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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ben Elliot,

10/15

You sounded a little surprised when I called. Bud, who is with Pres now, asks that I send this material over to you for editing. He wants to give this to Pres in the morning through Dick.
J?

The Four Basic Themes

There are four mutually reinforcing ways to keep the peace:

- Through strength and steadiness.
- Through the help of friends and allies.
- Through crisis prevention.
- Through the promotion of democracy, so that an environment conducive to peace can endure.

Although we have strong rebuttal material for the charges Mr. Mondale will level (on U.S.-Soviet relations, Central America and the Middle East), the core achievements of the Reagan record can be found in these themes. They deserve to be emphasized and reemphasized and can serve as answers, or partial answers, to many of the questions you will receive.

Tone and self-confidence will often be as important as substance in throwing back the challenge. We're militarizing Central America? Hardly. Nicaragua's armed forces are larger than all the others combined. Our policy is democracy. No Camp Davids? We've spent four hard years preserving Camp David and making it work against forces who wanted to tear it down. Talks with the Soviet Union? Our record is clear. But it takes more than talk. Or do you forget, Mr. Mondale, that the Carter-Brezhnev "kiss" of Vienna was followed by Afghanistan. Arms control? Of course we're for it. But your agreement was so one-sided it had to be withdrawn. And previous "arms control" allowed nuclear arms to increase by 500 percent. Now there's something awfully wrong with Mr. Mondale's version of arms control. And so on.

In stressing these themes, we refer frequently to the mess you inherited. Mondale will no doubt reply that the issue is your record and the future. Don't be thrown off-track. I recommend that you take the initiative and respond to this along the following lines: "Let's be clear at the outset. I am running on my record and my goals for the future. I'm not running on the back of Mondale-Carter failures. But part of my record consists of turning around the failures they left me. And if Mr. Mondale thinks I'm not going to honestly describe where we started -- and how far we've come -- he's mistaken."

TAB I

THEMES

Peace Through Steadiness and Strength

I believe peace can best be assured by steadiness and strength. Four years ago both were in short supply. Our strategic systems were aging and defense spending was at the lowest point in forty years. Readiness was low and morale was worse. We had no leverage for arms control. After all, what incentive could the Soviets have to talk as long as we appeared to be disarming ourselves? Finally, our strategic posture was crumbling around the world.

We've turned it around. Not one inch of territory has been lost to Soviet aggression. Indeed, Grenada has been recovered and the freedom fighters of Afghanistan show inspiring strength. Modernization is working. Our airmen will soon have a replacement for the B-52, a plane older than the pilots who fly them. Enlistments are up. Drug addiction is down. And readiness is steadily improving. I don't have to draw the bottom line, because you've guessed it already: men and women are proud to serve their country again and morale is terrific.

Why would anyone want to go back? Mr. Mondale wants to start canceling things again. Cancel the B-1. Stop strategic modernization. He wants you to believe we're squandering money on nuclear forces, but doesn't tell you that over four-fifths of the defense budget goes for people and conventional defense. Mr. Mondale talks about the future. I've built for it. I stood my ground and insisted that our defenses be refurbished. And it is precisely these strengthened defenses that future Presidents can rely on to keep the peace. I would never leave for them the weakened forces that were left for me.

It's not enough to be strong; you have to be steady. Mr. Mondale has said I'm preoccupied by security issues. What he's really saying is: I've refused to ignore them. We believe that if you take the security of your friends seriously, they'll return the favor. And we also believe that if you help them work at improving their security -- day in and day out -- you can build confidence and keep the peace. Be steady. Be persistent.

Mr. Mondale, on the other hand, is always discovering security threats too late. He did it in Afghanistan. And now he says he might quarantine Nicaragua. At what risk? With how many ships? Doesn't he realize our whole policy of help is aimed at preventing precisely this kind of escalation? More recently, Mr. Mondale's running mate discovered the American people were questioning where she stood on defense. She sought to reassure them by saying she could push the nuclear button as quickly as anyone else. That's not what being President is about.

Peace Through Allies and Friends

The United States cannot keep the peace alone. We need our friends and our allies. But they need something from us, too: reliability and a willingness to help solve problems.

Four years ago our position in the world had crumbled. The Soviets were moving boldly in Ethiopia and Yemen, improving their ability to choke off vital waterways. Iran fell in the face of American weakness and, not surprisingly, Afghanistan fell shortly thereafter. These failures were compounded by foolish threats to jerk troops out of Korea and by blowing hot and cold toward important NATO decisions. Our economy was a mess and we were dragging others down with us. Gas lines were frequent. And inflation was increasing. Emboldened by success abroad, the Soviets and their friends decided to transform Nicaragua and Grenada into instruments for subversion in our own hemisphere. Stopping this drift was thought to be unfashionable by the Mondale-Carter team. They thought talk was the answer, and spent more time heaping abuse on our friends than in helping them. Around the world our friends had the jitters; and around the world a crucial political question was being raised: Does it pay to be a friend of the United States?

We've turned that around. When the Soviets tried to intimidate NATO on Pershing missiles and arms control, we stood our ground: Either talks occur or the Soviet monopoly will be ended. Today the alliance is in better shape than ever and we can look forward to talking from a position of strength. Likewise, when six East Caribbean countries called for help over Grenada, we were there. Instead of quarreling with our friends over nuclear power, we're working with them on the real problem -- stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable parts of the world. When Saudi Arabia asked for help to deter Iran, we sent it. Gas lines have ended. When Sudan asked for warning aircraft to hold off Qadhafi, they were dispatched. When Egypt needed minesweeping forces, they came on time.

Our economy is lifting the world out of depression. We're treating Israel the way we should have all along -- as a strategic ally. We didn't duck this one, like the past Administration. After KAL I went to Asia to ensure our friends we stood with them. Moreover, I didn't scare South Korea with talk of pullouts. I gave support. And today South Korea feels confident enough to talk to the North. We've also strengthened relations with China, but not at the expense of friends on Taiwan. If you travel to the region today you will hear one theme: "We're glad America is back as a partner in the Pacific." And indeed this is the same message you will hear around the world.

Peace Through Crisis Prevention

Coping with crises is important. But an even greater test of leadership is preventing them from happening at all. We've done this in case after case. Let me mention just four. As in the memorable Sherlock Holmes tale: These are the "dogs that don't bark." At least they don't bark in Mr. Mondale's campaign.

Gaslines. Americans no longer have to get up at 5:00 a.m. to wait in line for gas, despite the fact that the war between Iran and Iraq continues. This isn't just luck. It's because our presence has helped to keep the war from spilling over and affecting other suppliers. It's because we gave the Gulf states the tools to better defend themselves. It's because we rebuilt our petroleum reserve and encouraged others to do so. And it's because all of these actions combined to build confidence in the market.

Suez Mining. Recently, some radical force tried again. Knowing we had kept the Persian Gulf open, they tried to close the Red Sea -- other vital trade artery. Our friends in the region had enough confidence in us to ask for our help. We were there and our allies came with us. We got there fast. And got the job done without fanfare or incident.

Debt Crisis. Remember too -- a short while ago -- all those articles on the world's debt crisis. Remember as well those confident predictions that Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (with debt totalling over \$200 billion) would default and plunge the banking system into chaos. It hasn't happened. And, once again, it wasn't luck. At my request, the Secretary of the Treasury went to work with leaders of the world financial community to keep it from happening: not with bail-outs, but with sensible plans to promote greater financial stability. I didn't sit around studying the problem for two years. I saw the problem: and I fixed it.

Grenada. I acted in time to save our students on Grenada and to stop a brutal Marxist dictatorship from a beginning campaign of violence against the peaceful islands of the Caribbean. I made the decision to move myself, late at night when the request for help came. For two days I was criticized. But when it became clear what we prevented, when our students came home, I was praised. Mr. Mondale now says he thinks the decision was right. Though his running mate appears not to have made up her mind yet. Hindsight doesn't count for much when you're President, Mr. Mondale. You have to act in time. Before small problems turn into big ones.

Peace Through the Promotion and Defense of Democracy

We are working for peace around the world. In looking to the future we recognize that the growth of democracy is the surest foundation of all for a more peaceful world order. It's also the firmest guarantee of human rights. That's why I have worked hard to promote democracy, beginning with my speech in London and by holding an international conference on elections. And that's also why I have not hesitated to try to defend democracy when it is threatened. The Carter-Mondale administration believed in democracy, too; but they mistakenly thought it could be achieved by shouting at our friends, rather than helping them.

We've turned this approach around. And it's working. Our NATO ally, Turkey, has fought off terrorism and is restoring democratic rule. In our own hemisphere over 90 percent of the people are either living in democracies or in countries with a firm timetable toward democracy. Dictators are being replaced by popular leaders, as we are seeing in Grenada. Elections are being held in Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and other countries. In El Salvador, President Duarte has turned the tide and is taking courageous new steps to bring the rebels into the democratic process. Indeed, I can sum up our policy in the hemisphere in one word -- and that word is democracy.

Liberty's friends will fail, however, if we fail them. That's why we are helping others resist the crushing of free opposition in Nicaragua. And that's why we have worked so hard to be able to give assistance to those threatened by the Sandinistas, the PLO, the Cubans and the Soviets. The issue, Mr. Mondale, is not whether we're willing to send our good wishes, the issue is whether we care enough about democracy to help.

TAB II

FUTURE



Foreign Policy and the Future

The future should be an important question in any campaign. I have spent four years rebuilding American strength and reliability, creating prosperity, promoting democracy, and preventing crises. When I look to the future, I see more of the same. Am I supposed to be ashamed of this? Mr. Mondale says he's looking to the future too. But his vision of the future is largely a rerun of the past: tax the people, pull the string on our friends, stop our defense program and hope it will lead to arms control. Of course he dresses this up in the more sophisticated language of moratoria and dialogue, but the net result is the same. I'm not embarrassed to tell you my vision of the future will be built on the progress of the last four years. But he should be embarrassed to tell you his future is built on the failed concepts of four years ago.

Still, let me be precise in stating just some of the objectives I have:

- I want to see if we can't make the 80's the decade of democracy in this hemisphere. We're on our way, and I plan to offer new incentives for progress.
- I want to reduce nuclear weapons and move further away from doctrines of mutual annihilation. I want to use technology to increase conventional deterrence in NATO and to explore defenses against incoming missiles.
- I want to keep our own prosperity on track and see if we can't find some quiet ways to lift the economies of Europe further up with our own.
- We made some strides in curbing nuclear proliferation -- the first suppliers meeting in seven years -- and I want to build on this with new incentives for restraint and new penalties for safeguards violations.
- We've defused the world debt crisis, but in my second term I want to see if we can't find an enduring solution.
- I've convinced the other democracies that terrorism -- just like skyjacking -- cannot be solved until we work together. The foundation for that cooperation is in place. I want to break the back of the terrorist problem in my second term.
- We will continue to promote peace wherever it is threatened: in the Middle East, in South Africa, in the Gulf. Even if we cannot make peace overnight, we will try to prevent new hostilities.
- We've restored our alliances and friendships all over the world. But too many of our friends -- like Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan -- are still embroiled in disputes with one another. We would like to help stabilize partnerships around the world, by making a new and concentrated effort to solve some of the problems that keep our friends from working together.

TAB III

FOUR SPECIFIC CHALLENGES

III

Arms Control

Mr. Mondale tells us we have had fifteen years of arms control before I came to office. Well, I appreciate the reminder. And let me remind him that in those fifteen years the world has witnessed a Soviet military buildup that is the largest in the history of the world -- including a more than 500 percent increase in missile warheads. Now something's wrong -- indeed, very wrong -- with this kind of arms control. The Democratic Senate of 1979 knew there was something wrong, too, because they refused to ratify the agreement the Carter-Mondale team brought to the table.

Getting an agreement is not the issue. We could probably sign an agreement tomorrow by giving the Soviets enough of what they want. The issue is getting a good agreement. And that means, among other things, a verifiable one. Mr. Mondale is so desperate for an agreement that he is ready to start freezing and agreeing to moratoria. But if he's talking about a mutual freeze -- and not just a unilateral one -- then how does he plan to verify it? For a fully verifiable mutual freeze is like asking for red-hot, solid ice -- you just can't get it. And even if you could, wouldn't it be better to work for real reductions? What about those one-sided moratoria as a sign of good will? John Kennedy tried that once, and admitted later he'd never make the same mistake again. Did President Carter's unilateral termination of the B-1 lead to Soviet reciprocation? Of course not. They pocketed the concession and went looking for another.

I want nothing more than to have as my legacy serious progress in nuclear arms control. Yes, I see the importance of this today more than ever. And that's part of the reason I've worked so hard to stop nuclear proliferation to unstable regimes, even as we waited for the Soviets to agree to talks. But the proposals I've put on the table have all been good ones. Mr. Mondale seems to think a proposal is no good unless the Soviets snap it right up. Mr. Mondale says my START proposal is unfair because it emphasizes Soviet heavy missiles. But these are the most destabilizing weapons in today's arsenal. Should I apologize for wanting an agreement to make things safer?

That gets us back to the core of the issue. I want arms control that makes us safer. That's the primary criterion by which I evaluate any arms control proposal, and -- by the way -- it's also my criterion for judging defense programs. That's why I want to explore new technologies that might one day give us some defense against incoming missiles -- missiles that might just as easily come from Libya or a terrorist group as from the Soviet Union. Mr. Mondale thinks it's wrong to even ask if we can defend ourselves. His answer is more of the same. Cosmetic agreements, and reliance on the threat to kill innocent civilians as a basis for strategy. That's a pretty gloomy future. Mr. Mondale's strategy won't end the arms race. It will only guarantee that the race remains one-sided -- with the Soviets racing ahead and us stumbling behind. I want agreements that are better. And I'm going to get them.

Relations with the Soviet Union

We seek stable relations with the Soviet Union based on reciprocity and restraint. We can succeed if we are steady and maintain bipartisan support. But we must learn from history and understand what works and what doesn't.

Mr. Mondale harps at talking. He thinks we should have talked more even though the Soviets have had three different leaders while I have been President. Communication is crucial, but there are times when talk doesn't help. Jimmy Carter met in Vienna for a famous summit with Brezhnev. The summit ended with a kiss. Six months later the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. And Carter-Mondale brought back an arms agreement their own Senate wouldn't approve. I've avoided the kiss. And I've avoided one-sided agreements -- and maybe that's why no new Afghanistans have occurred. The signals the Soviets get from me are clear. We're always ready to deal, but always on fair terms.

Yes, we want constructive relations. And I believe we are in the best position in decades to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a sound and enduring basis. This is because of our strength. And it is because the next Soviet leadership is certain to face a momentous choice between continued deprivation of its own people and a reordering of national priorities. We have no illusion we can change the Soviet system; that is their job. But we must understand what this process can mean for our own policy.

I draw from this two conclusions. First, we don't want to mislead the Soviets into believing they can avoid new priorities at home as a result of one-sided U.S. concessions and false detente. Where their policy leaves us no alternative, we are committed to compete. But, second, we won't turn away from small steps as long as they are forward ones -- not false ones. That is why we have focused on issues like confidence-building and the hot line even as the Soviet leadership underwent many changes. Only if we obey both rules can our policy succeed.

When Mr. Gromyko came to Washington, this was the message I gave him. If the Soviets are ready to solve problems, we will meet them halfway. We're looking for peace, not one-sided gains. And they had better be too.

Middle East

First, let's get rid of myths. We have a strategy for the Middle East. It's a strategy of strengthening moderates so they can resist extremists. That's why we've opposed Qadhafi. It's a strategy of deepening cooperation with Israel, so that Israel can have greater confidence and security. And it's a strategy of preventing drift toward a new war, while quietly building the conditions for future peace.

Peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed. Those who imply that it can are the same people who would deliver Israel to its enemies on a platter. There are times for reaching agreement, and times for doing the hard and thankless work of laying the foundation for future agreement. This is exactly what we have done.

I'm prepared to give President Carter credit for Camp David. But why does Mr. Mondale refuse to see all we have done to preserve that agreement against the forces that have tried to tear it down? It was my decision to put U.S. peace-keeping forces in the Sinai -- a decision greatly debated in the closing days of the Carter term -- that helped make Camp David stick.

I'm also tired of Mr. Mondale talking about the Middle East in a way that omits our crisis management in the Persian Gulf, our ending gas lines, our economic help for Israel, the growing recognition of Egypt, our support for moderates against Libya, our help for Sudan and our successful efforts to clear the Red Sea of mines. Let's not forget that the most important provision of Camp David is unwritten -- that it works only if the U.S. is active and engaged.

Lebanon and Terrorism

Mr. Mondale has talked repeatedly about Beirut. But when people reflect on what he is saying I think they will quickly realize the point he thinks is his best, is readily his weakest.

We tried in Lebanon to do two things. First, to achieve a PLO pullout from Beirut without the need for an Israeli military attack that would have cost thousands of lives. We succeeded in that and our friends in the Middle East are safer because we did. Our second objective was to help the government of Lebanon strengthen itself so that it could establish control of its own country. That has been a disappointment.

But let's not miss the central point. Our country's strategy for promoting peace is based on helping others and on giving them the best possible chance. We can't impose peace. And we can't do for others what they are unable to do for themselves.

Our Marines went to Lebanon to give peace a chance -- and they did that. We understood the difficulties when we went in; and we understood when the circumstances demanded a change of course. Both actions required decisiveness. Yes, there truly are times when trying by itself counts for much. This was one such time. And our friends in the region know this.

Of course the repeated bombings are tragic. And of course in hindsight there is always more one wishes one could have done. Mr. Mondale apparently wants me to pillory people for not sitting in Washington second-guessing our officials in Beirut. Their lives were on the line. Does Mr. Mondale think they had some special incentive to downplay the threat? Our diplomats don't want to live in a bunker. And who can blame them? Terrorism, Mr. Mondale, is a global problem. In the last six months we've seen 37 attacks in 20 countries.

Solving the terrorist problem will require the same approach used in the Sixties to greatly reduce skyjacking. The threatened countries of the world have to band together and agree not to harbor terrorists and to help to track and apprehend them. This was my goal at the London Summit, and my message is taking hold.

Mr. Mondale suggests Lebanon means we weren't standing tall. But here again he misses the point. Standing tall doesn't mean guaranteed success. It means facing up to problems, rather than blaming them on the malaise of our own people; and it means accepting occasional setbacks as an inevitable price of trying to ensure a more stable world.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: ^{Bud} BOB SIMS

SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Debate

Some items for your checkoff list:

- Debate Prep Panelists: When you have selected those who will ask the questions Wednesday and Thursday, I'd like to consult with them about most likely questions and who will cover which subject areas.
- Debate Format. In the VP's prep sessions, we were told the panelists were required to ask exactly the same general question to each candidate, with different followups. In the debate, it was not done that way. Makes a great deal of difference how you frame the questions in the prep sessions. I assume that on the 21st panelists will ask different questions and followups, as they did in the VP event. Can we nail down this groundrule?
- Debate Panelists: When we have some agreed upon, I'd like to know. I will then research and advise on what areas they are most likely to ask about.
- First Theme Meeting: Will there be an agenda on Wednesday?
- Issue Papers: Have we covered everything, or are there other subjects on which you want papers?
- RR Winners: Assume additional one-liners will be coming from the Campaign directly to you.
- Closing Statement.
- Press Plan: Larry has my tentative White House plan, which Bud has also seen.
 - o It's similar to last time, but we are recommending that you talk to the magazines late in the week to get preliminaries out of the way so Sunday night's backgrounder can deal with analysis of the debate itself.
 - o We also have to note the added media interest in this debate, and be prepared to have people available for television before the debate as well as after. The buildup, in fact, is already well underway as Sunday's TV talk shows indicated.

Bud RCM HAS SEEN
FYI
Bob

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Tone and self-confidence will often be as important as substance in throwing back the challenge. We're militarizing Central America? Hardly. Nicaragua's armed forces are larger than all the others combined. Our policy is democracy. No Camp Davids? We've spent four hard years preserving Camp David and making it work against forces who wanted to tear it down. Talks with the Soviet Union? Our record is clear. But it takes more than talk. Or do you forget, Mr. Mondale, that the Carter-Brezhnev "kiss" of Vienna was followed by Afghanistan. Arms control? Of course we're for it. But your agreement was so one-sided it had to be withdrawn. And previous "arms control" allowed nuclear arms to increase by 500 percent. Now there's something awfully wrong with Mr. Mondale's version of arms control. And so on.

In stressing these themes, we refer frequently to the mess you inherited. Mondale will no doubt reply that the issue is your record and the future. Don't be thrown off-track. I recommend that you take the initiative and respond to this along the following lines: "Let's be clear at the outset. I am running on my record and my goals for the future. I'm not running on the back of Mondale-Carter failures. But part of my record consists of turning around the failures they left me. And if Mr. Mondale thinks I'm not going to honestly describe where we started -- and how far we've come -- he's mistaken."

Peace Through Steadiness and Strength

The surest path to peace is steadiness and strength. FDR, Truman, Kennedy and Scoop Jackson all understood this. My opponent never has. His voting record on defense was more than bad. It placed him in the far-left wing of the Democratic party. If all his votes against modernizing our defense had been passed, America today would be impotent in the world. Four years ago when our defenses had fallen into terrible neglect, when defense spending reached the lowest point in forty years, readiness was low, and morale was worse, he was still resisting doing what needed to be done. We had no leverage for arms control, because the Soviets saw we were disarming ourselves. And we saw Communist takeovers in a new country every year between 1977 - 1980.

Well, we've turned all that around. Not one inch of territory has been lost to Soviet aggression. Grenada has been set free and the freedom fighters of Afghanistan show inspiring strength. Modernization is working. Our airmen will soon have a replacement for the B-52, a plane older than the pilots who fly them. Enlistments are up. Drug addiction is down. And readiness is steadily improving. America has regained strength, confidence and respect. Our young men and women are proud to serve their country again and they're the best we've ever had.

Why would we want to go back? Mr. Mondale would go right back to canceling things again. Cancel the B-1. Stop strategic modernization. His proposals reflect what Senator John Glenn has called "a fundamental lack of support for an adequate national defense." He wants you to believe we're squandering money on nuclear forces, but doesn't tell you that over four-fifths of the defense budget goes for people and conventional defense. Mr. Mondale talks about the future. I've built for it. I stood my ground and insisted that our defenses be strengthened. And it is these strengthened defenses that future Presidents can rely on to keep the peace. I would never leave for them the weakened forces that my opponent left for me.

It's not enough to be strong; you have to be steady. Mr. Mondale has said I'm preoccupied by security issues. What he's really saying is: I've refused to ignore them. We believe that if you take the security of your friends seriously, they'll return the favor. And we also believe that if you help them work at improving their security -- day in and day out -- you can build confidence and keep the peace. That is happening today; it wasn't happening four years ago.

My opponent, on the other hand, is always discovering security threats too late. He did it in Afghanistan. And now he says he might quarantine Nicaragua. At what risk? With how many ships? Our whole policy of help is aimed at preventing precisely this kind of escalation? More recently, Mr. Mondale's running mate discovered the American people were questioning where she stood on defense. She sought to reassure them by saying she could push the nuclear button as quickly as anyone else. That's not what being President is about.

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Four years ago our position in the world had crumbled. The Soviets were moving in Ethiopia and Yemen, strengthening their ability to choke off vital waterways. Iran fell in the face of American weakness and, then Afghanistan fell. These failures were compounded by foolish threats to jerk troops out of Korea, by blowing hot and cold toward important NATO decisions. Our economy was a disaster and we were dragging others down with us. Gas lines, runaway inflation, 21½ percent interest rates and collapsing growth -- but my opponent was wringing his hands saying there was no solution. The Soviets and their friends decided to use Nicaragua and Grenada as staging areas for subversion in our own hemisphere. Stopping this drift was thought to be unfashionable by the Mondale-Carter team. They thought talk was the answer, and spent more time heaping abuse on our friends than in helping them. Around the world our friends had lost confidence in America, and more and more were asking: Does it pay to be a friend of the United States?

Well we've turned that around. When the Soviets tried to intimidate NATO on Pershing missiles and arms control, we stood our ground: Either talks occur or the Soviet monopoly will be ended. Today the alliance is in much better shape than if we'd followed my opponent's policy of unilateral concessions in return for vague hints of Soviet goodwill. And, now, we can look forward to talking from a position of strength. Likewise, when six East Caribbean countries called for help over Grenada, we were there. Instead of quarreling with our friends over nuclear power, we're working with them on the real problem -- stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable parts of the world. When Saudi Arabia asked for help to deter Iran, we sent help. Gas lines have ended. When Sudan asked for warning aircraft to hold off Qadhafi, they were dispatched. When Egypt needed minesweeping forces, they came on time.

Our economy is leading the world out of recession. We're treating Israel the way we should have all along -- as a strategic ally. We didn't duck this one, like the past Administration. After KAL I went to Asia to ensure our friends we stood with them. Moreover, I didn't scare South Korea with talk of pullouts. I gave support. And today South Korea feels confident enough to talk to the North. We've also strengthened relations with China, but not at the expense of our friends on Taiwan. If you travel to the region today you will hear one theme: "We're glad America is back as a partner in the Pacific." And that's the same message you will hear around the world.

Peace Through the Promotion and Defense of Democracy

We are working for peace around the world. In looking to the future we recognize that the growth of democracy is the surest foundation of all for a more peaceful world order. It's also the firmest guarantee of human rights. That's why I have worked hard to promote democracy, beginning with my speech in London and by holding an international conference on elections. And that's also why I have not hesitated to try to defend democracy when it is threatened. The Carter-Mondale administration said it supported democracy, too; but they mistakenly thought it could be achieved by shouting at our friends, rather than helping them.

We've turned this approach around. And it's working. Our NATO ally, Turkey, has fought off terrorism and is restoring democratic rule. In our own hemisphere over 90 percent of the people are either living in democracies or in countries with a firm timetable toward democracy. Dictators are being replaced by popular leaders, as we are seeing in Grenada. Elections are being held in Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and other countries. In El Salvador, President Duarte is turning the tide, taking courageous new steps to bring the rebels into the democratic process. And the reason he can is that we have provided him the support he needed to negotiate from strength. My opponent would not have held firm. I can sum up our policy in the hemisphere in one word -- and that word is democracy.

Liberty's friends will fail, however, if we fail them. That's why we are helping others resist the crushing of free opposition in Nicaragua. And that's why we have worked so hard to be able to give assistance to those threatened by the Sandinistas, the PLO, the Cubans and the Soviets. The issue, Mr. Mondale, is not whether we're willing to send our good wishes, the issue is whether we care enough about freedom and democracy to help.

Peace Through Crisis Prevention

Coping with crises is important. But an even greater test of leadership is preventing them from happening at all. We've done this in case after case. Let me mention just four. As in the memorable Sherlock Holmes tale: These are the "dogs that don't bark." At least they don't bark in Mr. Mondale's campaign.

Gaslines. Americans no longer have to get up at 5:00 a.m. to wait in line for gas, despite the fact that the war between Iran and Iraq continues. This isn't just luck. It's because our presence has helped to keep the war from spilling over and affecting other suppliers. It's because we gave the Gulf states the tools to better defend themselves. It's because we rebuilt our petroleum reserve and encouraged others to do so. And it's because all of these actions combined to build confidence in the market.

Suez Mining. Recently, some radical force tried again. Knowing we had kept the Persian Gulf open, they tried to close the Red Sea -- another vital trade artery. Our friends in the region had enough confidence in us to ask for our help. We were there and our allies came with us. We got there fast. And got the job done without fanfare or incident.

Debt Crisis. Remember too -- a short while ago -- all those articles on the world's debt crisis. Remember as well those confident predictions that Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (with debt totalling over \$200 billion) would default and plunge the banking system into chaos. It hasn't happened. And, once again, it wasn't luck. At my request, the Secretary of the Treasury went to work with leaders of the world financial community to keep it from happening: not with bail-outs, but with sensible plans to promote greater financial stability. I didn't sit around studying the problem for two years. I saw the problem: and we're fixing it.

Grenada. I acted in time to save our students on Grenada and to stop a brutal Marxist dictatorship from a beginning campaign of violence against the peaceful islands of the Caribbean. I made the decision to move myself, late at night when the request for help came. For two days I was criticized. But when it became clear what we prevented, when our students came home, I was praised. It took Mr. Mondale 18 days to decide that maybe our students had been in danger, and we were right to take action. Though his running mate appears not to have made up her mind yet. Hindsight doesn't count for much when you're President, Mr. Mondale. You have to act in time. Before small problems turn into big ones.

Foreign Policy and the Future

20

The future is the central question in any campaign. We have spent four years putting America back together rebuilding American strength and reliability, creating prosperity, promoting democracy, and preventing crises. Today, America is at peace and our economy is in one piece. When I look to the future, I see stronger American leadership for peace, freedom and prosperity. Mr. Mondale says he's looking to the future too. But his vision of the future is a rerun of this failed past: tax the people, pull the string on our friends, stop our defense program and hope it will lead to arms control. Of course he dresses this up with rhetoric about strength and commitment, but the net result is the same. I'm not embarrassed to tell you my vision of the future will be built on the progress of the last four years. But he should be embarrassed to try to convince you any future can be built on the failed concepts of four years ago.

Still, let me be precise in stating just some of the objectives I have:

- I want to see the 80's the decade of democracy in this hemisphere. We're on our way, and I plan to offer new incentives for progress.
- I want to reduce nuclear weapons and move further away from doctrines of mutual annihilation. I want to use technology to increase conventional deterrence in NATO and to explore defenses against incoming missiles.
- I want to see our economic expansion continue to build by lowering further the tax rates on our people. This will strengthen even more American economic leadership in the world, helping lift the economies of other nations.
- We made some strides in curbing nuclear proliferation -- the first suppliers meeting in seven years -- and I want to build on this with new incentives for restraint and new penalties for safeguards violations.
- We've defused the world debt crisis, but in my second term I want to see if we can't find an enduring solution.
- I've convinced the other democracies that terrorism -- just like skyjacking -- cannot be solved until we work together. The foundation for that cooperation is in place. I want to break the back of the terrorist problem in my second term.
- We will continue to promote peace wherever it is threatened: in the Middle East, in South Africa, in the Gulf. Even if we cannot make peace overnight, we will try to prevent new hostilities.
- We've restored our alliances and friendships all over the world. But too many of our friends -- like Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan -- are still embroiled in disputes with one another. We would like to help stabilize partnerships around the world, by making a new and concentrated effort to solve some of the problems that keep our friends from working together.

Arms Control

Mr. Mondale tells us we have had fifteen years of arms control before I came to office. Well, I appreciate the reminder. And let me remind him that in those fifteen years the world has witnessed a Soviet military buildup that is the largest in the history of the world -- including a more than 500 percent increase in missile warheads. Now something's wrong -- indeed, very wrong -- with this kind of arms control. The Democratic Senate of 1979 knew there was something wrong, too, because they refused to ratify the agreement the Carter-Mondale team brought to the table.

Getting an agreement is not the issue. We could probably sign an agreement tomorrow by giving the Soviets enough of what they want. The issue is getting a good agreement. And that means, among other things, a verifiable one. Mr. Mondale is so desperate for an agreement that he is ready to start freezing and agreeing to moratoria. But when he talks about a mutual freeze -- and not just a unilateral one -- then how does he plan to verify it? Mr. Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of his Administration has stated that this would be impossible. And even if you could, wouldn't it be better to work for real reductions? What about his unilateral moratoria as a sign of good will? John Kennedy tried that once, and admitted later he'd never make the same mistake again. Did President Carter's unilateral termination of the B-1 lead to Soviet reciprocity? Of course not. They pocketed the concession and went looking for another. But Mr. Mondale, unlike President Kennedy, has not learned from history.

I want nothing more than to have as my legacy serious progress in nuclear arms control. Yes, I see the importance of this today more than ever. And that's part of the reason I've worked so hard to stop nuclear proliferation to unstable regimes, even as we waited for the Soviets to agree to talks. But the proposals I've put on the table have all been good ones. Mr. Mondale seems to think a proposal is no good unless the Soviets snap it right up. When they don't, or walk out of negotiations he blames America first. Mr. Mondale says my START proposal is unfair because it emphasizes Soviet heavy missiles. But these are the most destabilizing weapons in today's arsenal. Should I apologize for wanting an agreement to make things safer?

That gets us back to the core of the issue. I want arms control that makes us safer. That's the primary criterion by which I evaluate any arms control proposal, and -- by the way -- it's also my criterion for judging defense programs. That's why I want to explore new technologies that might one day give us some defense against incoming missiles -- missiles that might just as easily come from Libya or a terrorist group as from the Soviet Union. Mr. Mondale thinks it's wrong to even ask if we can defend ourselves. His answer is more of the same. Cosmetic agreements, and naive reliance on the threat to kill innocent civilians as a basis for strategy. That's a pretty gloomy future. Mr. Mondale's strategy won't end the arms race. It will only guarantee that the race remains one-sided -- with the Soviets racing ahead and us stumbling behind. I want agreements that are better. And I'm going to get them.

Relations with the Soviet Union

We seek stable relations with the Soviet Union based on reciprocity and restraint. We can succeed if we are steady and maintain bipartisan support. But we must learn from history and understand what works and what doesn't.

At no time in his political career has Mr. Mondale shown that he is "on to our adversaries" as he so often says. This is a man who has said the days of Soviet suppression by force are over. That was before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan he said it just baffles me why they act the way they do. Why do they have to build up all those arms? But far from learning from his mistakes he continued to oppose the long overdue defense rebuilding program for America.

Today Mr. Mondale's first priority is to sit down with the Soviets. That's fine, but first you have to prove you can stand up to them -- and this, Mr. Mondale, you have never done.

Mr. Mondale harps at talking. He thinks we should have talked more even though the Soviets have had three different leaders while I have been President. Communication is crucial, but there are times when talk doesn't help. Jimmy Carter met in Vienna for a famous summit with Brezhnev. The summit ended with a kiss. Six months later the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. And Carter-Mondale brought back an arms agreement their own Senate wouldn't approve. We've avoided the kiss. And we've avoided one-sided agreements -- and maybe that's why no new Afghanistans have occurred. The signals the Soviets get from America now are clear. We're always ready to deal, but only on fair terms.

Yes, we want constructive relations. And I believe we are in the best position in decades to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a sound and enduring basis. This is because of our strength -- strength we didn't have four years ago. And it is because the next Soviet leadership is certain to face a momentous choice between continued deprivation of its own people and a reordering of national priorities. We have no illusion we can change the Soviet system; that is their job. But we must understand what this process can mean for our own policy.

I draw from this two conclusions. First, we don't want to mislead the Soviets into believing they can avoid new priorities at home as a result of one-sided U.S. concessions and false detente. Where their policy leaves us no alternative, we are committed to compete. But, second, we won't turn away from small steps as long as they are forward ones -- not false ones. That is why we have focused on issues like confidence-building and the hot line even as the Soviet leadership underwent many changes. Only if we obey both rules can our policy succeed.

When Mr. Gromyko came to Washington, this was the message I gave him. If the Soviets are ready to solve problems, we will meet them halfway. If the Soviet Government wants peace, then there will be peace. We're looking for peace, not one-sided gains. And they had better be too.

Middle East

First, our strategy for the Middle East is one of strengthening moderates so they can resist extremists. That's why we've opposed Qadhafi. It's a strategy of deepening cooperation with Israel, so that Israel can have greater confidence and security. And it's a strategy of preventing drift toward a new war, while quietly building the conditions for future peace.

Peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed. Those who imply that it can are the same people who would deliver Israel to its enemies on a platter. There are times for reaching agreement, and times for doing the hard and thankless work of laying the foundation for future agreement. This is exactly what we have done.

I'm prepared to give President Carter credit for Camp David. But we have preserved that agreement against the forces that have tried to tear it down. It was my decision to put U.S. peace-keeping forces in the Sinai -- a decision greatly debated in the closing days of the Carter term -- that helped make Camp David stick.

I'm also tired of Mr. Mondale talking about the Middle East in a way that omits our crisis management in the Persian Gulf, our ending gas lines, our economic help for Israel, the growing recognition of Egypt, our support for moderates against Libya, our help for Sudan and our successful efforts to clear the Red Sea of mines. Let's not forget that the most important provision of Camp David is unwritten -- that it works only if the U.S. is active and engaged.

Lebanon and Terrorism

Mr. Mondale has talked repeatedly about Beirut. But when people reflect on what he is saying I think they will quickly realize the point he thinks is his best, is readlly his weakest.

We tried in Lebanon to do two things. First, to achieve a PLO pullout from Beirut without the need for an Israeli military attack that would have cost thousands of lives. We succeeded in that and our friends in the Middle East are safer because we did. Our second objective was to help the government of Lebanon strengthen itself so that it could establish control of its own country. That has been a disappointment.

But let's not miss the central point. Our country's strategy for promoting peace is based on helping others and on giving them the best possible chance. We can't impose peace. And we can't do for others what they are unable to do for themselves.

Our Marines went to Lebanon just as the French, British and Italian forces did, to give peace a chance -- and all of us did that. We understood the difficulties when we went in; and we understood when the circumstances demanded a change of course. Both actions required decisiveness. Yes, there truly are times when trying by itself counts for much. This was one such time. And our friends in the region know this.

Of course the repeated bombings are tragic. And of course in hindsight there is always more one wishes one could have done. Mr. Mondale apparently wants me to pillory people for not sitting in Washington second-guessing our officals in Beirut. Their lives were on the line. Does Mr. Mondale think they had some special incentive to downplay the threat? Our diplomats don't want to live in a bunker. And who can blame them? Terrorism, Mr. Mondale, as we've seen repeatedly in Italy, Germany and more recently in England, is a global problem. Since the first of September there have been over 40 terrorist attacks by no less than 13 terrorist groups against the citizens and property of twenty nations.

Solving the terrorist problem will require the same approach used in the Sixties to greatly reduce skyjacking. The threatened countries of the world have to band together and agree not to harbor terrorists and to help to track and apprehend them. This was my goal at the London Summit, and my message is taking hold.

Mr. Mondale suggests Lebanon means we weren't standing tall. But here again he misses the point. Standing tall doesn't mean guaranteed success. It means facing up to problems, rather than blaming them on the malaise of our own people; and, yes it means accepting occasional setbacks as an inevitable price of trying to ensure a more stable world.

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OCT 16 1984

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October 11, 1984

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: THOUGHTS FOR THE DEBATE

I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

Under Carter-Mondale the U.S. was in retreat globally. Respect for and confidence in the U.S. among friends as well as adversaries was in decline.

While it may be prudent to make an argument of the possible good intentions of the Carter-Mondale Administration and of Mr. Mondale at present, the Carter-Mondale leadership was singularly ineffective in handling the international relations of a great world power.

Where Carter-Mondale failed, the Reagan Administration has restored leadership and credibility.

A key point - to be used in answer to attacks on the President's Central America policy and more general attacks on alleged lack of achievement in Reagan foreign policy: ---- during the Carter-Mondale years, the Soviets make repeated gains throughout the world (list them: troops, modern fighter aircraft and submarine pens into Cuba, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the fall of Nicaragua, etc.).

In the four years of the Reagan Administration, on the other hand, the Soviets have made no new advances worldwide, indeed, they have not attempted any.

The message: don't be deceived by threatening Soviet rhetoric. The Soviets have become more cautious and less aggressive because of the Reagan Administration's policies. As a result there are fewer U.S.-Soviet confrontations which might flare into superpower conflict. The world under President Reagan is a safer place.

II. ARMS CONTROL

The United States favors productive negotiations, and has repeatedly made serious offers to Soviets. It takes two to

negotiate, however. The Reagan Administration will continue to hold the door open to the Soviets. It is in this context that the exchange with Gromyko should be viewed.

Grovelling at the feet of the Soviets, which characterized the approach to arms control of the Carter-Mondale Administration, is anathema to the American people.

It is axiomatic that the United States negotiate from strength, not weakness. U.S. defenses, and thus America's negotiating credibility, were weakened seriously by the Carter-Mondale Administration.

In order to restore America's strength and negotiating credibility, the Reagan Administration has worked for the last four years to rebuild America's defenses, (1) so that no adversary may achieve a position of military superiority over the United States, and (2) in order that the President be in the strongest possible position to undertake serious arms control negotiations.

Through four years of effort the Reagan Administration has laid the basis for a sound and balanced relationship with the Soviets - one that we both can live with.

Peace can be achieved and preserved only through patience and perseverance, and often at a price. An over-anxious desire for arms control now, for its own sake and divorced from the broader requirements of U.S. national security interests, will play into the hands of our adversaries. We must also take full account of the undeniable tendency of the Soviets to violate agreements when it suits their purposes. Arms control works only if both sides are honest; otherwise we can be lulled into a dangerous false sense of security.

Thus, we cannot afford to rush headlong into an arms control agreement simply for its own sake.

President Reagan has given the United States four years of peace with his current policies. Those policies have proven successful. The President should be given the opportunity to complete the movement to peace that he has begun.

It costs Mondale nothing to attack President Reagan's arms control policies. It is easy for him to say that he will negotiate arms control agreements. No one doubts that he

would indeed enter into negotiations. The key question is: is anyone confident that the interests of the United States will be represented as firmly and strongly by Mondale as they will be by President Reagan?

III. THE PACIFIC

The Reagan policy in the Pacific is a bright spot for the President to point to. The so-called Pacific Basin Initiative is developing as an extremely important new policy initiative from the standpoint of U.S. interests....and it is clearly a Reagan initiative.

America's relationship with Japan and other friends in the region is strong; with the exception of continuing Soviet/Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, the region is at peace.

United States continues to play a critical role in maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula (reversing the Carter-Mondale plan for withdrawal of U.S. troops, which would have been seriously destabilizing). America's relationship with China has been placed on a sound, positive, and mutually beneficial long-term basis.

IV. THE FUTURE

The Reagan vision of the future in foreign affairs is positive and forward-looking. Elements of this vision include the following:

- * a stable Central America, characterized by economic opportunity and social justice, free of Soviet and Cuban intervention;
- * a balanced, realistic relationship with the Soviet Union, based on mutual understanding, mutual interests, and equitable, mutually verifiable arms control agreements;
- * a strengthened Atlantic Alliance;
- * an expanding U.S. relationship with the nations of the Pacific, building on the growing economic ties that already exist;
- * support for and encouragement of free market mechanisms in the world economy, as the most important engine for economic

Page four

growth and development; a world safe for ourselves, our children, our friends and allies.

All of these require vision (the vision that has guided us for four years), strength of will, and strong leadership. Without question, the Reagan Administration has proven itself on this score.

V. POINTS ON TACTICS

It may be useful for the President to have a stable of key points to make, basic facts and well-focused messages, and keep coming back to them (as Mondale did with Social Security and Medicare last time).

The President cannot get too bogged down with minute detail, or in laborious explanations of figures or complex positions that few in the audience will understand.

The object is to get across not so much the President's mastery of complex facts and details but rather his important political messages.

Perhaps the President will feel constrained to challenge Mondale directly, even to turn to his challenger where necessary. This can be overdone, however, making the President look more like the challenger who is fifteen points behind.

Nonetheless, the President can force Mondale to explain himself and the Carter-Mondale record.

Most of all, the President's vision of the future must come across loud and clear. The pundits will be looking for this, of course, and will attempt to denigrate the President's efforts to present his vision. Thus, a mix of visionary rhetoric and hard-nosed explanation of the facts of the world situation may be useful. As the incumbent, the President is at a disadvantage: he is expected to know what Bill Clark did not ---- that Hastings Banana is the President of Zimbabwe.

Nonetheless, too much confusion of facts does the President a disservice. Rather too much emphasis on vision than the chance of too much confusion on facts.

Two final thoughts: if the defense budget issue is mentioned

by Mondale in the context of too much spending, the President might point out again (as he did at a press conference several months ago) that defense spending is substantially below (about \$16 billion) the levels thought necessary by Walter Mondale and Jimmy Carter (January, 1981 Carter budget submission). Moreover, defense spending under President Reagan has only roughly one-half the share of the federal budget (26%) that it had under President Kennedy (48-46%) ---- who served also in a time of peace.

Second, in connection with arms control and negotiations with the Soviets, the President should offer Mondale a classified briefing on Soviet arm control compliance. If Mondale refuses, then his refusal implies he does not want to know the facts. If he accepts, having been out of office for four years and not being current, he admits dependence on the President for superior knowledge. Either way, the President wins and simultaneously looks Presidential and magnanimous in wanting to help out his opponent. The briefing should come from the bi-partisan General Advisory Committee on Arms Control.

JC/c

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Don Fortier, 10/16

Here is some
input from John Lehman.

cc

Bob Sims

J

600 SHIP NAVY

Q. Under the Reagan Administration the Navy has expanded from 479 ships to 540 ships by the end of this year. Isn't it true that only 3 of these additional ships were part of Reagan defense budgets?

A. The Carter Administration reduced the fleet to below 500 ships and planned to keep it there. Their budget had planned to retire two aircraft carriers and more than 50 other destroyers, amphibious and support ships. We reversed this disarmament, overhauled the carriers for another ten years of life and modernized the destroyers and other ships that they would have scrapped.

We now have 102 new ships under construction so that my successors in the 1990's will not be faced with the aging and reduced fleet bequeathed to me by the Carter Administration.

The fact remains that in the face of the greatest Soviet naval buildup in history, the Carter-Mondale Administration cut the shipbuilding program they inherited from the Ford Administration in half and reduced the size of our Navy substantially.

Q. In your shipbuilding program you have mortgaged the future with billions and billions of dollars in outlays that will have to be paid out for the rest of this decade.

A. We inherited the biggest shipbuilding scandal and mess in American history from the mismanagement of the Carter-Mondale Administration. Every year of the Carter-Mondale Administration there were vast cost overruns in shipbuilding and nearly every program was way behind schedule. Moreover, as we now see in the newspaper there was substantial waste and fraud in the form of shipbuilders' claims. The Reagan Administration cleaned up that mess. Instead of cost overruns we have had three straight years of substantial cost under-runs.

A good example is the aircraft carrier THEODORE ROOSEVELT to be launched next Saturday, on his birthday. We renegotiated that Carter-Mondale contract and brought the price down \$100M. It is now being delivered 17 months ahead of the Carter-Mondale schedule.

The Congressional Budget Office has given a conservative estimate that every billion dollars spent in Navy shipbuilding produces 27,000 direct jobs in the economy. In the Reagan Administration we have fully funded every ship of the 102 now under construction with no appropriations left for the future on those ships. There is no hidden cost. Instead there is the prospect of continued cost under-runs saving the taxpayers increasing amounts of money.

NAVY READINESS AND AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Q. There have been claims that after three years of your increased defense spending the Navy is less ready than it was three years ago.

A. The facts tell the story. That modest increase in spending has totally and dramatically changed the readiness of our Navy and Marine Corps. Our surface ships are up 29% in combat readiness and our aircraft squadrons up 43% and our submarines up 32%. From the horror stories during the Carter Administration of ships unable to sail for lack of crews we have been manned at 100% for the last two years and we have met 100% of our recruiting goals every year of the Reagan Administration.

Q. Senator Mondale has opposed your spending on aircraft carriers as wasteful and vulnerable.

A. It is true Senator Mondale voted against every aircraft carrier proposal that came before the Senate. In fact, the aircraft carriers are one of the best bargains available to the taxpayer. They last 50 years in the fleet and are the least vulnerable of any military system. They are much better protected and more heavily armored and, of course, are far more mobile than land bases. As the Falklands War showed, deploying tankers, merchantmen or naval ships without the air cover of a super carrier is inviting disaster from air attack.

In 1957, we had more than 100 overseas bases available for military aircraft. Today we have only 40 overseas bases available. In contrast the aircraft carrier MIDWAY which was built during WWII is still in front line service and will remain in service through the end of this century.

MILITARY REFORM

Q. Senator Mondale has proposed reforming the JCS and strengthening the Chairman of the JCS to correct the current mismanagement and lack of strategy in the Reagan defense program.

A. Senator Mondale's conversion to interest in the military is welcomed. During the Carter-Mondale Administration the President almost never met with the Joint Chiefs. Not surprisingly for one with so little experience with the JCS, his proposals for reform would have the opposite effect. I solved the problem of the Carter-Mondale JCS by appointing the current excellent members of the JCS and Cap Weinberger is demonstrating with results that the mismanagement of the Carter-Mondale Pentagon is being very dramatically reformed.

ARMS CONTROL

Q. Congresswoman Ferraro has pointed out that even Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy were able successfully to negotiate arms control agreements.

A. Successful arms control agreements can only be negotiated from a position of confident security. During President Eisenhower's and President Kennedy's Administrations the Defense budget averaged between eight and nine percent of the GNP and constituted nearly fifty percent of the entire federal budget. Both of these figures are well above my defense spending figures.

FOREIGN POLICY

Congresswoman Ferraro blamed the bombings in Lebanon; the failure of the Soviets to meet with President Reagan; the reduction in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union; the war in El Salvador and the war in Nicaragua, all on the Reagan Administration.

A. The clearest difference between the Carter-Mondale-Ferraro approach to foreign policy and the Reagan approach is that the Democrats blame the United States first for every problem in the world. President Reagan by contrast strongly believes that the United States is a force for peace in the world, not the cause of war and terrorism.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RCM HAS SEEN
10/16

41

Bud,

For the US-Soviet Theme
Paper recommend adding a
line about their being an
equal superpower albeit with
a political system radically
different from ours which we
don't like.

JH

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS

DATE:

Diell Karma
10/16/84

TO: *Bud McFarlane* *This is*

FROM: WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, Member

crisp
Recommendation
to Elliott
Bud

Suggested conclusion

President's debate presentation

(from Charles Wolf of
the RAND Corporation)

SUGGESTED CONCLUSION FOR THE PRESIDENT'S LAST 90 SECONDS
OF THE DEBATE

I have asked you to consider "whether America is better off now than four years ago"? Mr. Mondale suggests that a preferable question to ask is "whether America will be better off in the future"?

All right, let's consider that question. The answer to it is straightforward from his record over many years, and from ours in the last four years.

If you think America will be better off with higher taxes, more inflation, increased government spending, larger government, weaker defense, and concessions granted before arms control or other foreign negotiations begin, then Mr. Mondale's record and programs -- in both domestic policy and foreign policy -- can be recommended.

But if you think America will be better in the future with lower taxes, reduced inflation, lower government spending, smaller government, stronger defense, and concessions only granted reciprocally after negotiations have occurred, then the record and programs of the past four years are what you should favor for the next four years.

The answer to the original question is plain: what you have seen in the past is what you will get in the future.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: THEMES MEETING

Wednesday, October 17, 1984
10:00 a.m. (60 minutes)
The Cabinet Room

FROM: RICHARD G. DARMAN I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this meeting is to discuss national security themes for the debate.

II. BACKGROUND

The topics which your advisers believe merit attention are the following:

- peace through steadiness and strength
- peace through allies and friends
- peace through promotion and defense of democracy
- peace through crisis prevention
- arms control
- relations with the Soviet Union
- the Middle East
- Lebanon and terrorism
- the future

You received outline notes with respect to these in your debate briefing book. In addition, we have forwarded (separately) prose versions of possible statements you might wish to make with respect to these topics. (These were prepared under Bud McFarlane's direction.)

III. AGENDA

We suggest what amounts to a mini-rehearsal. For each topic, we would suggest that you lead off with about a 2-minute version of what you might say in the debate. Discussion would then follow.

IV. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Paul Laxalt
George P. Shultz
Edwin Meese III
James A. Baker III
Michael K. Deaver

Robert C. McFarlane
Richard G. Darman
Robert B. Sims
Stu Spencer
Richard B. Wirthlin



NOTE
SUBJECT: Note to Tony Dolan

FROM:

ROBERT

MCFARLANE

Please print out the following:

Memorandum for: Tony Dolan

From: Bud McFarlane

Subject: Foreign Policy Debate

I have read your memo. Being charitable, I suppose it is possible that you misunderstand what I and my staff believe about US-Soviet relations. I put my beliefs on paper last night in an issue paper for the President's use in preparing for the debate. I think

Bud,

10/17

I really object to
Dolan's inflammatory
statement about Jack.
Dolan doesn't understand
the issues ^(or the President) and I doubt
he ever will. You might
want to call Dolan and tell
him this kind of sniping and
extremism doesn't help. I

October 17, 1984

47

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER
RICHARD DARMAN
MICHAEL DEEVER
ROBERT McFARLANE ✓

FROM: ANTHONY R. DOLAN *ad*
SUBJECT: Foreign Policy Debate

Besides disturbing conservatives, the attached story, if it indicates the direction of counsel for the debate, is rife with danger. It implies rejection of what all the polls show is one major reason people voted for Ronald Reagan: his hard line. The simple truth of the matter is that Ronald Reagan has said over and over again that the United States stands for the spread of freedom throughout the world. In the Soviet mind, any affirmation of freedom -- indeed the mere existence of a free, democratic nation like the U.S. -- is itself an act of aggression against the Soviet state, and calls into question the legitimacy of the Soviet regime. (However much the Jack Matlock/detentist school of thought wish it otherwise.) If the President is advised to move away from his commitment to freedom -- in the face of an aggressive Mondale who will push him on this point -- the result will be serious damage.

Mondale is going to become even more aggressive in this debate and will try and rattle the President. The President needs to adopt a strong countervailing theme. Time after time, the President has told the truth about the Soviets. Twenty years from now, historians will look back at this -- as they did at Churchill's warnings about Hitler or about the "Iron Curtain" -- as the most significant foreign policy accomplishment of the Reagan Administration, and perhaps the critical reason for the loss of Soviet energy. Do not advise the President to retreat from this. He should claim credit for it. I would suggest the following response if the "Evil Empire" or "hard-line" question comes up:

"The world is not Mr. Rogers' Neighborhood and my opponent really doesn't understand that. It's a dangerous place with dangerous adversaries. It's true I've been honest about those dangers and been candid with the American people about our adversaries. But that's the kind of honesty they expect of their President.

Furthermore, this candor helps the negotiating process. History shows that when the Soviets know their counterparts have no illusions about them, they settle down to serious negotiating.

If there are any wrong perceptions of the other side, we want to eliminate those and I've tried to do it. But this Administration and this country stands for the spread of freedom. We always will."

He might also welcome Mr. Mondale's new toughness on the Soviets, and ask him what protein supplement he's taking.

Hard Line Stops, Reagan Says

10/16/84

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 15 — President Reagan was quoted today as saying that it was "realism" for him to denounce Soviet behavior in sharp terms at the outset of his Presidency.

In an interview with the magazine U.S. News & World Report, Mr. Reagan was asked if he would "return to a hard, unyielding line" with the Soviet Union if returned to office.

"No," he said. "No. No way, because I happen to believe that if there's any common sense in the world at all, we not only should reduce nuclear weapons, we should eliminate them."

On another matter, Mr. Reagan said that the Administration was willing to discuss the possibility of a mutual moratorium on testing of anti-satellite weapons but wanted no "preconditions" on the discussions.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, speaking to reporters on a flight to Toronto today, said Mr. Reagan was referring to the Soviet request for an immediate moratorium on the testing

of the weapons as a "precondition" for the discussions.

In the interview, the President also said he had been misunderstood in the first month of his Administration when he said at a news conference that the Soviet Union was willing to lie and cheat to further its ends.

He said he had based his answer on "the fact that they themselves over the years have repeatedly stated that their morality is based on what will bring about the world socialist revolution, that anything that furthers socialism is moral and therefore is perfectly all right."

Mr. Reagan said that he had made his early comments about Soviet behavior because he "thought it was time that we stopped looking at our relationship with the Russians through rose-colored glasses."

He added: "At the same time, we made it plain we're not out to change their system. We're certainly not going to let them change ours. But we have to live in the world together."