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### WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD

(TOWER BOARD): Records

File Folder: SRB 378 TWA 847 (7) Box 93207

Archivist: mjd

**FOIA ID:** F97-059/2 **Date:** 09/21/1999

| DOCUMENT<br>NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE .  | DATE        | RESTRICTION       |
|------------------------|--|-------------|-------------------|
| l-memo                 | Robert McFarlane to the President re: Sanctions, 2p  | 7/2/85      | B1/F1             |
| 2. memo                | Q 3/20/04 F97-057/2 #47  Oliver North to McFarlane re: Sanctions, 1p                             | 7/1/85      | P1/F1             |
| 3. memo                | George Shultz to the President re: sanctions, 2p  R 2/12/02 NCSF97-059/2 # 69                    | 6/30/85     | P1/F1             |
| 1. memo                | R 2/12/02 NC5F97-059/2 # 69  North to McFarlane re: landing rights, 1p  R 3/20/04 F97-059/2 # 70 | 6/28/85     | P-1-4F1           |
| 5. memo                | to Elizabeth Dole re: landing rights, 1p   | a mantidama | P1/F1             |
| 5. memo                | Shultz to the President re: sanctions, 2p VLSF 75-069/2 #72                                      | 6/30/85     | <del>P1</del> /F1 |
| 7. memo                | Jock Covey to McFarlane re: response to General Williams, 1p                                     | 7/26/85     | P1/F1 B3          |
| 3. paper               | re: comments, 3p  P 10/29/01 NLSF 97-059/2 # 74  | nd          | P1/F1 133         |
| ememo                  | Nicholas Platt to McFarlane re: Hostages' families 3p  | 6/27/85     | P1/F1_            |
| 10. draft paper        | re: TWA 847, 11p  P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #76   | nd          | P1/F1             |
|                        |  |             |                   |
|                        |  |             |                   |
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### RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

### PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

### **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD (TOWER

Withdrawer

BOARD): RECORDS

4/23/2007 LOJ

File Folder

SRB 378 TWA 847 (7)

**FOIA** 

F97-059/2

**Box Number** 

93207

| ID Doc Type | Document Description             |                   | Doc Date               |
|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|
|             |                                  | Pages             |                        |
|             |                                  |                   |                        |
|             |                                  |                   |                        |
| 1 MFMO      | ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE          | 3/6/08            | 7/2/1985               |
| ,           | PRESIDENT, RE-IMPLEMENTATION     | <del>OF-</del>    |                        |
|             | <b>CIVIL AVIATION SANCTIONS</b>  |                   |                        |
| 3 MEMO      | GEORGE P SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDI   | # 36608<br>ENT. 2 | <del>- 6/30/1985</del> |
|             | RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL-      |                   |                        |
|             | AVIATION SANCTIONS               | 3/4/08            |                        |
| 6 MEMO      | - GEORGE P SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDI | NT, 2             | - <del>6/30/1985</del> |
|             | RE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL       |                   |                        |
|             | AVIATION SANCTIONS               |                   |                        |
| 9 MFMO      | NICHOLAS PLATT TO ROBERT ~~Y     | H 3/6/083         | 6/27/1985              |
|             | -MCFARLANE, RE STATE DEPARTME    | ENT               |                        |
|             | CONTACT WITH HOSTAGES' FAMIL     | HES-              |                        |

EOB: ROOM 385

SEGRET

PAGE 24

DOCUMENT NUMBER = MAX8505134

| DESC     | DOT REVOKES MIDDLE   | EAST AIRLINES AUTHORI | TY TO SERVE US |
|----------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------|
| KEYWORDS | TERRORISM<br>LEBANON | HIJACKING<br>MEDIA    | MIDDLE EAST    |
| DOCDATE  | 850626               |                       |                |
| RCVDATE  | 850626               |                       |                |
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NOTED BY POINDEXTER SEE 8505229 FOR FINAL ACTION 850702 UPDATES 850702

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STAFF/OFF NORTH Found

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF 7 A 111/45 CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 01 JUL 85 (

TO

PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOCDATE 30 JUN 85

NORTH

01 JUL 85

| KEYWORDS: HI | JACKING |
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TERRORISM

LEBANON

PD

CM

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PD RE IMPLEMENTATION OF CIVIL AVIATION SANCTIONS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE

DUE: 05 JUL 85 STATUS X FILES PA

\_\_\_\_\_

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

TEICHER

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COMMENTS \*\*\* CY SENT TO OMB FOR COMMENTS / CONCURRENCE \*\*\*

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DISPATCH

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 1, 1985

Presidential Determination No. 85-14

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE The Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT:

Suspension of Foreign Air Transportation to Lebanon by U.S. Air Carriers and of Foreign Air Transportation by Lebanse Carriers

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1114(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended ("the Act"), I hereby:

- (1) determine that Lebanon is acting in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft;
- (2) suspend the rights of all air carriers within the meaning of Section 101(3) of the Act to engage in foreign air transportation, whether direct or indirect (including through interline agreements), to and from Lebanon; and
- (3) suspend the rights of Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A.L. (MEA), on its own behalf, and Trans-Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L. (TMA), both Lebanese carriers, to engage in foreign air transportation within the meaning of Section 101(24) of the Act.

You are requested to bring this determination and these suspensions immediately to the attention of all air carriers within the meaning of Section 101(3) of the Act and to the attention of MEA and TMA.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Roucea Magan

| THATTOMAL DECURITY COUNCIL |                   |                |              |                  | Log Num           | ber <u>5229</u>  |
|----------------------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| DISTRIBUTION               | N RECORD          |                |              |                  | DateI_            | ıly 1, 1985      |
| Subject: PD 85-            | -14 SUSPENSI      | ON OF FORM     | I AIR TRA    | NSPORTATIO       | N TO LEBANON      | BY US AIR CARRI  |
| CLASSIFICATION:            | ☐ TOP SECRET      |                | SECRET       |                  | CONFIDENTIAL      | UNCLASSIFIED     |
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| THE HONORABLE              | ELIZABETH         | H. DOLE        | . / /        |                  |                   |                  |
| The Secretary              | of Transpo        | rtation        | 03/02/8      | 35 <u>1126</u>   | Tymo              | N 255/1/         |
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### EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

JUL 2 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

Executive Secretary

National Security Council

FROM:

Philip A. DuSault Phy Gontant

SUBJECT:

Civil Aviation Sanctions Against Lebanon

OMB has no objections to Secretary Shultz's June 30, 1985 proposal to impose civil aviation sanctions on Lebanon.

UNCLASSIFIED

with SECRET Attachment

| r    | OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT A                                  | IND BUDGET  |        |
|------|---|---|--------|
|      | ROUTE SLIP  |   |        |
| то   | John Eisenhoud  Ken Schwartz vs 1/2/55  Ed Strait S. S. | Take necessary action Approval or signature Comment Prepare reply |        |
|      | Phil DuSault<br>Bill Martin                             | Discuss with me For your information See remarks below            | _<br>_ |
| FROM | Len Zuza Bzu  | DATE  |        |

ID# 8505229



OMB FORM 4



to President

5229

### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Receiveden 185 JUL -2 21 9 23

July 2, 1985

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ACTION

-SECRET

NLS F97-059/2 #67

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY \_\_\_\_\_, NARA, DATE 3/2066

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

Implementation of Civil Aviation Sanctions

### Issue

Should the U.S. Government impose sanctions against Lebanon's Middle East Airlines and its cargo subsidiary?

### Facts

The Beirut International Airport (BIA) continues to pose a threat as a terrorist base. The lack of any governmental authority at the airport and the use of Lebanon's Middle East Airlines (MEA) assets for the conduct of terrorist acts demands that we take immediate action to limit the terrorists' flexibility.

### Discussion

Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Transportation Dole have proposed that we immediately take the following steps:

- suspend flights to the U.S. by MEA and their cargo subsidiary, Trans-Mediterranean Airways (TMA);
- issue a Presidential Determination terminating service to Lebanon by other U.S. carriers;
- authorize Department of Transportation to terminate all ticket sales in the U.S. for transit to/from Lebanon; and
- inform other governments of these actions, asking for their support, and urge that the Bonn Declaration group be convened to terminate landing rights for any nation whose airlines continue to fly to Lebanon.

OADR



SECRET-

2

A Presidential Determination directing Secretary Dole to suspend air transportation to Lebanon and terminating service to the U.S. by MEA and TMA is attached at Tab A. At Tab B is a justification statement for this action. Secretary Shultz' incoming memo is attached at Tab C.

### Recommendation



No

1. That you approve the Presidential Determination (Tab A) and the issuance of the statement at Tab B.

Prepared by: Oliver North

### Attachments

Tab A - Presidential Determination

Tab B - Justification Statement

Tab C - Secretary Shultz Memo of June 30, 1985

SECRET

SECRET

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 1, 1985

SECRET

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Implementation of Civil Aviation Sanctions

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President which forwards a Presidential Determination (PD) for his signature (Tab A). The PD implements civil aviation sanctions against Lebanon and prevents U.S. aircarriers from operating in that country. A justification statement is attached at Tab B. Secretary Shultz' memo to the President is at Tab C.

This package supersedes the earlier action against Middle East Airlines (MEA) proposed by Transportation (Tab II). Since Transportation had not seen or coordinated on the State proposal, we have provided them with a copy to ensure their concurrence.

Your memo at Tab I should not be forwarded to the President until DOT concurs. Once they have, we will advise by phone.

Don Fortier and Howard Teicher, concur.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo to the President at Tab I when DOT concurrence has been received.

Approve M

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President

Tab A - Presidential Determination

Tab B - Justification Statement

Tab C - Shultz Memo to the Pres of Jun 30, 1985

Tab II - North Memo to McFarlane (5134) of Jun 28, 1985

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

SECRETY JUL , NARA, DATE 3/20/06

SECRET Declassify: OADR

## JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 1114 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT REGARDING LEBANON

The President's determination under section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1514) that Lebanon has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (22 U.S.T. 1641) (the "Convention") is based upon the following analysis, with reference to the unlawful seizure and diversion to Beirut of TWA Flight 847 beginning on June 14, 1985:

- 1. The Government of Lebanon has failed to take offenders, as described in Article 1 of the Convention, who are present in its territory into custody and, in the absence of extradition, has failed to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution as stipulated in Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.
- 2. The Government of Lebanon has failed to take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander, as stipulated in Article 9(1) of the Convention, and has failed to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable and to return without delay the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession, as stipulated in Article 9(2) of the Convention.

## THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

June 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President

From:

George P. Shultz

Subject:

Implementation of Civil Aviation

Sanctions

We must not allow the release of the hostages, welcome as it is, to lessen our resolve to do all we can to prevent any future incident at Beirut airport. The security situation there remains extremely dangerous. We should move now to impose initial civil aviation sanctions against Lebanon. would include suspension of the twice-weekly operations between the United States and Lebanon of Lebanon's Middle East Airways (MEA), the rights of Lebanon's all cargo carrier (TMA), and the US-Lebanon authority of Pan American and TWA. These initial measures will serve three important purposes: reduce to some degree the exposure of U.S. travelers to the risks of Lebanon air travel; indicate that an uncorrected Beirut Airport security situation will have continuing costs beyond this immediate crisis; and lay the groundwork for broader international efforts or, if necessary, further unilateral U.S. measures to restrict Lebanese carriers and the use of Beirut airport.

### I therefore recommend:

- 1. that you approve DOT's issuance of an order terminating the "exemptions" which authorize MEA service to the United States;
- 2. that you issue the attached Presidential Determination which will terminate the permit authority for U.S.-Lebanon service by the Lebanese cargo airline, TMA, and by any U.S. carriers;
- 3. that you authorize a diplomatic note informing other governments of these actions;
- 4. that you authorize DOT to issue an appropriate order to commence the process for ending all sales in the U.S. of air transportation to and from Lebanon from points outside the U.S.:

SECRET/SENSITIVE DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 469

BY Smf , NARA, DATE 2/12/02

- 5. that you approve our initiative, already underway, to convene the Bonn Declaration Group with the purpose of convincing its members to terminate all air transportation to and from Lebanon, to terminate landing rights for any nation whose airlines continue to fly to Lebanon, and for amendments to the Declaration providing more effective mechanisms; and
- 6. that you approve other appropriate diplomatic initiatives designed to enhance international solidarity and action against hijackings, terrorism and the Beirut situation in general.

We are reviewing measures to further restrict or terminate air service to Beirut. We are also considering other unilateral measures the U.S. might take should this be necessary.

#### Attachment:

Draft Presidential Determination and Accompanying Justification

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE The Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT: Suspension of Foreign Air Transportation to Lebanon by U.S. Air Carriers and of Foreign Air Transportation by Lebanese Carriers

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Section 1114(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended ("the Act"), I hereby:

- determine that Lebanon is acting in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft;
- (2) suspend the rights of all air carriers within the meaning of Section 101(3) of the Act to engage in foreign air transportation, whether direct or indirect (including through interline agreements), to and from Lebanon; and
- (3) suspend the rights of Middle East Airlines
  Airliban, S.A.L., (MEA), and Trans-Mediterranean
  Airways, S.A.L., (TMA), both Lebanese carriers,
  to engage in foreign air transportation within
  the meaning of Section 101(24) of the Act.

You are requested to bring this determination and these suspensions immediately to the attention of all air carriers within the meaning of Section 101(3) of the Act and to the attention of MEA and TMA.

This determination shall be published in the Federal Register.

Roused Rag

## JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER SECTION 1114 OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT REGARDING LEBANON

The President's determination under section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1514) that Lebanon has acted in a manner inconsistent with the Convention for the Suppression of the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (22 U.S.T. 1641) (the "Convention") is based upon the following analysis, with reference to the unlawful seizure and diversion to Beirut of TWA Flight 847 beginning on June 14, 1985:

- 1. The Government of Lebanon has failed to take offenders, as described in Article 1 of the Convention, who are present in its territory into custody and, in the absence of extradition, has failed to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution as stipulated in Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention.
- 2. The Government of Lebanon has failed to take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft to its lawful commander, as stipulated in Article 9(1) of the Convention, and has failed to facilitate the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew as soon as practicable and to return without delay the aircraft and its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession, as stipulated in Article 9(2) of the Convention.

## -CONFIDENTIAL-

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 28, 1985

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|     |    |          |    |    |   |  |

ACTION

NLS F97-059/2#10

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, NARA, DATE 3/20/05

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Revocation of Landing Rights in the U.S. for

Lebanon's Mid East Airlines (MEA)

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to Secretary Dole authorizing the Department of Transportation to proceed with an order revoking the exemption authorities for Middle East Airlines to serve the United States. Your memo authorizes proceeding with the revocation order at Tab A and the public announcement at Tab B both of which were prepared by DOT.

Please note that your memo authorizes DOT to proceed after 1200 Eastern Daylight Time, which is after the normal MEA Saturday flight from Beirut has arrived in Paris en route to New York. We have taken these measures in order to ensure that U.S. citizen passengers who may be aboard the aircraft are not stranded in Lebanon.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

| Approve |  |
|---------|--|
|---------|--|

Disapprove

### Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to Dole

Tab A - Revocation Order

Tab B - Public Announcement

Declassify on: OADR

- CONFIDENTIAL

-CONFIDENTIAL-

#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5134

### CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ELIZABETH H. DOLE Secretary of Transportation

SUBJECT:

Revocation of Landing Rights in the U.S. for Lebanon's Mid East Airlines (MEA) (C)-

The President has authorized the Department of Transportation to revoke authority for Middle East Airlines (MEA) to serve in the United States. Your draft order (Tab A) and press statement (Tab B) are approved for implementation after the normal Saturday MEA flight from Beirut has landed in Paris. This measure should ensure that no U.S. citizens are stranded in Beirut. (6)-

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS <u>F97-059/2 \* 76</u> 3Y 2nd, NARA, DATE 3/20/06

Attachments

Tab A - Revocation Order

Tab B - Public Announcement

CC: Secretary Shultz

-CONFIDENTIAL -Declassify on: OADR

Je.

## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Issued by the Department of Transportation on the day of , 1985

### ORDER REVOKING AND CONDITIONING EXEMPTIONS

Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A.L. (MEA), a foreign air carrier of Lebanon, currently holds authority by exemption to conduct various services to and from the United States, both on its own behalf and on behalf of other foreign carriers. Specifically, the carrier holds authority to conduct scheduled operations of persons and property between points in Lebanon, the intermediate points Paris and London, and the terminal point New York.1/ MEA also holds authority to serve Cypress instead of Lebanon on these flights because of ongoing hostilities around Beirut Airport.2/ In addition, MEA holds exemption authority to charter cargo compartment space to Trans Mediterranean Airways. S.A.L., another Lebanese carrier, on its Lebanon-New York services.3/ Finally, MEA holds exemption authority to wet lease B-747 aircraft to EgyptATr to operate EgyptAir's Cairo-New York services, and to carry on those flights Athens-New York charter passengers of Homeric Tours, a U.S. Public Charter operator.4/ In granting MEA this authority, we specifically reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the authority at any time and without hearing, should circumstances warrant in the public interest.

<sup>1/</sup> See Orders 84-12-141 and 85-6-50. MEA was granted this authority through January 7, 1986 (the London intermediate authority is to expire October 31, 1985).

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{2}{3}$  See Order 85-3-50. This authority was granted through August 28, 1985.  $\frac{3}{3}$  See Orders 84-11-13 and 85-6-50. This authority was granted through  $\overline{\text{July 20}}$ , 1986.

<sup>4/</sup> Dockets 43131 and 43182. The Cairo authority was granted through May 15, 1986; the Athens authority, which permitted Homeric to part charter space on EgyptAir's scheduled flights, was granted through August 13, 1985. These actions have not yet been memorialized in an order.

Recent terrorist activities by groups based in Lebanon have brought into serious question the security of aircraft transiting that country. Given the unstable state of events in Lebanon, and the possibility of interference with U.S.-bound aircraft while on the ground in that country, we find that the public interest requires us to terminate, effective immediately, all the authority MEA currently holds to conduct scheduled operations to and from the United States in its own name. We find that these operations, including those serving Cyprus in lieu of Lebanon (but which nonetheless may involve technical movements of the aircraft into and out of Beirut), currently pose an unacceptable risk to the U.S. public.5/

We recognize that this action, taken on short notice, may cause some disruption to travellers' and shippers' plans, and to MEA. Our action is, nonetheless, necessary to protect the interests of the U.S. public. We would be willing to reconsider this action should the situation in Lebanon stabilize in a way which would remove the current public risk.

We are not at this time revoking MEA's authority to conduct operations for EgyptAir. We understand that these operations are conducted in a wholly separate manner from MEA's other operations, and that the aircraft involved carries EgyptAir's colors rather than those of MEA. We will, however, place two conditions on these exemptions, for the reasons described above: (1) EgyptAir must have the exclusive use of the aircraft, such that MEA does not use the aircraft for any other service; and (2) MEA may not physically move the aircraft into Lebanon for any reason during the term of this exemption authority. Failure to adhere to these conditions will immediately void that authority. In addition, upon arrival at New York, the aircraft shall be subject to additional security measures.

### ACCORDINGLY,

- 1. We revoke the exemption authority granted to Middle East Airlines Airliban, S.A.L. (MEA) in Orders 84-11-13, 84-12-141, 85-3-50, and 85-6-50;
- 2. We amend the exemptions granted MEA on May 16, 1985, to conduct Cairo-New York wet lease operations for EgyptAir through May 15, 1986 (Docket 43131), and the exemption granted MEA on June 4, 1985, to carry Athens-New York charter traffic of EgyptAir/Homeric Tours on these flights through August 13, 1985 (Docket 43182), to add the following conditions:
  - Egyptair must have the exclusive use of the aircraft involved in these operations, such that MEA does not use the aircraft for any other services; and
  - MEA may not physically move the aircraft involved in these operations into Lebanon for any reason during the term of this authority;

<sup>5/</sup> At present, no U.S. carrier is conducting services to Lebanon.

- 3. Our actions in ordering paragraphs 1 and 2 are effective immediately; and
- 4. We may amend, revoke, or modify this order at any time and without nearing.

Ву

ELIZABETH HANFORD DOLE Secretary of Transportation

TAB

В

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE insert date.

DOT xx-85 Contact: Jennifer Hillings Tel.: (202) 426-4570 Ted Lopatkiewicz Tel.: (202) 426-0398

### DOT REVOKES MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES' AUTHORITY TO SERVE UNITED STATES

The Department of Transportation (DOT) today revoked the exemption authority of Middle East Airlines (MEA), a Lebanese flag carrier, to serve the United States. DOT said that recent terrorist activities by groups based in Lebanon "have brought into serious question the security of aircraft" stopping in that country.

MEA holds temporary authority to conduct various services to and from the United States. It has scheduled authority between Lebanon and New York, with intermediate stops in Paris and London. MEA may serve Cyprus instead of Lebanon on these flights because of ongoing hostilities around Beirut Airport. DOT said today that it was terminating this MEA scheduled authority to the United States because these operations "currently pose an unacceptable risk to the U.S. public." The revocation includes MEA's authority to serve Cyprus in lieu of Lebanon, because it may involve technical movements of the aircraft into and out of Beirut.

The Department said that it realizes the action may cause some disruption to travellers' and shippers' plans, and to MEA. "Our action is, nonetheless, necessary to protect the interests of the U.S. public. We would be willing to reconsider this action should the situation in Lebanon stabilize in a way which would remove the current public risk."

The Department did not revoke MEA's authority to lease aircraft with crew to EgyptAir. That aircraft, which carries EgyptAir's colors, is used for that carrier's Cairo-New York service and is authorized to carry Athens-New York charter passengers of Homeric Tours, a U.S. public charter operator. DOT did, however, add two conditions to that authorization: first, that EgyptAir have exclusive use of the aircraft, such that MEA does not use the plane for any other service; and second, that MEA not physically move the aircraft into Lebanon for any reason. Failure to adhere to these conditions will immediately terminate the authority.

The Department also announced that, upon arrival in New York, the aircraft used by MEA on behalf of EgyptAir will be subject to additional security measures.

DOT's order is effective immediately.

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| Document No. |  |
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### WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

| DATE: 7/2/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: IMMEDIATE          |                |        |                |       |       |
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| SUBJECT: IMPLEMENT   | TATION OF CIVI | L AVIA | TION SANCTIONS | 3     |       |
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| We plan on having the President act on this today. Any objections? |                |        |                |       |       |
| RESPONSE:  |                |        |                |       |       |

# OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL Department of Transportation Washington, D.C. 20590 (202) 426-2972

NOTE TO: Ollie North, NSC (395-3345)

David Small, DOS (632-0242)

SUBJECT: Revised Press Release

Attached is a revised press release that announces both the suspension of MEA's authority and the prohibition in the United States of the sale of transportation by air to Lebanon. Also attached is the draft order which would affect the prohibition on the sale of transportation to Lebanon. Comments, if any, should be communicated to me or to my Deputy, Don Horn, 426-2972.

Warren L. Dean

Assistant General Counsel for International Law

Attachments

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE insert date.

DOT xx-85 Contact: Jennifer Hillings Tel.: (202) 426-4570 Ted Lopatkiewicz Tel.: (202) 426-0398

DOT REVOKES MEA AUTHORITY TO SERVE U.S.; PROPOSES TO PROHIBIT SALE IN THE U.S. OF ALL AIR TRANSPORTATION TO LEBANON

The Department of Transportation (DOT) today revoked the exemption authority of Middle East Airlines (MEA), a Lebanese flag carrier, to serve the United States. DOT said that recent terrorist activities by groups based in Lebanon "have brought into serious question the security of aircraft" stopping in that country. At the same time, the Department proposed to prohibit the sale in the United States of all air transportation to Lebanon.

MEA holds temporary authority to conduct various services to and from the United States. It has scheduled authority between Lebanon and New York, with intermediate stops in Paris and London. MEA may serve Cyprus instead of Lebanon on these flights because of ongoing hostilities around Beirut Airport. DOT said today that it was terminating this MEA scheduled authority to the United States because these operations "currently pose an unacceptable risk to the U.S. public." The revocation includes MEA's authority to serve Cyprus in lieu of Lebanon, because it may involve technical movements of the aircraft into and out of Beirut.

The Department said that it realizes the action may cause some disruption to travellers' and shippers' plans, and to MEA. "Our action is, nonetheless, necessary to protect the interests of the U.S. public. We would be willing to reconsider this action should the situation in Lebanon stabilize in a way which would remove the current public risk."

The Department did not revoke MEA's authority to lease aircraft with crew to EgyptAir. That aircraft, which carries EgyptAir's colors, is used for that carrier's Cairo-New York service and is authorized to carry Athens-New York charter passengers of Homeric Tours, a U.S. public charter operator. DOT did, however, add two conditions to that authorization: first, that EgyptAir have exclusive use of the aircraft, such that MEA does not use the plane for any other service, and second, that MEA not physically move the aircraft into Lebanon for any reason. Fallure to adhere to these conditions will immediately terminate the authority.

The Department also announced that, upon arrival in New York, the aircraft used by MEA on behalf of EgyptAir will be subject to additional security measures.

In a companion order, DOT proposed to prohibit the sale, by U.S. carriers and foreign carriers holding authority from the United States, of any air transportation to Lebanon. Should the Department's order be made final, it would prohibit the sale in the United States of any ticket, or the issuance in the United States of any airwaybill, with Lebanon in the itinerary, regardless of the type of stop in Lebanon, and regardless of whether the flight in question serves the United States. DOT said, "In light of recent terrorist activities by groups based in Lebanon, the Department finds that the security of aircraft transiting that country and the safety of passengers on board such aircraft have been placed in jeopardy."

Interested parties have until July XX to comment on the Department's tentative decision. DOT's revocation of MEA's authority is effective immediately.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON. D.C.

Issued by the Department of Transportation on the

In re:

SECURITY OF AIRCRAFT AND SAFETY
OF PASSENGERS TRANSITING
LEBANON

Docket

### ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

In light of recent terrorist activities by groups based in Lebanon, the Department finds that the security of aircraft transiting that country and the safety of passengers on board such aircraft have been placed in jeopardy. Therefore, we have decided to take steps to minimize the possibility that travelers and shippers will be harmed. We therefore propose to add the following condition to all U.S. air carrier certificates, all section 402 permits held by foreign air carriers and all exemptions held by U.S. and foreign air carriers:

Effective immediately and until further order of the Department, the holder and its agents shall not sell in the United States any transportation by air which includes any type of stop in Lebanon.

The action we are proposing today is designed to restrict, to the extent possible, air transportation to and from Lebanon. It would prohibit the sale in the United States of any ticket or the issuance in the United States of any airwaybill with Lebanon in the itinerary, regardless of whether the flight in question serves the United States. It also would prohibit the sale in the United States of any airwaybill for a flight which includes any stop, technical or otherwise, in Lebanon. We appreciate that this action could create hardships for travelers and shippers and could deprive air carriers and their agents of revenues. Nevertheless, the safety of travelers and security of shippers override these considerations. We note, however, that if the situation in Lebanon stabilizes so that the risk to the traveling and shipping public is removed, we will reconsider this action.

Under section 401(g)(1) of the Act, the Department may alter, amend, modify or suspend any certificate if required by the public convenience and necessity. Section 401(e)(1) provides that the Department shall attach to the privileges granted by the certificates "such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as the public interest may require." Section 402 of the Act provides that the permits of foreign air carriers may be conditioned, amended or suspended if the Department determines that such an action would be in the public interest. In view of the security and safety problems described above, we find that our action is required by both the public interest and the public convenience and necessity.

2.

### ACCORDINGLY.

- 1. We direct all interested persons to show cause why the tentative decision set forth above should not be made final;
- 2. Comments in response to this order shall be filed with the Department no later than 12 noon, July \*, 1985, and served on the persons named in paragraph 4;
- 3. In the event no comments are filed, all further procedural steps shall be deemed waived, and the Department shall enter an order, subject to the disapproval of the President pursuant to section 801(a) of the Act, which shall make final our tentative findings and conclusions set forth in this order:
- 4. We shall serve a copy of this order upon all certificated U.S. air carriers, all foreign air carriers holding foreign air carrier permits or exemption authority, the Ambassador of Lebanon and the U.S. Department of State.

By:

ELIZABETH HANFORD DOLE Secretary of Transportation

(SEAL)

<sup>1</sup> Since provision is made for the filing of comments to this order, petitions for reconsideration will not be entertained.

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U.S. Department of Transportation

### General Counse:

400 Seventh St. S.W. Washington, D.C. 20591

U.S.DOT TELECOPIER COVER SEZET

6/58/85 date

4:30

The number for this 3M 9165 is 426-8645. If you have any problems, please call 426-4687. Thank you for your help.

ADVANCE COPY

THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON

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SECRET/SENSITIVE

COPY (JMP)

June 30, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President

From:

George P. Shultz W

Subject:

Implementation of Civil Aviation

Sanctions

We must not allow the release of the hostages, welcome as it is, to lessen our resolve to do all we can to prevent any future incident at Beirut airport. The security situation there remains extremely dangerous. We should move now to impose initial civil aviation sanctions against Lebanon. This would include suspension of the twice-weekly operations between the United States and Lebanon of Lebanon's Middle East Airways (MEA), the rights of Lebanon's all cargo carrier (TMA), and the US-Lebanon authority of Pan American and TWA. These initial measures will serve three important purposes: reduce to some degree the exposure of U.S. travelers to the risks of Lebanon air travel; indicate that an uncorrected Beirut Airport security situation will have continuing costs beyond this immediate crisis; and lay the groundwork for broader international efforts or, if necessary, further unilateral U.S. measures to restrict Lebanese carriers and the use of Beirut airport.

#### I therefore recommend:

- l. that you approve DOT's issuance of an order terminating the "exemptions" which authorize MEA service to the United States;
- 2. that you issue the attached Presidential Determination which will terminate the permit authority for U.S.-Lebanon service by the Lebanese cargo airline, TMA, and by any U.S. carriers;
- 3. that you authorize a diplomatic note informing other governments of these actions;
- 4. that you authorize DOT to issue an appropriate order to commence the process for ending all sales in the U.S. of air transportation to and from Lebanon from points outside the U.S.;

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BY \_ SH , NAHA, DATE 2/12/02

- 5. that you approve our initiative, already underway, to convene the Bonn Declaration Group with the purpose of convincing its members to terminate all air transportation to and from Lebanon, to terminate landing rights for any nation whose airlines continue to fly to Lebanon, and for amendments to the Declaration providing more effective mechanisms; and
- 6. that you approve other appropriate diplomatic initiatives designed to enhance international solidarity and action against hijackings, terrorism and the Beirut situation in general.

We are reviewing measures to further restrict or terminate air service to Beirut. We are also considering other unilateral measures the U.S. might take should this be necessary.

#### Attachment:

Draft Presidential Determination and Accompanying Justification

SECRET/SENSITIVE

# White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997 By M 517 NARA, Date 9//7/99

EOB: ROOM 385

SECRET

PAGE 49

DOCUMENT NUMBER = MAX8505352

DESC

COMMENTS ON TWA HIJACKING

KEYWORDS

TERRORISM

**HIJACKING** 

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FROM WILLIAM, J

DOCDATE 05 JUL 85

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SUBJECT COMMENTS ON TWA HIJACKING

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FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

> COVEY FORTIER NORTH MCD NIEL

COMMENTS STAFFED PER PEARSON INSTRUCTIONS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

August 1, 1985

Dear Jim:

Thank you for forwarding Al Prados' thoughtful analysis of Shia violence. He correctly identifies a problem which has concerned all of us for some time.

I believe we are on the road to a workable approach to the Shia issue, however, and my experts are in touch with Colonel Prados to draw on his expertise.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Lt. General James A. Williams Director Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20301-6111

#### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 26, 1985

## SIGNED

#### CONFIDENTIAL

#### ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

JOCK COVEY

SUBJECT:

Response to DIA Director,

Lt. General James A. Williams

Williams passed along to you an analysis put together by a DIA analyst who worries that the U.S. faces a stark choice between treating the Shia as implacable enemies or taking their grievances seriously.

The paper is thoughtful and well written, but contributes little that is fresh to a debate which is essentially resolved: we are already quietly embarked on a program to reach out to the Shia, and not only in Lebanon. We know the analyst well, and are already in touch with him to see if there is anything specific he can offer.

Ollie North concurs.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached note to Williams.

Approve Disapprove.

Attachment

Tab I Note to Mr. Williams Tab A DIA Analysis

Declassify on: OADR

By SM NARA, Date 10/29/01

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

Dear Jim,

Thank you for fowarding Al Prados' thoughtful analysis of Shia violence. He correctly identifies a problem which has concerned all of us for some time.

I believe we are on the road to a nuanced approach to the Shia issue, however, and my experts are in touch with Col. Prados to draw on his expertise.

Sincerely,

Lt. General James A. Williams Director Defense Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20301-6111 FROM THE DESK
OF THE DIRECTOR...

NSC Bud Mc farlan

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find in ording...



Comments on the Hijacking of TWA Flight 847

The hijacking of TWA Flight 847 on 14 June 1985, as with all terrorist actions of this type, raises profound questions. The public debate has centered on how the United States should or should not respond, and intelligence efforts have been bent to identifying the perpetrators, assessing their demands, and preparing to support a wide range of contingency actions. All these actions are necessary, but in a very real sense they are too late. The hijacking is only the most recent of a series of terrorist attacks against the US interests in the Middle East, and we did not learn sufficiently from previous attacks to prevent this one.

Sadly lacking in the public debate or in interagency discussions are serious attempts to understand why the hijacking occurred. Failure to assess this aspect of the issue guarantees, as it did in this case, that similar actions will occur again. Tactically speaking, the hijackers achieved a victory the moment they took over Flight 847, a few minutes outside of Athens airport. They successfully detected a US vulnerability and exploited it. However abhorrent we deem their methods to be , we must conclude that they are intelligent, know how to plan, and are capable of devising an operation, using the few methods available to them, that was successful in holding US power at bay. Closing up these vulnerabilities must be an important lesson learned from this incident, but unless the more profound lessons are learned, they will find another vulnerability in the future and exploit it.

Far more important is coming to terms with the reasons for this hijacking. By their series of bombings against US installations in Beirut and elsewhere, and by this incident, various Shiite groups have declared their belief that they are at war with the United States. Moreover, in perpetrating these incidents, they sincerely believe that they are acting defensively against a declared enemy. Who in the United States, however, is particularly aware that we are involved in a declared war with the Muslim world in general and the Shiites in particular, as these militant groups believe?

In spite of the commentary of many distinguished American spokesmen, whether or not the United States gives in to the demands of the hijackers is virtually irrelevant. The terrorist attacks, including this one, have occurred because the Shiites have grievances against the United States to which they believe the United States to be insensitive. If we focus only on the terrorist threat and ways to contain it, while avoiding the larger issue of why the Shiites are so hostile, we will not put a stop to events of this type.

The United States really has only two contrasting options. The first is to accept the challenge that the Shiite groups have laid down, treat them as enemies, and plan accordingly. The second is to be sensitive to Shiite grievances against the United States and to seek legitimate ways within the context of overall US policies in the Middle East to respond positively toward them. Probably a mix would be most effective at defending US interests while ameliorating Shiite grievances toward our polices in both Lebanon and Israel.

UNCLASSIFIED

Max L. Gross DIC-2D

## -CONFIDENTIAL

Further Comments by DIO-MESA

- (U) In a concise and penetrating analysis, Dr. Gross has likened the recent rash of hijackings and terrorist acts by Shia Muslim extremists to a declared war against the United States. He points out that this war has resulted from Shia perceptions that they have grievances to which the United States is insensitive. He goes on to suggest two contrasting options: acceptance of the Shia challenge (i.e., treating them as enemies) and greater sensitivity to Shia complaints (i.e., seeking ways to ameliorate their sense of grievance). He recommends a mix of the two approaches.
- (U) While I agree in principle with this two-track approach, I believe the complexities that underlie present-day Shia extremism merit at least three further explanatory observations.
- (U) First, the Shia community, whether in Lebanon or at large, is far from monolithic. The Shia who have captured today's headlines belong to the principal sub-sect, the Twelver Shia, who await the reappearance of the 12th Imam. "Twelvers" predominate in Iran, parts of the northern Gulf (including southern Iraq), and parts of Lebanon. Two other Shia sub-sects feel considerably less affinity with the aspirations and activities of their fellow Iranian and Lebanese Shia: the Ismailis, followers of the Agha Khan, who are scattered in central Syria, parts of the Gulf, and South Asia; and the Zaidis of North Yemen, an independent, no-nonsense group whose members have little interest in martyrdom. Even within Lebanon, there are well-known divisions within the Shia community--mainstream Amal, hardliners such as Hizballah, older feudal families, still quiescent peasants, moderates, militants, and undoubtedly many opportunists.
- (FOUO) This fragmentation makes the search for a Shia spokesman distressingly like the attempt 10 years ago to identify an effective leader of the Symbionese Liberation Army. The Ayatollah Khomeini, increasingly affected by age, illness, and senility, seems to be relinquishing a large measure of control over routine activities in Iran (and, by extension, Lebanon) to a collegial leadership. While Iranian ties to Lebanon's Shia community are well known, it is doubtful that any one leader--Iranian or Lebanese--can effect the release of our hostages. On the one hand it is fair to say that Nabih Barri is not much of a mediator, but he's the only one we have. On the other hand, he is probably capable of delivering no more than 75% of the solution, at best.
- (U) Second, the depth of anti-American feeling on the part of Shia extremists is greater than we have experienced with previous anti-American groups. This is curious, in that the connection between US policy and Shia grievances is less clear than it was in the case of other grievants, such as the Palestinians. While both groups have cited US support for Israel as a leading complaint, active anti-Israeli sentiment among most Lebanese Shia is of quite recent vintage. After all, southern Lebanese Shia initially welcomed the Israeli invasion and only began to oppose the Israelis actively as the occupation became more and more onerous. The problem of Shia hostility to the United States goes deeper than Israel. Unlike the Palestinians, whose quarrel

DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLS F97-059/2 #74 By Amf, NARA, Date 10/29/01

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFIED BY: DIO-MESA DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

## **CONFIDENTIAL**

with the United States is largely confined to Palestinian-Israeli issues, extremist Shia fundamentalists oppose the very existence of the United States (or at least a US presence in the Middle East) as an affront to the purity of Islam. While this intransigent position may, or may not, represent a minority viewpoint among Lebanese Shia, it is widely held by those who wield political influence and military power within the Shia community.

(FOUO) Third, Arab attitudes toward Shia activism are ambivalent, but Arabs are unlikely to support US military retaliation against the Amal or Hizballah groups holding US hostages. On the one hand, many Arab regimes are fearful of Shia-sponsored conspiracies; moreover, the largely Sunni Muslims in the Arab World tend to distrust Shia as heretical, fanatical, and secretive. Recent military operations by Lebanese Shia Amal militias against Palestinian refugee camps near Beirut were uniformly criticized in the Arab World (with the exception of Syria, which has its own equities in Lebanon). There are exceptions, of course, and some fundamentalist Sunnis are sympathetic with extremist Shia objectives. More broadly, most Arab Sunni Muslims somewhat grudgingly acknowlege the Shia as fellow Muslims and—in some cases—fellow Arabs, and would condemn US retaliation directed against them.

- Fragmentation of the Shia community, the depth of anti-American feeling among some Shia, and ambivalent attitudes within the Arab World will all have an impact on the various measures we may take to combat Shia hostility, on the one hand, and respond to Shia grievances, on the other.
- -- As we seek to resolve the present crisis and preclude others of this nature, we will face an untidy assembly of divergent and in some cases mutually hostile Shia groups, each using our hostages as a lever to further its own position. We are unlikely to have a single point of contact with whom to deal. We may have to face a somewhat confusing pyramid of intermediaries and sub-intermediaries as we endeavor to gain access to and apply pressure upon those who can deliver a solution--probably a piecemeal solution, at that.
- -- We may find that there is little we can do to overcome the ideological hostility of the most militant Shia. Such persons are seeking nothing short of the extrusion of US presence from various parts of the Middle East, including Lebanon. Their demands may well escalate to include the departure of Americans, official and private. A convincing case can be made that the militants understand only the language of force.
- -- To the extent that more moderate Shia retain a voice in Lebanon, we may able to use their good offices in seeking future areas of cooperation. Probably a majority of Lebanese Shia are neither militant nor moderate; they carry a sense of grievance resulting not so much from US or even Israeli policies as from a domestic system which long relegated them to the bottom of the scale in their own country--politically, economically, and socially. Theoretically, their grievances are not our problem. In practice, we might realize long-term benefits from assisting in the reconstruction of the largely Shia southern part of Lebanon and in using our good offices to encourage a more equitable domestic system providing for a degree of Shia participation commensurate with their numbers.

-- Finally, friendly regimes and groups within the Arab World are likely to play a largely passive role as we grapple with the current crisis and with our future policies. In most cases they will be glad to help out as intermediaries; however, their cooperation will stop short of facilitating US military operations aimed at rescue or retaliation. At most, a few of them, including Jordan, would act to overpower terrorists operating on their own soil.

DIO-MESA

### National Security Council The White House

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| Paul Thompson              |              |                                    |                     |  |  |
| Wilma Hall                 |              |                                    |                     |  |  |
| Bud McFarlane              |              |                                    |                     |  |  |
| William Martin             |              |                                    |                     |  |  |
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FROM THE DESK OF THE DIRECTOR . . . Bud mo Farlane

## White House Guidelines, August 28, 1397 By NARA, Date 9/7/49

EOB: ROOM 385

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PAGE 33

DOCUMENT NUMBER = MAX8505162

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STATE CONTACT W/ HOSTAGES FAMILIES

KEYWORDS

HIJACKING

TERRORISM

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KEYWORDS. HIJACKING

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#### National Security Council The White House

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| Bud McFarlane             |              |              |                                       |
| William Martin            |              |              |                                       |
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4/28

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520 5162

June 27, 1985

#### MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: State Department Contact with Hostages' Families

In response to the interest you expressed to Mike Armacost yesterday we would like to bring you up to date on our efforts with the families of the hostages and recommend possible additional steps.

As part of the Department's TWA Hijacking Task Force, the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) has been in contact with the families of the hostages twice a day to keep them informed of developments and answer their questions. The exchanges between Consular officers and family members have been productive and congenial.

Consular officers in Algiers, Nicosia, and Paris have provided for the needs of the already-released hostages by providing emergency travel loans and assistance. The Task Force has also been successful in keeping TWA involved in family liaison efforts. At the urging of the Task Force, TWA has agreed to accept the billing for our emergency travel loans to the released hostages, and the airline yesterday agreed to explore with its insurer the coverage of the families' other hijacking-related expenses.

During Under Secretary Armacost's June 18 appearance in the House, two Congressmen praised State Department efforts to stay in touch with the families. Regarding Senator Leahy's inquiry, there is only one hostage from Vermont, Mr. Thomas Cullins, a Burlington architect who evidently is a personal friend of the Senator's. Task Force telephone logs show Consular Officers have been in regular contact with his family.

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

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However, if the detention of the hostages becomes more prolonged, frustration will rise, and some families will inevitably become angry and demanding. In previous crises we have seen this same evolution of frustration and anger, and psychologists have told us it is natural and to expect it. Task Force members are sensitive to it.

In a fast moving crisis like this one, it is understandable that families will not always be satisfied with the ability of consular staff to keep them informed. Media speculation will reach the families first, but because it is so important to maintain credibility with the families, the Task Force will not confirm or deny any information until it has been substantiated.

#### Possible Next Steps with the Hostages' Families

We are continuing to explore various options to maintain a helpful and responsive posture with the families without unrealistically raising their expectations or sending the terrorists the wrong signal. If the hostage situation becomes prolonged, we may want to consider sending mail to the hostages in Beirut and supplying the families with maps and relevant background information on the Middle East. We may also want to insure that the hostages' families have access to professional psychological counseling as needed.

The Department could dispatch a representative or a two-person team of hostage/terrorism experts to regional centers such as Chicago and Boston to meet with family members. We could arrange also for family members to come to Washington, either for a meeting with senior Administration officials or to participate as guests of the Administration in one of the events being organized for the 4th of July. Such a step would have a strong positive impact, but lends itself to the interpretation that the Administration expects the hijacking to drag on indefinitely. It is also likely to lead to a coalescing of the family members into an active lobby group.


If a decision is made to bring the families to Washington, we believe a meeting with the Secretary and you would be preferable to a meeting with the President. The profile would be lower, and the Secretary has met with families of other Americans captured in Lebanon. A later meeting with the President could be held in reserve.

### CONFIDENTIAL

Finally, we have been in close touch with the ICRC and our efforts have resulted in private visits by the ICRC to each of the hostages. At our request, the ICRC has undertaken to brief the families of each hostage of the results of the visits. We plan to inform the families of this development.

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Micholas Plan



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#### United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 28, 1985

#### SECRET-

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT McFARLANE THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT:

Proposed Presidential Statement

Attached is a proposed statement for the President or the White House press spokesman to use in the event of the release of the 39 TWA passengers.

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Micheles Place

#### Attachment

Proposed Presidential Statement

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By Man NARA, Date 4/17/44

SECRET DECL: OADR

#### PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

We welcome the release of the 39 Americans who were held hostage by terrorists in Lebanon. We know it is a moment of joy for them and their loved ones. But this is not a moment for celebration:

- -- The seven Americans who remain captive in Lebanon must be released, along with other innocent hostages from other countries.
- -- The murderers of Robert Stethem -- and of our Marines in El Salvador -- must be punished.
- -- Those responsible for other acts of barbarism against our Embassy, our Marines, and other Americans in Lebanon must be punished.
- -- The international community must ensure that all our airports are safe and that civil air travel is safeguarded.
- -- The world must join together in decisive action against terrorists, against nations that sponsor them, and against nations that give them safe haven.

This episode reminds us all how precious and fragile are the freedoms and standards of decency of civilized societies. Civilized life, to a great extent, depends on trust in other human beings. But these tragedies remind us that what we hold most dear must also be defended. Democracy, peace, and freedom have enemies; they must also have steadfast friends.

The United States gives terrorists no rewards and no guarantees. We make no concessions and no deals. The terrorists are on notice that we will fight back, in Lebanon and elsewhere, to combat the continuing attacks on American citizens and property.

We will remember who helped us and stood with us, and who did not.

We will not rest until justice has been done. We will not rest until the world community has met its responsibility:

-- We call upon those who helped secure the release of these TWA passengers to show the same energy and commitment to secure the release of all others held captive in Lebanon.

- -- We call upon the world community to put Beirut
  International Airport off limits until Beirut
  International Airport shows that it has put terrorists
  off limits.
- -- We call upon the world community to intensify its cooperation in all spheres to stamp out this evil.



#### The Hijacking of TWA 847

#### Background

On June 14, 1985, TWA 847, en route from Athens to Rome was hijacked by two Lebanese, who demand the release of all Lebanese detainees in Israel and Kuwait, and the release of four specific individuals: a third hijacker, who had been arrested in Athens, two Lebanese, allegedly in Israeli prisons, and one Lebanese allegedly held in Cyprus (but who had actually been released into Amal custody on May 30). TWA 847 had on board 135 Americans and 16 aliens. Between June 14 and June 16, the aircraft shuttles between Beirut and Algeria. It remains at Beirut Airport from June 16 to June 29 when the hostages are released. (This section will be expanded to short case study of incident)

#### Characterization of Process of USG Response to Hijacking

A preliminary characterization of the process of developing and implementing a USG response to the hijacking offers the following elements:

- -- The response to the hijacking was directed and coordinated by the National Security Advisor and National Security Council staff.
- -- Policy and operational response options were tasked to and developed by the appropriate departments and agencies, and vetted through those interagency groups constituted for the review and implementation of counter-terrorism responses.
- -- Policy and operational response options were reviewed on successive occasions during the crisis at the highest levels through conference calls and during NSPGs by the full National Security Council.
- -- There was frequent Congressional consultation and update.
- -- All relevant diplomatic channels were employed in the effort to seek the release of the hostages, including consultation with Allies.
- -- A set of coordinated, timed diplomatic initiatives and operational military rescue response options were developed.

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By \_\_\_\_\_\_, NARA, Date \_2/12/02\_\_\_\_





- -- There was concomitant development, consideration and decision to implement a range of longer-term counter-terrorism strategies, designed to safeguard against future hijacking incidents.
- -- There was ex post facto review of USG handling of the incident and the initiation of a long-term planning strategy both improve counter-terrorism operations and eventually to reduce the occurrence of terrorist incidents.
- -- Actions and options considered consistent with stated US policy.\* (Possible Israeli deal, US statement)



#### TWA 847 Chronology

#### June 14 - June 30, 1985

#### June 14

TWA Flight 847 departs Athens en route to Rome with 153 people on board, including 129 American passengers, 14 alien passengers, six American crewmembers, two alien crewmembers, and two Lebanese hijackers.

Circa 0310, TWA 847 is diverted to Beirut, where it lands at 0453 over the protests of Lebanese air controllers. Nineteen passengers, 17 women and two children are released, and the aircraft was refueled.

President's national security staff begin a series of secure conference calls which continue throughout crisis. (WHCMC chron.)

Terrorist Incidents Working Group (TIWG) is scheduled for 1000.

At 0630, TWA 847 leaves for Algiers. Prior to taking off, the hijackers list initial demands: release of all Lebanese detainees in Israel and Kuwait, and release of four specific individuals. In addition, the hijackers condemn the bombings at Bir al Abd and Riyadh, attack the Arab League and the Palestinians, condemn American practices in the Arab world, as well as US financial support to Israel.

State Department forms Task Force at 0700.

TIWG meets at 1000. Recommends: deployment of the Emergency Recovery Team (ERT)

US Emb. Algiers to seek Algerian government action to hold plane when it arrives, and to bring in the ERT (this is never granted); diplomatic initiatives to Syria and Berri. (WHCMC Chron)

At TIWG meeting, State is designated as lead agency and organizes a task force. The ERT is formed on Poindexter's authorization:

The team will be headed by State, and consist of reps from State,

Oakley,

Oakley,

(North Action Memo to Poindexter)

North Action Memo to McFarlane indicates President approved deployment of ERT and and notes that State has

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instructed USAMBs to approach Assad and other Arab leaders to assist in release. North indicates that TIWG principals agreed not to give Congressional briefings (North Memo to McFarlane, "Hijacking of TWA

US requests Algiers to allow plane to land on humanitarian grounds and not to depart.

847, June 14, 1985")

Plane arrives in Algiers at 1030 and spends several hours there, during which 21 additional passengers are released and the plane is again refueled although Algerians initially refuse. Hijackers threaten to execute hostages if aircraft not permitted to depart.

Hijackers add demand for US \$15 million and ask to talk to US Ambassador.

US urges GOL not to allow aircraft to return to Beirut, and urges governments of Syria and Cyprus to accept the aircraft if diverted from Beirut. Amal contact promises AMEMB Beirut heavy presence at Beirut airport and continued close contact on incident.

AMBEMB Beirut speaks to Gemayel about potential for plane returning to Beirut. Gemayel says little he can do to secure release of hostages. BIA manager say his orders are to prevent plane from landing.

USS SAIPAN and NIMITZ diverted to support contingency ops.

Hijackers reportedly plant explosives on aircraft.

USAMB Beirut tells GOL to refuse landing rights.

At 1525, aircraft leaves again for Beirut, landing at 1920 although runways blocked by trucks. Pilot says situation desperate, requests permission to land. Robert Strethem is killed and his body thrown onto the tarmac.

Hijackers demand that the ranking Amal official come to the airport. The request is eventually granted.

About a dozen heavily armed men, probably Hizballah and Amal militia, borad the plane and take control from the original hijackers.

Hijackers demand release of all Arab prisoners in Lebanon, complete withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon, withdrawal of Lahad's forces from Lebanon. They reiterate demand for release of Ali Atwah (third hijacker, in Greek custody) and threaten to kill eight Greek passengers, if he is not released.

American Jews and US military are singled out, and 12 passengers are taken off the plane, including all six US military.

President asks Algiers to allow aircraft to land but not to take off again.

President urges Assad to contact Iranian/Shia leaders to influence hijackers to release hostages to Algerian authorities.

#### June 15

Plane arrives in Algiers at 0250. International Red Cross (ICRC) sends team to Algiers at request of US and Algerian governments.

ICRC and Algerian officials are permitted to board plane to check health of hostages and hear the demands of the hijackers.

Hijackers reiterate previous demands and threaten to kill all passengers if Ali Atwah not released.

Sixty-one passengers and all five flight attendants are released.

ERT to Algiers??

Israelis announce intention to gradually release prisoners -- depending on security situation. Sooner or later, all are to be released.

President requests Algerian President Bendjedid to keep aircraft in Algiers.

Greek government considers release of third hijacker.

Shultz sends President detailed status report of current situation diplomatically, and with respect to deployment of ERT McFarlane writes in the margins to the President that "Mr. President, Our specific goals are:

(Shultz Memo to Pres.

"Status Report on the TWA Hijacking.)

#### June 16

After 25 hours in Algiers, aircraft departs again for Beirut, landing at 0745. Intercept from pilot or hijacker to Beirut Tower stated "We want aircraft demobilized in Beirut so it cannot be flown anymore."

Pilot radios that hijackers ultimately want to go to Teheran, where they will release passengers and crew. If request denied, plane will be disabled in Beirut.

USEMBDamascus informed that Assad told of US request to put heavy pressure on Berri to assist US.

Hijackers state they will negotiate with Red Cross. Secure telephone consultations held among McFarlane, Shultz, Weinberger.

Remaining 29 passengers are removed from plane; three flight crewmen remain on board with unknown number of hijackers.

Amal leader Nabih Barri enters negotiations. He says he is assured by hijackers that no harm will come to hostages if things are proceeding. He releases one hostage (Peel).

Bartholomew tells Algerian charge (Washington) to contact Shiite leader Fadlallah to try to end hijacking. Charge uninformed/not useful.

Barri pledges to release hostages if US persuades Israel to release Atlit prisoners. (FBIS)

President meets in SitRoom at 1300 with full NSC plus deputies for NSPG (includes participation of FAA administrator Donald Engen):

Shultz notes that Barri probably acted in concert with the Syrians; expectation that US will pressure Israelis to release Lebanese prisoners. Notes Algerians helpful but twice refused to keep aircraft. Weinberger agrees extremely dangerous to act. Reaffirms basic policy not to negotiate.

#### June 17

McFarlane calls Berri (30 minute conversation): US will not make concessions or ask anyone else to do so...will hold Shia community responsible if passengers harmed...future of Shia will be determined by responsible behavior...Al Dawa prisoner



release creates contest of wills which US/Israel will not concede.

ICRC meets with Israeli officials...ready to facilitate release of ex-Ansar prisoners...will not be party to negotiations.

Shultz makes statement "we call upon those holding the hostages to treat them properly and release them immediately. We will not make deals with terrorists and will not encourage others to do so."

Bartholomew in contact with Barri. Barth. reports Barri "very tough"..."it is now up to US."

AMEMBDamascus reports that Syria is pubically neutral but privately trying to get Barri involved.

#### June 18

Berri releases three more hostages, leaving 40 still in custody, all believed to be Americans.

Bartholomew talks to Barri. Very useful. Barri says he has all hostages, except five; but has connections with those holding the five, seeking consolidation of control.

TIWG held at 1400.

US demarche to Algiers, Jordan, France, UK, Spain, Saudi Arabia, FRG, Austria, UN: US holds Berri responsible...will not negotiate...request they use good offices to influence Berri and other political and religious leaders to effect release.

US demarche to Greece: improve airport security...travel advisory to be issued.

US demarche to Berri: the US understands aircraft is refueled and loaded with explosives, amd expects Berri to control the aircraft.

Presidential message to Assad: increase pressure on Berri to be tough with hijackers...use own channels with PSP, Hizballah, Iranians...release prisoners quickly and transfer out of Lebanon.

Speakes publically says that Israelis should release the Lebanese prisoners since they are illegally detained.

UAE paper reports Algerian plan that hostages be released if US promises that Israel will release Shia prisoners at a later date.

#### June 19

SECSTATE meesage to Gemayel looking to him for help.

US requests ICRC to see hostages.

#### June 20

NSPG meeting at 1000.

Austria offers to assist.

#### June 21

US proposes release scenarios to Berri: release to Syria, Algiers, UN, ICRC...avoid release in Beirut.

Japan approaches Iran and Syria...Iran denies responsibility, blames Syria.

US message to world requesting improvements in airport security.

President meets with hostage families in Dallas.

#### June 22

US message to Iran: Iran cannot escape responsibility for failure to act urgently to help.

US message to Syria: keep pressure on Berri...urge Iranians to use their influence.

In contact with Algerians.

#### June 23

In contact with Algerians.

Rabin announces that 31 of the Shia prisoners will be released the next morning a result of prior legal appeals,

not in response to hijacking.

#### June 24

CPPG meets: and to consider other methods of increasing pressure.

Israel releases 31 detainees from Atlit prison and, in Beirut, Nabih Berri announces a new demand: US Navy ships in area must leave before hostages can be released.

NSPG meets at 1400: President decides to let diplomatic action play out for next several days. Recognizes that real player is Assad and that plan has to be developed accordingly. (WHCMC Chron.)

In contact with Algerians.

#### June 25

Gemayel message to Shultz: doing what I can; area not under GOL control.

Larry Speakes discusses with the Press options the President might consider, including limiting goods and services to Beirut and limiting use of Beirut International Airport (BIA).

NSPG meets at 1330: reviews the Plan of Action to place increasing pressure on Syria to extricate the hostages and to press forward with a campaign against terrorism. (WHCMC Chron.)

CPPG meets at 1600: refines details of Plan.

In contact with Syrians.

#### June 26

NSPG meets at 1000: defers initial steps of plan pending diplomatic developments.

CPPG meets at 1050, chaired by Poindexter.

CPPG follow-on meeting at 1340, chaired by Fortier.

News blackout is declared.

Hostage Palmer is released because of heart condition.

Berri reiterates demand that US warships leave Lebanese coasts and adds demand that neither the US nor Israel retaliate once crisis is resolved.

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Berri announces proposal to transfer all hostages to a Western Embassy in Beirut or Damascus, where they would remain until the release of the Atlit prisoners.

In contact with Syrians, Paris.

#### June 27

Israeli Amb. to Armacost: there is debate as to status of prisoners under Geneva convention...asks US not to bring up issue again.

CPPG meets at 1000: develops a contingency plan in the event of only partial release of the prisoners.

Europeans will not accept conditions of Berri's release scenario.

In contact with Syrians, Algerians, Tel Aviv.

#### June 28

CPPG meets at 1030: recommends implementation of Phase 1 actions to pressure Assad, if no release by the afternoon.

NSPG meets at 1700: reviews diplomatic situation. Confirms plans for extraction of hostages once they are in Syria. Campaign against terrorism to continue.

In contact with Syrians, Algerians, Geneva, Paris, Tel Aviv.

#### June 29

US C-141 with reception team departs Washington for Frankfurt. Another C-141 goes to Damascus.

Hostages released, according to Press, and en route to Syria, although there are conflicting reports as to their status and location.

PM Peres, on Jerusalem radio, declares the freeing of the hostages "removes a major obstacle to freeing Lebanese Shiite prisoners"...denies Israel took any part in deal.

Later reporting, confirmed about 0700, shows hostages still in Beirut and in custody of Amal/Hizballah... Berri apparently seeking more definite guarantee re Atlit detainees and assurance that US will not retaliate.

State issues the following statement at 2230: "The US reaffirms its longstanding support for the preservation of

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Lebanon, its government, its stability and security, and for the mitigation of the suffering of its people." If asked, the spokesman was authorized to say that we are making this statement in order to make our position clear.

#### June 30

At 0330, Syrian officials in Damascus tell the US Embassy "Syria has solved" the problem that delayed the release of the 39 TWA hijacking hostages.

At 1405, Speakes announces release of the hostages and crossing of the Syria-Lebanon border at 1330.

At 1805 President announces departure from Syria.

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