership is drawn almost wholly from men who actively opposed Somoza, fought to overthrow him and sought to bring democracy to Nicaragua. Can it be that Babbitt—who bothered to write an op-ed piece that opposed aid to the contras and was published in The New York Times on March 12—has not bothered to inform himself about the background and beliefs of top Nicaraguan resistance leaders Adolfo Calero, Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz?

Then, again, Babbitt says the contras have fought a "notably dirty little war." But that is also not true. War is violent and terrible. But the contras have a record of working hard to avoid harming civilians. They have done nothing that compares with the systematic brutality the Sandinista government visits on dissenters and opponents. Is it possible that Babbitt has not read the 1985 report of the Nicaraguan Commission on Human Rights, which documents the shocking denial of rights and spread of terror in Nicaragua?

Babbitt tells us to "begin from the premise that the contras are not going to win." And he argues strenuously against giving them the arms necessary to defend themselves against Soviet armored helicopters, missiles and heavy weapons. Babbitt asserts that U.S. aid to the contras helps the Sandinista government justify its repression. Apparently he does not know that the repression of Nicaraguans preceded the con-

tras. Repression caused the contras, not the contras repression.

Babbitt asserts that the contras' struggle has a negative impact on Nicaragua's neighbors, all of whom now enjoy democratic governments. Apparently Babbitt is unaware that large majorities of neighboring populations regard the Sandinista government as a threat to stability in their own countries.

A poll conducted this winter by the highly reliable Consultoria Interdisciplinaria in Desarrollo reveals that 92 percent of Costa Ricans, 89 percent of Hondurans and 63 percent of El Salvadorans regard Nicaragua as a military threat to their respective countries. Unlike Babbitt, a majority of Costa Ricans, El Salvadorans and Hondurans want the United States to provide military assistance to the contras, according to the same poll.

Like many other opponents of U.S. aid, Babbitt believes the United States should negotiate a settlement with Nicaragua and agree to "sever our bonds with the contras provided the Sandinistas agree to expel Russians and Cubans, reduce their armed forces and forswear the support of Marxist rebels among their neighbors." He does not explain why the Sandinistas should agree to make such concessions when he and so many other congressional Democrats are willing to forswear unilaterally U.S. aid. In fact, Babbitt's "deal" has already been rejected by the Sandinistas, who rely on public relations firms and the Democrats to block aid for Nicaragua's freedom fighters.

But why should the Democrats be so reluctant to help freedom fighters so close to our borders?

They—at least many of them—understand that Nicaragua's rulers have established a harshly repressive, Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. They understand that there has been a massive flow of Soviet and Soviet-bloc arms and

material—totaling approximately \$500 million to \$700 million. They understand that Nicaragua has actively provided weapons and other support to guerrillas in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia and elsewhere, and participates in the drug and terror network that wreaks havoc in the hemisphere. They understand that neither the U.S. government, nor the countries of Central America, nor the Contadora group has been able to persuade the Marxist commandantes who govern Nicaragua to cease the militarization, Sovietization and totalitarianization of Nicaragua.

The Democrats in Congress know that the Sandinistas already lend their country as a base for Soviet intelligence gathering and other military activities. What the Democrats in Congress apparently do not understand is that the Sandinistas use prolonged negotiations to further consolidate their power over the economy, church, schools, press, military—and all other aspects of Nicaraguan society.

Nicaragua's exiled democratic political parties and other democratic groups, including trade union councils, have formed a single umbrella organization called the Coordinacion Opositora Nicaraguense. CON recently addressed a letter to the foreign ministers of the Contadora countries in which they pointed out that by prolonging negotiations the Sandinistas give themselves time for definitive consolidation of power. "This is very important. Every day that they acquire at the expense of your good intentions is a day that our country loses in its just struggle to achieve its independence and liberty."

Unilateral disarmament of the contras in the face of the Sandinistas' Soviet arms can eventually stop the war in Nicaragua. But it cannot stop the terror that advances day by day.

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C ent
America

REAGAN...CONTINUED

But more significantly, Reagan was selling a product that Americans don't appear to be buying.

"You have a public that is up in arms about \$600 toilet seats . . . and much more emotionally concerned about waste, fraud and abuse than about the Soviet threat right now," said Ornstein. "In this part, you could argue that Reagan was the victim of his own success. If they see stability, people don't want to go to the barricades for defense spending."

In the latest Washington Post-ABC News Poll, after Reagan's budget was announced, the president received the highest rating ever—75 percent approval—for his handling of relations with the Soviet Union. At the same time, 56 percent of those asked said they favored "substantial" cuts in military spending to trim the deficit.

Despite this, Wirthlin said, his surveys showed that the defense speech had some impact in educating people, if not producing a flood of calls to Congress. "We accomplished as much as we could, providing a new perspective to those who listened to the whole speech," he said.

Reagan's address tonight on behalf of the contras poses related problems. Polls show that aid to the rebels has long been a hard issue to sell because of indifference and because of anxiety about U.S. military involvement in Third World conflicts.

"A substantial number of people who don't have any idea what Nicaragua is, much less where, don't see the threat," said Ornstein. "They don't see a bunch of ragtag Latin Americans on their way to Harlingen [Tex.], and are probably more worried about sending their boys off to fight in some jungle."

When Reagan has tried to raise public consciousness about the issue before, he has often simultaneously mobilized the opposition to his policy; but if he failed to take the lead, not even his Republican allies would support his request for military aid to the Nicaraguan rebels.

For example, Rep. Edwin V.W.

Zschau (R-Calif.), who is seeking the GOP nomination for the Senate, said he supports Reagan but finds the public on the other side. "We find among California Republicans there is a majority that opposes military aid to the contras," he said. At a recent fund-raiser, Zschau said, 300 people outside protested his support for Reagan on the issue.

"If you are going to establish public support, it will take sustained effort, and some leadership," said GOP pollster Robert Teeter. Realizing this, some White House officials at first wanted to postpone the debate in hopes that Reagan could build support over several months. But according to one top official, they were overruled by the State Department and National Security Council aides who said the contras could be wiped out by later this year if the effort was postponed.

The timing was further complicated when House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) scheduled a vote sooner than White House officials expected.

In planning tonight's address, the White House wrestled with two approaches. An early draft of Reagan's speech was filled with horror stories of Sandinista torture and murder of civilians, designed to strike an "emotional" chord among viewers. But aides said yesterday that some of these examples were discarded and that Reagan would also target his appeal on Congress, stressing bipartisanship.

"What will work best, none of us is entirely certain," said another top presidential assistant. "I'm under no illusions it will reverse public opinion. But members of Congress have been begging us to give this speech. It will create accountability. If this thing was passed on and off the stage without a spotlight, it would be much easier for Democrats to ignore it, he added.

"The success doesn't necessarily come because people melt the switchboard. This speech can succeed [in Congress] even if the pollsters' numbers don't look a whole lot differently."

Claro
America

The Sandinista Road to Stalinism

The Sandinistas ask us to believe that Congress's full support for the Nicaraguan "contras" is forcing them to crack down further on free thought and speech. We don't believe it. The depredations of that C.I.A.-sponsored army neither justify nor explain the totalitarian trend in Managua.

More plausibly, it is the regime's loss of popularity at home that drives the suppression. The Sandinistas would have far less to fear from the contras they so recently scorned if their regime were not also alienating large segments of the population.

The rhythm of repression in Nicaragua does seem to be timed to Congress's votes on contra aid. Yet even when Congress withheld funds from the rebels, the Sandinistas soon embarrassed those seeking to give them the benefit of a doubt. The latest crackdown may have been delayed until Congress voted on President Reagan's \$100 million aid request, but only the credulous can fail to see the long roots of the police state now emerging.

In rapid order the Sandinistas have closed the last opposition newspaper, La Prensa, expelled two prominent Roman Catholic clerics and posted still tighter limits of permissible dissent.

La Prensa was the symbol of liberal resistance against the Somoza dictatorship. Its survival was thus tangible evidence of the Sandinistas' obligation to former allies and of their tolerance for at least one hostile voice. Now even censorship, harassment and intimidation no longer suffice, and the paper is indefinitely suspended. The sense of obligation and tolerance has evaporated.

The assault on the Catholic hierarchy also serves a longstanding goal, of creating a rival, "revolutionary" church. Cardinal Obando was tar-

geted long ago as an enemy of the regime, not just for defending his institution but also for advocating reconciliation among all Nicaraguans, including the political representatives of the contras. Formerly content to resist him with harsh denunciations and organized heckling, the Sandinistas now practice secular excommunication. They expelled Father Bismarck Carballo, a spokesman for the Cardinal, and Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, vice president of the Bishops' Conference, on the ground that they were unfit for citizenship.

And Comandante Bayardo Arce, a member of the ruling Sandinista Directorate, proclaims the dawn of a "new political phase" on top of the nine-month-old emergency decree. The parties permitted to run in the 1984 elections have already been restricted. Strikes are illegal and independent political activity often leads to jail. Punishment is now threatened for anyone who dares to call Nicaragua's civil war a civil war.

By these incremental steps, the pluralist revolution seems hopelessly betrayed. Instead of responding to the contra attacks by broadening their support, the Sandinistas use the war to justify breaking their promises to respect a vital private sector of the economy and to coexist with a lively political opposition. They are well down the totalitarian road traveled by Fidel Castro.

Was that their goal from the start? If so, they have fulfilled Mr. Castro's bid to do it slowly, to confuse sympathetic democrats until repression could be blamed on the United States. If a Stalinist tyranny was not the original aim, how can it serve the regime's security to alienate important segments of Nicaraguan society? Even in stress, governments are fairly judged by the enemies they make. Nicaragua's is daily making more of them.

EXCERPTS FROM REMARKS MADE BY VICE-PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER

YITZHAK SHAMIR

HOLON, JUNE 17, 1986

[unofficial translation]

Central
America

International terror constitutes an international plague. We mainly have to contend with Arab terror, but we know that the terror organizations, despite their abundant resources, are unable to inflict serious damage on any country without states that support them, aid them, provide them with money, provide them with weaponry, and provide them with territory for training.

It is easily possible to contend with a terror organization that acts without state assistance, and even possible to destroy it. Therefore, we think that the war on international terror, which the U.S., as the most powerful nation in the world, is leading, is a war of the utmost importance, since its aim is to prevent states from supporting international terror. The U.S. attacks on Libya were of the highest importance. They sought to deter, and we already see the results of this deterrence. They have deterred other states from taking this path, and they have also deterred the same states that engaged in this until now and caused them to think again and watch their step.

International terror is an international monster whose workings extend to every continent across the face of the world. We see it in Libya, and we see this terror, as well as PLO terror, even in Central America. We know, for example, that the PLO cooperated and aided the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and in exchange, the Sandinistas set up a PLO base in Nicaragua. We welcome the American action in confronting the terrorist danger there as well, in Central America, just as the U.S. did in Libya. By the way, a close relationship exists between Libya and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, too.

The war on terror is an international war that extends across the face of seas and continents. Israel supports the principle of international cooperation against international terror. We do this, and we are convincing others to take this course, and I think that there are results, and there will be more results, so that this evil, which does not let us live normal lives in this world, will be destroyed.

Sustaining a Consistent Policy in Central America: One Year After the National Bipartisan Commission Report



Report to the President
From the Secretary of State

April 1985



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Letter of Transmittal

Mr. President:

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America reported in January 1984 that the crisis in Central America engages vital moral and strategic interests of the United States. During the summer and fall, the Congress made available funds that enabled us to begin to act on many key Commission recommendations.


This study assesses how we are doing. A year is a brief period in the history of Central America. But we have begun to change popular attitudes as well as official policy. After years of relative indifference, we are putting a lot more than words into our support for equity, reform, and freedom for all our neighbors.

The events of the past year, while not conclusive, added up to a better year for many Central Americans. The ravages of poverty and violence can be measured by the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced within their own countries or moving to neighboring countries and the United States. But in most countries, the economic decline of recent years was stemmed; political life was more free. In El Salvador President Duarte talked directly to guerrilla leaders; while in the regional Contadora negotiations, some progress took place, buttressed by the effort we undertook at Manzanillo.

Only in Nicaragua did countertrends prevail. While democracy was becoming stronger elsewhere, the Sandinistas continued to betray the democratic principles of the anti-Somoza revolution, refusing to hold free elections or to talk to those Nicaraguans forced again to take up arms against dictatorship. While claiming to seek peaceful solutions, the Sandinistas are militarizing Nicaragua and supporting armed insurrection in other countries in ways that serve Soviet goals of destabilization and conflict.

Every American has a stake in helping our neighbors to build working democracies free of internal or external threats to their freedom and security. A great deal remains to be done. But the fundamental message of the attached study is that hard work and steadiness are making a real difference.

Sincerely yours,



GEORGE P. SHULTZ

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (referred to in this study as "the Commission") was named in July 1983 by President Reagan to advise on "a long-term United States policy that will best respond to the challenges of social, economic, and democratic development in the region, and to internal and external threats to its security and stability."

Henry A. Kissinger served as Commission Chairman. The Commissioners were: Nicholas F. Brady, Henry G. Cisneros, William P. Clements, Jr., Carlos F. Diaz-Alejandro, Wilson S. Johnson, Lane Kirkland, Richard M. Scammon, John Silber, Potter Stewart, Robert S. Strauss, and William B.

Walsh. Senior Counselors were Jeane Kirkpatrick, Winston Lord, William D. Rogers, Daniel K. Inouye, Pete V. Domenici, Lloyd Bentsen, Charles McC. Mathias, William S. Broomfield, Jack F. Kemp, James C. Wright, and Michael D. Barnes. Harry W. Shlaudemman served as Executive Director.

This study of where we stand in developing the long-term approach recommended by the Commission was prepared by the Department of State and the Agency for International Development, with assistance from the Departments of Defense and the Treasury, the United States Information Agency, and the Peace Corps.

Summary

The report submitted to the President on January 10, 1984, by the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America is at the core of U.S. policy in Central America. The Commission concluded that fundamental strategic and moral interests of the United States require a long-term national commitment to economic opportunity, human development, democracy, and security in Central America.

The Commission proposed a comprehensive approach—an active diplomacy in support of democracy, supported by economic aid to get at root causes of poverty and social unrest and by security assistance to protect peaceful development.

The Commission recommended an immediate supplemental appropriation of \$400 million and an additional \$8 billion in economic aid for the succeeding 5 years. The Administration's proposal was similar: a \$400 million fiscal year (FY) 1984 supplemental, \$5.9 billion in appropriated funds, and \$2.0 billion in insurance and guarantees for FY 1985–89.

The Commission also recommended increased military assistance to permit the application of modern, humane counterinsurgency strategies which require greater mobility, more training, higher force levels, and more equipment. The Administration proposed a \$259 million supplemental for FY 1984 and \$256 million for FY 1985.

Bipartisan congressional majorities approved increases in both economic and military assistance close to what the Commission recommended and the President proposed for FY 1984–85.

Current Strategy

Our increased economic assistance is being used to:

- Arrest declines in incomes, employment, and economic activity through major balance-of-payments assistance;
- Establish the basis for long-term economic growth through improvements in economic policy and the infrastructure needed to export;
- Assure the widest possible distribution of the benefits of growth

through assistance aimed at improving health, education, and housing for the poorest groups; and

- Support democratic processes and institutions through assistance for the administration of justice, technical training, and the development of leadership skills.

At the same time, security cooperation has been put on a firmer professional footing. The improved performance of the armed forces of El Salvador and the increased readiness of those of Honduras are directly linked to increases in both the quantity and the steadiness of U.S. security assistance and military cooperation.

Results

In Central America as a whole, regular elections have become the norm, and economic decline has been stemmed. After a decline of 4% in 1982–83, gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 1.2% in 1984—not enough to offset population increases but enough to mark a clear turnaround.

The longer term economic framework recommended by the Commission is beginning to take shape. Traditional development assistance—concentrated in education, nutrition, health, and agriculture—has been strengthened. In addition, we have begun to work with governments and legal organizations to improve the administration of justice and to develop new programs for leadership training, and other support for democratic institutions. The trade credit insurance program has been established. The Caribbean Basin Initiative, proposed by the President in 1982, took effect in January 1984, further opening the U.S. market to Central American as well as Caribbean nations for 12 years, until 1996.

A key problem is that Nicaragua continues to support—with Soviet and Cuban resources—antidemocratic forces throughout the isthmus. The security threat to other countries posed by this communist challenge diverts government revenues from development to defense and weakens the productive forces needed to support self-sustaining growth.

The United States continues to support a verifiable and comprehensive peace settlement that implements the Contadora principles. Whether or not an agreement is reached, however, substan-

tial amounts of U.S. aid will continue to be needed to strengthen our neighbors' well-being and security.

Next Steps

This year we again seek bipartisan support for the balanced and mutually reinforcing mix of political, economic, security, and diplomatic activities that the Commission concluded we should pursue simultaneously. For FY 1986, the Administration's economic assistance request totals \$1,053 million; the military request is \$261 million. Legislation that would authorize appropriations for non-military programs for FY 1986–89 would provide a critical assurance of U.S. commitment and an important tool for public and private planning in Central America.

In our FY 1986 foreign assistance authorization proposal, we also have requested the statutory authority to carry out three additional recommendations of the Commission:

- To support comprehensive programs to improve the administration of justice, including investigative and enforcement aspects necessary to assure that evidence is obtained and provided to courts in a professional, timely, and humane manner. Any activities otherwise subject to the Foreign Assistance Act's prohibition on assistance to police (section 660) would be subject to prior notification to the Congress.
- To allow aid recipients to use local currencies generated from appropriated funds to help compensate former owners of land transferred under land reform programs. This would enable the completion of the titling procedure in El Salvador, give increased security to the new owners, and provide capital for domestic investment by local entrepreneurs.
- To help organize and to join a regional forum to provide Central Americans, from the private sector as well as from government, an opportunity to participate in the formulation of strategies for achieving common objectives. The recommendations of this organization would be taken into account in allocating bilateral economic assistance. ■

Central America One Year Later

Almost as soon as the Commission issued its report, developments in Central America began to confirm the accuracy of its analysis and the soundness of its judgment. In early 1984, many in the United States, in Western Europe, and even in Latin America believed that El Salvador was caught in an endless war between the guerrillas of the left and death squads of the right. But the Commission saw a different future. It saw electoral democracy, reform, and political dialogue as realistic alternatives to the antidemocratic violence of the extreme left and right—provided El Salvador's democrats got the support they needed.

Today, El Salvador's problems are closer to resolution than a year ago. In 1984 there were two rounds of national elections leading to the presidential inauguration of Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon Duarte; the trial, conviction, and imprisonment of the murderers of four American churchwomen; changes in military and security personnel and in the procedures which govern their behavior; improved economic and military performance; a marked reduction in the number of political crimes; and President Duarte's initiation of a dialogue with the FMLN/FDR [Farabun-

I do not think [the outside world] has changed. It is the situation in El Salvador which has changed, especially since my election as president.

President Duarte,
July 19, 1984

do Marti National Liberation Front/Revolutionary Democratic Front] guerrillas. At the same time, the United States increased both economic and military assistance while West Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan all resumed or increased aid during 1984.

In Nicaragua, the Commission's analysis—and warnings—were also on the mark. The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime with support from Cuba and the Soviet Union continued and was perceived by Nicaragua's neighbors as increasingly threatening.

The Nicaragua of 1985 is less democratic, more heavily armed, and more closely tied to the Soviet bloc. Support from Western Europe and democratic Latin America is less than it has ever been. Just as a harsher Somoza dictatorship sparked more rebellion, so the *comandantes'* communism has bred increasing armed and unarmed resistance. Whether and, if so, how the Sandinistas can adjust their behavior to the needs of their people and their neighbors is now clearly the most important of Central America's current dilemmas.

Though less in the news than either El Salvador or Nicaragua, Guatemala—Central America's most populous country—also produced political drama in 1984. Shattering the stereotype of hopeless polarization, the Guatemalan electorate turned out in record numbers on July 1, 1984, to support the political center in elections that were open and honest. The Constituent Assembly is scheduled to complete its task this summer. General elections are scheduled for October 27, 1985.

Costa Rica and Honduras feel somewhat less secure today than at the beginning of 1984. This underscores two other key Commission findings: that each Central American country is directly affected by events elsewhere in the isthmus and that the United States is logically regarded as the one nation with both the moral responsibility and military strength to defend the region's democratic course. For both Costa Rica and Honduras, the antidemocratic policies of Sandinista Nicaragua and the apparent lack of consensus in the United States about what to do to help move Nicaragua in a more democratic direction have raised concerns about the longer term reliability of the U.S. commitment.

The past year gives reason to believe that the direction we have begun to take—if consistently sustained—can bring lasting and beneficial change for all Central Americans. But it also remains evident throughout Central America that this will require both the *reliability* of a long-term U.S. commitment and the *confidence* that this commitment will continue to be tied to equity, reform, and freedom. For a region so close to our own borders, no other outcome is compatible with the national interests of the United States.

Economic Stabilization and Growth

To help reverse economic deterioration and the social and political unrest it engenders, the Commission recommended an immediate additional \$400 million in U.S. assistance for emergency stabilization in 1984 and additional funds for balance-of-payments support to finance essential imports for the private sector in 1985. The Commission also recommended economic policy reforms to achieve stabilization, recovery, and economic development.

Except for Nicaragua, Central America's downward economic spiral has been halted. A regional increase in GDP of 1.2% in 1984 followed GDP declines of 3.3% in 1982 and 0.8% in 1983. In El Salvador, where the economy declined calamitously by 25% from 1980 to 1982, GDP leveled out in 1983 and rose an estimated 1.5% in 1984. Our current estimate is that regional GDP (still excluding Nicaragua) will further rise by 2.5% in 1985.

While this is impressive progress and a cause for renewed hope in the region, population increases mean that per capita income levels will not be restored at 1979 levels until at least the early 1990s. For example, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and Belize all increased GDP in 1984, but only Costa Rica achieved a positive per capita growth rate.

U.S. assistance programs were critical in achieving these results. Their continuation is essential if these positive trends are to continue.

Stabilization

Economic stabilization is an essential first step in the economic recovery and development process and, therefore, in the achievement of our goals in Central America. The modicum of stability brought about in the region in 1984 reflected positive changes in Central American economic policies as well as U.S. assistance flows.

In Belize, major steps were taken to reduce the fiscal deficit.

In Costa Rica, U.S. economic assistance supported the government's implementation of policies that improved substantially the country's fiscal and balance-of-payments positions.

El Salvador and Guatemala provided stronger incentives to exports through improved exchange rate policies.

In Honduras, the government imposed a moratorium on central government guarantees of debt incurred by autonomous agencies and raised revenue from tariff reform.

In Panama, the government made progress in implementing its stabilization program and is discussing with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank continuation of stabilization and structural adjustment programs.

U.S. economic assistance in the amount of \$274 million from the FY 1984 supplemental and \$607 million from the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution provided balance-of-payments support for vital imports and other assistance for economic stabilization. These funds also provided local currency credits for development activities. In addition, assistance totaling \$190 million was authorized to lay the foundation for long-term growth and development. This substantial assistance also helped to make possible the policy reforms that contributed to the fragile stabilization so far achieved.

Long-Term Growth and Development

The Commission recommended that the Central American nations adopt economic policies that would lead to private sector-led, free market-oriented development with an emphasis on nontraditional exports and increased agricultural productivity. It recommended U.S. assistance to regional programs and institutions. The Commission also stressed the need to seek ways to assist the Central American economies through U.S. trade and investment programs.

For growth to take place, the Central American countries must create the conditions for increasing domestic savings and attracting productive investment. Improving investment conditions means stabilizing the economy and ensuring that risk takers, whether foreign or domestic, can reap the benefits of their investments when they succeed. Only when economic and other risk-affecting conditions are such that domestic savers are rewarded for their thrift, and investors for their enterprise, will flight capital return home and new foreign investment begin to flow once again to the region.

This shift away from the statist, import-substitution, antiforeign model of the past 20 years requires considerable

political preparation and entails serious economic dislocation. These reforms would be difficult to carry out in peaceful and secure societies; they are especially hard to manage in fragile democracies caught up in the turmoil of armed insurgencies.

Against great odds, real progress has been made.

Belize has liberalized prices and taken steps to encourage livestock exports. The Agency for International Development (AID) has provided a \$5 million line of credit through the Central Bank of Belize for lending to productive enterprises through commercial banks. Contract assistance also is available to local and foreign investors in the preparation of private investment initiatives, primarily in agribusiness.

Costa Rica, where GDP grew by about 6% in 1984, has Central America's most comprehensive economic reform program. It adjusted its exchange rate to maintain export competitiveness and enacted a currency law reform which expands opportunities for private banks. A new IMF standby and a World Bank structural adjustment loan were approved in March. Other efforts are helping to lay a foundation for long-term growth.

- A nongovernmental investment bank to develop investment packages for new export activities is being created with AID assistance.

- A coalition of private business organizations is working with AID to provide training in U.S. business schools to entrepreneurs, bankers, and teachers.

- State enterprises are being divested.

- AID is financing infrastructure in the form of rural road construction, agricultural research and extension, marketing services, production credit, and land titling for the rural population in an area in northern Costa Rica.

- PL 480 food commodity assistance is generating over \$20 million in local currency to provide credit to farmers and promote increased agricultural productivity.

El Salvador has improved incentives to exporters by permitting them to sell their earnings on the more favorable parallel exchange market. The government also has improved the management of foreign exchange and has taken a more active role in the promotion of nontraditional exports.

- A project supported by AID is being implemented by the Ministry of

Foreign Trade to explore new market opportunities in the United States and other countries.

- An international trade fair was organized with AID support and technical assistance from the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service which attracted U.S. and other foreign investors to El Salvador. Several investment proposals resulted.

- A new business organization, "The Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development," is working with AID assistance to help small business owners, traders, and skilled crafts people develop and promote new export products.

- A new private finance company is being organized with AID assistance that will provide financial and technical support for productive enterprises. The new facility should add flexibility, initiative, and expertise to the commercial banking system.

Guatemala has legalized the parallel exchange market to improve incentives for exporters. Many activities are receiving AID assistance.

- Credit and technical support is being provided to rural industry and artisan enterprises.

- \$16 million in food commodity imports is generating local currency which will be used for the settlement of idle but arable productive lands now in the public domain.

- Land terracing and small-scale irrigation is being introduced in the highlands.

- Research is underway to develop or adopt technologies to increase production and exports of fruits, vegetables, flowers, and plants.

Honduras participates in a joint Honduran-U.S. Economic Working Group which has been formed to develop a rational economic policy framework which favors growth and development. Measures advanced by the group to reduce the fiscal deficit have been enacted by the government. Fiscal incentives were also enacted to promote non-traditional exports.

- AID recently helped establish a confederation of 10 commodity producers' associations, which provides prospective buyers or investors with

"one-stop" assistance, arranges meetings with producers and local investors, and provides information on subjects from production and price information to taxes and export licenses. This initiative is helping to diversify exports from near-exclusive reliance on coffee, bananas, sugar, and beef to a mix of winter vegetables, seafood, melons, pineapples, and other fruits and their byproducts.

- Assistance is also being provided to develop the nonprofit, private Honduran Agricultural Research Foundation.

- U.S. funding is helping thousands of farm families to cultivate hillsides, produce beef and dairy products, and increase the cultivation of coffee on small farms which had been affected by coffee rust.

Panama has committed itself to difficult economic reform measures that are required to manage its huge external debt, reduce fiscal deficits, and create a better economic climate for long-term growth. The new government has introduced tariff reforms, removed some price controls, enacted new tax and budget measures, and is trying to sell some public enterprises to the private sector. U.S. assistance is:

- Helping to work out revisions of Panamanian labor laws, port administration, and electricity rates that will make Panama more attractive to foreign investors;

- Working with the private sector to establish an export development bank to provide medium- and long-term lending to export businesses; and

- Intensifying assistance to Panamanian businesses to develop and promote export-oriented products.

Regional Programs

The Commission also recommended support for regionwide programs.

- A trade credit insurance program has been established which will provide guarantees for up to \$300 million in trade credits this fiscal year.

- Representatives of the Central American governments agreed in December 1984 to guidelines for revision of the Central American Common Market's (CACM) common external tariff with precise changes to be detailed in 1985. We are hopeful that these revisions will pave the way for reduction in the level of protection of goods produced within the region, thereby encouraging local producers to become more competitive.

... these countries are under economic siege. In 1977, 1 barrel of oil was worth 5 pounds of coffee or 155 pounds of sugar. To buy that same barrel of oil today, these small countries must provide five times as much coffee (nearly 26 pounds) or almost twice as much sugar (283 pounds). This economic disaster is consuming our neighbors' money, reserves, and credit, forcing thousands of people to leave for other countries—for the United States, often illegally—and shaking even the most established democracies. And economic disaster has provided a fresh opening to the enemies of freedom, national independence, and peaceful development.

President Reagan
February 24, 1982

The Commission recommended that the United States provide an emergency credit to the Central American Common Market Fund to refinance part of the trade deficits that CACM members have accumulated among themselves. An AID-financed study by independent contractors identified difficulties with this approach. We are proceeding cautiously. We note that Honduras has decided to stimulate its intraregional trade by adopting a new payment system that will allow market forces to play a major role in determining exchange rates on transactions within the CACM system. We have pledged to support this major reform with \$20 million in economic support funds, which will allow the clearing of Honduran arrearages in the Central American Clearing House.

- A recent AID-financed assessment concluded that the Central American Bank for Economic Integration has been an important institutional factor in past regional development, has the capacity to contribute significantly to further infrastructure development and increased industrial production and trade, and can effectively utilize financial assistance from AID. A development assistance and economic support fund (ESF) loan/grant is planned to assist the bank during 1985.

- The Commission also recommended the creation of a Central American development organization to provide an advisory forum for dialogue among all actors—government, business, and labor—on development issues. The Administration continues to seek the authorization of Congress for U.S. Government participation in such an organization.

- The Overseas Private Investment Corporation has continued its support for U.S. investors in Central America and expects to increase its role as new opportunities evolve.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The thrust of the Commission's economic recommendations are paralleled by the Administration's philosophy for the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The 12-year U.S. program of preferential duty-free treatment was implemented on January 1, 1984, for imports from 20 countries and territories in the Caribbean Basin. Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama have all been designated.

The fundamental objective of the CBI is to encourage both foreign and domestic investment in the beneficiary countries in efficient and diversified export production. As countries take advantage of the opportunity of preferential entry to the U.S. market, the result should be increased employment, better balance-of-payments positions, enhanced government revenues, and a more diversified and stable industrial structure producing for both domestic and export markets.

The results after 1 year of experience are hard to interpret but, nonetheless, promising. U.S. imports from the six Central American beneficiaries rose by \$220 million, an annual growth rate of 12% for the region as a whole. Although less than the rate of growth of U.S. imports from the world (26%) or from Latin America as a whole (15%), when these gross figures are disaggregated, they reveal important gains in nontraditional exports (that is, exports other than bananas, coffee, sugar, and other commodities), especially from countries that maximized the effect of the CBI tariff benefits by following flexible exchange rate policies. Efforts to develop economic and political climates that support private investment, innovation, and export will be crucial to the ultimate success of the CBI.

Third-Country Support

The Commission called for efforts to encourage other industrial countries to increase support for Central American growth and development. U.S. officials have focused on encouraging other developed countries to improve export opportunities for Central American countries.

In September 1984 the European Community (EC) and the five Central American states decided to negotiate a framework agreement for economic and technical cooperation.

Canada has already increased aid, and Japanese assistance also has grown more modestly.

Mexico and Venezuela have made major contributions by enabling Caribbean Basin countries to apply part of the price of oil they purchase to development projects. In 1980, Mexico and Venezuela established the San Jose accord whereby they provide concessional credit for petroleum purchases by Central American and Caribbean countries. The accord was renewed in August 1984.

Human Development

The Commission warned that economic growth and democratic institutions will have unstable foundations if malnutrition, illiteracy, poor education and health, inadequate housing, and population pressures are not addressed.

Health Initiatives. AID is developing new health initiatives and expanding ongoing programs to fulfill Commission recommendations. To benefit those most prone to infectious diseases and malnutrition—the rural and urban poor—the United States has obligated or authorized more than \$50 million for health services. Technical assistance is concentrated on such sectors as health economics and financing, hospital administration, epidemiology, and immunization. A regional program to improve the nutritional impact of food aid is in the final planning stages.

A new \$8 million Central American regional project promotes a simple, cost-effective technology that cuts deaths from diarrhea, the major killer of children in the developing world. More than 3 million packages based on oral

rehydration therapy have been distributed in Honduras alone. Through effective health services and mass media campaigns, rural and urban Hondurans have become aware of the value of this treatment to combat the debilitating and life-threatening effects of dysentery. In one study area, the mortality rate for children under the age of five was estimated to have dropped by 40% after introduction of oral rehydration therapy. Infant mortality in Honduras dropped from 88/1,000 in 1980 to 78/1,000 in 1984, in large part due to the program's success.

Housing and Infrastructure. The Commission recommended emphasis on development of housing and infrastructure, specifically urging \$200 million in housing guaranty resources to be allocated over 5 years. For FY 1985–89, \$125 million in development assistance, up to \$75 million in economic support fund (ESF), and some \$450 million in local currency generations from ESF programs are currently projected for housing and infrastructure. The emphasis is to be on rural infrastructure development, the use of labor-intensive technology, and the installation or upgrading of infrastructure to support urban shelters. In 1984, \$50 million were in use or programmed for Honduras and Panama. Housing guaranty programs also are being discussed with the Governments of El Salvador and Costa Rica.

Food and Agricultural Assistance. To help meet the immediate nutritional needs of the poor, U.S. concessional food assistance programs (PL 480) to the region increased from about \$90 million in FY 1983 to \$106 million in FY 1984 and to \$111 million this year.

Commitments to Central American agricultural projects and programs in FY 1984 were \$76.5 million and \$10 million in FY 1984 supplemental funds. In addition, local currency generations from PL 480 programs equivalent to \$93.8 million were directed toward the agricultural sector. Such assistance programs have helped to expand agricultural cooperatives, broaden land ownership, and enhance resources available for agricultural credit and investment.

Access to Land. A key element of our human development programs in Central America is expansion of access to land where additional U.S. resources, both human and financial, are being applied. Land ownership encourages long-

term decisions on capital investment and crop selection and is essential for access to credit.

- In El Salvador, the agrarian reform program since 1980 has broadened land ownership by transfer of 20% of Salvador's arable land to peasant families totaling 570,000 persons. Most had been landless. As of February 1985, 64,785 provisional and 12,589 definitive titles had been issued.

- In Honduras, an AID-financed land-titling project registered 14,000 titles benefiting roughly 75,000 farm family members. This achievement more than triples the 4,000 titles granted over the previous 50-year period. The plan is to register up to 70,000 titles by 1987.

Also in Honduras, we are preparing to extend a cooperative development project. In the pilot effort, some 1,300 small farmers with 9,600 acres of land were organized into four cooperatives, producing both food and export crops. They received \$3.5 million in credit for which they have an exemplary repayment record. Their export sales alone generated \$2 million in foreign exchange, and they have capitalized their cooperatives with more than \$250,000.

Demographic Goals. The Central American nations hope to reach their demographic goals by decreasing crude birth rates 1% per year over the next decade. Both education and material support are essential to this effort. In FY 1984 the United States financed \$5.6 million for support of voluntary family planning programs in Central America. AID has budgeted \$15 million for population programs in Central America for FY 1985. In administering programs to assist the free choice of Central Americans in determining family size, AID complies with the August 1984 U.S. policy statement on population assistance.

Employment Programs. In El Salvador, AID contributed to 137,000 full-time jobs in 1984 as part of public works employment programs for the general population and displaced persons. Contributing to these employment levels were AID-financed imports of raw materials and intermediate goods.

Humanitarian Relief. The U.S. Government also has expanded humanitarian relief efforts as recommended by the Commission. One-half million displaced Salvadorans have benefited through the Health and Jobs for Displaced Persons Project and through U.S. contributions to international and private organizations. In August 1984, AID authorized an additional \$60 million for El Salvador which, over the next 3 years, will finance vital services such as health and sanitation services and increased food deliveries and relocation. Congress earmarked \$7.5 million for humanitarian relief for Miskito Indian refugees in southern Honduras; the funds are being used for medical services, immunization, and oral rehydration therapy, and transportation facilities to improve emergency access and provision of agricultural inputs such as seeds and tools.

Educational Opportunities. The Commission also recommended support for programs designed to bring about substantial improvement in the availability and quality of educational opportunities. Thus, using a mix of FY 1984 supplemental and FY 1985 funds:

- In El Salvador, AID is beginning a \$17.68 million program to improve the quality of primary education and make it more available to poor children.
- In Honduras, AID will be providing \$10.86 million to reproduce and distribute textbooks to primary students nationwide.
- In Costa Rica, AID is using \$4.33 million for a program of selected training activities needed for development.
- Panama is receiving \$3.1 million for participant training programs to improve the productivity of selected exported-oriented firms.
- A \$2.05 million project in Belize will provide management, public administration, and technical skills to help the private sector identify and develop jobs for the unemployed.
- In Guatemala, \$22.7 million are being used to implement bilingual education for Indian children. In December 1984, the government adopted a law legalizing the use of Indian languages in public schools and creating a national bilingual education program which these funds will support.

Scholarships. AID and the United States Information Agency (USIA) have developed new special training and exchange programs under which 10,000 Central Americans will be educated in the United States through FY 1990. The programs cover a wide spectrum, from undergraduate education for poor students to advanced research opportunities.

The Central American Peace Scholarships Project (CAPS) was launched by AID in February 1985. The project will provide scholarship opportunities in the United States to approximately 7,000 Central Americans over 5 years, primarily from lower income families. CAPS will offer English language and remedial education as an integral part of the program and has built-in incentives to reward countries that emphasize concern for lower income youth, women, and minorities. Leadership potential is an important selection criterion.

Some 1,200 long-term and short-term participants should be in training in the United States by the end of FY 1985. By FY 1986, participants are to include 450 long-term scholars and 900 short-term trainees. Under the CAPS project, \$2 million from the FY 1984 supplemental appropriations was used to finance the Georgetown University "Central American Students Project." More than 100 Central Americans will participate, as well as some 70 faculty/administrators from Central America and the United States.

The USIA plan for scholarships in Central America totals \$9.5 million in FY 1985. It increases International Visitors, Fulbright, and university linkage grant programs and establishes a new program for undergraduates. Some 430 individuals, one-third of them faculty and administrators, will participate in these programs; 3,000 Central American students, at graduate and undergraduate levels, will be involved over the next 5 fiscal years.

Peace Corps. Working with AID and USIA, the Peace Corps is expanding cooperation with Guatemala, Honduras, Belize, and Costa Rica. The Peace Corps has no operations in El Salvador (for security reasons) or Nicaragua (where the Sandinistas in 1979-80 rejected U.S. offers to send volunteers). A program in Panama is under consideration.

In the Caribbean Basin, the Peace Corps aims to increase agricultural productivity and exports. In response to the Commission's recommendations, the Peace Corps' goal is to raise the number

of volunteers from about 600 to 1,000 in 1985 and to focus cooperative efforts with AID on education. Approximately 80% of the increase in volunteers will be placed in formal and nonformal educational projects. Participating in AID-funded education programs whenever and wherever possible, the other 20% of the volunteers will be assigned to rural self-help housing, health/nutrition, and small enterprise development. There has been good response from AID Country Missions to joint education efforts with the Peace Corps.

Building Democracy

The Commission report identified one strong trend in the region: "Democracy is becoming the rule rather than the exception." Democratic patterns continue to develop in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama, while democracy remains the norm in Belize and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas, however, continue antidemocratic policies in Nicaragua.

Democratic Practices

In El Salvador democratic political development was affirmed by presidential elections in March and May 1984 in which nearly 80% of the Salvadoran electorate turned out in the presence of hundreds of international observers to elect Jose Napoleon Duarte. Nine political parties representing a broad range of opinion campaigned in the March 1985 legislative and mayoral elections, which completed the constitutional renewal despite guerrilla attacks and harassment.

Political murder in El Salvador by "death squads" declined dramatically from the levels of previous years, particularly after President Duarte took office. Urban killings by guerrilla groups, however, have increased.

Due to the guerrilla threat, the state of siege restricts some constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the government has reinstated the right of assembly for political parties and peaceful organizations, including church and labor groups. Groups sympathetic to the guerrillas have freely run advertisements and held marches, demonstrations, and a human rights congress dominated by anti-government speeches.

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Guatemala held a nationwide election on July 1, 1984, to select delegates to a Constituent Assembly. More than 72% of those eligible cast ballots without official interference. Moderate parties won a majority in the Constituent Assembly, which is drafting a new constitution prior to national elections scheduled for October 27, 1985, and a runoff, if necessary, in November. The new Congress will be seated in December 1985, and a new civilian president will be inaugurated next January. The Guatemalan military is maintaining the scrupulous neutrality it adopted for the Constituent Assembly election.

Honduras continues to consolidate the democratic system begun with the 1981 Constitution and presidential election. Following the replacement of the chief of the armed forces and other military officers in March 1984, their successors reaffirmed military support for civilian rule and the 1985 elections. Labor and peasant organizations continue to operate freely and to play a major role in national events. The campaign is underway for presidential and congressional elections scheduled for November 1985. The succession will be the first transfer of power from one elected president to another in Honduras since 1927.

Panama returned to democracy on October 11, 1984. The inauguration of President Barletta and his civilian government culminated a process of political opening begun in 1978. Isolated incidents of violence and a slow vote count punctuated by charges of fraud marred the election, which was otherwise peaceful and marked by a large turnout of voters. The new president has pledged support for the principles of democracy, and, for the first time since 1968, the legislature has significant powers.

Belize held its first postindependence national elections on December 14, 1984. They were peaceful, open, and honest. The opposition won control of the Parliament and the ruling party handed over power on December 17.

Costa Rica remains steadfastly democratic despite pressing economic problems. As President Luis Alberto Monge told the International Labor Organization in Geneva on June 12, 1984: "Democracy works as a means of settling the problems of production and

to win battles in the struggle against underdevelopment and poverty." As a country whose citizens demand respect for the rule of law, Costa Rica has stood up to Sandinista intimidation, most recently over the Christmas eve kidnapping from the Costa Rican Embassy in Managua of a young Nicaraguan who had sought asylum there. President Monge's strong economic policies, backed by an independent legislature, produced the highest growth rate in Central America in 1984.

Nicaragua continued to be the sole exception to the general trend of democratic progress in Central America. During 1984, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) increased totalitarian controls over Nicaraguan Government and society through elections that excluded the major democratic opposition coalition and its candidate, former Sandinista junta member Arturo Cruz. Following closely the Cuban model, the FSLN runs the Sandinista Popular Army, the Sandinista Popular Militia, the Sandinista Defense Committees, the Sandinista Neighborhood Committees, and other mass organizations. Centralized government control of the educational system, as well as radio news and all television programming, is in the hands of FSLN cadre assisted by

Responding to internal and external pressures, the Sandinistas held national elections on November 4, 1984. Protracted negotiations took place with the opposition over electoral conditions, but the Sandinistas insisted on keeping their inherent advantage as party, government, and armed forces rolled into one. Censorship of the press, harassment and intimidation of the opposition, and a short campaign period forced the principal opposition parties to coalesce and then to withdraw from the election. Since the "election," the Sandinistas have suppressed or forced into exile many of the remaining leaders of the democratic opposition.

Democratic Institutions

The Commission identified strengthening of democratic institutions and support for countries in transition to democracy as essential to U.S. interests in Central America. This recommendation reinforces for Central America the President's 1982 announcement to the British Parliament that the United States would make a major effort to help "foster the infrastructure of democracy around the world."

Our objective in Central America is to help develop or strengthen institutional capacity for peacefully brokering

Democracy works as a means of settling the problems of production and to win battles in the struggle against underdevelopment and poverty.

President Monge,
June 12, 1984

some 2,000 Cuban teachers. The government publishes one newspaper, enjoys the uncritical support of a second, and exercises stringent prior censorship of the only opposition paper, *La Prensa*. One of its most effective instruments of political control is the ration card issued by the Sandinista Defense Committees. Since August 1984—when the government took over the distribution of corn, beans, rice, cooking oil, sugar, salt, soap, and sorghum—the ration card has become an instrument of control affecting the means to acquire even basic staples.

issues that might otherwise be exploited by antidemocratic forces. The trend toward more democratic government provides many opportunities to increase our support for democratic institutions and processes from the national to the community level.

To help individual Central American countries carry out fair elections and to build a permanent institutional capacity within the region to provide this assistance, AID is supporting the Center for Electoral Advice and Promotion, an autonomous, permanent activity of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights located in San Jose, Costa Rica. The center is a key source of technical advice and assistance to electoral

tribunals and private institutions on designing and implementing electoral systems and procedures; for observation and evaluation by impartial experts of how elections are conducted; and for sponsorship of conferences, research, and other activities that generate broad support for representative democracy.

We also support efforts to improve electoral systems on a country-specific basis. The FY 1984 El Salvador election project enabled the Central Elections Council to modernize and improve its registration and vote tabulation procedures, to conduct a broader public education campaign on eligibility requirements and voting procedures, and to expand the number of international observers present at the May 1984 presidential election. The system developed also was employed for the March 1985 legislative and municipal elections.

In Honduras, AID has provided \$5 million in locally generated currencies to the recently established National Electoral Tribunal to help develop a nonpartisan, comprehensive national voter registration system. This funding has been used primarily for computer equipment and technical training and assistance.

In leadership development and civic education, AID is helping to finance programs of the Partners of the Americas aimed at promoting the democratic process in decisionmaking at the community level. Civic leaders are being prepared as trainers in techniques of problem solving, community action, and civic responsibilities, so that they may help the citizens of their communities become informed participants in the local political process.

We also are developing a pilot regional leadership development program with a private institution in Costa Rica, the Center for Research and Training in Political Administration, which would offer young political leaders from the Central American countries professional, nonpartisan training in grassroots organizations, labor-management relations, local government, interest groups, negotiations, and public relations.

Another important assistance area is support for legislative bodies. AID pro-

poses to facilitate sharing with Central Americans a highly successfully experience in the Dominican Republic. With AID assistance, a Dominican university developed and implemented a training program for new legislators in 1982. The Dominican Congress is now planning to establish a center which will train legislators, members of the executive branch, and city council; undertake studies on policy issues; maintain a reference center; and provide internships for students. We plan to assist representatives from the Dominican university and Congress to work with appropriate institutions in Central America to develop similar programs.

USIA also has increased its programming of U.S. speakers traveling to Central America and International Visitors invited to the United States to discuss democratic processes. For example, special delegations of journalists and legislators from Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras were brought to the United States to observe the November 1984 U.S. elections.

Nongovernmental efforts to strengthen democratic development abroad also have increased, particularly those of the National Endowment for Democracy and affiliated institutes of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the AFL-CIO, and the Republican and Democratic Parties. The Free Trade Union Institute of the AFL-CIO has provided assistance in the form of loans, medical assistance, and family resettlement support to democratic trade unionists from Nicaragua now living in exile in Costa Rica. The National Endowment for Democracy has given a grant to the Center for Political Studies in Guatemala for activities aimed at bolstering the transition to democracy. The Endowment has also funded national seminars in Honduras to promote political awareness among non-Marxist labor and peasant leaders.

This innovative and long overdue focus on the political and organizational dimensions of democracy has received widespread support in Central America.

Administration of Justice

Implementing the recommendation of the Commission report, we have begun an intensive effort to help the Central Americans strengthen their judicial systems. Indeed, in his speech to the November 1984 General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS), Secretary Shultz highlighted the importance of the administration of justice to the consolidation of democracy throughout the hemisphere.

In September 1984, the United States committed \$9.23 million in FY 1984-85 ESF funds for a 3-5 year program in support of the Salvadoran Government's effort to strengthen the administration of justice. This program includes:

- Support for a revisory commission to identify the legislative, procedural, and administrative problems that prevent the judicial system from functioning effectively and to design and oversee the implementation of solutions to those problems;
- Support for a criminological institute, which is to include a permanent investigative capability and a modern forensic laboratory;
- Support for a judicial protection capacity (which began with U.S. funding to provide security for the trial of the murderers of the four U.S. churchwomen) to help shield participants in the judicial process from intimidation; and
- Assistance to the court system to improve general efficiency and responsiveness.

Under the program, an intensive, 6-week training of the initial group of investigator recruits was completed in Puerto Rico, and a full-time trainer-consultant in criminal investigation has been assigned to work with the unit and to assist the Government of El Salvador in planning the operation of the criminological institute.

The efforts of President Duarte, continuing those of President Magana, demonstrate the Salvadoran Government's commitment to improving the administration of justice. Despite the notable success evident in the May 1984 conviction of the killers of the U.S. churchwomen, President Duarte still

faces an extremely difficult political task in brokering enduring reforms among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. Strong, continued U.S. support will be necessary.

Significant changes also are being made elsewhere in the region. A new criminal code went into effect in Honduras on March 13, 1985. The need to improve the judicial system has already become a nonpartisan campaign pledge by candidates of both the government and opposition parties. Guatemala abolished secret courts on September 7, 1983. Administration of justice and

On March 22, 1985, the United States and ILANUD signed an agreement to begin a 5-year, \$10 million regional project to expand training and technical assistance to Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Panama and to Guatemala as it returns to civilian rule. This project will enable ILANUD and third-country experts to provide technical assistance to all elements of national judicial systems—from legal reform commissions to Supreme Courts to justices of the peace, from court administrators to prosecutors and public defenders. The project will provide scholarships for

One way to fight the terrorists, the drug traffickers, and all who abuse human life and dignity, is to develop the capacity of our legal systems to render independent, fair, timely, and accessible justice. . . . It is fundamental that in a democratic society all citizens have access to means for effective enforcement of their civil, political, economic, and social rights.

Secretary Shultz,
November 12, 1984

human rights are key concerns in the drafting of the new Guatemalan Constitution.

During the past year, the United States supported a conference of Central American bar associations in Costa Rica, a workshop on the administration of justice at the annual meeting of the Inter-American Bar Association in Panama, and participation of Central Americans in an American Bar Association meeting in Texas. The Inter-American Bar Association is making the administration of justice the central theme at its September 1985 annual meeting.

The U.S. Government funded scholarships for students from El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica for graduate study at the University of Costa Rica Law School. We also provided funding for Central American judges and prosecutors to participate in courses at the UN-affiliated Latin American Institute on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (ILANUD) in San Jose.

graduate legal training and continuing legal education at the University of Costa Rica and support an enhanced law program at the University of Honduras. It also will involve bar associations and other organizations able to contribute to strengthening networks of legal professionals committed to judicial reform and to the exchange of ideas and information on improvements to the administration of justice. This innovative project supports the 3-5 year program for El Salvador.

The Administration strongly concurs with the Commission's recommendation that we help to strengthen the entire process of administration of justice, including support for agencies responsible for criminal investigations. An exception to Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act enabled us to move ahead with training and other support for the investigative and judicial protection programs in El Salvador. In the FY 1986 Foreign Assistance Authorization bill we requested that the exception be extended to all of Latin America under carefully defined conditions and subject to prior notification to the Congress.

Security

The Commission encountered a sobering security situation in Central America. During the 1970s, the steady growth of Cuban military power, backed by the direct Soviet military presence in Cuba, was accompanied by reductions in U.S. military presence in the Caribbean Basin. Then, after the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in 1979, the U.S.S.R. shifted from opposition to support of Cuban advocacy of armed struggle. The belief that revolutionary conditions prevailed throughout Central America, especially in El Salvador, was widespread.

Summarizing the strategic significance of Central America to the United States, the Commission consensus was that our national security interests include:

- Preventing developments that might require allocating large resources to defend the southern approaches to the United States;
- Forestalling threats to the Caribbean shipping lanes;
- Avoiding a proliferation of Marxist-Leninist states that would increase violence, dislocation, and political repression; and
- Ending the erosion of our ability to influence events, which would result from a perception that we were unable to protect vital interests so close to the United States.

In 1984, El Salvador's elected government and increasingly professional armed forces made significant progress in dealing with the guerrilla war as a political as well as a military struggle. But the activities of Cuba and Nicaragua, with sizable Soviet cooperation and material support, continue to pose a serious threat to Central American governments and to U.S. interests in the region. Direct Soviet arms deliveries to Nicaragua and Nicaragua's continued support for the armed insurgency in El Salvador underline again the gravity of current security concerns and of the potential strategic risks at stake.

Nicaragua

For all of these reasons, the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua would be seen by its neighbors as constituting a permanent security threat. Because of its secretive nature, the existence of a political order on the Cuban model in Nicaragua would pose major difficulties in negotiating, implementing, and verifying any Sandinista commitment to refrain from supporting insurgency and subversion in other countries. In this sense, the development of an open political system in Nicaragua, with a free press and an active opposition, would provide an important security guarantee for the other countries of the region and would be a key element in any negotiated settlement.

The Commission Report,
Chapter 7

In the year since the Commission issued its report, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) further consolidated its control over the Nicaraguan Government and continued its military buildup. After the November 4 "elections," Soviet arms deliveries increased dramatically. During the past 12 months Nicaragua:

- Increased its armed forces to 62,000 active duty personnel and a total force of 119,000, including reserves and militia, while announcing the intention to expand even further through mandatory conscription;
- Acquired Soviet MI-24 Hind attack helicopter gunships;
- Expanded its military inventory to 150 T-54, T-55, and PT-76 tanks; 200 other armored vehicles; and some 300-400 surface-to-air missiles;
- Neared completion of a runway long enough to service any aircraft in the Soviet or Cuban inventory at Punta Huete outside Managua; and
- Deepened security links to Cuba and the Soviet Union as well as to radical states, such as North Korea, Libya, and Iran.

Nicaragua serves as a conduit for money, arms, munitions, medical supplies, and communications and logistical support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. The Salvadoran guerrillas maintain training facilities and command and control centers in Nicaragua. However, there are indications that some Salvadoran guerrilla units are experiencing difficulties in receiving supplies. This disruption of supplies is due to several factors, including more effective intelligence and patrol operations by Salvadoran Government forces, more active Honduran patrols along the border and in refugee camps, and armed resistance activities within Nicaragua.

El Salvador

There might be an argument for doing nothing to help the government of El Salvador. There might be an argument for doing a great deal more. There is, however, no logical argument for giving some aid but not enough. The worst possible policy for El Salvador is to provide just enough aid to keep the war going, but too little to wage it successfully.

The Commission Report,
Chapter 6

The Administration and Congress approved the Commission's recommendations to significantly increase military aid to El Salvador. This assistance is already making a positive difference in the military situation.

As recommended by the Commission, U.S. military aid has been administered with close and continual attention to human rights considerations. Under Public Law 98-332, the Executive now reports to Congress on El Salvador every 60 days. The four reports issued so far document steady improvements in respect for human rights by the Government and armed forces of El Salvador. The number of civilian deaths attributable to political violence has declined sharply. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating individuals residing in the United States who may be directing, financing, or otherwise involved in "death squad" activities in El Salvador.

In its treatment of the guerrilla war in El Salvador, the Commission felt that it was imperative to settle on a level of

aid related to the operational requirements of a humane counterinsurgency strategy and to sustain that aid over time. The Commission specifically recommended providing the Salvadorans with increased air and ground mobility; increased training; support for higher force levels; greater stocks of equipment; and better troop conditions, especially an improved capability to evacuate the wounded and to provide prompt medical attention.

These recommendations formed the basis for the Administration's request for increased assistance to El Salvador, which was included in two supplemental appropriation bills passed by Congress. In June 1984 the Congress passed an urgent supplemental including \$61.8 million in military assistance. In the FY 1984 supplemental, the Congress appropriated an additional \$70 million. Together with the FY 1984 Continuing Resolution, military assistance for El Salvador in FY 1984 amounted to \$197 million. Though short of the \$243 million requested by the Administration, it was, nonetheless, a substantial increase over the \$81 million appropriated for FY 1983. For FY 1985 Congress appropriated \$128.25 million, \$4 million short of the amount requested.

With U.S. support, including training as well as materiel, the Salvadoran Armed Forces have been able to maintain the battlefield initiative. They are now larger, better trained and led, and have improved mobility and communications. In addition, the military now has an aeromedical evacuation capability which, together with an expanded corps of trained medics, has improved morale and decreased the mortality rate among wounded Salvadoran troops. The arrival of two C-47 aircraft with mounted machine guns has provided the armed forces with the capacity to respond to units under attack by guerrilla forces. On January 7 and 8, 1985, a Salvadoran Army battalion withstood a guerrilla force twice its size because of the critical help of the armed C-47s. The Salvadoran military will occasionally suffer some battlefield setbacks, but it is undoubtedly a better military force now than a year ago.

As anticipated by the Commission, this improvement in the military situation for the Salvadoran Government contributed to the FMLN/FDR decision to accept President Duarte's October 1984 offer at the United Nations to meet with

the insurgents. This historic step offers some hope for the eventual reincorporation of FMLN/FDR members into the greatly strengthened Salvadoran democratic process. The short-term results, however, have been disappointing. That the guerrillas have by no means abandoned the goal of complete power is evidenced in their intransigent November 30, 1984, demands for power-sharing, recognition of areas "under guerrilla control," the amalgamation of government and guerrilla forces, and the formation of a new government as preconditions for elections.

Still, the guerrillas are beginning to demonstrate a lack of resolution in the face of the Salvadoran military's increased effectiveness and professionalism. The increased ability of government troops also has strengthened President Duarte's hand in dealing with the armed forces as an institution. The more self-confident military knows that the peace dialogue can be limited to a constitutionally based discussion of the FMLN/FDR's participation in the democratic process.

The humane pursuit of the war has been a central theme for President Duarte and his government. At La Palma and again at Ayagualo, Salvadoran officials proposed an agreement to end all attacks on the economic infrastructure and populated areas. Although their proposals were rebuffed by the FMLN/FDR, President Duarte has enforced strict compliance with rules of engagement to minimize noncombatant casualties. The government's National Plan envisions the extension of increased government services and programs to the civilian population in conflictive areas. We strongly support efforts to monitor closely the rules of battlefield engagement and to increase assistance to the National Plan to help displaced persons.

Other Regional Security Developments

Beyond El Salvador and Nicaragua, the principal security concerns of the Commission report, significant security developments took place in Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica.

Honduras. The military buildup in Nicaragua has placed new pressure on Honduras to modernize its small armed forces, less than one-fifth the size of Nicaragua's expanded military apparatus. U.S. security assistance to Honduras (\$77 million in FY 1984) helped to upgrade the mobility, firepower, and

reaction capabilities of the Honduran military. With our assistance the Honduran Armed Forces are being restructured to respond to security threats from Nicaragua and from Salvadoran guerrillas seeking sanctuary along the border with El Salvador. We have developed a pattern of close cooperation with Honduras on regional issues. We have been discussing with the Hondurans how both security and economic aspects of that relationship might be revised to reflect current circumstances and to achieve mutually shared objectives. These discussions are continuing.

Guatemala. The Commission noted the continuation of insurgency in Guatemala and the successful efforts of the military to combat the guerrillas through aggressive small-unit patrols and civil affairs programs. In the past year the Guatemalan Army continued to limit guerrilla operations in rural areas. The Mexican Government's decision in 1984 to move Guatemalan refugees from border camps to a region further inland helped improve Guatemalan-Mexican relations and deprived guerrillas of possible sources of logistics support and recuperation.

Guatemala's enlargement of the local civil defense force to 900,000 members also has played a key role in reducing insurgent activity. These largely unarmed forces, while defending their communities, also provide intelligence on guerrilla movements, thereby limiting guerrilla mobility in the countryside. Despite army successes, the shortage of spare parts for helicopters and other supplies hampers the government's ability to respond to guerrilla activity. The insurgents have promised to intensify their activities in the months leading up to general elections in October 1985. Although some abuses at the local level continue, the Guatemalan military now accepts the political need to allow dissent and to focus not on indiscriminate repression but development as the best, long-run counterinsurgency strategy.

The Commission encouraged civic action to address the root causes of insurgency. The Guatemalan Government, in fact, devotes considerable army manpower to such activities, which they designate "civil affairs" and which emphasizes the need for overall coordination of rural development. In addition, the National Reconstruction Committee has rebuilt several dozen towns destroyed in heavy fighting in 1981-82 and is encouraging refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes and land.

Costa Rica. Tensions between Costa Rica and Nicaragua increased in 1984 and early 1985. Armed incidents along their common border pointed to Costa Rican vulnerabilities. U.S. assistance is directed at upgrading Costa Rica's border-monitoring capabilities, professionalization of Civil Guard personnel, and the development of a reaction unit for preserving border integrity.

U.S. Security Assistance and Military Presence

The United States is committed to providing the necessary security for the protection of democratic processes in the region. This "security shield" consists of military assistance, training, exercises, naval maneuvers, and construction programs, including:

- \$321 million in FY 1984 and \$237 million in FY 1985 in military assistance—MAP grants, FMS credits, and IMET;

- Training under IMET of military personnel from five Central American countries—748 with FY 1984 funds and 1,076 with FY 1985 funds in U.S. and Panama Canal area schools (these figures exclude soldiers trained by U.S. Mobile Training Teams sent to specific countries for brief periods of time);

- Enhancement of regional military cooperation through major combined exercises, such as "Ahuas TARA II" and "Granadero I" as well as a series of small-scale deployment exercises to enhance the joint readiness of U.S. and allied Armed Forces in the region;

- U.S. naval deployments near Central American waters and the "King's Guard" combined naval surveillance and interdiction exercises with the Honduran and Salvadoran Navies in the Gulf of Fonseca; and

- Completion of airfield improvements at Palmerola and La Ceiba that increase Honduran military mobility.

In the fall of 1984, the School of the Americas operated by the U.S. Army was moved when, in compliance with the Panama Canal Treaty, its operations in Panama were discontinued. The school has reopened at Ft. Benning, Georgia, and will be in full operation by December 1985.

In 18 months of operation, the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras trained some 9,000 Central American military and security person-

nel. One of its notable contributions was to facilitate the rapid, but professionally sound, buildup of the Salvadoran Armed Forces during the critical election year of 1984. The Salvadoran military now has its own basic training center at La Union.

These U.S. security assistance and military activities were in harmony with the Commission's judgments and recommendations. However, the gap in the military capabilities among the region's individual countries increased substantially during 1984.

- Despite some \$77 million in U.S. security assistance, the modernization of the Honduran Armed Forces did not keep pace with the Nicaraguan military buildup.

- Despite \$9 million in MAP and \$133,000 in IMET, Costa Rica was in a similar situation, with its 8,000 Civil and Rural Guards relying almost exclusively on small arms.

The security threat—primarily in the form of Soviet-bloc arms deliveries to Nicaragua and the expansion of the Sandinista armed forces and paramilitary organizations—may still be growing at a faster pace than the policy and response capabilities of the United States and the Central American democracies.

The Search For Peace

... we would surely welcome genuine Nicaraguan interest in peace. All we are asking is that the Sandinistas commit themselves to specific, concrete, and far-reaching actions that would show their good faith interest in peace—actions involving no more than they committed themselves to 5 years ago[:] stop exporting subversion to their neighbors; ... reduce their bloated military to restore regional balance; sever military ties with Cuba and the Soviet bloc; and begin to honor their promises to the Organization of American States to create a democratic, pluralistic system.

Vice President Bush,
February 28, 1985

U.S. support for regional diplomatic peace efforts is strong, consistent, and undiminished. We have repeatedly made clear in private communications and public statements our willingness to support and abide by a comprehensive and fully verifiable implementation of the Contadora Document of Objectives of September 9, 1983.¹

During 1984, U.S. diplomacy pursued the Commission's recommendations that we test "Nicaragua's willingness to enter into a general agreement" and support efforts of the Contadora Group to find a comprehensive reciprocal and verifiable approach to the Central American crisis.

The Office of the Ambassador at Large and Special Envoy for Central America has proven to be an effective means for implementing this diplomacy. The incumbent, Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman, made 27 trips to Latin America between March 1984 and March 1985, holding 139 meetings with chiefs of state and senior Foreign Ministry officials.

The Contadora Process

The Contadora process has been the centerpiece of diplomacy among the regional countries since early 1983. Although negotiations were stalled in February 1985 by a dispute over political asylum between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, the Contadora Group scheduled a new round for April.

Three drafts of a final agreement were prepared in 1984. A draft "Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America" was prepared by the Contadora Group in June. After initial discussions, the Contadora Group prepared a second draft which it presented to the five Central American states on September 7. Nicaragua announced on September 21 that it would

¹The nine countries participating in the Contadora process formally agreed to this document as containing the objectives of their negotiations. These countries are the four members of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela) and the five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua).

sign this draft provided it was not modified and called on the United States to adhere to an additional protocol.

The other Central American governments welcomed this draft as a positive step but cited the need to strengthen provisions for verification and control and to provide for a more balanced and orderly implementation of its security provisions in particular.

U.S. spokesmen noted that the September 7 draft was much improved and that its elaboration was a positive step in the negotiating process. We also stated our view that provisions for verification needed to be strengthened. In consultations with Contadora participants, we stressed that our textual reservations are in no way to be equated with opposition to an effective treaty, which we would support.

On October 20, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras proposed another draft, incorporating the specific changes they felt necessary. Extensive consultations among the Contadora participants as to how the September and October versions might be reconciled took place on the margins of the OAS General Assembly in Brasilia November 12-16 and have continued through normal diplomatic channels.

The elaboration of several drafts in 1984 suggests that the Contadora process could make rapid progress in 1985. With negotiations about to resume, the key question is whether Nicaragua is willing to negotiate.

Bilateral Conversations With Nicaragua

We also have supported the Contadora process in bilateral talks with Nicaragua held in Manzanillo, Mexico. These discussions were begun at the request of the President of Mexico, acting on behalf of the Contadora Group. Secretary Shultz visited Managua on June 1, 1984, to begin the process. Since then, there have been nine rounds of talks between Special Envoy Harry W. Shlaudeman and Nicaraguan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Victor Hugo Tinoco. To give the talks the maximum chance to succeed, the two sides agreed not to discuss publicly their specific content. Although the Nicaraguans have publicly characterized the talks in a

general way, they have largely abided by this rule of confidentiality, as have we.

In mid-January we decided not to schedule further bilateral talks due to concern that Nicaragua was using them to avoid comprehensive negotiations within Contadora's multilateral framework. The Manzanillo talks have been useful in permitting each side to present its concerns fully to the other, but they have made no substantive progress. We undertook the Manzanillo talks in hopes of facilitating a successful outcome of the multilateral Contadora process. Any bilateral agreement necessarily would be incomplete with respect to all elements of the regional crisis. Arms and troop-level reductions, for example, can only be negotiated between Nicaragua and its neighbors. Nicaragua, however, appears to prefer a bilateral agreement, in lieu of Contadora.

On February 27, 1985, in a move that appeared designed primarily for public relations impact, President Ortega announced Nicaragua's intention to send home 100 Cuban military advisers; to suspend, for the time being, acquisition of new armaments, including "interceptor aircraft"; and to invite a U.S. congressional delegation to visit Nicaragua. The moratorium on new armaments systems is potentially significant, but only if it proves more far-reaching and permanent. The offer to send home 100 of the 2,500-3,500 Cuban military advisers could be significant, provided that it would be the beginning of a continuing withdrawal to be undertaken in the near term as part of an overall settlement.

We have communicated to all concerned our willingness to resume bilateral talks if that would contribute to a comprehensive agreement within Contadora. On March 2, Secretary of State Shultz met with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in Montevideo, Uruguay, to explore such possibilities. We are looking to the Contadora negotiations for evidence of Nicaragua's willingness to negotiate seriously. Normal diplomatic channels remain open to continue this dialogue.

Internal Dialogue in El Salvador and Nicaragua

We strongly support President Duarte's dialogue with Salvadoran guerrillas. The lack of a parallel development in Nicaragua was 1984's major disappointment.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly on October 8, 1984, Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte proposed to meet military representatives of the Salvadoran guerrillas in La Palma, El Salvador. That offer was accepted by the FMLN/FDR and meetings took place on October 15 in La Palma and on November 30 in Ayagualo.

At the first meeting, on October 15, President Duarte personally offered the insurgents the opportunity to be reincorporated into civil and political society, including the chance to participate in upcoming municipal elections. Public hopes that the talks might lead to an early agreement to end the war were dealt a blow by the guerrillas' reversion to uncompromising demands in the second round on November 30. This hardening contradicted public statements made in the United States by FDR representatives that guerrilla groups might participate in the March 1985 nationwide municipal and assembly elections.

The dialogue that was begun at La Palma and continued at Ayagualo has not yet resolved the major disagreements in the Salvadoran conflict. Its initiation, nevertheless, crossed a threshold of enormous significance. That President Duarte was able to meet with the guerrillas and lead his government to those talks reflects the dramatic change that has taken place in Salvadoran politics. President Duarte's initiative began the process of discussions that make it possible for the rebels to be incorporated into their society within a fully representative political system. We expect the dialogue will resume after the March 31 elections.

Nicaragua's 1984 elections proved to be an opportunity for a breakthrough that was, unfortunately, lost. The willingness of resistance forces to lay down their arms if allowed to participate in genuinely free and fair democratic elections had been on record, in writing, since December 1983. During the late spring and early summer of 1984 a coordinated democratic opposition (the *Coordinadora*) looked to the highly respected Arturo Cruz, a former member of the Sandinista government, to lead it in the November 1984 elections. Although Cruz

did not represent the armed opposition, few doubted that the entry into the campaign of this former junta member would help redirect Nicaragua's political life toward democratization.

Negotiations between the Sandinistas and the democratic opposition (brokered by the Socialist International) took place in Rio de Janeiro in early October 1984. They collapsed, however, and the Sandinistas withdrew their proposal; the democratic opposition agreed to participate on the basis proposed but was powerless to create the conditions necessary in the face of Sandinista intransigence.

The Nicaraguan opposition, armed and unarmed, continues to seek a dialogue with the Sandinistas. On March 2, 1985, several resistance organizations specifically and formally called for a Catholic Church-sponsored dialogue with the FSLN. Their manifesto—announced in San Jose, Costa Rica, by opposition leaders Arturo Cruz, Adolfo Calero, and Alfonso Robelo—included the following elements:

- Convocation by the Nicaraguan bishops conference;
- Suggestion that other Central American governments act as guarantors of any agreements reached;
- The presence as observers or guarantors of any other hemispheric governments;
- Suspension of all armed activities and a cease-fire in place; and
- Acceptance of Daniel Ortega "as head of the executive branch until such time as the people pronounce themselves in a plebiscite."

The response, at this writing, of the Sandinistas has been twofold. On March 7, Arturo Cruz, who was attempting to present the offer to the Nicaraguan Government, was denied entry into Nicaragua. Two days later, the Interior Minister summoned 10 leaders of the unarmed opposition to accuse them of conspiring with anti-Sandinista guerrillas.

On March 22, 1985, Nicaragua's Roman Catholic bishops expressed their "willingness to mediate in an internal dialogue." In doing so, the bishops explicitly recalled their Easter pastoral of April 22, 1984, which called for "all Nicaraguans inside and outside the country . . . [including] Nicaraguans who

have taken up arms against the government," to participate in "a sincere effort to seek appropriate solutions . . . in a climate of democratic harmony."

The Contadora Document of Objectives calls for "national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes. . . ." The Sandinistas based their ascent to power on democratic claims and promised free elections. The world is still waiting.

Western Europe

Several West European governments during the past year have shown an interest in supporting democratic development in Central America. West Germany, for example, returned a resident ambassador to El Salvador prior to the first round of general elections there last March and subsequently renewed a program of economic assistance, suspended since 1979. Many West European governments sent official observers to both rounds of the Salvadoran elections.

President Duarte was well received in visits to Belgium, France, West Germany, Portugal, and the United Kingdom in July, as was Costa Rican President Monge during a West European tour in June. The West Europeans have given the Contadora process and the U.S.-Nicaraguan talks at Manzanillo their strong support and encouragement. They have joined us in welcoming President Duarte's dialogue with Salvadoran guerrillas.

West Germany's Willy Brandt and other Socialist International leaders attempted to persuade the Sandinistas to create conditions to enable the *Coordinadora* to participate in the election. When that effort failed, few official observers attended the Nicaraguan elections.

Cuba and the Soviet Union

We have made our positions on Central American issues clear to both the Cuban and Soviet Governments. In particular, we have communicated our concerns regarding Cuban and Soviet military activities within and outside Nicaragua. The Commission's analysis and recommendations reaffirmed our view that we should discourage other governments from thinking we would support initiatives or measures that would tend to legitimize a Cuban or Soviet role in the region. ■

APPENDIX A: Summary of Commission Report

OUTLINE

The report, which was dedicated to Senator Henry Jackson and transmitted to the President on January 10, 1984, consisted of the following chapters:

1. Introduction and basic themes.
2. Placed crisis in larger hemispheric context.
3. Provided historical perspective.
4. Examined prospects for economic and political development; presents recommendations.
5. Discussed social issues—health and education particularly—and makes recommendations.
6. Explored security issues and recommends U.S. action.
7. Looked at diplomatic aspects and offers recommendations on pursuing negotiated settlements.
8. Conclusion.

—On security and diplomatic issues, the report dealt with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. Panama and Belize were included for discussion of development programs.

MAJOR THEMES SET FORTH IN THE COMMISSION REPORT

—The crisis in Central America is acute. Its roots are indigenous—in poverty, injustice, and closed political systems. But world economic recession and Cuban-Soviet-Nicaraguan intervention brought it to a head.

—The crisis will not wait. It must be addressed at once and simultaneously in all its aspects. Ultimate resolutions depend on economic progress, social and political reform. But insurgencies must be checked if lasting progress is to be made on these fronts.

—Indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is no threat to the United States. But the intrusion of outside powers exploiting local grievances for political and strategic advantage is a serious threat. Objective of U.S. policy should be to reduce Central American conflicts to Central American dimensions.

—United States has fundamental interests at stake: Soviet-Cuban success and resulting collapse of Central America would compel substantial increase in our security burden or redeployment of forces to detriment of vital interests elsewhere.

—As a nation we have deep and historic interest in promotion and

preservation of democracy. Report concludes that pluralistic societies are what Central Americans want and are essential to lasting solutions. In this case, our strategic interests and our ideals coincide.

—Central Americans desperately need our help, and we have a moral obligation to provide it. The United States and other nations can make a difference. But, in the end, solutions will depend on the efforts of Central Americans themselves.

—Although there is urgent need for action, no quick solutions can be expected. The United States must make a long-term commitment and stick to a coherent policy.

—That policy can and should be bipartisan. Commission found wide consensus on principles and objectives.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

—Central American economies grew substantially during the 1960s and early 1970s. But income distribution was highly inequitable, except in Costa Rica and Panama.

—Trend toward more pluralistic political systems in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua reversed in early 1970s.

—World recession and rising political violence had catastrophic effect on region's economies in late 1970s, early 1980s. All have declined dramatically. El Salvador's gross domestic product is off 25% since 1978.

—Even with successful stabilization programs and restored political stability, per capita wealth in 1990 would only be three-quarters of what it was in 1980.

—There must be substantial increase in outside assistance.

—Commission believes economic development cannot be separated from political and social reform. Objective must be parallel development of pluralistic societies and strong economies with far more equitable distribution of wealth.

—We propose a program of U.S. assistance designed to promote economic growth, democratization, and greater social equity.

—We encourage the greatest possible involvement of the U.S. private sector in the stabilization effort. Recommend the formation of an emergency action committee of private sector personalities to provide advice on new private-public initiatives to spur growth and employment.

Recommendations: An Emergency Stabilization Program

—Leaders of the United States and Central America should meet to initiate a comprehensive approach to economic development of the region and reinvigoration of the Central American Common Market.

—A \$400 million supplemental in FY 1984, over and above the \$477 million now in the budget for the seven countries. There is urgent need to stabilize economies now going downhill very fast.

—Focus this assistance on labor-intensive infrastructure projects and housing. Unemployment is a critical problem—politically and economically.

—Establish a program to provide U.S. Government guarantees for short-term trade credits. External credit has dried up. Without it economies cannot be reactivated.

—Provide an emergency loan to the Central American Common Market to permit the reactivation of this vital organization. Lack of resources in the market to settle trade accounts among the countries has stalled it.

—U.S. Government should take an active role in the efforts to resolve the external debt problems of Central America and should encourage the countries that have not done so to seek multilateral rescheduling.

—Also encourage commercial banks to renegotiate at the lowest possible interest rates.

Recommendations: Medium and Long-Term

—Commission estimates \$24 billion in net external exchange inflows needed by 1990 to foster a growth rate of 3% per capita, returning these countries to pre-recession levels of per capita wealth. About half—\$12 billion—is expected to come from international institutions, other donor countries and loans, and investments from private sector sources.

—U.S. Government will have to provide as much as \$12 billion if these financing needs are to be met.

—We propose, in this context, a program of \$8 billion over next 5 fiscal years (FY 1985–89) in U.S. Government assistance. This would be divided very roughly into about \$6 billion in appropriated funds and about \$2 billion in contingent liabilities covering guarantees, insurance, and the like.

—Compared with current projections for FY 1985–89, these contributions would constitute an increase of about \$2.8 billion in appropriated funds and \$0.7 billion in contingent liabilities over the 5-year period.

—Urge that Congress authorize multiyear funding of this program. Commission believes firm, long-term commitment is essential.

—To give form and structure to the development effort, suggest establishment of the Central American Development Organization (CADO). Perhaps one-quarter of U.S. aid could be channeled through CADO.

—CADO would consist of the United States and those countries of the seven willing to commit themselves to internal democracy and reform. Continued membership would depend on demonstrated progress toward those goals. Adherence to regional security pact also required.

—Nicaragua could participate by meeting these conditions.

—CADO's principal body would be a Development Council with tripartite, ILO [International Labor Organization]-style representation. Would assess program and progress toward economic growth, democratization, reform, and preservation of human rights.

—Other democracies would be invited to join.

Additional Recommendations

—Expanded assistance from the U.S. Government for democratic institutions and leadership training—neighborhood groups, cooperatives, binational centers, and visitor programs for leaders of labor unions, local governments, and other organizations.

—Require a firm commitment by the Central Americans to economic policies, including reforms in tax systems, to encourage private enterprise and individual initiative, to create favorable investment climates, to curb corruption where it exists, and to spur balanced trade.

—Urge extension of duty-free trade to Central America by other major trading nations.

—Review nontariff barriers to imports from Central America with a view toward using whatever flexibility that exists within the framework of multilateral agreements to favor Central American products.

—Establishment of the Central American Development Corporation—a privately owned venture-capital company which could initially be financed by a loan from the U.S. Government.

—Recommend that the United States join the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.

—Technical and financial support for export promotion and a U.S. Government review of nontariff barriers to Central American imports.

—Expanded availability of insurance guarantees for new investments from the U.S. Government's Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

—Increased focus in assistance programs on small business and accelerated agricultural development—particularly in production of food for domestic consumption.

HEALTH AND EDUCATION

—Democracy and prosperity in the region require accelerated human development. Hunger, disease, and illiteracy sap a people's vitality and impede the growth of viable democratic institutions.

—Literacy rates are unacceptably low in several countries (e.g., Guatemala, 45%; El Salvador, 63%; Honduras, 60%), handicapping education efforts seriously.

—Widespread malnutrition also handicaps education by sending physically and mentally underdeveloped children to school.

—Goals should include a reduction of malnutrition, elimination of illiteracy, expanded education, health, and housing opportunities.

—Initial efforts must be to increase food assistance to Central America through the PL 480 programs.

—Commission calls for formation, under direction of the Peace Corps, of a Literacy Corps and a Central American Teachers Corps.

—To meet needs in higher education, U.S. Government scholarships should be raised to approximately 10,000 over 4–6 years, a level comparable to Cuban and Soviet Union efforts.

—Educational reform can also be encouraged in the areas of technical and

vocational education through the expansion of the International Executive Service Corps and through closer cooperation with Central American universities to improve the quality of education.

—Judicial systems in Central America can be strengthened by providing resources for training judges, judicial staff, and public prosecutors.

—Continuation and expansion of existing programs for disease control and eradication, as well as immunization and oral rehydration.

—Training of primary health workers, especially nurses, should be expanded and the means developed to integrate private and public financing of health services.

—Assistance programs should target the area's severe housing shortage.

—Training of public administrators required to improve public service.

—U.S. Government should provide more resources to meet critical problem of refugees and displaced persons—more than 1 million of them need help.

SECURITY ISSUES

—In El Salvador there are two separate conflicts: (1) between those seeking democratic reform and those seeking to retain their privileges; (2) between Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and those who oppose Marxism-Leninism.

—In discussing the latter we identify three general propositions about such guerrilla movements:

(1) They depend on external support. Without it they are unlikely to succeed.

(2) They develop their own momentum which reform alone cannot stop.

(3) Victorious, they create totalitarian regimes, even though they have enlisted support of democratic elements in order to project democratic, reformist image.

—External support comes from Soviet Union, Cuba, and now Nicaragua. Cuba has developed into a leading military power through Soviet assistance. Since Sandinista victory, Soviets have come around to support Cuban strategy of armed road to power in Central America.

—There are serious strategic implications for the United States in Soviet-Cuban support for armed insurgency in the region.

—Triumph of hostile forces there could require us to devote large resources to defend our southern approaches.

—This could mean either substantially increased defense burden for the United States or redeployment of forces to the detriment of our interests elsewhere.

—Threat to our shipping lanes in the Caribbean.

—Increased violence and dislocation in the area from which we could not isolate ourselves.

—Erosion of our power to influence events worldwide as we are perceived as unable to influence events close to home.

El Salvador

—The war is stalemated, a condition to the ultimate advantage of the guerrillas.

—U.S. military assistance is inadequate to permit modern, humane, and successful counterinsurgency.

—Commission recommends that the United States provide significantly increased levels of military assistance for greater mobility, more training, higher force levels, and more equipment.

—Assistance is to be conditioned through legislation on terminating death squads, progress toward democracy, and establishment of the rule of law.

—In Guatemala, such assistance should only be provided if the same terms are met.

—Increased military assistance also needed for Honduras to build a credible deterrent and to meet renewed efforts at insurgency.

—Commission concludes that U.S. security interests are importantly engaged in Central America. Larger program of military assistance needed, as well as expanded support for economic growth and social reform.

—Success will depend on an end to massive violations of human rights and the neutralization of external support for the insurgencies.

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

—A successful U.S. political strategy in Central America requires resources to promote economic growth; vigorous efforts to advance democracy and reform; other inducements and penalties.

—General strategic objective of U.S. diplomacy in Central America should be to reduce the civil wars, national conflicts, and military preparations to Central American dimension.

—Specifically, we should seek to stop the war and killing in El Salvador. Create conditions under which Nicaragua becomes a peaceful and democratic member of the Central American community. And open the way for democratic development in all countries.

—Commission calls for negotiations in El Salvador between guerrillas and the government to be elected in March to establish conditions for later legislative and municipal elections in which all could participate: electoral commission with FMLN/FDR representation, cease-fire, and end to all violence; international observation of elections.

—Adequate economic and military assistance from the United States can help to achieve such a settlement.

—Commission believes military stalemate works against rather than for a political settlement based on the popular will.

—In Nicaragua, consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime would create a permanent security threat. Nicaragua's mainland location makes it a crucial stepping-stone to promote armed insurgency in Central America. Cuban personnel (2,000 military advisers and 6,000 civilian officials); several hundred Soviet, East European, Libyan, and PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] advisers; extensive arms deliveries (13,000 tons in 1983) add an external dimension to the threat posed by Nicaragua to its neighbors.

—What gives the current situation its special urgency is the external threat posed by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua; supported by Cuban military strength; backed by Soviet weapons, guidance, and diplomacy; and integrated into the Cuban network of intelligence and subversion.

—Central American leaders believe pluralistic political orders are essential to long-term security.

—An alternative would be an attempt at containment. But that would threaten militarization of the isthmus—the creation of garrison states. Democracy would wither. And the United States could find itself as surrogate policeman.

—Commission proposes comprehensive regional settlement based on:

(1) Respect for sovereignty and nonintervention.

(2) Verifiable commitments to nonaggression and an end to all attempts at subversion—covert or overt.

(3) Limitations on arms and sizes of armed forces. Prohibition of foreign forces, bases, and advisers.

(4) No military forces, bases or advisers of non-Central American countries would be permitted.

(5) Commitment to internal pluralism and free elections in all countries.

(6) Provision for verification of all agreements.

(7) Establishment of an intergovernment council to meet regularly to review compliance.

(8) Adherence to the overall agreement would be required for membership in the Central American Development Organization.

—The United States would support the agreement and provide assistance and would commit itself to respect results of elections within countries as long as principles of pluralism at home and restraint abroad observed.

—Commission's proposal based on and amplifies 21 points of the Contadora Group.

—Commission fully endorses Contadora efforts.

—Finally, majority of Commission opposes dismantling existing incentives and pressures for the regime in Managua to negotiate seriously.

—As for Cuba, Commission sees little possibility of separating it from Soviet Union. But the United States should be prepared to negotiate seriously if Cuba were to show itself prepared for genuine coexistence, dropping support for insurgency in Central America and revolutionary violence elsewhere in the world.

—As for Soviet Union, establishment of Soviet military base in Nicaragua is not the major concern. Before that could have happened, the crisis would have reached proportions not containable in Central American dimensions.

—There is little promise in negotiating with the Soviet Union over Central America. Soviets would seek to cast such negotiations in terms of sphere of influence, an unacceptable concept for the United States.

APPENDIX B: Legislative Update

1984 Authorization

At the request of the Administration, legislation embodying the President's Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative (the Central American initiative) for FY 1984 through 1989 was introduced in the House of Representatives on February 21, 1984 (H.R. 4874) by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and in the Senate on February 27 (S. 2347) by Senator Charles Percy (R-IL), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Each committee sought to act expeditiously on the proposals by including them as part of the FY 1985 worldwide foreign assistance bill, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1984 (H.R. 5119). Because of internal disagreements, the House Foreign Affairs Committee removed the Central American section from the foreign aid bill when the committee reported the legislation to the House of Representatives on March 15. On May 10, the House adopted by a vote of 211-208 an amendment to H.R. 5119 proposed by Representatives William Broomfield (R-MI) and John Murtha (D-PA) which contained most of the President's proposals for FY 1984 and 1985. H.R. 5119, containing the Central American initiatives, was then approved by the House.

In the Senate, neither the initiative nor the FY 1985 foreign aid bill reached the floor for consideration. On April 11, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted out the foreign assistance legislation (S. 2582), but an amendment by Senator Mathias (R-MD) incorporating much of the Central American proposal failed on a tie vote.

The Senate did not act on S. 2582 before adjourning on October 12. End-of-session efforts by both authorization committees to attach the foreign aid authorization bill, including the Central American initiative, to the Continuing Resolution failed in the appropriations conference for procedural reasons. However, authorization for the trade credit insurance program was included in the Continuing Resolution (P.L. 98-473).

1984 Appropriations

Initial funding for the Central American initiative was approved by the Congress in 1984 in the Supplemental Appropria-

tions Act for 1984 (P.L. 98-396) and in the FY 1985 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 98-473).

The President sent to Congress on February 21 a request for legislation to provide supplemental appropriations for FY 1984, including \$659 million in economic and military assistance for Central America. The House Appropriations Committee reported the Supplemental Appropriations Act for 1984 (H.R. 6040) on July 27. This bill, passed by the full House on August 1, did not provide any military assistance for El Salvador and reduced overall funding for Central America to \$156 million. The House approved this funding level and passed the bill on August 1.

On August 2, in its version of H.R. 6040, the Senate Appropriations Committee adopted and reported the full FY 1984 supplemental funding levels requested for Central America. On August 8, the full Senate approved the President's request.

The House-Senate conference on the bill filed its report on August 10 with Central American funding unresolved. The impasse was broken the same day when the House adopted by a vote of 234-161 an amendment by Representatives Jack Kemp (R-NY) and John Murtha (D-PA) to restore most of the Administration's request. The Senate then accepted the House position, also on August 10.

Presidential signature of the bill (P.L. 98-396) on August 22 enabled the Administration to obtain \$510 million for the implementation of Commission recommendations. Combined with \$61.75 million in emergency military assistance for El Salvador that the Congress provided earlier in the Supplemental Appropriations Act for the Department of Agriculture for 1984 (P.L. 98-322), the Administration in 1984 received \$571.75 million of the President's original supplemental request of \$659 million for Central America.

The FY 1985 Continuing Resolution (P.L. 98-473), enacted on October 12, contained additional funding for Central America. In the Continuing Resolution, the Congress approved almost all of the funds requested by the Administration for FY 1985 in support of the Commission recommendations. Of a request for \$1,030 million for economic assistance and \$262 million for military assistance, the amounts appropriated were \$979 million and \$237 million, respectively.

1985 Legislation

The Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative is contained in Title IV of the Administration's proposed International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, transmitted to the Congress on March 7 and introduced in the Senate (S. 660) on March 14 by Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in the House on March 19 by Representative Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The legislative proposal retains the principal elements of the 1984 authorization bill, including multiyear, nonmilitary authorization and authorities for economic assistance coordination, administration of justice, and land reform.

The Administration's request for FY 1986 appropriations for Central America is for a total of \$1,053 million in economic assistance and \$261 million in military assistance. Congressional consideration of these proposals began in mid-March. The proposed initiative establishes a long-term framework to build democracy, restore peace, and improve living conditions in Central America and authorizes nonmilitary assistance for FY 1987-89. The bill contains amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in order to carry out a number of the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America.

Section 401: Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative. This section amends Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act by adding a new chapter 6 entitled "Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative." The chapter contains six sections (sections 461-466) which include a statement of policy, the conditions imposed on the furnishing of assistance, the authorization for the establishment of an organization to promote cooperation in economic development among the countries of Central America and the United States, and a multiyear authorization of nonmilitary assistance funds.

Section 461 of the proposed chapter contains the findings of Congress that the building of democracy, the restora-

tion of peace, and the improvement of living conditions in Central America are important to the interests of the United States and the community of American states. The section also stresses the importance of dealing effectively with the interrelated social, humanitarian, economic, political, diplomatic, and security issues to assure a democratic and economically and politically secure Central America. Congress further recognizes that, although the achievement of democracy, human rights, peace, and equitable economic growth depends primarily on the people and governments of Central America, the United States can make a significant contribution through a policy that includes a long-term commitment of both economic and military assistance.

Section 462 provides that the President ensure that the assistance authorized by this chapter is furnished in a manner that fosters demonstrated progress and commitment to the objectives set forth in section 461. In doing so, the President under this section would consult with Congress on progress toward those objectives and on conditions imposed on the furnishing of assistance.

Section 463 is a statement of support for the initiatives taken by the Contadora Group and the September 1983 Document of Objectives agreed to by the nine countries involved and affirms that the United States should provide assistance and support as may be appropriate in helping to reach agreements which will ensure peaceful and enduring solutions to the Central American conflicts.

Section 464 states the finding by Congress that the participation of the United States and Central American countries in an effective forum for continuous review an advancement of Central America's political, economic, and social development would further the purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act. This section further states the sense of Congress that the President enter into negotiations with representatives of Central American countries to establish an organization for economic cooperation based upon principles stated in the section. This section then authorizes the President to participate in such an

organization, with the Administrator of the Agency for International Development as the U.S. representative.

This organization is not intended to be a bureaucratic entity in competition with bilateral or multilateral donor organizations. The organization should be composed of public and private sector representatives from participating countries and should draw on the experience of the International Labor Organization in joining together representatives from business, labor, and government. The number of professional staff of the organization should be kept to a minimum.

Section 465 contains a multiyear authorization for the furnishing of nonmilitary assistance for Central American countries for each of the fiscal years 1987-89.

Section 466 provides that for purposes of this chapter, the term "Central American countries" includes Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and regional programs which benefit those countries.

Section 402: Administration of Justice. In accordance with the recommendations of the Commission that the United States help strengthen judicial systems and that Congress consider authorizing the training and support of law enforcement agencies under carefully defined conditions, this section authorizes the use of funds made available for economic assistance programs for projects designed to strengthen the administration of justice in Latin American and Caribbean countries. These projects would include activities for judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigation agencies.

Section 403: Land Reform Programs. This section amends Section 620(g) of the Foreign Assistance Act to authorize the President to make available to governments assistance to compensate their nationals in accordance with a land reform program, if the President determines that monetary assistance for such land reform will further the national interests of the United States.

APPENDIX C:**Foreign Assistance for Central America: FY 1983, 1984, 1984 Supplementals, and 1985; FY 1986 Request¹**

\$ millions

	<i>Economic Assistance</i>				<i>Military Assistance</i>			
	ESF	Development Assistance	PL 480	TOTAL	MAP	FMS	IMET	TOTAL
Belize								
1983	10.0	6.7	0.0	16.7	0.0	0.0	0.066	0.066
1984	0.0	3.9	0.0	3.9	0.5	0.0	0.049	0.549
1984 supplemental	10.0	1.4	0.0	11.4	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000
1985	4.0	6.0	0.0	10.0	0.5	0.0	0.075	0.575
1986 request	4.0	6.8	0.0	10.8	1.0	0.0	0.100	1.100
Costa Rica								
1983	157.0	27.2	28.2	212.4	2.5	0.0	0.125	2.625
1984	70.0	15.0	22.5	107.5	2.0	0.0	0.133	2.133
1984 supplemental	60.0	6.2	0.0	66.2	7.0	0.0	0.000	7.000
1985	160.0	13.8	28.0	201.8	9.0	0.0	0.200	9.200
1986 request	150.0	14.4	23.0	187.4	2.5	0.0	0.225	2.725
El Salvador								
1983	140.0	58.8	43.1	241.9	33.5	46.5	1.300	81.300
1984	120.2	41.1	51.1	212.4	45.0	18.5	1.300	64.800
1984 supplementals	90.2	23.3	0.0	113.3	131.75	0.0	0.000	131.750
1985	195.0	69.7	46.0	310.7	111.8	15.0	1.500	128.300
1986 request	210.0	89.8	50.8	350.6	131.0	0.0	1.600	132.600
Guatemala								
1983	10.0	12.2	4.4	26.6	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000
1984	0.0	4.4	11.6	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000
1984 supplemental	0.0	16.6	0.0	16.6	0.0	0.0	0.000	0.000
1985	12.5	40.1	20.4	73.0	0.0	0.0	0.300	0.300
1986 request	25.0	33.0	19.0	77.0	0.0	10.0	0.300	10.300
Honduras								
1983	56.0	31.2	14.0	101.2	27.5	9.0	0.796	37.296
1984	40.0	31.0	19.3	90.3	40.0	0.0	0.940	40.940
1984 supplemental	72.5	7.3	0.0	79.8	36.5	0.0	0.000	36.500
1985	75.0	41.5	18.4	134.9	61.3	0.0	1.100	62.400
1986 request	80.0	45.0	18.0	143.0	87.0	0.0	1.250	88.250
Panama								
1983	0.0	6.2	1.0	7.2	0.0	5.0	0.450	5.450
1984	0.0	10.7	1.0	11.7	0.0	5.0	0.500	5.500
1984 supplemental	30.0	4.0	0.0	34.0	8.0	0.0	0.000	8.000
1985	20.0	20.0	0.0	40.0	10.0	0.0	0.600	10.600
1986 request	40.0	22.6	0.0	62.6	14.4	4.0	0.650	19.050
Regional Programs								
1983	0.0	19.4	NA ²	19.4	NA	NA	5.325	5.325
1984	0.0	15.5	NA	15.5	NA	NA	5.294	5.294
1984 supplemental	28.0	9.2	NA	37.2	18.5	NA	0.000	18.500
1985	70.0	51.7	NA	121.7	20.0	NA	5.500	25.500
1986 request	91.5	57.0	NA	148.5	0.0	NA	6.500	6.500
Central America Total								
1983	373.0	161.7	90.7	625.4	63.5	60.5	8.062	132.062
1984	230.2	121.6	105.5	457.3	87.5	23.5	8.216	119.216
1984 supplementals	290.5	68.0	0.0	358.5	201.75	0.0	0.000	201.750
1985	536.5	242.8	112.8	892.1	212.6	15.0	9.275	236.875
1986 request	600.5	268.6	110.8	979.9	235.9	14.0	10.625	260.525

¹In addition, State Department, Peace Corps, and USIA programs included in the Central America initiative total \$11.5 million (1984 supplemental), \$86.6 million (1985), and \$72.7 million (1986 request).

²Not applicable.


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"What Latin American Leaders Say about the Situation in Central America"

United States Department of State

**WHAT LATIN
AMERICAN
LEADERS SAY
ABOUT THE
SITUATION IN
CENTRAL
AMERICA**



**WHAT LATIN AMERICAN LEADERS
SAY ABOUT THE SITUATION IN
CENTRAL AMERICA**

Here, in their own words, are the publicly expressed positions of the democratic leaders of Latin America on the questions of the importance of democracy to internal reconciliation and regional peace, the Contadora negotiations, the struggle of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance, the Sandinista threat to regional security, and the Sandinista betrayal of the popular revolution of 1979.

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Caribbean

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On The Importance of Democracy:

"We are not dealing with a mere border problem. I believe it would be simplistic and avoiding the crux of the problem to believe that the conflict would be resolved simply by ensuring calm borders. No. It is a much more far-reaching problem, which demands the establishment of democracy in all areas."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
La Vanguardia (Barcelona,
Spain)
February 1, 1987

"Insurgent movements would have no justification...if Nicaragua had an authentic democratic process going on."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Letter to the Presidents of the
Contadora and Support
Group Countries
January 20, 1987

[Reporter] "What is your position regarding internal Nicaraguan problems?"

[President Cerezo of Guatemala] "We think that there must be increasing promotion of an internal political opening so that the Nicaraguan people will make their own decisions."

[Reporter] "Is this the case now?"

[Cerezo] "No, it is not because, unfortunately, regardless of the explanations and justifications, the truth is that the internal political space has been quite reduced, and the possibilities for pluralistic political activity are not absolutely clear. I think there is discussion about this topic. However, we

should work to achieve it because we maintain that the lack of pluralism and democracy leads to polarization and confrontation. To the extent that the political system is closed, the existence of armed groups opposed to a political group is justified."

— President Vinicio Cerezo
of Guatemala
Guatemala City Radio
Television
January 19, 1987

"In this context, the foreign ministers expressed their clear support for the democratic process of the region, given that its development calls for the guarantees within a context of broad participation and political pluralism in which dialogue replaces any alternative of confrontation among the countries of the area and the continent."

— Joint declaration of the
Foreign Ministers
of El Salvador, Guatemala,
Costa Rica and
Honduras
January 16, 1987

"There are opposing positions, but democracy is the sole road leading to a solution in Central America. We respect the people's right to self-determination, but we think that only by practicing democracy will we be able to resolve the problems and find peace."

— Foreign Minister
Mario Quinonez
of Guatemala
Caracas Television
January 9, 1987

"As long as there is no political opening in Nicaragua, there will be problems in Central America. . . as long as there is no democratic opening, there will be counter-revolutionaries, people in exile, and refugees."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Press Conference
January, 1987

"Only if we endeavor to enable all peoples to enjoy democracy, only if we encourage the downfall of all tyrants equally, can we prevent the threats to peace throughout the world from growing in the Americas."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
Washington Times
December 5, 1986

"I feel that democracy is the solution for Latin America. . . .

"Democracy helps unite our people. . . .

"I know of no case in which democratic governments have waged or declared war on one another; or in which they have democratically gathered and elected governments and then those governments have begun fighting or creating conflicts with others. Therefore, democracy has also become a tool of our people."

— President Jose Sarney of Brazil
XEW TV, Mexico City
December 5, 1986

"I reiterate here that to walk along paths of peace in the Americas and the Caribbean one must overcome the fear of

freedom: freedom and democracy for development, freedom and democracy for justice, freedom and democracy for peace."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"Radio Reloj" (San Jose,
Costa Rica)
September 9, 1986

"There can be no peace, even if the Nicaraguans throw all their artillery and their helicopter gunships into Lake Managua, if there is no democratic opening in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan people, both inside and outside, will keep fighting for their freedom, and Honduras and Costa Rica will keep suffering the effects of that struggle."

— President Oscar Arias of
Costa Rica
Speech before the National
Press Club as reported by
the *Washington Post*
May 29, 1986

"There can be no democracy if political parties are persecuted. There can be no democracy if the people's rights to representation and decision making are not respected."

— President Jose Napoleon
Duarte of El Salvador
San Salvador Education
Television
May 23, 1986

"We must strongly reaffirm our commitment to peace and our willingness to contribute to achieving peace through democratic participation."

— President Vinicio Cerezo
of Guatemala
Inauguration address
January 14, 1986

On Contadora:

"If Managua insists on negotiating with the United States, it will be displaying its intransigence. I have often said that my impression is that if the contras did not exist the Sandinistas would have to invent them, because they have used them as a pretext for establishing an increasingly authoritarian regime."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
La Vanguardia (Barcelona,
Spain)
February 1, 1987

"The Sandinista regime was becoming more radical and increasingly closing in on society. This evidenced a gap between what the Nicaraguans offered the Contadora Group and what they were doing. This cynicism, this gap between what is said and what is done, is hypocritical."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"Radio Reloj" (San Jose,
Costa Rica)
January 20, 1987

"The blocking of the Contadora negotiation process was provoked by Nicaragua when it took the Central American issue to the International Court of Justice. Honduras thus finds itself unable to negotiate both in the political forum and the jurisdictional forum."

"Partial or progressive proposals that only satisfy the political or security interests of one of the parties are unacceptable. An integral agreement is the guarantee that the solution will constitute an answer to the concern of all the States."

— President Jose Azcona of
Honduras
Letter to the Contadora and
Support Group presidents
January 20, 1987

"The Contadora Group and the Support Group have not had enough courage to pressure the Nicaraguan government to stop violating the rights of the Nicaraguan people, and this is taking us into a difficult situation to overcome."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Diario Las Americas
November 19, 1986

"In Panama the true situation was made very clear. Twelve Latin American foreign ministers, four Central American countries, supported the prompt signing of the *acta* [Contadora draft of September 1984 with agreed-upon modifications] in accordance with international opinion. Only Nicaragua was opposed, thus

demonstrating once again that it has neither an interest in, nor the will for, peace in Central America."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
La Nacion (San Jose,
Costa Rica)
April 9, 1986

"Nicaragua rejected everything, everything that was presented to it. There is nothing left to talk about."

— Vice President Rodolfo Castillo
Claramount of El Salvador
At the conclusion of the
Contadora meeting in
Panama
April 7, 1986

On The Struggle of the Democratic Resistance:

"I believe that the contras are fighting in Nicaragua; they are fighting for something they believe is the liberation of their country, and they have the right to fight for that. That is a problem between Nicaraguans; I cannot tell the contras to stop fighting against the Sandinista government."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Tiempo
February 16, 1987

"Foreign forces, with discrete banners and objectives, also existed in the past and, after seizing power, they betrayed the democratic precepts of the insurgency. This abandonment of principles resulted in

some of those same revolutionaries continuing the struggle today, always without the intervention of Honduras."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Letter to Honduran Christian
Democratic Leader
Efraim Diaz
January 28, 1987

"I want to make clear to you my position, which is the same that I expressed in Washington. It would cause me great sorrow if, because of what has happened in the U.S.—the so-called Irangate—aid to the contras is terminated and nothing more. . . that this results in allowing the Sandinista regime to consolidate, to not change, to not yield, to not compromise, and everything remains the same. I would say to you that to me as a Costa Rican, it would cause great regret, and I believe that it would hurt the Nicaraguan people much more than me because they have fought so hard to get rid of one tyrant, one dictator, and seven years later they have nine. . . [If] this scandal results only in Congress not approving more military aid, and leaves matters in Nicaragua as they are, I think it would be regretted by the Contadora Group, the Support Group, by the other Central American nations, by the whole world. Because—let's not fool ourselves—although the world does not support the war, this doesn't mean it concurs in the status quo

in Nicaragua. There is a distinction between not concurring in a military outcome but wanting important changes in the Managua regime."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
Press conference in San Jose
December 18, 1986

In a meeting with editors and reporters of the *Washington Post*, President Azcona expressed support for aid to the NDR because, in addition to other reasons, the aid might help the resistance "to exercise their right to remove a government which is not granting the freedoms it promised before coming to power."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Washington Post
May 29, 1986

"I generally. . . and Ecuadorean journalists representing the international press know me rather well, know that I am very careful about certain things, for example in expressing opinions about internal or external politics of other countries. But my point of view in relation to Nicaragua is very clear. In Nicaragua, everybody intervenes. . . . We are not wearing bandages over our eyes. Blues, reds, pinks, all types of combinations of political colors intervene in the internal life. There is a group of Nicaraguans who are fighting for their liberty. If they are able to acquire help, well. . . . Just as those in the government are acquiring aid from another party, since the only thing that it will do is to balance the forces a little

more. I ask, where do the arms that Nicaragua has come from? They don't come from the heavens. They come from a particular place in the world."

— President Leon Febres Cordero
of Ecuador
Press conference in Quito
March 18, 1986

In a March 13, 1986 meeting of the National Council of Salvadoran Businessmen, President Duarte described the Democratic Resistance as a "physical barrier" against the infiltration from Nicaragua to El Salvador of arms, guerrillas and supplies.

— President Jose Napoleon
Duarte of El Salvador
Meeting of the National
Council of Salvadoran
Businessmen
March 13, 1986

"They were trying to build a government on the Soviet-Cuban model. They were going right ahead with that, but they were stopped by external pressure. I believe they still have the same goal. The pressure on the Sandinistas is a good thing."

— Foreign Minister Carlos Jose
Gutierrez of Costa Rica
Interview with *Washington
Times*
June 19, 1985

On Nicaragua as a Threat to Regional Security:

"If Nicaragua halves its numbers of tanks, aircraft, armored helicopters, and so forth, it would simply mean that if they

were to decide to invade us it would take them 15 minutes longer to do so. What worries us is Nicaragua's failure to move toward a pluralist form of democracy, as they promised in 1979 and as advised by the Contadora document."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
La Vanguardia (Barcelona,
Spain)
February 1, 1987

"The insecurity and instability factors prevailing in the area are caused by the Sandinista authoritarianism, their militarism and the regime's alignment with the Soviet Bloc."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Letter to the Presidents of the
Contadora and Support
Group Countries
January 20, 1987

"Our security relations with the United States have developed and grown closer as the logical result and natural reaction expected from Honduras in view of the threat we feel from Nicaragua. It is unreasonable for Honduras to face on its own the Soviet-Cuban challenge hiding behind the Sandinista government, which has made it possible to arm and train around 150,000 men. . . .

"Honduras does not have the will to militarize its society. We will therefore maintain the special security relationship

with the United States of America as long as Nicaragua represents a threat to our security and our way of life and of government."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Letter to Contadora and
Support Group Countries
January 20, 1987

"It is necessary that in order to demonstrate this political will Nicaragua must cease its aid in all its forms against Salvadoran democracy, aggression which has converted Nicaragua into a sanctuary for the Salvadoran terrorists of the FMLN/FDR."

— President Duarte
of El Salvador
Memorandum used by
President Duarte in his
meeting with the
Contadora/Support Group
Foreign Ministers
January 20, 1987

"The struggle for national liberation of a Central American country resulted in its total alignment with the Soviet Bloc. The economic plan they announced and which should have redeemed their people from misery was adulterated to establish and consolidate a true war machinery with hegemonic and expansionist goals. These facts, which summarize the recent history of that country, have created uncertainty, wariness, and tension throughout the area."

— Foreign Minister Carlos Lopez
Contreras of Honduras
Speech before the UN General
Assembly
October 8, 1986

"Costa Ricans are worried about the consolidation of a regime with a Marxist ideology at our borders."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"Radio Reloj" (San Jose,
Costa Rica)
September 9, 1986

"Nicaragua has been the springboard, the sanctuary for the whole Salvadoran guerrilla movement."

— President Jose Napoleon
Duarte of El Salvador
San Salvador Education
Television
May 28, 1986

"I cannot ignore the fact that in Nicaragua there is a colony that is completely isolated, where the leaders of the Salvadoran guerrillas have their operations center, their means of communications, their arms and ammunitions depot, and from where they prepare for guerrilla warfare."

— President Jose Napoleon
Duarte of El Salvador
Interview with *Noticias*
Argentinas
April 6, 1986

On Sandinista Betrayal of the Revolution:

"Seven years ago, the Sandinistas promised a new Nicaragua. They have built a second Cuba,...so I think the Dutch people, in a way, have been betrayed since they helped the Sandinistas. They

thought they were fighting against Somoza in order to establish a democracy. Western Europe should put some pressure on the Sandinistas, because if we want peace, we will not find that peace without democracy."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"Panoramiek" (Dutch
National current affairs
TV show)
February 3, 1987

"We want the entire world to see the hidden truth and to expose a Nicaragua in which Sandino has once again been betrayed: Sandino was revived 7 years ago to mark the liberty of a people; he has been assassinated again."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
Speech to the UN General
Assembly
September 24, 1986

"There is no letup for anyone along the path chosen by the commanders, who betrayed a revolution aimed at returning democracy to several generations that only knew oppression. There is no letup for that people, who, frustrated and disappointed, have returned to civil war."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"Radio Reloj" (San Jose,
Costa Rica)
September 9, 1986

"The rulers of Nicaragua have chosen the way of their revolution, which, according to impartial observers, leads to Marxism-Leninism."

— President Jose Azcona
of Honduras
Address before the
Organization of American
States
May 28, 1986

"Costa Ricans feel deceived by the Sandinistas—in a way, even betrayed by them. They used our territory, we helped them a lot. We were very much against Somoza. We had many difficulties with the Somoza governments for more than forty years. No one helped the Sandinistas more than the Costa Ricans."

— President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
"John McLaughlin's 'One On
One'"
February 23, 1986

For further information, contact the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean:

ARA/LPD
Room 6253
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

The following publications are available from the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean.

Attacks on the Church: Persecution of the Catholic Church in Nicaragua
Comandante Bayardo Arce's Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN)
Crackdown on Freedom in Nicaragua and Profiles of Internal Opposition Leaders Dispossessed, the Miskito Indians in Sandinista Nicaragua
Human Rights in Nicaragua—from Revolution to Repression
In Their Own Words: Testimony of Nicaraguan Exiles
Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective
"Revolution Beyond Our Borders," Sandinista Intervention in Central America
Special Report No. 148—The U.S. and Central America: Implementing the National Bipartisan Commission Report
The Challenge to Democracy in Central America
The Sandinista Constitution
"The 72-Hour Document," The Sandinista Blueprint for Constructing Communism in Nicaragua

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TOUGH GOING

Cross country movement in the battle area is severely restricted by broken terrain and dense jungle vegetation. There are no roads, and the only real avenues of approach are stream beds or river valleys.

1

DEEP JUNGLE

Triple canopy jungle covers the entire battle area. This reduces the effectiveness of aerial bombardment and artillery, and puts emphasis on ground combat.

2

RESISTANCE MEETING

Rebel staff officers confer at the Resistance Strategic Command in the Bocay area.

3

IRON BOMB

One of the Soviet made bombs which were used by the Sandinista Regime in the indiscriminate high altitude bombing of the Bocay region. This one did not explode.

4

CLUSTER BOMB

Casing of a Soviet cluster bomb dropped on the Resistance refugee complex. These casings spew dozens of smaller bomblets which are devastating anti-personnel weapons. Here patients are treated at a Resistance aid station after a Sandinista bombing attack. The Sandinista bombers targeted the Resistance Hospital regularly.

5

JUNGLE HEADQUARTERS

The jungle headquarters of the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance.

6

REFUGEE SANCTUARY

The area of the heaviest fighting is also an area in which thousands of Nicaraguans have fled the Sandinista regime. The resistance supports these refugees, many of whom are related to Resistance fighters deep in Nicaragua.

7

PATRON IN THE MUD

At the base camp of the famous San Jacinto Regional Command, a little chapel remembers the Resistance fighters in Nicaragua. This command was tasked to defend the base area again. In the most recent fighting, this little base camp was over run by the Sandinistas, but the defenders held on to save the supplies stocked there because of the cessation of US aid to the Resistance. This command has successfully defended the base area along the border three times in three years. This is important to the fighters inside Nicaragua, because many have relatives living as refugees in the base area.

8

DENSE JUNGLE

The area of the recent fighting along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border is very dense jungle.

9

PEP TALK

Rebel commander Bermudez explains how the Resistance will continue fighting the Sandinista regime without US aid.

10

THE BORDER

The border between Honduras and Nicaragua in this area is the Coco River. In this photo, some Resistance reinforcements travel to the battle area in native "cayuca" boat, and supplies get moved in a fiberglass fishing boat.

11

SUPPLY BASE

The drop zone for the Nicarao Regional Command was where 100-150 tons of Resistance supplies are stockpiled. This was the Sandinistas main objective, but Resistance fighters were able to protect it after 5 days of heavy fighting.

12

GRIM DEFENDERS

Fighters from the San Jacinto Regional Command get the word of the impending Sandinista offensive. These rebels repelled the Sandinista attack, and saved the supplies (the last of the supplies for the 10,000 Resistance fighters deep in Nicaragua) after 5 days of heavy combat.

13

RESOLUTE

Defenders of the Bocay supply base hear the news of the impending Sandinista offensive to take their supplies, the last of the supplies for the 10,000 rebels deep in Nicaragua. These fighters blunted and then defeated the Sandinista attack after 5 days of intense combat.

14

READY FOR A FIGHT

Resistance fighters. These fighters were able to stop the Sandinista offensive just short of the supplies after 5 days of intense fighting.

15

HELICOPTER LZ

Resistance helicopter landing zone along the Coco River, the border between Honduras and Nicaragua. Here a Resistance helicopter lands to take out wounded.

16