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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
(TOWER BOARD): Records
File Folder: SRB 378 TWA 847 (10) Box 93207

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F97-059/2
Date: 09/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. agenda	re: Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) meeting, 1p <i>R 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #100</i>	6/18/85	P1/F1
2. memo	Oliver North to John Poindexter re: TIWG meeting, 2p <i>R " " #101</i>	6/18/85	P1/F1
3. agenda	text same as item 1, 1p <i>R " " #102</i>	6/18/85	P1/F1
4. summary	of Israeli Statements, 3p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #103</i>	nd	P1/F1
5. memo	Nicholas Platt to McFarlane re: Nabih Barri, 1p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #104</i>	nd	P1/F1
6. background paper	re: Barri, 2p <i>R 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #105</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. background paper	page 2 w/talking points, 1p <i>R 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #106</i>	nd	P1/F1
8. bio	2p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #107</i>	nd	P1/F1
9. bio	2p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #108</i>	nd	P1/F1
10. minutes	re: NSPG meeting, 7p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #109</i>	6/16/85	P1/F1
11. message	(partial), 1p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #110</i>	6/16/85	P1/F1 P3/F3
12. minutes	page 7, 1p <i>R 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #111</i>	nd	P1/F1
13. memo	George Shultz to the President re: Status report on hijacking, 2p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #112</i>	6/15/85	P1/F1
14. memo	Shultz to the President re: Status report (annotated), 2p <i>P 2/12/02 NLSF97-059/2 #113</i>	6/15/85	P1/F1
15. draft letter	Reagan to President Bendjedid, 3p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #114</i>	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD (TOWER BOARD): RECORDS

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/23/2007

File Folder SRB 378 TWA 847 (10)

FOIA

F97-059/2

Box Number 93207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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2	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE TERRORIST INCIDENT WORKING GROUP (TIWG) MEETING: TWA FLIGHT #847 HIJACKING	2	6/18/1985
6	TALKING POINTS	FOR NABIH BERRI MEETING	2	6/16/1985
10	MINUTES	FOR 6/16/85 NSPG MEETING	7	ND
12	MINUTES	PAGE 7 ONLY (WITH NOTATIONS)	ND	ND
13	MEMO	GEORGE P SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT, RE STATUS REPORT ON THE TWA HIJACKING	2	6/15/1985
14	MEMO	GEORGE P SHULTZ TO THE PRESIDENT RE STATUS REPORT ON THE TWA HIJACKING NO. 2	2	6/15/1985

EOB: ROOM 300

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PAGE 2

DOCUMENT NUMBER = ZIR850400637

RECID	850400637		
CLASS	TS		
CREDATE	850619		
TO/FRNAME	MCFARLANE	NORTH	850618
SCODE	C		
DESC	TERRORIST INCIDENT WORKING GROUP MEETING ON <u>TWA</u> FLIGHT 847 HIJACKING		
SUBJECT	LEBANON TERRORISM	TWIG	
ACT/CAO	NORTH POINDEXTER	D 850618 DRAFTED ACTION MEMO D 850620 APPROVED/MTG POSTPONED	
DISTRIB	850620 FILE-ORIG		

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MS NARA, Date 9/17/99

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	John Poindexter		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

cc: Oliver North (#2 and 3)
Jim Radzinski (#4)

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MTH 9/17/09

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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6/18/85

Vycky:

Since the TIWG meeting did
not come off on the 18th,
Jim Radzinski should be called
to pick up the attached folder
to hold until the next meeting.

Jennie



envelope

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-400637

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TERRORIST INCIDENT WORKING GROUP (TIWG) MEETING
Tuesday, June 18, 1985, 2:00-3:00 p.m.
White House Situation Room

- I. IMMEDIATE CONCERNS/PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS. . . Chairman
 - A. Declare travel advisory for Athens
 - B. Armed sky marshalls for U.S. international flights
 - C. Closure/denial of Beirut International Airport
 - D. Presidential statement
- II. CURRENT SITUATION. State
 - A. Status of victims
 - B. Third party interventions (Assad, Algeria, ICRC, Berri)
 - C. Connection between hijackers and those who hold other American hostages
 - D. Mihelich (Jenco) inquiry regarding Jackson
- III. NEXT STEPS Chairman
 - A. Other international support for U.S. sky marshalls, airport security, and Beirut initiatives
 - B. NSDD on aircraft/airport security
- IV. CONGRESSIONAL/PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. . . . Chairman

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NLS F97-059/2-#100

BY AM/ NARA, DATE 3/21/06

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TAB

I

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MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-400637

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 18, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) Meeting:
TWA Flight #847 Hijacking

This afternoon at 2:00 p.m. you are scheduled to chair a TIWG meeting in the WHSR. Attached at Tab I is the agenda for the meeting. At Tab A is the draft Presidential statement for tonight's press conference. Speechwriters have been given a copy.

In regards to the agenda:

- State has prepared a travel advisory for Athens.
- The Italians have armed guards aboard all their international flights. We should be able to use their precedent to establish our program. FAA is basically opposed to the program due to costs, management, and safety.
- The Presidential statement includes wording regarding the travel advisory, the sky marshalls, and the denial of Beirut airport. There is increasing sentiment for military action to destroy the runway.
- We should review what steps would be taken to prevent the aircraft being sent on a suicide mission by the most radical of the hijackers.
- Andy Mihelich, nephew of Father Jenco (Bud met with him last month), called regarding word he had received that Jessie Jackson had been contacted by those who hold our other seven hostages. There may be an attempt to link both sets of hostages, we need to be prepared for this.
- Numerous Congressional committees have called for hearings, briefings, and testimony by Administration witnesses. Consolidated guidance needs to be provided. The Task Force should prepare.

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8: Amf NARA, DATE 3/21/06

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2

-- The NSDD on next steps for aircraft/airport security should be prepared by Friday as a product of the IG/T. State needs to be "encouraged" on this matter.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the agenda at Tab I and the points above during the TIWG meeting.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Agenda

Tab A - Presidential Statement

~~TOP SECRET~~

DRAFT OPENING STATEMENT FOR PRESIDENTIAL PRESS CONFERENCE

I know that many of you have questions you would like to ask about the hijacking and hostage situation in Beirut. I realize that this is an issue which has considerable attention from the media but because it is a very sensitive situation, I will not take any questions on this matter. I do, however, have a brief statement before we move to your questions on other issues.

Terrorism has become a scourge against humanity in the 20th Century. International terrorism is a growing problem for all of us in the Western World, not just the United States. It is a threat to our way of life and civilized society and must be stopped if we are to live on this planet as God made us to do. Our citizens have become the target for many of these groups who believe that we will be responsive to their threats and act on their behalf in response to their attempted intimidation.

Our nation bears global responsibilities that demand we maintain a worldwide presence and not succumb to these cowardly attempts at intimidation. We in the Western democracies, who are increasingly the target of these violent and indiscriminate terrorist attacks, must be steadfast in our resolve not to capitulate to the demands of lawless terrorism. The United States will not, under any circumstances, concede to the demands of terrorists nor will we encourage others to do so. We cannot and will not ask others to do what we would not. If we start down the path of concessions to terrorists, there will be no end to it and no end

to the suffering of innocent people--Americans and others. We would be telling the terrorists of the world that they can force us to accept whatever they demand by capturing and murdering innocent people.

There has been, as there should be in a free society such as ours, considerable dialogue about our ability to respond to terrorist attacks such as the situation we now face in Beirut. I can assure you that our military and intelligence services have taken steps to more adequately deal with the kind of problem we are now experiencing. But this, in and of itself, is not enough. The community of Western nations must face the fact that the problem of terrorism will not disappear because we will it so. The TWA hijacking and what is now happening are an outrage. Innocent people have been taken hostage and terrorized. One of our servicemen has been brutally and cold bloodily murdered. Those that remain in Beirut are threatened with death unless demands are met with which they have no connection. This is unacceptable in any civilized society. It violates all international law and human values. There are no ends or demands which can justify such actions.

The hijackers are saying that Israel must release the Lebanese prisoners it is holding in return for the release of our citizens. This is a morally offensive demand, it is also useless, and counter-productive. The Israeli Government has been gradually releasing the Lebanese prisoners it holds. It is

our understanding that it intends to release them all. This hijacking will not further their release, but rather delay it. We cannot, nor will we, urge them to act under this kind of duress.

This act of terrorism is a stain on Lebanon, the people of that country in who's name it has been done, and devout Arab and Moslem people throughout the world. Lebanon and its communities have suffered enough. We understand and sympathize we their hopes and aspirations and want to help them realize their legitimate goals. Indeed, Lebanon and all its communities need the help and support of the international community. But those in Lebanon who commit acts of terrorism and those who support them in these undertaking must understand that they will irreparably damage their country, their cause, and themselves. In the eyes of the world, they will be held accountable.

I call upon those holding the innocent passengers and crew to release them immediately without condition. I call upon all leaders of Lebanon--governmental, political, religious--to meet their responsibilities and to do all necessary to this end in the name of humanity.

I am also asking other governments and international institutions to use their best efforts and influence to help secure the early and safe release of the passengers and crew. There is more at stake in this situation than an American plane and American

citizens in Lebanon. What is truly at stake is the right for all citizens of all countries to live in a world free from terrorism.

In order to further this end and to help prevent more incidents of this kind, I have directed that armed U.S. sky marshalls be placed aboard all international aircarriers as soon as possible. In addition, I have ordered our State Department to declare a travel advisory for U.S. citizens transitting the Athens airport until the security situation there has improved. I also believe that there are other measures which we of the Western world can take collectively to prevent travel to places like Beirut where lawlessness is rampant and innocent passengers are unprotected. I will confer with other Western leaders on steps we can take together toward these ends.

My thoughts and prayers are with the suffering passengers and crew and the families of those held hostage in Beirut. I think of the murder of a young American serviceman and the anguish of his family. So, too, I pray for the suffering Americans already held so long elsewhere in Lebanon and for their families. It is time to end this thoughtless tragedy.

To Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on Tuesday, June 18 1985

for VADM John M. Poindexter of NSC (White House)
(Name of person to be visited) (Agency)

STATE

✓ Amb Robert Oakley or Amb Parker Borg
✓ Geoffrey M. Levitt

OSD

✓ Richard L. Armitage

CIA

✓ Clair George

JCS

✓ VADM Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.
✓ ~~MGEN Wesley H. Rice~~

JUSTICE

✓ D. Lowell Jensen

DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION

✓ ADM Donald Engen
✓ Matthew Scocozza (DOB: 10/13/48)
✓ Billie Vincent

OMB

Dr. Alton G. Keel

MEETING LOCATION

Building White House

Requested by Fawn Hall

Room No. Situation Room

Room No. 392 Telephone 395-3345

Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m.

Date of request June 18, 1985

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

DO NOT DUPLICATE THIS FORM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-400637

~~TOP SECRET~~

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Tuesday, June 18, 1985, 2:00-3:00 p.m.
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 - D. Mihelich (Jenco) inquiry regarding Jackson
- III. NEXT STEPS Chairman
 - A. Other international support for U.S. sky marshalls, airport security, and Beirut initiatives
 - B. NSDD on aircraft/airport security
- IV. CONGRESSIONAL/PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE. . . . Chairman

NLS F92-059/2 #102

et. omf NARA, DATE 3/21/06

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~~TOP SECRET~~

TAB

A

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4868

June 18, 1985

UNCLASSIFIED/WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*
SUBJECT: Summary of Israeli Government Statements on
Ansar Prisoners

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memo to the NSPG principals forwarding the subject report (Tab A).

Jock Covey and Ollie North concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to NSPG Principals

Tab A Summary of Israeli government statements re
Ansar prisoners

UNCLASSIFIED/WITH
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

mjt 9/19/89

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

4868

UNCLASSIFIED/WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EDWIN MEESE III
The Attorney General

GENERAL JOHN W. VESSEY, JR.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

As a result of an NSPG tasking, the Department of State prepared the attached survey of Israeli government statements on Ansar prisoners. This report is forwarded for your information.

Attachment
As Stated

UNCLASSIFIED/WITH
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATTACHMENT

mgm 4/17/74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


Israeli Statements on Transfer of Ex-Ansar Prisoners to Israel

Summary

Public Statements: On April 2, the IDF released a large number of detainees from the Ansar camp near Nabatiye in south Lebanon, as the IDF prepared to evacuate that area. At the same time, it began the transfer of 1167 detainees, which it described as more dangerous than those released, from Ansar to the Atlit prison, near Haifa, in Israel. GOI spokesmen explained the action as necessary to ensure continued security in southern Lebanon while the IDF completed its withdrawal. They said the detainees would be held temporarily in Israel until the security situation in south Lebanon permitted their return. So far the Israelis have released 468 of the prisoners.

At the time of the TWA hijacking June 14, Defense Ministry spokesman Nachman Shai told the New York Times that the prisoners were moved to Israel to maintain security during the IDF's withdrawal, that their detention in Israel was temporary and that the GOI was committed to return them to Lebanon when the security situation permitted.

On several occasions, IDF spokesman said the ex-Ansar detainees would be treated in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention, although they denied its applicability. (At the time of the transfer of the prisoners, the State Department spokesman stated in response to a question that the U.S. believes the Fourth Geneva Convention was applicable to Israeli activities in Lebanon and that the transport of the detainees to Israel was inconsistent with the Convention.) The IDF also said the ICRC would have access to the detainees at Atlit, as it had at Ansar.



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DECL: OADR

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NLS F97-059/2 #103
By amy, NARA, Date 2/12/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

[REDACTED]

A chronology of GOI public and private statements follows.

Israeli Statements

IDF Chief of Staff Levy told the press April 2 that the detainees were being taken to Israel because "we do not want the detainees remaining in Ansar to force us to redeploy there and stay in Lebanon which is what most of the detainees would like us to do."

On April 2, the Israeli Mission to the UN issued a statement saying that the transport to and detention of the ex-Ansar prisoners in Israel was "temporary".

[REDACTED]

The IDF issued a background paper April 3 which announced that the IDF's "long term" goal was to release the Ansar detainees, but that for the time being a large segment of them would be "temporarily" transferred to a detention facility in Israel. The spokesman explained that this was being done "to prevent an immediate threat to IDF soldiers still deployed in Lebanon."

A later IDF press bulletin explained that these prisoners would be a threat to IDF troops and Lebanese citizens if they were released "at this time" since they "took an active part in terrorist activities." There was no facility in Lebanon where the ex-Ansar detainees could be lodged during the final stage of the IDF's withdrawal. Therefore, they would be "temporarily" held in Israel. The bulletin concluded that "The IDF will release the detainees in accordance with developments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

in South Lebanon as IDF forces withdraw from Lebanon." IDF officials were also quoted in the press as saying that the detainees would be returned to Lebanon when their villages were "quiet" and "when the security situation warrants."

On April 11, the IDF released thirty ex-Ansar detainees from Israel. Minister of Defense Rabin denied that the IDF would transfer the remainder of the detainees in Israel to a new facility in Lebanon.

On April 18, IDF sources announced that the IDF had released 37 of the ex-Ansar detainees held in Israel. They said the IDF "was continuing a policy whereby the Ansar detainees who were temporarily transferred to Israel are being released according to the stages of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon."

On May 20, 150 ex-Ansar detainees were released as part of a larger exchange of 1150 prisoners and terrorists in Israel for three Israeli soldiers held captive by Ahmed Jibril's PFLP-GC.

On May 29 another 249 prisoners were released at the request of AMAL leadership who appealed to the GOI because of their desperate need for manpower.

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8590675

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

M3/17/92

RECEIVED 17 JUN 85 09

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 16 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

INTELLIGENCE

BERRI, NABIH

TERRORISM

SUBJECT TALKING POINTS & TELEPHONE NUMBERS FOR PHONE CALL TO NABIH BERRI

ACTION. FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

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NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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National Security Council
The White House

System #

II

Package #

90675

85 JUN 17 P 3: 00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>KA 6/17</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room		<u>BT</u>	

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

AD NOT STAFF



System II
90675

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

TO: NSC - Mr. McFarlane
FROM: State - Nicholas Platt

As the Secretary has discussed with you, we are providing the attached talking points with the recommendation that you use them this evening with Nabih Berri. They have been approved by the Secretary.

Telephone numbers at which Berri may be reached in Beirut are:



I understand that the first of these numbers is preferred.

Nich Platt
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED In Part

NLS F97-059/2 # 104

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

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DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Background

Reg Bartholomew has been in touch with Amal Chief Nabih Berri throughout the day. He has sought to bring Berri under increasing pressure to recognize that the hijackers cannot realize their demand for release of the Shia prisoners held in Israel (the "Ansar" prisoners) in exchange for the TWA passengers. Moreover, that sympathy for the Ansar prisoners will turn into approbrium toward Lebanon, the Shia and Berri if the hostages are harmed. By this time, the actions of the hijackers are impeding release of these prisoners. Berri is feeling increasingly caught between us and the hijackers, with whom his followers largely sympathize, and is becoming skittish. Reg believes we should notch up the pressure--being careful not to cause Berri to bolt from the problem--through a high-level phone call from Bud McFarlane to Berri tonight (June 16).

Talking Points

- The TWA hijacking has the attention of the USG at the highest level.
- Secretary Shultz and I have conferred throughout the day, and he associates himself with these remarks.
- Everything you are doing to protect the lives and well-being of the TWA hostages--both those in the aircraft and those taken from it--is very sincerely appreciated. Maintaining their safety is important to both the United States and to Lebanon.
- We are relying on you to use your unique position to convince the hijackers that they cannot achieve their aims and that there is no humane or practical alternative to releasing the hostages they hold, both on and off the plane.
- We are firm in our long-standing policy not to make concessions to hijackers, nor will we ask Israel or anyone else to do so.

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 #105

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- The hijackers' action is not helping obtain the release of the Ansar prisoners; it is delaying it. Israel has already said, and repeated again today, that it will release the prisoners.
- We, too, believe the Ansar prisoners should be released, but neither we nor Israel will respond positively to these terror tactics.
- If the hostages are harmed, the responsibility will not be ours or Israel's. The world will put the responsibility on Lebanon.
- We are counting on you to convince the hijackers to release all of the passengers. This is the only way this increasingly hazardous affair can end without adding to the tragedy.

Drafted:NEA:JPlacke
0970A
6/16/85

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- REC.
DELETE
- The hijackers' action is not helping obtain the release of the Ansar prisoners; it is delaying it. Israel has already said, and repeated again today, that it will release the prisoners.
 - We, too, believe the Ansar prisoners should be released, but neither we nor Israel will respond positively to these terror tactics. No one can act favorably under this kind of duress.
 - If the hostages are harmed, the responsibility will not be ours or Israel's. The world will put the responsibility on Lebanon.-- and the Shia community.
 - [We are counting on you to convince the hijackers to release all of the passengers. This is the only way this increasingly hazardous affair can end without adding to the tragedy.]

This will have long to adverse consequence for the goa you espouse for Shia people in g eral and in the Lebanon particular

FOLLOWING POINTS ADDED BY NORTH WITH CONCURRENCE OF POINDEXTER & OAKLEY IN LIEU OF POINT ABOVE

- We recognize the importance of the Shia community and that it must have an important role in the future of a stable Lebanon -- and mid-east.
- We would like to take steps to help with the reconstruction of Shia areas in the Lebanon, but this kind of activity makes it impossible for those of us who want to help your people to do so. The terrorism must stop or we will be unable to help with measures that would truly aid your people. In particular, this event which has become so visible must end quickly with the release of our hostages -- otherwise this increasingly hazardous affair could well end in tragedy.

Drafted:NEA:JPlacke
0970A
6/16/85

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-05912 #106

BY snf, NARA, DATE 2/12/02

National Security Council
The White House

85 JUN 19 All: 13

System #

II

Package #

8590675

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson			
William Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>File/NFAA</u>	
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other NORTH, COVEY

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

ADVANCE cys sent by CIX - CCs given
to Buel, Regan, Chew

~~SECRET~~Biographic Information on
Nabih BarriFamily Background

Nabih Mustafa Barri was born in 1938 to a Shia family from the village of Tibnin in southern Lebanon near the Israeli border. His father, Mustafa Barri, a merchant, emigrated to Sierra Leone. Accounts differ on whether Barri was born in Tibnin or Sierra Leone. In 1981 Barri's father died; his mother and other family members still reside in Tibnin.

Education and Early Life

Barri studied at a Maronite school in Beirut until he was expelled for unknown reasons, after which he transferred to al-Amaliya, the foremost Shia school in Lebanon. Later Barri studied law at Lebanese University in Beirut prior to passing the bar exam and doing some postgraduate work in Paris.

In 1963 he was chairman of the Lebanese National Students Organization and a member of the Board of the World Students Association. The same year he came to the United States on a Foreign Leader Grant. While attending Lebanese University in Beirut, Barri apparently joined the Baathists, the secular pro-Arab party, rival branches of which now rule Syria and Iraq.

Family and Ties to the U.S.

Barri's family has roots in the Detroit area going back to the 1920's when some of its members migrated to the United States from Tibnin. Several hundred Barris now live in the Detroit area. Barri and his own family migrated to the United States in the mid-1970's.

Barri was married for almost twenty years to a cousin, Leyla, who grew up in the United States and bore him six children. His ex-wife, a police dispatcher, and their six children live in Dearborn, the Detroit suburb which has the largest Arabic concentration in North America. Members of the community say Barri comes to the Detroit area two or three times a year to see his children, to "renew" his green card and to visit the Dearborn branch of Amal. Unlike other major groupings of Moslems in the United States, Detroit's Arab-American community has a Shia majority.

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-059/2 #107
By smf NARA, Date 2/12/02


~~SECRET~~

His current wife, Randa 'Aassi, has born him five daughters and two sons: Solanne, Sausan, Farah, Hind, Mustafa, Abdallah and Amal.

Political Career

Barri's practical introduction to Lebanese political life came in the 1970's when he associated himself with the Imam Musa Sadr, the founder of the Shia Muslim "Movement of the Deprived," the forerunner of the Amal militia. When the Lebanese civil war began in 1975, Sadr chose Barri as his representative and liaison officer with other Lebanese Muslim groups, which provided Barri with vast political experience. When Sadr "disappeared" in Libya in 1978, Barri succeeded him as head of Amal, playing on his support among the largest Amal branch, that representing southern Lebanon. In doing so, Barri outmaneuvered Husayn al-Husayni, the chief of the Amal branch in the Biqa' valley.

In Lebanese political terms, Barri was virtually unknown to the traditional political establishment until recently. For example, he did not even rate mention in the "Who's Who in Lebanon, 1983-84," and veteran Christian leader Camille Chamoun first met Barri in an elevator at the Geneva national reconciliation conference in November 1983. Barri's rise to political prominence can be dated largely from the time of the Israeli withdrawal to the Awali River in September 1983 and even more particularly since Amal took control of West Beirut in February 1984.



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DECL:OADR

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-059/2 #108
By smf, NARA, Date 2/12/02

~~SECRET~~

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DECL:OADR

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ID 8590674

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

M77 6/17/99

RECEIVED 17 JUN 85 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOC DATE 16 JUN 85

NORTH

17 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: NSPG

INTELLIGENCE

TERRORISM

MINUTES

LEBANON

GREECE

SUBJECT: MINUTES OF JUN 16 NSPG MTG RE HIJACKING OF FLIGHT # 847

ACTION. FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS CD FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID NSPG0108 (K / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
FROM NORTHNSP
6/17/85

RECEIVED 17 JUN 85 09

DOCDATE 16 JUN 85

TO MCFARLANE

KEYWORDS: NSPG

INTELLIGENCE

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: NSPG MTG 16 JUNE RE HIJACKING TWA FLIGHT #847

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS S FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(K / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
NATH	S 6/17	for further action		
Mcfarlane	x 6/17	for decision		
C 6/17		Ponderexter approved		on

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URGENT

National Security Council
The White House

85 JUN 17

P12: 52

System #

Package #

IV

90674

1830

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	P	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	2	BT	N
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90674 Re-do

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 17, 1985

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By m-7D NARA, Date 9/17/99

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER NORTH
HOWARD TEICHER *for*

SUBJ: Minutes of NSPG Meeting
on Hijacking of
TWA Flight #847

Changes have been made as indicated.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the minutes
attached.

Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment
Original Package #90674
dtd June 16, 1985

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90674 Re-do

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 17, 1985

85 JUN 17 P12: 52

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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Approve ____ Disapprove ____

Attachment

Original Package #90674
dtd June 16, 1985

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *msn* - NARA, Date *9/17/99*

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II

90674

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 16, 1985

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
HOWARD R. TEICHER *HRT*

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting:
Hijacking of TWA Flight #847

Attached at Tab I are the minutes of the NSPG meeting held in the White House Situation Room this afternoon at 1:00 p.m.

RECOMMENDATION

That you review and approve the minutes attached at Tab I.

Approve */*

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Minutes of NSPG Meeting

done

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By MSH NARA, Date 9/17/00

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

SENSITIVE

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SYSTEM II

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
Sunday, June 16, 1985, 1:00-2:15 p.m.
White House Situation Room

SUBJECT: Hijacking of TWA Flight #847 (U)

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:
Craig Fuller
Donald Gregg

State:
Secretary George Shultz
Ambassador Robert Oakley

Treasury:
Secretary James Baker III

OSD:
Secretary Caspar Weinberger

CIA:
Director William Casey
John McMahon

JCS:
General John Vessey, Jr.
VADM Arthur Moreau, Jr.

FAA:
Administrator Donald Engen

White House:
Donald Regan
Robert McFarlane
VADM John Poindexter
Robert Sims

NSC:
Oliver North
Howard Teicher
Rod McDaniel

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-059/2 #109

By AM/, NARA, Date 3/21/06

Minutes

Mr. McFarlane: The incident probably began as a freelance operation by unaffiliated southern Lebanese Shia. As the meeting commenced, we probably have about 33 Americans aboard the aircraft including the 3 man crew. There are also indications that 10-12 passengers were removed on the second stop in Beirut and may be held separately by Amal and Hizballah. Director Casey will provide an overall summary of our intelligence.

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Declassify: OADR

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SENSITIVE

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SENSITIVE

FOIA(b)(1)

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The President: It seems that the size of the terrorist organization almost guarantees the death of most of the hostages.

Secretary Weinberger: Noted that the odds are indeed very heavily stacked against us.

FOIA(b)(1)

General Vessey: [REDACTED]

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Don Engen: The crew has been up for 54 hours straight. The pilot is exceptional, the first officer is very good, the engineer is apparently a very religious man who has been badly beaten--probably for having spoken his beliefs.

The President: Can the aircraft be kept from flying by shooting out the tires?

Don Engen: FAA recommends against attempting to disable the aircraft by shooting out the tires since there are examples of hijackers taken off despite this measure. Most importantly, the aircraft is "picking up" hours of flying time without maintenance. This can be serious for safety as it continues to fly.

Secretary Shultz: Negotiations will require that we deal with the Israelis/Ansar prisoner problem whether the plane is in Beirut or elsewhere. It should also be noted that the pilot has suggested that it is time to go for a military operation. We also should recognize that Beirut may not be as hospitable to the hijackers as we suspected. The hijackers have prevented the aircraft from approaching the terminal.

The President: What about the letter to me from the hostages (copy at Tab A) and the prospects for exchanging the Israeli prisoners for our hostages?

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SENSITIVE

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~~TOP SECRET~~

4

SENSITIVE

Secretary Shultz: Rabin stated that they don't know what American policy is on this particular issue but they will talk to the Red Cross. The Red Cross will arrive Tel Aviv tonight. It seems that Rabin is inviting us to call for the release of the prisoners.

The President: Reiterated his interest in bringing about the release of all American hostages followed by the release of the Israeli-held prisoners.

Secretary Shultz: Argued that this would effectively mean making a deal with the hostages--it will only create more problems in the future. The real problem is that Beirut airport is a menace to civilization where people can do whatever they want. We should make the airport physically unusable. It would be better if they were at Tehran.

The President: The Israelis don't have their planes hijacked because they are serious about security checks and put sky marshalls on the planes. Why can't our airlines do the same?

Donald Engen: Noted that TWA was conducting its own security in Athens as do most U.S. carriers, but that the Greek guards had fallen asleep when the hijackers went on board.

Robert McFarlane: Provided a variant on the President's proposal urging that we reiterate our position on not conceding to terrorist demands, noting that the Israelis don't either, and then getting the word out that the Israelis won't release any Ansar prisoners as long as the hijacking continues.

The President: Maybe we should have a talk with the Israelis, especially if they are going to let them go anyway. Maybe we should try and include some of the other hostages but making clear that the Israelis would release the prisoners. We would still not alter our policy on negotiating with terrorists.

Secretary Shultz: Suggested that our policy should continue unchanged. He noted that we have been able to get 107 released through protracted talks. We should let the ICRC and Barri talk and let the tension build. We must not change our policy and do anything that would be interpreted as cutting a deal with terrorist; we should keep this process going.

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SENSITIVE

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

The President: I am not opting to pick up the phone and call the Israelis to work out a deal.

Secretary Shultz: We should not force the pace as it would not be to our advantage.

Don Regan: Are there any incapacitating agents that could be introduced aboard the aircraft?

FOIA(b)(1)

General Vessey: [REDACTED]

Secretary Baker: Because it is likely to be a "long hot summer" we should be doing more about airport security including putting armed guards on airplanes.

Secretary Shultz: 20 years ago when we put sky marshalls on airplanes it was very expensive.

Secretary Baker: But it worked.

The Vice President: Asked about reports that people with Jewish-sounding names were being singled out.

Secretary Weinberger: Had seen these reports, couldn't confirm them, but did note that the man that was shot was named Weissman.

Robert McFarlane: We should review our next steps. We should encourage steps which keep talks going and buy time. Talk with the Amal, Syrians, Lebanese, and the ICRC. But if the plane takes off again, what is our preference regarding its destination? Jordan or Egypt would be fine, but what about Iran?

Secretary Weinberger: Defense strongly urges that we take any steps necessary to prevent the aircraft from going to Tehran. Continued that the Iranian leaders are absolute madmen.

Secretary Shultz: Made clear that no one wants the plane to go to Iran, but we have to be ready for the eventuality and prepare ourselves. Best outcome is if the aircraft goes back to Algiers or to Damascus given Assad's recent statements.

The President: How much more flying can the plane manage? I am still worried about a tragedy involving the hostages followed by the Israeli release of their prisoners. Need to see what Israel intends to do. I don't want the terrorists to win.

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SENSITIVE

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6

SENSITIVE

Secretary Weinberger: We need to document the Israeli position on the Ansar prisoners. Concerned that if we start giving in there will be new demands tomorrow. We also need to work on better aircarrier protection.

The President: Said that the media is showing the Israelis only willing to act if the U.S. asks. They do not wish to be seen as giving in to terrorist pressure.

Secretary Shultz: Said that the Israelis are clearly acting in a manner so that they cannot be blamed for the outcome.

Robert McFarlane: In summing up, said we must act in a way that does not show the U.S. giving in to terrorists. We do not negotiate with terrorists and do not encourage others to do what we would not do, but we will respect Israeli decisions on this matter. We need to ensure that the talks continue.

FOIA(b) (1)

General Vessey: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The President: It is important that no one here mention anything about our discussion of the Israeli offer on the Ansar prisoners.

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Robert McFarlane: Asked if we should close Beirut airport by cratering the runway.

Secretary Shultz: If the plane leaves Beirut, we should shut it down.

Don Regan: The American public expects us to do "something." They want some kind of satisfaction regarding terrorism.

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SENSITIVE

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7

SENSITIVE

The President: Asked whether we were sure which group the terrorists actually belonged to.

Secretary Weinberger: Responded that while we were not sure about the original two, the additional 12 who got on the plane are Amal and Hizballah trained in Baalbek.

The President: Then Baalbek it is.

Robert McFarlane: On leaving this meeting, we should say only that the President has met with his advisors and reviewed the situation that there is no change in U.S. policy on concessions to terrorists and that we are doing everything we can with those who have influence over the situation. We should try to keep as low a profile as possible for the next 24-48 hours so that we do not provide any encouragement to the hijackers while the other negotiations continue.

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SENSITIVE

FBIS 090 (SEE 089)

LEBANON: HIJACKED AMERICANS SEND MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN

NC161605 BEIRUT DOMESTIC SERVICE IN ARABIC 1555 GWT 16 JUN 85

(TEXT) AMAL REPRESENTATIVE BASSAM TULAYS RETURNED FROM THE PLANE A SHORT WHILE AGO, CARRYING A MESSAGE FROM THE HIJACKED AMERICANS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGE READS:

PRESIDENT REAGAN:

WE THE UNDERSIGNED, THE 32 AMERICANS ON FLIGHT 847, ARE WRITING TO YOU FREELY AND WITHOUT PRESSURE. WE ASK THAT YOU NOT TAKE ANY MILITARY ACTION. WE HOPE THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE ACCELERATED AND THAT YOU CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS TO RELEASE 800 LEBANESE DETAINED BY ISRAEL.

WITH ALL RESPECT.

16 JUN 1618Z

FOIA(b) (3)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-059/2 # 110

By smj, NARA, Date 3/21/04

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7

SENSITIVE

The President: Then Baalbek it is.

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*insert discussion here
as to who is responsible.
Turning in Baalbek etc.*

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DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-059/2 #111

BT - SM NARA, DATE 3/21/06

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SENSITIVE

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8590671

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 15 JUN 85 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOC DATE 15 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

ALGERIA

HIJACKING

AVIATION

AGENDA

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT ON TWA HIJACKING ✓

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

STARK

COVEY

MCFARLANE

POINDEXTER

KIMMITT

MCDANIEL

COMMENTS

File: This item verbally briefed to the President on June 16, 1985

REF# 8517709

LOG 8590664

NSCIFID

(E 1/3)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 6/27 Action completed per North

- 6/15 McFarlane approved per msg

IL 6/15 Information

C 6/18 Per noted

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

II
90674

85 JUN 20 P 3: 12

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	<u>done 6/15</u> <u>MEN</u>	<u>staff</u>
Situation Room	<u>2</u>	<u>done 6/15</u> <u>MEN</u>	<u>distribute</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

Distribution:
RCM - done
JMP - done
RMK
Regan
McDaniel

✓ Action: North
Comment: Stark
Covey

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>3</u>	<u>For review</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP
 (Date/Time)

*Bud, Handwritten changes in attached text are
 state suggestions. Tx,
 BSL*

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

ES SENSITIVE
8517709

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90671

June 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*
Subject: Status Report on the TWA Hijacking

The Situation on the Ground

The hijacked TWA aircraft returned to Algiers early this morning from Beirut, where more terrorists joined the hijackers and one still unidentified American was shot through the back of the head. A late report (unconfirmed) indicates that there may now be more than ten heavily armed terrorists aboard the aircraft. Forty two passengers have been released, but there are still over 100 passengers aboard the plane, most of them Americans, in addition to the eight crew members.

Demands and Threats

Although we still do not know what group, if any, these terrorists are associated with, they clearly have the support of the Hizballah, and Amal has been unwilling to take action contrary to their wishes. Their demands are:

-- the withdrawal of all Israeli and Israeli-supported forces from Lebanon;

-- the release of all Arab prisoners in Israel;

-- condemnation of bombings in the Arab world allegedly committed by the U.S., and

-- the release of four specific prisoners, including a comrade of the terrorists who was arrested at Athens airport following the hijacking, a prisoner the hijackers believe is still in Cypriot custody, and two prisoners allegedly held in Israel. The GOA and the ICRC are now in touch concerning these latter two.

The hijackers continue to threaten that they will kill all the passengers unless their demands are met. In particular, the terrorists have threatened to kill all the Greek passengers on the aircraft unless their comrade is flown from Athens to Algiers today. The Greek Government has decided to meet this demand and the prisoner is now on a flight to Algiers. We also learned this morning that the prisoner formerly held in Cyprus was released on May 30, but we have not yet publicly acknowledged this.

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-059/a #112
By *smk* NARA, Date *2/12/02*

U.S. Actions

Algeria: The primary focus of our efforts has been to support the Algerian Government. We have urged in the strongest possible terms that they do everything they can to ensure that the hijacked aircraft does not leave Algiers again. We have also suggested to them that they seek the help of Iran. Ambassador Newlin is at the airport and in continuous close consultation with Algerian officials. For their part, the Algerians seem to believe that if the demands for the release of the four specific prisoners can be met, it may be possible to get the terrorists to back off their broader demands. However, we have just received additional [REDACTED] information, which may well be credible, indicating that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I will be calling Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi.

Syria: Yesterday we conveyed a personal message from you to President Assad seeking his intervention in the hijacking. We have followed this up with two further demarches to the Syrian Government and intend to keep the pressure on them. While it does not appear that the Syrians are in a position to influence the hijackers much, they do have influence with Amal and with Druze militia leaders.

Lebanon: Reg Bartholomew has delivered strong messages to President Gemayel and other Lebanese Government officials, but they likewise are not in a position to do very much. Reg has also been in contact with leaders of the Amal and Druze militias who have generally tried to distance themselves from the whole affair, lest they be tainted with responsibility for any disasters. Reg is also trying through the Algerian ambassador and the Shiite Speaker of the Parliament, Hussein al-Husseini, to elicit statements from key religious leaders in Lebanon calling for the release of the hostages.

Emergency Support Team: The EST [REDACTED]

The Algerian Government has refused this assistance, asserting it prefers to handle this responsibility itself, but Ambassador Newlin believes it may be possible during the day to secure approval for one or two of the team to come to Algiers to assist the U.S. Embassy rather than the GOA. The publicity surrounding dispatch of the Delta team is making the Algerians and the hijackers both very nervous.

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

System II
90671 add-on

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

msnall/may
MODE

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

FLASH

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

85 JUN 15 P 6: 51

SECURE FAX #

46

ADMIN FAX #

RECORD #

PAGES

2

DTG

152241Z JUN 85

RELEASER

022

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

FROM/LOCATION

1. THE WHITE HOUSE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. J.M. KUHN FOR THE PRESIDENT

2. TO: 152247Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

CLASSIFICATION

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90671

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

June 15, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: George P. Shultz *GPS*

Subject: Status Report on the TWA Hijacking - No. 2

The Situation on the Ground

The hijacked TWA aircraft remains on the ground in Algiers. Of the original 153 persons (including crew) on board, a total of 102 have now been released, leaving 50 unaccounted for, in addition to the passenger killed yesterday. There are an increasing number of reports that as many as 10 passengers may have been removed in Beirut. According to passenger and crew reports, the hijackers are well-organized and are now heavily armed.

In Beirut, the as-yet unidentified body of the American who was shot yesterday has been turned over to the Lebanese Red Cross, for transfer of the remains to East Beirut to a military hospital there. The Embassy has made arrangements for a U.S. military helicopter to transport the remains to Cyprus tomorrow and then on to Frankfurt. It is unlikely that identification can be made prior to arrival in Frankfurt.

Demands and Threats

The TWA team in Algiers reports that the hijackers are requesting \$10-15 million, the release of 700 prisoners in Israel (presumably including those transferred from Ansar when the Israelis withdrew). They are also pressing for the release of the Lebanese hijacker jailed in Cyprus. We have passed along to the Algerians Cypriot government assurances that the prisoner in question was released May 30 into Amal custody.

U.S. Actions

Algeria: I saw the Algerian Ambassador to convey a message passing on our recent intelligence to the GOA and to urge the Algerians not to allow the aircraft to depart. I have asked Mike Newlin in Algiers to make a parallel presentation to Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi, whom I was unable to reach earlier today.

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FT2059/2 #113

By *smf* NARA, Date *2/12/02*

~~SECRET~~

/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Lebanon: Reg Bartholomew talked at length with President Gemayel and Acting Interior Minister Skaiff. Reg told both Gemayel and Skaiff that if the aircraft returns to Beirut and the situation deteriorates, and the Government of Lebanon does nothing, western countries would need to reevaluate their relationship with Lebanon. Subsequent to this conversation, Amal leader Nabih Barri, who has deliberately been unavailable during the past two days, called Reg to ask what we wanted him to do if the aircraft returned to Beirut. Barri stated that effective intervention on his part would be more difficult than it had been in the case of the Alia hijacking, when he had helped free the eight Jordanian skymarshals taken prisoner. These hijackers were Hizballah, and therefore not within Amal's direct sphere of influence. Barri promised to do more than his best, since this was a humanitarian issue.

Syria: We have sent another message to Assad asking him to put pressure on Nabih Barri and Walid Jumblatt to use their influence, and to have them intervene directly if the aircraft returns to Beirut.

International Committee of the Red Cross: ICRC remains in contact with the GOA and with us concerning the other two prisoners in possible Israeli custody, whose release the hijackers have demanded. The ICRC was reluctant to comply with an Algerian suggestion (passed through us) that it issue a public statement confirming it is in contact with the Israeli government concerning these two prisoners. As an alternative, we are issuing an announcement, stating that the ICRC is in contact with the Algerian and U.S. governments on this issue. The ICRC has agreed to send a 5-man team to Algiers to lend its good offices. Arrival of the ICRC team, scheduled to depart Geneva at 10:00 PM Geneva time (1600 EDT), has been approved by the Algerians.

Emergency Support Team: The EST

We have made no progress in securing approval from the Algerians for members of the team to come to Algiers.

We are moving forward on a priority basis to send a communications team to Algiers to assist the Embassy.

Mr President - Our specific goals are:

Beed

**National Security Council
The White House**

System #

II

Package #

90671

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	<u>done 6/15</u> <u>MEN</u>	<u>LIX</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information	A = Action	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Regan Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____


(Date/Time)

LIX URGENT Eyes Only to
State S/S for Ken Quinn. ADD note
"Text approved by White House" to
FBIHQ document.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Admiral Poindexter wants this
LDX'd immediately to Secretary
Shultz from McFarlane for his
clearance and FLASH transmittal.

[Handwritten signature]



RECEIVED

35 JUL 15 P 3: 47

WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE

C

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

WJ 6/17/94

MESSAGE NO. 334 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ PAGES 3

FROM ROBERT KIMMITT 456-2224 Gf1/WW
(NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRESIDENT BENDJEDID RE

TWA HIJACKING

NSC LOG #

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>KEN QUINN</u>	<u>S/S</u>	<u>X8448</u>
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REMARKS "TEXT APPROVED BY WHITE HOUSE FOR FLASH TRANSMITTAL"
URGENT. EYES ONLY.

SECRET

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR NEWLIN SHOULD SEEK AN IMMEDIATE, PERSONAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BENDJEDID TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. *Ambassador should make clear that President expects a reply from Bendjedid.*

3. BEGIN TEXT:

Dear Mr. President:

I regret disturbing you during the month of Ramadan, but events have been forced upon us which require serious consideration and action.

When we met in April, I stressed the gratitude the American people feel toward Algeria for its efforts to bring about the release of our hostages in Iran, as well as your assistance with other terrorist incidents. Tragically, we are again faced with the need to cooperate to resolve a terrorist act of war against the United States in particular, but, in reality, a deed directed against all of humanity.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-05912-114

By AM, NARA, Date 3/21/06

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

2

Recognizing our respect for Algeria's role in resolving this crisis, I appreciate your government's willingness to take all possible measures to end this hijacking in Algiers. We realize that keeping the plane in Algiers entails a certain level of risk for the passengers and crew. However, should the plane depart Algiers and return to Beirut, the passengers and crew would be thrust into a hostile, lawless environment where the prospects for violence and loss of life would be much greater. Therefore, I want to ask that you take the necessary steps to keep the aircraft in Algiers.

Your government has worked skillfully, to keep ^{the} negotiations going and
I am aware that efforts are underway to involve the ICRC to improve communications with the terrorists. We do not object to the participation of the ICRC, as long as such a process is productive. However, if such a process fails to produce positive results, I am obligated to fulfill my Constitutional responsibility to protect the lives of American citizens.

FOIA(b)(1)

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~~SECRET~~

3

It seems clear that a failure to resolve this crisis decisively and immediately can only result in greater danger to the passengers and crew of this aircraft while encouraging more air piracy in the coming summer months. We must directly confront this threat to civilized humanity.

I have no doubt that you will continue to play the courageous, humanitarian role which has earned you and the people of Algeria worldwide respect and gratitude.

With highest regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

(END TEXT)

4. THERE WILL NOT BE A SIGNED ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~