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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD  
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**Archivist:** mjd  
**FOIA ID:** F97-059/2  
**Date:** 09/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Hijacking of TWA 847, 8p <i>P 3/20/06 F97-059/2 #62</i>	2/2/87	P1/F1
2. paper	re: TWA 847 Chronology, 13p <i>P 3/20/06 F97-059/2 #63</i>	nd	P1/F1
<del>3. draft paper</del>	<del>re: TWA 847, 2p <i>R 3/20/06 F97-059/2 #64</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>4. note</del>	<del>re: TWA 847, 1p <i>A 3/20/06 F97-059/2 #65</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>
<del>5. paper</del>	<del>re: TWA 847 chronology (annotated), 1p <i>A " " " #66</i></del>	<del>nd</del>	<del>P1/F1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].

F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

2/2/87  
Drafted: MGMarkoff

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## The Hijacking of TWA 847

### Background

On June 14, 1985, TWA 847, en route from Athens to Rome with 135 Americans and 16 aliens was hijacked by two Lebanese (later identified as Hizballah), who demand the release of all Lebanese detainees in Israel and Kuwait, and the release of four specific individuals: a third hijacker, who had been arrested in Athens, two Lebanese, allegedly in Israeli prisons, and one Lebanese allegedly held in Cyprus (but who had actually been released into Amal custody on May 30).

Between June 14 and June 16, the aircraft shuttles between Beirut and Algeria as negotiations ensue as to its final destination. Early on the day of June 14, a total of 40 passengers, including women and children are released. However, US Navyman Robert Strettham is killed and his body thrown on the tarmac in Beirut.

Later that day, approximately a dozen armed Hizballah and Amal militia board the plane in Beirut and take control from the original hijackers. American Jews and US military are then singled out and a total of 12 passengers are removed from the plane and taken into custody by what is later learned to be Hizballah. The new hijackers escalate their demands to include the release of all Arab prisoners in Lebanon, complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and withdrawal of Lahad forces from Lebanon.

On June 15, in Algiers, an additional 61 passengers are released. The aircraft arrives at Beirut again on June 16 and remains at Beirut Airport from June 16 until after the conclusion of the incident on June 30. On June 16, the remaining 29 passengers are removed from the plane and taken into custody by the Syrian-controlled Amal, leaving 3 crewmen with an unknown number of hijackers still on the plane.

### US Efforts

Overall USG strategy in response to the hijacking of TWA 847 was directed and coordinated by the National Security Advisor and the National Security Council staff, yet tasked for the implementation of its various elements to the Departments of State, Defense and Transportation.

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-2-

On the morning of June 14, the Terrorist Incidents Working Group meets and recommends a three-pronged response: (1) ensure that the plane is diverted to a destination where the USG has access; (2) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (3) undertake a variety of diplomatic initiatives to assist in the release of the aircraft and its passengers.

FOIA(b) (1)

State is designated as the lead agency and organizes a task force which operates throughout the incident. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

State Department efforts are twofold: US Ambassadors in country are instructed to make high level demarches to Arab leaders to enlist their help in achieving resolution of the crisis, focussing in particular on Assad (Syria) and on Nabih Berri (Head of Amal, Lebanon). Demarches are also made to Algeria, Syria and Cyprus to ensure that they accept the aircraft if it is diverted and not to permit it to leave once it has landed. (Algeria permits the aircraft to land, but is unable to prevent it from leaving, as the hijackers threaten to execute the hostages.)

Reluctance on the part of the Governments of Algeria and Syria to intervene politically are countered by Presidential calls on June 15 to President Bendjedid of Algeria, urging him to keep the plane on the ground when it again lands in Algeria; and to Assad, requesting him to contact Iranian and Shia leaders to influence the hijackers to release the aircraft to Algerian authorities. On June 16, Berri, apparently under pressure from Assad, enters negotiations with the hijackers and succeeds in getting one hostage (Peel) released. Berri pledges to release all the hostages if the US persuades Israel to release the Lebanese prisoners held in Atlit prison.

Policy and operational response options are reviewed on successive occasions during the crisis at the highest levels. On June 16, the first NSPG, of the six which are convened during the two week incident, is held. The full NSC, plus deputies and FAA Administrator Donald Engen, is in attendance. Shultz lays the blame for the incident at the feet of Berri who, probably acting in concert with the Syrians, expected the US to pressure Israel to release the Atlit prisoners. He indicates that the negotiations will require the US deal with the Israeli prisoner problem. In addition, Shultz notes that while the Algerians have been

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helpful, [REDACTED] and have now twice refused to keep the aircraft.

At this NSPG, the President asks about the prospect of an exchange of the Israeli-held prisoners for the TWA hostages. Shultz indicates that Rabin has invited the US to formally call for it. The President expresses his interest in gaining release of the US hostages followed later by release of the Israeli prisoners. Shultz argues against what he feels would mean essentially a deal with the hijackers. McFarlane urges a variation, in which the US would state that the Israeli prisoners, scheduled to be released anyway, would be held until the US captives were released. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] In conclusion, the President directs that, although the Israeli position should be sounded out, basic policy (not to negotiate with terrorists) would remain unchanged; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Amal should be held responsible politically and diplomatic pressures be intensified in that direction.

FOIA(b) (1)

Diplomatic initiatives during the remainder of the incident are continued on two levels: Direct demarches by the President to Assad and by McFarlane to Berri, and an expanded set of in country demarches by US Ambassadors at Shultz' direction throughout the Arab world and Europe. The talking points used by McFarlane in his call to Berri on June 17 were prepared by State and reflect Shultz' position that there can be no quid pro quo on the US hostage release in terms of a release of Israeli-held prisoners: "The US will not make concessions or ask anyone else to do so...will hold the Shia community responsible if passengers are harmed...future of Shia will be determined by responsible behavior...Al Dawa prisoner release [demand] creates a contest of wills which the US/Israel will not concede." The President's message to Assad on June 18 is to increase pressure on Berri to be tough with the hijackers, and to use Assad's own channels with the Hizballah and Iranians to effect the quick release of the hostages and their transfer out of Lebanon. (On June 18, Berri releases 3 more hostages, leaving 40 still in custody.)

The Terrorist Incidents Working Group continues to meet during this time to consider both near-term options to effect the release of the hostages and longer-term options to reduce the incidence of hijacking and terrorism in general. [REDACTED]

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North/Teicher also recommend consideration by the NSPG of an alternative plan detailed in "non-paper" they had prepared. The plan comprises a detailed two-phased approach: the first phase to be implemented while the hostages are still captive; the second, to be implemented after they are released. Phase I [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Phase II [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Although McFarlane approves the memo for consideration at the NSPG, it is not clear whether it is discussed. Evidence does indicate that the President decides to let the diplomatic action play out for the next several days, based on the recognition that Assad is the real player and that a plan should be developed accordingly. The President also agrees to call Assad again.

However, the NSPG does meet again on June 25 to review a more detailed "Plan of Action" along the lines of that outlined above. The NSPG briefing memo drafted by North, Fortier, Teicher, Covey, and McDaniel, and approved by McFarlane, comprises three elements: a Framework for Decision -- a description of the stakes, objectives and strategy for achieving the release of the hostages; a Graphic Timeline -- a visual layout of diplomatic pressure, consultative activities for the next few days; a Day-by-Day description of operations. After the NSPG, the Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) meets to refine details of the Plan and a series of diplomatic messages are tasked in support of its execution: Talking Points for the Vice President to use in Europe; A SECSTATE letter to NEA Foreign Ministers informing them of US intentions to close BIA; SECSTATE letter to European Foreign Ministers requesting support of US actions to close BIA; SECSTATE instructions for demarche to East European Foreign Ministers in support of the closure of BIA.

On June 26, the NSPG meets again in the morning. The outcome of the meeting is to defer execution of the initial steps of the plan "pending diplomatic developments." [Note: There is no evidence to indicate what exchange causes the breakthrough in negotiations. Israel had already released 31 detainees on June 24 and indicated that another 31 could be released during the week. However, there are no communications to indicate that the US directly influenced the release. The GOI position had been that the detainees were to be used as bargaining chips to obtain the release of

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-6-

captive IDF soldiers. However, the Israelis had indicated that they were under pressure to release them quickly in any event as there was no legal basis under Israeli law to detain them.]

A Crisis Pre-Planning Group is chaired by Poindexter directly following the NSPG. Another CPPG is held that afternoon, chaired by Fortier. There is no information on the agendas or outcomes of those meetings, with the exception that a news blackout is declared. Later that day, Berri announces a plan to transfer all the hostages to a Western Embassy either in Beirut or Damascus, where they would remain until all the Lebanese detainees are freed from Atlit prison. Berri also reiterates a demand that that US warships leave Lebanese waters and adds the demand that he receive assurances that neither the US nor Israel would retaliate once the incident is resolved. A State status report to the President that day notes further evidence of Israeli preparations to release additional prisoners and undercores Syrian concern that the US would retaliate against all Arab states thought to be implicated in the hijacking.

On June 27, the CPPG meets again. The agenda item is the consideration of a contingency plan in the event of only a partial release of the hostages. The CPPG meets again the morning of June 28 and recommends the implementation of Phase I of the "Plan of Action" if the hostages are not released by the afternoon. Late that afternoon, an NSPG is held to review the diplomatic situation and to consider next steps to take given the apparent lack of progress in getting the hostages released. A briefing memo to McFarlane from North, Teicher, et.al., notes that the CPPG recommends returning to the original "Plan of Action." However, the NSPG directs that the plan for extracting the hostages once they are moved to Syria be implemented. [Note: There are no details on this plan, except to note that US pressure had focused on getting the hostages into Assad's custody.] The NSPG also directs that the longer-term plan for combatting terrorism be developed. Detailed reports by Shultz and Dole at this point are submitted to the President recommending plans for enhancing aviation security and combatting terrorism aimed at US civil aviation.

A June 29 North, Teicher, Fortier memo to McFarlane on "Next Steps for Obtaining Release of AMCIIT Hostages" concludes that the passengers and crew may not be released through Damascus "as expected"; in any event, there may be only a partial release -- it seems that only the Iranians and Assad have leverage over the Hizballah elements. They then recommend Phase I comprising [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the event, Phase I is not fruitful, they recommend going to Phase II.

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-7-

There is no evidence that this plan of action was approved since announcement of the hostage release is made the next day.

The afternoon of June 29, State issues the following statement: "The US reaffirms its longstanding support for the preservation of Lebanon, its government, its stability and security, and for the mitigation of the suffering of its people." If asked, the spokesman was authorized to say only that "we are making this statement in order to make our position clear."

In a memo to McFarlane, State presents its analysis of the role played by Assad. "Part of Assad's motivation in solving the hijacking was undoubtedly to limit the role of Iranian-backed radical elements in Lebanon...He also wishes to demonstrate to the American Government that Syria is a major power in the region, responsible for security is Lebanon." As part of the supporting documentation for the assessment, [REDACTED]

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On July 1, a full Cabinet meeting is held. A decision is taken to impose sanctions against Lebanese air carriers, terminating service. Later that day, it is reported that David Kimche confirmed to the USG that the Israeli inner Cabinet has decided to release 300 of the 735 Atlit detainees within 48 hours. PM Peres, on Jerusalem radio, declares the freeing of the hostages "removes a major obstacle to freeing Lebanese Shiite prisoners. He denies Israel took any part in a deal.

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Characterization of Process of USG Response to Hijacking

A characterization of the process of developing and implementing a USG response to the hijacking offers the following elements:

- The response to the hijacking was directed and coordinated by the National Security Advisor and National Security Council staff.
- Policy and operational response options were tasked to and developed by the appropriate departments and agencies, and vetted through those interagency groups constituted for the review and implementation of counter-terrorism responses.
- Policy and operational response options were reviewed on successive occasions during the crisis at the highest levels through conference calls and during NSPGs by the full National Security Council.
- There was frequent Congressional consultation and update.
- All relevant diplomatic channels were employed in the effort to seek the release of the hostages, including consultation with Allies.
- A set of coordinated, timed diplomatic initiatives and operational military rescue response options were developed.
- There was concomitant development, consideration and decision to implement a range of longer-term counter-terrorism strategies, designed to safeguard against future hijacking incidents.
- There was ex post facto review of USG handling of the incident and the initiation of a long-term planning strategy both improve counter-terrorism operations and eventually to reduce the occurrence of terrorist incidents.
- Actions and options considered apparently were consistent with stated US policy. There is no direct evidence to indicate that the White House concluded an arrangement with the Israelis.

TWA 847 Chronology

June 14 - June 30, 1985

June 14

TWA Flight 847 departs Athens en route to Rome with 153 people on board, including 129 American passengers, 14 alien passengers, six American crewmembers, two alien crewmembers, and two Lebanese hijackers.

Circa 0310, TWA 847 is diverted to Beirut, where it lands at 0453 over the protests of Lebanese air controllers. Nineteen passengers, 17 women and two children are released, and the aircraft was refueled.

President's national security staff begin a series of secure conference calls which continue throughout crisis. (WHCMC chron.)

Terrorist Incidents Working Group (TIWG) is scheduled for 1000.

At 0630, TWA 847 leaves for Algiers. Prior to taking off, the hijackers list initial demands: release of all Lebanese detainees in Israel and Kuwait, and release of four specific individuals. In addition, the hijackers condemn the bombings at Bir al Abd and Riyadh, attack the Arab League and the Palestinians, condemn American practices in the Arab world, as well as US financial support to Israel.

State Department forms Task Force at 0700.

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TIWG meets at 1000. Recommends: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] diplomatic initiatives to Syria and Berri. (WHCMC Chron)

At TIWG meeting, State is designated as lead agency and organizes a task force. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] (North Action Memo to Poindexter)

North Action Memo to McFarlane indicates President approved [REDACTED] and notes that State has [REDACTED]

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instructed USAMBs to approach Assad and other Arab leaders to assist in release. North indicates that TIWG principals agreed not to give Congressional briefings [REDACTED] (North Memo to McFarlane, "Hijacking of TWA 847, June 14, 1985")

FOIA(b) ( / )

US requests Algiers to allow plane to land on humanitarian grounds and not to depart.

Plane arrives in Algiers at 1030 and spends several hours there, during which 21 additional passengers are released and the plane is again refueled although Algerians initially refuse. Hijackers threaten to execute hostages if aircraft not permitted to depart.

Hijackers add demand for US \$15 million and ask to talk to US Ambassador.

US urges GOL not to allow aircraft to return to Beirut, and urges governments of Syria and Cyprus to accept the aircraft if diverted from Beirut. Amal contact promises AMEMB Beirut heavy presence at Beirut airport and continued close contact on incident.

[REDACTED]  
FOIA(b) ( / )

AMBEMB Beirut speaks to Gemayel about potential for plane returning to Beirut. Gemayel says little he can do to secure release of hostages. BIA manager say his orders are to prevent plane from landing.

USS SAIPAN and NIMITZ diverted to support contingency ops.

Hijackers reportedly plant explosives on aircraft.

SECDEF authorizes [REDACTED] FOIA(b) ( / )

USAMB Beirut tells GOL to refuse landing rights.

At 1525, aircraft leaves again for Beirut, landing at 1920 although runways blocked by trucks. Pilot says situation desperate, requests permission to land. Robert Stethem is killed and his body thrown onto the tarmac.

Hijackers demand that the ranking Amal official come to the airport. The request is eventually granted.

About a dozen heavily armed men, probably Hizballah and Amal militia, board the plane and take control from the original hijackers.

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Hijackers demand release of all Arab prisoners in Lebanon, complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, withdrawal of Lahad's forces from Lebanon. They reiterate demand for release of Ali Atwah (third hijacker, in Greek custody) and threaten to kill eight Greek passengers, if he is not released.

American Jews and US military are singled out, and 12 passengers are taken off the plane, including all six US military.

President asks Algiers to allow aircraft to land but not to take off again.

President urges Assad to contact Iranian/Shia leaders to influence hijackers to release hostages to Algerian authorities.

June 15

Plane arrives in Algiers at 0250. International Red Cross (ICRC) sends team to Algiers at request of US and Algerian governments.

ICRC and Algerian officials are permitted to board plane to check health of hostages and hear the demands of the hijackers.

Hijackers reiterate previous demands and threaten to kill all passengers if Ali Atwah not released.

Sixty-one passengers and all five flight attendants are released.

FOIA(b) (1)

Israelis announce intention to gradually release prisoners -- depending on security situation. Sooner or later, all are to be released.

President requests Algerian President Bendjedid to keep aircraft in Algiers.

Greek government considers release of third hijacker.

Shultz sends President detailed status report of current situation diplomatically, and with respect

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McFarlane writes in the margins to the President that "Mr. President, Our specific goals are: Keep them talking, keep the plane on the ground,

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(Shultz Memo to Pres.

"Status Report on the TWA Hijacking.")

June 16

After 25 hours in Algiers, aircraft departs again for Beirut, landing at 0745. [REDACTED] pilot or hijacker to Beirut Tower stated "We want aircraft demobilized in Beirut so it cannot be flown anymore."

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Pilot radios that hijackers ultimately want to go to Teheran, where they will release passengers and crew. If request denied, plane will be disabled in Beirut.

USEMB Damascus informed that Assad told of US request to put heavy pressure on Berri to assist US.

Hijackers state they will negotiate with Red Cross. Secure telephone consultations held among McFarlane, Shultz, Weinberger.

Remaining 29 passengers are removed from plane; three flight crewmen remain on board with unknown number of hijackers.

Amal leader Nabih Berri enters negotiations. He says he is assured by hijackers that no harm will come to hostages if things are proceeding. He releases one hostage (Peel).

Bartholomew tells Algerian charge (Washington) to contact Shiite leader Fadlallah to try to end hijacking. Charge uninformed/not useful.

Berri pledges to release hostages if US persuades Israel to release Atlit prisoners. (FBIS)

SECSTATE status report to the President on the hijacking notes that "Israel has told us that it would be responsive to an American request to exchange certain prisoners for release of the American hostages. It has also agreed to talk to ICRC representatives, but is not willing to engage in a substantive discussion until the US makes clear its position on a prisoner exchange. Our position is unchanged: we do not make deals of this kind with hijackers.

President meets in SitRoom at 1300 with full NSC plus deputies for NSPG (includes participation of FAA administrator Donald Engen): [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] Shultz notes that Berri probably acted in concert with the Syrians; expectation that US will pressure Israelis to release Lebanese prisoners. Notes Algerians helpful but [REDACTED] and twice refused to keep aircraft; indicates that negotiations will require that the US deal with the Israeli prisoner problem. President asks

FOIA(b) (1)

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-5-

about prospect of an exchange. Shultz indicates that Rabin has invited the US to call for it. President indicates his interest in bringing about the release of all US hostages followed by the release of the Israeli-held prisoners. Shultz argues that this would essentially mean making a deal with the hijackers. McFarlane urges a variation, where we not that the Israeli prisoners will not be released until hijacking ends. Weinberger agrees extremely dangerous to act with force; notes that if US gives in there will be new demands tomorrow. President suggests talking to Israelis since they appear to be prepared to let their prisoners go anyway. He directs that the discussion of the Israeli offer on the prisoners not be mentioned to anyone. Shultz says US policy should continue unchanged. Reaffirms basic policy not to negotiate. [REDACTED] Hold Amal responsible. [REDACTED]

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FOIA(b) (1)

June 17

McFarlane calls Berri (30 minute conversation): US will not make concessions or ask anyone else to do so...will hold Shia community responsible if passengers harmed...future of Shia will be determined by responsible behavior...Al Dawa prisoner release creates contest of wills which US/Israel will not concede.

The points made by McFarlane to Berri above are prepared by State and reflect SECSTATE's position that there can be no quid on the US hostage release in terms of release of Israeli prisoners. (Platt Memo to McFarlane)

ICRC meets with Israeli officials...ready to facilitate release of ex-Ansar prisoners...will not be party to negotiations.

Shultz makes statement "we call upon those holding the hostages to treat them properly and release them immediately. We will not make deals with terrorists and will not encourage others to do so."

Bartholomew in contact with Berri. Barth. reports Berri "very tough"... "it is now up to US."

[REDACTED] FOIA(b) (1)

AMEMBDamascus reports that Syria is publically neutral but privately trying to get Berri involved.

USEMBDamascus instructed to make another demarche to Asad, to put additional pressure on Barri, Iran and others.

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June 18

Berri releases three more hostages, leaving 40 still in custody, all believed to be Americans.

Bartholomew talks to Berri. Very useful. Berri says he has all hostages, except five; but has connections with those holding the five, seeking consolidation of control.

TIWG scheduled for 1400, but postponed. Briefing memo for Poindexter (North drafter) indicates agenda to cover: State travel advisory; sky marshal program; denial of BIA; Congressional call for hearings; an NSDD on next steps on airport/aircraft security.

US demarche to Algiers, Jordan, France, UK, Spain, Saudi Arabia, FRG, Austria, UN: US holds Berri responsible...will not negotiate...request they use good offices to influence Berri and other political and religious leaders to effect release.

US demarche to Greece: improve airport security...travel advisory to be issued.

US demarche to Berri: the US understands aircraft is refueled and loaded with explosives, and expects Berri to control the aircraft.

Presidential message to Assad: increase pressure on Berri to be tough with hijackers...use own channels with PSP, Hizballah, Iranians...release prisoners quickly and transfer out of Lebanon.

Speakes publically says that Israelis should release the Lebanese prisoners since they are illegally detained.

UAE paper reports Algerian plan that hostages be released if US promises that Israel will release Shia prisoners at a later date.

Teicher produces a memo on GOIsrael statements with respect to the Lebanese prisoners. A Minister of Defense spokesman tells the US that the intent of retaining the detainees is as bargaining chip for release of captive IDF soldiers. It was indicated that there was, however, no legal basis for the detention of the Lebanese, since they could not be tried under Israeli law, and therefore, they would have to be released. (Teicher to McFarlane Memo)

President holds a press conference on the situation in Beirut.



June 19

SECSTATE message to Gemayel looking to him for help.

US requests ICRC to see hostages.

McFarlane provides Senate update on hijacking. North/Teicher prepare detailed talking points which reflect internal White House discussions and planning. (North/Teicher Memo to McFarlane)

Shultz, Weinberger, McFarlane breakfast. Talking points prepared by North provide same update as provided to Senate leaders. (North Memo to McFarlane)

Teicher memo to McFarlane about Japanese debrief of Tokyo meeting between FOMIN Miyake and Iran FOMIN Ardabili, in which Japan indicates grave concern about hostage situation and Ardabili denies Iranian involvement and pins it on Syria. Handwritten note by Poindexter states that the US has evidence Ardabili is lying.

June 20

McFarlane briefs President at daily NSB on alternative solutions to the Beirut hostage problem. He reviews 3 possibilities: UN undertaking to find a protective power to take custody of hostages; Algeria being approached to intervene and ask that hostages be released to them; get Syria to take control, since Assad seems to have asserted his influence already with Berri.

NSPG meeting at 1000.

Austria offers to assist.

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Memo to McFarlane from Fortier, Covey, North entitled "TWA Hijacking: [REDACTED]"

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-8-

Teicher Memo to McFarlane outlines a Counter-Terrorism strategy for the aftermath of the hijacking. Involves three elements: identify participants, sponsors, infrastructure;

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Fortier/North concurred with memo; no indication of approval.

SECTTRANS Dole begins demarches to counterparts in high terrorist risk areas for improving airport security.

#### June 21

A State status memo to McFarlane is verbally briefed to the President. It indicates: Berri not in full control of hostages; Swiss made a demarche to Berri, but that Lebanese prisoners have to be released; strong message to Iran through Swiss indicating our knowledge that some hostages are in Iran-controlled Hizballah custody; Israel will not release prisoners unless asked to do so in a formal and explicit manner; new civil aviation measures being introduced; modalities for hostage release.

US proposes release scenarios to Berri: release to Syria, Algiers, UN, ICRC...avoid release in Beirut.

Japan approaches Iran and Syria...Iran denies responsibility, blames Syria.

US message to world requesting improvements in airport security.

President meets with hostage families in Dallas.

#### June 22

US message to Iran via USEMB Bern: Iran cannot escape responsibility for failure to act urgently to help resolve crisis situation.

US message to Syria: keep pressure on Berri...urge Iranians to use their influence.

In contact with Algerians.

President sends letters to all NATO heads of state on further practical activities to be undertaken to prevent terrorism.

#### June 23

In contact with Algerians.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-9-

Rabin announces that 31 of the Shia prisoners will be released the next morning a result of prior legal appeals, not in response to hijacking.

June 24

CPPG meets: reviews [REDACTED] and to consider other methods of increasing pressure.

FOIA(b) (1)

Israel releases 31 detainees from Atlit prison and, in Beirut, Nabih Berri announces a new demand: US Navy ships in area must leave before hostages can be released.

NSPG meets at 1400 to review [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] Briefing memo from North/Teicher to McFarlane for NSPG indicates that CPPG consensus was that [REDACTED] ineffective and that Assad should be confronted directly and called by the President. N/T recommend taking the actions proposed in another non-paper they prepared, a two-phased approach; the first, while hostages are still captive; the second, once released. Phase 1 [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

Phase 2 [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] McFarlane approves the memo for consideration at NSPG. (North Memo to McFarlane) NSPG results: President decides to let diplomatic action play out for next several days. Recognizes that real player is Assad and that plan has to be developed accordingly. (WHCMC Chron.)

In contact with Algerians.

State makes demarche to Soviets to use its influence with Syria. (approved by McFarlane)

State memo for McFarlane gives status update: Swiss approached GOI on Berri's requests; GOI indicates 31 prisoners may be released as early as the next week.

President calls Assad to bring his influence to bear on release.

June 25

Gemayel message to Shultz: doing what I can; area not under GOL control.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

-10-

Larry Speakes discusses with the Press options the President might consider, including limiting goods and services to Beirut and limiting use of Beirut International Airport (BIA).

NSPG meets at 1330: reviews the Plan of Action to place increasing pressure on Syria to extricate the hostages and to press forward with a campaign against terrorism. (WHCMC Chron.)

NSPG briefing memo drafted by North, Fortier, Teicher, Covey, McDaniel and approved by McFarlane included three elements for consideration: Framework for Decision -- a description of the stakes, objectives, strategy for achieving release of hostages; Graphic Timeline -- visual layout of dip, pressure, consultation activities for the next few days; Day-by-Day description of initiatives. This provides a detailed plan of the Phase 1/Phase 2 approach described earlier.

CPPG meets at 1600: refines details of Plan. Tasks a series of papers: T.P.s for the VP; SECSTATE letter to NEA FOMINS; SECSTATE letter EUR FOMINS requesting support of action to close BIA; SECSTATE instructions for demarche to East EUR FOMINS for support in closing BIA.

In contact with Syrians.

June 26

NSPG meets at 1000: defers initial steps of plan pending diplomatic developments.

CPPG meets at 1050, chaired by Poindexter.

CPPG follow-on meeting at 1340, chaired by Fortier.

News blackout is declared.

Hostage Palmer is released because of heart condition.

Berri reiterates demand that US warships leave Lebanese coasts and adds demand that neither the US nor Israel retaliate once crisis is resolved.

Berri announces proposal to transfer all hostages to a Western Embassy in Beirut or Damascus, where they would remain until the release of the Atlit prisoners.

State status report indicates: further evidence of Israeli preparations to release more Lebanese prisoners; Syrian concern that US would retaliate against all Arab states thought to be implicated in highjacking.

~~TOP SECRET~~

In contact with Syrians, Paris.

Office of Attorney General prepares legal opinion on options to prosecute hijacker addressed to McFarlane.

June 27

Israeli Amb. to Armacost: there is debate as to status of prisoners under Geneva convention...asks US not to bring up issue again.

CPPG meets at 1000: develops a contingency plan in the event of only partial release of the prisoners.

Europeans will not accept conditions of Berri's release scenario.

In contact with Syrians, Algerians, Tel Aviv.

McFarlane provides Senate update.

Shultz and Dole submit to the President State and Transportation Dept. reports on plans for enhancing aviation security and combatting terrorism aimed at US civil aviation.

June 28

CPPG meets at 1030: recommends implementation of Phase 1 actions to pressure Assad, if no release by the afternoon.

NSPG meets at 1700: reviews diplomatic situation, next steps in face of apparent lack of progress at getting hostages released. Briefing memo from North, Teicher, et.al., notes that CPPG recommends returning to original Plan of Action. NSPG Confirms plans for extraction of hostages once they are in Syria. Campaign against terrorism to continue.

In contact with Syrians, Algerians, Geneva, Paris, Tel Aviv.

June 29

North, Fortier, Teicher Memo to McFarlane on Next Steps for Obtaining Release of AMCIIT Hostages gives the view that the passengers and crew may not be released through Damascus (as expected) and that, in any event, it is possible that there will only be a partial release; it seems that only the Iranians and Assad have leverage over the Hizballah elements (not Berri). As a result, they propose (Phase 1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If this doesn't work, they propose (Phase 2)

FOIA(b) ( / )

~~TOP SECRET~~

-12-

dispatching high-level US emissaries to: Israelis, to defer further releases of prisoners; to Tokyo, to tell Rafsanjani that there will be signif. bloodshed; to Assad, to threaten serious reprisals; [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

US C-141 with reception team departs Washington for Frankfurt. Another C-141 goes to Damascus.

Hostages released, according to Press, and en route to Syria, although there are conflicting reports as to their status and location.

PM Peres, on Jerusalem radio, declares the freeing of the hostages "removes a major obstacle to freeing Lebanese Shiite prisoners"...denies Israel took any part in deal.

Later reporting, confirmed about 0700, shows hostages still in Beirut and in custody of Amal/Hizballah... Berri apparently seeking more definite guarantee re Atlit detainees and assurance that US will not retaliate.

State issues the following statement at 2230: "The US reaffirms its longstanding support for the preservation of Lebanon, its government, its stability and security, and for the mitigation of the suffering of its people." If asked, the spokesman was authorized to say that we are making this statement in order to make our position clear.

In a memo to McFarlane, State presents its analysis of the role played by Asad. "Part of Asad's motivation on solving the hijacking was undoubtedly to limit the role of Iranian-backed radical elements in Lebanon." He also wishes to demonstrate to the American Govt. that Syria is a major power in the region, responsible for security in Lebanon.

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

June 30

At 0330, Syrian officials in Damascus tell the US Embassy "Syria has solved" the problem that delayed the release of the 39 TWA hijacking hostages.

~~TOP SECRET~~

At 1405, Speakes announces release of the hostages and crossing of the Syria-Lebanon border at 1330.

At 1805 President announces departure from Syria.

July 1

Full Cabinet Meeting held. US imposes sanctions against Lebanese air carriers, terminating service.

David Kimche confirms to USG that the Israeli inner cabinet has decided to release 300 of the 735 Atlit detainees within 48 hours.

President calls Assad to thank him for his intercession in the release of the TWA hostages and to encourage timely action on the remaining hostages being held.

HLTF meets to review the TWA incident from the standpoint of what was learned that might be applicable to gaining the release of the remaining US hostages in Lebanon. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]

July 2

President greets hostages at Andrews AFB.

July 3

NSPG held to review counter-terrorism planning situation, including, as one option, a decision in principle to consider [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]



TWA 847

The hijacking of TWA 847 commenced on June 14, 1985 and ended on June 29, 1985.

### Issues and Elements of the TWA 847 Case

The response of the U.S. Govt ~~was fully directed by the National Security Council and Staff. That response can be characterized as follows:~~

- Fully directed and coordinated by National Security Council and Staff
- Response options (both policy and operational) were tasked to appropriate agencies, vetted through interagency groups constituted for counter-terrorism responses
- Reviewed frequently at highest levels ~~by~~ during NSPGs by full National Security Council
- Frequent Congressional <sup>consultation</sup> ~~briefing~~ and update
- Employment of all relevant diplomatic channels, including consultation with allies.
- Development of fallback military rescue options in coordination with <sup>all</sup> agency diplomatic assault.
- Simultaneous development and consideration of a range of <sup>long-term CT</sup> strategies designed to safeguard against future contingencies
- ex post facto review of handling of situation and ~~for~~ long-term planning of strategy (both policy and military) to improve CT operations.
- Actions\* and options consistent with stated ~~no~~ policy

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS 597-059/A-64

3/20/06  
BY SP-6, NARA JATE



Missing information on case

- determine connection
- possible guides for release of hostages  
(Israeli hostage release; other?)

17



## TWA 847

### Issues/elements

- short fuse situation
- coordinated through all appropriate groups
  - NSPG
  - TWA
- constant compress. updates
- all diplomatic initiatives pursued in all channels
- fallback military strategies
- banquets of initiative to safeguard w/ future <sup>highly</sup>
- experts facts review + long term planning of CT strategies
- action consistent w/ policy not to negot. w/ terrorists
- public explanation separate.

— Israeli prisoner release —  
only nasty threat.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 #65

BY SM, NARA, DATE 3/20/06

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR NSC/S

FROM: FAWN HALL *gh*SUBJECT: Response to Mr. Robert  
Schaeberle re Condition  
of Pregnant Wife of  
TWA Hijacking VictimC O P Y  
from ORM

Per Jock Covey's note, the State Department task force advised Mr. Schaeberle of action taken regarding his request.

RECOMMENDATION

That you place this package in the file for the record.

## Attachment

Platt Memo to McFarlane of 6/27/85  
w/attachments and Covey note

NSC # 8505157

7243

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1985

COPY  
FROM SPAIN

358055

3500

TR00302

TR00303

CH

ND016

CO086

PR003

CO152

CO145

Dear Mr. Oswald:

Thank you for your message to President Reagan commending his actions in connection with the return of the hostages of TWA Flight 847. Words of encouragement and support from friends in other nations are important to this Administration in all its endeavors to deal with the problem of international terrorism and to win the safe release of the seven Americans who continue to be held in Lebanon.

In light of your concern, I am enclosing for you a copy of the President's address on July 8 to the Annual Convention of the American Bar Association in Washington, D.C.

With the President's appreciation and best wishes,

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Director of Correspondence

Mr. Victor M. Oswald  
Apartado 290  
Boix y Morer 6  
Madrid  
SPAIN

NSC 8507243

SLR-

Defb on AVH393  
variation. Route to  
AUI+ Sn NSC to clean.

Thanks.

~~Sam~~

needs  
7/7 21.00 ch

SLR-

Defb on AVH393  
variation. Route to  
AUI+ Sn NSC to clean.

Thanks.

~~Sam~~

needs  
7/7 21.00 ch

1/2 Lot  
OK  
Peter Sommer  
NSC

NSC/S - Loretta

Please handle directly with  
Higgins shop and tell her it is  
fine w/NSC (Peter Sommer)

Carol Cleveland

Letter I.D.....JWF.850814.1  
Writer Name.....Mr. Victor M. Oswald  
Number of Pages.....1  
Final Reviewer.....  
Final Review Date...  
Print Date.....850902  
PARAGRAPHS SELECTED:  
P1:AVH393

NOTES:

N1:outgoing through AVH to NSC for review

ENCLOSURES:

ENV/LBL.....ENVELOPE

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

July 8, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONVENTION

Constitution Hall  
Washington, D.C.

10:32 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, John Shephard. I want to welcome all of you to the last tax deductible ABA Convention. (Laughter.) Really, I'm delighted you decided to come to the Capitol, and believe me, this week Washington belongs to you.

I noticed this morning that even Milt Pitts, the White House barber, has a welcome sign up -- "Hair cutting, \$10. Hair-splitting, \$100 an hour." (Laughter.)

I was disappointed, though, when the White House Council told me that I couldn't accept an honorarium this morning. Actually, I kind of thought it would be a first to talk to a group of lawyers and I'd come home with the fee. (Laughter.) But don't worry, I'm not going to speak very long. I have a lunch scheduled back at the White House with my wife, the Vice President, and my Chief of Staff -- or as you would put it, Reagan, Reagan, Regan, and Bush. (Laughter.)

Seriously, I'm delighted to be able to speak today, not just to the largest voluntary professional association in the world, but one whose exclusive concern is the starting point for any free society, a concern that is at the heart of civilized life: the law -- our courts and legal system -- justice itself.

Now, I want to be very candid with you this morning and tell you I'd been planning to come here today to speak on a number of legal issues -- the problems of our courts, our administration's enforcement of anti-trust and civil rights laws, as well as our ongoing attack on the drug trade and organized crime in general. But I'm afraid this discussion will now have to wait for another occasion, for it's been overtaken by events of an international nature -- events that I feel compelled as President to comment on today. And yet, I think these matters will be of interest to you, not only because you're Americans, but because, as lawyers, you are also concerned with the rule of law and the danger posed to it by criminals of both a domestic and international variety.

MORE

The reason we haven't had time to discuss the issues that I had originally hoped to address this morning has to do with our hostages -- and what all of America have been through during recent weeks.

Yet my purpose today goes even beyond our concern over the recent outrages in Beirut, El Salvador, or the Air India tragedy, the Narita bombing, or the Jordanian Airlines hijacking. We must look beyond these events because I feel it is vital not to allow them, as terrible as they are, to obscure an even larger and darker terrorist menace.

There is a temptation to see the terrorist act as simply the erratic work of a small group of fanatics. We make this mistake at great peril; for the attacks on America, her citizens, her allies, and other democratic nations in recent years do form a pattern of terrorism that has strategic implications and political goals. And only by moving our focus from the tactical to the strategic perspective, only by identifying the pattern of terror and those behind it, can we hope to put into force a strategy to deal with it.

So, let us go to the facts. Here is what we know. In recent years, there has been a steady and escalating pattern of terrorist acts against the United States and our allies and Third World nations friendly toward our interests. The number of terrorist acts rose from about 500 in 1983 to over 600 in 1984. There were 305 bombings alone last year -- that works out to an average of almost one a day.

And some of the most vicious attacks were directed at Americans or United States property and installations. And this pattern has continued throughout 1985, and in most cases, innocent civilians are the victims of the violence.

At the current rate, as many as 1,000 acts of terrorism will occur in 1985. Now, that's what we face unless civilized nations act together to end this assault on humanity.

In recent years, the Mideast has been one principal point of focus for these attacks -- attacks directed at the United States, Israel, France, Jordan and the United Kingdom. Beginning in the summer of 1984 and culminating in January and February of this year, there was also a series of apparently coordinated attacks and assassinations by left-wing terrorist groups in Belgium, West Germany and France -- attacks directed against American and NATO installations or military and industrial officials of those nations.



Now what do we know about the sources of those attacks and the whole pattern of terrorist assaults in recent years? Well, in 1983 alone, the Central Intelligence Agency either confirmed or found strong evidence of Iranian involvement in 57 terrorist attacks. While most of these attacks occurred in Lebanon, an increase in activity by terrorists sympathetic to Iran was seen throughout Europe: Spain and France have seen such incidents, and in Italy, seven pro-Iranian Lebanese students were arrested for plotting an attack on the U.S. Embassy; and this violence continues.

It will not surprise any of you to know that, in addition to Iran, we have identified another nation, Libya, as deeply involved in terrorism. We have evidence which links Libyan agents or surrogates to at least 25 incidents last year. Colonel Qaddafi's outrages against civilized conduct are, of course, as infamous as those of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The gunning down last year -- from inside the Libyan Embassy -- of a British policewoman is only one of many examples.

Since September 1984, Iranian-backed terrorist groups have been responsible for almost 30 attacks, and, most recently, the Egyptian government aborted a Libyan-backed plot to bomb our Embassy in Cairo. It was this pattern of state-approved assassination and terrorism by Libya that led the United States a few years ago to expel Libyan diplomats and has forced other nations to take similar steps since then. But let us, in acknowledging his commitment to terrorism, at least give Colonel Qaddafi his due. The man is candid: He said recently that Libya was -- and I quote -- "capable of exporting terrorism to the heart of America. We are also capable of physical liquidation and destruction and arson inside America."

And, by the way, it's important to note here that the recognition of this deep and on-going involvement of Iran and Libya in international terrorism is hardly confined to our own government. Most police forces in Europe now take this involvement for granted; and this is not even to mention the warnings issued by world leaders. For example, the Jordanian leadership has publicly noted that Libyan actions caused the destruction of the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.

Now three other governments, along with Iran and Libya, are actively supporting a campaign of international terrorism against the United States, her allies, and moderate Third World states.

First, North Korea. The extent and crudity of North Korean violence against the United States and our ally, South Korea, are a matter of record. Our aircraft have been shot down; our servicemen have been murdered in border incidents; and two years ago, four members of the South Korean Cabinet were blown up in a bombing in Burma by North Korean terrorists -- a failed attempt to assassinate President Chun. This incident was just one more of an unending series of attacks directed against the Republic of Korea by North Korea.

Now what is not readily known or understood is North Korea's wider links to the international terrorist network. There is not time today to recount all of North Korea's efforts to foster separatism, violence, and subversion in other lands well beyond its immediate borders, but to cite one example, North Korea's efforts to spread separatism and terrorism in the free and prosperous nation of Sri Lanka are a deep and continuing source of tension in South Asia.

And this is not even to mention North Korea's involvement here in our own hemisphere, including a secret arms agreement with the former communist government in Grenada. I will also have something to say about North Korea's involvement in Central America in a moment.

And then there is Cuba, a nation whose government has, since the 1960's, openly armed, trained, and directed terrorists operating on at least three continents. This has occurred in Latin America. The OAS has repeatedly passed sanctions against Castro for sponsoring terrorism in places and countries too numerous to mention.

This has also occurred in Africa. President Carter openly accused the Castro government of supporting and training Katangan terrorists from Angola in their attacks on Zaire. And even in the Middle East, Castro himself has acknowledged that he actively assisted the Sandinistas in the early 70's when they were training in the Middle East with terrorist factions of the PLO.

And finally there is the latest partner of Iran, Libya, North Korea and Cuba in a campaign of international terror -- the communist regime in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas not only sponsor terror in El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras -- terror that led recently to the murder of four United States Marines, two civilians, and seven Latin Americans. They provide one of the world's principal refuges for international terrorists.

Members of the Italian government have openly charged that Nicaragua is harboring some of Italy's worst terrorists. And when we have evidence that in addition to Italy's Red Brigades, other elements of the world's most vicious terrorists groups -- West Germany's Baader-Meinhoff Gang, the Basque ETA, the PLO, the Tupamaros, and the IRA have found a haven in Nicaragua and support from that country's communist dictatorship.

In fact, the communist regime in Nicaragua has made itself a focal point for the terrorist network and a case study in the extent of its scope.

Consider for just a moment that in addition to establishing strong international alliances with Cuba and Libya, including the receipt of enormous amounts of arms and ammunition, the Sandinistas are also receiving extensive assistance from North Korea. Nor are they reluctant to acknowledge their debt to the government of North Korea dictator Kim Il-sung. Both Daniel and Humberto Ortega have recently paid official and state visits to North Korea to seek additional assistance and more formal relations.

So we see the Nicaraguans tied to Cuba, Libya, and North Korea. And that leaves only Iran. What about ties to Iran? Well, yes, only recently the Prime Minister of Iran visited Nicaragua bearing expressions of solidarity from the Ayatollah for the Sandinista communists.

Now, I spoke a moment ago about the strategic goals that are motivating these terrorist states. In a minute, I will add some comments of my own, but for the moment, why don't we let the leaders of these outlaw governments speak for themselves about their objectives? During his state visit to North Korea, Nicaragua's Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega, heard Kim Il-sung say this about the mutual objectives of North Korea and Nicaragua: "If the peoples of the revolutionary countries of the world put pressure on and deal blows at United States imperialism in all places where it stretches its talons of aggression, they will make it powerless and impossible to behave as dominator any longer." And Colonel Qaddafi, who has a formal alliance with North Korea, echoed Kim Il-sung's words when he laid out the agenda for the terrorist network: "We must force America to fight on a hundred fronts all over the earth. We must force it to fight in Lebanon, to fight in Chad, to fight in Sudan, and to fight in El Salvador."

So there we have it. Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Nicaragua -- continents away, tens of thousands of miles apart -- but the same goals and objectives. I submit to you that the growth in terrorism in recent years results from the increasing involvement of these states in terrorism in every region of the world. This is terrorism that is part of a pattern, the work of a confederation of terrorist states. Most of the terrorists who are kidnapping and murdering American citizens and attacking American installations are being trained, financed, and directly or indirectly controlled by a core group of radical and totalitarian governments -- a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated. And all of these states are united by one, simple, criminal phenomenon -- their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our way of life, our international stature.

And the strategic purpose behind the terrorism sponsored by these outlaw states is clear: to disorient the United States, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to sow discord between ourselves and our allies, to frighten friendly Third World nations working with us for peaceful settlements of regional conflicts, and finally, to remove American influence from those areas of the world where we're working to bring stable and democratic government. In short, to cause us to retreat, retrench, to become "Fortress America." Yes, their real goal is to expel America from the world.

And that is the reason these terrorist nations are arming, training, and supporting attacks against this nation. And that is why we can be clear on one point: these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the government and people of the United States. And under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself.

Now, for the benefit of these outlaw governments who are sponsoring international terrorism against our nation, I'm prepared to offer a brief lesson in American history. A number of times in America's past, foreign tyrants, warlords and totalitarian dictators have misinterpreted the well-known likeability, patience and generosity of the American people as signs of weakness or even decadence. Well, it's true. We are an easy-going people, slow to wrath, hesitant to see danger looming over every horizon. But it's also true that when the emotions of the American people are aroused, when their patriotism and their anger are triggered, there are no limits to their national valor nor their consuming passion to protect this nation's cherished tradition of freedom. Teddy Roosevelt once put it this way: "The American people are slow to wrath, but when the wrath is once kindled it burns like a consuming flame." And it was another leader, this time a foreign adversary, Admiral Yamamoto, who warned his own nation after its attack on Pearl Harbor that he feared "we have only awakened a sleeping giant and his reaction will be terrible."

Yes, we Americans have our disagreements, sometimes noisy ones, almost always in public -- that's the nature of our open society. But no foreign power should mistake disagreement for disunity. Those who are tempted to do so should reflect on our national character and our history, a history littered with the wreckage of regimes who made the mistake of underestimating the vigor and will of the American people.

So, let me today speak for a united people. Let me say simply: We're Americans. We love this country. We love what she stands for. And we will always defend her. (Applause.) Thank you very much. Thank you. (Applause.) God bless you. (Applause.) Thank you and God bless you. We live for freedom -- our own, our children's -- and we will always stand ready to sacrifice for that freedom.

So the American people are not -- I repeat, not -- going to tolerate intimidation, terror and outright acts of war against this nation and its people. And we're especially not going to tolerate these attacks from outlaw states run by the strangest collection of misfits, looney tunes and squalid criminals -- (laughter) -- since the advent of the Third Reich. (Applause.)

Now I've taken your time today to outline the nature of this network of terrorist states, so that we might as a nation know who it is we're up against and identify the long-term goals motivating this confederation of criminal governments.

Do not for a moment, however, think that this discussion has been all-inclusive. First of all -- though their strength does not match that of the groups supported by the terrorist network I've already mentioned -- there are some terrorist organizations that are indigenous to certain localities or countries which are not necessarily tied to this international network. And second, the countries I have mentioned today are not necessarily the only ones that support terrorism against the United States and its allies. Those which I've described are simply the ones that can be most directly implicated.

Now, the question of the Soviet Union's close relationship with almost all of the terrorist states that I have mentioned and the implications of these Soviet ties on bilateral relations with the United States and other democratic nations must be recognized. So too, Secretary of State Shultz in his speech of June 24th of last year openly raised the question of Soviet support for terrorist organizations, as did Secretary Haig before him.

With regard to the Soviet Union, there is one matter that I cannot let go unaddressed today. During the recent hostage crises in Beirut 39 Americans were brutally kidnapped; an American sailor was viciously beaten; another American sailor stomped and shot to death; the families and loved ones of these hostages undergo indescribable suffering and a sense of distress, anger and outrage spreading through our nation like a prairie fire. The Soviet Union made some official comments through its government-controlled press. The Soviet government suggested that the United States was not sincerely concerned about this crisis, but that we were, instead, in the grip of -- and I use the Soviets' word here -- "hysteria." The Soviet Union also charged that the United States was only looking for a -- and, again, I use their word -- "pretext" for a military -- and, again, I use their word -- "invasion."

Well now, ladies and gentlemen of the American Bar, there is a non-Soviet word for that kind of talk. (Laughter.) It's an extremely useful, time-tested original American word, one with deep roots in our rich agricultural and farming tradition. (Laughter.) (Applause.)

Now, much needs to be done by all of us in the community of civilized nations. We must act against the criminal menace of terrorism with the full weight of the law -- both domestic and international. We will act to indict, apprehend and prosecute those who commit the kind of atrocities the world has witnessed in recent weeks.

We can act together as free peoples who wish not to see our citizens kidnapped, or shot, or blown out of the skies -- just as we acted together to rid the seas of piracy at the turn of the last century. And incidentally, those of you who are legal scholars will note the law's description of pirates -- "hostis humanis" -- "the enemies of all mankind." There can be no place on earth left where it is safe for these monsters to rest, or train, or practice their cruel and deadly skills. We must act together, or unilaterally if necessary, to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere.

Vice President Bush returned from Europe last week after intense consultations with our allies on practical steps to combat terrorism. He'll be heading up a government-wide task force to review and recommend improvements in our efforts to halt terrorism.

For those countries which sponsor such acts or fail to take action against terrorist criminals, the civilized world needs to ensure that their nonfeasance and malfeasance are answered with actions that demonstrate our unified resolve that this kind of activity must cease. For example, I've informed our allies and others that the Beirut International Airport, through which have passed 15 percent of the world's hijackings since 1970, must be made safe. And until that time, the airport should be closed.  
(Applause.)

Finally, I want you to accept a challenge -- to become part of the solution to the problem of terrorism. You have a fundamental concern for the law, and it's upon the law that terrorists trample. You need to address this problem in conferences and conventions that will lead us to a better domestic and international legal framework for dealing with terrorism. You must help this government and others to deal legally with lawlessness. Where legislation must be crafted to allow appropriate authorities to act, you should help to craft or change it. In the past, lawyers have helped when civilization was threatened by lawbreakers. And now is the time to do so again.

What I place before you this morning is not pleasant, nor will the solution be easy. The answer to the threat of international terrorism is difficult, but it can be found. It is to be found in a clear understanding of the problem and our -- the expression of our national will to do something about it. It's always been so with any important cause; it's why our Declaration of Independence was more important to our Revolution than any one military maneuver or single battle. And that is why we do not today engage in policy discussions or focus on strategic options but simply state the facts about the nature of international terrorism and affirm America's will to resist it.

But there is another point that needs to be made here -- the point I made at the start of this discussion. That in taking a strategic, not just a tactical view of terrorism, we must understand that the greatest hope the terrorists and their supporters harbor -- the very reason for their cruelty and viciousness of their tactics -- is to disorient the American people, to cause disunity, to disrupt or alter our foreign policy, to keep us from the steady pursuit of our strategic interests, to distract us from our very real hope that someday the nightmare of totalitarian rule will end and self-government and personal freedom will become the birthright of every people on Earth.

And here, my fellow Americans, is where we find the real motive behind the rabid and increasing anti-Americanism of the international terrorist network. I have been saying for some years now that the cause of totalitarian ideology is on the wane; that all across the world there is an uprising of mind and will, a tidal wave of longing for freedom and self-rule.

Well, no one senses this better than those who now stand atop totalitarian states, especially those nations on the outer periphery of the totalitarian world like Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua. Their rulers are frightened; they know that freedom is on the march and when it triumphs, their time in power is over.

You see, it's true that totalitarian governments are very powerful and, over the short term, may be better organized than the democracies. But it's also true -- and no one knows this better than totalitarian rulers themselves -- that these regimes are weak in a way that no democracy can ever be weak. For the fragility of totalitarian government is the fragility of any regime whose hold on its people is limited to the instruments of police-state repression.

That is why the stakes are so high, and why we must persevere. Freedom itself is the issue -- our own and the entire world's. Yes, America is still a symbol to a few -- a symbol that is feared and hated. But to more -- many millions more -- a symbol that is loved, a country that remains a shining city on a hill.

Teddy Roosevelt -- and he is a good President to quote in these circumstances -- put it so well: "We, here in America, hold in our hands the hope of the world, the fate of the coming years; and shame and disgrace will be ours if in our eyes the light of high resolve is dimmed, if we trail in the dust the golden hopes of man."

And that light of high resolve, those golden hopes are now ours to preserve and protect, and with God's help, to pass on to generations to come.

I can't close without telling you one little incident here. When I say, "We are a symbol of hope," I have, on my desk at home, a letter signed by 10 women in the Soviet Union. They are all in a prison camp in that Union -- a labor camp. The letter is no more than 2-1/2 inches wide, and just an inch high, and yet, by hand, they wrote a complete letter, signed their 10 names to it, smuggled that and another document just a little bigger -- about a three-inch square of paper -- that is the chart of the hunger strikes they have endured. And they smuggled it out to be sent to me because they wanted to tell me and all of you that the United States, where they are, in that prison, still remains their hope that keeps them going -- their hope for the world.

So, thank you very much, God bless you all. (Applause.)



218

Victor M. Oswald

Madrid - 3  
Calle Boix y Morer 6  
Tel. 251 91 05 / 231 90 00

His Excellency  
The President of the United States  
Mr Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington  
U.S.A.

July 1, 1985  
VMO/me

Dear Mr President,

As a Swiss citizen of over 70 years, who during his lifetime has visited the United States more than 160 times, usually three trips a year, I would like to congratulate you from the bottom of my heart for the skillful way you handled the incredibly complicated crisis of the TWA hostages.

When the crisis began I was in the United States, proceeding from Spain where I observed the unbelievably badly organised reception given to you by the Spanish Government, which was absolutely contrary to the opinion of countless millions of Spanish people.


Your master-minded handling of the situation averted a great human tragedy and has made a tremendous impact on the goodwill of the Spanish people. I would like to express my admiration and pride on being a long-standing friend of the U.S.A.

I wish you, dear Mr President, the same luck with the Russian bear, which thank God, has so many fleas in its hide : after 60 years of sabre-rattling and threat to the world, it is a country not capable of feeding its own people.

What a difference to observe the actual Administration of the U.S. in comparison to other previous Democratic administrations - in particular the tragedy of Cuba, which was so mishandled by the representative of U.S. foreign affairs.

Dear Mr President, let me wish you from the bottom of my heart good health and unlimited fighting spirit for the good of all right-thinking mankind. In deepfelt admiration,

Cordially yours





RECEIVED 13 SEP 85 17

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM OSWALD, VICTOR

DOCDATE 01 JUL 85

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

HIJACKING

TERRORISM

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM OSWALD RE ADMIRATION FOR ACTION TAKEN / TWA FLIGHT 847  
SITUATION

ACTION: MEMO MARTIN TO HIGGINS

DUE: 18 SEP 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

SOMMER

NORTH

GRIMES

CANNISTRARO

COMMENTS

RLF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( DR )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH *by hp Higgins* W/ATTCH FILE (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

JL003-02

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JULY 08, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: REAR ADMIRAL RALPH M. METCALF

8520508

SUBJECT: WRITES WITH SUGGESTION REGARDING HIJACKINGS  
AND PUNISHMENT FOR MURDERERS OF ROBERT  
STETHEM

ROUTE TO:		ACTION	DISPOSITION	
OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP
CHUCK DONOVAN		ORG	85/07/08	
	REFERRAL NOTE:			
✓ DOS		D	85/07/12	85/08/23
	REFERRAL NOTE:			
	REFERRAL NOTE:			
	REFERRAL NOTE:			
	REFERRAL NOTE:			

COMMENTS:

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: \_\_\_\_\_

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

\*\*\*\*\*

*ACTION CODES:	*DISPOSITION	*OUTGOING	*
*	*	*CORRESPONDENCE:	*
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION	*A-ANSWERED	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS	*
*C-COMMENT/RECOM	*B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	* OF SIGNER	*
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A	*
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET	*S-SUSPENDED	*COMPLETED = DATE OF	*
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*		* OUTGOING	*
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *			*
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE *			*
*X-INTERIM REPLY *			*

\*\*\*\*\*

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE  
(ROOM 75,OE0B) EXT-2590  
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING  
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS  
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 5, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM:

JOCK COVEY 

SUBJECT:

Reply to Rear Admiral Ralph Metcalf

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to Sally Kelley forwarding a State draft reply (Tab A) to Rear Admiral Ralph M. Metcalf, who writes concerning countering future hijackings and punishing the murderers of Robert Stethem. Adm. Metcalf's letter to the President is at Tab B.

Ollie North concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve



Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I      Memo to Sally Kelley  
Tab A      Draft reply to Rear Adm. Metcalf  
Tab B      Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8/28/85

6800

TO: NSC


ACTION:

- ☒ Review/Approval
- ☐ Recommendation
- ☐ Information Copy
- ☐ Draft Reply
- ☐ As we discussed

DATE ACTION NEEDED: ASAP

COMMENT:

Reference to justification of  
U.S. military forces in reply  
D.L.C.?

CHARLES A. DONOVAN   
Presidential Correspondence  
Room 94, OEOB - x7610



National Security Council  
The White House

System #

85 SEP 6

P 2: 53 Package #

6804

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson

1

0

William Martin

John Poindexter

Paul Thompson

Milma Hall

Lud McFarlane

William Martin

NSC Secretariat

2

Situation Room

to North  
to further  
action

= Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Reference: whether we are offering a  
reward for Steinhilber's killer(s) - per  
telcom. Tx, Done - North redid draft  
at Tab A  
concur red



National Security Council  
The White House

85 SEP 23

P 4: 11

System #

Package #

I

6804

SEQUENCE TO

HAS SEEN

DISPOSITION

Bob Pearson

1

P

William Martin

John Poindexter

Paul Thompson

Wilma Hall

Bud McFarlane

William Martin

NSC Secretariat

Situation Room

North

2

done FA

reds

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6804

Sally -  
incoming?  
~~cc~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Rear Admiral Ralph Metcalf

This memorandum forwards for appropriate signature an NSC-approved reply (Tab A) to Rear Admiral Ralph M. Metcalf, who writes concerning countering future hijackings and punishing the murderers of Robert Stethem.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to Rear Adm. Metcalf  
Tab B Incoming correspondence

DRAFT RESPONSE

cmo &  
ark

Dear Admiral Metcalf:

Thank you very much for your thoughtful letter to President Reagan containing insightful suggestions for countering future hijackings and punishing the murderers of Robert Stethem. Please be assured that we are looking at a full range of options for countering international terrorism, including the use of military force. While we cannot, for obvious reasons, provide a public reaction to such proposals, we do give them consideration as we continue to work on this most difficult problem.

The brutal murder of Robert Stethem is being vigorously investigated, and serious consideration is being given to the utility of a reward for the apprehension, prosecution, and conviction of his murderers. We also are working with the Congress on additional legislation which will improve our ability to bring terrorists to justice.

So that we may fully benefit from your insights, your letter has been forwarded to the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism for their review.



Enclosed <sup>is a copy</sup> ~~are copies~~ of recent testimony which you may find of interest. Again, thank you for your thoughtful comments.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

Enclosure~~s~~:

As stated (Wickley Testimony, 7/30)

Rear Admiral Ralph M. Metcalf, USN (Ret.)

14150 Douglass Lane

Saratoga, CA 95070

cc: W/cy of incoming to VP's Task Force on Combating Terrorism

TESTIMONY TO SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

July 30, 1985

by ROBERT B. OAKLEY,  
Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism  
and Emergency Planning

Mr. Chairman, and other Committee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify here today with Judge Sofaer to discuss our continued joint efforts to counter international terrorism.

Senator Specter's bill, S. 1429, the Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1985, can be an important part of this effort. We appreciate the opportunities we have had in the past to discuss the anti-terrorism initiatives of Senator Denton and Senator Specter and we look forward to a continuing good working relationship.

I have a short statement and will not attempt to duplicate Judge Sofaer's excellent discussion of the details of S. 1429. To allow the maximum time for questions, I will comment briefly on the utility of this legislation in strengthening our anti-terrorism effort. I would like to offer three areas, primarily relating to the foreign policy and diplomatic aspects of our anti-terrorism effort in which the bill is helpful.

First is the legal principle. The legislation can be a useful component in our efforts to obtain extradition of persons we seek to bring to trial or to persuade another government to prosecute. It emphasizes the view of the United States that criminal acts by terrorists, particularly

murder and attempted murder are crimes which require punishment. This is a very important principle. Second, the legislation is a useful step in developing an international legal framework against terrorism. It fills a gap, as Judge Sofaer said, in our current structure of criminal jurisdiction over acts of terrorism committed against Americans overseas. We would encourage other states to enact similar legislation. Third, the legislation is symbolic. It underscores the magnitude of our reaction against a series of recent violent murders of Americans overseas.

S. 1429 and the previous laws, as I'm sure the Committee recognizes, do not provide solutions in themselves. Rather, they should be viewed as tools-- part of our equipment to make clear to the world that acts of terrorism are neither glamorous acts nor part of some romantic fight for freedom, but criminal actions plain and simple. The brutal slayings of Robert Stethem, the Navy diver last month, and William Stanford and Charles Hegna, the two A.I.D. auditors last December, whose only fault was to be in the wrong airplane at the wrong time, were criminal acts, plain murder. Likewise, the shootings of six Americans at a restaurant in El Salvador on June 19 were acts of murder. These should be crimes in every nation's book. S. 1429 will give us additional legal means to pursue with other governments in responding to such acts of violence.

I believe it is essential to emphasize that this effort to strengthen the international legal framework against

terrorism is a two-way street. We must recognize that terrorists from other countries who have committed murders or other criminal acts sometimes seek refuge in the United States. We must be willing to help the governments of these countries bring such terrorists to justice, treating them as criminals and not indulging their claims to have been politically inspired.

We recently have completed a supplementary extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. Senate advice and consent to ratification of this treaty is essential to strengthen our international effort to cooperate in dealing with terrorism. We cannot focus solely on those aspects of terrorism which most directly affect U.S. citizens. To do so makes it more difficult to persuade our friends in Europe and elsewhere to understand that terrorism is an international threat and requires international cooperation.

These efforts to build the legal framework are very important. We welcome your initiative. If you have any questions, we would be glad to respond.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

6804

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*  
SUBJECT: Reply to Rear Admiral Ralph Metcalf

This memorandum forwards for appropriate signature an NSC-approved reply (Tab A) to Rear Admiral Ralph M. Metcalf, who writes concerning countering future hijackings and punishing the murderers of Robert Stethem.

Attachments

Tab A Reply to Rear Adm. Metcalf  
Tab B Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 8/28/85

TO: NSC

ACTION:

- ☒ Review
- ☐ Recon
- ☐ Inform
- ☐ Draft Reply
- ☐ As we discussed

*Per our  
telecon  
Thank  
Dretta*

DATE ACTION NEEDED: ASAP

COMMENT: *Reference to positioning of  
U.S. military forces in reply  
D.L.?*

CHARLES A. DONOVAN *CD*  
Presidential Correspondence  
Room 94, OEOB - x7610

8520508

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

JULY 12, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 317762  
MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 2, 1985  
TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FROM: REAR ADMIRAL RALPH M. METCALF  
USN, RET.  
14150 DOUGLASS LANE  
SARATOGA CA 95070

SUBJECT: WRITES WITH SUGGESTION REGARDING HIJACKINGS  
AND PUNISHMENT FOR MURDERERS OF ROBERT  
STETHEM

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE



317762

✓ Rear Admiral Ralph M. Metcalf, USN, (Ret.)  
14150 Douglass Lane - Saratoga, Calif. 95070

8520508

2 July, 1985

CAD.  
Dear Mrs. Reagan:

You haven't asked for my advice,  
but I'm going to offer it, anyway:

1. Countering future hijackings. Let's  
have in North Carolina is too far  
away. You should have a combat  
team at the ready in the Eastern  
Mediterranean or the Middle East, on  
a rotational basis.

2. Punishing the murderers. By now,  
you must know who killed  
Robert Fethem. Identify them to  
the world, and put a price on  
their heads, dead or alive.  
Matters will then take their course.

Respectfully,  
R. Metcalf



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8520508

Date August 23, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Rear Adm. Ralph M. Metcalf, USN,  
Retired.  
Date: July 2, 1985 Subject: Writes suggestion in regard to  
punishment for murderers of Robert Stethem.

WH Referral Dated: July 12, 1985 NSC ID# 317762  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

- X   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

TESTIMONY TO SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE  
ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

July 30, 1985

by ROBERT B. OAKLEY,  
Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism  
and Emergency Planning

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I have a short statement and will not attempt to duplicate Judge Sofaer's excellent discussion of the details of S. 1429. To allow the maximum time for questions, I will comment briefly on the utility of this legislation in strengthening our anti-terrorism effort. I would like to offer three areas, primarily relating to the foreign policy and diplomatic aspects of our anti-terrorism effort in which the bill is helpful.

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S. 1429 and the previous laws, as I'm sure the Committee recognizes, do not provide solutions in themselves. Rather, they should be viewed as tools-- part of our equipment to make clear to the world that acts of terrorism are neither glamorous acts nor part of some romantic fight for freedom, but criminal actions plain and simple. The brutal slayings of Robert Stethem, the Navy diver last month, and William Stanford and Charles Hegna, the two A.I.D. auditors last December, whose only fault was to be in the wrong airplane at the wrong time, were criminal acts, plain murder. Likewise, the shootings of six Americans at a restaurant in El Salvador on June 19 were acts of murder. These should be crimes in every nation's book. S. 1429 will give us additional legal means to pursue with other governments in responding to such acts of violence.

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We recently have completed a supplementary extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. Senate advice and consent to ratification of this treaty is essential to strengthen our international effort to cooperate in dealing with terrorism. We cannot focus solely on those aspects of terrorism which most directly affect U.S. citizens. To do so makes it more difficult to persuade our friends in Europe and elsewhere to understand that terrorism is an international threat and requires international cooperation.

These efforts to build the legal framework are very important. We welcome your initiative. If you have any questions, we would be glad to respond.

RECEIVED 29 AUG 85 14

TO PRESIDENT

FROM METCALF, RALPH

DOCDATE 02 JUL 85

PLATT, N

23 AUG 85

DONOVAN, C

28 AUG 85

KEYWORDS: HIJACKINGS

MP

STETHEM, ROBERT

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM RADM METCALF RE TERRORISM

---

ACTION: MEMO MARTIN TO SALLY KELLEY DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

---

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COVEY

NORTH

## COMMENTS

REF# 317762

8520508

LOG

NSCIFID

( LB PS )

---

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

---

<u>C</u>	<u>7/24</u>	<u>for review</u>		

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

2  
3  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Ollie

Does not seem  
worthy of a  
Presidential  
reply. How about  
The Task Force to  
phone the fellow  
on behalf of the  
President.

PC



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

5157

June 27, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: TWA Hijacking


Medical condition of wife of Arthur Toga

Mr. Robert K. Schaeberle, a friend of the Toga family, wishes Mr. Toga's Shiite captors to be aware of the fact that Mrs. Debra Toga is 7 1/2 months pregnant and experiencing symptoms of a miscarriage due to the stress and strain of being without her husband.

Mr. Schaeberle should be advised that this message was passed to our Embassy in Beirut on June 22, and subsequently to Nabih Barri on June 24. Hopefully, this information was not relayed to Mr. Toga.

Mrs. Toga was advised of above by telephone on evening of June 24.

A draft response is attached for your consideration.

  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

Mr. Robert K. Schaeberle  
25 Rangeway Road  
Mount Vernon, New Hampshire 03057

Dear Mr. Schaeberle:

Thank you for your telex of June 22 concerning the medical condition of Mrs. Arthur Toga.

Please be assured that the information on Mrs. Toga's medical condition was passed to the American Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon on June 22 and subsequently relayed to Nabih Barri on June 24. Hopefully, this information was not passed to Mr. Toga.

Please express to Mrs. Toga my personal concern for her health and well-being. I am doing everything humanly possible to bring her husband home safely.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan



cc K. Kelly Kelly  
Sally  
1-008769A173 06/24/85

ICS IPMWCWD WSH

01611 06-22 0625P EDT

PMS WHITE HOUSE DC 20500

4-0259938173 06/22/85

ICS IPMHTZZ CSP

6036737670 TDMT MT VERNON NH 174 06-22 0520P EST

PMS PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, DLR

WASHINGTON DC

URGENT

ACTION: HWG

COPIES:

S

D

P

NEA

S/S

S/S-S

TMB

S/S-S-SL

RF:vhd

DEAR MR PRESIDENT,

PLEASE BE ADVISED THAT MRS DEBBIE TOGA, WIFE OF ARTHUR TOGA, BEING HELD HOSTAGE IN BEIRUT LEBANON AND WHO WAS ALSO RELEASED FROM BEING HELD HOSTAGE LAST SATURDAY IS CURRENTLY HAVING SERIOUS MEDICAL COMPLICATIONS. MRS TOGA IS SEVEN AND A HALF MONTHS PREGNANT AND IS EXPERIENCING SYMPTOMS OF A MISCARRIAGE.

I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ASSISTANCE YOUR OFFICE CAN LEND IN ENSURING THAT THIS INFORMATION IS RELAYED TO THE CHIITE CAPTORS OF ARTHUR TOGA IN BEIRUT.

MRS TOGA IS CURRENTLY UNDER THE CARE OF ARTHUR TOGA'S PARENTS DR. MRS CARL TOGA IN LEXINGTON MASSACHUSETTS. CONTACT MAY BE MADE WITH THEM DIRECTLY AT 617-861-9247.

AS A FRIEND OF THE FAMILY, AND HAVING PERSONALLY ESCORTED MRS. D. TOGA HOME FROM EUROPE LAST SUNDAY I TRUST THE URGENCY OF MRS TOGA'S CURRENT MEDICAL CONDITION WILL INITIATE SOME POSITIVE ACTION TO HER HUSBAND'S CAPTORS.

MY FAMILY SUPPORTS YOUR EFFORTS AND ANYTHING YOU CAN DO TO IMMEDIATELY ASSIST THE TOGA FAMILY AND THOSE OTHER FAMILIES OF HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN BEIRUT LEBANON.

SINCEREST REGARDS,

ROBERT K SCHAEBERLE

REPLY REQUESTED

603-673-7670

25 RANGEWAY RD MT VERNON NH 03057

1722 EST

1707 EST

5 JUN 24 P 6: 12

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8505157

RECEIVED 27 JUN 85 11

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 27 JUN 85

**URGENT**

KEYWORDS. TERRORISM

HIJACKING

SCHAEBERLE, ROBERT K

TOGA, ARTHUR

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PRES LTR TO WIFE OF TOGA RE MEDICAL CONDITION

-----  
ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 28 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES WH  
-----

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

CANNISTRARO

GRIMES

DEGRAFFENREID

COVEY

FORTIER

MAHLEY

MCDANIEL

PEARSON

COMMENTS

*Teicherz*

REF# 8518782

LOG

NSCIFID

( HW )

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO*C**10/09**Close-out per North*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

*cut* *SE*  
(C)

TWA 847 Chronology

June 14 - June 30, 1985

June 14

TWA Flight 847 departs Athens en route to Rome with 153 people on board, including 129 American passengers, 14 alien passengers, six American crewmembers, two alien crewmembers, and two Lebanese hijackers.

Circa 0310, TWA 847 is diverted to Beirut, where it lands at 0453 over the protests of Lebanese air controllers. Nineteen passengers, 17 women and two children are released, and the aircraft refueled.

President's national security staff begin a series of secure conference calls which continue throughout crisis. (WHCMC chron.)

Terrorist Incidents Working Group (TIWG) is scheduled for 1000.

At 0630, TWA 847 leaves for Algiers. Prior to taking off, the hijackers list initial demands: release of all Lebanese detainees in Israel and Kuwait, and release of four specific individuals. In addition, the hijackers condemn the bombings at Bir al Abd and Riyadh, attack the Arab League and the Palestinians, condemn American practices in the Arab world, as well as US financial support to Israel.

t 0700.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/a #14

BY AM, DATE 3/20/04

major meeting →  
with the →  
security service →  
to take place →  
in the →  
of the →

PRESERVATION COPY

ID # 345409

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

COPY

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence  
Received (YY/MM/DD)

85 10/11

Name of Correspondent: ☐ Mr. ☒ Mrs. ☐ Miss

Ray Evans from ORM

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject:

Encloses article concerning Uli Derichson  
Stewards on the hijacked TWA Plane.

## ROUTE TO:

## ACTION

## DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	Hagg Cowell	ORIGINATOR	85 10 9/12	TR A H		85 10/15
	208	Referral Note:	85 10 9/12		C	85 10/10
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				

## ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet  
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

## DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

## FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

October 15, 1985

Dear Mrs. Evans:

Thank you for writing to President Reagan regarding the actions of TWA flight attendant Uli Derickson during the hijacking of flight 847.

Mrs. Derickson undoubtedly deserves praise for her unstinting efforts on behalf of the passengers of the hijacked TWA air craft throughout their ordeal, and particularly for her courageous intervention on behalf of Mr. Suggs. It is indeed unfortunate that her statements after her release were taken out of context. We too were dismayed that Mrs. Derickson's suffering was so needlessly prolonged.

I have enclosed an excerpt from the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 as it appeared in the Congressional Record. You will be pleased to note that it contains a provision which recognizes the actions of Mrs. Derickson and the crew of the TWA aircraft.

The Administration remains deeply concerned at the growing threat that terrorism poses to innocent persons like Mrs. Derickson and the passengers of TWA flight 847. We are working to ensure that events such as the TWA hijacking are not repeated, and that those who have committed such acts are brought to justice.

Thank you for sharing your views with us.

Sincerely,

Anne Higgins  
Special Assistant to the President  
and Director of Correspondence

Mrs. Ray Evans  
4037 Lively Lane  
Dallas, TX 75220

AVH/MB/DOS/ds (10AVHA)

OK MB

Department of State

Suggested Response

Dear Mrs. Evans:

*Thank you for writing to President Reagan*  
~~The President has asked me to reply to your letter of~~

~~May 6~~ regarding the actions of TWA flight attendant Uli Derickson during the hijacking of flight 847.

Mrs. Derickson undoubtedly deserves praise for her unstinting efforts on behalf of the passengers of the hijacked TWA aircraft throughout their ordeal, and particularly for her courageous intervention on behalf of Mr. Suggs. It is indeed unfortunate that her statements after her release were taken out of context. We too were dismayed that Mrs. Derickson's suffering was so needlessly prolonged.

I have enclosed an excerpt from the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 as it appeared in the Congressional Record. You will be pleased to note that it contains a provision which recognizes the actions of Mrs. Derickson and the crew of the TWA aircraft.

Mrs. Ray Evans  
4037 Lively Lane  
Dallas, Texas 75220

*How* →

The Administration remains deeply concerned at the growing threat that terrorism poses to innocent persons like Mrs. Derickson and the passengers of TWA flight 847. We are working to ensure that events such as the TWA hijacking are not repeated, and that those who have committed such acts are ~~tried~~ ~~and punished~~. brought to justice.

Thank you for sharing your views with us,

Sincerely,

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*October 10, 1985*

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY L. KELLY

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Mrs. Ray Evans  
re Uli Derickson, ordeal of purser aboard hijacked  
TWA 847

Attached at Tab A is a draft response prepared for signature by a White House staff member. The letter responds to Mrs. Ray Evans, who wrote to the President regarding the ordeal of Uli Derickson, purser aboard hijacked TWA flight 847 (Tab B).

The State Department and NSC concur in this draft response.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 8, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Mrs. Ray Evans  
re Uli Derickson, ordeal of purser aboard hijacked  
TWA 847

Attached at Tab I is a memo from Bill Martin to Sally Kelly forwarding a draft response prepared for White House staff signature (Tab A) to Mrs. Ray Evans. Mrs. Evans wrote to the President regarding the ordeal of Uli Derickson, purser aboard hijacked TWA flight 847 (Tab B).

The State Department suggested reply is attached at Tab II.

Vince Cannistraro and John Grimes concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bill Martin to initial and forward the memo to Sally Kelly at Tab I with Tabs A and B attached.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - Martin Memo to Kelly
  - Tab A - WH Staff draft ltr to Evans
  - Tab B - Evans ltr to the President of Jul 6, 1985
- Tab II - Platt Transmittal Form to McFarlane  
of September 27, 1985

Department of State

Suggested Response

Dear Mrs. Evans:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of July 6 regarding the actions of TWA flight attendant Uli Derickson during the hijacking of flight 847.

Mrs. Derickson undoubtedly deserves praise for her unstinting efforts on behalf of the passengers of the hijacked TWA aircraft throughout their ordeal, and particularly for her courageous intervention on behalf of Mr. Suggs. It is indeed unfortunate that her statements after her release were taken out of context. We too were dismayed that Mrs. Derickson's suffering was so needlessly prolonged.

I have enclosed an excerpt from the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986 as it appeared in the Congressional Record. You will be pleased to note that it contains a provision which recognizes the actions of Mrs. Derickson and the crew of the TWA aircraft.

Mrs. Ray Evans  
4037 Lively Lane  
Dallas, Texas 75220

The Administration remains deeply concerned at the growing threat that terrorism poses to innocent persons like Mrs. Derickson and the passengers of TWA flight 847. We are working to ensure that events such as the TWA hijacking are not repeated, and that those who have committed such acts are ~~tried and punished~~. *brought to justice.*

Thank you for sharing your views with us,

Sincerely,

July 29, 1985

# CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

H 6713

engage in foreign air transportation utilizing such airport; and

"(d) the President may prohibit air carriers and foreign air carriers from providing service between the United States and any other foreign airport which is directly or indirectly served by aircraft flying to or from the airport with respect to which the determination is made under this section.

"(e) The Secretary of Transportation shall promptly submit to the Congress a report with a classified annex (if necessary) on any action taken under this subsection, setting forth information concerning the attempts made to secure the cooperation of the foreign government in meeting the standard imposed by the Secretary in making the assessment of the airport under subsection (a).

## "LIFTING OF SANCTIONS

"(1) The sanctions required to be imposed with respect to an airport pursuant to subsection (e)(2) (A) and (B) may be lifted only if the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, has determined that effective security measures are maintained and administered at that airport.

"(2) The Congress shall be notified if any sanction imposed pursuant to subsection (e) is lifted.

## "AUTHORITY FOR IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF AIR SERVICE

"(g) Notwithstanding sections 1102 and 1114 of this Act, whenever the Secretary of Transportation determines that—

"(1) a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a foreign airport, and

"(2) the public interest requires an immediate suspension of services between the United States and the identified airport, the Secretary of Transportation shall, without notice or hearing and with the approval of the Secretary of State, suspend the right of any air carrier or foreign air carrier to engage in foreign air transportation to or from that foreign airport and the right of any person to operate aircraft in foreign air commerce to or from that foreign airport.

## "CONDITIONS OF AUTHORITY

"(h) The provisions of this section shall be deemed to be a condition to any authority granted under title IV or title VI of this Act to any air carrier or any foreign air carrier, issued under authority vested in the Secretary of Transportation."

## (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

(1) INFORMATION IN SEMIANNUAL REPORTS.—Section 315(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1356(a)) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sentence: "Each semiannual report submitted by the Administrator pursuant to the preceding sentence shall include the information described in section 1115(c) of this Act."

(2) CIVIL PENALTIES.—Section 301(a)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1471(a)(1)) is amended by inserting "or 1115(e)(2)(B)" after "1114".

(3) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—That portion of the table of contents contained in the first section of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 which appears under the center heading

## "TITLE XI—MISCELLANEOUS"

is amended by striking out

"Sec. 1113. Security standards in foreign air transportation."

and inserting in lieu thereof

"Sec. 1113. Security standards in foreign air transportation.

"(a) Assessment of security measures.

"(b) Consultation with the Secretary of State.

"(c) Report of assessments.

"(d) Notification to foreign country of determination.

"(e) Notice and sanctions.

"(f) Lifting of sanctions.

"(g) Authority for immediate suspension of air service.

"(h) Conditions of authority."

(c) CLOSING OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.—It is the sense of the Congress that the President is urged and encouraged to take all appropriate steps to carry forward his announced policy of seeking the effective closing of the international airport in Beirut, Lebanon, at least until such time as the Government of Lebanon has instituted measures and procedures designed to prevent the use of that airport by aircraft hijackers and other terrorists in attacking civilian airlines or their passengers, hijacking their aircraft, or taking or holding their passengers hostage.

## SEC. 552. TRAVEL ADVISORY AND SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

(a) TRAVEL ADVISORY.—Upon being notified by the Secretary of Transportation that the Secretary has determined, pursuant to subsection (e)(1)(B) of section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 that a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from a foreign airport which the Secretary of Transportation has determined pursuant to that section to be an airport which does not maintain and administer effective security measures, the Secretary of State shall immediately issue a travel advisory with respect to that airport. Any travel advisory issued pursuant to this subsection shall be published in the Federal Register. The Secretary of State shall take the necessary steps to widely publicize that travel advisory.

(b) SUSPENSION OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The President shall suspend all assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Arms Export Control Act to any country in which is located an airport with respect to which section 1115(e)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 becomes effective if the Secretary of State determines that such country is a high terrorist threat country. The President may waive the requirements of this subsection if the President determines and reports to the Congress that national security interests or a humanitarian emergency require such waiver.

(c) LIFTING SANCTIONS.—The sanctions required to be imposed pursuant to this section may be lifted only if, pursuant to section 1115(f) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, has determined that effective security measures are maintained and administered at the airport with respect to which the Secretary of Transportation had made the determination described in section 1115 of that Act.

(d) NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS.—The Congress shall be notified if any sanction imposed pursuant to this section is lifted.

## SEC. 553. UNITED STATES AIRMARSHAL PROGRAM.

(a) STUDY OF NEED FOR EXPANSION OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall study the need for an expanded airmarshal program on international flights of United States air carriers. The Secretary of Transportation shall report the results of this study to the Congress within 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act.

(b) AUTHORITY TO CARRY FIREARMS AND MAKE ARRESTS.—The Secretary of Transportation, with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, may authorize persons, in connection with the performance of their air transportation security duties, to carry firearms and to make ar-

rests without warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their presence, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States, if they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a felony.

## SEC. 554. ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION STANDARDS.

The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, jointly, shall call on the member countries of the International Civil Aviation Organization to enforce that Organization's existing standards and to support United States actions enforcing such standards.

## SEC. 555. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION BOYCOTT OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

It is the sense of the Congress that the President—

(1) should call for an international civil aviation boycott with respect to those countries which the President determines—

(A) grant sanctuary from prosecution to any individual or group which has committed an act of international terrorism, or

(B) otherwise support international terrorism; and

(2) should take steps, both bilateral and multilateral, to achieve a total international civil aviation boycott with respect to those countries.

## SEC. 556. MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE, AIRCRAFT HIJACKING, AND AIRPORT SECURITY.

The Secretary of State shall seek multilateral and bilateral agreement on strengthening enforcement measures and standards for compliance with respect to aircraft sabotage, aircraft hijacking, and airport security.

## SEC. 557. RESEARCH ON AIRPORT SECURITY TECHNIQUES FOR DETECTING EXPLOSIVES.

In order to improve security at international airports, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund (in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purpose) \$5,000,000, without fiscal year limitation, to be used for research on and the development of airport security devices or techniques for detecting explosives.

## SEC. 558. HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847 AND OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

The Congress joins with all Americans in celebrating the release of the hostages taken from Trans World Airlines flight 847. It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) purser Uli Derickson, pilot John Testrake, co-pilot Philip Maresca, flight engineer Benjamin Zimmermann, and the rest of the crew of Trans World Airlines flight 847 displayed extraordinary valor and heroism during the hostages' ordeal and therefore should be commended;

(2) the hijackers who murdered United States Navy Petty Officer Stethem should be immediately brought to justice;

(3) all diplomatic means should continue to be employed to obtain the release of the 7 United States citizens previously kidnapped and still held in Lebanon;

(4) acts of international terrorism should be universally condemned; and

(5) the Secretary of State should be supported in his efforts to gain international cooperation to prevent future acts of terrorism.

## SEC. 559. EFFECTIVE DATE.

This part shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

7783

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8527207

Date September 27, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:


To: Letter to President Reagan From: Mrs. Ray Evans  
Date: 7/6/85 Subject: Article concerning Uli  
Derickson, Stewardess on the Hijacked TWA plane  
WH Referral Dated: 9/16/85 NSC ID# 345409  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

  X   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

8527207

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 16, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 345409

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 6, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MRS. RAY EVANS  
4037 LIVELY LANE  
DALLAS TX 75220

SUBJECT: ENCLOSURES ARTICLE CONCERNING ULI DERICKSON,  
STEWARDESS ON THE HIJACKED TWA PLANE

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN  
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE  
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE  
(OR DRAFT) TO:  
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

39

July 6, 1985

The Hon. Ronald Reagan 8527207  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington D.C. 20000 345409

CPA

Dear Mr. President:

Early on in the hijacking of the TWA airliner, I heard, on TV News, briefly, about the act of bravery of Flight Attendant Uli Derichsmeier. In my estimation, this took a great deal of true courage, and I expected to read and hear more about this modern-day heroine, But not so.

When I saw this article in today's paper, I was shocked and dismayed to learn she must suffer, in addition to the TWA ordeal, from such an outrage as described in the attached article while others, silvery tongued and clever at walking the fence, are touted as heroes.

President Reagan, please right this wrong. Mr. Derickson risked her life for one of her passengers. The Shiites could easily have turned on her, and she must have known that when she bodily and verbally protected Clinton Suggs. God Bless you, Mr. President.

Respectfully,

Mrs. Ray W. Evans

P. S. Thank you for your excellent leadership. You are a great President!



# Jewish misunderstanding adds to ordeal for TWA purser

The Washington Post

FREDON TOWNSHIP, N.J. — Five days after she returned to the safety of her home amid the orchards of western New Jersey, Trans World Airlines purser Uli Derickson faced a new terror.

A militant Jewish group threatened to rally at her house to protest allegations — which persisted after they had been disproved — that she had turned over to her plane's Shiite hijackers the passports of passengers with "Jewish-sounding names."

On June 21, local law enforcement officials and the FBI took Derickson, 39, her son, Matthew, 7, and her mother to stay with friends nearby until the threat of the demonstration passed, Sussex County Prosecutor Richard Honig said.

Four days later, Mordechai Levy, head of the Manhattan-based Jewish Defense Organization, announced that the demonstration to teach Derickson "Jewish justice" was canceled because he had discovered that he, like others, had been misinformed.

"I had conditioned my demonstration on if she had separated Jews, then she was an enemy of the Jewish people," Levy said. "As I said to her in a letter... 'You're not important to us anymore because you're not our enemy.'"

The threatened rally and the allegations that prompted it have hurt the German-born Derickson during the past 2½ weeks, her husband and friends said. Hailed as a heroine by former hostages, she has stayed in seclusion in the family's house, refusing all re-

quests for interviews.

"What they did was find her guilty until proven innocent," her husband, Russell Derickson, a retired airline pilot, said.

The Dericksons are "very upset about this rumor that she cooperated with the Shiites," said Zina Rudzki, a longtime friend and neighbor. "It's unfortunate that such an ugly thing came out of such a lovely act of heroism." Returning hostages have said Derickson put herself between them and the hijackers, once halting the beating of Navy diver Clinton

Suggs by saying, "Enough, enough."

Derickson appeared at a June 16 news conference at New York's Kennedy Airport, where she said the hijackers had ordered her to single out Jewish-sounding names from among the 145 passports she had collected. A reporter asked, "How many were there that you picked out with Jewish-sounding names?" Derickson replied, "Six or seven, I believe."

TWA officials said Derickson did not hear the word "you" in the question. Later in the news

conference, she was asked directly whether she had picked the names.

"No," she said. "That was done by the terrorists. They looked at the passports." That part of the exchange was not broadcast on television in Israel, where the rumor over her role began.

On June 20, Israeli radio broadcast a report clarifying Derickson's role to a considerably smaller audience than that reached by television news, and the mistaken impression persisted.

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

7783

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT  
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8527207

Date September 27, 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
National Security Council  
The White House

Reference:


To: Letter to President Reagan From: Mrs. Ray Evans  
Date: 7/6/85 Subject: Article concerning Uli  
Derickson, Stewardess on the Hijacked TWA plane  
WH Referral Dated: 9/16/85 NSC ID# 345409  
(if any)

       The attached item was sent directly to the  
Department of State

Action Taken:

  X   A draft reply is attached.  
       A draft reply will be forwarded.  
       A translation is attached.  
       An information copy of a direct reply is attached.  
       We believe no response is necessary for the reason  
cited below.  
       The Department of State has no objection to the  
proposed travel.  
       Other.

Remarks:

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED  
(Classification)

33 4407

T H E   W H I T E   H O U S E   O F F I C E

REFERRAL

SEPTEMBER 16, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF:  
WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 345409

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JULY 6, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MRS. RAY EVANS  
4037 LIVELY LANE  
DALLAS TX 75220

SUBJECT: ENCLOSES ARTICLE CONCERNING ULI DERICKSON,  
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AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY  
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON  
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8507783

RECEIVED 30 SEP 85 20

TO PRESIDENT FROM EVANS, RAY

DOCDATE 06 JUL 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

HIJACKING

DERICKSON, ULI

MP

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES FM EVANS RE STEWARDESS ON HIJACKED TWA FLIGHT

ACTION: MEMO MARTIN TO KELLEY DUE: 03 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

CANNISTRARO

GRIMES

COMMENTS

REF# 8527207

LOG

NSCIFID

( DR )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 10/10	Martin. Post memo		OK, VC, JG, Wm
DISPATCH			W/ATTCH	FILE (C)