

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Sims, Robert B.: Files, 1983-1985

(Press Secretary, Office of the)

**SERIES:** IV: SUBJECT FILE

**Folder Title:** TWA Hijacking/Hostages, June 1985

(9 of 9)

**Box:** OA 11623

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** Sims, Robert: Files

**Withdrawer**

RBW 3/3/2011

**File Folder** TWA HIJACKING/HOSTAGES (9 OF 9)

**FOIA**

F97-046/4

**Box Number** CF0467

WILLS

49

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
106253	CABLE	STATE 209504	7	7/10/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CABINET MEETING

July 1, 1985

Cabinet Room

AGENDA

1. Review of the Hostage Situation ----- Robert McFarlane
2. Review of Diplomatic Efforts to ----- George Shultz  
Release the Hostages and Its  
Implications
3. Airport and Airplane Safety ----- Donald Engen

CABINET MEETING

July 1, 1985

PARTICIPANTS

The President

Secretary Shultz  
Secretary Baker  
Secretary Weinberger  
Attorney General Meese  
Secretary Block  
Secretary Baldrige  
Secretary Heckler  
Secretary Pierce  
Secretary Bennett  
Donald T. Regan  
Director Stockman  
Director Casey  
Ambassador Walters  
Ambassador Yeutter  
Robert McFarlane

Under Secretary McLaughlin  
    (Representing Secretary Hodel)  
Deputy Secretary Ford  
    (Representing Secretary Brock)  
Deputy Secretary Boggs  
    (Representing Secretary Herrington)

Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the President and Legislative  
    Strategy Coordinator

M.B. Oglesby, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs  
Edward Rollins, Assistant to the President for Political and  
    Governmental Affairs

Larry Speakes, Assistant to the President and Principal Deputy  
    Press Secretary

Beryl Sprinkel, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors

David Chew, Staff Secretary and Deputy Assistant to the President

Alfred H. Kingon, Cabinet Secretary

For Presentation:

Donald Engen, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration

Additional Attendees:

Boyden Gray, Counsellor to the Vice President

BACKGROUND BRIEFING  
ON  
HIJACKING OF TWA FLIGHT 847  
BY  
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL  
MONDAY, JULY 1, 1985, 4:21 P. M.

MR. KALB: Good afternoon. I'm going to pass this one statement out here, which is ON THE RECORD.

This will be BACKGROUNDER. The statement that I just distributed is ON THE RECORD. What follows from this point on will be a BACKGROUNDER. It is attributable to a Senior State Department Official.

Q We didn't get copies of this. Could you just read this statement so we can take it down?

A No. We'll get you copies in a second.

Q Can I ask one question about your statement, Bernie?

A Just a minute, Jim. This is all that we're having ON THE RECORD that I distributed, but --

Q No. That's what I'm asking you. An "office" can't make a statement. A "person" can, but an "office" can't. Now, is this attributable to you as the Spokesman?

A It is attributable to the State Department Press Office.

Q Well, I feel myself that I can identify the head of the Press Office when I use this statement.

A Distributed by me. That's perfectly fine.

Q Okay.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, this statement, for those of you that didn't get a copy, says that the United States is taking legal action and diplomatic steps to isolate Beirut International Airport and to encourage other governments to take similar steps.

The actions approved are to terminate MEA service to the United States -- Middle East Airline service to the United States.

To terminate the permit authority for U.S.-Lebanon service by the Lebanese cargo airline, TNA, and by any United States cargo carriers.

And the diplomatic steps referred to: We are informing other governments of our actions. We are encouraging them to take similar actions.

We are discussing with other governments the termination of all air transport to and from Lebanon, and to terminate landing rights for any nation whose airlines continue to fly to Lebanon.

Q That last phrase --

Q No. Who will terminate. Yeah, that's an ambiguous statement. Will the U.S. terminate it or will it ask that other governments terminate?

A To ask other governments to terminate.

Q To terminate?

A Yes.

Q If what?

A To terminate landing rights for any nation whose airlines continue to fly to Lebanon.

Q Will we do that too then?

Q We won't let them land here?

A We're starting -- this is actions approved today by the President, and what we are doing today is starting discussions, consultations, with other governments.

Q But you're terminating service here.

A We are terminating service here.

Q Only cargo service, you said.

A No. We have --

Q Middle East Airways.

A We have a service of Middle East Airways -- MEA, sorry, not airlines -- Middle East Airways, and that is, I believe, a twice weekly passenger service to New York. And they have landing rights for Lebanon's all-cargo carrier, TNA, Trans-Mediterranean Airways, and there is currently authority for Pan American and TWA cargo rights.

Q Where does TWA operation to? Is it New York?

A I'm afraid you're going to have a lot of specific questions that we'll have to dig out the answers for you. I don't have that.

Q How does this deter hijacking?

A I think the point of the decisions taken today is that we are trying to -- we are seeking a common international understanding of the nature of this problem, of the hijacking problem. We're trying to enhance international solidarity against hijackings, terrorism, and the Beirut situation in general.

Q How does this in any way impose any punishment on the people who killed a Navy diver and who held Americans hostage for 17 days. Isn't this sort of playing at the edges?

A We're trying to deal -- this is a very complex problem in trying to deal with the hijacking of the TWA flight. We have to deal with a host of related issues, and one of those related issues is the status of Beirut International Airport.

Q And doesn't --

A We want to put Beirut International Airport off limits until Beirut puts terrorists off limits.

Q Sir, when the hijackers forced the TWA plane to land at Beirut, it was almost in this kind of a status. The runways were barricaded and the pilot simply said he had to land, and they took the barricades away.

This doesn't seem to be trying to close the usefulness of that airport to hijackers, which is what Mr. Shultz said yesterday. He said, "It's not a question of sort of economic sanctions," or anything like that.

A I'd regard this as a stage in our effort to deny Beirut International Airport to the use of terrorists.

Q Will we apply the same thing, sir -- are we considering applying the same thing to other airports such as Tehran and Tripoli, or do you think that the Government of Lebanon has more control over the terrorists than Tehran and Tripoli?

A In the case of Lebanon we are trying to enlist the support of the authorities of the Government of -- of the authorities of Lebanon, including the Government of Lebanon. The authorities of Lebanon, the way history has developed over the last several years, includes leaders of the various militias, it includes the Minister of Justice of Lebanon.

Q But why not Tripoli and Tehran? No consideration of that at all? Is that --

A Well, there is no American service into either Tripoli or Tehran.

Q But, I mean, other nations do fly there. I just wondered if you'd given any thought to doing the same thing for those airports of governments that seem to be sponsoring these terrorists.

A We are focusing right now on Beirut International Airport. If you examine the sanctions we have put into effect in terms of our trade, our relationship with the Government of Libya and the Government of Iran, I think you'll find a very wide variety of sanctions that we've worked out over the last several years.

Q There are only three airlines that fly in, as far as I know, that fly -- aside from Middle East, that fly into Beirut, and they are Air France, Sabena and Cyprus Air.

Could you tell us what France has to say about this, or Belgium has to say about this, what Cyprus has to say about this, and whether you're going to cut off Air France from landing in the United States, and Sabena from landing in the United States.

Q We're just starting -- as of today the decision was taken to open consultations with other governments, so it's ahead of --

Q And have you gotten any early word from France?



A No. We have not yet. We -- it's already a bit late at night.

Q Well, would you -- are you considering cutting off these airlines from landing in the United States?

A We're considering consultations with those governments, in the first instance, and we'll determine our actions step by step as a result of those consultations.

Q Are his facts correct?

A Well, I know that there are no scheduled airlines, other than MEA, as of now using BIA. There are some charter flights. There are a variety of, I'm informed, other countries that have national airlines with landing rights in Beirut, but I gather those are not being actively exercised today.

Q Is that those three?

A I think those are included. There are also certain East European airlines as well.

Q Could you identify them?

A I would have to ask to -- for time to research that.

Q What about Aeroflot?

A I think that's among them, but again I caution you to let's check out the facts on that.

Q In the wake of this, do you still have any hopes of being able to obtain the safe release of the TWA plane itself?

A Yes. We see no contradiction between the diplomatic and legal steps which we're initiating and the return of the TWA flight -- or the aircraft.

Q You don't think you're providing an incentive here to -- any terrorists that may remain to take action against the aircraft itself or to prevent its departure?

A We hope we are providing an incentive to the authorities of Lebanon to curb the use of Beirut International Airport by terrorists.

Q Could you tell us whether there are any other steps that were either approved today, or can you tell us what other steps are under consideration following this incident?

A No, I can't go beyond those -- The steps that I've listed are those that have been approved today, and I won't go beyond that.

Q Are other steps being considered?

A I wouldn't go beyond that at this time.

Q What do you think will be the practical effect of this move? What's going to happen in Lebanon because of this?

A I think you -- you see, the target here is the authorities of Lebanon. It's also a number of governments who have joined in international agreements and treaties on hijacking. We hope that this will start -- we expect this will start a process of very intensive consultations with those governments to see what international action can be agreed upon. It's premature to say just how that's going to come out. We're just getting started.

Q Is this going to hurt somebody, or is somebody going to feel a lot of pressure for some particular reason because of this, and, if so, why?

A I think it's a very clear signal from Washington, from the White House, of the seriousness with which it regards hijacking, with which it takes the -- with which it has taken the hijacking of TWA 847, and we want to, as I say, start now on the steps which we hope will forestall future use of BIA by terrorists.

Q I apologize in advance for asking a question that I think has been asked before, but I didn't understand the answer: Is the United States Government considering the possibility of taking action against the carriers of countries that continue to permit or accord landing rights to MEA?

A What we are looking for is, first and last, the closure of BIA in terms of its use. We're not trying to damage Middle East Airways. Middle East Airways, as you know, has operated throughout prolonged periods when BIA was closed. If I'm not mistaken, I think that was the situation for almost five months last year -- there were no flights in there. So this is not directed against MEA. It's directed against BIA.

Q So you're also telling MEA, then, "Go find another airport."

A Well, it has many other airports. It has operated successfully outside of other -- from other centers.

Q Then, can you take it -- excuse me, Bernie, just to follow up and answer the question as stated: if other countries continue to accord landing rights to MEA out of BIA, would you then take action, or would you contemplate action against the carriers of those countries?

A I think you've got to let this process of discussions with the other governments get started, get underway before we make statements one way or the other. These steps today are taken with, out of the real seriousness of purpose, and we will be impressing on other governments where MEA does have landing rights just how seriously we regard it.

We'll have more to say about this in the future, but I'm not going to slant it one way or the other.

Q But you're leaving open that possibility, honestly, sir.

A I have to leave open all possibilities.

Q Dick, why not just --

Q Why not punish the Shi'ites as opposed to MEA, which is, you know, the government airline that is not necessarily operated, run, owned, or anything else by any one connected to those people that took the Americans hostage?

A First of all, let me draw a very clear line against your question. We're not out to punish the Shia; we're out to punish those who engaged in hijacking and who may contemplate use of BIA in the future for those purposes.

I think as the Secretary has commented on more than one occasion, this has been a unique affair in which hijackers have been able to draw on the resources of a substantial part of a major city. And as you look back over the last 15 years, I think the statistics show some 15 percent of international hijackings have either originated, transitted, or terminated at BIA.

Q Just to follow up Bill's question, how does this make it impossible for them to use the airport? I mean if there were another hijacking in another part of the world, theoretically, they would still be able to land at Beirut Airport.

A Uh-huh.

Q You're punishing MEA, it seems to me, but not --

A Well, the intent is to get BIA off-limits.

Q How does this act further the closure of the Beirut International Airport, or the non-use of it by future terrorists?

A It is a first step.

Q Why not just bomb the airport, seriously? Why not bomb the airport, or just take some action on our own to just make it out of action.

A (No response)

Q What is the answer to that question?

Q I didn't hear that.

(Laughter)

A The answer was "no comment."

Q No comment to "The Times?"

Q What effect might this decision have on the release of the --

A The answer was, "I'm not going to speculate on Bernie's question."

Q What effect might this decision have on the release of the seven remaining hostages?

A We don't see those two questions as related. We are working intensively, and will continue to do so for the release of the seven, two of whom have been held now for, I think, it's over 16 months. We are working through a variety of channels and contacts with a number of different governments concerning the seven, and we will continue to do so.

Q This is the fifth year that the Reagan Administration has been issuing warnings to terrorists who keep right on terrorizing, but no terrorists, to my knowledge, have been punished, as Secretary Shultz and the President vowed to

do yesterday. And since Editor Norman Podhoretz of Commentary notes, "We know very well who the criminals are, with Hezbollah's address published in the newspapers."

Could you tell us how can the American people believe that the Reagan Administration intends to do anything more than issue words at this time, in this kind of indirect economic -- We understood, or from what I gathered, there have been vows of punishment -- we're going to punish these people.

Now, does that mean any action, or is it just going to seep down kind of like the "trickle down" theory?

A I think you've got to see this, the actions, decisions taken today as part of a general campaign against terrorism and against hijackings, but focusing in this case on the Beirut International Airport.

Q There will be more, is what you're saying, right? There's going to be lots more?

A The goal is to get BIA off-limits.

Q But I mean, there will be more reaction than just the Beirut Airport? We are going to hunt down Stethem's killers, aren't we?

A We want Stethem's killers brought to justice.

Q How are you going to do it?

A We'll be pursuing that question with the authorities in Lebanon.

Q What's the legal basis for these steps?

Q Today's statement says that Syria remains on the terrorist list, and the explanation was that Syria, in various ways, has assisted terrorists. Do you know -- Does the State Department know at this point whether the terrorists who hijacked the airline, or the second group of terrorists who held Americans captive for 17 days were in any way trained, supplied, or sponsored by Syria?

A No, we don't know that. All of the facts are not in on the three who initially hijacked the plane, and who were joined apparently by members of their elements of the Hezbollah -- and incidentally, Mr. Potter, it's his statement notwithstanding the exact addresses are not known, that there are many different elements under the generic term "Hezbollah."

The debriefing of the passengers involved, as you know, is in process right now in Germany, and we'll be sifting through a good deal of evidence before we reach any firm conclusions. But we have no evidence, in answer to your direct question, at this time.

Marvin.

Q Sir, Mr. McFarlane said today that there are two or three strategic targets in the Middle East. You have, very cautiously today, identified one action by the Department. Is one to interpret this action as a "first step," to use your words, towards action against the two or three targets that Mr. McFarlane talked about?

A All I'm going to talk about today is BIA.

Q Are they linked, however? Could you say whether there is a program that the Administration may have incorporating both this action against BIA as well as the two or three targets that Mr. McFarlane talked about?

A The Administration is engaged in a very wide-ranging program, a wide-ranging set of considerations aimed at international terrorism; and I'm not going to go into any more specifics.

Q Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned a moment ago that you were pursuing the question with the authorities of Lebanon about finding the killers of Robert Stethem. Does that mean that you're going to seek extradition?

A That would be one way to proceed, yes.

Q As you know, the names of those believed to be the killers have been in the press. Do you believe you know who killed him?

A We -- No, the man who pulled the trigger? As of now, we don't know. But that is what I hope is going to come out of the ongoing debriefings of the passengers.

Q You do not know the man who pulled the trigger?

A No.

Q Do you know down to --

A We know the names --

Q --- down to one of two people who pulled the trigger?

A I don't believe so. No.

Q You started to say something.

A I do not personally know that.

Q I'm sorry. I thought you started --

A No. We had the names, and each one seemed to have more than one name and more than one passport in Athens.

Q Is this Ali Atva, or Atvi, one of them?

A Was one of them, yes.

Q Was one of them.

A Yes. But who pulled the trigger is a question. I don't know who pulled the trigger.

Q You don't know whether he pulled --

A I don't know who pulled the trigger.

Q Do you have any additional information about the seven, as a result of what the past 17 days, for example, their whereabouts, their well-being? All they all alive?

A No, nothing surfaced about the whereabouts of the seven. That they are alive we assume. We've heard nothing to the contrary.

Q Do we know whether they are together? Do we know even whether they are all in one place, or do we know that --

A No, we do not know that.

Q If the measures that you are talking about implementing today were fully in effect two months ago, would it have affected the hijacking in any way? It wouldn't, would it? The course of the hijacking would not have been affected in any way by the steps that you are taking today?

A No, but these steps are to be seen as the beginning of a campaign of an overall process. You're right.

Q A couple of the hijackers who were interviewed last night had said that it was their impression that our American Ambassador in Beirut had asked Nabih Berri to become involved at some point. Is that something you can confirm or deny?

A I believe that Nabih Berri stepped forward on his own when he put Amal members onto the plane at the time of the second landing in Beirut.

Q Do you deny that the American Embassy officials in Beirut made any approach to Mr. Berri before that?

A I honestly don't recall whether there was a specific contact. I don't want to mislead you on it. I just don't recall, in the mass of cables we've had over the last several weeks, that it happened at the airport. That Amal is the controlling militia at the airport is a fact; but whether he was in contact before Berri made his own move to put his own people on the plane, I can't confirm that.

Q When you say you're talking to officials in Lebanon about punishment for the killers of Stethem, does that mean you're talking to Nabih Berri as the Justice Minister there? To whom were you talking?

A We're talking to the -- it gets to sound like the "Mikado," doesn't it? We talking to him and other members of the government.

Q What is it you want them to do, specifically, in response to this action?

A To the response of the killing?

Q No, no. In response to your action today on the BIA, your effort to close the airport? What would be a constructive response of the authorities to whom you're talking in Lebanon?

A Well, the constructive response ultimately would



be the closing of the airport as a whole until such time as the Government of Lebanon is in a position to deny its use by terrorist. I mean, it's kind of a tautology.

Q Would this kind of action lead to increased Lebanese airlines from Syria and Syrian control over Lebanon? And wouldn't that be contradictory to your statement of support for Lebanon independence and sovereignty, and all that --

A Why do you say that?

Q Well, where are they going to go? Aren't they going to go to Syria, or do you expect them to go to Israel?

A Who?

Q The Lebanese, or the Middle East Airlines?

A What are you talking about -- commercial benefit to other airports that the Lebanese would be using?

Q I don't see what else they could use. What are they going to do with the airport? For what reasons?

A It's designed as a pressure on the community of Lebanon, yes, to bring about its -- to get that airport denied by -- for use by hijackers.

Q Would you consider sanctions also against Air France, because, if you know, Air France owns 50 percents of the Middle East Airlines?

A I think it's less than that, but Air France is a substantial partner in that, yes.

MR. KALB: We're going to take a couple more questions, please, because of scheduling.

Q What is the legal basis for this action which you announced today, please?

A If you take the first, which is denial of MEA service to the United States, the legal action there would be taken through the Department of Transportation, and the legal action is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Section 1114(a).

Q On another related subject.

Q I don't remember that one.

STATE DEPARTMENT

**WASHFAX RECEIPT**  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

85 JUL 2 1952

**B**

S/S #

RECEIVED

85 JUL 2 9:52

STATE DEPARTMENT  
SITUATION ROOM



MESSAGE NO. **001698** CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE <sup>RW 3/3/11</sup> No. Pages \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: JBARGER TASK FORCE X 6610 7514  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION LIST OF FORMER HOSTAGES RETURNING TO  
ANDREWS AFB ABOARD TWA SPECIAL FLIGHT

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>WH/Press</u>	<u>Bob Sims</u>	<u>X 2949</u>	
	<u>MARTIN</u>		
	<u>SMALL</u>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☒ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: For urgent delivery.

S/S Officer: [Signature] RSP

1. TWA Special Flight as of 7/2/85, 0615 Hours

1. AMBURGY, Victor M/M
2. ANDERSON, Kenneth M/M
3. BARCZAK, Jerome and 1 family member
4. BOWEN, Kenneth and family member
5. BYRON, LEO Jr. and 1 (or 2 per TWA) family member(s)
6. CARLSON, Kurt M/M
7. CONWELL, Allyn and 2 family members
8. CULLINS, Thomas and 2 family members
9. DAHL, Stuart M/M
10. DARSH, STUART and 4 family members
11. DEMPSEY, Stuart M/M
12. ELLIOTT, Grant and 2 family members
13. HERZBERG, Richard and 1 family member
14. HILL, Peter and 3 family members
15. HOSKINS, James Jr. and 3 family members
16. INGALLS, Jeffrey and 1 family member
17. JOHNSON, Raymond and 1 family member
18. LAZANSKY, George and 2 family members
19. MARESCA, Phillip
20. MCCARTY, John and 2 family members
21. MCLAUGHLIN, James and 2 family members
22. MOON, Richard and 1 family member
23. MURRY, Thomas
24. PEEL, Bob Jr. and 2 family members
25. SUGGS, Clinton D. M/M
26. SYNNESTVEDT, Blake and 3 family members
27. TESTRAKE, John and 1 family member
28. WATSON, Tony Daniel M/M
29. WHITMOYER, Claude
30. WILLETT, Steve M/M
31. ZIMMERMANN, Ben

Total: 31 exhostages + 43 (or 44) family members = 74 (or 75)

II. The following will return to the US separately:

1. Brown, Michael Brad--probably will leave Wednesday
2. Brown, Robert--Lufthansa 442 to Boston 7/2
3. Darras, William M/M
4. Garza, Vicente TWA 741 7/3 JFK
5. Grossmayer, Simon TWA 741 7/2 JFK  
TWA 815 to Chicago ETA 1746
6. Traugott, Ralph and 3 family 7/2 on Lufthansa 422
7. Trautman, Bobby and 2 family 7/3 on TWA 741
8. Toga, Arthur and 1 family on British Airways Concord 7/2

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

### *Collection Name*

Sims, Robert: Files

### *Withdrawer*

RB 3/3/2011

W

### *File Folder*

TWA HIJACKING/HOSTAGES (9 OF 9)

### *FOIA*

F97-046/4

WILLS

### *Box Number*

CF0467

49

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
106253 CABLE	STATE 209504	7	7/10/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Who's the point of contact (in the  
working group) for public affairs aspects  
of a possible release?

Ed Dineen will  
be our man

Mark full

The following statement was released by the Department's spokesman:

"The United States reaffirms its longstanding support for the preservation of Lebanon, its government, its stability and security, and for the mitigation of the suffering of its people."

If Asked:

We are making this statement in order to make our position clear.