

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** President's Special Review Board  
(The Tower Board): Records, 1987

**Folder Title:** TWA 847 SRB 378  
(14 of 14)

**Box:** Box 93207  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD  
(TOWER BOARD): Records  
**File Folder:** SRB 378 TWA 847 (14) Box 93207

**Archivist:** mjd  
**FOIA ID:** F97-059/2  
**Date:** 09/21/1999

| DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE  | DATE    | RESTRICTION            |
|---------------------|--|---------|------------------------|
| 1. memo             | Nicholas Platt to Robert McFarlane re: CCPG meeting, 1p<br><i>R 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #165</i> | 6/25/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 2. list             | of attachments, 1p<br><i>R 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #166</i>                                      | nd      | P1/F1                  |
| 3. draft message    | re: talking points for the Vice President, 3p<br><i>R 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #167</i>           | 6/26/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 4. message          | from Secretary Shultz, 3p<br><i>R 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #168</i>                               | 6/25/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 5. message          | re: Shultz letter to Foreign Ministers, 4p<br><i>R 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #169</i>              | 6/25/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 6. message          | re: air travel, 2p<br><i>R 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #170</i>                                      | 6/26/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 7. talking points   | re: Senate briefing, 2p<br><i>P 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #171</i>                                 | nd      | P1/F1                  |
| 8. paper            | re: official reaction to hijacking, 7p<br><i>A 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #172</i>                  | nd      | P1/F1                  |
| 9. memo             | Platt to McFarlane re: hijacking, 2p<br><i>P 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #173</i>                    | 6/24/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 10. memo            | Platt to McFarlane re: hijacking, 3p<br><i>P 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #174</i>                    | 6/24/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 11. memo            | Oliver North, et al to McFarlane re: NSPG meeting, 1p<br><i>A 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #175</i>   | 6/25/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 12. paper           | re: framework of decision, 5p<br><i>P 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #176</i>                           | nd      | P1/F1                  |
| 13. chart           | re: plan of action, 2p<br><i>D 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #177</i>                                  | nd      | P1/F1                  |
| 14. timeline        | re: initiatives to end hijacking, 9p<br><i>D 3/27/06 F97-059/2 #178</i>                    | 6/25/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 15. memo            | Platt to McFarlane re: hijacking, 2p<br><i>P 2/14/02 F97-059/2 #179</i>                    | 6/26/85 | P1/F1                  |
| 16. memo            | Rodney McDaniel to McFarlane re: terrorism, 3p   | 6/27/85 | <del>P1/F1</del><br>P5 |

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD (TOWER BOARD): RECORDS

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/23/2007

**File Folder** SRB 378 TWA 847 (14)

**FOIA**

F97-059/2

**Box Number** 93207

| ID Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date |
|-------------|----------------------|-------------|----------|
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|               |                  |                                   |                       |              |               |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|
| <del>12</del> | <del>PAPER</del> | <del>FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION</del> | <del>mvh 3/6/08</del> | <del>5</del> | <del>ND</del> |
|---------------|------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------|---------------|

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By M-77 NARA, Date 9/17/01

IVE

EOB: ROOM 385

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 22

DOCUMENT NUMBER = SYI8590718

|           |   |                  |         |
|-----------|---|------------------|---------|
| DESC      | TRANSMITTAL OF PAPERS TASKED AT 25 JUN CPPG |                  |         |
| KEYWORDS  | CPPG  | <u>TERRORISM</u> | LEBANON |
| DOCDATE   | 850626                                      |                  |         |
| RCVDATE   | 850627                                      |                  |         |
| STATUS    | C   |                  |         |
| IACTION   | NOTED BY MCFARLANE                          |                  |         |
| INFO      | COVEY                                       | NORTH            |         |
| SOURCES   | PLATT                                       | N                |         |
| FILE/OC   | IF  |                  |         |
| STAFF/OFF | NONE  |                  |         |

2  
A



Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II  
90718

June 26, 1985

85 JUN 26 9 04 55  
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

**RCM HAS SEEN**

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Papers Tasked at June 25  
CCPG Meeting

At Tab A are texts of draft telegrams from the Secretary of State to a number of Foreign Ministers of countries in Eastern and Western Europe and the Middle East, most of which have air service with Beirut International Airport (BIA). Modifications have been made in the basic text, in order to make it fit the Vice President's itinerary, to urge certain key governments without air service to assist our efforts, and to limit the amount of intelligence provided certain governments (e.g. Eastern European).

At Tab B are talking points for use by the Vice President on the need to take action against air piracy, particularly BIA.

*Nicholas Platt*  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab A - Draft Telegrams from the Secretary of State to Foreign Ministers
- Tab B - Talking Points for Vice President

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 #165

BY *smf* NARA, DATE 2/14/02

1. FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT - TALKING POINTS ON THE NEED TO CLOSE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.
2. SECRETARY OF STATE LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF NEA COUNTRIES ASKING THEIR SUPPORT TO CLOSE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
3. SECRETARY OF STATE LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ASKING THEIR SUPPORT TO CLOSE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
4. SECRETARY OF STATE INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADORS IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FOR DEMARCHE TO HOST GOVERNMENTS REQUESTING THEIR SUPPORT TO CLOSE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 #166

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/14/02

1.

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

3219N

M/CTP:ECBAILEY:ECB  
06/26/85 EXT. 23451  
M/CTP:RBOAKLEY

EUR - RBURT  
EUR/RPM - MKLOSSON  
S/S-0 -

EUR - JHKELLY  
P - MSPENDLETON

M/CTP, EUR, EUR/RPM, P

IMMEDIATE BRUSSELS, GENEVA IMMEDIATE, PARIS IMMEDIATE  
LONDON IMMEDIATE,  
IMMEDIATE ROME, BONN IMMEDIATE, THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE

TERREP EXCLUSIVE, FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT, FOR AMBASSADOR BORG

DECL: OADR

PTER

-- VICE PRESIDENTIAL TALKING POINTS - CESSATION  
OF AIR SERVICES TO/FROM BEIRUT AIRPORT

REF: STATE 192168 {NOTAL}

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN CONJUNCTION WITH HIS JUNE 18 PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT ON PREVENTING TRAVEL TO PLACES WHERE LAWLESSNESS IS RAMPANT AND INNOCENT PASSENGERS ARE UNPROTECTED, THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TOWARD OBTAINING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN BRINGING ABOUT A CESSATION OF THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT {BIA} AS THE WORLD'S FOREMOST CENTER FOR AIR PIRACY. THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS ARE SUPPLEMENTAL TO THOSE ALREADY PROVIDED THE VICE PRESIDENT ON TERRORISM AND ARE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT TO DRAW UPON IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS TO ELICIT THEIR SUPPORT FOR THIS POSSIBLE ACTION. THE SECRETARY OF STATE WILL REINFORCE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S DEMARCHE WITH SEPARATE MESSAGES TO A NUMBER OF OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS TO ENLIST

RBO  
ECB  
RB  
JHK

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-059/2 #167

~~SECRET~~

BY smf, NARA, DATE 3/27/06

~~SECRET~~

2

THEIR COUNTRIES' SUPPORT FOR A CESSATION OF AIR SERVICES TO AND FROM BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. THIS ACTION TO INTERDICT FLIGHTS TO AND FROM BIA WAS ALSO SUGGESTED IN REFTEL AND THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT JUNE 23. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING SEPARATELY A PAPER ON THE HISTORY OF THE TERRORIST MISUSE OF BIA AS WELL AS THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WHICH SECRETARY SHULTZ IS SENDING TO OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS. WHERE THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY VISITED, ADDRESSEES SHOULD PROVIDE TALKING POINTS BELOW AND PAPER ON MISUSE OF BIA AS FOLLOW-UP TO THOSE WITH WHOM THE VICE PRESIDENT MET.

3. TALKING POINTS:

A} ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM IS THAT DIRECTED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, PARTICULARLY HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE, WHICH ENDANGER SO MANY INNOCENT PERSONS AT ONE TIME.

B} A MAJOR PART OF THE WORLD-WIDE PROBLEM IS AN ESPECIALLY ACUTE TERRORIST THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH IN THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS HAS SEEN A SHARP RISE IN SUCH TERRORISM.

C} BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF ORGANIZED AIR PIRACY. SINCE 1970 ALMOST 15 PER CENT OF ALL HIJACK INCIDENTS OUTSIDE THE U.S. BEGAN, ENDED, OR PASSED THROUGH BEIRUT AIRPORT.

D} THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE UNHAMPERED USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BY AIR PIRATES.

E} WE ASK THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT JOIN US IN COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AS A POINT OF ORIGIN FOR OR A DESTINATION OF TERRORISTS.

F} AMONG THE MEASURES WHICH WE BELIEVE WARRANT URGENT CONSIDERATION ARE THE CESSATION OF ALL FLIGHTS INTO, THROUGH OR OUT OF BEIRUT; AGREEMENT BY THE FLIGHT INFORMATION REGIONS AROUND LEBANON THAT THEY WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT AIR TRAFFIC BOUND TO OR FROM THERE; TERMINATION OF SUPPLIES OF AVIATION GAS TO BEIRUT, WHICH DEPENDS HEAVILY ON IMPORTED FUEL; AND TIGHT CONTROLS OVER ANY AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING PASSENGERS, BAGGAGE, AND CREW, WHICH COMES FROM BEIRUT.

G} WE WELCOME YOUR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF THE

~~SECRET~~



**DRAFT**

~~SECRET~~

3

PROBLEMS ATTENDANT WITH BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND ITS CONTINUING POTENTIAL FOR USE AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

H3 WE REQUEST YOUR THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS AND ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU IN FINDING A SUITABLE SOLUTION TO THIS URGENT PROBLEM AS WELL AS TO ENDING OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

4. FOR INFO ADDRESSEES - PLEASE DRAW UPON ABOVE TALKING POINTS IN CONSULTATIONS WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AS FOLLOW UP TO THE TALKS WHICH THE VICE PRESIDENT CONDUCTED.444

~~SECRET~~

2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6221K

NEA/ARN: JBRUNS: BGT  
06/25/85 EXT. 22481  
SECRETARY

NEA: RHPELLETREAU  
NEA: RWMURPHY  
S/S:  
S:

NEA/ARN: DLMACK  
EB/TT/OA {INFO}  
S/S-0:

NIACT/IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE,  
BAGHDAD NIACT IMMEDIATE, BAHRAIN NIACT IMMEDIATE,  
IMMEDIATE CAIRO

EXDIS

DECL: OADR

PTER, LE, US, EAIR, ECON

MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ ON BEIRUT  
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

GPS

JB

RHP

DLM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ACTION ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO THE APPROPRIATE HIGH LEVEL HOST COUNTRY OFFICIAL. IN YOUR PRESENTATION, YOU SHOULD PLACE THIS LETTER IN THE CONTEXT YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE HOST COUNTRY TO DATE REGARDING THE TWA HIJACKING AND THE POSITION WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN. OUR OBJECTIVE IS TO GAIN MAXIMUM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CLOSING OFF CIVIL AVIATION TO AND FROM BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

3. FOR BEIRUT: YOU SHOULD INFORM THE GOL OF OUR REGRET AT HAVING TO TAKE THIS MEASURE, BUT THAT LACK OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL AT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND TERRORIST USES OF THAT AIRPORT PERMIT US NO OTHER COURSE.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ:

WE HAVE WITNESSED IN THE LAST DAYS THE TRAGIC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NLS F97-059/2 #168

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/14/02

CONFIDENTIAL

2

CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM UNCHECKED, WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND MURDER OF INNOCENT AIR TRAVELLERS, WHICH HAS RESULTED NOT ONLY IN THE UNCONSCIONABLE ABUSES INFLICTED UPON MY COUNTRYMEN ABOARD TWA 847, BUT OF THE DEATHS OF SO MANY OTHER INNOCENT VICTIMS THROUGH THE BOMBINGS AT FRANKFURT AND NARITA AIRPORTS, AND WHAT VERY MUCH APPEARS TO BE THE BOMBING OF THE AIR INDIA FLIGHT. WE DEPLORE THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES; STRONGLY CONDEMN THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES; AND REVILE THE BARBARIC ACTS WHICH ARE THEIR CAUSE AND THOSE GROUPS WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS A SERIOUS AND LONG-TERM PROBLEM THAT MUST BE FACED SQUARELY AND COLLECTIVELY BY THE CONCERNED NATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM IS THAT DIRECTED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, PARTICULARLY HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE, WHICH ENDANGER SO MANY INNOCENT PERSONS AT ONE TIME. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT A STRONG COLLECTIVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE, FOCUSED UPON ICAO, TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY MEASURES AND PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ENCOURAGING GOVERNMENTS TO COMPLY WITH ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES AND EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. WE SHOULD ALSO DEVELOP STRONGER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL.

A MAJOR PART OF THE WORLD-WIDE PROBLEM IS THE ACUTE TERRORIST THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP RISE IN SUCH TERRORISM. BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF ORGANIZED AIR PIRACY. THE AIRPORT IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ALL AIRCRAFT AND AIR PASSENGERS IN THE REGION.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE UNHAMPERED USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BY AIR PIRATES. WE CALL UPON RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN US IN COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AS A POINT OF ORIGIN FOR OR A DESTINATION OF TERRORISTS. AMONG THE MEASURES WHICH WE BELIEVE WARRANT URGENT CONSIDERATION ARE THE CESSATION OF ALL FLIGHTS INTO, THROUGH OR OUT OF BEIRUT, INCLUDING FLIGHTS OF TWA AND MEA; AGREEMENT BY THE FLIGHT INFORMATION REGIONS AROUND LEBANON THAT THEY WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT AIR TRAFFIC BOUND TO OR FROM THERE; A CUT OFF OF SUPPLIES OF AVIATION GAS TO BEIRUT, WHICH DEPENDS HEAVILY ON IMPORTED FUEL; AND

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

TIGHT CONTROLS OVER ANY AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING PASSENGERS, BAGGAGE AND CREW, WHICH COME FROM BEIRUT.

MY GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME YOUR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS ATTENDANT WITH BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND ITS CONTINUING POTENTIAL FOR USE AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY. WE REQUEST YOUR THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS AND ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU IN FINDING A SUITABLE SOLUTION TO THIS URGENT PROBLEM AS WELL AS TO ENDING OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

SINCERELY YOURS,  
GEORGE P. SHULTZ

{END MESSAGE}

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

YYY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3.

~~SECRET~~

3218N

M/CTP:ECBAILEY;ECB  
06/25/85 EXT. 23451  
M/CTP:RBOAKLEY

EUR - R. HAASS  
NEA - R. PELLETREAU  
S/S-0 -

EUR/RPM - M. KLOSSON  
INR - T. THORNE

M/CTP, NEA, EUR, EUR/RPM, INR, CIA FOR DCI  
FOR POTENTIAL ADDRESSEES SEE SEPARATE LIST

TERREP EXCLUSIVE, FOR AMBASSADORS FROM THE SECRETARY

DECL: OADR

PTER

SECRETARY SHULTZ LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTERS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER I WOULD LIKE YOU TO DELIVER TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF YOUR COUNTRY. AS YOU MAY READ, THIS LETTER SEEKS SUPPORT FROM YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT FOR MEASURES TO END THE USE BY TERRORISTS OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. YOU WILL BE RECEIVING BY SEPTTEL A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE PURPOSES OF THIS LETTER AND OF AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON THE TERRORIST USE OF BEIRUT AIRPORT WHICH IS TO BE TRANSMITTED TO YOUR HOST GOVERNMENT WITH AND IN SUPPORT OF MY LETTER.

3. LETTER FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ TO FOREIGN MINISTERS OF

-- LIST COUNTRIES RECEIVING LETTER

RBO  
ECB  
RH  
MK  
RP  
TT

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NLS F97-059/2 #169

~~SECRET~~

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/14/02

~~SECRET~~

2

QUOTE - WE HAVE WITNESSED IN THE LAST DAYS THE HORRIBLY TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM UNCHECKED, WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND MURDER OF INNOCENT AIR TRAVELLERS, WHICH HAS RESULTED NOT ONLY IN THE UNCONSCIONABLE ABUSES INFLICTED UPON MY COUNTRYMEN ABOARD TWA 847, BUT OF THE BRUTAL DEATHS OF SO MANY OTHER INNOCENT VICTIMS THROUGH THE BOMBINGS AT FRANKFURT AND NARITA AIRPORTS, AND WHAT VERY MUCH APPEARS TO BE THE BOMBING OF THE AIR INDIA FLIGHT. WE DEPLORE THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES; STRONGLY CONDEMN THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES; AND REVILE THE BARBARIC ACTS WHICH ARE THEIR CAUSE AND THOSE GROUPS WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE.

AS YOU KNOW, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS A SERIOUS AND LONG-TERM PROBLEM THAT MUST BE FACED SQUARELY AND COLLECTIVELY BY THE CONCERNED NATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IF WE ARE TO END THIS SORT OF BARBARISM. CERTAINLY ONE OF THE MORE DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM IS THAT DIRECTED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, PARTICULARLY HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE, WHICH ENDANGER SO MANY INNOCENT PERSONS AT ONE TIME. IT MUST BE STOPPED. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT A STRONG COLLECTIVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE, FOCUSSED UPON ICAO, TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY MEASURES AND PROVIDE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ENCOURAGING GOVERNMENTS TO COMPLY WITH ACCEPTED INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROCEDURES AND EXISTING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. WE SHOULD ALSO EXPLORE STRONGER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, BOTH MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL.

A MAJOR PART OF THE WORLD-WIDE PROBLEM IS AN ESPECIALLY ACUTE TERRORIST THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS IN THE MIDDLE EAST THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP RISE IN SUCH TERRORISM. BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF ORGANIZED AIR PIRACY. YOU WILL SEE FROM THE PAPER WHICH ACCOMPANIES THIS LETTER JUST HOW BAD THE SITUATION IS AND WHY IT CONSTITUTES SUCH A DANGER TO CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY IN AND NEAR THE REGION. THIS DANGER IS ILLUSTRATED BY BUT CLEARLY NOT LIMITED TO THE RECENT TWA HIJACKING. IT IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ALL AIRCRAFT AND AIR PASSENGERS IN THE REGION.

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3

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES IS DETERMINED THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE UNHAMPERED USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BY AIR PIRATES. WE CALL UPON RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN US IN COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AS A POINT OF ORIGIN FOR OR A DESTINATION OF TERRORISTS. AMONG THE MEASURES WHICH WE BELIEVE WARRANT URGENT CONSIDERATION ARE THE CESSATION OF ALL FLIGHTS INTO, THROUGH OR OUT OF BEIRUT; AGREEMENT BY THE FLIGHT INFORMATION REGIONS AROUND LEBANON THAT THEY WILL REFUSE TO ACCEPT AIR TRAFFIC BOUND TO OR FROM THERE; TERMINATION OF SUPPLIES OF AVIATION GAS TO BEIRUT, WHICH DEPENDS HEAVILY ON IMPORTED FUEL; AND TIGHT CONTROLS OVER ANY AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING PASSENGERS, BAGGAGE, AND CREW, WHICH COMES FROM BEIRUT.

MY GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME YOUR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS ATTENDANT WITH BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND ITS CONTINUING POTENTIAL FOR USE AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY. WE REQUEST YOUR THOUGHTS AND SUGGESTIONS AND ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU IN FINDING A SUITABLE SOLUTION TO THIS URGENT PROBLEM AS WELL AS TO ENDING OTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM.

FOR ADDRESSEES WHERE MEA CURRENTLY FLIES OR HAS LANDING RIGHTS - WE URGE YOU TO TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO SUSPEND RIGHT AWAY AIR SERVICE/SUSPEND LANDING RIGHTS AS PART OF THIS COLLECTIVE EFFORT.

FOR SUMMIT SEVEN GOVERNMENTS ONLY - THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES BY AIR PIRATES IS A SPECIFIC URGENT PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES OUR COLLECTIVE BEST EFFORT. IN ADDITION, AS YOU KNOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE RAPID ACTION BY THE SEVEN TO TRANSFORM THE DISCUSSION BY OUR EXPERTS IN BONN MARCH 12 AND 13 INTO EFFECTIVE ACTION PROPOSALS DEALING WITH THE BROADER LONG-TERM PROBLEMS. AMONG THOSE PROPOSALS WHICH WE CONSIDER PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ARE THE USE OF TRAVEL ADVISORIES, THE STRENGTHENING OF ICAO, AND THE PROVISION FOR SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENTS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, COLLECTIVE OR COOPERATIVE ACTION BY THE SEVEN CONSTITUTES THE CORE AROUND WHICH PARALLEL ACTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS CAN CLUSTER AND THE BEST ENERGIZING MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS ICAO. THIS IS DUE TO THE ROLE OF THESE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AS WELL AS THEIR OVERALL POLITICAL AND MORAL INFLUENCE.444

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4

POTENTIAL ADDRESSEES:

ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE  
ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE  
ANKARA IMMEDIATE  
ATHENS IMMEDIATE  
BELGRADE IMMEDIATE  
BERN IMMEDIATE  
BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE  
COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE  
DOHA IMMEDIATE  
DUBLIN IMMEDIATE  
KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE  
LAGOS IMMEDIATE  
LISBON IMMEDIATE  
MADRID IMMEDIATE  
MONROVIA IMMEDIATE  
MUSCAT IMMEDIATE  
NICOSIA IMMEDIATE  
OSLO IMMEDIATE  
OTTAWA IMMEDIATE  
RIYADH IMMEDIATE  
STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE  
TOKYO IMMEDIATE  
TUNIS IMMEDIATE  
VIENNA IMMEDIATE

MEA CURRENTLY FLIES TO: FRANKFURT, ISTANBUL, LONDON, MILAN, NICE, PARIS, ZURICH, ADEN, BAHRAIN, DHAHRAN, DOHA, DUBAI, JIDDAH, KUWAIT, LARNACA, AND MUSCAT.

MEA CURRENTLY HAS LANDING RIGHTS BUT IS NOT SENDING FLIGHTS IN ATHENS, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, GENEVA, MADRID, ROME, ABU DHABI, AMMAN, ANKARA, BAGHDAD, CAIRO, KHARTOUM, ABIDJAN, KANO, LAGOS, MONROVIA, TUNIS, BANGKOK, AND MANILA.

MEA LANDED A FLIGHT THIS EVENING {JUNE 25} IN NY CITY.

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4.  
ORIGINAL

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EUR/RPM: CEREDMAN  
06/26/85 EXT.21627 34128  
EUR:RBURT

EUR:MPALMER  
S/S-0:  
EUR/EEY:RKUCHEL  
EUR/CE:RMCCORMICK

M/CTP:ROAKLEY  
P:MPENDLETON  
EUR/SOV:TSIMONS

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW, WARSAW IMMEDIATE, BERLIN IMMEDIATE, PRAGUE  
IMMEDIATE, SOFIA IMMEDIATE

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: CESSATION OF AIR TRAVEL TO/FROM BEIRUT

AUTH  
DRFT

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1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. EMBASSIES ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE FOLLOWING DEMARCHE ASAP TO HOST GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST LEVEL POSSIBLE. ACTION ADDRESSEES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS AMONG THOSE NATIONS WHOSE NATIONAL AIRLINES CONTINUE TO FLY INTO BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT {BIA} OR WHO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INCOMING FLIGHTS ORIGINATING AT BIA. SEPTTEL PROVIDES A REPORT ON THE HISTORY OF TERRORIST MISUSE OF BIA WHICH YOU SHOULD SHARE WITH HOST GOVERNMENT. FYI, THE SECRETARY IS SENDING PERSONAL MESSAGES TO WESTERN AND ALLIED GOVERNMENTS URGING SIMILAR ACTION ON A COORDINATED BASIS.

3. TALKING POINTS:

--WE HAVE WITNESSED IN RECENT DAYS THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM UNCHECKED, WITH THE KIDNAPPING AND MURDER OF INNOCENT AIR TRAVELLERS. IN ADDITION TO THE INCIDENT

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NLS F97-059/2 #170

BY smf, NARA, DATE 2/14/02

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1 2

INVOLVING TWA 847, WE HAVE SEEN THE BRUTAL DEATHS OF MANY OTHER INNOCENT VICTIMS THROUGH THE BOMBINGS AT FRANKFURT AND NARITA AIRPORTS AND WHAT APPEARS TO BE THE BOMBING OF THE AIR INDIA FLIGHT.

--AS YOU KNOW, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES HAS LONG BELIEVED THAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS A SERIOUS AND LONG-TERM PROBLEM THAT MUST BE FACED SQUARELY AND COLLECTIVELY BY THE CONCERNED NATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

--ONE OF THE MOST DANGEROUS ASPECTS OF TERRORISM IS THAT DIRECTED AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, PARTICULARLY HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE, WHICH ENDANGER SO MANY INNOCENT PERSONS AT ONE TIME.

--THE THREAT TO CIVIL AVIATION IS ESPECIALLY ACUTE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WHERE THERE HAS BEEN A SHARP RISE IN SUCH TERRORISM OVER THE PAST EIGHTEEN MONTHS .

--IN PARTICULAR, BIA HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF ORGANIZED AIR PIRACY AND AS SUCH, CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS THREAT TO AIRCRAFT AND AIR PASSENGERS IN AND NEAR THE REGION.

--WE BELIEVE THAT THERE MUST BE AN END TO THE UNHAMPERED USE OF BIA BY AIR PIRATES AND CALL UPON RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN US IN COLLECTIVE ACTION TO PREVENT THE USE OF BIA AS A POINT OF ORIGIN FOR OR A DESTINATION OF TERRORISTS.

--AMONG THE MEASURES WHICH WE BELIEVE WARRANT URGENT CONSIDERATION ARE THE CESSATION OF ALL FLIGHTS INTO, THROUGH OR OUT OF BEIRUT AND TIGHT CONTROLS OVER ANY AIRCRAFT, INCLUDING PASSENGERS, BAGGAGE OR CREW, WHICH COME FROM BEIRUT.

--WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS ATTENDANT WITH BIA AND ITS CONTINUING POTENTIAL FOR USE AS A BASE FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

YYYYY

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Teacher

5136

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 26, 1985

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH  
HOWARD R. TEICHER *WRT*

SUBJECT: Talking Points for Senate Update on Hijacking  
of TWA #847

Tomorrow at 2:15 p.m. you are scheduled to update Senate members (Room S-407) on the current situation with regards to the hijacking. Talking points for your use are attached at Tab I.

On June 19, you provided a similar brief for approximately 70 members.

The current State Department update is attached at Tab II.

Ron Sable concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I during your briefing.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Don Fortier  
Bill Martin  
Rod McDaniel  
Jock Covey  
Bob Sims

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *MSH* NARA, Date *9/17/99*

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Declassify: OADR

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~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~TALKING POINTSCurrent Situation 0800, June 27, 1985Hijacking of TWA #847

- Nabih Berri announced yesterday that he had released hostage Jimmy Dell Palmer due to his heart condition. Palmer flew immediately to London via Larnaca, Cyprus. Berri has also indicated that another hostage, Simon Grossmayer, may also be released due to his medical condition.
- Berri also said that "agreement had been reached" to release French journalists, Jean-Paul Kaufman and Michael Seurat (kidnapped in late May 1985) along with the TWA hostages. No mention was made of the other seven Americans, two French diplomats, and a British-UNWRA employee who are also missing.
- Although the press has reported that Berri had agreed to transfer the hostages to "a Western embassy" in Beirut, there has been no confirmation of this proposal. Berri apparently demanded that the embassy "hold the hostages until the Israelis release the Atlit prisoners."
- There have been additional reports, again unconfirmed, that Berri agreed to move the hostages to "somewhere else, like Damascus." Berri again reiterated that the U.S. must remove its naval forces and has demanded that the U.S. pledge not to retaliate after the release of the hostages.
- Philip Maresca, the TWA co-pilot, was treated for an insect bite--rumors abounded that one of the crew aboard the aircraft was dying.

FOIA(b) (1)

Analysis/Assessment by North/Teicher (supported by [REDACTED] State)

- Berri's commitment to release the two French journalists may indicate more than passing influence over those who hold the other seven missing Americans. It is especially noteworthy that this took place after Rafsanjani's visit to Damascus. We have long believed that the earlier hostages were held by Hizballah and could not be reached by Amal. His offer may mean that he has more influence over Hizballah than we believed, that Assad is getting serious, or that some of the other missing Americans may also be held by Amal.

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Declassify: OADR

By and NARA, Date 3/29/86~~SECRET~~

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- The Kuwaiti Government has announced that they intend to execute the three Dawa prisoners condemned to death for the bombings on December 12, 1983 in Kuwait. We expect that, if this commitment is carried out, some (probably three) of the earlier American hostages will also be killed. The Archbishop of Canterbury has asked Pope John Paul and the President of the Presbyterian Church to join him in a public ecumenical appeal for release of all the Western hostages.

FOIA(b) (1)

- In the Middle East, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Tunisia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon, all announced official condemnations of the hijacking in response to President Reagan's request for support from other governments. Algeria's silence is an attempt to maintain their role as an intermediary. As expected, Libya has used the event for more anti-American rhetoric and disinformation.
- The Soviet media, while condemning hijacking, in general, has linked the release of the Israeli Shiite prisoners to the repatriation of the American hostages--noting that this is a logical way of resolving the situation. TASS has also noted that we are practicing "power diplomacy" in the Near East.
- Preparations are underway for implementing the sky marshal program and other civil aircraft security measures called for in the President's initial statements following the hijacking. Secretary Dole will announce these measures in her address before the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in Montreal on Thursday, June 27.
- The Vice President continues to confer with European leaders and has developed considerable support for more stringent responses to terrorist acts. The apparent bombing of the Air India 747 over the Atlantic has created an atmosphere of anxiety among Western Europeans and a renewed sense that we must act together in combatting terrorism.
- Planning is nearly completed for a series of steps we could take should our diplomatic efforts fail. These include measures designed to apply force against those who support, train, or harbor terrorists. They also provide for application of U.S. law by the Attorney General to indict, apprehend, and try terrorists regardless of where they are located.
- We must also complete plans for political and military action should the diplomatic process succeed.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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
June 26, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Update of Official Reaction to the Hijacking

Attached is an update of official and press overseas reaction to the hijacking of the TWA. The information is current as of 12:00 Noon today.

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By M717 NARA, Date 9/18/99

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DECL: OADR



~~SECRET~~NLS F97-059/2 #172Middle EastBY Am/ NARA, DATE 2/14/02

Lebanon: Prime Minister Karami and other government officials made statements June 23 condemning the hijacking.

Saudi Arabia: The Saudi Foreign Ministry officially condemned the hijacking June 23 in the Saudi Gazette.

Bahrain: The Foreign Ministry made an official statement condemning the hijacking June 23 to the Bahraini news agency WAKH.

Kuwait: The Foreign Ministry made an official condemnation of the hijacking June 21 to the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) as part of a blanket condemnations of all hijackings.

Egypt: Egyptian Radio quoted a "responsible" Egyptian government source June 19 denouncing the TWA hijacking.

Jordan: King Hussein denounced the hijacking in a June 19 message to President Reagan, which was highly publicized.

Tunisia: Both President Bourguiba and Foreign Minister Caïd Es-Sebsi have publicly condemned the hijacking June 18.

Israel: The Peres government quickly denounced the hijacking in a number of fora. Recent press articles have centered on how the issues of the TWA hijacking and releasing the Atlit detainees will affect US-Israel relations.

Press and Official Reactions in Other Middle Eastern Countries

Syria: The Syrian government has made no official statement condemning the TWA hijacking, among other reasons to maintain its "neutral" status like Algeria. The government-controlled newspaper al-Thawra charged June 25 that the US and Israel are using the TWA hijacking as a "pretext" for "a large-scale military operation against Lebanon". Al-Thawra alleges that the US and Israel are seeking "revenge" against Lebanon and Syria for prior "defeats" in Lebanon. IRAN still has not officially taken a position on the TWA hijacking. Iranian Majles Speaker Rafsanjani maintains that there is "no connection between the hijacking and the Islamic Republic". Rafsanjani asserts that US retaliation for the hijacking would be "the Americans' greatest mistake", and suggests that the US often blames governments such as Iran for terrorist acts because it cannot identify the real culprits.

Morocco: Several Moroccan newspapers have condemned the hijacking, but Moroccan Foreign Ministry officials have only expressed their sympathy and concern to Embassy Rabat. They have said that an official public statement is unlikely at the present time as they try to arrange for an Arab League Summit in Morocco in early July.

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Algeria: The government and press have generally avoided comment on the hijacking.

Libya: No official reaction, but the Libyan news agency has said that the US is using the hijacking of an American flight to "concentrate its presence in the Mediterranean Sea and threaten the Lebanese people with the use of American fleets."

Press comments in IRAQ, QATAR, the UAE, OMAN, and the YEMENS have condemned the TWA hijacking or hijacking in general (lumping together the TWA and Alia hijackings), but no official statements have been reported.

#### Official and Press Reactions in South Asian Countries

Sri Lanka: Minister of Foreign Affairs Hameed condemned the hijacking in a June 25 statement.

India: Prime Minister Gandhi condemned hijackings in general in a talk with the press June 23.

Pakistan: The government condemned the hijacking and called for the release of the TWA hostages in a statement June 22. The statement also called for release of the Lebanese prisoners Israel is holding in violation of international law.

Bangladesh: The government condemned "all acts of individual and state terrorism" June 24, linking the TWA hostages to the Shia Israel holds at Atlit.

Nepal: The government made a statement condemning the TWA hijacking on Katmandu External (radio) Service June 24.

#### Western Europe

The European Community issued June 25 a statement representing the views of its ten members. The EC statement expressed the Community's "unqualified condemnation" of the continued holding of the hostages, called for their prompt release and demanded that they not be harmed in any way.

Luxembourg followed up with a government statement iterating the points made by EC and specifically protested the murder of one hostage. Craxi made a personal statement pledging solidarity with the U.S. "for this reprehensible episode of air piracy." Kohl, speaking at a luncheon for Vice President Bush, said that "all civilized nations" must join forces against the terrorist threat and offered the U.S. "a helping hand" in the present case.

Among non-EC countries Sweden has issued a foreign ministry statement roundly condemning the hijacking. Others responding to our demarch are Finland, Norway, and Austria. The Pope

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- 3 -

referred to the hijacking at his weekly audience June 19, leading thousands in prayer that "the situation might have a speedy and peaceful solution."

The TWA hijacking was displaced as the top story in the European press early this week by the Air India crash, but it remains a major topic of media comment. The pro-U.S. tone of comment has remained constant, currently with emphasis on approval of the Administration's efforts to arrange a peaceful release of the hostages.

#### USSR-Eastern Europe

USSR: The only "official" Soviet comment on the incident so far was made by Lomeiko at a press conference today at which he said he was unaware of any US approach on the subject, but commented that US actions shared responsibility for the episode. Primary media emphasis remains on the danger of US military intervention, and on reminders that US (and Israeli) actions have created the frustrations which lead to the hijacking.

At the same time, Soviet media and the private statements of officials to point out the illegality of hijacking--a "breach of international law"--and domestic Soviet coverage in recent days has focused more on the hostages themselves, elements of the story which are inherently sympathetic to US concerns. Soviet coverage has also drawn attention to the relationship between the hostages and the Israeli Shiite prisoners, permitting the inference that the resolution of this problem would be a logical basis for releasing the hostages.

TASS gave unusually prompt treatment to yesterday's NSC meeting and the possibility of measures which it characterized as amounting to an economic blockade. A Russian language international service report on the same subject alleged that the "U.S. administration is continuing its 'power diplomacy' in the Near East.

#### Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe: Bloc press reporting and commentary on the hijacking has not deviated from the pattern previously noted, i.e. deploring the incident but stressing US responsibility for the underlying causes of unrest in Lebanon.

The only official response to the US demarches beyond those reported in the earlier memo has been from Hungary where the Foreign Ministry official expressed sympathy for the hostage situation and said his government would examine what could be done.

Poland is expected to reply today to a second demarche made in Warsaw yesterday.

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## Latin America

Colombia: On June 20, following our demarche, the government made known "its keen concern" over the hijack, and "hopes that the government of Lebanon, bearing in mind the conventions of Hague and Montreal, will free the hostages."

Peru: On June 21, Prime Minister Percovich said that his government "rejects the hijackers' alleged decision to exert pressure on governments and countries," and called on the Lebanese authorities to "make efforts to end the situation of the innocent hostages." He said that "this act...does not lead to a solution to the problems of [the Middle East]."

Argentina: On June 20, Foreign Minister Caputo issued a statement expressing his government's "firm condemnation" of the hijacking, and calling on governments to take the necessary preventive measures. The GOA expressed its "solidarity with the hostages, called their detention a "violation of human rights," and its support for UN SecGen Perez de Cuellar's efforts to obtain their "immediate release."

Mexico: On June 21, the Mexican government issued a statement of "energetic condemnation," calling the hijacking "a transgression of the most fundamental norms of the civilized community." The statement urged negotiations over violence and made "an urgent appeal for the early liberation of the passengers and crew of the hijacked airplane."

Honduras: On June 20, Honduras issued a press communique that expressed "deep concern" over the conduct of the Lebanese government, and especially that of Nabih Berri. The Hondurans termed "unacceptable" the Lebanese government's attempt to "take advantage of air piracy to demand of a third country the liberation of prisoners." It labeled that stance "totally unadmissible under international law" and demanded the unconditional release of the hostages. The Hondurans also expressed full support of the "justified position" of the US and any actions it takes to liberate the hostages that comply with international law.

## United Nations

On June 21, UNSYG Perez De Cuellar condemned acts of terrorism as cowardice, criminal, and without any possible justification. In addition, he drew a sharp distinction between the US hostages in Lebanon and the detention of the Shiites in Israel and maintained that these crises should be dealt with separately. He further admitted that the UN could do little without member state action, but that it stood ready to help.

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### East Asia

South Korea: The ROK Foreign Ministry June 24 issued a public statement deploring the hijacking, asserting that the detaining of innocent passengers could not be justified and calling for their immediate release.

Japan: Negative. (Have been working behind the scene with the Iranians).

China: Chinese press coverage of the hostage situation has been straightforward. China has cited moderate Arab countries' condemnation of the hijacking and the hijackers, and has refrained from blaming US policy for leading to the seizure of the plane. The only Chinese comment to date was made by a senior foreign policy advisor, who in a June 21 interview expressed admiration for our patience and predicted that we "will not hastily resort to force to rescue the hostages."

Australia: In a June 20 Australian Broadcasting Corporation interview, Prime Minister Hawke expressed sympathy for President Reagan and everyone involved in the hijacking and stated his support for the principle of not negotiating with terrorists. The Foreign Ministry also has requested information on steps that we or other allies would consider useful.

Singapore: In a statement released June 26, the Government condemned the hijacking and appealed to the terrorists to release all the hostages.

### Africa

Liberia: Our Chargé in Monrovia presented the demarche on July 20 to the Minister of State for Presidential Affairs, following two unsuccessful attempts to arrange a meeting with the Foreign Minister. So far, there has been no response.

Kenya: Demarche made to MFA PermSec in ForMin absence on July 21. GOK issued statement June 24 calling for release of hostages and reiterating its own opposition to hijacking and terrorism. The Standard, major Nairobi daily, editorial June 25 also condemns use of terrorism for political ends.

Mauritius: Demarche made to MFA PermSec as ForMin at Cabinet session June 19. ForMin Gayan releases statement June 25 condemning hijacking.

Nigeria: On June 19, Embassy Lagos made a demarche to MFA permanent secretary Dove-Edwin. On June 24, Nigeria issued a press release and president Buhari sent letters via personal emissaries to the presidents of Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon asking them to use their good offices to secure the release of the hostages.

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- 6 -

South Africa

--No reported government statement.

--No statement likely until USG condemns ANC terrorism.

--Press coverage and commentary is generally pro-US.  
Press is preoccupied with regional affairs, coverage is not the main item. Commentary has focused on comparison with South African action against the ANC and SWAPO.

--South African broadcasting, which is government controlled, made a statement June 24 relating US domestic demands for retaliation to South African retaliation against the ANC in its June 13 raid on Botswana, justifying the raid. (It also refers to the US action in Grenada) the commentary condemns western reluctance to wipe out terrorism at its operational headquarters.

Zambia: No press (government controlled) commentary.  
Minimal coverage of the story.

Zimbabwe: Demarche delivered June 19. Foreign office official appeared sympathetic to request for public statement but pointed to problem of swift government action during electoral campaign. No press.

Tanzania: No reaction.

Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique: We have presented demarche which was sympathetically received, but no public statements yet.

Burkina: Demarche made by Ambassador to Acting Foreign Minister. Thus far there has been no reaction or public statement by Burkina Government.

Chad: Ambassador made demarche to Secretary of State in Foreign Ministry. Latter expressed sympathy for US position and stated he would try to have message sent by President Habre to President Reagan on this issue.

Gabon: Demarche made by Ambassador to Acting Head of Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry official noted Gabon's firm stand against terrorism and promised to seek authorization for public statement.

Mali: Ambassador made demarche to Foreign Minister. Latter expressed outrage and promised to bring USG request before Council of Ministers. Embassy believes public statement unlikely.

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- 7 -

Mauritania: Embassy made demarche to Acting Secretary General in Foreign Ministry. Latter promised to take up US request with Foreign Minister, Embassy believes public statement unlikely.

Niger: We have not yet received a report of Embassy Niamey's demarche. No public statement has been reported.

Sudan: TMC leader Suwar al-Dahab assured Ambassador Horan Sudan "was firmly opposed to all actions of international piracy and hostage taking," but ducked Ambassador's request that GOS made its position a matter of public record.

Ethiopia: Chargé and DCM made demarches respectively to chief and deputy chief of America's Department in Foreign Ministry. Both Ethiopians promised to pass on our request for a public condemnation.

Djibouti: Foreign Minister assured Ambassador that the President had been "vigorous" in denouncing hijacking, privately but was reluctant to make a public statement without confirmation that other Arab League states had done so.

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8590710

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 JUN 85 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOC DATE 24 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

HIJACKING

LEBANON

SUBJECT. TWA HIJACKING STATUS RPT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

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FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

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WHITE HOUSE  
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S/S 8518715  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520 SYSTEM II 90710

June 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: TWA Hijacking

Contacts with Barri

In a conversation with Amal leader Nabih Barri June 24, Ambassador Bartholomew emphasized again that the US would not make concessions to terrorists and would not press other countries to do so. Reg also told Barri he ought to restrain his people from making the extreme statements they had been issuing to the press. Barri took the point. Per his instructions, Reg also briefed Barri on joint US-Jordanian exercises scheduled to begin June 25. Barri raised with Reg the letter Phil Habib had written to Lebanese Prime Minister Wazzan at the time of the PLO evacuation from Beirut, in which Barri claimed the US had accepted responsibility to seek release of persons wrongfully detained during the Israeli invasion. Bartholomew's initial response was that the letter was written at a different time, in different circumstances. More detailed guidance is being prepared for Reg's use.

The Algerian Ambassador is expected to return to Beirut tonight or tomorrow morning, June 25, and will presumably be in touch with Barri immediately. Ambassador Bartholomew will seek a readout from the Algerian Ambassador as soon as possible.

Public Statements

As part of his continuing effort to get Lebanese leaders of all confessions to speak out publicly against the hijacking and to get stronger statements from those who have already said something, Reg met today with Gemayel advisor Elie Salem to underscore again the importance of a public presidential condemnation of the hijacking. Separately, the [REDACTED] Embassy in Washington has told us that [REDACTED] has asked [REDACTED] missions in the Middle East, at their discretion, to contact their host governments to urge them to reinforce pressure on Barri.

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DECL: OADR

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By any, NARA, Date 8/14/02




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Meeting with Jesse Jackson

Bob Oakley met with Jesse Jackson and several Americans from the Detroit area of Lebanese Shi'ite origin. They were plainly feeling isolated and uncomfortable with the focus of unfavorable attention on their community. Asked whether it would help if they traveled to Beirut to try to obtain the release of hostage Americans, Oakley expressed no objection as long as they understood they were going in a purely private capacity.

Airport Security at Athens



*Nicholas Platt*

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8590709

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 JUN 85 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

msn  
11/1/89

DOC DATE 24 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

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LEBANON

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING STATUS RPT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

June 24, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: TWA Hijacking: Weekend Wrap-up

Public Condemnations

Many governments in Europe, the Far East, Africa and South America have issued or intend to issue statements condemning the hijacking and hostage-taking. Within the Arab and Islamic world the governments of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Kuwait, and Pakistan have publicly condemned this act, as has the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The governments of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have undertaken to do so.

At a press conference at the end of the week, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar made another public statement which broadly condemned terrorism. Arab League Secretary General Klibi, however, decided against a statement, given both Lebanese and Amal sensitivities over a recent League meeting regarding Amal clashes with the Palestinians. The League, however, has told us it is in touch with Nabih Barri, as well as with the Algerian Government. At Reg's urging, Sunni Prime Minister Karami, like many of his Lebanese colleagues, issued a statement condemning the hijacking.

Syria

In a message from Assad to the President, Syria has told us Assad dispatched an emissary bearing a message to Barri, which the Syrians hoped would lead to a "good outcome" for the hostages. [REDACTED] speaking through an intermediary, advised us that the most significant source of pressure on Barri would continue to be Syria, which could provide him with the backing and political cover he needed to obtain the release of the hostages. Concerning Israel's decision to release 31 Atlit detainees, our Embassy in Damascus has been authorized to tell the Syrians we see this action as evidence that Israel is proceeding with its publicly announced intention to release the prisoners, stressing our position that there can be no linkage between the passengers and the prisoners, and urging Syria to continue its efforts. A CBS report that Barri may go to Damascus today to meet Assad is unconfirmed.

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By omf, NARA, Date 2/14/02

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### U.S. Jordanian Military Exercise

Beginning June 25, the U.S. and Jordan will conduct annual, joint exercises (Shadow Hawk). In past years, it has been our practice to notify both Israel and Syria in advance, although the latter is provided minimal detail only 24 hours ahead. Syrian notification, especially important in light of the hijacking situation, is scheduled to take place June 24. The exercise is classified; it is possible, however, that word might leak. Given the potential for misinterpretation in light of current circumstances, we have decided to inform Algeria as well.

### Iranian Response to USG Demarche Concerning Beirut and Tehran Airport Hostage Crises

The official Iranian response to our concerns over the airport hostage crises is that Iran has already publicly condemned in strongest terms acts of aerial piracy and terrorism in general. Iran itself has been on several occasions the victim of acts of terrorism and hijackings, but the international community has never seen fit to condemn publicly and specifically those violations and has never intervened to ensure the safe return of hijacked Iranian aircraft. Therefore, the Government of Iran will not condemn those responsible for the Tehran and Beirut airport hostage crises now.

The statement also states that preliminary examinations of hijackers captured at Tehran airport are underway; however, authorities will not publish details of the examinations or subsequent trials of those hijackers unless and until Iran receives the same information regarding treatment of hijackers acting against Iranian interests.

### Activities

Reg met [REDACTED] Ambassador [REDACTED] after the latter's conversation with Nabih Barri. [REDACTED] reports Barri told him that he had had to get involved but did not control the hostages that Hizballah holds. Barri said that the US is risking lives over "face and principles" and said that a stalemate has ensued. To an apparent [REDACTED] proposal that he release hostages on the hope that Atlit prisoners would be released, Barri replied that Hizballah would not release those it holds. Reg told [REDACTED] that our "principle" is to protect Americans now and other nationalities later. He urged [REDACTED] pressure on Barri to release all hostages unconditionally and to remind him of the tremendous damage to the Shi'a in world opinion.

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- 3 -

Barri told Dan Rather, in a CBS-TV report broadcast on Sunday, that Israel's intended release on Monday of 31 detainees would not bring about release of the American hostages. The remaining detainees from Lebanon must also be released, Barri said.

Lebanese Detainees Released

Jerusalem Radio has reported that 31 "Shi'ite" (sic) detainees were taken out of Atlit military prison on Monday morning and were transported by truck northward toward the Lebanon border.

  
Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

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## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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June 25, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH  
DONALD R. FORTIER  
HOWARD R. TEICHER  
JOCK P. COVEY  
RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting,  
1:45-2:45 p.m., WHSR

Attached are documents for your use at this afternoon's NSPG meeting:

- Tab A: Framework for Decision (Provides a description of the stakes, objectives, and strategy for achieving release of our hijacked citizens and elimination Beirut as a terrorist haven. Establishes rationale for initiatives displayed in Tabs B and C.)
- Tab B: Graphic Timeline (Provides a visual layout of diplomatic, pressure, and public awareness/affairs and Congressional consultation activities over the course of the next eight days.)
- Tab C: Day-by-Day Description of Initiatives (Provides detailed description of initiatives to be undertaken each day for the next eight days. This tracks with Tab B.)

We have printed ten copies of each of the Tabs for use at today's meeting and provided them to ADM Poindexter for distribution as appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the documents attached during the NSPG meeting.

Approve LM

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

## Attachments

- Tab A - Framework for Decision  
Tab B - Graphic Timeline  
Tab C - Day-by-Day Description of Initiatives

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NLS F97-059/2 #175

BY smf, NARA, DATE 3/27/06

FRAMEWORK FOR DECISIONThe Stakes

- The hijacking is beginning to assume the shape of a major geopolitical event. Our response will affect not only the incentives for future acts of terrorism, but also our regional agenda, the fate of moderate regimes in the area, and our international credibility more broadly.
- We are dealing with a group that commits audacious acts and, in so doing, appears to succeed in gaining its political objectives, e.g., success in driving the Israelis and Americans out, etc. Their example can have an important destabilizing effect on other states in the region, by providing the youth in those countries with a new "model for success."
- The way in which we stress our priorities publicly must increasingly reflect these broader facts. Our hostages are of immense importance, but we must also consider the impact of having America itself again held hostage.
- The more we create the impression we will do anything to secure the hostages' release, the more politically valuable the hostages become to their captors and the less likely we are to see them returned.
- Already we have to ask ourselves whether it is likely that all of our hostages will be returned. If we think the probability is low, this fact must have a definite bearing on our strategy.

The Application of Pressure

- Politically and substantively, the most agonizing part of the problem is when and how to make the cross-over from where we are today (patient diplomacy) to sharper pressure and, ultimately, to more decisive acts to end the crisis, even with the potential of some loss of life. The attached time line reflects this choice.
- In analyzing where and how best to apply pressure, we need to differentiate between the key actors: Assad, the Iranians, and the Shia.
- The Shia are perhaps the hardest for us to influence directly. The more radical factions seek nothing more than that we should engage them directly. The more turmoil they create, the more they enhance the magnetism of their appeal.

- If we apply enough serious, long-term pressure on Beirut proper, it is conceivable we can reduce the coercive potential of the Shia by affecting the milieu in which they operate. This is, however, a long-term effort and its near-term utility is problematic.

FOIA(b)(1)

The Iranians provide another pressure point. From the standpoint of [REDACTED]

Here, though, we do run up against an important competing priority: how to shape the succession crisis in Iran in a favorable direction. We want to avoid giving the Soviets cheap opportunities to insinuate themselves further into internal Iranian politics.

#### Focusing on Syria

- Finally, there is Assad. We do not know whether he was actively complicit in the current hijacking. But his active complicity in past events is clear enough; and his passive complicity is continuing.
- Moreover, as a result of Assad's hegemonic position in Lebanon and his brutal internal tactics, he holds decisive political sway over the Shia in Lebanon. If Assad could impose upon Berri and others a resolution to the violent conflicts between Arabs and the Palestinians in Beirut, it is reasonable to suppose he could free at least the majority of the hostages.
- If we give Assad sufficient incentive, it is plausible that he -- more quickly and effectively than anyone else -- could bring the situation under greater control and at least ensure the safe return of a majority of the hostages.
- To date we have solicited Assad's assistance but without meaningful results. At this point, further such appeals can only demonstrate to Jordan and others that we feel compelled to bargain with Assad. In so doing, we would help to establish Assad's most important objective: to be seen as the arbiter of regional events.

FOIA(b)(1)

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Although he may doubt our staying power, he has in the past shown himself to be responsive to American power -- particularly when we have been willing to cross certain thresholds.

FOIA(b)(1)



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- Our immediate objective should be to create pressure to help free the hostages. Failing that, however, our actions should secure the complementary objective of regaining the initiative, throwing the terrorists off balance, curbing their coercive potential and forcing them into mistakes.

- The role of the Soviets must also be taken into account. They seem to be signaling that Assad is on his own in this effort. While the Soviets will no doubt seek to turn whatever we do to their advantage, it is doubtful that they would want to create a major U.S. confrontation in defense of hijacking and international terrorism. As a precautionary step, however, we should have sufficient force on hand to hold the Soviets at bay [REDACTED]

- Diplomacy will continue to be crucial to our efforts. It will be essential in continuing to probe for a satisfactory release, and it will be vital to helping to explain and build support for many of the actions outlined below.

- We must proceed, however, in self-conscious contrast to earlier hostage crises. A plethora of international activity that demonstrates only mixed results will simply signal weakness.

- The beginning point of the initiative should be a private Presidential call to President Assad. We should say that we believe Syria has it within its power to end the crisis, that we expect action, and that time is running out.

The second step within one to two days of the message would be the closure --

██████████ -- of the Beirut airport. Our public message would be that we are closing the airport to prevent future terrorist use. We should not imply that we expect this action per se to lead to release.

- Privately, our message to Syria should be that the airport's closure is the first in a series of steps to document and act upon the premise of Syrian accountability.

- Our next action should play to Assad's major concern: internal vulnerability. Assad has repeatedly shown himself to be preoccupied by the potential danger to his minority

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FOIA(b)(1)

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- In short, during the phase when we are still actively seeking the hostages' release, there should at least be a hard underside to our diplomatic activity. The hope is that these unconventional threats will by themselves persuade Assad that game-playing with the hostages is simply not worth it.
- If our efforts don't bear fruit, that underside can become more robust, visible, and punishing as we transition from one phase of the crisis to another.

FOIA(b)(1) Crossing the Second Threshold

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- Intermixed in this campaign should be appropriate diplomatic activity and other forms of punishment for those found complicit in terrorism. For example, we should immediately

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cancel the engine sale to Yugoslavia if we can confirm their role in training air hijackers.

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- Two final considerations. The timeframe should be compressed. The actions under consideration are likely to have a powerful impact if undertaken swiftly. The longer the crisis drags on and the more our citizens are humiliated, the less decisive our actions will seem. Second, the initiative of a carefully sequenced, surprise campaign against the global terrorist infrastructure can help us shift attention quickly from the hijackers' injustice to our people to an effective campaign to reduce the aggregate capability for ongoing world terrorism.
- This implies a self-conscious shift in objective, a shift which by its very nature would at least guarantee some important form of U.S. success. For this to happen, however, we could not blink in response to near-term pressure -- domestic or international.

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RECEIVED 27 JUN 85 14

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 26 JUN 85

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KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

HIJACKING

LEBANON

SUBJECT: TWA HIJACKING STATUS RPT

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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June 26, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: TWA Hijacking

Proposal for Transfer of Hostages to a Western Embassy

Barri publicly proposed transfer of the hostages to a western embassy in West Beirut, such as the French or Swiss Embassy, provided the government concerned would pledge not to release the hostages unless the Lebanese prisoners in Israel are freed. [REDACTED] have been in touch with us about this proposal. All appear cautious, although the [REDACTED] have instructed their Ambassador to be ready to receive the hostages if Barri should move to do so.

Israeli Policy

There continue to be press reports of preparations in Israel for a further release of prisoners, although Israeli Coordinator for South Lebanon told Embassy Tel Aviv June 25 that no further releases were imminent. Rabin said June 26 "The army has from time to time released groups of people, and it is our intention to continue this policy in the future according to cabinet decisions. The final aim is that no Lebanese prisoners will be left in Israel." Embassy Tel Aviv has commented in an analysis predating the Rabin statement that Israel officials are formulating their reaction to the hijacking based on three objectives which may prove contradictory over time: 1) limiting damage to the U.S. relationship or at least to Israel's image in the U.S.; 2) maintaining a credible anti-terrorism policy, especially in the wake of the May POW exchange, and 3) maintaining prospects for working-out adequate security arrangements in southern Lebanon. All options carry risks which could contribute to the collapse of the Peres Government, which is concerned about the lack of coordination with the U.S.

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NLS F97-059/a #179  
By smf, NARA, Date 2/14/02

International Pressure

The Arab League headquarters in Tunis has informed us that its Secretary General made a public statement condemning the hijacking in an interview with Beirut newspaper As-Safir. The Italian Foreign Ministry released a press statement June 25 concerning the demarche made by the Italian Ambassador to Barri on behalf of the European Community, in which the ten "expressed condemnation without reserve of the airplane hijacking and the detention of the hostages," and called for their prompt release. The British demarche to Barri yesterday, on which we now have a readout, emphasized U.S. determination not to give in to the hijackers' demands, and the need to resolve the crisis fast. Barri replied to both the British and the Italians that he had involved himself out of humanitarian motives.

American Red Cross

The American Red Cross has received from the ICRC a list of the hostages visited by the ICRC yesterday and will be initiating contacts with their families. The ARC will serve as liaison between the ICRC and the families, forwarding first the signature forms signed by the hostages yesterday, and later messages to the families when they are received.

*Bomckinley*  
for Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

ACTION

27 June 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Terrorism Public Relations

*add to action plan*

Background

One of the principal objectives of terrorist activity is public opinion-related: attracting disproportionate public attention to a cause, paralyzing normal public activity, and intimidating the public and their governments. To the extent that a terrorist incident does this, it is successful regardless of the particular outcome of the incident.

The current hijacking has been an unqualified success in these terms. Over 90 percent of the American public and probably a similar proportion of the world's population are following events in Beirut closely. They are being informed constantly of the Shiite demands suddenly made worthy of broadcast by their terrorist act. Normal U.S. Government activity has been paralyzed as disproportionate attention is devoted to the crisis. The changing of travel plans and the cancellation of business and vacation trips by people around the world are evidence that the public has been intimidated from thousands of miles away by this act.

Most anti-terrorist efforts, both before and during incidents such as the current hijacking, deal almost exclusively with the terrorists, their acts, and their support systems. While considerable attention is paid to the public stance taken against the terrorist act itself, and there is much criticism of the media's coverage of the incident because it helps the terrorists achieve their goals, activities generally ignore the terrorists' public relations objectives themselves. This permits the successful realization by the terrorists of these objectives.

However, being prepared to confront and block the publicity objectives of terrorism in our overall strategy for dealing with specific terrorists incidents would contribute significantly to the diffusion of these incidents as well as helping to diminish the likelihood of new incidents. A pro-active public relations strategy can minimize the ability of the terrorist to achieve their objectives.



The basic need is to control public awareness, and hence, terrorist awareness of the level of government attention any specific incident is receiving:

- The quicker terrorists know they have affected the highest political levels, the more successful they are and bolder they become because they will have achieved their principal objective -- publicity.
- There is a need for a strategy to publicly approach terrorist incidents in a calm measured manner, even to the point of slowing down the decision making process itself.
- Our information technology provides information rapidly, much too rapidly to be carefully digested and integrated. Public relations must slow the press and terrorists down to keep the pressure from building too rapidly to make decision, any decision, even if its the wrong one.

Such a terrorism public relations strategy would minimally focus on the following items:

1. Minimizing any specific terrorist incident by putting it in its proper context:
  - Terrorism has a long history, is worldwide, and will be constantly with us.
  - The U.S. is not disproportionately targetted.
  - Most USG efforts successfully protect U.S. interests and citizens.
  - There are on-going international effort to deal with it.
2. Carefully planning the White House and the President's public involvement so a balance between proper presidential interest in the particular event, but constant concern with the greater problem of terrorism occurs. For example, a public relations strategy would provide for the President to contact hostage families privately, on a personal basis, with minimal press coverage so the terrorists won't be led to believe that the President is preoccupied with them.
3. Organizing a group of experts who will play down the demands and threats of the specific terrorists and prepare the public for a lengthy crisis from the start, explaining the intricacies of saving lives while not further endangering others because of the way the lives are saved.

4. Preparing public relations components of any confidential diplomatic initiatives toward the terrorists and/or terrorist-supporting nations.
5. Writing presidential speeches on the terrorist crisis and relevant inserts for presidential speeches on regular, non-terrorist topics.
6. Determining the public opinion context of ongoing activities and its potential reaction to specific negotiatory or retaliatory acts USG might pursue.
7. Preparing public explanations for possible rescue attempts and/or retaliation acts.

It is not too late to implement such a public relations campaign during the current crisis. Should the hostages be released within a short time, there is still the need to prepare for the retaliatory and generally anti-terrorist activities that will follow. If the hostage crisis drags on, there is the need to reestablish control of the President's public agenda.

The best way to proceed is to establish a public relations strategy group at the highest level consisting of people with the President's confidence and chaired by you. Members would consist of principal Assistants to the President as appropriate and key outsiders with special expertise such as Richard Wirthlin and Lynn Nofsinger. This group would develop the overall strategy within the context of the policy established by the NSC.

At another level would be a working group chaired by the NSC Executive Secretary. Members would come from the CMC, the NSC press office, the NSC task force, DoD, and State. This group's responsibility would be to draw up the specific plans, data collection efforts, implementation procedures, talking points, speeches and inserts, etc. for review and approval by the senior public relations strategy group.

#### Recommendation

That you organize a senior level terrorist public relations group.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you direct the Executive Secretary to organize a working level terrorist public relations group.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_