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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 12, 1986

*Central
America.*

SUBJECT: SANDINISTA REPRESSION OF INDIANS

Between March 25 and April 16, at least 10,500 Nicaraguan Indians fled to Honduras after their villages were attacked by Sandinista troops. This most recent episode of Sandinista repression of the indigenous Miskito, Suma, and Rama Indians of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast region has been largely ignored by the international public.

Since taking power in 1979, the Sandinista government has consistently persecuted the Indians by undermining their political, cultural, and social institutions--forcibly relocating them to camps in the interior, destroying their villages, crops, and livestock, and conscripting their young men.

The material in this packet provides information on the plight of Nicaragua's Indians and specifically on the recent exodus.

SANDINISTA REPRESSION OF INDIANS

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SANDINISTA REPRESSION OF NICARAGUAN INDIANS: 1986 EXODUS

Since March 25, at least 10,500 Nicaraguan Miskito Indians have fled to Honduras after their villages were attacked by Sandinista troops. Some 7,500 have been registered in United Nations camps near Mocoron, while about 3,000 more reside outside official reception centers just north of the border. Tribal leaders expect several thousand more Indians to cross in coming months. Many of the Indians fleeing Nicaragua are part of the 10,000-12,000 allowed to return to their homelands in northeastern Nicaragua after being forcibly relocated to government camps in the interior in 1981-82. Returning Indians were promised that they would be left alone, and allowed local government.

Instead, in an apparent attempt to reassert dominance over the Indians, Sandinista troops recently attacked several Miskito villages near the Coco River with mortars and tanks. They also entered others to forcibly conscript Miskito men into the Sandinista army. Refugees reported that Sandinista soldiers disguised as Red Cross workers had been entering their communities weeks before to gather intelligence on resistance activity.

Background

Repression of the Miskitos began immediately after the Sandinistas took power in 1979. The Miskitos, with their semi-autonomy in the remote eastern region, and their distinct language and culture, were an immediate target of efforts to extend FSLN control over every element of Nicaraguan society. Thousands of Sandinista soldiers, and hundreds of Cuban advisers and teachers moved into the Atlantic coast to establish a new, revolutionary order. Although the Indians largely supported the Sandinistas during the Somoza ouster, by 1981, their chief support organization, MISURASATA, had become the main Indian anti-Sandinista group.

By mid-1981, a few hundred Indians had fled to Honduras. In December, Sandinista army and security forces detained and executed some Miskito dissidents. In January and February 1982, the Sandinista government forced approximately 10,000 Indians to march to relocation camps in the interior. The Miskitos' homes, crops, and livestock were destroyed to deter them from returning to their villages. The relocations allowed FSLN troops to operate more freely in the Indian regions and concentrated the Indians in camps where they could be more easily controlled and indoctrinated by the FSLN.

The first massive Indian emigration coincided with the government's forced relocations in 1982. Approximately 12,000 Miskitos fled sporadically to Honduras after the Sandinista government evacuated some 42 northern border communities, obliging the inhabitants to march to camps located 60 kilometers in the interior. Sandinista repression of Nicaragua's indigenous Indians--including detentions, incommunicado imprisonment, torture, and disappearance of hundreds of Miskitos--is documented by the 1984 report on the Miskitos by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

April 1986

The Indians and Creoles of the Atlantic Coast

Historically, Zelaya Province on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua has been inhabited by perhaps 150,000 to 165,000 Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians indigenous to the area plus a lesser number of blacks or creoles whose ancestors were brought to the region while it was a British protectorate. The predominant languages of the area are the native Miskito dialect and English. In their ethnic background, religion, language, culture, and economics, the inhabitants of the Atlantic Coast differ markedly from the Hispanic people of western Nicaragua.

Under the Somozas, the central government in Managua generally left the Indians and creoles alone. Not dependent on a cash economy, the Indians maintained a high degree of self-sufficiency and self-government. On the village level, the government was basically democratic, with both tribal and church leaders being elected.

Following the revolution in 1979, the Sandinistas attempted to upset this relationship by imposing an unprecedented degree of state control over the Atlantic Coast region. Their policies clashed with the desire of the peoples of the Atlantic Coast to preserve their unique cultural identity, their community organizations, and their traditional economy. To defend these family and community traditions against forced cultural, political, and economic assimilation and to retain control of their own lands and natural resources, the Indians and creoles sought to maintain their traditional autonomy from the central government.

Friction between the FSLN and the Indians began soon after the revolution, when Sandinistas and their Cuban advisers began moving into the Atlantic Coast area in large numbers. They brought with them their Communist government apparatus and "mass organizations" such as the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS) which disrupted existing political and social patterns. The FSLN disbanded the existing Miskito organization ALPROMISU, substituting a new group known as MISURASATA (an acronym for "Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity"). The Sandinistas ignored the Indian leaders' demands for some form of autonomy.

As resistance to the Sandinistas developed, some incidents of violence occurred. In early 1981, the Sandinistas jailed and tortured numerous MISURASATA leaders in an effort to quell this unrest. These actions only served to escalate the conflict, however, and small groups began armed resistance against the Sandinistas.¹

In December 1981, the Sandinista army and State Security forces in Northern Zelaya launched an opera-

tion against rebel Miskitos who had formed the MISURA Indian organization. These government forces detained large numbers of Miskitos, including many women and children. In the villages of San Carlos and Leimus, the Sandinistas summarily executed dozens of prisoners and buried them in mass graves.²

In January and February 1982, citing "security dangers," the government rounded up more than 8,000 Indians living in villages near the Honduran border and moved them to "relocation camps" in the interior. This forced evacuation of the Miskitos was carried out in a brutal fashion, with Sandinista troops often rousting the Indians out of their beds late at night with no warning and then forcing them at gunpoint to march to the resettlement camps. The villages themselves were razed so that the Indians would have nothing to go back to, and many Miskitos who resisted or could not make the march were killed. In the face of this unprecedented repression, thousands of Miskitos fled to Honduras or Costa Rica.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report on the Sandinistas' mistreatment of the Miskitos stated:

In the period between January 1 and February 20, 1982, the relocation of approximately 8,500 people was effected. Approximately half of the Rio Coco region population fled to Honduras, fearing that their lives were in danger....

The relocation in Tasba Pri [a Sandinista "relocation camp"] of some Miskitos, and the flight to Honduras of others, uprooted the Miskitos from the banks of the Coco River, where they had lived from time immemorial, resulting in the division of numerous towns and entire families, the destruction of their homes, the loss of their livestock and, in some cases, all of their belongings. The Miskito structure of authority was undermined and later dissolved *de facto* as a result of the repression of the MISURASATA leaders, who were accused of "counter-revolutionary" activities....

Hundreds of Miskitos have been arbitrarily detained without any formalities and under vague accusations of carrying out "counterrevolutionary activities"; many of these detentions have been followed by prolonged periods of incommunicado imprisonment and in some cases the Commission has verified that torture and abuse took place.³

The report also noted cases of illegal arrest and detention and approximately 70 disappearances linked to government security forces.⁴

Conditions in the relocation camps vary. The Sandinistas have attempted to turn the Tasba Pri camp into a model settlement to impress visiting groups. However,

even there the Miskitos lead a bare existence and long to return to their homeland and traditional life style. At other camps, conditions are far worse. One camp in Jinotega was described by Indian rights attorney and activist Steve Tullberg: "Conditions were unfit for pigs." He depicted housing as "sheds that measured 12 by 30 feet—with 20 to 30 people in each." He reported that food was tightly rationed and that the Indians were forced to produce for the state.⁵

The Sandinistas have been ruthless in their efforts to defeat the Miskito resistance. For example, in July 1982, the army and the DGSE began further military and repressive civil actions in the Miskito Indian communities in the Seven-Bank and Puerto Cabezas areas. During the military actions, large numbers of Miskitos fled their towns. Many of them were captured and then killed by the army; others were interrogated first and then shot. Of those who stayed in their town, hundreds were taken prisoner.⁶

Continuing Sandinista repression in Zelaya has caused repeated waves of emigration. For example, in December 1983, the entire population of the village of Francia Sirpe (about 1,000 people) fled on foot to Honduras when they learned that they were about to be relocated. In an action typical of their practice of spreading false information, the Sandinistas charged that the Miskitos had been "kidnapped" by counterrevolutionaries. The outside world learned the truth about the "Christmas March," however, when Catholic Bishop Salvador Shlaefer, who had been in Francia Sirpe on a routine pastoral visit at the time of the evacuation and accompanied the Miskitos during their escape, revealed that the Miskitos had left voluntarily and that resistance forces had only provided security against attacks on the villagers by Sandinista troops. (Inside Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have suppressed the facts and still refer to this incident as a kidnapping.)

Among other cases of mass exodus was the April 1984 flight of some 600 Miskitos from the Sandy Bay region of Zelaya to refuge in Honduras. In this case, too, the Sandinistas alleged that the Miskitos were "kidnapped" by resistance forces.

Repressive Sandinista policies have brought a cultural calamity to the people of Zelaya. Many Miskito and Sumo villages have been totally destroyed, with their inhabitants killed, relocated, or driven away. A fourth of the Indians have been placed in relocation camps such as Tasba Pri or fled to refugee camps in Honduras or Costa Rica. Indian rights to self-government, land, or control over natural resources have been abolished by the Sandinista government. Subsistence farming, fishing, and hunting are strictly controlled, and have disappeared in many areas. Freedom of movement has been severely and arbitrarily restricted. Access to staple foods is so limited that hunger has be-

come a constant problem. With the undermining of the Moravian Church's humanitarian activities, many villages have been forced to go without medicine, doctors, or pastors. In many cases canoes (a major method of transport in this seashore area) have been confiscated or their use prohibited.⁷

Despite their repressive policies, Sandinistas failed to subdue the Miskitos. Faced with their inability to defeat the Miskito resistance and global condemnation of their actions toward these people, the Sandinistas modified their strategy. By late 1983, they began to admit "past errors" in dealing with the Miskitos and released hundreds of Miskito prisoners. The following year, they began to negotiate with certain Miskito leaders on the question of regional autonomy. In 1985, they began to allow some Miskitos to leave the relocation camps to return to their traditional villages.

During 1985, the government repeatedly announced that autonomy negotiations were proceeding well. In fact, the talks have made no progress. Even Miskitos who favored negotiations now view them with increasing skepticism. Events such as the January 1985 attack by Sandinista forces on a Miskito village being visited by Brooklyn Rivera, an Indian leader with whom the government had been discussing regional autonomy, and the June death under mysterious circumstances of another Miskito leader, Eduardo Pantin, who had gone to Puerto Cabezas to negotiate with local Sandinista officials, made them question the FSLN's sincerity.⁸ In view of the Sandinistas' record in the region and their unwillingness to grant terms that would make autonomy a reality, ever more Indians judge the negotiations as simply another FSLN attempt to deceive and divide the Indian people.⁹

The Sandinistas did allow 5,000 Miskitos to return to their traditional homeland during 1985. The conditions for these returning Miskitos reportedly are poor, however. The villages and economic infrastructure previously destroyed by the Sandinistas have not been rebuilt. Food shortages and malnutrition reportedly continue, and the Indians remain subject to restrictions on movement and on ownership of property. The Sandinistas acknowledge that serious problems persist, but they insist that this is because weather, military activity, and economic restraints have hampered the government's settlement project.¹⁰

Even as they acknowledged the failure of their resettlement policies in the Atlantic Coast region, the Sandinistas launched a new program of forced relocation elsewhere in the country. On March 10, 1985, President Ortega announced that the government would begin the evacuation of 7,000 families from the northern departments. The head of the government's social services agency later estimated that 50,000 people would be moved in 1985 as part of a program that could ulti-

mately affect 200,000-250,000 individuals. According to Sandinista officials, the purpose of the program was twofold: to deprive resistance forces of local support by removing relatives and neighbors sympathetic to them from war zones; and to create "free-fire zones," where the Sandinista army could operate freely. The CPDH holds that another objective of the forced relocations is to create new dependence on the government by compelling the inhabitants to live in resettlement camps where they must accept government indoctrination and policies in order to survive.¹¹

Notes on Chapter VII

¹ See Alan Riding, "Nicaraguan Indians Clash With Regime," *New York Times*, June 18, 1981, p. A2. See also Annex 11 for a complaint filed by MISURASATA with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

² The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights viewed the Leimus incident as a serious violation of the right to life. It called upon the Nicaraguan Government to conduct a thorough investigation and punish those responsible. It found the Sandinistas' response to its request to be "unsatisfactory." Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin*, 1984, p. 97. See also Annex 3.

³ Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, *Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin*, 1984, pp. 129-30.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130. See also The International League for Human Rights, *Nicaragua's Human Rights Record*, March 1983, pp. 5-6. Americas Watch has also noted that the government has failed to account for the 70 disappeared Miskitos. It has confirmed accounts of torture and other abuse of Miskito prisoners. In its April 1984 report, it stated:

We understand that some of the allegations of mistreatment of Miskito defendants that we noted in our earlier reports have now been confirmed, after the victims have been released by operation of the amnesty decree. Those abuses included food and water deprivation for several days; forcing the victims to stand for many hours; and physical threats against the lives of the victims. Some

of them have suffered simulations of shootings and some were dangled out of the helicopters in flight. (pp. 28-29.)

⁵ "Free Land" is called a concentration camp," *Detroit News*, November 26, 1984, p. 1.

⁶ See Annex 3.

⁷ See *Nicaragua's Human Rights Record*, pp. 5-6. See also Annex 11 for reports by Bernard Nietschmann, a professor at the University of California at Berkeley.

⁸ See Guy Gugliotta, "Stop bombing of Indian villages, rebel leader urges Sandinistas," *Miami Herald*, January 12, 1985, p. 18. See also Annex 11.

⁹ "Sandinista gesture: more than meets the eye," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1985, p. 23.

¹⁰ See Nancy Nusser, "Nicaragua's uprooted Indians," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 26, 1985, p. 16; Stephen Kinzer, "The Way Home Is Hard For Indians Of Nicaragua," *New York Times*, August 22, 1985, p. A2.

There is evidence that the Sandinistas have attacked villages under reconstruction, killing some of the returning Indians and forcing others into new relocation camps. For example, one Miskito leader has charged that on January 5, 1985, the residents of Columbus relocation camp were allowed to return to their village of Bihmuna to rebuild it. Ten days later, as the Indians were working on reconstruction, the village was bombed by Sandinista aircraft. It was completely destroyed and 12 villagers were killed. On February 12, 1985, the Sandinista army burned the villages of Halover, Waunta, Laya Siska, Kua Laya, and Tasbapauni, leaving 4,000 Miskitos homeless. About 2,000 fled into the jungles; 300 were captured and taken to a new relocation camp near Wawa. See statement by Congressman Bob Livingston, *Congressional Record*, April 4, 1985, pp. H1909-10.

¹¹ The government describes those relocated as "displaced peasant families" who mobilized themselves in response to attacks by armed resistance forces and have sought security from the Sandinista government. Many peasants, however, have reported that Sandinista troops arrived in their towns and ordered the inhabitants to leave within 24 hours. In the northern town of Limay, evacuees and relief officers reported that homes of peasants were burned and animals killed to prevent the people from returning. One evacuation official claimed that some people had been evacuated only because they had relatives with the resistance forces and that others had been ordered to leave because the government had told them that it intended to bomb the area. See "Sandinistas Forcing Thousands Out Of War Zone," *New York Times*, March 19, 1985, p. A11; and Gary Moore, "The darker side of Nicaragua's revolution," *Atlanta Constitution*, April 28, 1985, p. C1.

The Miskito Indians

The Sandinistas' abuse of the indigenous people of Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast is well known and has been widely condemned.

The first document is an excerpt from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1984 *Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin* containing a February 1982 complaint by the Indian organization Misurasata. (Part I (D)(2) of the *Report*.)

The second and third documents are reports by Professor Bernard Nietschmann of the Department of Geography, University of California (Berkeley), who has done extensive research into the situation of Nicaragua's Indian peoples. One is an October 1983 statement by Professor Nietschmann before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The other is an article by Professor Nietschmann in *Indian War and Peace with Nicaragua*, Center for World Indigenous Studies, Snoqualmie, Washington, 1985.

The final two documents deal with the case of Eduardo Pantin, a leader of the MISURA Indian organization fighting the Sandinistas in northern Zelaya. In June 1985, Pantin died under mysterious circumstances while conducting peace talks with Sandinista officials. One document is a translation of an article in the pro-FSLN *El Nuevo Diario* reporting Minister of Interior Tomas Borge's claim that Pantin had been killed as part of a CIA effort to block the peace talks. When information about Pantin's death surfaced that showed Borge's assertion to be false, the Sandinistas produced a different explanation. The other document is a letter from Vice Minister of Interior Luis Carrion to Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts providing this new version of Pantin's death. According to Carrion, Pantin was fatally wounded by an accidental discharge from his own pistol which he dropped while getting out of a hammock. (See a news release issued by the Senator's office on July 31, 1985.)

The Misurasata Complaint to The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights February 1982

Events of December 1981

a. On December 23, the Sandinista Air Force bombarded the Indian communities of Asang and San Carlos, located on the banks of the upper Coco River, with "Push and Pull" airplanes and helicopters, killing 60 Indian brothers with 80-lb bombs. Fifteen brothers were taken prisoner from San Carlos in the direction of Waspan or Puerto Cabezas, and among them were: Rev. Higinio Morazan (the community's Moravian minister), Juan Saballos, Julián Mansanares, Noel Wellington, Balandor Barrow, Manuel Saballos, Juan Charles, Alberto Zelaya, and Elsa Barrow.

A military air base and 82 members of the Sandinista Army were installed in Asang. San Carlos received reinforcements of 150 troops, with some Cubans among them. Both communities were militarized to prevent the populations from fleeing to Honduras. The soldiers take away the Indians' food, force them to dig trenches, and forbid them to leave their communities in search of food and other necessities.

b. In Leimus, close to Waspan, 80 brothers from Asang, San Carlos, Waspuk, Krasa, etc., were captured on December 22, as they prepared to travel to their respective communities from Waspan, Puerto Cabezas and Managua in order to spend Christmas and the New Year with their relatives (a Miskito custom). The next night (December 23), the army killed 35 of them, and buried them together in a single grave. Some of those killed were: Norma, Rogelio and Seimeón Castro, Joselín and Asel Mercado, Cristina and Mayra Lacayo, Víctor and Carlos Pérez, Justo Martínez, Villanor Pantin, Roseno Gómez, Luis Fajardo, Efraín Poveda, Celso Flores, Ramiro Damasio, etc. The wives of these brothers were raped by the soldiers from Leimus and later forced to go to their communities. On the 24th, twelve (12) brothers were thrown into the Coco River and killed. On the 26th, four (4) brothers were buried alive near Leimus. The whereabouts of the remaining 80 brothers taken prisoner are unknown. The military base in Leimus runs a concentration camp and a forced labor program for prisoners.

c. In Bluefields, on December 26, 30 Criollos, Indians and Mestizos were imprisoned without any charges. A civilian Criollo was seriously wounded by a soldier for resisting forced recruitment into the Sandinista Army.

d. In the Raudales comunites (Raiti, Aniwás, Walakitán, Bokay, etc.) along the Coco River, Indians who are part of the Sandinista Army are thrown into the river with their hands and feet tied for refusing to take part in the massacre of their brothers in those communities. The corpses of many of these military brothers can be found in the communities of Siksayaru and Andristara. In each of the communities of this zone, there are concentrations of from 100 to 300 soldiers.

Events of January 1982

a. On January 7, 300 soldiers appeared in the Sandy Bay Tara community, repressed the people, militarized the community, and took 40 prisoners to Puerto Cabezas. Many Indians were forced to abandon their community and flee to the mountains.

b. In the Bilwaskarma community of Río Coco, the Moravian Hospital (the only in the area), was closed and converted into a command headquarters for the army. The community was militarized, and dozens of brothers were taken prisoner, among them, Bárbara Díaz (a nurse in the hospital and the daughter of the minister of the community's Moravian Church).

c. In the community of Uhri, down-river on the River Coco, six (6) bombs were dropped by a Push and Pull airplane belonging to the Sandinista Army, thus forcing the population to take refuge on the Honduran side.

As a result of the events of Leimus and of Asang-San Carlos, the militarization and bombardment of communities, the capture and massive repression of the Indians, persecution of church and communal leaders, and the constant military threat to exterminate the Indian race, thousands of brothers from the Río Coco communities fled to Honduras after December 23, joining those who had gone to that country a year earlier. Nearly 6,000 Indians from more than 20 entire communities are already in Honduras; among them, are the Siksayari, Andristara, Karisal, Santa Isabel, Krasa, Taniska, San Sang, Kitaski, Krinkrinkia, Pilpilia, Namahka, Winwika, Paliyuhmba (Esperanza), Isulibila (Santa Fe), Wirapahni (San Alberto), Pransa, Nasuni (San Jerónimo), Ipringni, Bulsirpi, Lakuntara, Wiswis, Nilwas, Uhri. It should be noted that the brothers of these communities left empty-handed, abandoning

their homes, their livestock and their other belongings because of the prevailing situation in the region.

Recent Events

The FSLN is carrying out an intense political propaganda campaign urging the refugee brothers in Honduras to return to their respective communities, since they know that the refugees have suffered hunger and sickness in that country, and the FSLN is offering food, medicine, doctors, and every kind of assistance. They say that those who kill and oppress the Indians are the Somocistas or the counterrevolutionaries (??) and to pay no attention to the lies of other groups. But the Indian people is not to be deceived; they know nothing of the existence of such alleged anti-Sandinista armed groups, but they experienced the oppression and bombardment of their communities, the mass killings of their brothers by the soldiers of Sandinismo. What is ironic in this FSLN campaign is that while their propaganda makes an effort to persuade on the basis of lies, their military sets fire to communities, expropriates the livestock and property of the refugees, and forces the few families who remained in the communities to move to another area as alleged refugees.

Beginning on January 11, the military began to burn houses, temples and schools in the communities of Irpitingni, Pransa, El Carmen, Lakun Tara, Bulsirpi, San Jerónimo, Wirapahni, etc.

Also, the livestock (cows and horses) of these communities are being given over to the INRA (Nicaraguan Institute for Agrarian Reform) and they are then used to feed these same officers (who have red meat daily).

In some communities, such as Sante Fe (Isulibila), Esperanza (Paliyuhmpa) and San Jerónimo (Nasuni) where a few Indian families still remained, the Armed Forces of Sandinismo have forced them to abandon their communities and move to the Tasba Raya area as supposed refugees, under the pretext of protecting them from Somocista and counterrevolutionary groups.

MSURASATA denounces to the world the ethnocide of its Indians by the Sandinista regime, the massacres at Leimus and Asang-San Carlos, the dozens of prisoners from San Carlos, Sandy Bay Tara, Bluefields, Bilwaskarma, and Leimus, the bombardment and burning of the communities of the Coco River, the expropriation of the livestock and other property of the Indian refugees, the persecution of the leaders of the churches and communities, the decision to annihilate the Indian race, the militarization of the communities and especially the defamation campaign to denigrate the authentic struggle of our Indian peoples for their lands and autonomy, which links them to the Somocista or counterrevolutionary groups. We repeat that the Somocistas have always been the enemies of our Indian peoples and we believe that no counterrevolutionary group represents the interests of the Indians of MSURASATA, so that the Indian struggle can in no way be related to the interests of these unknown groups. We denounce that the FSLN, while lacking grounds and fair arguments in the face of the claim of our Indian peoples for the defense of their historical rights, has launched this slanderous campaign to continue to deny us our ancestral rights and in order to exterminate the Nicaraguan Indian race.

Statement Before the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, on the Situation of the Indians in Nicaragua, Presented by Bernard Nietschmann, October 3, 1983

I want to thank the Commission for the opportunity to testify today.

I am a professor of geography at the University of California, Berkeley. My research and teaching specialties are indigenous peoples, resource use, customary land and sea rights, and tropical resources. I have done research on these subjects in various parts of the world including Nicaragua, Polynesia, Micronesia, and Australia.

Between 1968 and 1976 I spent 2½ years in eastern Nicaragua in Miskito villages. I lived for varying lengths of time in several villages and visited communities from Bluefields north to Old Cape and from the lower Río Coco up to as far west as Raiti.

I was supportive of the overthrow of the Somoza regime and the establishment of the new government and looked forward to a new and beneficial government policy toward the East Coast Indian peoples.

In 1980 I went to Nicaragua at the invitation of the Sandinista government to advise on and promote the possibility of establishing a national marine park off northeastern Nicaragua that would serve to protect various marine species and habitats and to provide sustainable resources for coastal Miskito communities who would manage and oversee many aspects of the proposed park.

I kept up frequent mail contact with Miskitos in various villages over the years even though my research took me to other parts of the world. In 1981 the mail from these correspondents suddenly ceased and I received no replies to my letters.

After two years of silence I heard again from some of my old acquaintances who called and wrote from Costa Rica. They were refugees and told me they had had to flee from their villages to seek safety in Costa Rica. They feared for their lives in Nicaragua. Some of these people were men of more than 60 years of age, others were women who came with children.

I went to Costa Rica at the first opportunity to see these people and to learn what had happened to them and in their villages since I'd last visited the East Coast of Nicaragua.

Examination of the Information

I have just returned after spending 2½ months in Costa Rica, Honduras and Nicaragua. I carried out research using standard systematic techniques of formal interviews, informal discussions, crosschecking, corroboration and obtaining multiple confirmations to establish the validity and reliability of the information—the same techniques that I would use to obtain and verify information that forms the basis of research results presented in scholarly books and articles. A tape recording, film and photographic record was made.

I visited old acquaintances some of whom I've known for 15 years and who are now in refugee camps, or are unregistered refugees, or are in exile. Their stories appeared to be consistent and were confirmed by others I met who were scattered about in Costa Rica and Honduras. And their stories were alarming.

Miskito villages in eastern Nicaragua had long been closed by the Sandinista government to independent outside observers. I had the opportunity to go inside Nicaragua with the invitation from the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Nations to visit their territory. I was in a Miskito area in eastern Nicaragua for several weeks. I traveled from village to village, staying for varying lengths of time depending on security considerations. I talked to hundreds of peo-

ple, lived with them, ate what they were barely managing to live on, experienced the conditions, met many people I'd known from my previous visits years ago, listened and asked questions, and carried out research on what had happened to them during the years since the 1979 Sandinista revolution.

Because much of the information I obtained might jeopardize individuals and entire communities, I trust you will understand why I cannot provide specific names, places and dates. Nor can I reveal exact details that would give clues to the location of these people and villages because of possible punitive retaliation from the Sandinista military—something that the villagers fear and that I respect and agree with.

I wish to share with you what I found out from the perspective of the Miskito villagers living inside Nicaragua. My interest is to acquaint you with their experiences and their human rights situation. I am not interested in nor have I taken part in the rhetoric that has confused examination of the Miskito situation.

Human Rights Violations

It is with sadness that I report widespread, systematic and arbitrary human rights violations in Miskito Indian communities. These violations by the Sandinista government include arbitrary killings, arrests and interrogations; rapes; torture; continuing forced relocations of village populations; destruction of villages; restriction and prohibition of freedom of travel; prohibition of village food production; restriction and denial of access to basic and necessary store foods; the complete absence of any medicine, health care or educational services in many Indian villages; the denial of religious freedom; and the looting of households and sacking of villages.

Arbitrary Killings

In several villages I talked to people who had witnessed the arbitrary killing of Miskito civilians by Sandinista military forces. Many of these killings occurred during one of several Sandinista military invasions and occupations of Indian villages. Some of the villagers were arbitrarily shot when the government soldiers first invaded the villages; others were killed during the weeks of occupation, confinement, torture and interrogation. For example, it was reported to me by several different firsthand sources that one man was nailed through his hands and ankles to a wall and told he would remain there until he either confessed to being a "contra" or died. He died. His widow, dressed in black, and others in that traumatized

village are filled with grief and anger over this and other atrocities committed during their forced confinement under a reign of terror by several hundred Sandinista soldiers. Other Miskitos were killed by forcing their heads under water to extract confessions of "counterrevolutionary" activities. Two older men—60 and 63 years of age—were threatened with death unless they confessed to involvement with "contras." They too were finally killed in the course of these same events.

Throughout my notes and tape recording are descriptions of such killings in village after village in the Atlantic Coast Indian region. Descriptions were given to me by wives, daughters, mothers, and other relatives and villagers. The occurrence of arbitrary killings of Miskito civilians appears to be widespread. A pattern is readily seen. Miskito men and women are accused of being contras, tortured or threatened with death unless they confess, killed, and then reported as having been contras, if, indeed, there is any report at all.

Arbitrary Arrests

Many Miskito civilians appear to have been arbitrarily arrested, interrogated and jailed. As with the killings, many of these frequently occur during Sandinista military operations against particular Indian villages. Military occupation of a village is carried out apparently in retaliation after an attack by Miskito warriors either on a distant Sandinista position or on a Sandinista patrol in the region. All of the information I have received leads me to conclude that the Sandinista military has not been able to locate the many basecamps of the Miskito warriors who are operating permanently far inside the Miskito region of eastern Nicaragua. I must stress that these are *not* Indian combatants who must slip across and retreat back across Nicaragua's borders with neighboring states. These Indian combatants or warriors, as they prefer to be called, are Indian men and women who are operating permanently from camps which are hundreds of kilometers from the borders. Their camps are too well hidden to be easily detected and they have generally avoided going into villages so as not to endanger the civilian population. Unable to effectively attack and destroy the warriors, the Sandinistas have attacked the villages and have taken punitive measures against the only Miskitos they can catch—the villagers. Some of these civilians, noncombatants, are accused of being "contras" and then arbitrarily killed, arrested, and tortured.

A recent example of this seemingly frequent violation was the officially announced release of some forty prisoners detained for eleven months after the court found no legal grounds for charges of counter-

revolutionary activities. Some of those released are from a community where seven villagers were summarily killed at the time of their arrest. If these released villagers are innocent, were those killed innocent too?

Torture

Civilian Miskitos have been tortured in villages and according to reports which I consider to be very reliable, in jails. I received confirming reports and descriptions from reliable witnesses who saw beatings done by Sandinista military in many villages. I also talked to and photographed people who had been tortured. I was shown scars from what they said were bayonet wounds (a man of 60 years), fingernails pulled out (a man of 48 years), deep scars under fingernails from nails driven in (a man of 52 years). Several men reported that they had been held under water for long periods to extract confessions. Another man had been tied by his feet and hung upside down and beaten repeatedly with sticks. His body still showed evidence of bruises and his shoulders were deformed.

Rapes

Rape by Sandinista soldiers of Miskito girls and women has been common. In one village, for example, six women between the ages of 15 and 42 were raped by the occupying Sandinista soldiers. Two were gang raped. In each community that has experienced a Sandinista military invasion and occupation, women have been raped. Some were held down by soldiers, some were restrained with a bayonet under their neck and then raped. From what the villagers have observed and experienced, Sandinista soldiers are apparently given great freedom to do as they please when they invade an Indian village.

Looting, Sacking of Villages, Confiscation of Property

One of the many things I noticed as being markedly different in Miskito communities was the absence of anything of value. Households had no radios, some had no dishes; more formal clothes usually worn to church on Sundays were absent. This was not the result of the people's poverty or the lack of clothes in stores—although these conditions prevail and are worsening—but are due to the theft of property by Sandinista soldiers. Radios, clothes, gold bracelets, necklaces, and rings had been stripped from the Indian villagers and looted from their houses. Again and again people reported to me that this hap-

pened to them when the Sandinistas occupied their villages. Furthermore, the soldiers killed their pigs, cows and chickens for food but did not pay for them.

In several villages, all canoes and diesel-powered boats have been confiscated and taken away. No compensation has been paid. Confiscation of fishing boats and livestock has also meant confiscation of the means of subsistence and livelihood.

Prohibition of Village Food Production

The Miskitos used to produce the majority of their basic food needs; in some communities 70% or more of all they consumed was obtained from their small farms, from fishing in the rivers, lagoons and at sea, and from hunting in the forests and lowland swamps. During the late 1960s and 1970s when I lived in Miskito villages people produced food in sufficient quantities and hunger was very uncommon. At present, hunger is a considerable problem. This is because the Miskitos have been forbidden to go far from their villages to plant. This restriction on freedom of movement is evidently a response to the Sandinistas' fear that the villagers would make contact with Miskito warriors in the bush. The villagers are not permitted to fish because of similar restrictions and the lack of canoes in many villages. They also are not permitted to go hunting because all hunting arms—such as .22 rifles and shotguns—have been confiscated.

In order to limit the availability of food for the Miskito warriors, the Sandinista military has limited and prohibited the production of food by Miskito civilians. To affect one group, another group is made to go hungry.

Locally produced food was in critically short supply in some villages I visited. In other villages in areas protected more securely by Miskito warriors, villagers were beginning to fish again and to plant a few crops even though it was not the most appropriate season to do so.

In those villages where Sandinista occupations have occurred, livestock is conspicuously absent. In one village I visited there was no livestock—no pigs, horses, cows, or even chickens. The villagers said the Sandinistas had machine-gunned all, including 90 cows.

Restriction and Denial of Basic and Necessary Store Foods

In every Miskito village food such as rice, beans, sugar, flour, coffee, salt, and so on has been rationed through a strict system imposed by the Sandinista officials that limited each family to a quota for 15-day periods. For example, in one village this meant that a

family of 7 or 8 received 4 pounds of rice every 15 days. The rice would actually last three or four days. The restricted quantity of food imposed a control on the villagers and, it appears, was also meant to limit any food above minimal survival needs so that none would be given to Miskito warriors.

Continuing and growing military actions by Miskito warriors over the past year suggests that restricting civilians' food in order to limit the Miskito warriors' food supply has not worked.

Recently the Sandinistas have cut off all supplies of food they used to send to the villages in a large part of the Indian region. Staple foods such as rice, beans, flour, sugar, and so on, are no longer being supplied. None of these items had been received for many weeks in several villages I toured. People were living primarily on green coconuts and the oil and pulp they sucked from hone palm seeds. These foods do not provide even minimal nutritional requirements.

No food is being sent into villages and the people have not produced food from local sources because of preexisting prohibitions. Many are slowly starving.

Medicine, Health Care, Education

Western medicine and health care was completely absent from every village that I went to. There was no medicine. None. According to villagers the lack of medicine and access to health care has been going on for one and two years. As a result, severe health and medical problems are common. Malaria is rampant, dysentery and intestinal parasites are common, and tuberculosis is widespread. All of these medical problems could be greatly reduced with well known and relatively inexpensive medicines. But these medicines are not available in many Indian villages, and villagers who have managed to walk to distant towns where there are doctors are forbidden to bring back medicine for other villagers. A Miskito villager who becomes ill must be well enough to walk to a doctor if he is to have any hope of securing medical help. Otherwise, he must go without or use only traditional plant medicines obtained from the forests. These traditional medicines sometimes work but are not effective against many medical problems and diseases.

If the Sandinista government policy is to deny the villagers medicine in order to prevent Miskito warriors from having access to it, their strategy is not working. I have reliable information that it is the Miskito warriors who give medicine to the villagers.

Schools were closed in every village I went to and had been for months, sometimes years.

The medical and educational achievement in rural areas so often publicized by the Sandinista government are conspicuously absent from the Miskito area

I traveled through. And I traveled through a large area.

Denial of Religious Freedom

Only in those villages now under the protection of Miskito warriors are religious services being held. For some villages I visited, that protection had only recently been secured. And even in this large zone many villages cannot hold church services because their religious leaders are in jail or are in exile in Honduras or Costa Rica.

During the Sandinista military occupations of villages churches have commonly been used as jails, to detain men and women accused or suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. Churches have also been used to house the Sandinista soldiers. Bibles and hymn books have been destroyed. Villagers accuse the Sandinista soldiers of defecating and urinating in the churches. There are many credible reports of these activities. I heard reports of churches that had been burned elsewhere in Indian communities, but in the areas I visited I saw no churches that had been destroyed.

In response to this policy many thousands of Indians have already fled Nicaragua to Honduras and Costa Rica. This flight is still continuing. While I was recently in Costa Rica the entire Miskito village of Set Net arrived and asked for protection from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

Others have stayed within the country and have struggled to survive under these harsh conditions or have actively joined in armed resistance. There has been terror and serious trauma in many villages yet the result has not been submission to Sandinista authority. Rather, the killings, torture, violence, rapes, looting and denial of basic needs appears from all available evidence to have served to further unite the Indian communities in their opposition to the Sandinista government. The influence of the Indian warriors and the territory over which they have strong military control is growing.

The story of what has happened to the Miskito Indians in eastern Nicaragua (and to the Sumo and Rama) that has so long been hidden by denials or by excuses that shift blame to outside influences will come out. There is simply too much evidence, too

many people have been affected, and too many lives have been lost. From their violations of the human rights of Indian peoples, the Sandinistas have created a people in rebellion, Indian peoples united against them. United because of internal not external reasons. United because of what has happened to them at the hands of the Sandinistas.

This is but a brief summary of some of my findings. More elaboration and documentation will be provided in articles that I am beginning to prepare for publication.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to present this information.

The Miskitos are a very religious people, and they have suffered greatly from the denial of their freedom of religion. In almost all of my discussions with hundreds of Miskito men and women, this was a principal grievance they reported to me.

Continuing Forced Relocations of Village Populations

While I was in the Miskito communities I heard reports that villagers northwest of Puerto Cabezas had been relocated to the area around Sisin. The villages mentioned to me include Auya Pini, Santa Marta, Kwakwil, Boomsirpi, and Sangnilaya. The Commission should investigate to see if these reports are true.

Recently, reports from inside Nicaragua have also been received that the communities of Dakban, Karata and Wawa (all in a 10 to 20 mile radius of Puerto Cabezas) have been relocated.

I was not able to independently verify these recent relocations of village populations.

Miskito leaders inside Nicaragua claim to have knowledge of a Sandinista government plan to relocate villagers from the coastal communities of Wawa south to Tasbapauni to some still unknown resettlement site. This information is said to come from sources within the government. It appears that these sources have proved reliable in the past, including the recent past, and there is strong indication that Wawa has already been relocated. If confirmed, this information shows a government policy to relocate Indian villages south of Puerto Cabezas, villages which are over a hundred kilometers from the Honduran border.

Indian Nations and the Nicaraguan State

By Professor Bernard Nietschmann
Department of Geography
University of California (Berkeley)

The armed conflict of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Nations, and the Creole peoples with the Nicaraguan state has been the subject of Misurasata-Sandinista negotiations since December 1984. More than 30 Indian leaders came to the talks to observe the only negotiations in the Americas between a state and armed Indian nations. Russell Means of the American Indian Movement (AIM) declared this war and the Indian peace initiative "to be the most important thing happening to Indian peoples at this time anywhere. It is beyond the colonizers' comprehension."

To the Indian nations, the Nicaraguan state is a superpower that has invaded and expropriated their lands, forcibly imposed foreign controls, and denied Indian peoples any rights to territory, resources, or freedom to pursue their own ways of life. The Indian war seeks to remove the Sandinista state from Indian lands and communities. John Mohawk (Six Nations Confederacy) has followed the war from the start and says "The Nicaraguans go through all sorts of gyrations to hide the facts that their people have invaded the coast, and that they look different, talk different, are in a different place—not their home, and are there with guns. I call this imperialism. What do you call it?"

The Miskito, Sumo and Rama peoples have never lost or given away their sovereignty, territory or rights of self-determination. In order to incorporate Indian lands and peoples into the new Nicaraguan state, the Sandinistas claim that the Indians are Nicaraguan citizens—not distinct peoples—who as ethnic groups are but a small minority of the national population. Misurasata leader Brooklyn Rivera told the Sandinistas, "Ethnic groups run restaurants. We have an army. We are a people. We want self-determination."

Latin America is also Indian America. Frontiers are being reversed. The Miskito, Sumo and Rama are the only peoples in the Americas to experience and reject both extremes of European economics and politics: Capitalism and dictatorship under Somoza, and Marxism and dictatorship under the Sandinistas. Their Fourth World revolution is determined to free their nations from occupation by colonialists, imperialists, capitalists, or Marxists.

Indian objectives in the war and in the negotiations are the same: 1) A pullback of Sandinista

military forces from Indian lands and communities which would end the shooting war; 2) A withdrawal of Sandinista state institutions (DGSE [*Nicaraguan State Security*], CDS [*Neighborhood Defense Committees*], ATC [*Labor Unions*], ENABAS [*Nicaraguan State Stores*], MINT [*Ministry of Interior*], etc.) and personnel from Indian nations which would end the institutional repression; 3) An expansion of the Indian defensive force to protect Indian peoples and their territories; 4) Bring home the 20,000 to 25,000 Indians being held in state resettlement camps, and the 25,000 in refugee camps and in exile in Honduras and Costa Rica; 5) Rebuild the more than 100 destroyed communities; and 6) Obtain external recognition of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama as peoples with sovereign and inalienable rights over their nations, communities, lands, waters, and surface and subsurface resources.

During almost six years of occupation and six months of negotiations, the Sandinistas have refused to accept the Indians' right to self-determination over their own nations and resources. Instead, Managua asserts its power to force Sandinista-determination over Indian nations with claims of "national sovereignty," "national security," and "national resources." Indians who resist the invasion and takeover are labeled "counterrevolutionaries," and those who organized to defend Indian rights and lands were arrested as "separatists" and "CIA mercenaries."

Hardly revolutionary, the Sandinista state's invasion, occupation, confiscation and repression are but racist and supremacist brutalities unleashed by many Third World states—the new colonialists—against indigenous nations. In this, distinctions are erased between Nicaragua and the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma, Ethiopia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Guatemala.

The two Indian organizations—Misurasata and Misura, and their combined Frente Interno military forces, seek co-existence between indigenous nations and the state, such as is evolving between the San Blas Kuna and Panama, and the Inuit and Denmark. The Indians call this autonomy, the Sandinistas call it counterrevolutionary.

The Sandinistas appear to be organizing their own "Indian autonomy," possibly to be modeled on the Soviet example. In February 1985, Managua sent two Sandinista Miskitos (Armando Rojas and Fomes Rabonias) to Moscow and Lithuania to study the

Soviet system of ethnic autonomy. If the Sandinistas continue to draw upon repressive foreign models to control Indian peoples, they will but prolong, not end the war.

The Sandinista state has ignored and rebuffed offers of Indian leaders who seek to help promote a solution to the crisis through recognition of indigenous rights. At the Bogotá II negotiations in March 1985, Sandinista delegation head Luis Carrión said that the presence of Indian observers (American Indian Movement, Haudenosaunee, National Indian Youth Council, Winnebago Nation, World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and Indian representatives from Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), "was a threat to the sovereignty of Nicaragua." Oren Lyons (Sub-Chief, Haudenosaunee) responded that "it is the Sandinista position that is a threat to Indians." And Russell Means (AIM) remarked, "the Sandinistas say that we are a threat to their sovereignty; we have to carve that one in granite."

Indian forces are prepared to fight and negotiate with the Sandinistas to defend their nations and promote their goals. The Sandinistas, however, have directed their military occupation forces against civilian Indian communities during the course of the negotiations. These regrettable events—probably carried out at the direction of Tomás Borge, have severely jeopardized the talks, breaking them off in January, and now the Sandinista disregard for honor has led to their indefinite suspension.

As a precondition for beginning negotiations last year, Brooklyn Rivera returned to Indian Nicaragua with a Misurasata delegation under guaranteed safe conduct from Daniel Ortega. On the day of his departure—October 31—a large Sandinista attack was made on the Miskito village of Haulover, a center of Misurasata support. After the first negotiations in early December 1984, Rivera went inside Indian Nicaragua by outboard-powered canoe with an armed Misurasata unit to tell the people about the talks and to listen to their opinions. On January 1, the Sandinistas sent a military force against Indian communities in the Pearl Lagoon-Rio Grande area. Rivera was wounded by aircraft rocket shrapnel in the attack. He witnessed the attacks on Indian villages of Kara, Little Sandy Bay and Karawala. Other attacks were launched against Indian communities (Haulover, Wounta, and others) south of Puerto Cabezas. State military forces occupied many of the villages until February. Because of the attacks and occupation, Misurasata broke off the next round of talks scheduled for January 19–20, 1985. Only at the personal instigation of Colombian President Belisario Betancur did the talks resume in late March.

The Mexico City April 20–22 meeting produced a good faith accord between the Nicaraguan state and the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Nations. The Sandinistas promised to release Indian and Creole political prisoners, assist in supplying food and medicine to the villages, allow people the freedom to hunt, fish, and plant again. In turn, Sandinista and Misurasata forces would refrain from military actions. The Sandinistas wanted the accord to influence the April 23 vote on contra assistance in Washington; Misurasata wanted the accord to help the people who are being held as virtual prisoners in the villages. On April 28, 14 political prisoners were released by the Sandinistas; Misurasata suspects that more are held by the state.

In late April and May, Managua began to escalate security and military actions against the defensive forces of the Indian nations. State security agents infiltrated Nicaraguan Red Cross teams to gather counterinsurgency information under the pretext of distributing medicine. Military forces were moved from the Siuna-Bonanza area to the Indian communities of Alamikamba and Limbaika. The Frente Interno (combined Misurasata-Misura force) destroyed three troop transport trucks. The EPS occupation forces retaliated against Indian villages. On May 17, the Frente Interno attacked the Sandinista garrison in Bluefields.

The hit-and-run Bluefields attack sparked an uprising in the Creole militia (Milicias Populares Sandinistas—MPS). Sandinista occupation forces are generally detested by Indians and Creoles who if they are not in the armed resistance, must give tacit support to survive. The Nicaraguan state has exported its obligatory military service (Servicio Militar Patriótico—SMP) to the occupied Indian territories, and it is forcing Indians and Creoles into Nicaraguan units to fight against Indians and Creoles in the Frente Interno resistance. This is a common tactic of colonialist invaders who'd prefer to protect their occupation with the lives of the dominated. However, the reality in Indian Nicaragua is that civilians are Indians without guns, and many local militias are Misurasata forces being fed by the state.

Further talks have been suspended after the breakdown of the Bogotá III negotiations, May 25–26. During this last round of talks, the Sandinista delegation devoted its attention solely to denouncing Misurasata for supposed violations of a ceasefire that never existed, ignored proposals to set up a third-party commission to monitor agreements and violations, and avoided discussion of any of the fundamental issues such as land rights, resource rights, and autonomy.

A *New York Times* article (April 26, 1985:6) quoted Minister of Interior Tomás Borge—who is now in charge of Sandinista Indian policy and administration—as making this chilling statement in Bluefields: “Here there are no whites, blacks, Miskitos or Creoles. Here there are revolutionary and counter-revolutionary Nicaraguans, regardless of color of their skin. The only thing that differentiates us is the attitude we assume toward the nation.”

Nicaragua is but another colonialist state seeking to justify its expansion into Indian homelands by accusing the Indian people of not adhering to the invader’s ideology. Sandinista claims to a right to control Indian peoples and nations rests on the self-serving assumption that only the enemy resists takeover and subjugation. Six Nations Confederacy Chief Oren Lyons put it this way: “How can the Sandinistas justify being on Indian land? If they say they own it, they then declare themselves to be the aggressors. The only other way is to be there by invitation.”

The Sandinistas cannot say they are on Indian land to assist Miskito, Sumo and Rama peoples because they have brought more suffering and repression in six years than has occurred during all the preceding 85 years of invading state regimes from Zelaya to Somoza. They cannot say they are on Indian land to defend the Indians from the FDN because it has been the Sandinista armed forces who have attacked the Indians: More than 100 villages destroyed; houses, canoes, crops burned; 50,000 people displaced to state camps and refugee camps; 1000 killed; 72 listed as “disappeared” after being taken by State Security forces. [SEE: *Appendix: Indian Trabilka and Indian-Sandinista Conflicts: inside cover maps*] They were not invited, they are not wanted, and they will eventually leave because no invaders have ever maintained their invasion.

The essential question is how long can the Sandinistas sustain their invasion of Indian lands? After almost 500 years, the Miskito, Sumo and Rama peoples have yet to be integrated by would-be invaders. To get the Sandinista state off their lands and out of their villages, the Indians were the first to take up arms, and are the first to try to negotiate. They will not forgive, they will not forget, they will not reconcile with the Sandinistas, but they will continue to educate, fight and negotiate with them until the Sandinistas or whatever government that may be in Managua accepts the reality that the long-term political and military costs of an invasion are not sustainable.

The Sandinistas have made promises and have admitted errors for almost six years, but still they occupy Indian land, still they deny rights, still they exploit essential Indian resources, still they prohibit

basic freedoms, still they imprison thousands in their state labor camps, and still they claim the right to maintain their invasion of Indian nations by repression. They can no longer pretend that the resulting Indian war is being fought by *somocistas*, right-wing contras, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), mercenaries or terrorists, because the Sandinistas have entered into direct negotiations with Indian resistance leaders—and no one else—to end the Indian war.

The Sandinistas are faced with a situation similar to what Amílcar Cabral (a former leader of Guinea-Bissau resistance against Portuguese occupation) called the “dilemma of cultural resistance”: They can either try to liquidate almost all the population of the dominated nation to eliminate cultural resistance; or, they can try to impose themselves and the foreign systems without damage to the culture of the dominated people. The first hypothesis, Cabral notes, implies genocide of the indigenous population and thus destroys the object of the invasion. The second hypothesis has yet to be confirmed by history.

To avoid this choice, the invading state—regardless of political ideology, will try to create theories to convince the world that the invasion is in the best interests of the indigenous peoples (assimilation, integration, the Sandinistas’ “New Indian”), that those being dominated are actually a minority that wants more than their fair share, that Indians are but an anachronistic impediment to progress, and that the State’s suppression is not as bad as that done to indigenous peoples by neighboring or distance states.

The invading state must of course also try to convince the dominated peoples of the indigenous nations that it is really in their best interests to cease resistance; otherwise, military occupation must be relied upon as a long-term necessity. One way to control the culture of a dominated peoples is to change that culture. This is a common tactic used by invader states and settler states against Fourth World nations. It is what Rudolph Rysse calls “the great lie” which seeks to replace indigenous history, intellectual thought and rights, with European history, intellectual thought and rights: “The great lie is simply this: If indigenous peoples will only reject their own history, intellectual development, language, and culture and replace these things with European values and ideals, then indigenous people will survive.” (*Pathways to Self-Determination* 1984:28) Surrender and submit and survive, or face annihilation to the point where even history books will only mention the indigenous resistance as being done by terrorists and mercenaries, today’s equivalents of “marauding savages.”

The Sandinistas are uncomfortable as colonialist invaders and they have yet to devise a “solution” to what they call the “Indian Problem.” At the Bogotá II

talks in March 1985, Sandinista *Comandante* Omar Cabezas exclaimed, clutching his throat, "We have had it up to here with you Indians." The Nicaraguan state thrashes about, using some of every occupation strategy: Military attacks, counterinsurgency against civilians, "hearts and minds," resettlement into government camps, negotiation promises, application of "the great lie" in invader schools and political meetings, try to manipulate indigenous peoples' goals, change occupation force leaders, shuffle occupation policy, and withhold basic necessities such as food and medicine until submission. All this and more and still it does not work.

The resistance of the Miskito, Sumo and Rama Nations is stronger today than it was just a few years ago. From late 1979 to early 1981, Misurasata focused Indian demands for rights and expanded internal support within the three indigenous nations; beginning in late 1981 they developed an armed defensive force;

from mid-1982 they began to take control of the countryside and isolate the occupation forces into garrisoned cities and military camps; by 1983 they had forced the occupation armies into a costly and unsuccessful counterinsurgency campaign; by 1984 they had gained considerable international support for their struggle — and the occupation force had lost much; late 1984 they entered into negotiations with the government of the armed occupation; and in early 1985 they began to gain more support from Fourth World nations and resistance movements around the world.

At a meeting of Indian leaders at the Bogotá II talks in March, Gerald Wilkinson (National Indian Youth Council) said to the group: "Misurasata is in a very real way fighting for all of us. The point of a warrior is to give courage. It is now time to give support to these warriors."

[El Nuevo Diario, June 28, 1985]

Autonomy Document Ready

MISURA Leader Who Supported It Murdered

Tomas Announces that the DN [FSLN National Directorate] and the Government Will Examine It Thoroughly and Describes the CIA's Latest Moves to Disrupt Autonomy

Fagoth's Cruel Cynicism — He Uses Pantin in Exchange Offer After They Had Murdered Him

Eduardo Pantin, one of the leaders of the armed Indian group MISURA who had initiated peace talks with the Sandinista government, was murdered as part of a CIA plan aimed at delaying the pacification of the Atlantic region, Interior Minister *Comandante* Tomas Borge reported last night.

Borge also denounced that the objective of the recent unity agreement between the MISURA and Misurasata, who plan to hold an assembly in Honduras within the next 60 days, is to disrupt the autonomy process while at the same time allowing them to share in the \$27 million that Reagan is going to give the contras.

Delivery of Autonomy Document

Last night *Comandante* Borge, who is the President of the National Commission on Autonomy, received at a special ceremony the document containing the principles and objectives of the important process that will make the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua an autonomous region. In closing the ceremony the Interior Minister stated that the government is prepared to continue a dialogue with the members of MISURA who follow Pantin's example.

Pantin was killed by Steadman Fagoth's people in the Yulu community last June 22, exactly one day before a meeting of Miskitos was to evaluate the results of the talks, and acts of sabotage and am-

bushing of civilians along the routes to the Coco River were to be halted.

Borge said that he has proof that there were conflicts between Pantin and Fagoth. The former wanted peace and the latter demanded war.

The witnesses to the death of Pantin, who was known as *Layan Pauni* (Red Lion), include Red Cross representatives in Puerto Cabezas, representatives of the International Red Cross, and Pantin's brother. They saw his body in Yulu, a community in northern Zelaya.

Comandante Antenor Rosales and *Sub-Comandante* Jose Gonzalez, the military leaders in northern Zelaya, had talked directly to Pantin and other MISURA leaders, agreeing upon a cease-fire, the return of the Miskito communities to the Coco River, and that group's support for the autonomy plan.

The cease-fire, which is still in effect, began on May 17 and allowed the government to supply food and medicine to the communities. The talks also resulted in the elimination of identification cards in northern Zelaya.

The CIA agent Steadman Fagoth, who is the leader of part of MISURA, said a few days ago in Honduras that he is holding Regine Schmemann, the German internationalist, and offered to exchange her for Pantin who, according to him, is being held prisoner by the Sandinista Army.

Tomas Borge said that Fagoth was shameless because, even though he knew Pantin was dead, he was offering to exchange him. "It is a deliberate blow against negotiation and pacification," Borge stated.

In-depth Examination

The National Directorate of the Sandinista Front and the government will immediately begin "a serious in-depth examination" of the autonomy document delivered yesterday by the expanded commission which studied the plan.

"With autonomy," Tomas said, "the ethnic groups of the Atlantic are going to exercise the rights they have always had but which were never recognized."

"The Indians will speak their own language, use their land, and maintain relations in accordance with their own customs. These are the same rights enjoyed by the inhabitants on the Pacific side," he explained.

He affirmed that the autonomous rights of the Atlantic region, which will be the law, will in no way impair the rights and duties of the nation.

Borge urged the inhabitants of the Pacific region to learn about the actual situation and the history of the Atlantic region and said that the inhabitants of the Atlantic region should do the same with respect to the Pacific area.

Letter From Vice Minister Carrion to Senator Kennedy on Pantin's Death

Managua, Nicaragua
July 22, 1985

Senator Edward Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Kennedy:

I received your letter of July 15, 1985, in which you request information about the death of MISURA leader Eduardo Pantin.

Because of military conflict which is prevalent in the zone it has not been possible to complete an exhaustive, official investigation. However, the investigations which we have been able to complete appear to corroborate the version that the death of Pantin was accidental.

Initially, we thought that he had been assassinated because we knew that was the expressed wish of Fagoth who wanted to terminate the talks which Pantin had initiated with the authorities in the

Region, the talks which led to the immediate establishment of a ceasefire by the forces under his command.

Later we learned from his sublieutenant the version about the accident. In addition, a local Red Cross official who was in the place where the developments took place only a few days later was able to speak with nearby residents.

The present version is that he was lying in his hammock with a pistol on top of his body and that while he was suddenly getting up the pistol fell to the ground discharging and mortally wounding him. Our investigations have not uncovered anything that questions this version which we now consider to be well established ["fundamentally certain"].

We hope that this will be a satisfactory answer to the concerns which you brought to our attention.

Luis Carrion Cruz
Commander of the Revolution
First Vice Minister of the Interior

As Vote Nears, Try This Little Nicaragua Quiz

By BERNARD NIETSCHMANN

Many people claim to know all about Nicaragua. Congressmen know, citizens' and religious groups know, journalists and news commentators know, and friends know. There are ways to test this.

Try asking some questions that get at the shibboleths of the debate:

1. Name the armed groups that make up the contras.
2. Name the former National Guard people who are supposed to be leading the contras.
3. Why don't refugees from Guatemala, El Salvador, Cuba and Haiti flee to Nicaragua?
4. Where are the more than 100,000 civilian contra supporters who were relocated in 1985?
5. The Sandinistas call Cardinal Obando y Bravo "right wing" and a "Somocista." What did Somoza call him?
6. Why is it necessary to unite opposition forces to fight the Sandinistas?
7. Why can't people who took power by guerrilla warfare, defeat guerrillas?
8. What country is used as the model for the Sandinistas' proposed autonomy for Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians?
9. You know who has received the U.S. government and private aid money, but who is actually doing the fighting?
10. Extra credit: What group was the first to shoot down a Sandinista helicopter, destroy Soviet-built T-55 tanks, carry out frogman demolition raids and an amphibious assault, and destroy a major fuel depot? Hint: A pilot on the first aerial bombing attack on the Managua airport on Sept. 8, 1983, was from this group.

ANSWERS:

1. The only group that accepts the Sandinista term "contra" is the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) operating out of southwestern Honduras and northern Nicaragua. The Indian resistance forces say they are fighting a revolution for Indian land and self-determination goals, not simply a war against the Sandinistas. Eden Pastora and his Sandino Revolutionary Front say they are the real Sandinistas whose revolution overthrew Somoza.
2. Enrique Bermudez, Enrique Bermudez.
3. Refugees don't flee to Nicaragua, they flee from Nicaragua. Refugees are the litmus test of political systems. (A map of refugees is the quickest shortcut to understanding the world's governments.)
4. Many are in makeshift camps on the swampy eastern shore of Lake Nicaragua, but nobody writes about them or bothers to find where the others have been taken.
5. A "communist."

6. It is not necessary. For the U.S. to force a unification among various opposition groups is to reduce a wide spectrum of military and political opposition to the Sandinistas. The problem is to force a change in Managua, not to force the opposition to change. The U.S. should not attempt to impose a solution more complicated than the problem.

7. Eden Pastora says it is because most of the former Sandinista guerrilla commanders are no longer supporting Managua. Adolfo Calero says it is because the Nicaraguan rural people support the contras. Indian leaders Brooklyn Rivera and Wycliff Diego say it is because their fighters are on home territory and receive food, information and shelter from the villagers. I think it is because the Sandinistas got slow and fat from Marxist bureaucracy. However, since 1984 they've become more effective with the use of helicopters, faster communications, relocation of campesinos, better ground surveillance and greater infiltration. The Nicaraguan Democratic Force contras have become less effective, in part because of a bloated, wasteful, noncombatant bureaucracy.

8. The Soviet Union. (Lithuania is to Russia as the Miskito Coast would be to Nicaragua.)

9. Poor campesinos and poor Indians. U.S. aid reaches only one of the four primary opposition groups, and most of that does not reach those actually doing the fighting or those civilians who support the fighters. These people know what they are fighting for, they are not being used, nor are they "cannon fodder." They'd just like some help to get on with the resistance.

10. The Miskito people.

Mr. Nietschmann, a geography professor at the University of California, Berkeley, has worked with the Miskito Nation and in Nicaragua over the past 18 years. He is currently doing research on the various armed Ladino and Indian forces.

Miskitos Try to Recapture a Way of Life

Violence Displaces a Peaceful Civilization

By Elie Wiesel

NEW YORK

Somewhere in the Honduran jungle, on the banks of the Mocoron River, an ancient and traditionally peaceful and industrious Indian tribe, the Miskito, attempts to rebuild its homes and its dreams, which a regime marked by violence on the other side of the Nicaraguan border tried to change and even to destroy.

Driven from their villages for military considerations, persecuted for ethnic, social or cultural reasons, the Miskitos (a name derived from the word *mosquito*) have chosen exile, that is to say uncertainty and nostalgia.

Images that have become familiar: the slow gait of the men, the fatigue and weariness in the women's eyes, the unsettling laughter of the children who, half or completely naked, make up the majority of the local population. Like all the refugees passing through this century, they live in the expectation of a sign or a miracle. Since their uprooting—which dates from two weeks to two years—they have evolved in a universe of their own, in a time of their own: We remain outside. Do they hope to go home one day, to Leimus or San Carlos, to rejoin their Miskito brothers and sisters who would not or could not cross the border? Some say yes, but do they believe it? Encouraged by government authorities, aided by private and official rescue agencies, they will leave the refugee camps to settle in villages recreated by them, for them, villages reminiscent of those they had to leave behind.

And yet, back home, over there, they were hardly involved in politics. Marx or Somoza? The Miskito, simple men of modest aspirations, led lives not of their century. All they wanted was to work their land, bathe in the river, listen to the secret sounds of the forest, speak their language, get together in their Moravian Protestant churches and celebrate their holidays and marriages according to their own customs. In short, they wanted to live removed from modern society with its temptations and perils.

True, some sympathized with the revolution; the Sandinistas succeeded in appealing to their romantic side. And then too, the ever-bloodier dictatorship of Somoza had made too many victims and not only in the cities. After their victory, the Sandinistas recognized their debt to the Miskito and offered them important posts in the new administration. Things went wrong the day the Sandinistas, anxious to strengthen their borders, expelled the Miskito from their villages, designating them "military zones."

Confronted by resistance and refusal on the part of the Indians, the soldiers began to burn down the houses and massacre the cattle. Other ordeals followed: arrests, humiliations, executions. As a result, the previously pro-Sandinista Miskito chose clandestinity and guerrilla warfare against the Sandinista regime. Going beyond their military operations, the Sandinistas organized the Miskito exodus toward Honduras. Last Dec. 24, 1,000 refugees—men, women

and children—succeeded in crossing the border after an exhausting march of three days and three nights during which they were attacked, fired at with machine guns, bombarded by the regular army. How did they manage not to give in to defeat, the fear? How did the children manage not to panic? They smile: When one is Miskito, one can do anything.

They are now fighting the Sandinistas because "they attacked our identity."

"We had our own way of life, our own customs, our stories, our legends, our memories, our secrets: the happy ones and the sad ones: the Sandinistas were anxious to take them from us. By any means."

They tell their tales so willingly, simply, using precise stark language:

"Me, I have seen my house burn."

"As for me, I have seen my son killed, my son-in-law assassinated."

"Sir, do you know Leimus? They massacred 35 Indians in Leimus."

"And I, I have spent 28 months in prison."

Are they exaggerating? It is possible, but I don't think so. It would be out of character. Besides, they almost never used big words. Or clichés. They speak neither of ethnic "genocide" nor of cultural extermination. On the scale of recent tragedies, theirs ranks far behind that of Cambodia or Biafra. Is that the reason for the indifference shown them by the world? Or could that reason be the fact that the Miskito are against the Sandinistas, and thus for the Americans?

"We refuse to become involved in

All they wanted was . . . to live removed from modern society with its temptations and perils.

East-West affairs," says Steadman Fagot Muller, the bearded and effervescent young commander of the Miskito Resistance. "What is happening to us has nothing to do with them."

A naive statement? No doubt. An armed movement cannot remain neutral. By fighting the Sandinistas, the Miskito are defending U.S. interests. Just as the former are manipulated by the communist world, the latter probably are by the Western powers.

In the meantime, the civilians are the ones to suffer, the children are the ones to endure the harshness of exile.

They are beautiful, the Miskito children. But unsmiling. And strangely, they never hold out their palms. They ask for nothing. This is the first time that I reached children living in a refugee camp who do not ask for your pity. They want neither chocolate nor chewing gum. They look at you, nothing else.

Will they grow up as refugees? The Honduran authorities and the responsible international organizations are against it. The Miskito are being permitted to rebuild villages and homes where they will live among themselves as they did before.

"Everything reminds us of the places of our childhood," an Indian tells me. "The sky, the trees, earth, the river. We even succeed in recreating of our own society here. But . . . still there are some things we could not carry with us." After a long pause, he continued: "Our cemetery."

Elie Wiesel is the author of "Night," a memoir of the Holocaust; his most recent work, among 26 published volumes, is "The Golem." He is Mellon Professor in the Humanities at Boston University.

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— Times photo
Teofilo Archibold switched allegiances.

Nicaraguan urges U.S. to fight Somoza-like rule

By Gary Scharrer
Times staff writer

A Nicaraguan who once supported the Sandinistan government of Daniel Ortega said in El Paso Monday that he now supports the anti-Sandinista *contras* because Ortega's promises of democracy and freedom have been replaced by terror and torture.

Teofilo Archibold said he changed his loyalty because Ortega has turned Nicaragua into a ruthless dictatorship since the 1979 revolution that toppled the regime of Anastasio Somoza.

Archibold is a leader of a Creole-Miskito Indian organization that is affiliated with the United Nicaraguan Opposition.

"Without the U.S. help, we will not survive. We'll all be dead in a short way without your help. Today is for me, and tomorrow it will be for the United States."

— Teofilo Archibold

In the late 1970s, Archibold organized black labor unions and community organizations as part of a broad coalition that overthrew the Somoza government.

But Archibold now is touring the United States to stimulate support for the anti-Sandinista rebels.

"Without the U.S. help, we will not survive. We'll all be dead in a short way without your help," Archibold said.

"Today is for me, and tomorrow it will be for the United States."

Archibold and 250 of his followers were jailed for 10 months when they protested the loss of jobs to Cubans. While in jail, the Sandinistas pulled out his fingernails.

He and his family later managed to escape to Honduras.

Archibold met with El Paso Chamber of Commerce leaders during his brief visit and was escorted by state Rep. Nick Perez, D-El Paso.

Although "a hard-line Democrat," Perez said he agrees with President Reagan's attitude about helping the *contras*, and that he considers the argument over U.S. aid to be "a human rights issue. It ought not to be a political football."

The United States should support groups that are fighting "a highly oppressive regime like the Sandinistas that are no better than the Somoza regime," Perez said.

But the United States should be careful not to support groups that will be worse than the existing government, he said.

United States Department of State



IN THEIR OWN WORDS

Testimony of Nicaraguan Exiles



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March 1986

Alberto Gamez Ortega

Alvaro Baldizon Aviles

Mateo Guerrero Flores

Silvio Herrera

Jose Alonso Valle

Francisco Delgado Flores

Guadalupe Castellanos

Prudencio Baltodano Selva

Oscar and Sarita Kellermann

After the fall of Somoza, the deepest aspirations of the Nicaraguan people, of which the revolutionary leadership had ample opportunity to learn during its years of struggle, were pushed into the background. The defense of revolutionary power became the only objective of the new regime. . . . Political fanaticism replaced the idealism that inspired the fight against Somoza.

—Xavier Arguello, anti-Somoza political organizer, La Prensa columnist, Secretary General of the Sandinista Ministry of Culture, and editor of the official cultural journal of the regime, who resigned in protest of government censorship in 1984 and left his country [New Republic, February 24, 1986].

Since the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power in Nicaragua on July 19, 1979, the Nicaraguan people and their leaders have received more public attention than ever before. Few modern revolutions have been so highly publicized, so emotionally charged, and yet so clouded by conflicting reports and opinions.

The National Directorate of the Sandinista Front deliberately contributed to the confusion, publicly promising democracy, a mixed economy, respect for human rights, and a foreign policy of nonalignment. In reality the regime had no intention of following through on these promises, and its actions, and occasionally the words of its leaders, have shown its true goals.¹ In 1984, it promulgated electoral rules making it virtually impossible for opposition parties to organize an effective campaign, guaranteeing a Sandinista victory. To the extent possible, the FSLN sought to nationalize all major private industry. As soon as they came into power in July 1979, the Sandinistas introduced press censorship, and by March 1982 imposed a broad suspension of civil liberties which remained in effect until the 1984 election campaign.² In October 1985, nearly all civil liberties were suspended again. Despite the provision of \$118 million in U.S. economic assistance to Nicaragua between July 1979 and April

1981, the Sandinistas quickly established substantial ties with Cuba and the Soviet bloc. These countries provided massive military assistance, including advisers, for Nicaragua's militarization.

Sandinista leaders hasten to claim that United States backing for counterrevolutionary forces prevented them from fulfilling their pledges to the Organization of American States, especially in their observance of human rights. But according to testimony of former Sandinista officials, soldiers, and refugees, these stated goals were long ago subverted. Many victims of the regime speak of creeping totalitarianism, confiscation of property, and a disregard for civil liberties that eventually forced them to leave Nicaragua despite personal hardship and an uncertain future. To all, the alternative of staying was far worse than the burden of exile.

Former Sandinista junta members Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo have become familiar outspoken critics of the growing repression inside Nicaragua. But there are many other voices as well. Here a cross-section of Nicaraguans tell why they became disillusioned with the FSLN. They are former Sandinistas, professionals, soldiers, and farm workers—each with a personal view of injustices experienced firsthand.

¹Comandante Bayardo Arce, Coordinator of the FSLN's Political Committee, delivered a revealing speech to the Nicaraguan Socialist Party in Managua in May 1984. The speech was taperecorded without Arce's knowledge and printed in its entirety in Barcelona's *La Vanguardia* (July 31, 1984). Arce talked about the Sandinistas' national reconstruction initiative. "As part of that program we spoke of bringing about revolutionary change based on three principles which made us presentable in the international context and which, as far as we were concerned, were manageable from the revolutionary standpoint. Those principles were nonalignment abroad, a mixed economy, and political pluralism. With those three elements we kept the international community from going along with American policy in Nicaragua; in fact, we got a number of governments of various tendencies to back the position of Nicaragua, the position of the Sandinista Front and of the revolutionary forces.

"Of course, once defined in specific terms, this imposed certain commitments. One was that we said we were going to elect a constituent assembly, that we were going to have elections. While we might view those commitments as negative, if we analyze our revolution in black and white, we still consider them to be positive at this time. Of course, if we did not have the war situation imposed on us by the United States, the electoral problem would be totally out of place. . . . What a revolution really needs is the power to act. The power to act is precisely what constitutes the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [The speech is reprinted in its entirety in Department of State Publication 9422, "Comandante Bayardo Arce's Secret Speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN).]

²The National Emergency Law, Decree No. 996, enacted March 20, 1982, suspended most civil liberties under the Statute on the Rights and Guarantees of the Nicaraguan People. The law was extended until July 1984, when it was lifted to accommodate the Nicaraguan presidential elections.

Alberto Gamez Ortega—former Vice Minister of Justice

Alberto Gamez Ortega and Tomas Borge had been friends since college days in the early 1950s. Gamez was openly critical of dictator Anastasio Somoza, and two of his daughters were active in the FSLN. Shortly after the revolution, he was named chief penal prosecutor of Nicaragua and six months later Vice Minister of Justice. But before long, he became disillusioned with the growing subversion of the Nicaraguan judicial system to serve political ends. When he resigned from the Sandinista government on November 19, 1982, Gamez had little idea that he would soon be a victim of the judicial system he had helped administer. He was stripped of his immunity as a Cabinet member, accused of spying (among several other charges), and held in El Chipote prison for two and a half months.

My resignation was presented in writing to the government junta through the Minister of Justice in office at that time [Carlos Arguello Gomez], my immediate superior. In the official newspaper, the *Gazette*, however, there appeared a government decree deposing me from these positions and ignoring my resignation which represented the first step [taken by the government] to involve me in counter-revolutionary actions, deprive me of the immunity that protected me as a member of the Cabinet, and to prefabricate a legal action against me.

Once I had handed over my offices to the political officer in charge at the Ministry, I rejected the offer made by more than 20 officials who were waiting at the door in order to accompany me to my home, and I left only with my private driver. Ten minutes after my arrival, the person responsible for operations at the state security office appeared with a contingent of armed soldiers and ordered me to accompany him as a prisoner. I was then put into an automobile and made to lie face down on the floor with the boot of one of the soldiers on my spine, and was driven to the military complex named El Chipote. At a later date, I found that my house was searched for three days and that my wife had been interrogated several times for more than six consecutive hours. All of my legal files and personal papers were confiscated.

I was put into a cell approximately four by three meters in size and I was told that the first rule to be observed was to say nothing, not to complain, and not to cry out whatever the circumstances might be in the future, because that was where I was going to rot and I would have to accept this. I was given a shove, forcing me to go in, and they closed the heavy door in such a violent manner as to make

a great deal of noise, and they locked the padlock and chains the same way. The cell was then left in total darkness with no ventilation whatsoever.

From that cell I came out innumerable times to be taken with my hands on my knees and my head bowed to a semilighted office with air-conditioning at temperatures which I suppose were normal, but because of the different temperature in the cell, seemed to me excessively cold.

In due time, I was permitted to raise my head during the interrogation so that I began to recognize the face of the interrogator. Sometimes his place was taken by the director of security operations, Captain Oscar Loza, who would threaten me if I refused to admit the charges filed against me. These charges were so many and so varied that I myself could not even guess where they stemmed from. For example, [since] I had worked for a U.S. company many years ago, and since the government had all my papers and photographs, they linked me with the CIA as of that date.

I was accused of having participated in the drafting of laws to avoid the passage of such strict laws as were required in defense of the revolution, and I was accused of so many other things that I could write a whole book [about them]. After this series of accusations, the threats began; that if I did not sign the statements that they had drawn up against me, involving other persons, the consequences of this would be fatal for me because I would never be able to get out. Then they went from threats to describing the consequences this would have for my family.

Concerning the reason for resigning his post, Gamez claims he was alarmed at the growing number of persons imprisoned unjustly to support the regime's quest for power.

Legal agencies were replaced by political interests in such a way that in the Justice Ministry and the courts it was accepted almost systematically that the end justified the use of immoral means. In order to eliminate certain economic and social sectors and political or union leaders who were dissatisfied with the system—who increased in number with the passage of time and who were unhappy with the trends of the revolution—a whole new legal strategy was planned which would permit the state to bring actions against and incarcerate citizens who were considered to be a political threat. Laws were approved whose language was vague and imprecise, in violation of legal rights. . . . This was supplemented with the creation of different tribunals, or special courts, which would allow them to try people by summary trials which made the victims defenseless. These tribunals were composed mainly of judges

who had no knowledge of the law, and who eliminated all legal procedures as they had existed previously.

Even though the Supreme Court of Justice made the appointments of the persons that served as judges, these persons in reality were selected by the Ministry of Justice because of their unquestionable support of the regime. This pattern worsened in such a way that, as an example, [in] the trials that took place in Puerto Cabezas on the Atlantic coast against the Miskito Indians in 1981 and 1982, the judge . . . was one of the prosecutors of the city of Managua, as was the attorney who was appointed to defend the Miskitos. Not one of the procedural formalities of the law was complied with since they did not even assign interpreters. Most of the people on trial could not speak Spanish. To summarize the case, the Miskitos were brought to a trial in which the judge who sentenced them and their so-called defense lawyer were prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice.

According to Gamez, the Ministry of Justice became increasingly subordinate to the General Directorate of State Security, which, he says, was advised by "Cuban internationalists." In the interrogation cells of El Chipote the Cubans are said to have implemented a system of "softening" prisoners with violent threats, darkness, lack of communication, bad sanitary conditions, and violent interrogation methods intended to cause mental breakdown. Hoping to improve their plight, some prisoners signed blank pieces of paper that were later filled in with contrived declarations by State Security personnel.

The numerous complaints brought before me by defense attorneys concerning this type of confession forced me later to speak with prisoners who, once condemned, were taken to prisons that were more accessible to the officials of the Ministry, and they stated that indeed they had signed blank pages while others had resisted and had never signed the statements presented by the prosecutors.

Gamez said that innumerable persons were arrested on false charges and sent to prison without valid evidence against them, sometimes to isolate government opponents, other times to illegally confiscate property.

By taking advantage of the laws regulating trade in precious metals, the Sandinista police organized a squadron which assaulted jewelry stores under any pretext whatsoever. During the night, they would arrest the jewelers, accusing them of having violated the law—and they would confiscate the jewelry, precious metals, the household furnishings . . . and even the vehicle owned by the store owner. When evidence of the supposed violation was not accepted by the penal bureau, they were obliged to free the



Alberto Gamez was disillusioned by the subversion of the Nicaraguan judicial system.

person, but the seized objects were never returned. Dozens of jewelry stores disappeared in this manner.

Gamez states that international organizations promoting respect for human rights were often manipulated by the Ministry of Justice, as well as other agencies of the Sandinista government. "Their visits are scheduled for selected places such as the Open Structure Penitentiary System in the agricultural farms, or to certain prisons which show only what they [Sandinista government officials] wish to be shown. But the visitors are not shown El Chipote, i.e., the punishment cells, the clandestine jails, etc." At times when the Ministry of Justice was involved, internationalists were sometimes selected to prepare required reports and serve as a liaison between the Ministry and the visitors. In a subsequent interview on March 16, 1986, Gamez stated:

Argentine internationalists also prepared documents on human rights in Nicaragua, such as the report prepared by the Ministry for the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 1983. This report was principally coordinated through Argentine attorney Manuel Gaggero [also known as "Gallero" and "Che Manuel," a purported leader of a group of Argentine Montonero terrorists living in Nicaragua] who acted as an official of the Ministry and managed the Center for Legal and Political Investigations created by the Ministry.

Following his release from prison, Gamez remained in his house for five months, enduring the regular visits of state security agents. Because of recurring medical problems, he was granted an exit visa to seek treatment outside the country. On July 5, 1983, he left for San Jose, Costa Rica, where he and wife have lived since.

Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles— Borge's Chief Investigator

Alvaro Baldizon Aviles was an enthusiastic supporter of the Sandinista Front in 1979, before the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza. After the revolution, he joined the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry as a policeman. In September 1980 he was sent to the Soviet Union for a 10-month criminology course. By 1982, Baldizon was working in the Interior Ministry's office for internal investigations and, within a year, became a full member, or *militante*, in the FSLN. From December 1982 to July 1985, Baldizon was the chief investigator for the Interior Ministry's Special Investigations Commission. During an interview at the U.S. Department of State in November 1985, he made the following statements:

I began working for the Sandinista Front in January 1979 with the same objective as other Nicaraguans—to bring about the downfall of the Somoza dictatorship, and end the suffering of the Nicaraguan people. That was the impulse that caused me to join the winning side, the side that offered an alternative.

After the victory, I continued collaborating with the Front. At the factory where I worked, I was taught how to promote political movements among the workers, and was subsequently elected president of the new Sandinista-affiliated union. Soon after, I

decided to join the armed forces. I especially wanted to be in the police, because I thought the new police would become a model for Latin America, and an organization that would respect human rights.

Upon returning from the Soviet Union, I studied financial investigation and was assigned to the Office of the Chief of National Police to conduct internal investigations. I began to uncover cases of corruption and human rights abuse. At that time, I considered them isolated incidents, phenomena attributable to the times in which we were living.

When I was later transferred to the Ministry of the Interior [Special Investigations Commission], I gradually realized that corruption and human rights abuses were not isolated events—they were the policy of the Nicaraguan Government.

The purpose of the Interior Ministry's Special Investigations Commission was, in fact, to inquire into reports of human rights abuses committed by the Sandinistas themselves, so the regime could concoct appropriate cover stories for the Nicaraguan public and international consumption. During his investigations, Baldizon uncovered abuses and cover-ups linking high-ranking government figures such as Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion with the executions of many of the government's political opponents. He also discovered that the government used murder and torture as a regular and approved way to control internal opposition. Commenting on one episode of the crackdown on the Miskito Indians, he said:



Alvaro Baldizon Aviles has testified extensively before Congress, public affairs groups, and the press since his arrival in the United States.

In July, August, and September of 1982, more than 500 Miskitos were captured in communities surrounding Puerto Cabezas. They were taken to a State Security post where they were submitted to torture to make them talk. The Minister [Tomas Borge] insisted that a "bi-partisan" commission be formed to decide the fate of the detainees. This commission included Comandante Jose Gonzalez of the Ministry [of Interior], Captain Alvaro Herrera of State Security, Comandante Joaquin Cuadra of the Army, and the Chief of Military Intelligence.

The commission decided to shoot 150 of the Miskitos in a forested area near the Rio Wawa. Those that remained were imprisoned in the cells of the Zona Franca [prison] in Managua. It was my office that carried out the investigation, took declarations, and made the required inspections. We took all of this to the Minister of Interior [Borge], who used it to put together a "believable lie"—to save face in front of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights [Nicaragua's independent human rights organization].

But those who opposed the Sandinistas weren't the only ones singled out for harsh treatment. Baldizon claims that by 1982 three Sandinista army commando platoons had been trained in East Germany in special combat deception techniques to counter growing pockets of armed resistance. Some of these techniques involved operations against Sandinista supporters, as Baldizon explains in his remarks on the first unit to go into operation.

Their first mission was to search out and annihilate bands of counterrevolutionaries operating in the countryside surrounding Matagalpa and Jinotega. . . . The soldiers were disguised as counter-revolutionary combatants, and were given old clothes and miscellaneous weapons. They went into the countryside, and began operations as if they were part of the resistance. They killed about a dozen peasants who were known Sandinista collaborators. They burned their houses and even set fire to a government cooperative. At the same time, small bands of resistance fighters were beginning to make contact with each other and unite. The platoon joined up with these groups. At night, in their camps, they slit the throats of the real. . . combatants. In this way, they moved from band to band, wiping them out.

A new unit was inaugurated in October 1984, whose mission was. . . more oriented toward international propaganda. It began operations near the Honduran border in Chinandega, Madriz, Nueva Segovia, and Jinotega [departments]. They also made selective incursions into Honduras. They still operate in that area, and their mission is to pose as FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force] combatants,

ambush civilian vehicles, as well as threaten and beat up local peasants—especially those known to have collaborated with the government.

The existence of such special units was confirmed by Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, in an interview with a *Washington Post* reporter. Ortega, while omitting mention of these special units' actions against civilians, said: "Our strategy calls for the development of various campaigns, maneuvers, and special actions, and to work to disband them [members of the armed resistance] as the Interior Ministry has done. The Interior Ministry had infiltrated their exclusive groups and killed their leaders during special actions." The entire interview was printed in a special supplement to the official Sandinista newspaper *Barricada*, pages 1-14, October 10, 1985.

Meanwhile, on October 3, 1985, Baldizon told representatives of various human rights and religious organizations how Interior Minister Borge described visiting foreign delegations as *tontos utiles* (useful fools), referring to the way the Sandinistas use such groups to further their own ends. In a subsequent interview, he detailed how such "shows" are staged.

Tomas Borge gave me the job of keeping a list of 10 persons with health or economic problems to be available for a "show," whenever a foreign delegation would visit. He would arrange to be attending the person at the hour his guests would arrive in order to impress them. One of these individuals was a blind man who had asked for an accordion to use as a means of supporting his mother and himself. Borge said that he would give him the instrument, and I withdrew money from petty cash to make a down payment. After we gave the blind man his accordion in front of a group of West Germans, I received instructions to take it back. I was not in agreement with this immoral act. Nevertheless, Borge made a show with this man, just as he did with others.

The results of Baldizon's investigations compelled him to leave Nicaragua to expose what he had seen. "I began to have moral and ideological reservations about the Sandinista regime. They seemed to say one thing and do another." On July 1, 1985, Alvaro Baldizon crossed the Rio Guasale into southern Honduras where he surrendered to military authorities. He had been planning his escape for more than a year. After he left, his wife and brother were detained by the Nicaraguan Government. His wife was placed under house arrest and his brother was jailed in the Nicaraguan Interior Ministry's "El Chipote" prison and has been held incommunicado since. As of February 1986, sources within Nicaragua said that he has been formally charged with an unspecified crime and is performing forced labor.

Mateo Guerrero Flores and the Human Rights Commission

From 1982 until early 1985, Mateo Guerrero was executive director of the government's National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human rights (CNPPDH). Guerrero says that early on the Sandinista government saw the need for an organization to polish its human rights record in the international arena, and formed the commission to perform that task. The CNPPDH was also to be used by the government to compete with the older, independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights, which had exposed human rights abuses of the Somoza dictatorship and continued to expose abuses under the Sandinistas.³

Guerrero, the son of a farm worker who picked cotton, graduated from the University of Managua as an attorney in 1975.

I was in charge of the General Directorate of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Rights. I was given the job after a year and about eight months working as administrative director. I was a lawyer, and a notary, and I had a certain amount of training in human rights. I participated in various seminars on social justice, I participated in a congress on human rights in Spain, and I went to Costa Rica several times, taking courses in documentation of human rights materials.

I had sympathy for the Sandinista Front. Like all other Nicaraguans, I wanted a change after 1979. My neighbor at the time was Dr. Leonte Herdocia Ortega, who was the National Commissioner for Human Rights for Nicaragua. He knew my work and my potential very well and offered me the job, managing this commission, directing a staff of five lawyers, one social worker, and a team of secretaries.

I believe that it was the policy of the government to have its own commission to try to provide a political image of respecting human rights. And it seemed that the Permanent Commission had already made strong attacks against the Sandinista government. For this reason, it was decided, as an internal policy, to compare findings or to try to examine the problems among people who would be on the side of the government. This was the original idea. I think it was the idea of the Foreign Minister, Father Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann.

The commission was pretty limited from the start. We could never enter the State Security

prisons, because it was the policy of the Interior Minister [Borge] never to allow anyone in, not even from international human rights organizations. Supposedly, we processed declarations of families who had relatives in prison, looked into whatever violations they claimed to have suffered, and would make a summary of their declarations and try to assign someone to attend to the commission's recommendations. But in most cases this was never done. A tough attitude was taken against people who protested, against people who tried to correct some of the excesses.

In 1984, the situation got worse. The commission's work became more political in nature. We looked into some 700-800 cases of ex-national guardsmen who had been sentenced by special tribunals, many of whom had been detained unjustly from the moment in which they had been judged. Many were people who were given excessive sentences, and had little responsibility for anything done against the state—gardeners, cooks, etc. The Interior Ministry selected those individuals that met their criteria, and at an opportune political moment, gave amnesty to 100 of them, while the rest were held back. A lot of deceit, a lot of demagoguery.

Guerrero had become deeply involved in a particular case in which the government tried to cover up its involvement with the unexplained disappearance of a young man who had been arrested by the Nicaraguan State Security. Guerrero was assigned to investigate the case and determined that the youth had been arrested and seen in jail by witnesses. The Nicaraguan Government said that it pardoned the boy after his detention, but he was never seen again.



Mateo Guerrero speaking at a press conference in Washington, D.C., March 11, 1986.

³There are two commissions on human rights in Nicaragua today. The Permanent Commission on Human Rights of Nicaragua (CPDH) was created in 1977 and exposed human rights abuses of the Somoza government. Since 1979 it has similarly criticized Sandinista abuses. The National Commission for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (CNPPDH) was formed in 1980 as a dependency of the Sandinista government.

I dedicated a lot of effort to the case of this 17-year-old youth who was captured and pardoned by the government, and whose family found him missing when they went to pick him up. I investigated it. My investigation confirmed that he had been captured and detained. But at one point, the authorities told me that he had been neither apprehended nor held. Of course, it was a lie. I had talked with prisoners who had conversations with the boy in jail. His name was Ramon Ordonez Ramirez. I sent my report to the Appeals Court, the Justice Court, and the Supreme Court. I didn't get any answer. At the Appeals Court I handed over the results of my investigations and newspaper reporters took my declarations, but the reports were censored. According to the boy's family, with whom I talked various times, he was a member of the Nicaraguan Workers' Central (CTN), a union that was not affiliated with the Sandinista Party.

Later, I was called by the government to have the commission make a statement that Ramon Ordonez couldn't enjoy the benefits of his pardon, because he had already been allowed to leave. The commission itself never published this communique, but it was published three days later without its consent, making it look like this young man had already been released.

Despite Guerrero's efforts, the young man was never found, and it was not until Alvaro Baldizon left Nicaragua that his fate was known. Baldizon testified that young Ordonez was singled out as troublemaker by Vice Minister of Interior Luis Carrion Cruz and executed. In fact, Baldizon received orders to discuss the case with Sub-Commander Alvaro Guzman so that an appropriate cover story could be prepared.

Meanwhile, Mateo Guerrero became increasingly uneasy about his work. By January 1985, he was seriously thinking of leaving Nicaragua.

The first of the year [1985], I had a meeting with Alejandro Bendana, who is General Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, and he told us that our work had not been effective, that the work of the commission should project itself outside the country—above all toward Europe, and that it should denounce the activities of the *contra* [democratic resistance] in violating human rights. We should dedicate ourselves more to this task, and try not to get involved in things like Patriotic Military Service [conscription], and the resentment of communities that had been [adversely] affected by the Sandinista war effort.

Mateo Guerrero left his country March 28, 1985. Awarded a United Nations grant for a training seminar in human rights, he went to Costa Rica. Instead of returning at the end of his stay, he flew to the United States.

Silvio Herrera—Miskito Indian Lay Preacher

While the dust was still settling from the Sandinista revolution, the Ministry of the Interior and the Sandinista army lost no time searching out so-called counterrevolutionaries along the northern border. Particularly affected were the Miskito Indian settlements in the northeastern reaches of the country. The Miskitos traditionally maintained a culture apart, and they were one of the first population groups the Sandinistas sought to control. At first there were random sweeps by squads of soldiers. By December 1981, some 10,000 Miskitos were being forced out of their homes into relocation camps farther south. Since the intimidation and killings began in early 1980, some 23,000 Miskitos have sought refuge in nearby Honduras.⁴

Silvio Herrera is a Moravian minister who now lives with his wife and five children in the refugee settlement near the Rus Rus River in Honduras. His people decided to leave Nicaragua when news of a massacre in a nearby village reached their doorstep.

We left November 18, 1980, from La Esperanza, near the border. We left because the Sandinistas were killing us. Nearby, in Leimus, there was a massacre. They killed about 42 young men. They



A seven-year-old Miskito Indian boy at a refugee camp near Rus Rus, Honduras.

had a raft which used to take cars back and forth across the river. There they tied up the young men and shot them.

They don't respect us, especially those of us who are pastors. When we had something to say, they would tell us, "You are not important. We are the ones who give the orders here." The Sandinistas pursued the youths because they thought they were counterrevolutionaries. It was a lie. They pursued the pastors too, because they said we worked with the counterrevolutionaries. I prayed to God that He wouldn't leave me to be taken by the Sandinistas, who would kill me for nothing.

Jose Alonso Valle and Francisco Delgado Flores—Soldiers

Jose Francisco Alonso Valle, a 20-year-old coffee picker from Leon, was drafted into the Sandinista army March 11, 1985. He was forced to leave his invalid mother and two disabled brothers—one an epileptic, the other blind. When his mother died, he was not permitted to go home to visit. Angry, he escaped to Honduras six months later. His story is typical of many young farm workers who are the sole supporters of their families.

I was recruited March 11. I was cutting coffee when they [Sandinista soldiers] grabbed me. I felt stricken because I knew I wasn't going to see my mother again. It happened that on May 18 she died, but my commander wouldn't give me permission to go home. When I finally did get authorization the 15th of July, I didn't find her, of course. That's when the decision [to leave] came to me, along with the realization that I was fighting so others like [Defense Minister] Humberto Ortega and Danielito [President Daniel Ortega] could live easy.

There were times when we went for three days without eating. We suffered a lot of hunger, and had to eat a lot of things that made us sick. My assignment was political officer of a company of 120 men. There were Cuban and Chilean officers in our unit who tried to talk us into fighting harder. In Chinandega I heard that the Sandinistas arrived at the house of a woman and said, "Your son returns dead." The son was a Sandinista soldier. But inside the coffin were a dozen banana stalks. It was prohibited that anyone should open the box, but the separation between the woman and the son had been



Jose Alonso Valle plays the guitar to pass time in a Honduran refugee center.

so great that she opened the coffin and found the branches. She later found out her son was alive.

Francisco Martin Delgado Flores is a 19-year-old youth from Matagalpa. Like Jose Alonso Valle, he was forcibly conscripted and went into battle against the anti-Sandinista resistance in Central Nicaragua. Six months later, his entire squad of 10 men deserted. Francisco felt fortunate to be able to make it to Honduras where he was interned in a refugee camp even though he had no clothes, little to eat, and looked forward to an uncertain future. At the time of his interview, he did not know what happened to the other members of his patrol.

The peasants are very unhappy with the Sandinistas. They [the Sandinistas] force themselves into houses, break down the door, and take away the young people. At the high schools they keep them [the students] locked up with police all around the building so they can't escape. Afterward, a truck arrives. They make the students get on and take them to a school like the one at Mulukuku. That's what happened to me. I was taken by force. I was three months at Mulukuku. And the other three months I was in combat in the mountains. Persecution of the *contra* was our first priority. Our instructors were both Cuban and Nicaraguan. There were about 30 Cubans in the school. They gave us Marxist political training. Our soldiers mistreated the *campesinos* and stole their cattle, slaughtering their cows for food. During the three months we were in combat, many of my friends fell fighting, were

*This figure represents the number of Nicaraguan Indian refugees in the United Nations center at Mocarón, Honduras and those assisted by Friends of the Americas (a private U.S. charity) in settlements along the Coco and Rus Rus Rivers. By the end of December 1985, there were approximately 11,000 refugees at the U.N. center, and 12,000 in settlements served by Friends of the Americas.

injured, and many left behind. When I deserted, all 10 of us in the squad decided to escape. We were all from different parts [of the country]. I am from Matagalpa. I was not in agreement with that so-called Sandinista process they have in Nicaragua, nor the fact that I was obligated to go fight in the mountains.

Guadalupe Castellanos— Coffee Picker

Guadalupe Castellanos is an ex-farm worker from the town of Dipilto, near the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. She left Nicaragua in April 1984 after recovering from grenade wounds to her back and one arm.

I went to church a few days before Christmas in 1983 and there was a State Security man named Manuel Martinez who was there preaching to us. He said we had to have a Bible in one hand and a rifle in the other so that the revolution would be successful. I had an argument with him and then went to cut coffee with my two children.

They came with me because as poor people you need to work hard for a living and they were small, so they accompanied me. We were let off work at midday since the next day was December 24. I stayed to gather big leaves at the bottom of the gully so I could make a Christmas decoration for my children. While in the gully, I ran into some *piri* [from *piriquaco*, which literally means mad dog, a derogatory term applied to Sandinista soldiers] who were still there guarding the coffee fields. They started harassing me and tried to grab me, but I ran away from them for a short distance. Then they caught up to me and started beating me. I told my children to run up the mountain and catch up with the other group of coffee pickers that had already left.

After the Sandinistas beat me, they left me there and went off. Maybe they thought I was dead or they were just waiting to see if my sons would return to help me. I'm not sure, but what I am sure of is that I got up and started running up the hill to reach my children. I caught up with them, and then passed them because I knew which way we needed to go. I turned around to see if they were still following us and yes, they were behind us.

Just as we were getting to the top of the hill, a grenade exploded in the middle of us. We all fell on our faces and when I turned around I could tell my 6-year-old Alonso was dead. The crown of his head had been cut right off and it was laying there a few

feet from his body. It was a clean cut because you could see the bone of his skull. My 12-year-old son Misael had been hit in the ear and I tried to help him up, but he couldn't hold out his arms. He had a shrapnel wound in his back, and it looked like the shrapnel had severed his [spinal] column. He told us to pray and then he told me to get some help.

Guadalupe Castellanos said that the Sandinistas prohibited the people in her hometown from returning to the area where the grenade exploded. Six days later, she returned to find Misael dead.

It was a grenade [not a land mine], because all the other people that were cutting coffee had passed through that same path and nothing happened to them. You see, this isn't something invented or made up, but is a reality because if my companions had passed by there and nothing happened to them, how was something going to happen to me? They had gone ahead of me and I was the last one to go up the path, so there had been nothing in the path. The Sandinistas were the ones following us, and the *contras* weren't anywhere around, so it would have to have been them.



Shacks of canvas and scrap lumber house Nicaraguan refugees like these young girls near Jacaleapa, Honduras.

Prudencio Baltodano Selva— Farmer and Lay Preacher

Prudencio de Jesus Baltodano Selva was a 40-year-old farmer and Pentecostal lay preacher living in the small southern village of El Tendido. In February 1984, Baltodano, another man, and about 40 women and children fled the scene of a battle between Sandinista troops and members of the anti-government resistance. The group was captured by the Sandinistas, and the two men were separated from the rest. The soldiers tied Baltodano to a tree, cut off his ears, and sliced his throat with a bayonet. Although he was left to bleed to

death, he survived and managed to escape to Costa Rica. On March 14, 1984, in San Jose, he told what happened.

At the beginning of December 1983, there was combat near my farm between members of the Sandinista army and armed groups, and, owing to the danger that my family faced, I opted to go to the house of a friend that was located on the other side of the River Punta Gorda. I stayed there two months with my family.

At the beginning of the month of February 1984, there was more combat in that zone, specifically in the community El Tendido, where 22 families lived, in their respective little houses, and also in the community called El Salto del Leon, where the same number of persons also lived.

The day after the fighting, the Sandinista army took the area, and later identified themselves as the "Los Sombreritos Battalion" (the Battalion of the Little Hats). That day, at dawn, the two families with whom we were hiding [and ourselves] started to flee. We were two adult men and the rest were women and children.

On the road, we encountered three more families, which made a total of 40 persons. The following day, while we built a hut to protect the children from the rain, we were surprised by Sandinista troops who proceeded to surround us. Four of them took us into captivity [the two men that were in the group].

They were dressed in green khaki [fatigues], and had wide-brimmed hats of the same color and material. Immediately they pointed at us and tied our hands behind our backs with rope. They asked us our names and began to interrogate us, asking us where the arms were, where the rest of our companions were that were fighting. We responded that we were not involved in any group, that we were fleeing with our families for fear of being hit by the shots. . . . In that moment, some shots were heard and they ordered the rest of the families to their houses, and they took us up to the river, crossing two farms, and when we arrived at Mr. Miguel Fernandez's property, they proceeded to undress us. They put a khaki colored shirt on me, and an olive green uniform on Crisanto Jaime. Later on they made us get down on our knees and one of them began to kick us while questioning us. Again they asked us our names and, when I said mine, one of the said: "For many days I have been looking for you. You still don't know what we do to the evangelical pastors. We are communists and don't believe in God."



Prudencio Baltodano Selva.

He tied me to a tree with my hands behind me and another Sandinista came and hit me with the butt of his rifle on my forehead. . . . I was bleeding a lot. Then he showed me his bayonet and while he grabbed my hair, he cut my neck And then he cut off my ears. The other Sandinista asked him, "Do I shoot him?" And the one with the bayonet said, "It's not worth spending the bullets on this son of a bitch. It's better if he dies suffering slowly—look how he bleeds; I cut his jugular." He said this while he stuck his bayonet into my neck.

After that, I fainted, and I didn't realize what happened. This all took place around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. When I recovered my senses, I was still tied to the tree, my face almost rubbing the ground. I tried to stand up, but . . . I could hardly move. Finally at night, after several unsuccessful attempts, I released myself and began to walk.

Later at night, I heard voices and knew that members of the battalion that captured us were still in the area. I hid, and later walked deep inside the bushes. I spent two days with no food, almost

unconscious with the danger of wild animals. My left ear was infected with worms. I felt very bad, but kept on walking until after two days I found the family of Crisanto Jaime. They washed my wounds and cared for me. I stayed there with them for 10 days and when I realized that my family was out of danger, I joined them at La Gloria in Zelaya del Sur.

When I got to La Gloria I met there with members of the anti-Sandinista group ARDE [Democratic Revolutionary Alliance] who offered to protect me and my family. They took me to the San Juan River where a doctor saw me every day.

I am a victim who survived the tragedy of the community of El Tendido. I personally offer testimony of having seen the corpses of farmers of the neighborhood who had been detained during these events. I remember the names of some of them: Miguel Flores, 80 years old, a minister; Adan Brizuelas, 50 years old, a farmer; Cristina Sequeira, 20 years old; and her mother Matilda Flores, 38 years old.



Prudencio Baltodano receiving medical treatment in Costa Rica.

Oscar and Sarita Kellermann— Jewish Exiles

In the years following the revolution, the National Directorate of the Sandinista Front tried to give the impression that there was no systematic discrimination against Jews in Nicaragua, even though ties between the Sandinistas and the Palestinian Liberation Organization date to the 1960s. It has been an easy claim to make, since there are essentially no Jews left in the country. They were forced into exile during and shortly after the fall of Somoza.

Oscar Kellermann came to Nicaragua as a boy from Czechoslovakia, where he narrowly missed deportation to a Nazi concentration camp. Before the Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua, they harassed him, followed his car, and tried to set it on fire. In 1978, Sandinista militants fire-bombed Managua's synagogue while most of the congregation was inside attending the Friday night service. After the revolution, Sandinista soldiers frequently entered the Kellermann's house to make random searches of their property, and the family began to receive telephone death threats.

Oscar and Sarita Kellermann belong to the small community of Nicaraguan Jews, some 60 to 70 families forced into exile by the Sandinista government.

Oscar Kellermann: I came to Nicaragua when I was nine years old. I was pulled off a truck that was taking me and my parents to a concentration camp. Friends of my father, the underground, smuggled us out of the country, and this was how we came to Nicaragua, because my father had two brothers living there since 1923.

We came to Nicaragua, the only country in those days accepting Jewish refugees. There were no Jewish schools there. We had no rabbi. We had no shochet [kosher butcher]. We had no cantor [leader of liturgical singing in a synagogue]. The only Jewish life we had was what our parents would teach us. We all attended Catholic schools.

In 1948, my parents, to give us a better education, left Nicaragua and came to the United States of America, to Los Angeles. I attended Hollywood High School. I graduated at Loyola. I started my college career when the Korean war broke out. I joined the United States Air Force. I spent five years in the Air Force. I am a Korean war veteran. In 1955-56, I returned to Nicaragua, as my parents had moved there. I got married there. I raised two children with my wife. We had a nice Jewish family. I worked and I prospered in my family business.

During those years, since I can remember, there was no anti-Semitism in Nicaragua. We were a very few families, too small to be in politics. We could not afford to be in politics. In 1977-78, I was vice president of the Jewish community in Nicaragua. I remember one day, one evening, on a Shabbat evening while we were singing Lechadodi [traditional Jewish prayer welcoming the Sabbath], two bombs hit the door. We had a big wooden door in the synagogue, where a big Star of David was, and all of a sudden, the whole place was on fire.

I remember running, getting the fire hose, and started running to the entrance of the synagogue, when I stopped because two other members that

used to be in concentration camps in Europe, they had already reached the outside of the synagogue.

We were met by a jeep and another small car with eight members that had handkerchiefs on their faces, and they identified themselves as members of the FSLN, [which] means the Sandinista guerrilla movement. They said that they were the FSLN and [friends of the] PLO and that they were going to burn all the Jews. So we were forced back into the synagogue.

I tried to hit the fire with the water hose, and I only made the fire bigger. So we wet the curtains, and we were able to put all the fire out. We had to wait about 20 minutes, I believe it was, because we couldn't go outside. Those people were still outside.

Three times I was followed, and they tried to kill me three times. Twice they tried to burn me. With gasoline, they tried to burn the car. Other times, I did not take the path or the road that they thought I was going to take, because every day we would take a different road. We knew already that we were being followed. We were all receiving, not only myself, but the rest of the Jewish families, receiving harassment, threats, phone calls. And all this made us little by little, one by one, leave Nicaragua.

During Oscar Kellermann's previous stay in the United States he had become a U.S. citizen. On July 25, 1979, the Kellermanns received a call from the U.S. Embassy in Managua and were advised to leave the next day. According to Mr. Kellermann, the Embassy told him "Nicaragua was no longer a safe place for American citizens to be . . . and especially [for] me of the Jewish faith."

After the revolution, Sarita Kellermann returned to Managua to pack the family's household goods.

Sarita Kellerman: I was in my house, and day after day, I had to open the doors to trucks with soldiers with machineguns, with rifles, that came to search the house without a warrant. And they . . . vandalized and looted the house every time. I was even afraid to pick up a phone, because all I heard in the phone was threats against me as a Jew. "Dirty Jew." "You better get out before we kill you." "What Hitler started, we'll finish." And I could go on, saying what I heard.

Now, it's not very pleasant to be intimidated in that form. And I found it very difficult to live in an atmosphere where I knew that I was being persecuted because I was a Jew. The only crime they could accuse me of was my religion.



Sarita Kellerman in testimony at the White House, March 14, 1985.

So, I was forced to leave the country. Leaving everything I worked for behind me. Through the ADL, which is the Anti-Defamation League, we tried to contact the Sandinista government and find out what charges they had against us that made them harass us in such a form. There were no charges.

However, they said they had passed a law that said that if you did not live in Nicaragua for six months, you, your property, whatever you owned would be confiscated. And they applied that law to my case, as to the cases of all the other people from the Jewish community of Nicaragua. There are no Jews that belong to our community in Nicaragua today. And our only crime was that [we were Jews].

Conclusion

On July 19, 1979, many Nicaraguans celebrated the fall of the Somoza regime, looking forward to a new era of freedom and social justice. But that dream evaporated quickly in the face of the hard realities of life in a Marxist-Leninist

state. Since the revolution, almost 10 percent of the Nicaraguan population has left the country. The number of Nicaraguan refugees in other Central American countries and illegal immigrants in the United States now comes to nearly 225,000. All of these people have their own stories and unique reasons for leaving their home behind. What they tell us offers an inside view of the disillusionment with Nicaragua's revolutionary process.

The deepest significance of these testimonies lies in the fact that those who seem to have suffered the most are people whom the revolution was meant to help—workers, peasants, the economically disadvantaged, and the politically disenfranchised. As discontent has become more pronounced, the Sandinistas have turned to even greater measures of repression to maintain their hold over the populace. For many Nicaraguans who disagreed with this turn of events, leaving the country was the only thing they could do to save their lives, and the telling of these stories completes the personal link between the early promises of the Sandinista leaders and the harsh reality of what the revolution has become.

Today the dominant Sandinista ideology is a spurious Marxism, stripped of its humanistic values and reduced to the bare bones of totalitarian necessity. A truly democratic socialism, creative and free, which the Sandinistas once promised, exists only as a myth for the consumption of innocents, tourists, left-wing intellectuals, and organizers of international writers' congresses—foreigners who after brief visits to Nicaragua return to their own countries to defend a system they do not truly know and would never accept themselves if by some misfortune they were forced to endure it.—Xavier Arguello [New Republic, February 24, 1986]



Thousands of Nicaraguan youths living in Honduras and Costa Rica face an uncertain future as refugees. Some have lived in camps up to five years without access to work or educational facilities.

Sources:

Alberto Gamez Ortega—statement presented at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., March 11, 1986, and subsequent interview March 16, 1986.

Alvaro Baldizon Aviles—interviews conducted at the Department of State from October 1985 to February 1986.

Mateo Guerrero Flores—interview at the Department of State, December 10, 1985.

Silvio Herrera—interview conducted in the Honduran Mosquitia, December 15, 1985.

Jose Alonso Valle—interview in Jacaleapa, Honduras, December 13, 1985.

Francisco Delgado Flores—interviews in Choluteca, Honduras, March 1985.

Guadalupe Castellanos—interview conducted in Teupasenti, Honduras, by Wesley R. Smith and Richard H. Rygg, March 9, 1985.

Prudencio Baltodano Selva—personal statement presented in San Jose, Costa Rica, March 14, 1984.

Oscar and Sarita Kellermann—testimony presented at the White House, March 14, 1985.

Expanding Freedom: A Formula for Growth in the Americas



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Cont
America

Following are the texts of an address by Elliott Abrams, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on October 30, 1986; and a paper by Paul D. Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, that was presented to the Conference on the Political Implications of the Latin American Foreign Debt organized by the Institute for European-Latin American Relations and the Corporacion de Investigaciones Economicas para Latinoamerica in Madrid, Spain, on December 2, 1986.

ADDRESS BY MR. ABRAMS

I believe it is especially appropriate for me to be speaking today in Brazil, because my theme of political and economic change sweeping Latin America is nowhere more vividly illustrated.

Political and Economic Change in the 1980s

The 1980s have been a period of profound change in the Western Hemisphere. A moral and intellectual revolution is underway throughout the Americas. Little by little, country by country, we are in the process of rede-

fining the role of the state in order to increase both political and economic freedom.

The revolution has been most evident in the political sphere. Since 1979, dictatorships or military regimes have relinquished power to democratically elected governments in Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in South America and in El Salvador,

A truly free economy helps build, and helps preserve, a free and open society. And free and open societies are the goal which all of us who live in the Americas share and want to pass on to our children.

Grenada, Guatemala, and Honduras in the Caribbean Basin. Today, 91% of the population of Latin America live under democratic regimes.

The revolution may be less evident in the economic changes that have taken place, but it is no less palpable. In the United States, tax reduction and deregulation have increased economic freedom, and this has contributed to the longest period of growth since the end of the Second World War.

At the same time, Latin America is undertaking the first steps of what we hope may become a transition from state-dominated economic systems to more market-oriented economies. There are many examples of this idea:

- Mexico sold or closed 23 public sector enterprises in recent months;
- Argentina signed the first contracts under its program to open up its energy sector to exploration by foreign investors; and
- Chile is working to solve the problem of debt by encouraging foreign private investment and debt/equity swaps.

This redefinition of the economy is overcoming statist stagnation and mobilizing resources for vibrant growth and development.

Political Transformation

Let me start with the political transformation of Latin America.

The state must have enough power to govern, but it also must be restrained enough to maintain individual freedom. The search for the appropriate balance has preoccupied thinkers from Aristotle to the authors of the *Federalist Papers*.

In the United States, it is axiomatic that the power of the state often works against the freedom of the individual. Opposition to government abuse has

been a key element running through U.S. politics from our rebellion against the British to Watergate.

In Latin America, in contrast to our own traditions, from the days of the hierarchical Indian societies, which were replaced by a similarly hierarchical colonial system, the people have looked to the state for the care of the individual. The state has been the means to assert public standards of conduct and morality over private interests.

We in the United States have placed our faith in the individual and structured our political systems to maximize personal freedom. Latin Americans have been influenced by a history fraught with instability and political upheaval. This has reinforced the colonial inheritance of centralized systems which are aimed at protecting the individual from the hazards of political chaos. Thus the state has come to have a much larger role in society than can be justified by the demands of efficiency, equity, or democracy today. And many Latin Americans are recognizing this.

Economic Transition

There is a similar, although less obvious, transformation occurring in the economies of the hemisphere. The state must be large enough to create the conditions for economic prosperity to benefit all its citizens. But if the state becomes too large and unwieldy, it can stifle individual initiative and growth.

More must be done to reduce the role of the state and free up Latin American economies. This means substantial deregulation, reduction of state involvement in production of goods and services, and, more broadly, a change in the perception of the role of the state. Rather than serving as the direct guarantor of social welfare, the state must act to create an environment conducive to economic growth.

In the last 2 years, Latin American governments have taken steps away from the excessive statism, market intervention, and import substitution economic models they have relied upon for decades. The debt crisis has forced governments to the realization that it is impossible to sustain double-digit fiscal deficits through excessive borrowing.

The debt crisis, as difficult as it has been, has served as the impetus for change, as an incentive to adopt better economic policies. Today, in contrast to the latter part of the 1970s and even the

early part of the 1980s, more realistic exchange rates prevail, current accounts are in better balance, and unsupportable fiscal deficits are being reduced. The long-term objective should be truly free markets—with the state protecting no special interests but, instead, promoting free markets as mechanisms for gaining and protecting the individual's autonomy.

Often Latin American clerics or intellectuals say to me, "We reject capitalism." My reply is, you have never seen capitalism. You have seen a kind of interlocking directorate of politicians, regulators, bureaucrats, and businessmen controlling an economy, serving a wide variety of special interests, and restraining growth and competition. Their power grows, and their wealth may grow, but that is not the free market, and it is a system ultimately incapable of using resources with maximum efficiency, creating opportunity, and spreading the benefits of growth to all the people. Free markets protect no vested interests, as our own deregulation process in the United States has proved, but they offer fairness, opportunity, and growth for Latin Americans who today see a bleak economic future. To Latin Americans who seek radical solutions to their economic problems, I have one to offer—the most radical: not more regulation or more state control, which are not radical but traditional in Latin America, but less. Let political freedom nurture and be nurtured by economic freedom. If a citizen can freely choose his president, let him freely choose his medicine or his car. As millions of men and women around the world have seen, a free economy can defeat misery, and it can grow. And surely growth is the goal on which we can all agree.

U.S. Policies To Encourage and Support Economic Reform

U.S. policy initiatives have encouraged reforms which promote greater economic freedom. When we met in Caracas last year, I described U.S. policy for dealing with debt-related problems, the Program for Sustained Growth. On September 8 of this year, Mexico reached agreement in principle with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on a program that fits within the context of this program.

The newly concluded Mexican financial package includes the three key elements of the Program for Sustained Growth.

First, new policies to promote growth;

Second, new international credit led by the IMF and the World Bank; and

Third, net new credit from the commercial banks over the next 3 years.

Mexico's proposed structural reforms will make the Mexican economy more efficient and competitive. They combine fiscal measures to reduce the public sector deficit and a commitment to conduct prudent monetary and foreign exchange rate policy with external financing to support Mexico as it undergoes structural change.

Substantial progress has been made under the strengthened debt strategy in the last year. The Mexican package, despite its prominence, is not the only example of a debtor country undergoing significant adjustment.

- Efforts to reduce inflation are underway in Argentina, Bolivia, and here in Brazil.

- Argentina, Chile, and Ecuador are seeking to turn more public sector enterprises over to private sector ownership and management.

- Argentina and Colombia have liberalized their import regimes.

- Colombia and Ecuador have taken significant steps to increase the market orientation of their economies by reducing government interference in many markets.

These are promising beginnings, but policy reform does not take place in a vacuum. The United States is working with other creditor countries as well as with debtor countries to improve international conditions which will offer support for the reforms.

- We have cooperated to realign exchange rates to more accurately reflect underlying economic conditions. The decline in international interest rates has provided substantial debt relief.

- We met with other nations in Punta del Este in September to launch the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We agreed there to work with others to "halt and reverse protectionism" and to develop a more open multilateral trading system so as to promote growth and development.

- We also met with many countries at the IMF/World Bank annual meetings in September. We support the international financial institutions in their efforts to encourage economic reform.

The IMF continues to play a central role in managing debt problems. When the programs that are now under discussion are completed, the IMF will have standby programs or enhanced surveillance arrangements in place with 13 of the 15 major debtors. The IMF and World Bank are cooperating closely in assisting the major debtors to formulate growth-oriented adjustment programs within a consistent framework.

The World Bank is playing an increasingly important role through emphasis on fast-disbursing loans tied to adjustment of economic policies as well as traditional sectoral loans. This is a major reorientation for the Bank's lending program.

The Bank negotiated new policy-based (structural or sectoral) loans for 8 of the 15 major debtors.

The Caribbean Basin Initiative

The United States also has special initiatives underway which will provide greater economic latitude to the private sector in specific regions.

One element in our broad-scale effort to promote the private sector is the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The centerpiece of the program is preferential duty-free entry for virtually all products imported by the United States from the region. This can be a powerful incentive for growth and job creation in the CBI countries, but it depends, of course, on the ability and willingness of the private sector in the countries to fully exploit these new opportunities.

The U.S. Government also seeks to encourage UN bodies, especially economic and developmental organizations, to avail themselves of the wisdom and experience of key private sector organizations. One of the United Nations' key developmental organizations is the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). ECLAC plays a significant role in formulating and articulating economic and development policy for its Latin American members.

This past week my colleagues in the Department of State have been discussing with ECLAC, as well as with Chamber representatives, the possibility of a program of ongoing consultations and cooperation between both organizations. In effect, we would like to see ECLAC draw on the experience and counsel of your members when formulating its developmental strategy. We hope

you will endorse this effort and encourage your members and offices to take advantage of every possible opportunity to work with ECLAC in this endeavor.

Conclusion

As business persons in Latin America, you live and work in a moment of change and progress. The all too often stifling hand of the state is being lifted in country after country—slowly, sometimes much too slowly, but perceptibly. Free elections, press freedom, and free speech are being followed by debate and action about economic freedom as well. If the trends continue—if the economies are freed to grow and if the enemies of political and economic freedom can be vanquished—the interests of all our peoples will be served.

Let me close by stressing that point: "all our peoples." A truly free economy provides no favoritism, no elitism, and no protectionism. It offers incentive, mobility, and opportunity. It will produce wealth spread among the many, not captured by the few. A truly free economy helps build, and helps preserve, a free and open society. And free and open societies are the goal which all of us who live in the Americas share and want to pass on to our children.

PAPER PRESENTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Causes of the Debt Crisis

The Latin American debt crisis came to public attention in August 1982 with Mexico's dramatic announcement that it was unable to meet its international financial obligations. While substantial individual differences among the various countries make it difficult to generalize about the causes of the debt crisis, it is clear that the crisis resulted in large part from the pursuit of inappropriate economic policies by many developing countries despite changing international circumstances. Overvalued exchange rates that undermined international competitiveness and monetization of unsupportable fiscal deficits were major factors contributing to the region's economic and financial problems.

When the industrialized countries took steps to adjust their economies to

higher oil prices and inflation, worldwide economic activity contracted. Interest rates soared, and prices in world commodity markets turned downward. Many developing countries—caught by falling export revenues and rising debt service obligations—were forced to make difficult choices in their overall economic policies or face destabilizing social and political changes.

Virtually every country in Latin America reacted to the debt crisis by adjusting its domestic economy. Latin American governments cooperated with the IMF and official and private creditors to develop economic programs appropriate to changing international circumstances. Some potential negative consequences of the crisis were averted. The international financial system was not disrupted.

These efforts did not prevent the global recession from deepening throughout the region. Living standards fell to the levels that had prevailed in the middle 1970s. Declining international commodity prices and, in 1986 especially, the drastic decline in oil prices have adversely affected producing countries, with potentially destabilizing effects. At the same time, an unprecedented wave of democratic success has highlighted our stake in the economic viability of Latin America. Growth has become imperative not only to facilitate debt service but, as importantly, to enhance the well-being of Latin American populations which have suffered declines in living standards from the levels of the early 1980s.

The International Debt Strategy

The United States and other creditor countries share with the debtor countries an interest in resolution of their economic problems. The debt problem has, in fact, had one salutary effect in underscoring the interdependence of the United States and Latin America. The U.S. strategy for dealing with the debt crisis has been coordinated with other industrial countries since 1983. That strategy, based on a case-by-case approach, emphasizes the need for economic adjustment in the debtor countries supported by the international financial institutions, especially the IMF. Adjustment also has been supported by private commercial banks and creditor governments. Progress toward economic stabilization has been aided by worldwide economic recovery with markets which have remained generally open despite strong protectionist pressures.

At the 1985 annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank in Seoul, Korea, Treasury Secretary Baker proposed a new initiative, the Program for Sustained Growth, that builds upon and strengthens the previous strategy. The U.S. debt initiative contains three essential and mutually reinforcing elements:

First, adoption of growth-oriented macroeconomic and structural reforms by the debtor countries;

Second, a continued central role for the IMF in conjunction with an increase in structural development loans by the World Bank to support policy reform; and

Third, when the first and second elements are in place, new lending by the commercial banks to support the reforms and provide the basis for long-term growth.

At the heart of the debt strategy is a new emphasis on growth within the debtor countries as a prerequisite to reducing debt burdens over time. This approach has received the strong support of the international community and was recently reaffirmed by the IMF Interim Committee and IMF/World Bank Development Committee at their meetings in September.

Although the net new lending in the strengthened debt strategy may be moderate in comparison to the unsustainable levels reached in the period leading up to the debt crisis, we believe it can support the adoption of comprehensive growth-oriented programs by the major debtors and, therefore, provide the foundation for renewed economic growth.

Prospects for Economic Reform and Growth

The impact of the external debt on the economies of the region has been aggravated by the economic recession which began in Latin America in 1981. Average real gross domestic product (GDP) for the entire region grew only 1% in 1981 and declined 0.9% in 1982, compared with average annual growth rates of 6% in the 1970s. It declined another 3.1% in 1983 before recovering with 3.2% growth in 1984. In 1985 growth was 3.7%. On a per capita basis, the growth rate in 1984 would be less than 1% and in 1985, 1.5%.

Foreign Debt in Latin America, 1985

Country	Foreign Debt in Billions of Dollars	Interest Payments on the Foreign Debt as a Percentage of Export Earnings
Argentina	50.0	54.5
Bolivia	3.2	60.0
Brazil	101.9	43.5
Colombia	13.4	23.0
Chile	19.6	46.5
Ecuador	7.3	24.5
El Salvador	2.1	14.0
Guatemala	2.5	11.5
Honduras	2.5	17.0
Mexico	97.7	37.0
Nicaragua	4.4	17.0
Panama	5.1	—
Paraguay	1.9	13.0
Peru	13.8	34.5
Uruguay	4.9	35.5
Venezuela	30.3	22.5

Source: UN Economic Commission for Latin America.

While the debt is a serious problem and debt service a heavy burden to the developing countries, other factors—principally inappropriate domestic economic policies—have imposed serious constraints on economic growth and development. Lack of confidence in economic policies dried up domestic savings and investment and led to huge capital flight. Total capital flight for Latin America since 1979 is conservatively estimated to have exceeded \$100 billion. In recent years capital flight is estimated to have offset roughly half of the inflow of new loans. Adverse external economic developments aggravated the resulting deficits in the borrowing countries' balance of payments.

As economic adjustment has proceeded, it has been accompanied in Latin America by a growing recognition that private initiative and private savings and investment must be stimulated if there is to be hope for sustained growth. In the last 2 years, many Latin American governments have taken preliminary steps away from the excessive statism, market intervention, and import substitution strategies they have relied upon for decades.

The most important reasons for this shift are related to their debt situations and to the Latin Americans' acceptance of market discipline as they sought assistance to manage their debt-related problems and to stimulate their

economies. The debt crisis forced governments to the realization that it has been impossible to sustain double-digit fiscal deficits through excessive borrowing. International financial institutions and U.S. policy initiatives also have encouraged these reforms.

The macroeconomic adjustments and policy reforms which have been required by the International Monetary Fund and private creditors as the price for continued financial support have been reinforced and enhanced by greatly increased structural adjustment and sectoral lending by the World Bank. With the emphasis on structural adjustment in the Program for Sustained Growth, plus a changed outlook in both the debtor countries and in the World Bank, the percentage of policy-based lending to the Latin American region jumped dramatically.


Most countries have moved to more realistic exchange rates, expanded exports, and cut inflation. Reforms in Argentina, Bolivia, and Brazil, for example, have cut inflation rates enormously. Of even greater importance for the longer term, several have begun to reduce entrenched structural barriers to growth; specifically, to take steps to reduce price controls and subsidies, to liberalize trade, to attack overregulation and excessive bureaucratic controls, and to improve the investment climate, including reducing restrictions on foreign private investment.

Several key debtor nations have recognized the heavy structural burden of inefficient and highly subsidized public enterprises. These operations siphon off crucial national savings and sharply increase external indebtedness. Several countries have moved to transfer government-owned industries to private ownership and management. Mexico, for example, has made an important beginning in this area. In addition, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay are seeking to turn more state enterprises over to the private sector.

Other debtor nations have understood that what is best for internal markets is best for external markets as well. If correct signals are received from free markets operating through price mechanisms, then external commerce is best regulated, not by governments but by reliance on price in liberalized trading regimes. Haiti has converted import quotas to tariffs, the Dominican Republic has eliminated many import surcharges,

Latin America: Gross Domestic Product, 1984-86

(Average annual growth rate)



Average annual growth rate

(Percent)

	1984	1985	1986 ¹	Cumulative Variation 1981-86
Latin America	3.2	2.7	2.0 to 3.5	4.2-5.8
Oil-exporting countries ²	2.6	1.7	-3.5 to -1.5	2.0-4.0
Non-oil-exporting countries ³	3.7	3.6	5.5 to 6.5	8.5-9.5
Brazil	4.8	8.2	7.0 to 8.0	17.0-18.0
Other non-oil exporting countries	2.5	-1.5	3.5 to 5.0	-1.0-0.5

¹Preliminary estimates subject to revision. Graph based on midpoint of the range.

²Oil-exporting countries: Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.

³Non-oil-exporting countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

Source: Based on official data from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America.

and Ecuador has sharply reduced duties on a wide variety of manufactured imports. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations signifies for the United States an opportunity to eliminate or reduce trade barriers to the point where global commerce truly becomes a function of prices and markets. Mexico's recent steps to liberalize trade, which received both IMF and World Bank support, provided a sound basis for its accession to the Generalized Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

In some important respects, Mexico's comprehensive economic reform program offers a model for similar programs in other debtor countries. Mexico's adjustment program combines structural reforms designed to make the Mexican economy more efficient and competitive, fiscal measures designed to reduce the public sector deficit, a commitment to conduct prudent monetary and foreign exchange rate policy, and external financing to support Mexico as it undergoes structural reform. The key policy reforms are designed to:

- Increase the efficiency of the public sector;

- Rationalize the price structure leading to more market-based prices;
- Reform the tax system;
- Liberalize trade and increase Mexico's export competitiveness; and
- Improve the environment for foreign direct investment.

Innovative features of the package emphasize growth. Additional financing will be made available over a limited period if oil prices fall below \$9 per barrel. The IMF has agreed to make available up to 600 million Special Drawing Rights (\$720 million) under the contingency mechanism. If real growth falls below 3.5% in 1987, a contingency growth fund from the commercial banks of up to \$500 million will be activated. The IMF also agreed to accept a more gradual reduction in the fiscal deficit, and Mexico agreed to longer term adjustment measures.

International Efforts To Encourage Economic Growth

Since 1982, considerable progress has been made. Concerns about the international financial system have been allayed. Most of the developing countries have been able to continue servicing their external debt once adjustments were made to bring their financial

obligations into line with their ability to pay. Contributing to these results has been the decline in international interest rates—a drop of more than five percentage points from the peaks registered in mid-1984. Since 1981, the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (LIBOR) has dropped from 17% to 6%, thereby greatly reducing debt service costs. Each percentage point change in interest rates is worth an estimated net \$2 billion a year for the eight major Latin American debtors at their current levels of foreign debt.

The IMF has negotiated new standby programs or letters of intent with eight of the major debtors since October 1985. Two additional programs are now under discussion with Argentina and Morocco. When these negotiations are completed, the IMF will have standby programs or enhanced surveillance arrangements in place with 13 of the 15 major debtors.

The World Bank is playing an increasingly important role in the stimulation of sustainable economic

growth in the debtor countries through emphasis on policy-based, fast-disbursing structural adjustment loans and sectoral loans. The World Bank increased aggregate lending commitments to the 15 major debtors from \$4.4 to \$6.1 billion during its fiscal year which ended June 30, 1986—an increase of nearly 40%.

It also has negotiated new policy-based loans for eight of the major debtors, for a total of about \$3 billion. Discussions are now underway with 11 of these countries on additional policy-based loans for about \$5 billion. The proportion of policy-based loans also has increased and in 1986 accounted for 37% of World Bank loans to these countries. This is in contrast to 10% or 15% in the years 1982–85. The IMF and World Bank are cooperating closely in assisting the major debtors to formulate growth-oriented adjustment programs within a consistent framework.

The commercial banks also are being called upon to do their part. Commercial banks hold two-thirds of the total Latin American debt, and more than 60% of this portion is owed to West European, Japanese, and other banks headquartered outside the United States. The U.S. Government has called on U.S. banks—holders of around 22% of the total Latin American debt—to do their part. The recent agreement on a \$7.7 billion commercial bank package for Mexico provides concrete evidence of commercial bank support for the strengthened debt strategy. It includes \$6 billion in new money and \$1.7 billion as contingency funds linked to investment and growth. The World Bank has agreed to provide cofinancing guarantees for the final year of a \$500-million commercial bank loan and \$250 million of the contingency loan.

We expect that commercial banks will begin discussions with other debtor countries once IMF/World Bank-supported reforms are underway. Negotiations on a short-term trade finance facility linked to oil exports for Ecuador were recently completed. New loans linked to World Bank cofinancing and a rescheduling arrangement have been agreed with Uruguay. Rescheduling negotiations also are underway with Bolivia.

A number of debtor countries have adopted programs permitting foreigners or residents to convert foreign currency debt claims into equity or local currency debt investments. Debt/equity swaps have been particularly active in Chile where the government established a favorable regulatory framework for such transactions. Swaps also have begun in Mexico. Meanwhile, direct foreign investment has generally not yet recovered to the levels of the 1970s. This apparently dismal performance reflects the continuing lack of confidence in the investment environment in the region.

Trade Effects of Adjustment and the U.S. Role

Once adjustment measures, particularly realignment of overvalued exchange rates and domestic interest rates, began in 1983, many countries' balance-of-payments situations improved dramatically. The current account deficit for the region dropped from \$42.6 billion in 1981 to only \$3.1 billion in 1984. A slight increase to \$4.6 billion in the current account deficit occurred in 1985, as export performance was not as robust. An additional increase to \$12.9 billion is expected in 1986 and 1987 as a result of increased imports not matched by export growth, especially in oil-exporting countries.

The growth of Latin America's export earnings has slowed considerably from an average annual pace of more than 18% in the 1970s to about 5% during the 1980s. Slumping international prices for agricultural products, raw materials, and fuels explain much of the decline in the growth of regional exports. The prices of all but one of Latin America's 14 principal export commodities have fallen 11% or more since the beginning of the decade.

During the first 6 months of 1986, Latin America recorded a substantial decrease in its trade surplus with the rest of the world. The primary cause of the decrease is the continuing depression of the world petroleum market which caused a severe shock to the producing countries. World prices also remain low for other traditional Latin American exports: among others, grain prices affect Argentina; copper prices, Chile; and tin, Bolivia. U.S. advocacy of outward-oriented, export-led economies over inward-focused, import-substitution models is based on the necessity of freeing economies from overdependence on one or a few commodities. Expanded

and diversified production which is competitive in world markets is the ideal way to achieve optimal use of domestic resources in an increasingly integrated world economy.

Faltering economic activity in the industrialized world also explains some of Latin America's poor export performance in the 1980s compared to the previous decade. In the 1970s aggregate OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] growth averaged more than 3.3% a year but slowed in the 1980s to 2.3%. The United States, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, Canada recorded the highest growth rates among OECD countries in the 1980s and increased their imports from Latin American countries at a faster rate than did Western Europe.

Latin American competitiveness in West European and Japanese markets eroded because the region's currencies remained linked to the dollar which appreciated sharply. In February 1985, when it hit its peak, the value of the dollar had risen some 55% against other OECD currencies on a trade-weighted average since the beginning of the decade. Since then, the dollar has lost a little more than one-half that appreciation.

The United States increased its imports from Latin America—mostly manufactured products—by nearly 7% a year during the 1980s, a rate well in excess of annual GDP growth. Meanwhile, Latin America and the Caribbean reduced their imports from the United States by 40% from 1981 to 1983. The magnitude of the U.S. role in hemispheric current account adjustments is illustrated by the shift from a \$3-billion U.S. trade surplus in 1981 to a \$17-billion trade deficit with Latin America and the Caribbean in 1985.

In contrast, imports of Latin American goods by three major European Community countries—West Germany, France, and Italy—rose by 2% or less a year, while imports into the United Kingdom actually declined. The growth of Japan's imports of Latin American goods averaged 5.8% per year, somewhat higher than the overall OECD average annual pace of 4.8% during the period. The relatively high rate of absorption of Latin American exports by the United States reflects a high U.S. growth rate among OECD countries and maintenance of lower import barriers

than most other industrialized countries. The U.S. share of exports from Latin America and the Caribbean, traditionally large, expanded from 39% in 1981 to 49% in 1985.

Conclusion

Most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have accomplished major adjustments in their trade accounts and in domestic policies since 1982. They are thus prepared to resume more attractive rates of growth without anticipating the social disruption of the past 5 years. According to projections by the UN

Economic Commission for Latin America, the rate of economic growth in 1986 among the non-oil-exporting countries of the region will surpass the 1985 rate and be the highest registered since 1980. Moreover, the increased levels of imports being realized point the way toward stronger recuperation and economic growth ahead.

Latin American steps toward policy reform are most encouraging. Experience all over the world shows that the surest path to economic prosperity is through free market principles and internationally competitive enterprises. Free market policies unleash the full force of human initiative, creativity, and energy. They parallel in the economic arena the advance of democracy in the political sphere.

The United States will continue to devote considerable efforts to overcome the international debt problem. We will continue to oppose protectionism and to support liberalization of trade in the newly launched round of multilateral trade negotiations. We will do our part to support the realization of sustained growth and improved standards of living for the people of Latin America. ■

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Nicaragua: A Speech to My Former Comrades on the Left

David Horowitz

TWENTY-FIVE years ago I was one of the founders of the New Left. I was one of the organizers of the first political demonstrations on the Berkeley campus—and indeed on any campus—to protest our government's anti-Communist policies in Cuba and Vietnam. Tonight I come before you as the kind of man I used to tell myself I would never be: a supporter of President Reagan, a committed opponent of Communist rule in Nicaragua.

I offer no apologies for my present position. It was what I thought was the humanity of the Marxist *idea* that made me what I was then; it is the inhumanity of what I have seen to be the Marxist *reality* that has made me what I am now. If my former comrades who support the Sandinistas were to pause for a moment and then plunge their busy political minds into the human legacies of their activist pasts, they would instantly drown in an ocean of blood.

The issue before us is not whether it is morally right for the United States to arm the *contras*, or whether there are unpleasant men among them. Nor is it whether the United States should defer to the wisdom of the Contadora powers—more than thirty years ago the United States tried to overthrow Somoza, and it was the Contadora powers of the time who bailed him out.

The issue before us and before all people who cherish freedom is how to oppose a Soviet imperialism so vicious and so vast as to dwarf any previously known. An "ocean of blood" is no metaphor. As we speak here tonight, this empire—whose axis runs through Havana and now Managua—is killing hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to consolidate a dictatorship whose policies against its black citizens make the South African government look civilized and humane.

DAVID HOROWITZ was the editor of *Ramparts* magazine and a founder of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. His early books include *Student* (1962) and *Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of Contemporary History* (1970). More recently he has been the co-author (with Peter Collier) of *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty* and *The Kennedys: An American Drama*. A somewhat different version of the present article was read at Berkeley on April 4 at a conference entitled "U.S./Nicaragua: Exploring the Possibilities for Peace."

A second issue, especially important to me, is the credibility and commitment of the American Left.

In his speech on Nicaragua, President Reagan invoked the Truman Doctrine, the first attempt to oppose Soviet expansion through revolutionary surrogates. I marched against the Truman Doctrine in 1948, and defended, with the Left, the revolutions in Russia and China, in Eastern Europe and Cuba, in Cambodia and Vietnam—just as the Left defends the Sandinistas today.

And I remember the arguments and "facts" with which we made our case and what the other side said, too—the Presidents who came and went, and the anti-Communists on the Right, the William Buckleys and the Ronald Reagans. And in every case, without exception, time has proved the Left wrong. Wrong in its views of the revolutionaries' intentions, and wrong about the facts of their revolutionary rule. And just as consistently the anti-Communists were proved right.

Today the Left dismisses Reagan's warnings about Soviet expansion as anti-Communist paranoia, a threat to the peace, and a mask for American imperialism. We said the same things about Truman when he warned us then. Russia's control of Eastern Europe, we said, was only a defensive buffer, a temporary response to American power—first, because Russia had no nuclear weapons; and then, because it lacked the missiles to deliver them.

Today, the Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower, missiles and all, but it has not given up an inch of the empire which it gained during World War II—not Eastern Europe, not the Baltic states which Hitler delivered to Stalin and whose nationhood Stalin erased and which are now all but forgotten, not even the Kurile Islands which were once part of Japan.

Not only have the Soviets failed to relinquish their conquests in all these years—years of dramatic, total decolonization in the West—but their growing strength and the wounds of Vietnam have encouraged them to reach for more. South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia, Yemen, Mozambique, and Angola are among the dominoes which have recently fallen into the Soviet orbit.

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To expand its territorial core—which apologists still refer to as a “defensive perimeter”—Moscow has already slaughtered a million peasants in Afghanistan, an atrocity warmly endorsed by the Sandinista government.

Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega describes the army of the conquerors—whose scorched-earth policy has driven half the Afghan population from its homes—as the “pillar of peace” in the world today. To any self-respecting socialist, praise for such barbarism would be an inconceivable outrage—as it was to the former Sandinista, now *contra*, Edén Pastora. But praise for the barbarians is sincere tribute coming from the Sandinista rulers, because they see themselves as an integral part of the Soviet empire itself.

“THE struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” So writes the Czech novelist Milan Kundera, whose name and work no longer exist in his homeland.

In all the Americas, Fidel Castro was the only head of state to cheer the Soviet tanks as they rolled over the brave people of Prague. And cheering right along with Fidel were Carlos Fonseca, Tomas Borge, Humberto Ortega, and the other creators of the present Nicaraguan regime.

One way to assess what has happened in Nicaragua is to realize that wherever Soviet tanks crush freedom from now on, there will be two governments in the Americas supporting them all the way.

About its own crimes and for its own criminals, the Left has no memory at all.

To the Left I grew up in, along with the Sandinista founders, Stalin’s Russia was a socialist paradise, the model of the liberated future. Literacy to the uneducated, power to the weak, justice to the forgotten—we praised the Soviet Union then, just as the Left praises the Sandinistas now.

And just as they ignore warnings like the one that has come from Violetta Chamorro, the publisher of *La Prensa*, the paper which led the fight against Somoza, and a member of the original Sandinista junta—“With all my heart, I tell you it is worse here now than it was in the times of the Somoza dictatorship”—so we dismissed the anti-Soviet “lies” about Stalinist repression.

In the society we hailed as a new human dawn, 100 million people were put in slave-labor camps, in conditions rivaling Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Between 30 and 40 million people were killed—in peacetime, in the daily routine of socialist rule. While leftists applauded their progressive policies and guarded their frontiers, Soviet Marxists killed more peasants, more workers, and even more Communists than all the capitalist governments together since the beginning of time.

And for the entire duration of this nightmare, the William Buckleys and Ronald Reagans and

the other anti-Communists went on telling the world exactly what was happening. And all that time the pro-Soviet Left and its fellow-travelers went on denouncing them as reactionaries and liars, using the same contemptuous terms with which the Left attacks the President and his supporters today.

The Left would *still* be denying the Soviet atrocities if the perpetrators themselves had not finally acknowledged their crimes. In 1956, in a secret speech to the party elite, Khrushchev made the crimes a Communist fact; but it was only the CIA that actually made the fact public, allowing radicals to come to terms with what they had done.

Khrushchev and his cohorts could not have cared less about the misplaced faith and mispent lives of their naive supporters on the Left. The Soviet rulers were concerned about themselves: Stalin’s mania had spread the slaughter into his henchmen’s ranks; they wanted to make totalitarianism safe for its rulers. In place of a dictator whose paranoia could not be controlled, they instituted a dictatorship by directorate—which (not coincidentally) is the form of rule in Nicaragua today. Repression would work one way only: from the privileged top of society to the powerless bottom.

The year of Khrushchev’s speech—which is also the year Soviet tanks flattened the freedom fighters of Budapest—is the year that tells us who the Sandinistas really are.

Because the truth had to be admitted at last, the Left all over the world was forced to redefine itself in relation to the Soviet facts. China’s Communist leader Mao liked Stalin’s way better. Twenty-five million people died in the “great leaps” and “cultural revolutions” he then launched. In Europe and America, however, a new anti-Stalinist Left was born. This New Left, of which I was one of the founders, was repelled by the evils it was now forced to see, and embarrassed by the tarnish the Soviet totalitarians had brought to the socialist cause. It turned its back on the Soviet model of Stalin and his heirs.

But the Sandinista vanguard was neither embarrassed nor repelled. In 1957, Carlos Fonseca, the founding father of the Sandinista Front, visited the Soviet Union with its newly efficient totalitarian state. To Fonseca, as to Borge and his other comrades, the Soviet monstrosity was their revolutionary dream come true. In his pamphlet, *A Nicaraguan in Moscow*, Fonseca proclaimed Soviet Communism his model for Latin America’s revolutionary future.

This vision of a Soviet America is now being realized in Nicaragua. The *comandante* directorate, the army, and the secret police are already mirrors of the Soviet state—not only structurally but in their personnel, trained and often manned by agents of the Soviet axis.

BUT the most important figure in this transformation is not a Nicaraguan at all. For twenty years, from the time the Sandinistas first arrived in Havana, they were disciples of Fidel Castro. With his blessings they went on to Moscow, where Stalin's henchman completed their revolutionary course. Fidel is the image in which the Sandinista leadership has created itself and the author of its strategy. Its politburo, the *comandante* directorate, was personally created by Fidel in Havana on the eve of the final struggle, sealed with a pledge of millions in military aid. It was Fidel who supplied the arms with which the Sandinistas waged their battles, just as he supplied the Cuban general—Zenén Casals—who directed their victorious campaign (just as the Soviets supplied the general who directed Fidel's own victory at the Bay of Pigs). *Without Castro's intervention, Arturo Cruz and the other anti-Somoza and pro-democratic contras would be the government of Nicaragua today.*

And it was Fidel who showed the Sandinistas how to steal the revolution after the victory, and how to secure their theft by manipulating their most important allies: the American Left and its liberal sympathizers.

Twenty-five years ago Fidel was also a revolutionary hero to us on the New Left. Like today's campus radicals, we became "coffee-pickers" and passengers on the revolutionary tour, and we hailed the literacy campaigns, health clinics, and other wonders of the people's state.

When Fidel spoke, his words were revolutionary music to our ears: "Freedom with bread. Bread without terror." "A revolution neither red nor black, but Cuban olive-green." And so in Managua today: "Not [Soviet] Communism but Nicaraguan *Sandinismo*" is the formula Fidel's imitators proclaim.

Fidel's political poems put radicals all over the world under his spell. Jean-Paul Sartre wrote one of the first and most influential books of praise: "If this man asked me for the moon," he said, "I would give it to him. Because he would have a need for it."

When I listen to the enthusiasts for the Sandinista redeemers, the fate of a hero of the Cuban revolution comes to my mind. For in the year that Jean-Paul Sartre came to Havana and fell in love with the humanitarian Fidel, Huber Matos embarked on a long windowless night of the soul.

The fate of Huber Matos begins with the second revolution that Fidel launched.

All the fine gestures and words with which Fidel seduced us and won our support—the open Marxism, the socialist humanism, the independent path—turned out to be calculated lies. Even as he proclaimed his color to be olive-green, he was planning to make his revolution Moscow red.

So cynical was Fidel's strategy that at the time it was difficult for many to comprehend. One by

one Fidel began removing his own comrades from the revolutionary regime and replacing them with Cuban Communists.

Cuba's Communists were then a party in disgrace. They had opposed the revolution; they had even served in the cabinet of the tyrant Batista while the revolution was taking place!

But this was all incidental to Fidel. Fidel knew how to use people. And Fidel was planning a *new* revolution he could trust the Communists to support: he had decided to turn Cuba into a Soviet state. And Fidel also knew that he could no longer trust his own comrades, because they had made a revolution they thought was going to be Cuban olive-green.

Although Fidel removed socialists and the Sandinistas removed democrats, the pattern of betrayal has been the same.

To gain power the Sandinistas concealed their true intention (*a Soviet state*) behind a revolutionary lie (*a pluralist democracy*). To consolidate power they fashioned a second lie (*democracy, but only within the revolution*), and those who believed in the first lie were removed. At the end of the process there will be no democracy in Nicaragua at all, which is exactly what Fonseca and the Sandinistas intended when they began.

When Huber Matos saw Fidel's strategy unfolding in Cuba, he got on the telephone with other Fidelistas to discuss what they should do. This was a mistake. In the first year of Cuba's liberation, the phones of revolutionary legends like Huber Matos were already tapped by Fidel's secret police. Huber Matos was arrested.

In the bad old days of Batista oppression, Fidel had been arrested himself. His crime was not words on a telephone, but leading an attack on a military barracks to overthrow the Batista regime. Twelve people were killed. For this Fidel spent a total of eighteen months in the tyrant's jail before being released.

Huber Matos was not so lucky. Fidel was no Batista, and the revolution that had overthrown Batista was no two-bit dictatorship. For his phone call, Huber Matos was tried in such secrecy that not even members of the government were privy to the proceeding. When it was over, he was sentenced to solitary confinement, in a cell without sunlight, for *twenty-two years*. And even as Fidel buried his former friend and comrade alive, he went on singing his songs of revolutionary humanism and justice.

MILAN KUNDERA reveals the meaning of this revolutionary parable of Huber Matos and Fidel. Recalling a French Communist who wrote poems for brotherhood while his friend was being murdered by the poet's comrades in Prague, Kundera says: "The hangman killed while the poet sang."

Kundera explains: "People like to say revolu-

tion is beautiful; it is only the terror arising from it which is evil. But this is not true. The evil is already present in the beautiful; hell is already contained in the dream of paradise. . . . To condemn Gulags is easy, but to reject the poetry which leads to the Gulag by way of paradise is as difficult as ever." Words to bear in mind today as we consider Nicaragua and its revolution of poets.

To believe in the revolutionary dream is the tragedy of its supporters; to exploit the dream is the talent of its dictators. Revolutionary cynicism, the source of this talent, is Fidel's most important teaching to his Sandinista disciples. This is the faculty that allows the *comandantes* to emulate Fidel himself: to be poets and hangmen at the same time. To promise democracy and organize repression, to attack imperialism and join an empire, to talk peace and plan war, to champion justice and deliver Nicaragua to a fraternity of inhumane, repressive, militarized, and economically crippled states.

"We used to have one main prison, now we have many," begins the lament of Carlos Franqui, a former Fidelista, for the paradise that Nicaragua has now gained. "We used to have a few barracks; now we have many. We used to have many plantations; now we have only one, and it belongs to Fidel. Who enjoys the fruits of the revolution, the houses of the rich, the luxuries of the rich? The *comandante* and his court."

To this grim accounting must be added the economic ruin that Fidel's Marxism has wrought. Among the proven failures of the Marxist promise, this is the most fateful of all. The failure of Marxist economies to satisfy basic needs, let alone compete with the productive capitalisms of the West, has produced the military-industrial police states which call themselves socialist today. Nicaragua, with its Sandinista-created economic crisis and its massive military build-up, is but the latest example of this pattern.

Twenty-five years ago we on the Left applauded when Fidel denounced Cuba's one-crop economy and claimed that U.S. imperialism was the cause of the nation's economic plight. It seemed so self-evident. Cuba was a fertile island with a favorable climate, but U.S. sugar plantations had monopolized its arable land, and the sugar produced was a product for export, not a food for Cubans. The poor of Cuba had been sacrificed on the altar of imperialist profit. Whenever we were confronted by the political costs Castro's revolution might entail, we were confident that this gain alone—Cuba's freedom to grow food for Cubans—would make any sacrifice worthwhile. The same illusion—that the revolution will mean better lives for Nicaragua's poor—underlies every defense of the Sandinistas today.

It is nearly three decades since Cuba's liberation, and Cuba is still a one-crop economy.

But the primary market for its sugar is now the Soviet Union instead of the United States. Along with this have come other economic differences as well. Cuba's external debt is now *200 times* what it was when Fidel took power. And it would be far greater if the Communist *caudillo* had not mortgaged his country to his Soviet patron. So bankrupt is the economy Castro has created that it requires a Soviet subsidy of over \$4 billion a year, one-quarter of the entire national income, to keep it afloat. Before the revolution, Cubans enjoyed the highest per-capita income in Latin America. Now they are economic prisoners of permanent rationing and chronic shortages in even the most basic necessities. The allotted rations tell a story in themselves: two pounds of meat per citizen per month; 20 percent less clothing than the allotment a decade earlier; and in rice, a basic staple of Cuba's poor, *half* the yearly consumption under the old Batista regime.

The idea that Marxist revolution will mean economic benefit for the poor has proved to be the most deadly illusion of all. It is *because* Marxist economies *cannot* satisfy economic needs—not even at the levels of the miserably corrupt capitalisms of Batista and Somoza—that Marxist states require permanent repression to stifle unrest and permanent enemies to saddle with the blame.

THIS is also why Castro has found a new national product to supply to the Soviet market (a product his Sandinista disciples are in the process of developing in their turn). The product is the Cuban nation itself, as a military base for Soviet expansion.

The event that sealed the contract for this development was the moment of America's defeat in Vietnam in April 1975. This defeat resulted in America's effective withdrawal from the crucial role it had played since 1945, as the guardian of the international status quo and the keeper of its peace.

To the Soviet imperialists, America's loss was an opportunity gained. In 1975 the Kremlin began what would soon be a tenfold increase in the aid it had been providing to Cuba. Most of the aid was of military intent. Toward the end of the year, 36,000 Cuban troops surfaced in Africa, as an interventionary force in Angola's civil war. Soviet aid to Cuba tripled and then quintupled as Castro sent another 12,000 Cuban troops to provide a palace guard for Ethiopia's new dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had thrown himself into the Soviet embrace with a campaign which he officially called his "Red Terror." A year after his henchmen had murdered virtually the entire graduating class of the high schools of Addis Ababa—just the most poignant of Mengistu's 100,000 victims—Fidel presented him with a Bay of Pigs medal, Cuban socialism's highest award.

Ethiopia's dictator is only one of the international heroes who regularly pass through the Cuban base to be celebrated, trained, and integrated into a network of subversion and terror that has come to span every continent of the globe. And in the Sandinista revolution Fidel's colonial plantation has produced its most profitable return: an opportunity for Moscow to expand its investment to the American land mass itself.

Nicaragua is now in the grip of utterly cynical and utterly ruthless men, exceeding even their sponsors in aggressive hostility to the United States. The Soviets may be the covert patrons of the world's terrorist plague, but not even they have had the temerity to embrace publicly the assassin Qaddafi as a "brother" the way the Sandinistas have. The aim of the Sandinista revolution is to crush its society from top to bottom, to institute totalitarian rule, and to use the country as a base to spread Communist terror and Communist regimes throughout the hemisphere.

The Sandinista anthem which proclaims the Yankee to be the "enemy of mankind" expresses precisely the revolutionaries' sentiment and goal. That goal is hardly to create a more just society—the sordid record would dissuade any reformer from choosing the Communist path—but to destroy the societies still outside the totalitarian perimeter, and their chief protector, the United States.

Support for the *contras* is a first line of defense. For Nicaraguans, a *contra* victory would mean

the restoration of the democratic leadership from whom the Sandinistas stole the revolution in the first place, the government that Nicaragua would have had if Cuba had not intervened. For the countries of the Americas, it would mean a halt in the Communist march that threatens their freedoms and their peace.

IN CONCLUSION, I would like to say this to my former comrades and successors on the Left: you are self-righteous and blind in your belief that you are part of a movement to advance human progress and liberate mankind. You are in fact in league with the darkest and most reactionary forces of the modern world, whose legacies—as the record attests—are atrocities and oppressions on a scale unknown in the human past. It is no accident that radicals in power have slaughtered so many of their own people. Hatred of self, and by extension one's country, is the root of the radical cause.

As American radicals, the most egregious sin you commit is to betray the privileges and freedoms ordinary people from all over the world have created in this country—privileges and freedoms that ordinary people all over the world would feel blessed to have themselves. But the worst of it is this: you betray all this tangible good that you can see around you for a socialist pie-in-the-sky that has meant horrible deaths and miserable lives for the hundreds of millions who have so far fallen under its sway.

Where Arabism and Zionism Differ

Elie Kedourie

ARABISM and Zionism are ideologies. In other words, they offer a blueprint for political action based on historical arguments which purport to establish the true character of, respectively, Arabs and Jews. They are, then, nationalist ideologies.

Nationalism, generally, gives an account of human society, and a vision of the good life based on it. For nationalism, the primordial human reality is the nation. The nation, it holds, produces national values. One, but only one, among these many national values, the product of the national genius, which identify and help to preserve a nation, is that nation's religion. For nationalism, also, a national religion has simply instrumental value, and the truth of a religion is subordinate to its value as the badge or emblem of the nation.

There is, then, *prima facie* a conflict between religion—as religion views itself—and nationalism. For a religion, the supreme consideration is the claim that it is true, not whether it can serve to provide a sense of identity and continuity to a group such as the nation. Still less is religion disposed to look upon itself as the mere product of the genius of a nation. Again, for monotheistic religions like Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, belief in a divine revelation is taken for granted by the believer, to whom it does not occur that it could be questioned. Believers refuse to see their religion diminished by allegations—such as those made by some writers of the European Enlightenment—that it is a deliberate fraud concocted by priests in the service of kings, or an unconscious piece of fetishism, as Feuerbach and his follower Marx claimed, or the product of hidden psychological drives, as Freud argued. Nationalism, we may note in passing, comes from the same intellectual stable as these modern European ideologies.

Such being the believer's outlook, there is incompatibility and conflict between religion and nationalism. But to leave matters there is not adequate or satisfactory. Religion is, typically, not

simply a belief, or a rule, or a practice followed by isolated solitaries like the cenobites. It is rather a social affair: religion is postulated upon, and assumes, a community of believers. Moreover, religious beliefs held in common do generate—even if this is not their primary purpose—the social cohesion and solidarity on which nationalism itself relies. They do constitute a badge of group identity such as nationalism desiderates for the nation. Thus—to take a clear contemporary example—the social cohesion generated by the Greek Orthodox faith provides a basis for *enosis*, i.e., the argument that the Greeks of Cyprus are part of the Greek nation and should become part of the Greek state. Here, to be Greek, and to be an adherent of the Greek Orthodox faith, seem to be interchangeable, if not identical, states of being.

This leads to the conclusion that between religion and nationalism the relation is not always one of outright opposition and conflict. Religion and nationalism may be seen, rather, as linked in a dialectical relation, now opposing and now supporting one another.

The relation between Islam and Arab nationalism further illustrates and clarifies this dialectical relation. The ideology of Arab nationalism derives from precisely that European thought of the Enlightenment and the first half of the 19th century which made revealed religion problematic for its traditional and hitherto uncomplicated believers. The same development may be seen when Arab nationalism began to impinge on traditional Islam.

Islam had been the focus of loyalty for Muslims who believed that they could lead a fully Islamic life only in a Muslim state ruled by Muslims. The only Muslim theory of politics is that of the Caliphate or Imamate—namely, that the Muslim *umma*, or community, should be under one ruler who is the apostolic successor of the Prophet. It is of course the case that the theory quickly ceased to be true in practice, since there came to be, fairly early in Islamic history, more than one Muslim ruler. The theory, however, did not take—did not know how to take—cognizance of this state of affairs. It is thus striking that until the very end of the Ottoman empire, a Muslim who came from

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Carlucci Denies Columnists' Report

Frank C. Carlucci, the new White House national security adviser, yesterday issued a statement denying a report by columnists Jack Anderson and Dale van Atta that Carlucci had expressed the view that the rebels fighting Nicaragua's Sandinista government cannot win.

A spokesman for Carlucci said he "never held or expressed the opinion that the contras couldn't succeed. He strongly endorses the president's position of support to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua."

The column, which appears in today's Washington Post on Page C11, reports that Carlucci told a Jan. 5 meeting of the NSC staff that "I don't see how the contras can win. We need a serious review of our policy now."

A White House official said yesterday that Carlucci requested a briefing on Nicaragua when he took over as NSC director this month but that no review was under way that would foreshadow a change in administration policy of supporting the contras.

JACK ANDERSON and DALE VAN ATTA

Carlucci Signals New Policy on Contras

The bell tolled for the Nicaraguan contras last week at a secret meeting of the National Security Council. The anti-Sandinista rebels should start looking somewhere besides Washington for funds to continue their desultory, five-year insurrection against the Marxist regime in Managua.

It was Jan. 5, and the NSC staff had been summoned for its first meeting with the new boss, Frank C. Carlucci. According to sources who were present, the first words out of Carlucci's mouth were: "I don't see how the contras can win. We need a serious review of our policy now."

As the president's new national security adviser, Carlucci presumably spoke with the authority of the Oval Office behind him. So his remark confirmed a policy change that began with the forced resignation of Carlucci's predecessor, Vice Adm. John M. Poindexter, for his role in the sale of arms to Iran and diversion of the profits to aid the contras.

The effect of Carlucci's verbal bombshell on the NSC staff was revealing. Many breathed a sigh of relief, according to our sources. The "review of our policy" promised a return to sanity, as one staffer put it, a welcome end to the harum-scarum days when Poindexter and his deputy, Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, were playing cowboys and Indians in the White House basement.

There is more in Carlucci's appointment that comforts the devastated NSC staff. He is the first real pro that President Reagan has put in the job. The first national security adviser, Richard V. Allen, lacked clout; the second, William P. Clark,

had the president's confidence but was a fish out of water in the foreign policy area.

The president then went the "deputy" route, giving the job to Clark's second in command, Robert C. McFarlane, an inveterate staff officer unaccustomed to the heady air at the top. McFarlane's poor judgment belatedly became evident from revelations of his role in the Iran/contra fiasco.

When McFarlane quit in frustration, he was succeeded by his deputy, Poindexter. A cautious man not given to rocking boats, the admiral tried to get rid of the rambunctious North, but was overruled.

Carlucci has the crucial qualities that his predecessors lacked: political smarts that tell him what will fly in Washington and what won't. He has had broad and deep experience in both foreign policy and administration. He is a staunch but pragmatic anticommunist.

Carlucci has friends and respect on both sides of the aisle in Congress, and has served Democratic and Republican presidents.

All this is what makes Carlucci's apparent view of the contras so significant. In the past, congressional disenchantment with the Nicaraguan rebels led to a cutoff of funds. The NSC's response was to get money to the contras in secret defiance of Congress' expressed wishes.

At the very least, no such end-around play will come out of Carlucci's National Security Council.

But Carlucci's opening statement to his staff and his general attitude suggest that he is ready to dump the contras at the first opportunity.



*Anti
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Special Edition

February 1987

ADL A periodic update from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—Civil Rights Division

William Pierce & The Neo-Nazi Church

Since the beginning of 1986, after federal law enforcement and the courts had drawn a curtain on the violent crime spree in the Pacific Northwest perpetrated by the gang of right-wing extremists called "The Order," considerable interest has focused on the activities of William L. Pierce, an advocate of a Nazi takeover of America and the author of a political novel that inspired the thugs of The Order in their terrorism.

Pierce has established a compound on tax-exempt property in the mountain wilderness of West Virginia. He has described his "Cosmotheist Community Church" as a place to "train a new generation to pick up the torch and become warriors for our cause."

Connections With The Order

The crimes of The Order included murders, robberies, counterfeiting, and the bombing of a synagogue. After a Seattle bank robbery in 1983, the terrorist gang's leader, Robert Mathews, had told an acquaintance that he was the robber and that the American Nazi revolution depicted in Pierce's novel had now begun. Mathews, who died in a fire resulting from a shootout with FBI agents in 1984, had been a Pacific Northwest representative of Pierce's own organization, the Arlington, Virginia-based neo-Nazi propaganda apparatus called the National Alliance. The Order itself was, in fact, founded by people from the National Alliance and from the extremist Aryan Nations organization of Hayden Lake, Idaho.

William Pierce's book, *The Turner Diaries*, written under the pseudonym "Andrew Macdonald" and published in 1978, fantasized an overthrow of the American government by far rightists who systematically kill Jews and blacks, destroy Israel (which they identify as the real foreign enemy), and ultimately establish an "Aryan" world. The fiery death of the real-life Aryan warrior Mathews did not diminish the author's enthusiasm for the cause. Pierce's publication *National Vanguard* praised The Order for having "set its sights on a full-scale, armed revolution, ending with the purification of the U.S. population and the institution of a race-based



authoritarian government." The editorial asked: "... how will the Jews cope with the man who does not fear them and is willing, even glad, to give his life in order to hurt them? What will they do when a hundred good men rise to take Robert Mathews' place?"

Pierce's 'Kampf'

That William L. Pierce, holder of a Ph.D. in Physics and a former university professor, might take Mathews' place—at least as a racist ideologue of some interest—should not be surprising; he has been active through the two decades since the American Nazi fuhrer George Lincoln Rockwell, recognizing him as "an idealist," first tapped his talents.

NATIONAL VANGUARD

Toward a New Consciousness, a New Order, a New People.

The symbol which appears in the NATIONAL VANGUARD logotype is the Life Rune. It comes from an ancient alphabet, or futhark, used in northern Europe for many centuries before the general adoption of the Roman alphabet there. The Life Rune signifies life, creation, birth, rebirth, and renewal. It expresses in a single symbol the *raison d'être* of the National Alliance.

Pierce, a native of Atlanta now in his early fifties, went from three years of teaching at Oregon State University and a later position as a laboratory researcher (to give himself "more free time for writing") into a brief career in the sale of guns, through which he hoped to attract "those persons most likely to be responsive to my ideological message." That message brought Pierce into an association with Rockwell in 1967, when he was named editor of the *National Socialist World*, a quarterly published by Rockwell's World Union of National Socialists. When Rockwell was assassinated later that year, William Pierce emerged as one of the leaders of the American Nazi Party—subsequently named the National Socialist White People's Party—and became its Assistant Executive Officer in 1968.

Pierce left the Party in 1970 and became active with the National Youth Alliance (NYA), a group with half-concealed Hitlerian trimmings that was then run behind the scenes by Willis Carto, the head of Washington's ultra-right, anti-Jewish Liberty Lobby. The NYA described itself as a "fighting" movement determined to "liquidate the enemies of the American people."

Pierce eventually wrested control of the NYA from Carto, and in 1974 he turned it into his own creature, the National Alliance, with more flagrantly neo-Nazi aims. For more than a decade now, the National Alliance and its bi-monthly *National Vanguard* have been, respectively, Pierce's base of operations and his voice. The magazine is published under the inscription "Toward a New Consciousness; a New Order; a New People." The National Alliance promotes a vast array of racist and anti-Semitic materials from publishers and organizations of America's neo-Nazi network. Its own National Vanguard Books, propagating themes such as "Western History," "Communism and Zionism," and "Race," has offered for sale, among other such books, *The International Jew*, Francis Parker Yockey's massive justification of Hitlerian racism called *Imperium*, and Hitler's *Mein Kampf* itself.

Violence and 'Education'

In 1978 the Internal Revenue Service denied tax-exempt status to the National Alliance, ruling that the organization's publications did not meet the IRS code's definition of "educational." Pierce's organization appealed the ruling, claiming that free speech automatically qualified its materials as educational. In 1981 a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT	
No. 81-1899	No. 81-1900
NATIONAL ALLIANCE,	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,	Defendant-Appellant,
v.	v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	NATIONAL ALLIANCE,
Defendant-Appellee.	Plaintiff-Appellee.
ON CROSS-APPEALS FROM AN ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, THE ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, AND THE NAACP AS AMICI CURIAE	

federal district court ruled that the IRS definition of "educational" was too vague and sent the case back to the IRS for further proceedings. Early in 1983 an *amicus* brief was filed before a U.S. appellate court by the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Congress and the NAACP in support of the original IRS ruling, and in June, 1983 the court ruled that the National Alliance was indeed not educational, that it did

not qualify for tax exemption because its publications were "far outside the range Congress would have intended" for such exemption.

The court noted that William Pierce's organization "appeals for action, including violence" to injure members of "named racial, religious, or ethnic groups," and added that National Alliance published materials "cannot reasonably be considered intellectual exposition."

The 'Cosmotheist' Church

In the latter part of 1985, William Pierce moved the base of his operations to a remote 345-acre site in Mill Point, West Virginia which had been purchased for \$95,000 cash and received tax-exempt status as a "religious" property. Pierce has denied receiving any of the more than \$4 million in loot from bank and armored car robberies committed by the terrorists of The Order. (Federal authorities have said that some \$750,000 of the unrecovered monies were distributed among leaders of various white racist groups.)

The property in the hills of Pocahontas County belongs to the Cosmotheist Community, which is described as a "church" and lists William Pierce as trustee. Pierce told the Roanoke Virginia *Times and World News* that his church is non-Christian and believes in a "natural" god (presumably in contrast to a supernatural one). He has also stated that the church will concern itself with "the fitness of our race for survival," and that the intention is to train "warriors for our cause."

Considering the "cause" that William L. Pierce has championed throughout his career, claims of tax-exemption come sharply into question. The Anti-Defamation League has written to the IRS Commissioner calling for a federal investigation. The Question: Is Pierce's National Alliance, having been denied an "educational" tax exemption, now using his church's tax-exempt status in its use of land as a device to fund and train his "warriors" in racist violence?



Special Edition

October 1986



A periodic update from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—Civil Rights Division


The John Brown Anti-Klan Committee

It sounds like a good bet.

Don't bet on it. While it ostensibly opposes the tactics of Ku Klux Klanism and promotes itself as a reliable source of information on such extreme right-wing activity, the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee (JBAKC) actually promotes racism and advocates organized violence—as does the KKK itself. It proclaims law enforcement to be its enemy, supports racial revolution, and aligns itself closely with some of the most dangerous radical elements in the U.S.

The JBAKC ties the Klan to "Zionism" in a world view containing clear anti-Semitic innuendo, and its "National Program" declares that "the fight against white supremacy in the U.S. cannot proceed on a principled basis without struggling against Zionism."

The JBAKC, which has its national office in New York City and claims chapters in 13 states, has been identified by law enforcement officials as a front for the May 19 Communist Organization, an above-ground offshoot of the Weather Underground, the violent group organized in 1969 to begin "armed struggle against the state." The JBAKC also makes common cause with the




New Afrikan People's Organization, a revolutionary black separatist apparatus which grew out of support activities for terrorists apprehended in connection with the 1981 Brinks truck armed robbery and murders.

The JBAKC Tactics

The Klans, the neo-Nazis and other extremists of white racism attempt to exploit and heighten racial tensions to promote their own ideologies; similarly the John Brown Anti-Klan Committee exaggerates the strength and influence of the KKK in order to indict all of society with the taint of Klanlike racism.

NAZIS OUT OF YORKTOWN HIGH!

**DEATH TO THE KLAN
AND NAZIS!**



DEMONSTRATE

SAT. NOV. 5th 6:30 p.m.

YORKTOWN H.S. 5201 28th N., ARLINGTON

A particularly pernicious tactic has been the JBAKC's attempts to spark actual physical confrontations with Klan members in an effort to place law enforcement officials in the position of "protecting" the hooded Kluxers. A typical tactic is for members of the JBAKC to instigate violence, then condemn the police and other city officials as being sympathetic to KKK goals.

Revolutionary Politics

One of JBAKC's "Principles of Unity" as outlined in its newsletter, *Death to the Klan* (Jan.-Feb., 1981), says that the use of the Klan is "a major way the U.S. has always oppressed Third World people within its borders." Therefore, as the JBAKC sees it, those who use violence against public authorities are not terrorists but a resistance movement worthy of support.

Special Edition

September 1986



A periodic update from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—Civil Rights Division

"Extremism Targets the Prisons"

Organized political extremists in the United States—the radicals of both the Right and Left—have set the nation's prison population in their sights, eyeing a potential new target for agitation and for recruitment. They are seeking out some of the most violent people in our society as soldiers in their causes.

In recent years the numbers and the clout of the extremist organizations in the U.S. have declined. One reason: some of the most zealous Klansmen and neo-Nazis and members of such groups as The Order, the Black Liberation Army, and the Weather Underground have been convicted and imprisoned for such crimes as armed robbery, murder and bombings. Thus, increased extremist activity in the prisons is connected rather ominously with its decline on the outside.

The Rationale and the Gangs

Prison inmates are seen as having little to lose; their stake in the established order is minimal. Many bear grudges against the forces of law and the society they protect. Many such prisoners are viewed as victims of racial oppression, thus likely to be receptive to revolutionary ideas and stimuli of racial conflict.

There is a ready constituency for the extremists in the form of violence-prone prison gangs. The Department of Justice has tabulated 114 gangs in U.S. prisons and reports that membership is based on race and is usually connected with racist beliefs—examples, the Black Guerrilla Family and the white supremacist Aryan Brotherhood. With racial tensions running high in our penal institutions, the offers of organized bigotry find many takers.



"Prisons: Fortresses of Repression"


Connections between extremist groups and the gangs have been verified. Of concern is that inmates with such connections have already engaged in lawlessness and that many of the recruiting organizations themselves have records of criminal behavior. The histories of certain far-right and far-left factions show that those members originally recruited in prisons are among their most violent activists. For instance, Gary Yarbrough, now serving a 60-year sentence for his part in crimes committed by The Order,

was originally recruited into the Klan-Nazi hate networks during an earlier imprisonment.

A still more disturbing aspect is that, with the United States a declared target of world terrorist movements, some of the radicals of the Left now recruiting in the prisons have links with such forces—e.g., Libya and the PLO.

The Armor of Religion

An incentive for prison gang members to affiliate with outside extremists is provided by "churches" organized by some radical groups to enable incarcerated members to claim privileges enjoyed by regular church-going inmates. Thus, prisoners have joined the Aryan Nations organization's "church," the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, which espouses the so-called "Identity" doctrine that holds "Aryans" to be the "true Israel," Jews to be the "seed of Satan" and non-whites to be sub-human. Prison members of this "church" have demanded the right to conduct Identity "services" with visits from Identity "pastors." Correction departments in several states have refused such demands. The Aryan Nations leader, "Pastor" Richard Butler (he extols Hitler and advocates the founding of a white racist state in the Northwest) awaits two pending court decisions on freedom for his "religion" behind bars.



Aryan Nations Emblem

At the other end of the spectrum, members of El-Rukn, a powerful, violent black crime syndicate which has close relations with Nation of Islam hatemonger Louis Farrakhan, lost a suit against the Illinois Department of Corrections. They sought recognition as a religion in order to hold "worship services" in prisons, a privilege denied them on the grounds that their services would threaten prison security.

"At War With Society"

The most active right-wing "prison ministry" is conducted by Robert Miles, former national "chaplain" and Michigan Grand Dragon of the United Klans of America, a man who has been on both sides of the prison walls and who believes that "a new political minority is being created" from the pool of convicted criminals. Miles,

"Pastor" of the Mountain Church, headquartered at his Michigan farm, has been described as the "spiritual leader" of the hate movement in the U.S., whose other group chieftains meet with Miles several times a year at his farm to plan strategy.

Robert Miles served six years in a federal penitentiary in the 1970s for conspiracy to bomb school buses and to tar and feather a school principal. Since his release he has directed much of his "church" resources to regular



correspondence, visits, and mailings of newsletters to prisoners with white supremacist views—prisoners he regards as "members of the folk and faith" who are victims of a conspiratorial

building of a sovereign socialist Black nation" on U.S. territory, the land to be acquired "by any means necessary."

The NAPO grew out of support activities for the domestic terrorists of the Black Liberation Army and the Republic of New Afrika who had been apprehended in connection with the 1981 Brinks robbery and murders in New York State. Such prisoners, NAPO declares, are "Freedom Fighters" engaged in "armed struggle against the American Empire."

Another organization, the New York-based Committee to Fight Repression, is composed of white revolutionaries. It promotes the view and supports the imprisoned members of a range of violent Leftist groups involved in criminal activity.

Among such groups are the African People's Socialist Party, which demands "the immediate and unconditional

The Larouche Propaganda and Political Network



Lyndon LaRouche

The cult-like network of organizations led by Lyndon H. LaRouche has made concerted efforts to penetrate rural communities and farm organizations by projecting doom-filled prophecies of an impending world-wide agricultural collapse and mass starvation. A LaRouche front group, the Schiller Institute, has attempted to sign up farmers at propaganda meetings held in rural communities throughout the midwest. In recent years, LaRouche and his organization have published wild charges linking the FBI and Jews—particularly the ADL—with underworld conspiracies involving the Queen of England, drug trafficking, and political assassinations.

The Anti-Defamation League has been monitoring the efforts of these and other radical groups, and has concluded that while they are cause for concern, they have been largely unsuccessful in their efforts to sell bigotry and extremism to farmers. This conclusion was confirmed by a recent Harris poll conducted in Iowa and Nebraska.

According to the poll, anti-Jewish prejudice still exists in rural America, but it has not risen noticeably, and farmers are not blaming religious minorities for their economic woes.

Several important factors have impeded the growth of extremist ideologies among farmers:

**Leaders of mainstream farm organizations have distanced themselves from extremist group representatives.*

**The recent significant law enforcement crackdowns on several hate groups have sent a strong message to those who would affiliate with extremists.*

**Concerned farm, church, and community organizations—like the ADL—have worked cooperatively to expose the extremists and repudiate their message of bigotry.*

**Most important of all, the overwhelming majority of American farmers are too decent and sensible to fall for the propaganda of bigotry and hatred.*

The following related reports are available from ADL:

- The American Farmer and the Extremists
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- The Populist Party: The Politics of Right-Wing Extremism
- The LaRouche Political Cult: Packaging Extremism
- Extremism on the Right: A Handbook (\$5)

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH

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ADL MIDWESTERN REGIONAL OFFICES

Special Edition

June 1986



A periodic update from the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith—Civil Rights Division

Extremist Group Outreach to Rural Americans

Over the past eighteen months, many midwestern farmers have faced desperate economic situations attempting to hold onto farms which may have been in their families for generations. They are frustrated, confused and angry. Using this situation, extremist groups such as the following have made concerted efforts to route this anger toward bigotry and hatred.

The Populist Party

The Populist Party is a new political amalgam of the far-right, launched to promote the agenda of long-time anti-Semite Willis Carto and his Washington, D.C.-based Liberty Lobby—the most professional and sophisticated anti-Jewish propaganda organization in America. Liberty Lobby's publication, *The Spotlight*, has been a principal publicity organ for the Populist Party, announcing local meetings and devoting a marked increase in attention to farm issues in recent months. *Spotlight* readers are viewed as prime candidates for Party membership. The Populist Party has been the major right-wing extremist organization attempting to exploit the farm crisis.

Heritage Library


The Heritage Library is a Velma, Oklahoma-based paramilitary group whose leader, Lawrence L. Humphreys, has poured much of his five million dollar oil and banking inheritance into the organization since its inception in 1982. Humphreys' organization adheres to the philosophy of the "Identity" movement, a pseudo-theology which preaches that Anglo-Saxons, not Jews, are the "true Israel" and the Chosen People. Vicious prejudice is a major component of this movement's theology of hate. Heritage Library literature promotes racial segregation and purports to expose an international Jewish "conspiracy."



Another bankrupt farm auction. Extremists try to channel troubled farmers' anger into bigotry.

On November 15, 1985, approximately twenty-five armed men led by Humphreys confronted a sheriff who was attempting to foreclose a farm in Cochran, Georgia. The momentary "success" of this tactic has been trumpeted by many extremist groups and publications and has suggested to some observers the serious potential danger of violence arising from attempts at its repetition elsewhere. In December and January, representatives of the Heritage Library sponsored meetings in Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Nebraska.

The Posse Comitatus



The Posse is an extremely radical organization of loosely-affiliated groups of armed vigilantes and survivalists in several states in the mid-west and west. This group—which has been classified as a domestic terrorist organization by the F.B.I.—has blamed Jews and the Federal government for the plight of American farmers and has encouraged farmers to defend their lands "with their lives." The Posse implements its philosophy through various forms of intimidation and harassment, including the open flaunting of weapons, disruption of court proceedings and nuisance lawsuits against public officials. A pamphlet entitled "The American Farmer: Twentieth Century Slave," written by James Wickstrom, the Posse's former self-proclaimed "national director of counterinsurgency," has received wide distribution in the midwest.

The National Agricultural Press Association (NAPA)

This organization, headed by Colorado resident Roderick (Rick) Elliot, has promoted quasi-legal, self-help responses to farm foreclosures along with the false promise of low-interest loans to farmers. NAPA has published several periodicals which combine articles on agricultural matters with others containing thinly-veiled religious bigotry. NAPA has been investigated by officials in Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Colorado and by the Minnesota and United States Departments of Agriculture. Elliot himself is currently facing twenty counts of theft and conspiracy in Colorado in connection with soliciting more than \$250,000 in loans he never repaid.

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333 So. 132 Street, Omaha, NE 68154 (402) 333-1303



Weinberger Letter Kicks Up Fuss:

One Panel Defers, Another OKs Fiscal 1988 NASA Authorization

A dispute over military use of the proposed U.S. space station has blocked House action on a nearly \$10 billion fiscal 1988 authorization bill for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

The conflict centers on an as-yet unnumbered bill now before the House Science, Space and Technology Subcommittee on Space. It would prohibit the deployment or testing of weapons on NASA's planned, permanently manned, orbiting space station. Military-related research, however, would be allowed.

The weapons ban would apply to President Reagan's controversial space-based strategic defense initiative, known as "star wars." Fiscal 1988 funding for the program would be cut under a House vote May 12.

Because of a strongly worded protest about the space station restric-

tions from Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, subcommittee Chairman Bill Nelson, D-Fla., delayed a May 12 markup of the NASA bill and indefinitely postponed another markup session the next day.

"We have some folks that are very upset with the Weinberger letter," Nelson said May 13. "It [the letter] has made it very difficult to reach agreement on the one outstanding portion of the bill, and that is [Pentagon] use of the space station."

A similar NASA authorization bill (S 1164), which did not contain restrictions on the space station, was approved by voice vote May 14 by the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee.

Last year, Reagan vetoed the fiscal 1987 NASA authorization bill because of disagreements with Congress

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MEDIA...from Pg. 9

refrain from using live ammunition during upcoming Soviet military exercises scheduled to occur off the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido. The 20 May Kyodo News Service report says Japan "reserves the right to demand compensation" should any accidents occur.

PHILIPPINES: Pres Corazon Aquino has signed an executive order establishing a "Citizens' Army" and abolishing the Home Defense Forces as mandated by the 1987 Philippine Constitution. A 19 May Far East Broadcasting Company broadcast says the new Citizens' Army militia will undergo military training and serve "as provided by law," but the regular armed forces will still provide for the security of the state.

(Summarized from transcripts provided by Foreign Broadcast Information Services. Complete texts available from SAF/AAR, 4C881)

DINGELL TAKES WEINBERGER TO TASK OVER TRW AUDIT

Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.) has asked Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger what he intends to do about TRW's "successful efforts to dilute the impact" of a critical Defense Contract Audit Agency comprehensive labor review of TRW operations at Redondo Beach, Calif.

Dingell told Weinberger in a May 7 letter that this was "another embarrassing example of how defense contractors have succeeded in strong-arming the Defense Contract Audit Agency into deflecting the impact of corporate wrongdoing."

Dingell said the audit, which identified "material weaknesses" of \$1 billion in labor charges, "apparently underwent a rather substantial transformation" after TRW executives paid a visit to the head of DCAA.

According to a TRW internal document obtained by Dingell's House subcommittee investigating defense procurement, the purpose of TRW's efforts was to "neutralize the effectiveness of the DCAA audit before the subcommittee hearings in early March."

According to the internal document, Dingell said, such terms as "overcharge," "mischarge" and "unacceptable" were dropped from the report.

Dingell said he understood that DCAA had originally raised concern about TRW's internal control weaknesses and potential for labor mischarging for almost a decade. The impact of this message was substantially reduced, Dingell said, when TRW pressured DCAA to change the tone of the report.

"We also learned that after TRW met with DCAA, \$30 million in unsupported labor charges mysteriously shrank to a mere \$1.1 million," Dingell said. "What happened?"

Dingell said this disclosure raises a number of questions about DCAA's apparent concessions to TRW's "strong arm tactics preventing them from independently and effectively monitoring defense contractors."

Dingell said he wanted to know why labor charges were reduced so drastically, what actions DOD has taken to prevent TRW ignoring DCAA's warnings about "substantial material weaknesses" for 10 years and what are the charging irregularities discovered in the labor audit which have been deleted from the report.

Dingell asked Weinberger to respond by June 1 how he plans to handle the TRW situation. This would be in time for hearings on TRW planned for this summer. A Weinberger spokesman could not be reached for comment.

Contra Aid Pays Off, Top U.S. General in Latin America Says

By RICHARD BOUDREAUX and MARJORIE MILLER, *Times Staff Writers*

PANAMA CITY—The commander of U.S. military forces in Latin America said U.S. support for the contras is the "cheapest and most effective way" to keep Nicaragua's Sandinista government from subverting its neighbors.

In an interview, Gen. John R. Galvin said U.S. assistance and training have transformed the Nicaraguan insurgents from "an absolutely ragged" band of rebels into a disciplined guerrilla force capable of winning the five-year-old war.

But he said the contras are under undue pressure to perform quickly to impress Congress before an expected September vote on \$105 million in new aid for next year.

"When you start telling a guerrilla that it has to be done quickly, it costs lives because the essence of guerrilla warfare is slow, careful planning," Galvin said.

"I don't think there's a contra out there that is not aware that he had better get some good action done by September. . . . That is why I hope we not only support the contras but we will give some indication that we're going to sustain that support for some time."

To Take Command of NATO

The 58-year-old four-star Army general spoke to The Times late Monday at his tropical hilltop headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command. He ends a two-year tour next month to become commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces and will be replaced here by Gen. Fred F. Woerner Jr.

During the two-hour interview, Galvin said a negative vote in Congress will be "a disaster for Central America," but he opposed direct U.S. military action against the Sandinistas. He acknowledged that the Iran-contra hearings in

Washington might affect the vote as much as the rebels' own performance, but he insisted that sustained funding is vital both as a sign of reliability to U.S. regional allies and as a deterrent to an expanded Soviet Bloc arsenal in Nicaragua.

"How long are we committed to stability in the Western Hemisphere?" he asked. "Just for this year? Or are we committed forever?"

The general made these other points:

—Human rights abuses in Central America are unevenly reported, with more emphasis on violations by the contras than on those by leftist Salvadoran guerrillas or the Sandinista government. "The atrocities in their bulk have been committed by the other side," he said.

—He personally inspected the Salvadoran army garrison at El Paraiso two weeks before guerrillas attacked it March 31. He found the base to be well protected but said the army "got cocky" and let its defenses down. He criticized the press for seizing on that raid as evidence of new guerrilla strength and underplaying an unsuccessful garrison attack by the rebels the following month.

—A Costa Rican plan to bring peace to Central America is "overly idealistic" because it calls for a cease-fire in Nicaragua before any concessions by the Sandinistas. The five Central American presidents are scheduled to meet next month to discuss the plan.

—Increased U.S. assistance is needed to keep foreign debts, leftist guerrillas and drug traffickers from undermining new democracies throughout Latin America. "If we don't get wise to the fact that these countries face a terrible threat," he said, "we'll end up living in a

hostile hemisphere."

The Southern Command oversees U.S. military operations in 16 Latin American countries. While the CIA and not the Pentagon directs the contras' insurgency, Galvin said he has twice visited Nicaraguan rebel camps in Honduras to monitor their progress.

The contras say they are fighting to overthrow the Marxist-led Sandinistas, who came to power in 1979 by defeating President Anastasio Somoza's National Guard in their own guerrilla insurgency.

Negotiations Sought

Galvin, like other U.S. officials, said the United States is backing the contras to try to force the Sandinistas to negotiate and adopt a more democratic system.

"I think the contras, if they are sustained, are capable of bringing about that kind of change," he said.

If U.S. aid stops, he added, "The contras won't have the wherewithal to fight at the levels they are now. The Sandinistas will have more time to undermine their neighbors, and that's what they will do."

"The contras are the cheapest and most effective way that we can achieve our goals and protect our allies in Central America. There's no way we could contain the Sandinistas at a cost of anything like \$100 million a year."

"It would cost 10 times that, at least," he said, to enlarge armies in neighboring countries and station more U.S. troops in the region. "But that would be barking up the wrong tree," he added, because the Sandinistas would attack with ideological "subversion" rather than conventional warfare, and "You cannot contain that by putting military forces on their border."

Since U.S. aid was resumed last October after a two-year cutoff, most of the contras have infiltrated back into Nicaragua from camps in Honduras. Galvin said 12,000 rebels are now in Nicaragua, twice the number the Sandinistas estimate.

He said the number of monthly clashes has risen from 125 two years ago to 300 now, with the contras sabotaging economic targets while avoiding large-scale combat with the Sandinista army.

"It's an entirely new war that's going on now," he said. "The contras are all over the place. They are learning to fight like guerrillas."

Noting that the Sandinista insurgency was 15 years old when it triumphed, Galvin said the contras need years to develop. But he contended that their ability to get food in rural areas of Nicaragua shows they already have a degree of popular support.

Throughout the war, the contras have been accused of stealing food and killing civilians with land mines and assaults on cooperative farms. Galvin said their recent U.S. training has emphasized a military code of conduct.

"We have not put pressure to stop them from using mines," he said. "We have put pressure to use them the right way. We've told them: 'If you use a mine, it is to be used to fight the enemy, not to fight women and children.'"

The general said the Soviet Union "is not anxious to become overly involved" in Nicaragua and would "back off" if the war turns in the contras' favor.

He also said the United States should not intervene with its own forces if the contras fail. "It is not something the present Administration, the Congress or the American people want," he said. "I don't think that's going to happen."

EUROPEAN MEDIA

STARK ATTACK: Western reaction to Iraq's air attack on the USS Stark in the Persian Gulf is reported widely in the European press. Belgium's 19 May *Le Soir* quotes defense expert Don Kerr as warning that a buildup of US, Soviet, British and French naval fleets in the Gulf will only "increase the risks of serious international incidents." In an article titled "Nightmare of a Wider Gulf War Edges a Step Closer," the *London Financial Times* suggests the attack may help increase peace

efforts in the region.

BRITAIN: The White House and State Dept are not happy with Sec/Def Caspar Weinberger's "persistent questioning" of the administration stance on eliminating US and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the *Independent* reports. Sec/State George Shultz favors leaving 100 such missiles on both sides at sites outside of Europe, "but Weinberger is against it," the 19 May newspaper notes.

FRANCE: *Le Figaro's* Henry de Kergorlay reports on the capabilities of the NATO Airborne

Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft based in Geilenkirchen, W. Germany. In a 19 May article titled "NATO's Flying Sentries," Kergorlay quotes base commander BG Hugh Cox, USAF as saying each of the 18 AWACS planes at Geilenkirchen is worth \$130 million. "Every now and then we have some sabotage attempts," Cox notes, "But so far nothing really serious (has happened to the AWACS)."

(Summarized from transcripts and translations provided by SHAPE Public Information Office. Source text available from SAF/AAR, 4C881)

WASHINGTON POST 21 MAY 1987 Pg. 21

State Dept. Closing In On Foggy Bottom HQ

GSA Clears Long-Sought Consolidation

By Judith Havemann
Washington Post Staff Writer

The State Department's 15,000 Washington area employees were promised an implosion yesterday, a consolidation of 26 widely separated offices into six major sites, most of them located near State's headquarters in Foggy Bottom.

The General Services Administration and the department signed a memorandum of understanding yesterday agreeing to speedily concentrate most office activities of State and the Agency for International Development in or near the main building.

"Most importantly, from the standpoint of the public," said GSA Administrator Terence C. Golden, "this will save \$123 million in rental costs and management expenses over the next 30 years and will increase efficiency and provide for greatly improved security."

"There will be additional savings," said Secretary of State

George P. Shultz, "just in the time people spend going from place to place."

The State Department has been seeking centralized quarters for more than 40 years, according to Richard C. Faulk, deputy assistant secretary for operations in the Bureau of Administration and Security. "In 1948 we had 27 locations. Today we have 26, and in the meantime we built the biggest part of the main building. I hope we can keep the ball rolling."

GSA announced plans to construct a new building for State at 2121 Virginia Ave. NW; to give it permanent rights to State Annex No. 2 at 515 22nd St. NW; to relocate the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Bureau of Mines from Columbia Plaza at 2401 E St. NW and renovate that building for State Department occupancy; and to relocate Central Intelligence Agency offices at 2430 E St. NW to newly enlarged quarters in Langley so its building also can

be used by State.

In addition, GSA said last fall that it would build a new Foreign Affairs Training Center at the old Arlington Hall Army Intelligence Center in Arlington. This will house the Foreign Service Institute—now located in four leased buildings in Rosslyn—and a new Bureau of Diplomatic Security training center.

About \$20 million of the estimated savings will come from reduced lease payments because most of the department's employees will be working in government-owned buildings, Golden said.

GSA said it has already spent \$15 million improving the main State Department building during the last five years, and additional major renovations are scheduled that could cost \$40 million. They will include improvements to the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems, the electrical systems and elevators, and purchases of any needed sprinklers and other fire safety devices.

Golden said the renovations at Columbia Plaza will include complete replacement of the heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems.

Approval of the Office of Management and Budget and of Congress must be obtained for both the Columbia Plaza and the Main State renovations.

WASHINGTON POST 21 MAY 1987 Pg. F-14

Deal With GSA Allows AT&T To Bid for Federal Contract

By Elizabeth Tucker
Washington Post Staff Writer

The General Services Administration and American Telephone & Telegraph Co. yesterday reached an agreement in a contracting dispute that will allow AT&T to bid on a \$4.5 billion contract to build a new telephone system for the federal government.

AT&T had protested terms of the telephone contract last week, saying it was impossible for a federally regulated phone company to bid on the massive project. Under the settlement, the deadlines for

bids has been extended from June 30 to July 30. GSA still plans to award the 10-year contract by the end of this year.

AT&T had complained that the GSA's bidding proposal excluded long-distance companies because it required a fixed-price contract that would not be subject to federal regulation. The Federal Communications Commission regulates AT&T long-distance rates.

The agreement between AT&T and the GSA will allow a bidder to offer either rates regulated by the FCC or a fixed-price contract. Yes-

terday's compromise restricts rate increases and permits the government to break the contract if the FCC orders AT&T to charge higher rates.

Jerry Thames, vice president of communications for Martin Marietta Corp., which has teamed with MCI Communications Corp. to compete for the contract, yesterday said the compromise was satisfactory but that the government still faces "potentially not having a fixed-price contract." The government would be unlikely to break a contract five years from now because of a rate hike, he said.

NEW YORK TIMES 21 MAY 1987 Pg.1

In Public, Praise for Contras; In Private, a Darker U.S. View

By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 20 — While American officials were publicly touting the virtues of the Nicaraguan rebel leaders, Government officials and other participants in the contras' private aid network viewed some leaders of the movement as wasteful, incompetent and possibly corrupt, according to Congressional testimony and documents.

Even as President Reagan was calling the contras "moral equivalents of the founding fathers," Lieut. Col. Oliver L. North, the dismissed National Security Council staff member, was getting a stream of reports from Robert W. Owen and other aides who had wholly different assessments.

Indeed, Government officials said today that Mr. Owen's letters to Colonel North in 1985 and 1986 provided a much more realistic picture of progress by the contras and of their internal political bickering than was given in Central Intelligence Agency reports of the same period. Other documents suggest that the Administration misled Congress in 1985 and 1986 with its assertions that the contras lacked military supplies.

Who Led the Contras?

As depicted by Mr. Owen and confirmed by Government officials directly involved in the program, the contra movement had only one leader: Adolfo Calero, the former Coca-Cola bottler turned revolutionary who appeared today before the Congressional committees investigating the Iran-contra affair.

Mr. Calero told the committee members that in 1985 he gave Colonel North \$90,000 in blank travelers' checks that could be cashed by the bearer. Congressional investigators said they had been unable to determine how Colonel North spent much of that money, and canceled checks show that he may have put some to his own use.

Mr. Owen's memos suggest that the other contra leaders — Alfonso Robelo and Arturo Cruz — were less-than-

equal partners added to the contra directorate to please Congress. That structure has since collapsed, amid complaints from Mr. Robelo and Mr. Cruz that they were unequal to Mr. Calero. A new contra leadership was announced this month with Mr. Calero retaining a pre-eminent position.

Mr. Owen's long, typed memos told Colonel North of charges circulating among the contras and their supporters of being victimized by "sweetheart deals," referring to arms transactions with retired Maj. Gen. Richard V. Secord. They detail how Mr. Calero rebuffed efforts by American officials to build up the power of Mr. Robelo and Mr. Cruz.

In a March 1986 memo to Colonel North, Mr. Owen called Mr. Calero a "creation" of the United States Government.

Edgar Chamorro, who was a member of the contra directorate until 1984, said the C.I.A. handpicked Mr. Calero as a contra leader in 1983 and predicted that he would be president of Nicaragua someday. Now, some United States officials who work with the contras say they are concerned that, should the contras ever attain power in Nicaragua, their leaders may be ill-suited to run the country.

Mr. Owen's memo, whose conclusions were endorsed by Government officials, said Mr. Calero surrounded himself with aides who were "liars and greed- and power-motivated," adding:

"This war has become a business to many of them. There is still a belief the Marines are going to have to invade, so let's get set so we will automatically be the ones put into in power."

In the same document, Mr. Owen wrote that Mr. Calero was a "strong man" and that if members of the United States Government "think they control Calero, they also have another thing coming." He went on: "The question should be asked, does Calero manipulate the U.S.G.? On several occasions, the answer is yes."

As for the contra aid package approved by Congress in 1986, Mr. Owen

wrote that without improvements, it "will be like pouring money down a sinkhole," and added: "Things will not get better, they will get worse. The heavy hand of the gringo is needed."

After Congress cut off aid in 1984, Colonel North arranged for money to be funneled directly to contra bank accounts from foreign contributors.

Colonel North, using the code name "Steelhammer," wrote to Mr. Calero, code-named "Friend," of a \$20 million contribution from a country that has since been identified as Saudi Arabia.

"Please do not in any way make anyone aware of the deposit," he said. "Too much is becoming known by too many people. We need to make sure that this new financing does not become known. The Congress must believe there continues to be an urgent need for funding."

Senator William S. Cohen, Republican of Maine, asked Mr. Calero today whether he was helping Colonel North mislead Congress. Mr. Calero said he did not recall receiving the letter.

Months after the Saudis' deposit, which went into the contras' bank accounts, Colonel North decided to take control of the money being donated on behalf of the rebels, according to testimony by General Secord and Mr. Owen. From that point on, money was funneled into various Swiss bank accounts, and airdrops to the contras were arranged with money controlled by General Secord and his business associate, Albert Hakim.

According to General Secord and Mr. Owen, the finances were reshuffled because of concerns about Mr. Calero's brother, Mário Calero, who was involved in buying supplies for the contras. Adolfo Calero has vigorously defended his brother from charges of corruption, saying American Government investigators have never proved such allegations. Instead, Mário Calero complained that the contras were being overcharged by General Secord.

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