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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

March 8, 1983

UNCLASSIFIED
(With ~~Confidential~~ Attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK

SUBJECT Senior Interdepartmental Group on International Economic Policy (SIG-IEP)

A meeting of the SIG-IEP is scheduled for Thursday, March 10, at 10:30 a.m., in the Roosevelt Room. The agenda is as follows:

1. Debt Strategy (Treasury oral report),
2. Export-Import Bank Charter (paper attached),
3. Polish Debt (paper attached),
4. Korea Cotton Sales (paper attached),
5. Export Administration Act (paper attached), and
6. East-West Studies (oral presentation by State).

Attendance will be limited to principal, plus one.

Donald T. Regan

Donald T. Regan

Attachments

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EXIMBANK CHARTER RENEWAL

I. Issue

The Export-Import Bank Act expires on September 30, 1983. The SIG-IEP is asked to decide whether the Administration should request a simple five-year extension or propose an amendment to enhance further the Eximbank's mandate to be competitive in financing.

II. Background

NAC Alternates Meeting: On January 18, 1983, the National Advisory Council (NAC) Alternates met to consider various proposals to amend the Eximbank Act. The consensus among the agencies was that the Administration should support a simple extension of the Eximbank Act until September 30, 1988. The single exception was a proposal by Commerce and USTR that the Bank's mandate to be competitive be declared its principal mandate. Treasury, Eximbank, OMB, State, the Federal Reserve and IDCA opposed this proposal. (A summary of the meeting and the NAC decision memorandum are attached.)

Competitiveness Mandate: The Eximbank Charter directs the Bank to provide guarantees, insurance, and extensions of credit at rates and terms and other conditions competitive with those offered by other governments. The Act also provides that "loans made by the Bank shall bear interest rates determined by the Board of Directors of the Bank, taking into consideration the average cost of money to the Bank as well as the Bank's mandate to support United States exports at rates and on terms and conditions which are competitive with exports of other countries."

USTR and Commerce propose that the Bank's mandate to be competitive be legislatively declared its principal mandate. The objective of this proposal is to ensure that in making loan policy changes the Bank should give even more weight to the competitive needs of U.S. exporters and less weight than it has given in the past to its funding costs. It is not intended to require the Bank to match exactly the terms of foreign competition.

The genesis of proposals to strengthen the competitiveness mandate was the Eximbank Board's decision in July, 1981, to raise interest rates above the minimum interest rates in the Export Credit Arrangement, in the absence of similar increases by other countries. The Bank also imposed a 2 percent application fee. The purpose behind these actions was to combat the Eximbank's seriously deteriorating financial position, which had arisen from its efforts to match foreign competition during the period 1978-1981 when market interest rates surged dramatically. The Board actions placed Eximbank's

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rates 2-3 percent above rates set by some foreign countries; however, the Bank's rates at the time were as much as 5 percent below its cost of funds (10-year Treasury bonds) and 10-12 percent below the rates charged on Euro-credit syndications, the principal alternative source of funds for the Bank's borrowers.

Some agencies believe that Eximbank should have maintained its interest rates and fees closer to the foreign competition. The business community has been concerned that these Board actions, in conjunction with the Bank's long-standing practice of limiting direct credit cover, placed U.S. exporters at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign counterparts.

Other agencies believe, however, that Eximbank has in fact made competitveness its principal mandate and raised interest rates only when required for financial stability. They point out that Eximbank remained largely competitive, even during this period of higher interest rates.

In the past year, the United States successfully negotiated increases in the minimum interest rates allowed under the OECD Arrangement on Export Credits. This, in conjunction with falling market interest rates, has now enabled Eximbank to offer interest rates which eliminate any gap between its rates and those offered by other governments.

III. Discussion

The proposal is to amend the Export-Import Bank Act to establish the Bank's mandate to be competitive as its principal mandate.

Supporters of the proposal argue that:

-- By limiting the ability of the Bank's Board to raise its interest rates when market rates increase, the number of cases lost to foreign subsidized financing would decrease.

-- The proposal would enable the Administration to diffuse pressures for legislation that would reduce further the Bank's flexibility.

-- The proposal would reassure the business community of the Administration's responsiveness to its needs.

Opponents of the proposal argue that:

-- The proposal is unnecessary. Eximbank already provides financing on terms and conditions which enable U.S. suppliers to compete for export sales. Even during the period of higher Eximbank interest rates, very few cases were lost because of financing.

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-- The proposal could be costly and would undermine the Administration's flexibility, because it would (1) make it more difficult for the Administration to limit the cost of export subsidies during periods of inflation, thereby sheltering exports relative to other sectors of the economy; and (2) would permanently lock Eximbank into providing subsidized financing, a policy step not heretofore taken.

-- Rather than diffusing Congressional pressures, the proposal would (1) give rise to legislative history which could be cited as grounds for requiring Eximbank to match precisely the terms offered by foreign competition, a position which all agencies oppose; and (2) run the risk of opening up the statute to an even more stringent competitiveness requirement, as well as opening it up to other potentially damaging provisions.

IV. <u>SIG-IEP Decision</u>

Support Proposal ______

Oppose Proposal ______

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Summary of Meeting of
NAC Alternates
January 18, 1983

U.S. Export Credit Policy

The NAC unanimously reaffirmed the basic tenets of U.S. export credit policy:

(1) The Administration opposes export credit subsidies.

(2) Export credit subsidies should be reduced and eventually eliminated through international agreement; and

(3) Eximbank credits should be targeted where the competition is greatest.

Export Credit Strategy

The NAC unanimously endorsed the following export credit strategy:

(1) The United States should strongly resist any effort to lower the present interest rate mimima in international export credit institutions, unless an automatic market-related system is adopted.

(2) Eximbank should give more emphasis to guarantees and insurance, which would offset (a) capital market imperfections and (b) increased country risk problems. Direct credits would be targeted against subsidized foreign credits, if commercial rates again surge.

Treasury, Eximbank, OMB, State, IDCA and the Federal Reserve agreed that the Administration should resist any efforts to amend the Eximbank Act. USTR and Commerce wanted only to strengthen the Bank's competitiveness objective.

Eximbank Charter

The NAC unanimously agreed that the Administration should support the extension of Eximbank's Charter until September 30, 1988. The NAC made the following decisions on specific proposals to amend the Charter.

(1) The NAC agencies were split on the proposal to emphasize the supremacy of the Bank's mandate to be competitive over its other objectives. USTR and Commerce

supported the amendment, while Treasury, Eximbank, OMB, State, IDCA and the Federal Reserve opposed the amendment. The NAC unanimously opposed any proposal that would require Eximbank to match precisely the terms offered by foreign competition.

(2) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to require the President to appoint Directors to serve for fixed, staggered four-year terms.

(3) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to re-establish the Bank's Advisory Committee.

(4) The NAC unanimously opposed proposals to amend Section 1912 of the Export-Import Bank Act (Section 1912 enables Eximbank to provide domestic financing to offset the predatory financing practices of foreign credit agencies).

(5) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to establish an Eximbank "war chest."

(6) The NAC unanimously opposed proposals to modify Eximbank's practices on human rights and the environment.

(7) The NAC unanimously opposed proposals to remove Eximbank from the Federal budget.

(8) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to set aside specified portions of Eximbank's annual loan authority for transactions involving loans of $5 million or less.

(9) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to require an annual set-aside of direct loan funds to support agricultural exports.

(10) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to remove Eximbank from Functional Code 150 of the Federal budget ("international affairs") and place it elsewhere.

(11) The NAC unanimously opposed a proposal to privatize Eximbank.

(12) The NAC unanimously opposed proposals (a) to increase the aggregate amount of Eximbank loans, guarantees and insurance that may be outstanding at any one time or (b) to increase the amount of Eximbank's immediate line of credit from the Treasury.

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BACKGROUND INFORMATION PREPARED BY THE

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

BLENDED CREDIT FOR COTTON TO KOREA

March 4, 1983

United States Department of Agriculture
Foreign Agricultural Service
Washington, D.C. 20250

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MAR 4 1983

TO: Alan T. Tracy
Acting Under Secretary for
International Affairs and Commodity Programs

FROM: Richard A. Smith
Administrator

Dick S

SUBJECT: Background Information Regarding Blended Credit for Cotton to Korea

Attached is the background paper you requested outlining the pros and cons of extending blended credit to the Koreans for purchases of U.S. cotton. We are also attaching a copy of the February 15 memorandum to the Secretary regarding this issue and a copy of the cabinet decision paper which went to the Secretary during your absence last week.

The direct costs to the U.S. Government for the $10 million interest free credit for 30 months would be $1.7-1.9 million but the direct benefits would be $26-29 million in savings under the most likely scenario outlined in the attached paper. Far more important over time would be the positive effect of blended credit and credit guarantees in maintaining our traditional share (90-95 percent) of the Korean cotton market. Without this small investment by the United States, U.S. cotton industry analysts and we are convinced that our share of the Korean market will trend downward over time toward the market shares we had in 1981/82 in Japan (45.0 percent), Taiwan (61.8 percent) and Hong Kong (33.6 percent).

Cotton's share of the additional $1.25 billion blended credit authorization is in line with cotton's share of U.S. agricultural exports (see attached table), and we believe the benefits in terms of increased exports and domestic program savings would be equal to those for other major agricultural exports.

Attachments

What would be the savings to the US Government of a $50 million blended credit cotton program for Korea?

The cost to the U.S. Government of the blended credit proposal would be the loss of interest for 30 months on the $10 million direct credit portion of the loan. This would total about $1.7 to 1.9 million.

The potential cotton program cost to the U.S. Government could be much higher if blended credit is not authorized. The 86,000 bales of cotton that would be exported under the proposal, if redeemed from loan stocks, would save CCC $26 to 29 million- the cost of releasing 86,000 bales to producers under the PIK program. At the present time about 7.1 million bales are under loan. The current 1983/84 U.S. production forecast is 9.5 million bales.

The potential longer term cotton program costs of not providing the blended credit now could be much higher should the U.S. share of the Korean market decline sharply from the 90-95 percent traditional level.

How much of the Korean cotton market will we lose if we do not provide blended credit?

The latest industry estimates project a market loss of 1.2 million bales over the next 3 years (1983-84-85) valued at $452 million. Their projections show our market share slipping from about 90 percent to about 60 percent.

The U.S. share of the Korean cotton market is unusually high reflecting the effectiveness of our credit programs and close political and economic ties. Our market share in 1981/82 in Japan was 45 percent, in Taiwan 61.8 percent and in Hong Kong 33.6 percent.

Who are the countries that are currently competing with the U.S. for the Korean cotton market?

At the moment, Australia, Brazil, India, Pakistan and the Sudan are all trying to gain a larger share of the Korean market at the expense of the United States cotton producers. The trade safeguard provisions that will be incorporated into all blended credit programs will protect the traditional market share of nonsubsidizing countries.

Are the Koreans threatening to reduce cotton imports from the U.S. to obtain blended credit?

The U.S. has already begun to lose market share in Korea as a result of aggressive action taken by other cotton suppliers to break into the large Korean market. Also, there are strong internal and external pressures to diversify cotton imports to help address Korea's trade surplus with several other cotton suppliers.

Korean Cotton Imports

Period	Country	Percent Market Share
Jan/July 1982	U.S.	95.1
	All Others	4.9
Aug/Nov 1982	U.S.	88.6
	All Others	11.4
Dec 1982/ Feb. 11, 1983	U.S.	79.8
	All Others	20.2

The Korean Spinners and Weavers Association now control all cotton imports and favors trade with the U.S. due in large part to our credit arrangements, strong trade ties and reliability as a supplier. Without the credit programs, ties to the U.S. would be weaker and it is possible that control of cotton imports would shift to a Korean Government Agency or to private trading companies. This shift would likely have a negative impact on our share of Korean imports.

Does the Korean textile industry need blended credit and credit guarantees?

The Korean textile industry has suffered from the world recession and a number of firms are facing severe financial problems. Their financial situation, however, is not our primary concern. Our concern is how these programs help expand markets for U.S. cotton and reduce our farm program costs.

What effect will the blended credit have on U.S. textile imports from Korea?

Imports of cotton textiles into the United States from Korea are limited by the United States-Korea bilateral agreement negotiated under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement. Blended credit for Korea would have no bearing on the level of U.S. cotton textile imports. Korea can be expected to continue to fill its U.S. import quotas, whether the textiles are made from U.S. or foreign cotton.

Are we providing aid to the Koreans through our credit programs?

Without question past PL 480 sales greatly assisted in the economic development of Korea. Current credit guarantees and the proposed blended credit program would provide important but limited benefits to the Korean textile industry, but the primary beneficiaries would be the U.S. cotton producer and the U.S. Treasury (see cost discussion above).

Will the cotton industry continue to press for their fair share of available credit?

The U.S. cotton industry has been interested since the 1940's in securing credits as an aid to their efforts to expand our foreign markets for U.S. cotton. It is certain their requests for credit assistance will continue for the forseeable future as they have had a number of success stories. The outstanding success story is Korea. This market has progressed from one quarter of a million bales at the end of the Korean war to a one and half million bale market today, primarily due to the extensive use of concessional PL 480 financing during the fifties and sixties and short term commercial credits and guarantees during the seventies and the eighties.

What is cotton's share of the blended credit program?

An analysis of the potential recipients of the additional $1.250 billion available under the blended credit program for fiscal year 1983 as reflected in the potential list of $1,890 billion clearly shows that the raw cotton share of 5.5 percent is in parallel with cottons percentage share of total agricultural exports (see attached table).

	U.S. Agricultural Exports (Billion $)				Potential Additional Blended Credit Program (BC) (Million $)	
Commodity	FY 1982	Percent	Forecast FY 1983	Percent	BC	Percent
Raw cotton..	2.141	5.5	1.6	4.4	105	5.5
Wheat & Prod	7.675	19.6	6.8	18.9	846	44.7
Feed Grains.	7.051	18.1	6.7	18.6	345	18.3
Rice........	1.149	2.9	0.9	2.5	264	14.0
Oilseeds & Prod.......	9.730	24.9	9.1	25.3	191.1	10.1
Others......	11.348	29.0	10.9	30.3	139.25	7.4
Total......	39.094	100	36.0	100	1890.35	100

Tobacco, Cotton and Seeds Division
March 3, 1983

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20250

CABINET MATTER ________

I SUBJECT: Approval of Blended Credit to enable export of cotton to Korea

II ORIGINATOR: Department of Agriculture

III ACTION FORCING EVENT: Need to increase exports of cotton to limit Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) program outlay and to meet foreign competition.

IV STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE: The Department of Agriculture in the face of rising cotton program outlays seeks cabinet approval to authorize a 36 month blended credit program consisting of $10 million GSM-5 and $40 million GSM-102 that would enable export of cotton to Korea.

V ANALYSIS: The domestic price of U.S. cotton is hovering at the loan level because of large stocks and reduced export prospects due to world recession and keener foreign competition. Commodity Credit Corporation outlays for the cotton program will be more than $1.5 billion in FY 1983. Use of blended credit to assist exports would reduce stocks and help restrict potential CCC loan outlay. A blended credit program for Korea would help the United States maintain its share of a market that has been developed through long-term promotion effort.

A blended credit program consisting of $10 million in GSM-5 direct credit and $40 million in GSM-102 guarantees will finance export of 143,000 bales ($50 million) of cotton to Korea in 1983; 86,000 bales of this would not be exported without blended credit. Reduction of domestic stocks by 86,000 bales will remove cotton which could go under loan at a cost of $24.5 million in CCC direct outlay.

Korea is now the second largest foreign market for U.S. cotton accounting for nearly 30 percent of total U.S. exports. The United States dominant supplier position (consistently more than 90 percent of Korea's cotton imports) is the result of more than a decade of diligent promotion effort by the U.S. cotton industry in cooperation with USDA. The United States share of the Korean market is being eroded by cheaper foreign growths.

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Several competitors are now offering cotton to the Koreans at prices below our prices for comparable quality. The lower price quotations by some competitors (e.g. Brazil) reflect, in part, production and export aids designed to break into the large Korean cotton market.

Spinners and Weavers Association of Korea (SWAK) member mills would prefer to continue to rely on U.S. cotton for the great majority of their needs. However, they are experiencing a cost-price squeeze due to the slump in textile demand, the impact of high interest rates on financing of raw cotton purchases and the strength of the dollar. They are being forced to turn to cheaper sources of supply. It could be very difficult for U.S. exporters to regain their traditional share of Korea's market, once it is lost.

Blended credit would reduce the cost of purchasing U.S. cotton and demonstrate to SWAK that the United States intends to remain a dependable supplier.

VI

RECOMMENDATION: USDA be given authority to extend blended credit for cotton to Korea.

VII DECISION:

____Approve ________Approve as amended _____Reject ___ No Action

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133156	MEMO LIONEL OLMER TO MARC LELAND RE: EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT - FEBRUARY 28 MEETING	1	3/3/1983	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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133157	OPTIONS PAPER RE: EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT RENEWAL (SIMILAR TEXT TO 133140)	24	3/2/1983	B1