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NATIONAL COUNCIL OF YOUNG ISRAEL

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ב"ה

June 18, 1986

SPECIAL DELIVERY

The Honorable Ronald Reagan
President
The United States of America
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

I am enclosing herewith a very interesting article which I thought would give you additional support for your build-up of our military position in the United States, and for your strong support for the Contras in Nicaragua. It is an excellent article and I think you would appreciate it.

I want you to know that I speak on behalf of our quarter of a million members in the National Council of Young Israel, and that we support you whole-heartedly on your foreign policy position regarding Nicaragua and your dealings with the Soviet Union.

Best wishes for your good health.

Cordially,

DR. HAROLD M. JACOBS
National President

HMJ:sb
enclosure

cc: Dr. Max Green

"והשיב לב אבות על בנים ולב בנים על אבותם"



Nicaragua: A Speech to My Former Comrades on the Left

David Horowitz

TWENTY-FIVE years ago I was one of the founders of the New Left. I was one of the organizers of the first political demonstrations on the Berkeley campus—and indeed on any campus—to protest our government's anti-Communist policies in Cuba and Vietnam. Tonight I come before you as the kind of man I used to tell myself I would never be: a supporter of President Reagan, a committed opponent of Communist rule in Nicaragua.

I offer no apologies for my present position. It was what I thought was the humanity of the Marxist *idea* that made me what I was then; it is the inhumanity of what I have seen to be the Marxist *reality* that has made me what I am now. If my former comrades who support the Sandinistas were to pause for a moment and then plunge their busy political minds into the human legacies of their activist pasts, they would instantly drown in an ocean of blood.

The issue before us is not whether it is morally right for the United States to arm the *contras*, or whether there are unpleasant men among them. Nor is it whether the United States should defer to the wisdom of the Contadora powers—more than thirty years ago the United States tried to overthrow Somoza, and it was the Contadora powers of the time who bailed him out.

The issue before us and before all people who cherish freedom is how to oppose a Soviet imperialism so vicious and so vast as to dwarf any previously known. An "ocean of blood" is no metaphor. As we speak here tonight, this empire—whose axis runs through Havana and now Managua—is killing hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians to consolidate a dictatorship whose policies against its black citizens make the South African government look civilized and humane.

DAVID HOROWITZ was the editor of *Ramparts* magazine and a founder of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. His early books include *Student* (1962) and *Empire and Revolution: A Radical Interpretation of Contemporary History* (1970). More recently he has been the co-author (with Peter Collier) of *The Rockefellers: An American Dynasty* and *The Kennedys: An American Drama*. A somewhat different version of the present article was read at Berkeley on April 4 at a conference entitled "U.S./Nicaragua: Exploring the Possibilities for Peace."

A second issue, especially important to me, is the credibility and commitment of the American Left.

In his speech on Nicaragua, President Reagan invoked the Truman Doctrine, the first attempt to oppose Soviet expansion through revolutionary surrogates. I marched against the Truman Doctrine in 1948, and defended, with the Left, the revolutions in Russia and China, in Eastern Europe and Cuba, in Cambodia and Vietnam—just as the Left defends the Sandinistas today.

And I remember the arguments and "facts" with which we made our case and what the other side said, too—the Presidents who came and went, and the anti-Communists on the Right, the William Buckleys and the Ronald Reagans. And in every case, without exception, time has proved the Left wrong. Wrong in its views of the revolutionaries' intentions, and wrong about the facts of their revolutionary rule. And just as consistently the anti-Communists were proved right.

Today the Left dismisses Reagan's warnings about Soviet expansion as anti-Communist paranoia, a threat to the peace, and a mask for American imperialism. We said the same things about Truman when he warned us then. Russia's control of Eastern Europe, we said, was only a defensive buffer, a temporary response to American power—first, because Russia had no nuclear weapons; and then, because it lacked the missiles to deliver them.

Today, the Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower, missiles and all, but it has not given up an inch of the empire which it gained during World War II—not Eastern Europe, not the Baltic states which Hitler delivered to Stalin and whose nationhood Stalin erased and which are now all but forgotten, not even the Kurile Islands which were once part of Japan.

Not only have the Soviets failed to relinquish their conquests in all these years—years of dramatic, total decolonization in the West—but their growing strength and the wounds of Vietnam have encouraged them to reach for more. South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Ethiopia, Yemen, Mozambique, and Angola are among the dominoes which have recently fallen into the Soviet orbit.

To expand its territorial core—which apologists still refer to as a “defensive perimeter”—Moscow has already slaughtered a million peasants in Afghanistan, an atrocity warmly endorsed by the Sandinista government.

Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega describes the army of the conquerors—whose scorched-earth policy has driven half the Afghan population from its homes—as the “pillar of peace” in the world today. To any self-respecting socialist, praise for such barbarism would be an inconceivable outrage—as it was to the former Sandinista, now *contra*, Edén Pastora. But praise for the barbarians is sincere tribute coming from the Sandinista rulers, because they see themselves as an integral part of the Soviet empire itself.

“THE struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting.” So writes the Czech novelist Milan Kundera, whose name and work no longer exist in his homeland.

In all the Americas, Fidel Castro was the only head of state to cheer the Soviet tanks as they rolled over the brave people of Prague. And cheering right along with Fidel were Carlos Fonseca, Tomas Borge, Humberto Ortega, and the other creators of the present Nicaraguan regime.

One way to assess what has happened in Nicaragua is to realize that wherever Soviet tanks crush freedom from now on, there will be two governments in the Americas supporting them all the way.

About its own crimes and for its own criminals, the Left has no memory at all.

To the Left I grew up in, along with the Sandinista founders, Stalin’s Russia was a socialist paradise, the model of the liberated future. Literacy to the uneducated, power to the weak, justice to the forgotten—we praised the Soviet Union then, just as the Left praises the Sandinistas now.

And just as they ignore warnings like the one that has come from Violetta Chamorro, the publisher of *La Prensa*, the paper which led the fight against Somoza, and a member of the original Sandinista junta—“With all my heart, I tell you it is worse here now than it was in the times of the Somoza dictatorship”—so we dismissed the anti-Soviet “lies” about Stalinist repression.

In the society we hailed as a new human dawn, 100 million people were put in slave-labor camps, in conditions rivaling Auschwitz and Buchenwald. Between 30 and 40 million people were killed—in peacetime, in the daily routine of socialist rule. While leftists applauded their progressive policies and guarded their frontiers, Soviet Marxists killed more peasants, more workers, and even more Communists than all the capitalist governments together since the beginning of time.

And for the entire duration of this nightmare, the William Buckleys and Ronald Reagans and

the other anti-Communists went on telling the world exactly what was happening. And all that time the pro-Soviet Left and its fellow-travelers went on denouncing them as reactionaries and liars, using the same contemptuous terms with which the Left attacks the President and his supporters today.

The Left would *still* be denying the Soviet atrocities if the perpetrators themselves had not finally acknowledged their crimes. In 1956, in a secret speech to the party elite, Khrushchev made the crimes a Communist fact; but it was only the CIA that actually made the fact public, allowing radicals to come to terms with what they had done.

Khrushchev and his cohorts could not have cared less about the misplaced faith and mispent lives of their naive supporters on the Left. The Soviet rulers were concerned about themselves: Stalin’s mania had spread the slaughter into his henchmen’s ranks; they wanted to make totalitarianism safe for its rulers. In place of a dictator whose paranoia could not be controlled, they instituted a dictatorship by directorate—which (not coincidentally) is the form of rule in Nicaragua today. Repression would work one way only: from the privileged top of society to the powerless bottom.

The year of Khrushchev’s speech—which is also the year Soviet tanks flattened the freedom fighters of Budapest—is the year that tells us who the Sandinistas really are.

Because the truth had to be admitted at last, the Left all over the world was forced to redefine itself in relation to the Soviet facts. China’s Communist leader Mao liked Stalin’s way better. Twenty-five million people died in the “great leaps” and “cultural revolutions” he then launched. In Europe and America, however, a new anti-Stalinist Left was born. This New Left, of which I was one of the founders, was repelled by the evils it was now forced to see, and embarrassed by the tarnish the Soviet totalitarians had brought to the socialist cause. It turned its back on the Soviet model of Stalin and his heirs.

But the Sandinista vanguard was neither embarrassed nor repelled. In 1957, Carlos Fonseca, the founding father of the Sandinista Front, visited the Soviet Union with its newly efficient totalitarian state. To Fonseca, as to Borge and his other comrades, the Soviet monstrosity was their revolutionary dream come true. In his pamphlet, *A Nicaraguan in Moscow*, Fonseca proclaimed Soviet Communism his model for Latin America’s revolutionary future.

This vision of a Soviet America is now being realized in Nicaragua. The *comandante* directorate, the army, and the secret police are already mirrors of the Soviet state—not only structurally but in their personnel, trained and often manned by agents of the Soviet axis.

BUT the most important figure in this transformation is not a Nicaraguan at all. For twenty years, from the time the Sandinistas first arrived in Havana, they were disciples of Fidel Castro. With his blessings they went on to Moscow, where Stalin's henchman completed their revolutionary course. Fidel is the image in which the Sandinista leadership has created itself and the author of its strategy. Its politburo, the *comandante* directorate, was personally created by Fidel in Havana on the eve of the final struggle, sealed with a pledge of millions in military aid. It was Fidel who supplied the arms with which the Sandinistas waged their battles, just as he supplied the Cuban general—Zenen Casals—who directed their victorious campaign (just as the Soviets supplied the general who directed Fidel's own victory at the Bay of Pigs). *Without Castro's intervention, Arturo Cruz and the other anti-Somoza and pro-democratic contras would be the government of Nicaragua today.*

And it was Fidel who showed the Sandinistas how to steal the revolution after the victory, and how to secure their theft by manipulating their most important allies: the American Left and its liberal sympathizers.

Twenty-five years ago Fidel was also a revolutionary hero to us on the New Left. Like today's campus radicals, we became "coffee-pickers" and passengers on the revolutionary tour, and we hailed the literacy campaigns, health clinics, and other wonders of the people's state.

When Fidel spoke, his words were revolutionary music to our ears: "Freedom with bread. Bread without terror." "A revolution neither red nor black, but Cuban olive-green." And so in Managua today: "Not [Soviet] Communism but Nicaraguan *Sandinismo*" is the formula Fidel's imitators proclaim.

Fidel's political poems put radicals all over the world under his spell. Jean-Paul Sartre wrote one of the first and most influential books of praise: "If this man asked me for the moon," he said, "I would give it to him. Because he would have a need for it."

When I listen to the enthusiasts for the Sandinista redeemers, the fate of a hero of the Cuban revolution comes to my mind. For in the year that Jean-Paul Sartre came to Havana and fell in love with the humanitarian Fidel, Huber Matos embarked on a long windowless night of the soul.

The fate of Huber Matos begins with the second revolution that Fidel launched.

All the fine gestures and words with which Fidel seduced us and won our support—the open Marxism, the socialist humanism, the independent path—turned out to be calculated lies. Even as he proclaimed his color to be olive-green, he was planning to make his revolution Moscow red.

So cynical was Fidel's strategy that at the time it was difficult for many to comprehend. One by

one Fidel began removing his own comrades from the revolutionary regime and replacing them with Cuban Communists.

Cuba's Communists were then a party in disgrace. They had opposed the revolution; they had even served in the cabinet of the tyrant Batista while the revolution was taking place!

But this was all incidental to Fidel. Fidel knew how to use people. And Fidel was planning a *new* revolution he could trust the Communists to support: he had decided to turn Cuba into a Soviet state. And Fidel also knew that he could no longer trust his own comrades, because they had made a revolution they thought was going to be Cuban olive-green.

Although Fidel removed socialists and the Sandinistas removed democrats, the pattern of betrayal has been the same.

To gain power the Sandinistas concealed their true intention (*a Soviet state*) behind a revolutionary lie (*a pluralist democracy*). To consolidate power they fashioned a second lie (*democracy, but only within the revolution*), and those who believed in the first lie were removed. At the end of the process there will be no democracy in Nicaragua at all, which is exactly what Fonseca and the Sandinistas intended when they began.

When Huber Matos saw Fidel's strategy unfolding in Cuba, he got on the telephone with other Fidelistas to discuss what they should do. This was a mistake. In the first year of Cuba's liberation, the phones of revolutionary legends like Huber Matos were already tapped by Fidel's secret police. Huber Matos was arrested.

In the bad old days of Batista oppression, Fidel had been arrested himself. His crime was not words on a telephone, but leading an attack on a military barracks to overthrow the Batista regime. Twelve people were killed. For this Fidel spent a total of eighteen months in the tyrant's jail before being released.

Huber Matos was not so lucky. Fidel was no Batista, and the revolution that had overthrown Batista was no two-bit dictatorship. For his phone call, Huber Matos was tried in such secrecy that not even members of the government were privy to the proceeding. When it was over, he was sentenced to solitary confinement, in a cell without sunlight, for *twenty-two years*. And even as Fidel buried his former friend and comrade alive, he went on singing his songs of revolutionary humanism and justice.

MILAN KUNDERA reveals the meaning of this revolutionary parable of Huber Matos and Fidel. Recalling a French Communist who wrote poems for brotherhood while his friend was being murdered by the poet's comrades in Prague, Kundera says: "The hangman killed while the poet sang."

Kundera explains: "People like to say revolu-

tion is beautiful; it is only the terror arising from it which is evil. But this is not true. The evil is already present in the beautiful; hell is already contained in the dream of paradise. . . . To condemn Gulags is easy, but to reject the poetry which leads to the Gulag by way of paradise is as difficult as ever." Words to bear in mind today as we consider Nicaragua and its revolution of poets.

To believe in the revolutionary dream is the tragedy of its supporters; to exploit the dream is the talent of its dictators. Revolutionary cynicism, the source of this talent, is Fidel's most important teaching to his Sandinista disciples. This is the faculty that allows the *comandantes* to emulate Fidel himself: to be poets and hangmen at the same time. To promise democracy and organize repression, to attack imperialism and join an empire, to talk peace and plan war, to champion justice and deliver Nicaragua to a fraternity of inhumane, repressive, militarized, and economically crippled states.

"We used to have one main prison, now we have many," begins the lament of Carlos Franqui, a former Fidelista, for the paradise that Nicaragua has now gained. "We used to have a few barracks; now we have many. We used to have many plantations; now we have only one, and it belongs to Fidel. Who enjoys the fruits of the revolution, the houses of the rich, the luxuries of the rich? The *comandante* and his court."

To this grim accounting must be added the economic ruin that Fidel's Marxism has wrought. Among the proven failures of the Marxist promise, this is the most fateful of all. The failure of Marxist economies to satisfy basic needs, let alone compete with the productive capitalisms of the West, has produced the military-industrial police states which call themselves socialist today. Nicaragua, with its Sandinista-created economic crisis and its massive military build-up, is but the latest example of this pattern.

Twenty-five years ago we on the Left applauded when Fidel denounced Cuba's one-crop economy and claimed that U.S. imperialism was the cause of the nation's economic plight. It seemed so self-evident. Cuba was a fertile island with a favorable climate, but U.S. sugar plantations had monopolized its arable land, and the sugar produced was a product for export, not a food for Cubans. The poor of Cuba had been sacrificed on the altar of imperialist profit. Whenever we were confronted by the political costs Castro's revolution might entail, we were confident that this gain alone—Cuba's freedom to grow food for Cubans—would make any sacrifice worthwhile. The same illusion—that the revolution will mean better lives for Nicaragua's poor—underlies every defense of the Sandinistas today.

It is nearly three decades since Cuba's liberation, and Cuba is still a one-crop economy.

But the primary market for its sugar is now the Soviet Union instead of the United States. Along with this have come other economic differences as well. Cuba's external debt is now *200 times* what it was when Fidel took power. And it would be far greater if the Communist *caudillo* had not mortgaged his country to his Soviet patron. So bankrupt is the economy Castro has created that it requires a Soviet subsidy of over \$4 billion a year, one-quarter of the entire national income, to keep it afloat. Before the revolution, Cubans enjoyed the highest per-capita income in Latin America. Now they are economic prisoners of permanent rationing and chronic shortages in even the most basic necessities. The allotted rations tell a story in themselves: two pounds of meat per citizen per month; 20 percent less clothing than the allotment a decade earlier; and in rice, a basic staple of Cuba's poor, *half* the yearly consumption under the old Batista regime.

The idea that Marxist revolution will mean economic benefit for the poor has proved to be the most deadly illusion of all. It is *because* Marxist economies *cannot* satisfy economic needs—not even at the levels of the miserably corrupt capitalisms of Batista and Somoza—that Marxist states require permanent repression to stifle unrest and permanent enemies to saddle with the blame.

THIS is also why Castro has found a new national product to supply to the Soviet market (a product his Sandinista disciples are in the process of developing in their turn). The product is the Cuban nation itself, as a military base for Soviet expansion.

The event that sealed the contract for this development was the moment of America's defeat in Vietnam in April 1975. This defeat resulted in America's effective withdrawal from the crucial role it had played since 1945, as the guardian of the international status quo and the keeper of its peace.

To the Soviet imperialists, America's loss was an opportunity gained. In 1975 the Kremlin began what would soon be a tenfold increase in the aid it had been providing to Cuba. Most of the aid was of military intent. Toward the end of the year, 36,000 Cuban troops surfaced in Africa, as an interventionary force in Angola's civil war. Soviet aid to Cuba tripled and then quintupled as Castro sent another 12,000 Cuban troops to provide a palace guard for Ethiopia's new dictator, Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had thrown himself into the Soviet embrace with a campaign which he officially called his "Red Terror." A year after his henchmen had murdered virtually the entire graduating class of the high schools of Addis Ababa—just the most poignant of Mengistu's 100,000 victims—Fidel presented him with a Bay of Pigs medal, Cuban socialism's highest award.

Ethiopia's dictator is only one of the international heroes who regularly pass through the Cuban base to be celebrated, trained, and integrated into a network of subversion and terror that has come to span every continent of the globe. And in the Sandinista revolution Fidel's colonial plantation has produced its most profitable return: an opportunity for Moscow to expand its investment to the American land mass itself.

Nicaragua is now in the grip of utterly cynical and utterly ruthless men, exceeding even their sponsors in aggressive hostility to the United States. The Soviets may be the covert patrons of the world's terrorist plague, but not even they have had the temerity to embrace publicly the assassin Qaddafi as a "brother" the way the Sandinistas have. The aim of the Sandinista revolution is to crush its society from top to bottom, to institute totalitarian rule, and to use the country as a base to spread Communist terror and Communist regimes throughout the hemisphere.

The Sandinista anthem which proclaims the Yankee to be the "enemy of mankind" expresses precisely the revolutionaries' sentiment and goal. That goal is hardly to create a more just society—the sordid record would dissuade any reformer from choosing the Communist path—but to destroy the societies still outside the totalitarian perimeter, and their chief protector, the United States.

Support for the *contras* is a first line of defense. For Nicaraguans, a *contra* victory would mean

the restoration of the democratic leadership from whom the Sandinistas stole the revolution in the first place, the government that Nicaragua would have had if Cuba had not intervened. For the countries of the Americas, it would mean a halt in the Communist march that threatens their freedoms and their peace.

IN CONCLUSION, I would like to say this to my former comrades and successors on the Left: you are self-righteous and blind in your belief that you are part of a movement to advance human progress and liberate mankind. You are in fact in league with the darkest and most reactionary forces of the modern world, whose legacies—as the record attests—are atrocities and oppressions on a scale unknown in the human past. It is no accident that radicals in power have slaughtered so many of their own people. Hatred of self, and by extension one's country, is the root of the radical cause.

As American radicals, the most egregious sin you commit is to betray the privileges and freedoms ordinary people from all over the world have created in this country—privileges and freedoms that ordinary people all over the world would feel blessed to have themselves. But the worst of it is this: you betray all this tangible good that you can see around you for a socialist pie-in-the-sky that has meant horrible deaths and miserable lives for the hundreds of millions who have so far fallen under its sway.

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

823 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

*Critique
America*

MEMORANDUM

To: *National Executive Committee*

From: *Nathan Perlmutter*

Date: *July 23, 1986*

Subject: *Update on Nicaragua and the UAHC*

Several months ago, following a mailing to the U. S. Congress by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, in which they flat-out denied Sandinista anti-Semitism, we reported our findings to the contrary. We then met with a UAHC spokesman and learned that their denial of Sandinista anti-Semitism was made without benefit of discussion with any Nicaraguan Jews.

To the UAHC's credit they have reviewed their position and revised their conclusions about Sandinista anti-Semitism -- as reported in the attached memorandum by our Rabbi Morton Rosenthal. Because the issue continues to percolate and because a reversal in position is not an everyday occurrence, I thought you'd be interested.

MA

NP:gaf
Attachment

cc: Administrative Staff
Regional Directors

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE

OF B'NAI B'RITH

823 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

N.P.

MEMORANDUM

To: Abraham H. Foxman
From: Morton M. Rosenthal
Date: July 14, 1986
Subject: Nicaragua and Cuba: Union of American Hebrew Congregation (UAHC)

I met with Albert Vorspan and Rabbi David Saperstein today to discuss the Nicaraguan situation and the situation of Jews in Cuba. I want to share with you the essence of our conversation.

I. Nicaragua:

I laid out for David and Al, who is David's supervisor, our perception of the Nicaragua situation. Al reiterated what David said he told Nate some weeks ago. The U.A.H.C. has disavowed, although not publicly, its position on Sandinista anti-Semitism set forth in a letter dated March 19, 1986 to members of the U.S. House of Representatives. That letter said that the accusations of anti-Semitism are "discredited canards." Al pointed out that when this same letter was sent subsequently to members of the Senate the reference to anti-Semitism was omitted.

Al and David said that their characterization of the charges of anti-Semitism as "canards" was due to their reliance upon reportage in the Washington Post and the New York Times without considered study of the issue by any member of the UAHC staff. After objections were raised, they studied all that had been written by ADL and others and concluded that ADL's position on Sandinista anti-Semitism is solidly based and correct. After both expressed great respect for the work which ADL has done on Nicaragua, I asked Al to publicize this change of position. He promised that he would try to find a proper forum to do so, mentioning the UAHC magazine, "Reform Judaism," as a possibility.

Interestingly, both Al and David spoke very critically of the Sandinista regime. David said that he had offered the second to a resolution adopted at the recent convention of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, criticizing the Sandinistas. Nonetheless, they are both opposed to Reagan Administration policy towards Nicaragua.

We also discussed Balfour Brickner's actions re Nicaragua. I told Al that Brickner sent his letter for publication in the New Alliance, a viciously anti-Semitic anti-Zionist and pro-Farrakhan publication and I gave him a copy of the New Alliance article and a copy of my reply to Balfour. He and Balfour are personal friends and Balfour was Al's deputy at UAHC, but Al said that he is critical of Balfour's endorsement of the Sandinistas and he has voiced this criticism to Balfour.

Matt -

- Pls advise him that we can not offer official advice or assistance. "We hope he has a good trip."
- He should be changed to cat. 3 on dpp ~~to~~ list.

- L

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/2/86

Linaz,

I spoke with Barron Ostoj-Starzewski (Knights of Malta).

He said he has attended briefings here on Nicaragua and on SDI.

He is going on a trip to Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil. He has been invited to Honduras to meet with the Nicaraguan Indians

His questions:

1. Should he meet with the Nicaraguan Indians or decline the meeting?
2. A representative from Mr. Pastore of the Contras group asked the Barron to meet with him. Is this OK w. you?
3. He'd like you to telex Amb. Taylor in Paraguay to clear the way for the Barron to brief the Ambassador.
4. I promise I'm not making this up.

Your responses please.

Matt

Sinner

To _____

Date _____ Time _____

WHILE YOU WERE OUT

M. Baron Stojan-Stanz
of Knights of Malta
Phone 251-6315

| Area Code | Number | Extension |
|--------------------|--------|-----------------|
| TELEPHONED | | PLEASE CALL |
| CALLED TO SEE YOU | | WILL CALL AGAIN |
| WANTS TO SEE YOU | | URGENT |
| RETURNED YOUR CALL | | |

Message _____

Operator

MG Dennis Ross

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

Gen Jacobus

☐

YOU WERE CALLED BY

☐

YOU WERE VISITED BY

7560

OF (Organization)

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PLEASE PHONE

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Yeshiva U.

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WILL CALL AGAIN

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IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

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RETURNED YOUR CALL

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WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Ralph

Baron

Crass - Mtg.

Nicaragua

SDI

Help - Gene Sab

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*And then for
stop Argentina
Brazil. then*

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

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STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
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MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY-- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY--

4 pm 251-1858
OF (Organization)

251-6155 msg.

☐ PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

6315

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

② Ref from Pastore
Cantors group 4/5 weeks
Going to Europe
Meet w. you →
③ Telex to Taylor embassy
telling coming.

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

Group Taylor

63-110 · NSN 7540-00-634-4018
*U.S.GPO:1985-0-461-274/20008

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

Nicaragua: Will Democracy Prevail?



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Central
America

Following is a statement by Secretary Shultz before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., February 27, 1986.

U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is an essential element in our efforts to defend Central America from aggression, to preserve recent democratic gains, and to improve prospects for renewed economic growth and equitable development. It is an important stimulus to a diplomatic solution to the Central American conflict. It contributes to our defense against Soviet and Cuban military intervention in this hemisphere. Finally, it can help to restore to the Nicaraguan people their right to self-determination denied by a minority that seeks to perpetuate itself in power by force of arms and totalitarian controls.

In short, the assistance the President requested on February 25 is needed. It is legally, morally, and strategically justified. And it can make a vital difference to the emergence of a democratic outcome in Nicaragua and throughout Central America.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

In talking with foreign leaders and Members of Congress, I find that just about everyone agrees on what the problem is. It is that a democratic revolution has been betrayed by a violent

minority willing and even eager to serve as an instrument of Soviet and Cuban strategic designs on the hemisphere, including armed aggression in the form of support for terrorism and subversion.

In 1979, Nicaraguan democrats and their sympathizers throughout the world believed that the end of the Somoza regime marked a new beginning for Nicaragua. Nicaraguans learned very quickly, however, that instead of democracy, they had fallen prey to what the Sandinistas say is "revolution by vanguard" and what the rest of us know is communist totalitarianism. The popularity of the overthrow of Somoza concealed the establishment of a new dictatorship that threatens the security of Nicaragua's neighbors and has brought the cold war to Central America.

Intervention

One of the most striking characteristics of Sandinista communism is its messianic impulse to violence. As Congress has repeatedly and formally found, Nicaragua has since 1980 been engaged in unlawful intervention, serving as the staging ground for arms shipments to guerrillas in El Salvador. Because so much attention has been focused on this arms flow to El Salvador, which has been sustained and occasionally massive, it is less widely known that at one point or another Sandinista intervention has touched virtually the entire hemisphere.

The map on page 3 depicts the breadth of Nicaragua's interventionist

activities. (It also makes clear, incidentally, that the Nicaraguan communists are perfectly serious when they refer to their policy as one of "internationalism.") The map identifies the countries where the current Nicaraguan Government has tried to export violence, by shipping arms, training guerrillas, or providing the kinds of support necessary for terrorist operations. Managua has become a gathering place for terrorists from all over the world, including Europe and the Middle East as well as Latin America.

Two aspects of this pattern of intervention are worth emphasizing.

First, the intervention is strongest against Nicaragua's immediate neighbors, but it is not limited to Central America.

Second, the pattern is politically indiscriminate. Violence and subversion have been directed against democracies and even against Contadora countries as well as against dictatorships and more traditional military regimes.

Militarization

The Sandinistas like to portray themselves as nationalists, but their soldiers are trained and supported in combat by thousands of Cubans and other foreigners known as "internationalists." And this is why, despite its limited size and resources, Nicaragua is able to intervene so widely in the hemisphere: it has

been armed by the Soviet Union and is manned by Cubans in key sectors from training and weapons use to intelligence and counterintelligence.

The first Cuban advisers entered Managua with the Sandinistas and took up positions in Somoza's bunker less than a week after he left it. As soon as the security apparatus was in place, Soviet-bloc arms began to arrive to give the Nicaraguan communists the capacity to repress their own people and to engage in unconventional warfare against their neighbors without risk of a conventional military response.

Chart I depicts the militarization of Nicaragua by this combination of Soviet-bloc weapons and Cuban manpower. The total of Cuban advisers has stabilized at slightly lower levels since October 1983, when the U.S. action in Grenada led the Cubans to seek a lower profile in Nicaragua. Soviet arms shipments peaked in the fall of 1984 with the delivery of HIND attack helicopters at a time when the resistance had been cut off from U.S. Government assistance. The reality is clear: Managua's military capabilities are closely tied to the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Cuban military and security officers, in fact, have done everything from helping with the establishment of political control structures in the armed forces and the state security apparatus to an active combat role with sophisticated Soviet weapons systems.

resistance responds to a long series of repressive acts, some of which are listed chronologically in the chart. These go from the arrival of the Cubans and the establishment of the defense committees in the summer of 1979 to the start of censorship and the postponement of elections, the murder of opposition leader Jorge Salazar, and the burning of Indian villages in 1981. Catholic and Protestant church leaders were systematically attacked, and the Pope was insulted. Forced conscription came next, followed by stage-managed elections, Ortega's visit to Moscow, and finally the suspension of civil rights in the fall of 1985.

By betraying their promises of pluralism, the Nicaraguan communists have forced the citizens of Nicaragua to take up arms once again. Like Somoza, the Sandinistas don't seem to listen to anyone who isn't armed. And, like Somoza, they seek to blame outside forces for the resistance of their own people to their policies.

The Nicaraguan communists like to say that covert U.S. support created the resistance; that their opponents are all agents of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and of the heirs of Somoza. This is ridiculous. It was Sandinista repression that in 1979, 1980, and 1981 destroyed the coalition that overthrew Somoza and sparked the resistance. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, the United States was providing aid to the Government of

Nicaragua, not to the resistance.

From May of 1984 until late in 1985—well over a year—the U.S. Government provided no assistance to Nicaraguan resistance forces. As indicated in Chart II, the resistance grew by 50%, roughly from 10,000 to 15,000 during a period when there was no U.S. Government assistance.

The Sandinistas, of course, would like to create the impression that there is no viable alternative to them. Like Somoza before them, they have driven many of their opponents into exile. But these opposition groups represent a variety of political and programmatic viewpoints. They are committed to presenting those viewpoints to the Nicaraguan people in a competitive democratic process and would do so if given the opportunity.

Adolfo Calero, Arturo Cruz, and Alfonso Robelo lead the main resistance organization, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO). All three actively opposed Somoza while he was still in power. Calero was jailed by Somoza; first Robelo then Cruz became junta members with the Sandinistas until they could no longer accept betrayal of democratic principles and of Nicaraguan national interests.

The largest guerrilla forces belong to the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), headed by Calero since 1983. Other important resistance organizations include ARDE [Democratic Revolution-


THE RISE OF THE RESISTANCE

When Daniel Ortega spoke in Havana on February 5 to the Congress of the Cuban Communist Party, he referred to "the blood of Cuban internationalists fallen on Nicaraguan soil." Ortega was talking about Cubans killed fighting Nicaraguans inside Nicaragua.

In this fact is a bitter truth: Nicaraguans who dissent must fight more than other Nicaraguans. And they must fight a sophisticated, heavily equipped, and pervasive security apparatus designed to deny power to all but the ruling communist vanguard. One need look no further than the fate of Solidarity in Poland over the last few years to realize the difficulty of taking on such a formidable internal security apparatus.

Chart II (see p. 6) demonstrates the growth of armed resistance in the face of the new Nicaraguan police state. The

Chart I







ary Alliance], built by Robelo and former Sandinista Comandante Eden Pastora, and MISURASATA [Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista] and KISAN [United Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Nicaragua] guerrillas active among the Indians of the Atlantic coast.

Resistance fighters are overwhelmingly rural youths. Most are between 18 and 22 years old. They are fighting to defend their small plots of land, their churches, and in some cases their indigenous cultures. Some joined the resistance rather than be forced to fight for the Sandinistas against their friends and neighbors. In defending their families and communities, these young Nicaraguans are fighting for self-determination above all else.

The commanders are more likely to come from urban areas and have more diverse occupations and backgrounds. They include both former National Guardsmen and former Sandinista fighters, but most are civilians from the very groups the Sandinistas claim to represent: peasants, small farmers, urban professionals, and students. One was a primary school teacher; another, an evangelical pastor.

Chart III (see p. 7) depicts the backgrounds of the 153 most senior military leaders of the FDN as of last November. The FDN has the largest number of former military professionals; however, less than half the commanders have prior military experience. And notice a key fact that many have tried to hide: a full 20% of the FDN leaders joined the resistance after serving in the Sandinista army, militia, or security services.

The evidence irrefutably confirms that the Nicaraguan resistance is the product of a popular, pervasive, and democratic revolt.

DEMOCRACY AS THE HEMISPHERIC ANSWER

Throughout these 6½ years while Nicaragua was trading one dictatorship for another, the rest of the hemisphere was making an unprecedented and historic turn toward democracy.

The maps on pages 4 and 5 illustrate the shift to democracy in Latin America and

the Caribbean over the past 10 years. The map on the left shows the politics of the region in 1976, while the one on the right shows the situation today.

Largely or entirely democratic and open societies are green. Dictatorships or military regimes are shown in light brown. Three countries not readily categorized as either democracies or dictatorships are colored gray.

Ten countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay) joined the democratic column in this last decade.

Since the fall of Duvalier in Haiti, Nicaragua is one of only five dictatorships or military regimes left in all of Latin America (the others being Chile, Cuba, Paraguay, and Suriname).

The question is sometimes asked whether any Latin American country supports our Nicaraguan policy. But isn't a better question whether any Latin American country (other than Cuba) supports Nicaragua's policies?

Differences between the United States and our allies, to the extent they exist at all, are not over policy goals but over how to achieve them.


Nicaragua poses very complicated issues for Latin Americans, as it does for us. Latin Americans are properly concerned about the defense of sovereignty and the rejection of foreign intervention. History has focused much of that rejection against past military interventions by the United States.

As Latin Americans, however, our neighbors also reject Cuban-Soviet intervention. And when Cuban pilots fly Soviet helicopters, it is not the United States that is injecting the East-West conflict into Central America. It is the Soviets, and that is how it is perceived in Latin America.

So Nicaragua poses a problem on two levels. The Latin American dimension they feel that they can and must deal with themselves; the Soviet dimension they believe only we are strong enough to deal with. This is a point they have made to us repeatedly. The Latin American foreign ministers told me

Chart II

Sandinista Repression & the Growth of Armed Resistance: 1979 - 1985



when I met with them on February 10 that they agreed with us that Cuban-Soviet intervention in Nicaragua was unacceptable.

Of course, though nobody wants a second Cuba, most would oppose any direct U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua. But we are not making a case for direct U.S. military action. We are making a case for helping Nicaraguan democrats to help themselves. If our policy advances democracy, we will always have at least tacit support.

Latin American support—indeed, enthusiasm—for democracy is evident. I would hope that by now ours is, too.

WHY PRESSURE IS NECESSARY

If democracy is our objective, why do we want to pressure Nicaragua? The answer is simple: we want a political solution. The Nicaraguan communists do not. They want a political solution only if they can violate it militarily. Pressure is the one way to bring them to the bargaining table ready to bargain. Power and diplomacy must go hand in hand.

A vote for military assistance to the democratic resistance will give Contadora a better chance to succeed, because it will give the Sandinistas an incentive to negotiate seriously—something they have yet to do. They did not negotiate with the Carter Administration when the United States was Nicaragua's largest supplier of aid. And they did not negotiate seriously either with us or with their neighbors when the Congress suspended all aid to the resistance 2 years ago. On the contrary, in the fall of 1984, instead of bringing their political opponents back into the political process through competitive elections, the Sandinistas imported assault helicopters from the Soviet Union.


Military pressure is just as essential now to convince the Sandinistas to negotiate a political solution as it was critical in convincing them to agree to the Contadora process in the first place.

The United States can now help the Contadora process by doing two things simultaneously:

First, the United States must support Contadora politically and diplomatically, so as to help keep the negotiating process alive for the day when the Sandinistas finally do negotiate. This support must include cooperating in the staff work needed to ensure verification of any agreement. After the Sandinistas' record in repudiating their commitments to the Organization of

Chart III

Background of FDN Military Leaders: Late 1985



| | |
|-----------------------------|------------|
| Total Civilian | 53% |
| Total National Guard | 27% |
| Total Sandinista | 20% |

American States, who would trust an agreement that is not enforceable?

Second, the United States must support the Nicaraguan resistance, so as to sustain pressure on the Sandinistas to accept meaningful negotiations toward a workable Contadora agreement. Why would the Sandinistas negotiate if there were no armed resistance?

WHAT WE ARE ASKING

Carefully thought-out and implemented assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance can make a difference. The President transmitted his proposal to you 2 days ago only after we had consulted widely with our friends in Cen-

tral America and in the Contadora Group as well as with the members of this committee and others in the Congress.

- \$100 million would be made available to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance by transfer from the FY [fiscal year] 1986 Department of Defense Appropriations Act. Twenty-five percent would become available immediately, with an additional 15% released every 90 days through the end of September 1987, as reports are submitted to Congress.

- \$30 million of the total \$100 million package would be reserved for humanitarian assistance administered by the existing Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (including \$3 million specifically earmarked for human rights programs and activities). The President

would be free to use the remaining \$70 million for any kind of assistance he deems appropriate, using whatever agencies he desires, subject to normal procedures for congressional oversight. If properly led and trained, the armed resistance will be able to minimize the suffering of Nicaraguan noncombatants during military operations. The United States expects that the armed resistance will follow a code of conduct on the battlefield that will protect noncombatants and prisoners.

- In the event of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Central America, any remaining balance of the \$100 million could be used (through the end of FY 1987) for relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction purposes in the countries of Central America, including Nicaragua.

All current statutory conditions on involvement by intelligence agencies would be satisfied by congressional approval of the President's request. At the same time, we are not breaking relations with the Sandinista government. This demonstrates our willingness to keep open the lines of communication. It strengthens the possibility of a peaceful settlement. It increases everyone's ability to cooperate. And it maintains the program's operational viability.

We are thus asking for an overt vote on a program that will operate within clearly defined parameters. We see these parameters, if Congress approves the President's request, as follows:

- U.S. policy toward Nicaragua will be based on Nicaraguan responsiveness to U.S. concerns about Soviet/Cuban ties, military buildup, support for subversion, internal repression, and refusal to negotiate.

- The United States will address these concerns through economic, political, and diplomatic measures, as well as support for the resistance. In particular:

- We will engage in simultaneous talks with Nicaragua if Nicaragua will also engage in internal dialogue as proposed by UNO (the UNO proposal includes a cease-fire and lifting of the state of emergency); and

- We will respond positively to other steps by the Government of Nicaragua toward meeting our concerns.

- Any easing of U.S. pressure on Nicaragua will be implemented, after consultation with Congress, by reference to observable Nicaraguan conduct (e.g., freedom of the press, reduced arms deliveries or foreign military presence, respect for a cease-fire).

- The U.S. actions shall be consistent with our right to defend ourselves

and assist our allies for the purpose of achieving a comprehensive, verifiable Contadora agreement and democratic reconciliation in Nicaragua, without the use of force by the United States.

- The President will report to Congress every 90 days on diplomatic efforts, human rights, and use of appropriated funds. This is the same as current reporting requirements.

I should note that the objectives reflected in these undertakings are not those of the United States alone. Each of them, including national reconciliation through dialogue with the armed opposition, are agreed objectives of the Contadora process. We are asking the Sandinistas to do no more than what they themselves have ostensibly agreed are the steps essential to a lasting peace in Central America.

CONCLUSION

Either we are willing to act on a vital issue close to our shores at a critical moment when the world is watching, or we are not. Either we help Nicaraguans to gain their freedom, or we do not. In Europe and in the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in Cambodia, in South America and in southern Africa, our friends and our enemies will draw their own conclusions from what we decide.

The Sandinistas' record in dealing with Nicaraguans and other Central Americans makes clear that the resistance is the only constraint they recognize. As long as the Sandinistas are free to try to expand their revolution, the killing and misery will continue in Central America.

Only a democratic opening in Nicaragua can alter these dim prospects. And the resistance is the major element in the present equation that can help create that opening. Nicaraguans are disenchanted with the Sandinistas; more Nicaraguans are likely to join the resistance if they believe the United States will support the restoration of the revolution's original goals.

U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resistance may intensify support for the Sandinistas among certain individuals who are already firmly in their camp, but we do not see the ranks of Sandinista supporters growing as a result of our backing of the resistance. On the contrary, our assistance will give heart to the vast majority of Nicaraguans who yearn for freedom.

Opposition to U.S. aid to the resistance is greatest *outside* Nicaragua, wherever people do not appreciate that the Sandinistas depend on violence as a

political tool, or where they lack information about the extent of Sandinista abuses of human rights, or among those who do not realize that the true underdogs are the Nicaraguan people and their neighbors who are resisting violent minorities backed by military aid from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. Reactions among former Sandinista sympathizers suggest that the reality of the new tyranny in Nicaragua is being increasingly understood in Europe as well as Latin America and the United States.

The bottom line is this: absent a credible challenge to their militarized control of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have no incentive to negotiate a lasting political solution to the conflict in Central America. The resistance can provide such a challenge—if we help. Without military aid to the resistance, the Sandinistas will simply monopolize power and continue to destabilize their neighbors. If the Central American house remains divided against itself, prospects for democracy would ultimately be doomed in the region as a whole as well as Nicaragua.

The United States has both moral and strategic interests in the consolidation of democracy in this hemisphere. To the extent that we support Latin Americans who are struggling for objectives similar to ours, we reduce the likelihood of having to intervene to protect our interests and defend our allies. If there were no armed resistance, we might ultimately confront choices even more difficult than this one.

Under the expedited procedures that Congress has provided, the President is entitled to a vote on his request. A positive vote is essential to protect our strategic interests, preserve opportunities for diplomacy, and assure that the progress made in recent years in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala will not be reversed and that Costa Rica will maintain its democracy.

There are many uncertainties ahead in Nicaragua. We are fully aware of them. But we are also aware that there were many uncertainties in El Salvador, in Central America generally, and most recently in Haiti and the Philippines. We were right in El Salvador. Castro, and the Soviets, and the Libyans, and the Nicaraguan communists have clearly made their choice. Now it is up to us to make ours. ■

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Jegne Kirkpatrick

Nicaragua and Libya: Partners in Terror

Maybe knowing about Nicaragua's Libyan connection will help the U.S. Congress and others understand the nature of the Sandinista government and why developments in that country are important to the peace and security of the hemisphere. Governments, as with people, can be known by their friends. The ties between rulers of those nations were reaffirmed last week when Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega communicated with Libya's Muammar Qaddafi.

"My brother, given the brutal terrorist action launched by the U.S. government against the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, I wish to send sentiments and solidarity from the FSLN National Directorate and the Nicaraguan people and government. . .," he said.

It is not the first time leaders of Libya and Nicaragua have sworn eternal friendship. They have been working together for more than a decade. Years before they came to power—in July 1979—Sandinista leaders trained in PLO camps in Libya and Lebanon. Strong bonds were forged with the Middle Eastern terror network, and those bonds were reinforced when the Sandinistas seized the government of Nicaragua. Qaddafi then pledged political and financial aid and has made good on his promise.

"Our friendship with Libya is eternal," said Sandinista commander Tomas Borge on Sept. 1, 1984.

Another member of the Nicaraguan junta, Sergio Ramirez, testified that "The solidarity of the Libyan people, of the Libyan government

and comrade Muammar Qaddafi was always patently manifest. This solidarity has been made real, has been made effective, has been made more fraternal since the triumph of our revolution."

Sandinistas received a \$100 million "loan" from Libya in the early years, and last year signed a trade agreement that exchanges Libyan oil for Nicaraguan bananas and coffee. The world got a look at another dimension of the relationship in April 1983, when Brazilian authorities inspected four Libyan planes bound for Nicaragua and found that crates marked "medical supplies" contained 84 tons of military equipment—missiles, machine guns, bazookas, mortars, bombs, cannons and two unassembled fighter planes.

"Nicaragua is a wonderful thing," Qaddafi has emphasized. "They fight America on its own ground."

Most Americans have been reluctant to recognize the interconnections among terrorist groups, but those ties can no longer be denied. Neither can Sandinista links with Libya, the PLO and Iran, links which place Nicaragua in a network of violence that murders and maims from the Bekaa to Bogotá.

We prefer to think that violence originates in each country out of strictly indigenous problems and reflects indigenous hostilities. We prefer to think civil wars result from popular discontent and social injustice. We do not at all like the notion of international bands training together, working together, wreaking violence, and mak-

ing revolution together. And yet, the reality of Nicaragua's training with the PLO, and Libya can no more be denied than the reality of Libyan economic, financial and military assistance for the Sandinistas.

Today resources from throughout the Soviet bloc aid in consolidating Sandinista power in Nicaragua and spreading violence in Central and South America. Managua has become the capital city of terrorism in the Western hemisphere.

Germany's Bader-Meinhoff gang, Spain's Basque ETA, Colombia's M19, Peru's Sendero Luminoso and El Salvador's FMLN meet with those of Libya and the PLO. Italian Premier Benito Craxi has publicly complained of the presence of fugitive Italian terrorists in Managua.

Nicaragua's support for Colombia's principal guerrilla group, M19, has been documented in some detail. M19 has offices in Managua, its members are honored guests at Sandinista functions, and they travel on Nicaraguan passports.

When an M19 group attacked Colombia's supreme court last December, more than 100 were left dead. Many of the guns captured in that raid were linked to Libya, Vietnam, Cuba and, of course, Nicaragua. Some of the rifles used in the raid had been sold by the Vietnamese to Libya, and from there were shipped to Nicaragua and then to the Colombian guerrilla movement. Sandinista army rifles (M-16s and R-16s) were also found at the scene.

Sandinistas directed preparation for the attack, which was modeled on their 1978 seizure

of the parliament building in Managua. An FSLN commando group traveling on Colombian passports arrived in that country a day before the bloody occupation and coordinated it. Other Nicaraguans handled communications. And Tomas Borge himself eulogized the slain Colombian guerrillas at a "people's mass."

The Libyan link was also clear. Leading participants (for example, Diana Morales, who inflicted the most casualties on the military) had been trained in Libya, Nicaragua and Cuba.

These facts make the relevance of Nicaragua to U.S. security undeniable. Speaking after the American bombing of Libya, Borge commented, "Who has given the United States government the right to determine what is terrorism and what is not terrorism?" One might well ask instead: who has given the Nicaraguan government the right to spread violence in this hemisphere?

Congressmen and others who have been hoping for the best in Nicaragua are being confronted with new details of the Sandinista role in the international support system for violent politics.

The cost to Central America in loss of peace and freedom is already high. If the full consolidation of Sandinista power and the full incorporation of Nicaragua into the "world socialist system" is permitted, U.S. congressmen will look back with nostalgia on a time when \$100 million in American aid to the contras could have made a real difference.

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NICARAGUA'S JEWS: Their Story
A Report Commissioned by PRODEMCA

Central
America

prepared by
Susan Alberts, Joshua Muravchik, and Antony Korenstein

INTRODUCTION

The seizure of power by Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) precipitated an exodus by that country's small Jewish community. This fact was first brought to light by the Anti-Defamation League, which charged that Nicaragua's Jews had fled as a result of anti-Semitic persecutions by the FSLN.

This accusation was vigorously denied by Sandinista representatives and subsequently by various American Jewish groups and leaders, many of whom have defended the Sandinistas' on other grounds as well. Some of these Jewish figures traveled to Nicaragua and reported that they found no anti-Semitism there. These denials were echoed in editorials in The New York Times and in news analyses in the The Washington Post.

The White House brought two of these Jewish refugees to a press briefing, but some skeptics wondered whether the testimony of these two was sufficient to sustain the allegation that the Jewish community as a whole was victimized.

In our attempt to resolve this controversy, we sought to locate the Nicaraguan Jewish refugees in their current homes in the United States and Costa Rica, and to interview them individually to learn of their experiences and their reasons for flight.

In summary, our finding is that while Sandinista anti-Semitism is not motivated by traditional religious reasoning or the more radical and racist theories of the Nazis, it is anti-Semitism all the same. Jew hatred is not a

central tenet of Sandinista ideology. Nevertheless, they persecuted the Jews as Jews, with no apparent regard for the views or activities of individual Jews. They were no doubt largely motivated by their hatred for Israel, which they have long seen as their enemy, their strong support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and their views that Nicaragua's Jewish community was no more than an arm of Israel. This kind of anti-Semitism is apparent in the conduct, for example, of the Third World and Soviet bloc in the United Nations; some analysts describe it as "The New Anti-Semitism," or "Left-wing Anti-Semitism." However this phenomenon is best described, it is clear that Sandinista anti-Semitism should not be taken lightly.

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1970s the Jewish community of Nicaragua comprised approximately 50 individuals in eighteen families. The bread-winners were virtually all engaged in commerce, some with rather substantial enterprises and some with small ones. The community maintained a synagogue and conducted regular worship services, although it did not have a rabbi. (The participation of a rabbi is not required for Jewish worship.) The community displayed some sense of cohesiveness. One of its members was designated as its president, and some interviewees said their social lives revolved around the synagogue. The community felt a sense of emotional attachment to Israel similar to that of Jewish communities everywhere. One member was the "honorary consul" of the state of Israel, which maintained only part-time diplomatic representation in Nicaragua.

Today, the entire community lives outside of Nicaraguan, with the exception of one individual, Jaime Levy, a French citizen beyond the age of seventy.

Susan Alberts succeeded in interviewing members of 13 of the 18 families. Members of two other families initially agreed to grant interviews but later reversed their decisions; one of these expressed fear of provoking reprisals by the Sandinistas. Members of two of the five families with which we have not had contact, the Gorn and Preiss families, have previously given extensive public accounts of their experiences, and these correspond closely to those given by our interviewees.

WHOM TO BELIEVE

We have no means of evaluating definitively the accuracy of the details of each of the individual accounts we heard, but the stories were all compatible. In their general outlines, and in many specific details, they were mutually corroborating, and in no significant respect were they contradictory. In addition to these first person accounts, we found other evidence corroborating details of their stories. (For example, Mauricio Palacio, a gentile Nicaraguan formerly employed by Fred Luft, one of the Nicaraguan Jews, is now himself in exile in the United States after having grown disillusioned with the Sandinistas -- with whom he once covertly collaborated. He has given a signed statement confessing to his part in the 1978 arson attack against the Managua synagogue.)

In the past, Sandinista representatives and sympathizers have challenged the veracity of one or another individual Jews whose complaints have been publicized. We find it impossible to imagine that the fifteen stories heard from refugees living in different countries and cities could have been fabricated and still be as mutually consistent as these are. Indeed we found no reason to doubt the veracity of any of the individuals we interviewed; the only challenge to their accounts comes from the Sandinistas or their

sympathizers. On the other hand, we found evidence of mendacity on the part of the Sandinistas, and many efforts by the Sandinistas to manipulate and mislead their American sympathizers. (Examples of mendacity: the Sandinistas first said that certain FSLN officials, such as Ambassador Tunnerman, are Jewish. Tunnerman apparently has some Jewish ancestry, but is a professing Catholic. The Sandinistas first claimed that the Managua synagogue was confiscated because it had been the personal property of Abraham Gorn, but records show clearly that it was the communal property of the congregation. Example of manipulation: the Jewish Human Rights delegation that visited Nicaragua in August of 1984 on behalf of the New Jewish Agenda met more than once with Mateo Guerrero, a top staff member of the government-sponsored Nicaraguan Commission for Human Rights. Guerrero, now a refugee himself, told us that he had been summoned by Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco in advance of the delegations' arrival and was simply "instructed to tell them that there had been no persecution of Jews.")

PERSECUTION AND FLIGHT

It is sometimes alleged that Jews left Nicaragua after the revolution because they lost their positions or their property -- or that the Sandinistas may have turned against them simply because they sought to retain privileges they supposedly enjoyed under the old regime. In fact, the Sandinistas' hostility to the Jews was evident well before the revolution, and Jews were given no opportunity to make peace with the new regime.

Harassment of Jews by the FSLN began during the year prior to its seizure of power. Many or most Jewish families began receiving abusive and threatening telephone calls. Some report that they received such calls daily. All said the calls were frequent. All reported that the callers used

foul and abusive language and made specific derogatory references to the Jewishness of the respondent. The callers identified themselves as Sandinistas and made death threats both against the heads of households and against their children. Similar threats and abuse were also conveyed in post cards and in graffiti sprayed on Jewish homes and places of business. Some told of receiving warnings from friendly employees with links to the Sandinistas, and a few told of being followed or approached with threatening messages by men on the street whom they did not recognize.

These various threats were underscored by an event that occurred during Friday night services in December 1978. That night, an incendiary device was hurled at the synagogue, igniting its wooden doors. When some of the worshippers emerged from the building they were confronted by a carload of armed men, recognizable to them as Sandinistas, who pointed guns at them and ordered them back inside. Eventually, the Sandinistas drove off and the fire was extinguished without the building being destroyed or any of the worshippers being seriously injured. According to the testimony of the Sandinista defector Palacio, the aim of the incident was not to injure but to further intimidate the Jews. In this it was successful.

As the fighting between FSLN insurgents and Somoza's National Guard reached its climax in the summer of 1979, several Nicaraguan Jews left the country. When the Sandinistas triumphed, these individuals, as well as a couple of others who coincidentally found themselves out of the country on business at that moment, faced a decision about whether to try to return. One who did return was Abraham Gorn, an elderly businessman and reputed friend of the first Somoza (who had ruled the country until the mid-1950s). In 1979, Gorn was president of the Jewish community. Shortly after his return, he was imprisoned by Sandinista authorities for a few weeks, during which time he was

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SUMMARY

The entire community of individuals who identify themselves as Jews fled Nicaragua, with the exception of one individual, leaving behind almost all their property. The flight was motivated by threats and abuse directed against them as Jews, as well as by persecution that they suffered in common with many gentile businessmen. But clearly not all persons involved in business were harassed and threatened in the manner of the Jews. In fact, the Sandinistas have sought to convey an impression of moderation by boasting how they have urged some businessmen to stay. Although Sandinista defenders often rebut the charge of anti-Semitism by saying the Nicaraguan Jews were harassed because they were businessmen, in other arguments they make much of the claim that a large part of the Nicaraguan community remains in private hands. The

Jews have clearly suffered more than most: because of their fears, they fled, and because of their flight, they lost their property.

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NICARAGUA'S JEWS: Their Story

A Report Commissioned by PRODEMCA

prepared by

Susan Alberts, Joshua Muravchik, and Antony Korenstein

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INTRODUCTION

The seizure of power by Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) precipitated an exodus by that country's small Jewish community. This fact was first brought to light by the Anti-Defamation League, which charged that Nicaragua's Jews had fled as a result of anti-Semitic persecutions by the FSLN.

This accusation was vigorously denied by Sandinista representatives and subsequently by various American Jewish groups and leaders, many of whom have defended the Sandinistas' on other grounds as well. Some of these Jewish figures traveled to Nicaragua and reported that they found no anti-Semitism there. These denials were echoed in editorials in The New York Times and in news analyses in the The Washington Post.

The White House brought two of these Jewish refugees to a press briefing, but some skeptics wondered whether the testimony of these two was sufficient to sustain the allegation that the Jewish community as a whole was victimized.

In our attempt to resolve this controversy, we sought to locate the Nicaraguan Jewish refugees in their current homes in the United States and Costa Rica, and to interview them individually to learn of their experiences and their reasons for flight.

In summary, our finding is that while Sandinista anti-Semitism is not motivated by traditional religious reasoning or the more radical and racist theories of the Nazis, it is anti-Semitism all the same. Jew hatred is not a

central tenet of Sandinista ideology. Nevertheless, they persecuted the Jews as Jews, with no apparent regard for the views or activities of individual Jews. They were no doubt largely motivated by their hatred for Israel, which they have long seen as their enemy, their strong support for the Palestine Liberation Organization, and their views that Nicaragua's Jewish community was no more than an arm of Israel. This kind of anti-Semitism is apparent in the conduct, for example, of the Third World and Soviet bloc in the United Nations; some analysts describe it as "The New Anti-Semitism," or "Left-wing Anti-Semitism." However this phenomenon is best described, it is clear that Sandinista anti-Semitism should not be taken lightly.

BACKGROUND

In the mid-1970s the Jewish community of Nicaragua comprised approximately 50 individuals in eighteen families. The bread-winners were virtually all engaged in commerce, some with rather substantial enterprises and some with small ones. The community maintained a synagogue and conducted regular worship services, although it did not have a rabbi. (The participation of a rabbi is not required for Jewish worship.) The community displayed some sense of cohesiveness. One of its members was designated as its president, and some interviewees said their social lives revolved around the synagogue. The community felt a sense of emotional attachment to Israel similar to that of Jewish communities everywhere. One member was the "honorary consul" of the state of Israel, which maintained only part-time diplomatic representation in Nicaragua.

Today, the entire community lives outside of Nicaraguan, with the exception of one individual, Jaime Levy, a French citizen beyond the age of seventy.

Susan Alberts succeeded in interviewing members of 13 of the 18 families. Members of two other families initially agreed to grant interviews but later reversed their decisions; one of these expressed fear of provoking reprisals by the Sandinistas. Members of two of the five families with which we have not had contact, the Gorn and Preiss families, have previously given extensive public accounts of their experiences, and these correspond closely to those given by our interviewees.

WHOM TO BELIEVE

We have no means of evaluating definitively the accuracy of the details of each of the individual accounts we heard, but the stories were all compatible. In their general outlines, and in many specific details, they were mutually corroborating, and in no significant respect were they contradictory. In addition to these first person accounts, we found other evidence corroborating details of their stories. (For example, Mauricio Palacio, a gentile Nicaraguan formerly employed by Fred Luft, one of the Nicaraguan Jews, is now himself in exile in the United States after having grown disillusioned with the Sandinistas -- with whom he once covertly collaborated. He has given a signed statement confessing to his part in the 1978 arson attack against the Managua synagogue.)

In the past, Sandinista representatives and sympathizers have challenged the veracity of one or another individual Jews whose complaints have been publicized. We find it impossible to imagine that the fifteen stories heard from refugees living in different countries and cities could have been fabricated and still be as mutually consistent as these are. Indeed we found no reason to doubt the veracity of any of the individuals we interviewed; the only challenge to their accounts comes from the Sandinistas or their

sympathizers. On the other hand, we found evidence of mendacity on the part of the Sandinistas, and many efforts by the Sandinistas to manipulate and mislead their American sympathizers. (Examples of mendacity: the Sandinistas first said that certain FSLN officials, such as Ambassador Tunnerman, are Jewish. Tunnerman apparently has some Jewish ancestry, but is a professing Catholic. The Sandinistas first claimed that the Managua synagogue was confiscated because it had been the personal property of Abraham Gorn, but records show clearly that it was the communal property of the congregation. Example of manipulation: the Jewish Human Rights delegation that visited Nicaragua in August of 1984 on behalf of the New Jewish Agenda met more than once with Mateo Guerrero, a top staff member of the government-sponsored Nicaraguan Commission for Human Rights. Guerrero, now a refugee himself, told us that he had been summoned by Deputy Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco in advance of the delegations' arrival and was simply "instructed to tell them that there had been no persecution of Jews.")

PERSECUTION AND FLIGHT

It is sometimes alleged that Jews left Nicaragua after the revolution because they lost their positions or their property -- or that the Sandinistas may have turned against them simply because they sought to retain privileges they supposedly enjoyed under the old regime. In fact, the Sandinistas' hostility to the Jews was evident well before the revolution, and Jews were given no opportunity to make peace with the new regime.

Harassment of Jews by the FSLN began during the year prior to its seizure of power. Many or most Jewish families began receiving abusive and threatening telephone calls. Some report that they received such calls daily. All said the calls were frequent. All reported that the callers used

foul and abusive language and made specific derogatory references to the Jewishness of the respondent. The callers identified themselves as Sandinistas and made death threats both against the heads of households and against their children. Similar threats and abuse were also conveyed in post cards and in graffiti sprayed on Jewish homes and places of business. Some told of receiving warnings from friendly employees with links to the Sandinistas, and a few told of being followed or approached with threatening messages by men on the street whom they did not recognize.

These various threats were underscored by an event that occurred during Friday night services in December 1978. That night, an incendiary device was hurled at the synagogue, igniting its wooden doors. When some of the worshippers emerged from the building they were confronted by a carload of armed men, recognizable to them as Sandinistas, who pointed guns at them and ordered them back inside. Eventually, the Sandinistas drove off and the fire was extinguished without the building being destroyed or any of the worshippers being seriously injured. According to the testimony of the Sandinista defector Palacio, the aim of the incident was not to injure but to further intimidate the Jews. In this it was successful.

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NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

The Nicaraguan Resistance was formed in April 1987, replacing the Unified Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) as the anti-Sandinista insurgents' umbrella group. Now known as the Nicaraguan Resistance, it includes:

- The UNO/FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Force), Southern Opposition Bloc, Atlantic Coast indigenous groups, and several other resistance organizations formerly allied with UNO.

- A seven-man directorate (six are currently seated) which oversees all resistance activities. Directorate members include former Southern Bloc leader Alfredo Cesar, former UNO Director Alfonso Robelo, and recently exiled Social Christian party representative Azucena Ferrey.

- The resistance assembly elected the directorate and serves as a consultative organ. Its 54 members come from the various groups represented on the directorate.

- An agreement in which the military wing of the resistance is under civilian control, a longstanding demand of moderate rebel leaders.

By opening up the directorate and the assembly to previously unrepresented elements opposed to the Sandinistas, the resistance hopes to enhance its effectiveness inside Nicaragua as well as in international relations.

- In connection with the recent peace proposal by Costa Rican President Arias, the NR has expressed a willingness to discuss a peaceful solution to the regional situation.

NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP

AZUCENA FERREY

Age 42. The newest member of the directorate, Ferrey was a long-time opponent of Somoza and now opposes the Sandinista regime. A member of the Social Christian Party, Ferrey began supporting the resistance struggle because of Sandinista resistance to democratic change. In 1983, the National Congress of the Social Christian Party elected Ferrey as Second vice-president, with responsibility for foreign affairs, and in 1985, as Third vice-president with responsibility for finance and administration. In April 1987, Ferrey participated in meetings of the Nicaraguan Social Christians in exile.

ALFREDO CESAR

Age 36. Cesar is a former Sandinista supporter and official. Following the triumph of the revolution, he served as both the Minister Secretary of the ruling Sandinista Junta and as Minister of the Internal Reconstruction Fund. He also became head of the Nicaraguan Central Bank. In 1982, he denounced the Sandinista government as Marxist and went into exile. He led a small resistance group known as the Southern Opposition Bloc, based in Costa Rica. Cesar graduated in industrial engineering from the University of Texas at Austin in 1972. In 1975, he obtained a master's degree in finance from Stanford University, where he taught as an assistant professor.

ALFONSO ROBELO

Age 47. Robelo was a one-time member of the Sandinista dominated Governing Junta of National Reconstruction. In 1980, he resigned his post in the junta and denounced the swing towards totalitarianism under the Sandinistas. Because of the Sandinistas' refusal to share power democratically, he joined the armed struggle. Robelo participated in the founding of the anti-Sandinista Democratic Revolution Alliance. He later served on the directorate of the United Nicaraguan Opposition. Robelo graduated in chemical engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York.

ADOLFO CALERO

Age 55. Calero is the longest-serving resistance official. Calero was an opponent of dictator Anastasio Somoza and was jailed briefly in 1978 for joining an anti-government business strike. After Somoza was overthrown, Calero became a Sandinista opponent, predicting they would create a Marxist dictatorship rather than the pluralistic society they promised. The Sandinistas saw an adversary in Calero and forced him into exile in 1982. In exile he decided that armed struggle was the only effective means of liberating his country. Calero served as president of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). He was a former member of United Nicaraguan Opposition directorate. A businessman, he was a manager and stockholder in Coca-Cola of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas took over the company in 1983. Calero received a degree in business administration from Notre Dame University, Indiana. In 1972, he received the degree of Doctor of Law from the Central America University in Managua.

PEDRO JOAQUIN CHAMORRO

Age 35. Chamorro is the son and namesake of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Sr., assassinated La Prensa publisher and anti-Somoza leader. A Sandinista opponent, young Chamorro left Nicaragua when the Sandinistas stepped up their harassment and censorship of La Prensa, which they closed indefinitely in July 1986. His mother Violetta Chamorro is the publisher of La Prensa, his sister Claudia is the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Costa Rica, and his brother Carlos is the editor of the Sandinista newspaper Barricada. Chamorro obtained a degree in political science from McGill University in Montreal. In 1976, he obtained a master's degree in business administration from the Central American Institute of Business Administration.

ARISTIDES SANCHEZ

Age 41. In 1969, Sanchez obtained a Doctor of Law degree from the Central American University. In 1970, he was named Counselor of the Nicaraguan Embassy to the Vatican. In 1980, Sandinista repression forced him into exile in Guatemala, where he dedicated himself to helping organize resistance forces. In 1983, Sanchez participated in the founding of the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN), a nationalist movement to further the struggle against the Sandinista regime. He was a member of the political junta of the FDN. Later, this was restructured into a directorate of seven members, of which he became General Secretary

NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE

DIRECTORATE

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <u>Adolfo Calero</u> | <u>Aristides Sanchez</u> | <u>Alfonso Robelo</u> | <u>Azucena Ferrey</u> | <u>Alfredo Cesar</u> | <u>Pedro Joaquin Chamorro</u> |
| Conservative | Liberal | Social Democrat | Social Christian | Southern Opposition Bloc | At Large |

ASSEMBLY

| | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Conservatives</u> | <u>Liberals</u> | <u>Social Democrats</u> | <u>Social Christians</u> | |
| 6 members | 6 members | 6 members | 6 members | |
| <u>Southern Opposition Bloc</u> | <u>Atlantic Coast</u> | <u>Labor</u> | <u>Private Business</u> | <u>Agrarian</u> |
| 6 members | 6 members | 6 members | 6 members | 6 members |

NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| <u>Northern Front</u> | <u>Southern Front</u> | <u>Atlantic Front</u> |
| Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) | Southern Opposition Bloc (BOS) | YATAMA |