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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
(TOWER BOARD): Records
File Folder: SRB 378 TWA 847 (11) Box 93207

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F97-059/2
Date: 09/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Oliver North/Howard Teicher to Robert McFarlane re: NSPG meeting, 1p <i>PART 4/12/01 F97-059/2 #115</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1
2. agenda	NSPG meeting, 1p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #116</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1
3. memo	re: telephone call to President Assad, 2p <i>R 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #117</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1
4. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p <i>PART 4/12/01 F97-059/2 #118</i>	nd	P1/F1
5. talking points	re: NSPG meeting, 6p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #119</i>	nd	P1/F1
6. memo	North to John Poindexter re: TWIG meeting, 1p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #120</i>	6/14/85	P1/F1
7. agenda	re: TWIG meeting, 1p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #121</i>	6/14/85	P1/F1
8. memo	North to McFarlane re: hijacking, 1p <i>P 4/9/02 F97-059/2 #122</i>	6/14/85	P1/F1
9. summary of events	re: Hijacking, 2p <i>P 4/9/02 F97-059/2 #123</i>	6/14/85	P1/F1
10. message	reL Hijacking, 2p <i>D 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #124</i>	nd	P1/F1
11. cable	141824Z JUN 85, 2p <i>D 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #125</i>	6/14/85	P1/F1
12. message	text same as item 10, 2p <i>D 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #126</i>	nd	P1/F1
13. memo	Howard Teicher to McFarlane re: Counter-terrorism strategy, 3p <i>D 4/9/02 F97-059/2 #127</i>	6/20/85	P1/F1
14. memo	re: telephone call to President Assad, 2p <i>R 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #128</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1
15. memo	North/Teicher to McFarlane re: NSPG meeting, 1p <i>P 4/12/01 F97-059/2 #129</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1
16. agenda	re: NSPG meeting, 1p <i>P 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #130</i>	6/24/85	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD
(TOWER BOARD): Records
File Folder: SRB 378 TWA 847 (11) Box 93207

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F97-059/2
Date: 09/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. memo	William Casey to the President, 2p <i>D 3/21/06 F97-059/2 #131</i>	6/22/85	P1/F1
18. paper	re: Lebanon, 3p <i>D 4/12/01 F97-057/2 #132</i>	nd	P1/F1
19. memo	Nicholas Platt to McFarlane re: hijacking, 3p <i>P 2/14/02 NLSF97-059/2 #133</i>	nd	P1/F1
20. memo	Fortier/Covey/North to McFarlane re: hijacking, 3p <i>D 4/10/06 MDI-018 #25</i>	6/20/85	P1/F1
21. memo	Platt to McFarlane re: hijacking, 3p <i>P 2/14/02 NLSF97-059/2 #134</i>	6/20/85	P5 P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD (TOWER BOARD): RECORDS

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/23/2007

File Folder SRB 378 TWA 847 (11)

FOIA

F97-059/2

Box Number 93207

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
3	MEMO	RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASSAD	2	6/24/1985
		mvh 3/6/08		
5	TALKING POINTS	RE HIJACKING	6	ND
		mvh 3/6/08		
14	MEMO	RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL TO PRESIDENT HAFIZ AL-ASSAD	2	6/24/1985
		mvh 3/6/08		

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ID 8590706

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

NSN 9/17/99

RECEIVED 24 JUN 85 13

TO

MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOC DATE 24 JUN 85

TEICHER

24 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: NSPG

TERRORISM

LEBANON

SUBJECT: AGENDA & TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG MTG ON SITUATION IN BEIRUT

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES IF

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC IF ID

(B 15)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	C 6/24	Mcfarlane approved		ON, HT

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

National Security Council
The White House

System #

Package #

85 JUN 24 P 1: 09

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	1	✓	
William Martin	2	WFM	
John Poindexter	3		
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	4	M	RCM HAS SEEN
William Martin	5	WFM	
NSC Secretariat	6	BST	N
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

RCM: LMP approved agenda (TODI).

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90706

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
HOWARD R. TEICHER

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
[REDACTED] 2:00 p.m., WHSR

The CPPG met this morning to review Director Casey's proposal for next steps in resolving the problem of terrorism [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] A copy of his paper is attached at Tab A.

The consensus of the CPPG members was that the measures proposed by the DCI will probably not contribute [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The measures suggested in our "non-paper" of Sunday (Tab B) were considered and the paper has been updated to include additional steps for an incremental [REDACTED]

should be directly confronted regarding his responsibilities for resolving the situation and that the President should call him.

The proposed agenda for this afternoon's NSPG meeting is attached at Tab I. At Tab II are talking points for the suggested phone call from the President [REDACTED] No meeting memorandum has been prepared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the agenda at Tab I.

Approve M Disapprove _____

2. That you review the talking points at Tab II during the NSPG meeting.

Approve M Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Agenda

Tab II - Talking Points for Phone Call [REDACTED]

Tab A - DCI Memo of June 22, 1985
[REDACTED]

Tab B - North/Teicher "Non-Paper" of June 23, 1985

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 97-05912 #115
By CS, NARA, Date 7/12/01

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90706

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING

Monday, June 24, 1985, 2:00-3:00 p.m.

White House Situation Room

AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION. Bud McFarlane
- II. STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. Sec Shultz
FOIA(b)(1)
- III. REVIEW OF DCI PROPOSAL [REDACTED] . . . Director Casey
- IV. PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL CALL TO ASSAD Bud McFarlane
- V. DISCUSSION ON CLOSING BEIRUT AIRPORT. Bud McFarlane
 - A. Vice President's Discussions in Europe
 - B. Approaches to Other Countries/International Bodies
 - C. Timing
- VI. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE . . . All
 - A. Recognition that AMCITS may not be released
 - B. Countering Perception of U.S. Inability to Act

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-659/2 #116

By AMF, NARA, Date 3/21/06

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: His Excellency Hafiz al-Assad,
President of the Syrian Arab Republic

DATE: Monday, June 24, 1985

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Planning Group (NSPG)

PURPOSE: To directly convey to President Assad our belief that he can assist in the release of AMCITS being held in West Beirut.

BACKGROUND: Assad is meeting today with Iran's Rafsanjani and Nabih Berri. Gorbachev apparently asked Assad to use his influence with Berri to end the hijacking "because the U.S. and Israel are planning a major military operation in Lebanon." According to information circulating within the PLO, Gorbachev also warned Berri of U.S. military action. Gorbachev reportedly told both Assad and Berri that the USSR would not get involved, but advised both to end the crisis. Today, Berri announced at a press conference a new demand: that U.S. naval forces off Lebanon had to be "removed" before the AMCITS could be released.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-059/2 #117NARA, DATE 3/21/06

A straightforward approach to Assad may be our best (and perhaps our last) hope for resolving the situation in the near term. By informing Assad that we expect him to take positive action, we serve notice that he bears responsibility for any next steps we may have to take.

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION:

1. It has come to my attention that Mr. Berri and speaker Rafsanjani have been meeting with you in Damascus.
2. In our earlier exchanges, I made absolutely clear the importance the American people attach to the immediate release of our citizens.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

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2

TOPICS
OF DISCUSSION: (Continued...)

3. Ten days have passed and I do not see that my people's freedom is at hand. In fact, Mr. Berri seems to be escalating the demands. Mr. President, I and the American people have limits. We will not wait forever to resolve this problem.

4. You have recently demonstrated your ability to resolve decisively the violent conflicts between Amal and the Palestinians in Beirut. I expect you to use all your influence to resolve this problem as well.

5. (CONTINGENCY) If the on-going diplomatic process does not yield freedom for our citizens, the United States will take other measures.

Date of Submission:

Action

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~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-400669

~~TOP SECRET~~

Increasing Pressure on the Terrorist and Their Friends

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~RE~~

~~REDACTED~~

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~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

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Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-05912 #118
By CH, NARA, Date 9/12/01

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~~TOP SECRET~~

2

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REDACTED

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REDACTED

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

RCM HAS SEEN

Talking Points

- The hijacking is beginning to assume the shape of a major geopolitical event. Our response will have important implications, not only for counter-terrorism, but for: our regional agenda, the fate of moderate regimes in the area, and our international credibility more broadly.
- The way in which we stress our priorities publicly must increasingly reflect this fact. Our hostages are of immense importance, but we must also consider the impact of having America itself again held hostage.
- The more we create the impression we will do anything to secure the hostages' release, the more politically valuable the hostages become to their captors and the less likely we are to see them returned.
- Already we have to ask ourselves whether it is likely that all of our hostages will be returned. If we think the probability is low, this fact must have a definite bearing on our strategy. I will ask Director Casey to speak to this shortly.
- The questions confronting us today, then, are these:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-059/2 #119
By DMJ, NARA, Date 3/21/04

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- Diplomatically, what are the most promising avenues before us?
- Second, over the near term, how do we begin to apply more credible pressure -- pressure that can help free the hostages or, failing that, at least deprive their captors of their ability to set our agenda?
- Third, what kind of retaliation should we contemplate in the aftermath of a successful -- or unsuccessful -- resolution of the current crisis?
- Fourth, how do we ensure that our actions are consistent with, and help reinforce, the longer-term goals toward Libya, Iran and Syria?
- Analytically, the hardest part of the problem may be to ensure the proper relationship among these various elements.
- Politically and substantively, the most agonizing part of the problem is when and how to make the cross-over from where we are today (patient diplomacy) to sharper pressure and, ultimately, to more decisive acts to end the crisis, even with the potential of some loss of life.

- In analyzing where and how best to apply pressure, we need to differentiate between the key actors: Assad, the Iranians, and the Shia.
- The Shia are perhaps the hardest for us to influence directly. The more radical factions seek nothing more than that we should engage them directly. The more turmoil they create, the more they enhance the magnetism of their appeal.
- If we apply enough serious, long-term pressure on Beirut proper, it is conceivable we can reduce the coercive potential of the Shia by affecting the milieu in which they operate. This is, however, a long-term effort -- [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] - and its near-term utility is problematic.

- The Iranians provide another pressure point. From the standpoint of [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED]
Here, though, we do run up against an important competing priority: how to shape the succession crisis in Iran in a favorable direction. We want to avoid giving the Soviets cheap opportunities to insinuate themselves further into internal Iranian politics.

- Finally, there is Assad. We do not know whether he was actively complicit in the current hijacking. But his active

complicity in past events is clear enough; and his passive complicity is continuing.

- Moreover, as a result of his hegemonic position in Lebanon and his brutal internal tactics, he holds considerable political sway over the Shia in Lebanon.
- If we give Assad sufficient incentive (and there is a legitimate question as to whether we can), it is plausible that he -- more quickly and effectively than anyone else -- could bring the situation under greater control and at least ensure the safe return of a majority of the hostages.
- To date we have sought his assistance. This was inevitable; and it was proper to test his willingness to help. But nothing has happened. All that further such appeals will demonstrate to Jordan and others is that we feel compelled to bargain with Assad. He wants to be seen as the arbiter of regional events. His position is historically founded on dominance -- not consensus.

FOIA(b) (1)

Although he may doubt our staying power, he has in the past shown himself to be responsive to American power -- particularly when we have been willing to cross certain thresholds.

- Assad is now back from Moscow. Today he is meeting Berri and Rafsanjani. A first question for us to confront is whether or not it makes sense for us to convincingly change the tone and thrust of our message to him. It was the unanimous view of the CPPG, Mr. President, that you yourself call Assad today to say we believe Syria could stop this if it wanted, that we expected it to, and that time was running out.
- What should we do after the fact, however, to convince Assad -- and others -- of our seriousness?
- One very good starting point is to close the Beirut airport
[REDACTED]
FOIA(b) (1) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- Publicly, our argument would be to prevent the spread of the disease and complicate the workings of terrorism. We can seize upon the piracy analogy. Privately, however, the message to Assad would be that we are taking this action to help make his future accountability crystal clear.
- Conventional military pressure on Syria is not likely to seem credible -- at least at this moment. Our actions do, however, need to reflect a certain daring and decisiveness.

- Assad's principal vulnerability is internal. Indeed, he seems to worry more about it than the facts would immediately warrant. He does have a minority regime. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1) [REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

- This is a program that would have to be thought through. [REDACTED] But it would show we are capable of hurting Assad in ways that keep tolerable the risks to ourselves. It would show we are willing to cross thresholds. We could sustain it, advertise it, deny it. The threat itself may be enough to change his calculus at least with respect to this instance.

- In short, during the phase when we are still actively seeking the hostages' release, should there not be a hard underside to our public and diplomatic effort? If our efforts don't bear fruit, that underside can become more robust, visible, and punishing as we transition from one phase of the crisis to another.

FOIA(b)(1)

- It can spread from Syria to other actions [REDACTED] to strike at the systemic infrastructure of international terrorism.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 24 JUN 85 13

M79117/46

TO MCFARLANE FROM NORTH DOCDATE 24 JUN 85
TEICHER 24 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: NSPG

TERRORISM

LEBANON

SUBJECT: AGENDA & TALKING POINTS FOR NSPG MTG JUN 24 ON SITUATION IN BEIRUT

ACTION: FOR DECISION DUE: STATUS C FILES IFM O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8590711

NSCIFID NSPG0110 (B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

To: - - Officer-in-Charge
 Appointments Center
 Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on June 24, 19 85
 for The President of White House
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz

All Attended

Treasury:

Secretary James A. Baker, III

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

White House:

Mr. Donald T. Regan

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Admiral John M. Poindexter

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House

Requested by Carol Cleveland

Room No. Situation Room

Room No. 372 Telephone 3044

Time of Meeting 2:00 p.m.

Date of request June 24, 1985

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

EOB: ROOM 385

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1

DOCUMENT NUMBER = SY18590664

DESC	TWIG MTG ON TWA FLIGHT 847 HIJACKING		
KEYWORDS	<u>TERRORISM</u> AVIATION	ALGERIA AGENDA	HIJACKING
DOCDATE	850614		
RCVDATE	850614		
STATUS	C		
IACON	FOR DECISION		
IACOFF	POINDEXTER		
UPDATES	850614	POINDEXTER APPROVED RECOM	
SOURCES	NORTH		
FILE/OC	INT 0		
STAFF/OFF	NORTH		

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM II
90664

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: TWIG Meeting regarding Hijacking of TWA Flight
847, ~~Situation Room~~, 10:00 - 11:00 a.m.
Room 208

Attached at Tab I is an agenda for this morning's TWIG meeting. The State Department has been designated as lead agency and a task force organized in their OPs Center. CMF has established a direct link to State and is in the process of collecting relevant data for the meeting.

State has opened a direct line from their Ops Center to Algiers. Amb Newlin has approached the Algerians asking for them to waive their policy of not receiving the aircraft since there are three wounded aboard.

FOIA(b) (1)

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FOIA(b) (1)

Representatives at the meeting: State (Oakley/Pelletreau); CIA
[REDACTED] and DoD (Koch/Moreau); FAA (BILLY VINCENT,
JSA (REV. WESLEY RICE
Jim Stark and Rod McDaniel concur. LEWIS BOIK;

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the agenda at Tab I for the meeting.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Agenda

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-059/2 #170

By Amf, NARA, Date 3/21/06

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SYSTEM II
90664

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Twig Meeting
June 14, 1985
10:00 - 11:00 a.m.
Room 208, OEOB

Hijacking of TWA Flight 847

AGENDA

- I. INTELLIGENCE CIA
- A. Number of AMCITS Aboard Aircraft
 - B. Information on Group Hijacking Aircraft
 - C. Hijacker's Demands
 - D. Capabilities of Local C/T and Hostage Rescue Forces (Algeria, Morocco, etc.)
- II. DIPLOMATIC SITUATION State
- A. Demarche to Algerian Government re Aircraft Landing
 - B. Instructions to Other Embassies? FOIA(b)(1)
 - C. Coordination [REDACTED] with Others (Spain, UK, etc.)
- III. OPTIONS FOR U.S. Chairman
- A. [REDACTED]
 - B. [REDACTED] FOIA(b)(1)
 - C. [REDACTED]
- IV. PUBLIC AFFAIRS/CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE Chairman

Distribution

State: Robert Oakley (M/CT)
Robert Pelletreau (NEA)

CIA: [REDACTED]
Tom Twitten FOIA(b)(1)

OSD: Noel Koch
JCS: Arthur Moreau
FAA: Billy Vincent
JSOA: Gen. Wesley Rice, Lewis Boink

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F92-059/2 #121
By smf, NARA, Date 3/21/06

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Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

EOB: ROOM 300

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PAGE 1

DOCUMENT NUMBER = ZIR850400618

RECID 850400618

CLASS TS

CREDATE 850614

TO/FRNAME MCFARLANE

DEGRAFFENREID

850614

SCODE C

DESC HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847

SUBJECT LEBANON
HIJACKING ALGIERS

ACT/CAO MCFARLANE
SITRM
NORTH

D 850614 APPROVED 2 RECMS
D 850614 DISPATCHED MSG
D 850614 DRAFTED ACTION MEMO

DISTRIB 850627 FILE-ORIG

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997
By MSA NARA, Date 9/17/97

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	Robert McFarlane		
2			
3			
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5			
6			

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	FILE
<input type="checkbox"/>	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

cc: Oliver North (#2 and 3)
 Jim Radzinski (#4)
 James Stark (#5)

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

m 9/17/99

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400618

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Warning Notice

Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

SYSTEM IV
NSC/ICS-400618

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 14, 1985

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Hijacking of TWA Flight #847, June 14, 1985

Attached at Tab I is a summary of events since the hijacking of TWA Flight #847 early this morning. The JCS (Moreau) has been apprised of the President's decision to deploy both the Emergency Response Team (ERT) [REDACTED]

If the aircraft is allowed to take-off from Algiers and return to Beirut, as the hijackers intend, it will be necessary [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A
[REDACTED] cable from you to [REDACTED] is attached at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you review the summary at Tab I and initial below signifying, for the record, the President's approval of the steps taken.

Approve RCN Disapprove _____

2. That you release the cable at Tab II.

Approve RCN Disapprove _____

cc: James Stark

Attachments

Tab I - Summary of Events

Tab II - [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

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NLS F97-059/2 #122
By smf, NARA, Date 4/9/02

TAB

I



~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY OF EVENTS
Hijacking of TWA Flight #847
June 14, 1985

The most recent breakout of the passenger manifest for TWA Flight #847 is as follows:

- 121 Americans
 - 1 Mexican
 - 2 Lebanese
 - 5 Greek
 - 3 Australians
 - 1 Sudanese
- 12 Unknowns

It is believed that among the American citizens are several U.S. embassy employees and dependents from MidEast posts, as well as some military personnel. Three passengers are believed to have been wounded/injured by the hijackers.

Based on the recommendations of the TIWG and the President's subsequent determination, the following actions are underway:

- An Emergency Response Team (ERT) headed by a [REDACTED] will depart for Rota, Spain, at 1400 from Andrews AFB. The team consists of experts from [REDACTED]. Once approval has been received from the Algerian Government, the team will be delivered to Algiers [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] can convince them to allow the rest of the ERT and perhaps even the [REDACTED] to deploy to Algeria.

- Ambassador Newlin has approached the Algerian Government and asked for [REDACTED]

-- [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-059/2 #123
By Smf, NARA, Date 4/9/02

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2

-- [REDACTED]

-- State has instructed our Ambassadors to approach Assad and other Arab leaders regarding contact with Shia religious leaders to determine whether they can assist in negotiations with the hijackers.

-- PRINCELY RIDER, a counter-terrorist exercise due to start tomorrow and involving [REDACTED]

-- USCINCEUR, without authority from OSD or JCS, [REDACTED]

-- State's task force is preparing public affairs guidance which [REDACTED] emphasizes our hope that the hostages will be released through negotiations. By agreement among the TIWG principals, no Congressional briefings will be undertaken unless the [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~



TAB

II

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National Security Council
The White House

System #

IV

Package #

400618

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson			
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>JP</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>W</u>	<u>H</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
<u>NORTH</u> Situation Room	<u>4</u>		
<u>JP</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>v</u>	

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

File FILE! ACTION COMPLETED. PLEASE
RETAIN ORIGINAL & RETURN COPY.
17.

FYI - This
was sent.

Good Deal

EOB: ROOM 300

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3

DOCUMENT NUMBER = Z1R850400668

RECID	850400668		
CLASS	TS		
CREDATE	850624		
TO/FRNAME	MCFARLANE	TEICHER	850620
SCODE	C		
DESC	COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE AFTERMATH OF <u>TWA</u> 847		
SUBJECT	LEBANON TERRORISM	SYRIA NSDD	
ACT/CAO	TEICHER PEARSON	D 850621 DRAFTED ACTION MEMO D 850624 RETURNED WITH CONCURRENCE	
DISTRIB	850624 FILE-ORIG		

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By WJH NARA, Date 9/17/99

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	Robert C. McFarlane	6/21	
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> APPROVAL	INFORMATION
COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> RETURN
DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

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W-3M 9/17/69

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The White House

System #

10

Package #

400668
1841

85 JUN 21 P 5: 52

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin	<u>2</u>		
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>North / Covey</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>concur</u>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

~~SECRET~~SYSTEM II
90706

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~*John*RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: His Excellency Hafiz al-Assad,
President of the Syrian Arab Republic

DATE: Monday, June 24, 1985

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Planning Group (NSPG)

PURPOSE: To directly convey to President Assad our belief that he can assist in the release of AMCITS being held in West Beirut.

BACKGROUND: Assad is meeting today with Iran's Rafsanjani and Nabih Berri. Gorbachev apparently asked Assad to use his influence with Berri to end the hijacking "because the U.S. and Israel are planning a major military operation in Lebanon." According to information circulating within the PLO, Gorbachev also warned Berri of U.S. military action. Gorbachev reportedly told both Assad and Berri that the USSR would not get involved, but advised both to end the crisis. Today, Berri announced at a press conference a new demand: that U.S. naval forces off Lebanon had to be "removed" before the AMCITS could be released.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-059/2 #12837 Am NARA, DATE 3/21/01

A straightforward approach to Assad may be our best (and perhaps our last) hope for resolving the situation in the near term. By informing Assad that we expect him to take positive action, we serve notice that he bears responsibility for any next steps we may have to take.

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION:

1. It has come to my attention that Mr. Berri and speaker Rafsanjani have been meeting with you in Damascus.
2. In our earlier exchanges, I made absolutely clear the importance the American people attach to the immediate release of our citizens.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

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2

TOPICS
OF DISCUSSION:

(Continued...)

3. Ten days have passed and I do not see that my people's freedom is at hand. In fact, Mr. Berri seems to be escalating the demands. Mr. President, I and the American people have limits. We will not wait forever to resolve this problem.

4. You have recently demonstrated your ability to resolve decisively the violent conflicts between Amal and the Palestinians in Beirut. I expect you to use all your influence to resolve this problem as well.

5. (CONTINGENCY) If the on-going diplomatic process does not yield freedom for our citizens, the United States will take other measures.

Date of Submission:

Action

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Teacher
SYSTEM II
90706

MEMORANDUM

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
HOWARD R. TEICHER

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting
2:00 p.m., WHSR

The CPPG met this morning to review Director Casey's proposal for next steps in resolving the problem of terrorism. A copy of his paper is attached at Tab A.

The consensus of the CPPG members was that the measures proposed by the DCI will probably not contribute

The measures suggested in our "non-paper" of Sunday (Tab B) were considered and the paper has been updated to include additional steps for an incremental

should be directly confronted regarding his responsibilities for resolving the situation and that the President should call him.

The proposed agenda for this afternoon's NSPG meeting is attached at Tab I. At Tab II are talking points for the suggested phone call from the President. No meeting memorandum has been prepared.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That you approve the agenda at Tab I.

Approve M

Disapprove _____

2. That you review the talking points at Tab II during the NSPG meeting.

Approve M

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Agenda

Tab II - Talking Points for Phone Call

Tab A - DCI Memo of June 22, 1985

Tab B - North/Teicher "Non-Paper" of June 23, 1985

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Declassify: OADR

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NLS F97-059/2 #129
By CAS, NARA, Date 4/12/01

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP (NSPG) MEETING

Monday, June 24, 1985, 2:00-3:00 p.m.

White House Situation Room

AGENDA

- I. INTRODUCTION. Bud McFarlane
- II. STATUS OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES. Sec Shultz
- FOIA(b)(1)
- III. REVIEW OF DCI PROPOSAL [REDACTED] Director Casey
- IV. PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL CALL TO ASSAD Bud McFarlane
- V. DISCUSSION ON CLOSING BEIRUT AIRPORT. . . . Bud McFarlane
 - A. Vice President's Discussions in Europe
 - B. Approaches to Other Countries/International Bodies
 - C. Timing
- VI. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY/CONGRESSIONAL GUIDANCE . . . All
 - A. Recognition that AMCITS may not be released
 - B. Countering Perception of U.S. Inability to Act

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NLS F97-05912 #13

By AM, NARA, Date 3/24/06

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Increasing Pressure on the Terrorist and Their Friends

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~ACTED~~

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NLS F97-059/2 #132
By CH, NARA, Date 9/12/01

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PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8590702

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 22 JUN 85 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 21 JUN 85

KEYWORDS HIJACKING

TERRORISM

LEBANON

SWITZERLAND

ISRAEL

SUBJECT TWA HIJACKING / STATUS OF INITIATIVES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 24 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

TEICHER

COVEY

COMMENTS

REF# 8518480

LOG 8590700

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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William Martin			
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>		<u>staff</u>
Situation Room			<u>asap</u>

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Action: North

Comment: Fischer

InB: Covey

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
90702~~SECRET~~~~/SENSITIVE~~MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking - Status of Initiatives


There follows a report of the current status of our initiatives to obtain the release of the hijacked TWA aircraft and its passengers and crew.

Discussions With Barri

Reg Bartholomew spoke at length today with Nabih Barri, who gave no indication that the hijackers were prepared to back down on their demand for the release of the Ansar prisoners. Reg led him through our position again, forcefully underlining that Barri had no choice but to remain engaged, and that he must persuade the hijackers their strategy would not work. Barri also told Reg he had not succeeded in his efforts to join the small group that had been earlier removed from the aircraft with the rest of the passengers, but that he had obtained a guarantee they would be released along with the larger group. A number of key Lebanese leaders, including Sheikh Fadlallah and Shia Parliamentary Speaker Hussein al-Husseini, issued statements against the hijacking, apparently in response to Reg's earlier urging.

ICRC

In his meeting today with the Secretary, ICRC President Hay discussed how ICRC could cooperate in exploring mechanisms for release of the hostages.



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NLS F97-059/2 #133

By smf, NARA, Date 2/14/02~~SECRET~~~~/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

2

Israel

The Israelis have informed us that 31 of the Ansar prisoners may be released as early as next week. The group is reportedly to include both Lebanese and Palestinians. According to the Foreign Ministry, this group may have been involved in an appeal to the Israeli courts concerning their status, and the GOI may have decided to release them rather than face a judicial process which would require justification of their continued detention.

Echoing Peres' statement from yesterday, Foreign Minister Shamir voiced agreement with U.S. terrorism policy, while noting Israel's intention to release the Ansar prisoners, but not under pressure from hijackers.

European Initiative

Regarding our request for a public statement on the hijacking, the response of host governments and international organizations has been sympathetic, and many have promised to consider seriously our request. Fifteen governments have issued statements so far, either formally or as statements to the press. Eleven others have given virtual assurances of such. Responses from EC governments indicate they intend to issue a collective statement and may have Italy in its capacity as EC President make a demarche to the Lebanese government. The head of the Islamic Conference Organization intends to issue a statement against both the hostage-taking and Israel's imprisonment of the Ansar detainees.

Private Initiatives

Congressman Nick Rahhal, who has met with Barri several times in the past, expressed interest in being helpful. We suggested that a message from him, reinforcing our position, would be a useful contribution. A similiar suggestion was passed to Mohammed Ali, through his advisor, who had called to inquire how Mohammed Ali might help fully follow up on his previous messages to Sheikn Shams ad-Din and Barri's deputy.

Nomckniley
for Nicholas Platt.
Executive Secretary

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3

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x6610 nW1146A 6/21/85
Clear:NEA:RHPelletre
M/CTP:ROakley

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ID 8590697

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 JUN 85 15

TO MCFARLANE

FROM FORTIER

DOC DATE 20 JUN 85

COVEY

20 JUN 85

NORTH

20 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

LEBANON

HIJACKING

SUBJECT: APPLICATION OF FORCE RE TWA HIJACKING

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

msn 6/17/85

RECEIVED 21 JUN 85 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 20 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

HIJACKING

LEBANON

SUBJECT: RPT ON TWA 847 HIJACKING RE CONTINUED EFFORTS TO END CRISIS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 21 JUN 85 STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

COVEY

MCDANIEL

MCFARLANE

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS FILE: THIS ITEM WAS VERBALLY BRIEFED TO THE
PRESIDENT ON JUN 21. *North*

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: TWA Hijacking - Continued Efforts to End the Crisis

The following is a summary of where our efforts to resolve the hijacking crisis currently stand.

Lebanese Contacts

Reg Bartholomew today conveyed a personal message from the Secretary to President Gemayel, expressing appreciation for Gemayel's personal involvement in efforts to free the hostages and requesting that he continue to do everything possible to resolve the problem. In his ongoing effort to bring pressure to bear on Nabih Barri, Reg also spoke today to former President Camille Chamoun, Transportation Minister Walid Jumblatt, and Acting Interior Minister Joseph Skaff. Chamoun pushed Barri hard, but Barri said he was not in full control and had to accommodate Hizballah. Chamoun later issued a strong statement calling for unconditional release of the hostages. In all of his contacts, Reg continues to stress that the continuation of the hostage crisis is hurting Lebanon and that the demand for linkage is delaying release of The Shia prisoners.

Iran

We have prepared a strong message through the Swiss to Tehran urging the Iranian Government to express its opposition to the hijacking and to call for the immediate release of the hostages. The Japanese told us yesterday that they had

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DECL: OADR

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NLS F97-059/2 #134

By smf, NARA, Date 2/14/02

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2

independently delivered demarches to Iran and Syria, and that the Iranians had told them that they had already condemned the hijacking and had no connections with the hijackers. We checked this, found it to be untrue, and are getting back to the Japanese with the facts, including our information that Iran is involved with Hizballah - one of the two groups holding our hostages.

Syria

President Asad is currently in Moscow for long-planned talks with the Soviets. The hostage issue is not expected to be a major topic of discussion. We have asked SARG for official confirmation that the President's last message to Asad was delivered to him in Moscow.

Algeria

Algerian Ambassador Ghoraieb left Beirut yesterday for Algiers, where he was to meet with President Bendjedid to brief him on recent hijacking developments. Ghoraieb will await our response to Algeria's latest proposal, which he will then carry back to Beirut.

The UN

Perez de Cuellar has proposed to us that the UN use its good offices to find an acceptable protecting power as a first step toward a release of both the American hostages and the Lebanese prisoners in Israel. Under the UN plan, the former inmates of Ansar would be transferred to UNIFIL at the Lebanese border once the hostages had departed Lebanon. We are in the process of formulating a response to the UN Secretary General.

ICRC

President Hay and Operations Director Hocke have proposed issuing a humanitarian appeal for the release of both the hostages and the Shia prisoners, but not linking them. They would discuss this in advance with the parties to get their approval and would expect the U.S. to support it.

Israel

The hijackers' demand for the release of the Lebanese Shia prisoners at Atlit and the renewed publicity concerning the legality of their detention there have put Israel in an

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3

increasingly uncomfortable position. The GOI has issued a statement that the detainees are being held in accordance with international law. Officials have also sought to de-link the hijacking and Atlit issues, and there is speculation that this may be an attempt to lay the groundwork for the resumption of Atlit releases regardless of developments in the hijacking crisis.


In an interview published today, Israeli Defense Minister Rabin said, apparently in response to growing American media criticism of the Israeli position, that as long as the U.S. did not ask Israel "in the most explicit and formal manner" to release the Shia detainees, he would not "lend a hand" in doing so. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, told reporters he admired the U.S. position on the hijacking, but refused to comment further, saying Israel was not responsible for the rescue of the hijacked passengers.

Civil Aviation Measures

We are examining options to exert pressure on Lebanese authorities responsible for control of Beirut International Airport to restore security there to an adequate level. The most effective and politically acceptable means would be denial of landing rights to Middle East Airlines flights from BIA and cessation of flights from other airlines into BIA. The major mechanisms for achieving these goals, however, are all problematical in various ways, and we are not optimistic that such efforts would succeed. The main problem is that the bulk of MEA traffic is with Arab and other countries which would be unlikely to cooperate in our efforts. We are exploring the ideas of a boycott by the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations.

Modalities of Release

We have been analyzing alternatives for handling the transfer of the hostages should Barri succeed in obtaining the hijackers' agreement to release them. The four most likely options are releases to Syria, Algeria, the UN, or the ICRC. Any release in Beirut, particularly West Beirut, will pose logistical problems as well as security risks.


for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~