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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 27, 1982

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WS

MEMORANDUM FOR ALL LUNCHEON PARTICIPANTS

FROM: DAVE GERGEN *DG*
SUBJECT: *Don* Rather Briefing Luncheon

Attached please find the materials given to the President this morning on domestic issues (focusing on questions raised by Rather in his commentary last night). NSC has given the President a separate set of materials on foreign/defense issues.

For an agenda, Larry and I suggest:

1st 25 minutes -- NSC briefing (Clark/McFarlane)
Next 15 minutes - Federalism update (Williamson)
Next 20 minutes - Economic update (Regan/Anderson)

Theoretically, that will give us 15 minutes of "extra" time to cover curve balls.

Attachment

05 JAN 28 1982

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: [Illegible text]

[Illegible text]

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DOMESTIC ISSUES RAISED BY RATHER SHOW LAST NIGHT

THE RECESSION: How Long? How Deep?

-- Expect to see signs of recovery in spring and early summer; then a strong second half of year (5% growth in 2nd half).

-- Fundamentals for recovery already in place (tax cut, stimulus from more defense spending).

-- If asked: unemployment now at 8.9%, could possibly go higher. Expect to hold below double digits.

-- Encouraging notes: new orders for durable goods up 2 months in row, housing starts are up (but note that interest rates are edging up, too).

-- Best news: inflation down to 8.9% in 1981 vs. 12.4% in 1980. Out of double digit range for first time in 4 years.

THE DEFICITS: How High? What Impact?

-- Expect the 1982 deficit to be in mid-90s. With our program, should come down steadily thereafter.

-- Exact estimates won't be available until budget goes up on February 8.

-- News of deficits should actually be reassuring to markets, since media was reporting leaks of much higher deficits in December.

-- How can you finance deficits? Won't you choke off recovery?

-- Won't be hard to finance during recession because private credit demands are low.

-- As tax cuts stimulate recovery, should have an enlarged pool of private savings that will make financing easier. Savings rate has already shot up from 5% to 6% of personal income; encouraging news.

-- But still, we believe it extremely important to hold down deficits as much as possible -- thus, the need for spending restraints.

THE SPENDING CUTS: How Much? How to Enact?

-- Entitlement savings will be \$63 billion over 4 years (excludes Social Security).

-- Other billions of savings thru management initiatives -- including debt collection, surplus proper sales, strengthened fraud, waste and abuse prevention, etc.

-- Cut the rate of growth of Fed spending from 17% in FY 1981, to 9% in recession budget of FY 1982, to less than 5% in FY 83-84 budgets.

-- Will be looking seriously at another omnibus budget reconciliation as means of securing some of these savings this year.

MONETARY POLICY: Fed at Fault? Paul Volcker?

-- We have steadily supported Fed's commitment to slow, stable monetary growth.

-- Our only difference has been that several times over past year, they have wandered outside the targets -- at first too low, more recently a spurt upwards.

-- All we're asking is that they play in the fairway, not in the rough.

-- Re: Volcker. A good professional, in many ways an admirable man, sincerely trying. Again, any differences we might have are not over policy but application of policy.

-- Volcker's term expires in August, 1983. RR doesn't have power to remove (except for malfeasance).

-- Incidentally, a few years ago, Congress considered a change that would allow President early in his term to name his own chairman; Fed testified for it, but never passed.

Other Domestic Issues of Interest

Social Issues

- Baker committed to floor consideration this session.
- Helms bill versus Hatch amendment debate likely to be a hot one on abortion; school prayer also expected on the floor and anti-busing push certain to be raised again.
- May be brought up as soon as February.
- Meese working on issues now.

Press Conference Factual "Errors"

- Interesting that first AP story ran early evening, then rewrite ran again with changes and corrections and deletions. They made mistakes in reporting RR's "errors."

Polls

- Recent decline reported in RR's approval ratings counter-balanced by latest Harris survey showing improvement from December finding of 52-47 percent negative. January finding is 52-47 positive.
- By 55 to 42, RR was rated positively on "inspiring confidence in the White House" by Harris.

Leaks

- Press still expressing distaste toward crack down, feeling it will chill relations, dry up sources. It's attacked as effort to protect Administration from embarrassment, not national security.
- NSC under Judge Clark now working up procedures that will protect classified information, while recognizing need to keep public and press fully informed.

Civil Rights

- Both Voting Rights extension and IRS schools legislation to be considered this session; will refocus attention on RR's civil rights posture, sensitivity to minorities.

Thunder on the Right

- Conservative spokesmen been candidly critical of RR's Administration and White House staff since first of the year.


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- Widely reported press conference by group of conservatives gave RRonly a "C" on first year report card.
- Meese & Baker talked to group last week; have had good private talks since (Meese).

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1982

BRIEFING LUNCHEON FOR CBS INTERVIEW

DATE: January 27, 1982
TIME: 12 noon (75 minutes)
PLACE: Cabinet Room
FROM: Larry Speakes 

I. PURPOSE

To bring the President up to date on topics that may be asked during the President's interview with Dan Rather of CBS.

II. BACKGROUND

See attached questions and answers

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President	William P. Clark
The Vice President	Richard G. Darman
Ed Meese	Kenneth Duberstein
Jim Baker	Craig Fuller
Mike Deaver	David Gergen
Martin Anderson	Larry Speakes

IV. PRESS PLAN

There will be no press coverage.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The entire time will be used for discussion of the interview.

-- Would you give us your appraisal of the first year of your foreign policy

AFRICA

-- Isn't it a fact that relations with Black Africa have been on the back burner in your Administration?

-- How are we doing in southern Africa?

-- Have we made withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola a condition of a Namibia settlement?

DEFENSE/CRISIS MANAGEMENT

-- Do you intend to go forward with arms control? Are you now opposed to setting a date to begin START? Will Polish developments block progress in START and other arms control areas?

-- Many people here and abroad think that the US and the Soviet Union have enough nuclear weapons to completely destroy one another. They ask why we should spend billions more on defense. What is your response?

-- As part of your commitment to reduce the size of the federal budget deficit, can't the defense budget growth be further reduced?

-- Could you explain how the strategic proposals will help strategic arms control proposals?

-- Are we planning to develop a ballistic missile defense system, including space-based missile defense? Would such activity be contrary to the ABM Treaty? Wouldn't such a system be destabilizing?

-- Considering the budget deficit now expected and the downturn in the economy, why not skip the B-1 and accelerate development of the "Stealth" bomber?

-- There have been recent reports that the Administration, perhaps because of Hill pressure, has dropped superhardening of MX silos as part of the Reagan strategic force program. Does this represent a change in policy?

-- Given the greater accuracy of the MX, can't the US be accused of acquiring a first-strike capability and won't that be destabilizing?

-- Your remarks this fall on the possibility of limiting nuclear war have raised a storm in Europe. Do you have any reaction?

-- What is the reason for all these massive anti-nuclear and anti-American demonstrations in Europe? Are they caused by Soviet agitators?

-- On January 7, 1982, you decided to continue peacetime draft registration. Why did you change from the strong opposition to registration you expressed during the 1980 campaign?

-- Who are the members of this Special Situation Group, and how often have they met?

INTELLIGENCE

- Is the Administration planning to issue an Executive Order that will make it significantly easier to classify documents?
- Could you comment on a recent CBS News program (aired on Saturday evening, January 23) which charged that during the Vietnam war the President and other US leaders were deceived by the US intelligence community regarding estimates of the strength and size of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces?

LATIN AMERICA

- With so little available for foreign aid, how can you really expect to address the poverty and resulting instability throughout Latin America?
- There are a variety of assessments on the situation in El Salvador, ranging from Salvadoran spokesmen suggesting the military is in control, reports that the guerrillas are close to controlling major portions of the country, to Secretary Haig's own assessment of a stalemate. What is your own assessment?
- Would you comment on reports that the Cuban economy has become much more prosperous since the Mariel boatlift and that the US embargo has not blocked economic growth?
- There are reports that the Soviets have supplied Cuba with more MIG-23s (FLOGGERS). Does this disturb you, and do you plan to do anything about it?
- What exactly do you plan to do about Cuba's subversive activities in Central America?
- Why has it taken so long to announce the Caribbean Basin plan? Is there anything to it?

LAW OF THE SEA

- The law of the sea negotiations start again in early March. Will the U.S. participate in them?

MIDEAST

- In the wake of our veto of the Security Council resolution calling for sanctions against Israel, do we intend to accept Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan?
- Do we see any prospects for a breakthrough in the autonomy talks?
- Do we have a position on the autonomy talks?
- Are you going to appoint a special negotiator for the autonomy talks?
- What happens to Camp David if there is no autonomy agreement?

ECONOMICS

-- Do you really feel that development can be achieved by more emphasis on private sector investment and less emphasis on international institutions such as the World Bank?

-- By supporting a more restrictive textile agreement last month, hasn't the Administration gone back on its pledge at Cancun to open its markets to developing countries?

(Qs & As on trade with Japan included in Far East questions)

FAR EAST

-- Has there been an easing in relations between the United States and Vietnam in the past year?

-- Can you confirm that a US Government team will be traveling to Hanoi to discuss POW/MIA issues?

-- Your conservative supporters seem to feel that you've backed away from your promise to "upgrade" relations with Taiwan. Why did you submit to PRC pressures and refuse to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan?

-- What was the Chinese reaction to your decision?

-- Haven't you violated at least the spirit, if not the letter, of the Taiwan Relations Act with this decision?

-- South Korea has proposed a series of measures designed to open communication between North and South Korea. There is also mention of eventual reunification. Is this another propaganda ploy, or is there real significance to it?

-- Are you satisfied that Japan is doing enough to increase its defense spending?

-- Would you comment on the current state of US-Japanese trade relations?

-- Do you anticipate a new disagreement with Japan over Automobile imports?

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

-- Does the United States support the resolution convening Global Negotiations in New York?

GREECE

-- Prime Minister Papandreou of Greece has been making statements calling into question Greece's commitment to NATO, to the European Community, and the status of U.S. bases in that country. What is your reaction?

- What about the status of East Jerusalem? Isn't this a stick point between the Egyptians and the Israelis?
- There are recurring reports that the Israelis continue to object to European participation in the MFO on the basis of their latest communications. What is happening?
- What does Israel have to do before we resume the suspended talks on the Memorandum of Understanding?
- Can you tell us something about objectives we hope to achieve from the visit of Egyptian President Mubarak early next month?
- What can you tell us about the situation in Lebanon? Is Habib going back?
- Is the killing of an American defense official in Paris linked to Libya?
- Since the threat to U.S. officials from terrorist hit squads has diminished, what is U.S. policy toward Libya?
- Do you still regard the threat from Libya as serious, or is there a possibility that your information was incomplete? Given doubts among informed officials within your own administration over the seriousness of the threat, why don't you make public the information you had that caused a flap?

POLAND

- There has been an increasing number of articles pointing out that the lack of coordinated response to Poland signals a grave crisis for the Atlantic Alliance. Where do our allies stand, and where does the Alliance itself stand?
- Are things getting worse in Poland?
- What is the economic situation in Poland under martial law, and how have our sanctions affected the situation?
- What can you tell us about Lech Walesa?
- What is your reaction to General Jaruzelski's January 25 speech?
- Would you comment on recent press reports that DOD officials stated that the U.S. could delay "for many years" construction of the Siberian pipeline by banning export and use of U.S. equipment and technology required for that line?
- Is there anything the U.S. can or should do to help the suffering people of Poland, and to alleviate the side-effects of our economic sanctions against the Polish Government?
- There has been a suggestion that the West accept some of the Solidarity leaders that are now detained in Poland? Would we be prepared to do that?

- Will there be a new series of measures applied against the Soviet Union?
- You said recently that our economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union were having effect. What evidence do we have of their effectiveness?
- In your press conference of January 20, you said that the Pope supported actions the United States had taken against the governments of Poland and the Soviet Union. The Vatican subsequently released a statement that contradicted your assertion. Where does the truth lie?

USSR

- What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations?
- Given your longstanding belief in linkage, why proceed with Haig-Gromyko talks, let alone consider a summit when Soviet behavior in Poland and Afghanistan continues to be so negative?
- What can you tell us about the meeting between Secretary Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?
- Would you give any thought to reimposing the grain embargo which both American and European critics say would be the most effective step against the Soviets?
- Have we discussed a joint grain embargo with our Allies?
- Do you have any comment on the French-Soviet gas accord?

WESTERN EUROPE

- Is a new trade war developing between the US and Europe on steel and agriculture?

HUMAN RIGHTS

- As you look back over the first year of this Administration, how would you characterize the Reagan human rights policy?
- The Administration seems to use quiet diplomacy with friends and public castigation with enemies. Isn't this a double standard?

LEAKS

- What led you to issue the recent directive on leaks?
- What kind of damage has been done by leaks thus far in the Administration?
- Doesn't NSDD-19 represent a sharp departure from past practices?
- Doesn't this directive amount to an abridgment of freedom of the press, upon which an informed citizenry must depend?
- The Directive states that "all legal methods" will be used to investigate leaks. Could you elaborate further on this statement?

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DAN RATHER INTERVIEW: FIRST YEAR
APPRAISAL OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

-- In the year that has passed since my Inauguration, this Administration has made good progress in pursuing our foreign policy objectives.

-- We are restoring American economic, military and political strength and are demonstrating that we are a reliable friend and ally and are willing to use our strength to defend our interests and ideals.

-- We are standing firm in our opposition to Soviet adventurism -- as in Afghanistan and in the Soviet sponsored crack-down in Poland. For instance, we remain committed to exerting maximum pressure to reverse martial law and to help ensure the restoration of internationally recognized rights for the Polish people.

-- We are strengthening alliances and working to develop a common view of how we and our Allies must deal with the challenges, such as Poland, that test us.

-- We are creating a new balance with the Soviets that will lay a stronger basis for peace in a new framework of reciprocity and restraint.

-- We are continuing to maintain an active dialogue with the Soviet leadership to make clear our views and to minimize the risks of miscalculation and misunderstanding.

-- We are moving with determination to negotiate with Moscow in the arms controls area, i.e., the TNF talks.

-- Our restrained but firm response to the relentless buildup of Soviet military power includes decisions to strengthen sea, land and air-based elements of the strategic triad, and a proposed defense program designed to remedy the neglect of the past decade and restore the eroding balance on which our security, and the security of our friends and allies, depend.

-- In the Middle East we are continuing our partnership in the Camp David process in the hopes that the benefits of peace and prosperity can come to all the nations and people of that region.

-- We have underscored our commitment to seek improvements in human rights conditions through traditional diplomacy and to speak out publicly where necessary to heighten international consciousness of human rights concerns.

11/5/51

DAY NATIONALLY INTERVIEW: FIRST YEAR
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-- We have made a major effort to combat international terrorism and have demonstrated that we will not continue business as usual with countries who support terrorism.

-- In the area of non-proliferation, we are working to enhance our nuclear supply cooperation with other key allies in order to secure more vigorous and effective cooperation in coping with proliferation in sensitive areas of the world.

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AFRICA



26
January 21, 1982

RELATIONS WITH AFRICA

Q: Isn't it a fact that relations with Black Africa have been on the back burner in your Administration?

A: Not at all. We have been engaged on a daily basis since I took office on the resolution of the Namibian and Southern Africa problems. In my first year, I personally met with seven African heads of government including President Moi of Kenya, who is Chairman of the Organization of African Unity. The Vice President has met several other African leaders. I have personally exchanged correspondence with a number of African leaders on problems of mutual concern. Our opposition to Libyan aggression in Africa - in Chad and Sudan - was public and prompt, as is our continuing support to the African Peace Keeping Force in Chad. I have personally approved extraordinary funds to support Sudan, Liberia, and the Chad Peace Keeping Force. I recently dispatched a high-level trade and investment mission headed by Secretaries Block and Baldrige to four African countries to increase not only official contact on economic matters but also private investment - on that delegation were 26 chief executive officers of US companies.

NSC

January 24, 1982

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January ²⁶~~18~~, 1982

NAMIBIA NEGOTIATIONS

Q: How are we doing in southern Africa?

A: -- We met ^{earlier this month} ~~last week~~ with the South Africans in London and with the Angolans in Paris as part of our continuing effort to achieve Namibian independence and in general to improve prospects for longterm peace and security in the southern African region. I am encouraged by the progress that is being made although there remain very serious issues to be resolved with all parties.

Q: Have we made withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola a condition of a Namibia settlement?

A: -- In our view the two issues are clearly related, although we are not approaching these negotiations with conditions. We are seeking peace and security in the region; both issues are part of achieving that overall objective.

NSU

DEFENSE
ISSUES



January 26, 1982

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Q: You reportedly have approved production of nerve gas. Do we really need such a ghastly weapon? Can't we sit down with the Soviets and work out some minimal degree of cooperation?

A: To avoid chemical warfare has been an international goal throughout the century. The United States supports this goal and is committed to the objective of banning lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. We are also firmly committed to the policy of "no first use" of such weapons.

Considering the current world situation, in particular the absence of a verifiable ban on producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, the United States must maintain a credible deterrent capability. We strongly believe this capability will provide a leverage towards negotiating a verifiable agreement banning such weapons. A decision on the production of chemical weapons must involve these considerations.

150

ARMS CONTROL - START/SALT, INF, MBFR, NEGOTIATIONS

Q: Do you intend to go forward with Arms Control issues? Are you now opposed to setting a date to begin START negotiations? Will Polish developments block progress in START and other arms control areas?

A: In my address of November 18 I underlined this Administration's commitment to seeking substantial reductions in strategic and other weapons. We continue the commitment to achieving reductions which are equal and verifiable and which will reduce the threat of war.

Our preparations for START are continuing, and at present the INF and MBFR talks will continue. As to the impact of developments in Poland, we have made clear our concern about continuing repression of the Polish people and there can be no question that the climate of East-West relations, including prospects for moving forward in arms control, will be seriously affected by such repression. We urge the Soviet leaders to keep this in mind, and to turn from the path of repression and confrontation to the path of peaceful progress.

Nsc

January 25, 1982

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January 26
~~December 2~~, 1982

US DEFENSE PROGRAM

Q: A deep belief exists among many people here and abroad that both the US and the Soviet Union have more than enough nuclear weapons to completely destroy each other. They ask, why should we spend billions more on defense? What is your response?

A: The last decade has seen an unparalleled military buildup by the Soviet Union, while the United States cut back its military programs. The resulting imbalance threatens US security and world peace.

Our defense programs are designed to assure capable conventional and nuclear forces. Both conventional and nuclear forces are essential for the maintenance of a credible deterrent. Peace through strength is sound. At the same time, we will seek meaningful arms reductions through equal and verifiable arms control agreements.

A. I agree that both sides have too many strategic nuclear weapons. It will be my goal to have massive reductions in the START negotiations.

January 26
~~December 14~~, 1982

DEFENSE BUDGET

Q: As part of your commitment to reduce the size of the federal budget deficit, can't the defense budget growth be further reduced?

A: We must resist the expedient solution of further reducing our crucial defense programs. I have already made the maximum reduction that is prudent in this area. As a first priority we must provide long-term defense budget growth to strengthen our defense and offset the massive Soviet military buildup.

A. We hope so and I am going to have
a special group look at this problem.

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A: The House has passed a bill to increase defense spending by 10 percent over the next five years.

ADMINISTRATION'S STRATEGIC PROGRAMS

Q. Could you explain how the strategic proposals will help strategic arms control prospects?

A. The Administration's strategic program will strengthen our total deterrence, not just one leg of the Triad. We believe that we must not enter into negotiations with the Soviets except from a position of strength. The Soviets have long recognized this principle, and have never allowed arms control to interfere with their perceived military requirements. We must recognize this as well. Then we can begin talking about how to reduce these requirements.

NSC

January 25, 1982

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- A. The Administration's strategic program will strengthen our total deterrence, not just one leg of the Triad. We believe that we must not enter into negotiations with the Soviets except from a position of strength. The Soviets have long recognized this principle, and have never allowed arms control to interfere with their perceived military requirements. We must recognize this as well. Then we can begin talking about how to reduce these requirements.

January 26
~~December 14~~, 1982

Q: As part of the strategic package, we are planning to develop a ballistic missile defense system, including space-based missile defense. Would such activity be contrary to the ABM Treaty? Wouldn't such a system be destabilizing?

A: The research and development activities we are planning to pursue are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty. A truly effective space-based missile defense, which is also cost-effective, would provide an enormous advantage to the side possessing it. Such a system, however, is so far in the future that it is difficult to talk of it as being stabilizing or destabilizing. We really don't know, at this time, the world context into which this system would be introduced.

ASC

January 26
~~December 14~~, 1982

B-1

Q: Considering the budget deficit now expected and the down turn in the economy, why not skip the B-1 and accelerate the development of the "Stealth" bomber?

A: I know that many are truly concerned about my selecting the B-1 bomber at a time of real fiscal constraints. It was only after long and deliberate reflection, I made my decision. The B-1B represents a much needed and most significant addition to our strategic force posture and will effectively perform various missions well into the next century. To have accelerated the "Stealth bomber" would have required taking unwarranted risks. I am not willing to rely on an aging and potentially vulnerable bomber force while awaiting the promising, but unproven capabilities of the "Stealth" bomber.

NSC

January 26, 1961

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an aging and potentially vulnerable bomber force while
awaiting the promising, but unproven capabilities of
the "stealth" bomber.

MX

Q: There have been recent reports that the Administration, perhaps because of Hill pressure, has dropped superhardening of MX silos as part of the Reagan strategic force program. Does this represent a change in policy?

A: No. My Administration is committed to closing the window of vulnerability in the quickest time possible. To do this we will deploy some MX missiles in existing hardened silos pending a decision on our long-term survivable ICBM basing mode. Further study has shown that existing hardened silos will suit our needs during this interim period.

NSC

January ²⁶25, 1982

MX

Q. Given the greater accuracy of the MX, can't the US be accused of acquiring a first-strike capability and won't that be destabilizing?

A. Our MX program is designed to overcome the vulnerabilities introduced by the continuing buildup of Soviet military programs. It is in fact the Soviet drive for superiority which has made our overall strategic modernization programs imperative. The MX interim basing in silos is a first step toward restoring the ICBM balance, and thereby establishing a more stable and lasting US strategic deterrent.

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NSC

January 25, 1982

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A second major step in our strategic modernization program is the development of a new, more accurate, and more reliable ICBM. The MX program is a key element in this effort. It is designed to provide the US with a secure, survivable, and effective ICBM force. The MX program is also a key element in our overall strategic modernization program. It is designed to provide the US with a secure, survivable, and effective ICBM force. The MX program is also a key element in our overall strategic modernization program. It is designed to provide the US with a secure, survivable, and effective ICBM force.

LIMITING NUCLEAR WAR

Q: Your remarks this fall on the possibility of limiting nuclear war have raised a storm in Europe. Do you have any reaction?

A: It is unfortunate that what I said in October has been taken out of context and misused. As I said later on the way to the Cancun meetings, there has been no change in the NATO doctrine of flexible response. I would point out that this doctrine, which is a doctrine of deterrence, not of warfighting, calls for the Alliance to be able to respond to aggression at any level -- conventional, tactical nuclear or strategic nuclear. We therefore have forces capable at all these levels. We do not intend to fight wars at those levels, but by our capability to prevent the other side from thinking they could increase their power by military aggression. Furthermore, it is simply untrue that the United States is considering a war in Europe that would spare the United States. I take seriously the NATO Treaty provision that an attack on one member state is an attack on all. Twice in my lifetime the United States has entered wars in Europe in order to keep a hostile country from dominating the continent. We have 350,000 U.S. soldiers along with their families in Europe right now. No American President could deliberately plan to sacrifice those citizens. The United States is committed fully to the deterrence of military aggression against its allies in Europe by its commitment to fight alongside its allies should deterrence fail.

NSC

January ²⁴25, 1982

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Q: What is the reason for all these massive anti-nuclear and anti-American demonstrations in Europe? Are they caused by Soviet agitators?

A: It is well known that the Soviet Union provides funding and direction to many of the organizations involved in these demonstrations. However, I believe Soviet actions are not entirely responsible for them. These demonstrations are prompted by the concern that every person feels when he thinks about nuclear weapons. I feel the same horror at the consequences of nuclear war. However, the demonstrators and I have entirely different ideas of how we deter such a war. They apparently believe that if the West unilaterally reduces the level of its nuclear weapons the world will become a safer place. I believe only if both sides reduce their weapons will our security and the chances for peace be improved. In addition, I believe that only a firm commitment to modernize our forces will provide incentives to bring the other side to the bargaining table. We have made a proposal at Geneva for the total elimination of one of the most threatening nuclear weapons systems -- land-based intermediate range missiles. However, if we are unable to reach a verifiable and fair agreement, then we will ensure that there is a balance at higher levels, and our security and the peace will be ensured, as they have been for 35 years.

NSC

January 25, 1982

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PEACETIME DRAFT REGISTRATION

Q: On January 7, 1982, you decided to continue peacetime draft registration. Why did you change from the strong opposition to registration you expressed during the 1980 campaign?

A: After careful analysis of the findings of the Presidential Military Manpower Task Force, it was clear that continuation of peacetime draft registration is in the best interests of the country. In the event of a future threat to national security, registration could save as much as six weeks in mobilizing emergency manpower. However, it is important to remember that registration does not mean a return to the draft; my opposition to a draft remains firm.

NSC

January 22, 1983

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January 26
~~December 16~~, 1982

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

- A. Who are the members of this Special Situation Group, and how often have they met?
- A. Because we do not wish to leave the impression that everytime this group meets we have a "crisis" that we are attempting to "manage," we have classified the directive that governs the membership and procedures for the Special Situation Group chaired by the Vice President. I can tell you, however, that this system is in place, and that it has functioned smoothly in expediting the development of issues in situations that are rapidly changing.

FYI: Background - The procedures defined in NSDD-3 were used during the Gambian Situation (August), Sadat's assassination (October), and ~~this week~~ as the situation in Poland developed.

NSC



ECONOMICS

TRADE WITH JAPAN

(Q's and A's on this subject incorporated
under the Far East Section)

ECONOMIC POLICY

Q: Do you really feel that development can be achieved by more emphasis on private sector investment and less emphasis on international institutions such as the World Bank?

A: Yes. The entire record of economic history demonstrates that the most productive economies are the present economies. It has been proven over and over again that private enterprise is generally much more productive than state enterprise. This is not to say that the World Bank and other similar institutions do not have an important role to play in the developing countries. They do, but their role is precisely in financing projects such as roads, dams, ports, etc. which make sense only if related to directly productive activities, and those activities are best performed by private enterprise.

TRADE WITH LDCS

Q. By supporting a more restrictive textile agreement last month, hasn't the Administration gone back on its pledge at Cancun to open its markets to developing countries?

A. The U.S. market is more open to LDC products than most other markets. As a percentage of GNP, U.S. imports of LDC manufactured goods in 1980 amounted to more than 1%. Only Britain surpassed the U.S. performance. Other countries have an obligation to increase their imports of LDC products. We stand ready to match any country in the openness of our markets. If the developed countries do not accept LDC products, how can we expect to accomplish anything with our aid? After all, the purpose of aid is ultimately to enable developing countries to earn their own way through trade.

NSC

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1881



FAR EAST

26
January 25, 1982

VIETNAM: US-SRV RELATIONS

Q: Has there been an easing in relations between the United States and Vietnam in the past year?

A: -- There has been no change in US relations with Vietnam during the past year. Our support of ASEAN on the need for Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea remains firm.

-- Although normalization of our relations with Vietnam cannot occur as long as the Vietnamese occupation of its neighbor continues, we continue to discuss with the SRV humanitarian issues such as the orderly departure program and MIAs.

-- There has been no relaxation of the embargo on trade in effect since 1975, although shipment of humanitarian gift parcels continues to be permitted.

Shade

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

POW/MIA TEAM VISIT TO HANOI

Q. Can you confirm that a US Government team will be traveling to Hanoi to discuss POW/MIA issues?

A. I cannot comment on that at this time; however, we attach high priority to the resolution of POW/MIA issues.

(FYI -- Not for Public Release:

We proposed such a trip in November, and the Vietnamese accepted last week. We are now working out the details prior to a public announcement. Only POW/MIA issues will be discussed, and the trip does not represent any change in current US policy towards Vietnam.)

NSC

January ²⁴25, 1982

ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN

Q: Your conservative supporters seem to feel that you've backed away from your promise to "upgrade" relations with Taiwan. Why did you submit to PRC pressures and refuse to sell advanced aircraft to Taiwan?

A: -- I am very proud that, from the outset, this Administration has treated the people of Taiwan, and their unofficial representatives, with the dignity and respect which befits old friends. I am convinced that we do not make new friends by mistreating old friends, and our actions have been consistent with that conviction.

-- Let me make clear that while no decision affecting our national security can be made in a vacuum, our decision on this difficult issue was not made in response to pressure. It was taken after the most careful study of actual needs, by all concerned US government agencies, and I am confident it was the correct decision when looked at in that light.

Q: What was the Chinese reaction to your decision?

A: -- Assistant Secretary Holdridge had useful, constructive talks with his counterparts in Beijing recently on this and broader international issues; but I am not going to get into the details.

Q: Haven't you violated at least the spirit, if not the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act with this decision?

A: -- No. The decision we reached was based on thorough study by all concerned US government agencies, in a manner consistent with our internal legislation on this subject.

State

KOREAN REUNIFICATION PROPOSAL

Q: South Korea has proposed a series of measures designed to open communication between North and South Korea. There is also mention of eventual reunification. Is this another propaganda ploy, or is there real significance to it?

A: I feel that this is a serious proposal from South Korea, and fully support it. The Korean people have been tragically divided for too long, and I hope very much that North Korea responds positively to President Chun's proposal.

150

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

JAPANESE DEFENSE SPENDING

Q: Are you satisfied that Japan is doing enough to increase its defense spending?

A: In this year's budget, defense spending was increased by 7.75%. This was significant in that for the first time money obligated for defense increased more than money obligated for social welfare. This was a positive step in the right direction, and I am very hopeful that that trend will continue.

NSC

26
January 18, 1982

U.S.-JAPANESE TRADE TENSIONS

Q: Would you comment on the current state of US-Japanese trade relations?

A: -- The message we want to get across is that we do not wish to redress the problem by limiting Japanese exports or creating trade barriers, but that we want the Japanese market to be as open as the US market is to imports from Japan and other countries. ^I~~The President~~ met ^{recently}~~yesterday~~ with the new Japanese Minister of International Trade and Industry, Mr. Abe, and was pleased to hear that Japan is moving in that direction.

-- Prime Minister Suzuki recently announced a fresh look at non-tariff barriers, and the advance implementation this coming April of tariff cuts originally scheduled for implementation between now and 1984. We emphasized the seriousness of the situation and the need for dramatic action. It may be difficult to get quick results, but a start has to be made.

Start

JAPANESE AUTO IMPORTS

Q. Do you anticipate a new disagreement with Japan over automobile imports?

A. This Administration believes that the best remedy for the difficulties of any particular industry or for potential trade conflicts with foreign partners is the revitalization of the American economy and the continued improvement of the multilateral trade system. The immediate economic situation is difficult and we must recognize the additional pressure it creates for precipitous action. Just as we are doing with the European countries, we intend to maintain continuing and close contact with our Japanese trading partners and keep a high-level perspective of our broader interests focused on these problems.

150

GLOBAL
NEGOTIATIONS



1981

1981

GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS

Q. Does the United States support the resolution convening Global Negotiations in New York?

A. The United States has been very cooperative and candid on this issue. Our position is forthcoming and well known. I indicated at Cancun that we were prepared to enter a new preparatory process based on a series of understandings offering the prospect of meaningful progress in these talks. That remains our position and we have offered suggestions in New York in line with our position. We hope that other countries will now be as forthcoming as we have been and support the changes that we have offered.

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1981

GREECE

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

GREECE

Q: Prime Minister Papandreu of Greece has been making statements that call into question Greece's commitment to NATO, to the European Community, and the status of U.S. bases in that country. What is your reaction?

A: Last month both Al Haig and Cap Weinberger both had long discussions with Prime Minister Papandreu himself in Brussels and we are in close contact with the Greek government at many other levels. The relationship we have with Greece includes common membership in NATO, extensive bilateral ties and important cultural affinities. We believe this complex relationship is beneficial to both countries. We believe that with good will on both sides we can work out any issues between us to our mutual satisfaction.

NSU



INTELLIGENCE

January ²⁶25, 1982

Classification Executive Order

Q: Is the Administration planning to issue an Executive Order that will make it significantly easier to classify documents?

A: Since early last year, the Administration has been considering improvements in the current classification Executive Order. These improvements are not designed to increase classification, but rather to provide better protection for information that is properly classified. Any revision to the Order will be based on the principle that an appropriate balance must be struck between the government's responsibility to protect sensitive information and the public's right to be informed of government activities.

NSC

January 25, 1982

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CBS PROGRAM ON INTELLIGENCE DECEPTION DURING VIETNAM

Q: Could you comment on a recent CBS News program (aired on Saturday evening, January 23) which charged that during the Vietnam war the President and other US leaders were deceived by the US intelligence community regarding estimates of the strength and size of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces?

A: I have not seen this program. With regard to intelligence estimates, however, I can only repeat what I said when I signed the Intelligence Executive Order last December -- "The goal of our intelligence analysts can be nothing short of the truth, even when that truth is unpleasant or unpopular. I have asked for honest, objective analysis, and I shall expect nothing less. When there is disagreement, as there often is, on the difficult questions of our time, I expect those honest differences of view to be fully expressed."

NSC

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1961



LATIN
AMERICA

LATIN AMERICAN FOREIGN AID

Q. With so little available for foreign aid, how can you really expect to address the poverty and resulting instability throughout Latin America?

A. Problems of poverty and instability not only in Latin America but throughout the developing world continue to require our urgent attention and call for additional resources. The U.S. has provided more foreign aid over the past 35 years than any other country and will continue to contribute its fair share in the future. But development is not just a question of throwing money at problems. It is a question of the most effective use of foreign aid. My Administration has put forward an approach to development which stresses the application of aid to build self-sustaining capability for trade and private investment. Aid resources will always be limited. They must be applied so as to help countries engage in commercial activities which are limited only by the ingenuity of the entrepreneur. U.S. development policy stresses the interrelationship of trade, investment and foreign assistance. Aid dollars are stretched to help countries earn their own way through trade and investment.

Nsc

January 15, 1962

UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID

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January 26, 1982

THE SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

Q: There are a variety of assessments on the situation in El Salvador, ranging from Salvadoran spokesmen suggesting the military is in control, reports that the guerrillas are close to controlling major portions of the country, to Secretary Haig's own assessment of a stalemate. What is your own assessment?

A: -- What we have seen in the past year is a fundamental shift in the tactics of the guerrilla forces. After the unsuccessful efforts to stimulate a mass uprising earlier this year, the guerrillas shifted to attacks on the economic infrastructure of the country. In some respects, this represents a victory for the Government, in that it constituted an admission by the guerrillas that they did not have a strong support base in the Salvadoran population.

-- The reformist civilian-military coalition under President Duarte held together very well during this period and has emerged stronger and more unified than it was previously. We are confident that the election process will go forward in March as an essential step in restoring peace and stability to El Salvador.

-- In recognition of their lack of support within El Salvador, the guerrillas may attempt to disrupt the election process and intimidate people who want to vote. President Duarte is striving to ensure that the elections go forward as planned in a free and stable atmosphere.

January ²⁶25, 1982

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CUBAN EMBARGO

Q: Would you comment on reports that the Cuban economy has become much more prosperous since the Mariel boatlift and that the US embargo has not blocked economic growth?

A: -- The Cuban economy has been a shambles for many years and, despite minor ups and downs, shows little sign of improvement. Were it not for massive, continuing and increasing Soviet support, Cuba's economy would deteriorate rapidly and probably collapse.

-- The Soviets give Cuba \$8-10 million per day merely to keep its economy afloat. Despite sometimes using the US embargo as a whipping boy, in occasional fits of candor Cuban leaders from Fidel Castro on down admit that the real culprit is an economic system that doesn't work.

Slat

THE FLOGGER AIRCRAFT IN CUBA

Q: There are reports that the Soviets have supplied Cuba with more MIG-23s (FLOGGERS). Does this disturb you, and do you plan to do anything about it?

A: I don't care to comment about these reports; however, I am concerned about stepped-up Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba which last year were three times greater than in any year since 1962. The more arms Cuba gets, the more it can deliver to Nicaragua, which in turn can supply the guerrillas in El Salvador.

We have and will continue to make our position on this matter very clear to the Soviet Union. This is all I have to say for now.

Nse

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26
January 25, 1982

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Q: What exactly do you plan to do about Cuba's subversive activities in Central America?

A: -- We are working with our friends to strengthen and assist democratic institutions, as shown in our support for the electoral process in Honduras and El Salvador, and to assist the region's troubled economies through our bilateral assistance and the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

-- We are also providing some of our friends with the security assistance to deal with the immediate problem of Cuban-supported guerrilla activities. At the OAS General Assembly, Secretary Haig offered to join with other concerned nations to address the threats to regional security caused by Cuban and Nicaraguan intervention.

State

CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE

Q. Why has it taken so long to announce the Caribbean Basin plan? Is there anything to it?

A. The Caribbean Basin plan has been developed in close consultation with other sponsoring countries and with the countries themselves in the region. This has taken time and reflects our interest in tailoring this program to the real needs, concerns and capabilities of all of the countries involved. We are making steady progress in the development of this plan. Our purpose is not to treat this Initiative as a public relations program but to establish a long-term, fundamental framework to encourage trade, investment and productive aid activities in this region as a way of achieving self-sustaining economic growth and enhanced political stability.

N 50



1961

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

LAW OF THE SEA

Q: The law of the sea negotiations start again in early March. Will the U.S. participate in them?

A: Yes, we will. We have just completed a major review, and I will issue a statement on it very shortly.

NSC

January 22, 1983

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1981

MIDEAST

January 26, 1982

ISRAEL: GOLAN ACTIONS

Q: In the wake of our veto of the Security Council resolution calling on sanctions against Israel, do we intend to accept Israel's de facto annexation of the Golan?

A: Our view is that all issues between Israel and Syria should be resolved by negotiations, in the context of Resolutions 242 and 338.

1/5c/5020

January 16, 1982

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January 26, 1982

AUTONOMY TALKS

Q: Do we see any prospects for a breakthrough in the autonomy talks?

A: -- We would like to see an agreement on principles signed as soon as feasible, but there is no deadline.

-- This is an extremely complicated matter which requires delicate and patient diplomacy.

-- Secretary Haig's trip to Israel and Egypt this week, his second trip to the region this month, reflects our commitment to the peace process.

105/105N

January 26, 1982

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January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

Q: Do we have a position on the autonomy talks?

A: We are looking at the arguments put forward by both sides and trying to come up with bridging strategies. We want a reasonable agreement on full autonomy called for in Camp David. We think most of the technical questions can be solved. But what is required now is creative thinking and political will. We believe an autonomy agreement is possible, provided there is political will.

NSi

January ²⁴~~25~~, 1982

SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR THE AUTONOMY TALKS

Q: Are you going to appoint a special negotiator for the autonomy talks now that they are getting more priority?

A: -- We have no plans to at the moment, but we are leaving this option open. If we decide that the appointment of a special negotiator could be helpful, then of course we will consider it.

State

January 25, 1982

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January ²⁶25, 1982

FUTURE OF CAMP DAVID

Q: What happens to Camp David if there is no autonomy agreement?

A: -- That is a hypothetical question. We are and will continue our efforts to achieve an autonomy agreement between Egypt and Israel for as long as it takes, and we will explore every avenue to achieve this agreement.

State

26
January 25, 1982

Q: What about the status of East Jerusalem? Isn't this a sticky point between the Egyptians and the Israelis?

A: Aspects of the Jerusalem problem are among the most difficult to resolve. At this stage of the negotiations, the issue is the participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the autonomous regime.

NSC

January 25, 1982

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January ²⁶20, 1982

MFO: EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION

Q: There are recurring reports that the Israelis continue to object to European participation in the MFO on the basis of their latest communications. What is happening?

A: -- The four European states are committed to participate.

While there are still some areas of disagreement as to the terms of that participation, we expect those differences to be worked out in the very near future. As I have said before, we warmly welcome European participation and are confident that contingents from the four concerned states will be there when the force is in place on March 20.

State

January 20, 1982

MEMO: EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION

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January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

ISRAEL: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Q: What does Israel have to do before we resume the suspended talks on the Memorandum of Understanding?

A: -- We have not set down any explicit conditions for this.

We hope that we can get the memorandum back on the tracks in the future, sooner rather than later. We signed that memorandum with Israel last November 30 in the context of a certain spirit of partnership and consultations and I hope that spirit will be restored.

State
January 25, 1982

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January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

VISIT OF EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK

Q: Can you tell us something about objectives we hope to achieve from the visit of Egyptian President Mubarak early next month?

A: -- I extended an invitation to President Mubarak to visit Washington in the wake of the assassination of President Sadat. That invitation and the forthcoming visit are clearly a reflection of the continuity and importance we attach to our relations with Egypt and to maintaining close consultations on a wide range of issues, particularly efforts to move forward with the Middle East peace process, and to build a strong regional security posture in that area of the world.

State

January 28, 1982

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26
January 25, 1982

SITUATION IN LEBANON

Q: What can you tell us about the situation in Lebanon? Is Habib going back?

A: -- I am very pleased that the cease-fire in southern Lebanon -- now almost six months old -- is still holding. I think it is extremely important that everyone exercise the greatest restraint in Lebanon to permit fledgling efforts to forge a national consensus to make some progress.

-- I have not yet decided when Ambassador Habib should return to the area, but he will resume his mission when we believe this would be useful.

State

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

LIBYA

Q: Is the killing of an American defense official in Paris linked to Libya?

A: We have no evidence yet as to the source of this cowardly action. If the Libyan government is engaging in such terrorist actions, it is well aware of the consequences of such actions.

NSC

January 25, 1982

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January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

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Q: Since the threat to U.S. officials from terrorist hit squads has diminished, what is U.S. policy toward Libya?

A: To inhibit Libya from undermining friendly governments in Africa and the Middle East and to end Libyan support for international terrorism.

NSC

January 23, 1982

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January ²⁶25, 1982

LIBYA: THREAT TO THE U.S.

Q: Do you still regard the threat from Libya as serious, or is there a possibility that your information was incomplete? Given doubts among informed officials within your own administration over the seriousness of the threat, why don't you make public the information you had that caused such a flap?

A: -- The Secret Service and other appropriate US Government agencies are taking necessary measures to safeguard US officials from the numerous threats which emanate from various quarters. Regarding the Libyan matter, I believe that there already has been too much said and I do not intend to comment on it.

Stat
January 25, 1981

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1981

POLAND



1981

January ²⁶~~25~~, 1982

POLAND: ALLIED RESPONSE

Q: There has been an increasing number of articles pointing out that the lack of a coordinated response to Poland signals a grave crisis for the Atlantic Alliance. Where do our allies stand, and where does the Alliance itself stand?

A: I believe that the Alliance is alive and headed in the right direction. We even plan to add a new member this year -- Spain. For several years NATO has lacked a key ingredient -- American leadership. There were important issues on which we changed course, acted without consultation, and weakened the confidence and trust of our allies.

We are now restoring that leadership. For example -- in the INF negotiations in Geneva, our position was worked out through exhaustive consultation with our allies and enjoys their full support.

On occasion leadership requires an initial action alone. The United States imposed a first round of sanctions on the Polish government and the Soviet Union. We have requested our allies and other nations to take parallel actions. However, building a fifteen-nation consensus on difficult and complicated issues takes time and effort. We are in that process now, and I believe it is succeeding. The NATO foreign ministers issued a declaration two weeks ago with a joint analysis of the situation in Poland and Soviet responsibility for it. This week further consultations are taking place on the actions required by that analysis. I am optimistic that our friends and allies will take concrete, effective actions in response to the Polish crisis which are complementary to ours.

NSC

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January 26, 1982

POLISH CRISIS

Q. Are things getting worse in Poland?

A. The situation in Poland is continuing to deteriorate. The Polish government admits that there are almost 5,000 political prisoners in Poland, many of whom have been detained for more than a month without charges. No one but the Polish government knows whether this is an accurate figure. Some estimates of prisoners are considerably higher.

Military courts are in full operation, and there are no indications that the government is seriously interested in meaningful negotiations with the Church and Solidarity.

Censorship in the Polish media continues to be strict, and throughout Poland, people are being fired for refusing to sign statements condemning Solidarity.

In essence, Poland appears to be returning to the dark days of the early fifties with the security organs having a free hand.

Finally, the economy is also continuing to slide relentlessly downhill.

N3C/S

January 26, 1982

POLAND: ECONOMIC SITUATION

Q: What is the economic situation in Poland under martial law, and how have our sanctions affected the situation?

A: There is no sign that Poland's desperate economic problems have been alleviated in any significant way by the imposition of martial law. To the contrary, severe shortage of food, medicine and many other necessities of daily life continue and threaten to get worse. Shortages of fuel and raw materials hinder industrial activity. It is becoming more and more clear that the military government of General Jaruzelski cannot hope to resolve Poland's economic dilemma without returning to a path of negotiation and compromise with Poland's workers.

Our sanctions against the Polish Government have had a significant impact. The Polish authorities themselves say so. We continue to hold in reserve additional measures which could be invoked if the repression in Poland worsens. At the same time, we want to do all that is possible to avoid hurting the Polish people. This is why I agreed when sanctions were imposed to continued shipments of U.S. humanitarian food and medical aid through private relief agencies and the Catholic Church in Poland. I have also informed General Jaruzelski that the United States is ready to consider substantial aid and support to help Poland rebuild its economy if the Polish Government returns to internationally recognized standards of respect for human rights.

January 26, 1982

LECH WALESA

Q: What can you tell us about Lech Walesa?

A: He remains under detention. He has courageously refused to bow to the government's demands that he capitulate. We and our Allies have called for his release. It is tragic commentary on events in Poland that the government finds it necessary to treat an individual of international stature in this manner.

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January 26, 1982

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January 26, 1982

COMMENT ON JARUZELSKI'S SPEECH

Q: What is your reaction to General Jaruzelski's January 25 speech?

A: -- General Jaruzelski's speech was a disappointment. It contained no indication of a willingness to compromise. There was no mention of genuine movement on martial law, prompt release of political prisoners, or return to dialogue. There were no initiatives on a program of reform and renewal such as he promised in his Christmas address.

-- It was essentially an effort to justify the continuing repression of the Polish people with little hope for any serious move toward moderation and conciliation as Polish Government spokesmen had suggested in advance of the speech.

-- The speech is indicative of a general lack of ideas and plans on the part of the military junta that rules Poland, beyond more and more repression.

NSC/S

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January 26, 1982

SIBERIAN PIPELINE

Q: Would you comment on recent press reports that DOD officials stated that the U.S. could delay "for many years" construction of the Siberian pipeline by banning export and use of U.S. equipment and technology required for that line?

A: -- U.S. opposition to the pipeline project is well known. On December 30, in light of the situation in Poland, the U.S. imposed an export control on all U.S.-origin equipment and technology for oil and gas projects in the Soviet Union, which of course includes the pipeline. Licensing of this equipment has been suspended.

-- We recognize that U.S. economic sanctions may affect some pieces of equipment for the so-called Siberian pipeline. We also note our Allies' commitment to implement our common resolve not to undercut each other's actions.

-- We trust our Allies will take parallel action and will not undercut the measures we have taken. We recognize, as does the NATO Declaration, that the national possibilities for action are different in different countries. We are engaged in a series of intensive consultations, both bilateral and multilateral, on those issues.

NSC/S

January 26, 1982

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January 26, 1982

Q: Is there anything the U.S. can or should do to help the suffering people of Poland, and alleviate the side-effects of our economic sanctions against the Polish Government?

A: My Administration is continuing to ship humanitarian aid to the people of Poland through independent relief organizations such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services. We have under consideration the need for more such aid. This crisis has again demonstrated for me the generous spirit of the American people. The Polish-American Congress and dozens of other organizations throughout the country, large and small, are collecting money, food, clothing, and medicine to help the suffering people of Poland. Similar efforts are underway in Europe. I applaud these efforts which show in the clearest possible way our concern for the well being of the Polish people.

January 26, 1982

Q: Mr. President, there has been a suggestion that the West accept some of the Solidarity leaders that are now detained in Poland? Would we be prepared to do that?

A: Dan, I wouldn't want to comment on something like that.

It's too hypothetical a question.

(We have specifically requested our Allies in NATO not to make any response to the approach made to the EC-10 by Jaruzelski on this subject. Our Allies have thus far honored our request. It would undermine our relations with them were you to comment this question.)

26
January 25, 1982

POLAND

Q: Will there be a new series of measures applied against the Soviet Union?

A: If there is no substantial progress towards the ending of martial law in Poland, the release of the political prisoners and the reopening of negotiations among the government, Solidarity and the Church, there will certainly be another set of sanctions adopted.

January 26, 1982

EFFECTIVENESS OF SANCTIONS AGAINST POLAND/THE SOVIET UNION

Q: You said recently that our economic sanctions against Poland and the Soviet Union were having effect. What evidence do we have of their effectiveness?

A: In the case of Poland, there is no question of the economic effectiveness of our sanctions: the Polish authorities themselves have repeatedly said so. The Poles have been deprived of valuable fishing rights in US waters which they have regularly exercised in past years. The normal flow of US feed grains to Poland has been interrupted, with inevitable effects on Polish livestock and poultry industries. The interruption of LOT airlines service to the US has deprived the government of the revenues it previously received from that source.

Our sanctions against the Soviet Union have above all served to convey the seriousness with which we view Soviet involvement. But they also have had an economic effect. The suspension of Aeroflot flights has deprived the Soviets of revenue. The suspension of the export of high technology and oil and gas equipment has at a minimum disrupted Soviet plans and probably increased costs. The new port access regime has cut off all cruise and some commercial shipping revenue. The closing of the Soviet Purchasing Commission reflects the reduction in US-Soviet trade caused by the sanctions.

26
January 25, 1982

RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

Q: In your press conference on January 20, you said that the Pope supported actions the United States had taken against the government of Poland and the Soviet Union. The Vatican subsequently released a statement that contradicted your assertion. Where does the truth lie?

A: We have been in close touch with the Vatican concerning events in Poland. The Pope and I share the same goals for that troubled country: The end of repression of its people, release of those detained and a resumption of the dialogue involving Solidarity. The Vatican operates differently from the United States or the governments of other countries. The Pope and his Church have moral authority and responsibilities and deal mainly on that plane. We have heard the Pope and other Church officials speak out strongly against repression in Poland. Our government and governments of other countries have not only moral, but also diplomatic, economic, and military power and responsibilities. It is our obligation to utilize them appropriately to support the people of Poland. Therefore I see no contradiction between the United States and the Vatican, but only complementary policies.



USSR

SOVIET UNION: CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS

Q: What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations? Recently, Soviet Premier Tikhonov made what appeared to be a conciliatory statement which emphasized that while the Soviets blame the U.S. for the deterioration in bilateral ties they are willing to return to normal relations. Do you have a comment?

A: The current state of U.S.-Soviet relations is not ideal. Many outstanding issues dividing our two countries have to be resolved. Yet, I categorically disagree with the Soviets as to who is to blame for the profound deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. It is their aggressive, expansionist policies which have engendered this state of affairs. The Soviet Union continues to wage brutal war against the Afghani people in support of an illegitimate government. It actively supports and trains terrorists throughout the world, plays a disruptive role in Third World conflicts, and continues to impose its ideology and its system on other countries. Moreover, the Soviet Government has played a key role in the repression of Solidarity in Poland.

We continue to be ready to talk to the Soviets about these and other issues of concern. Yet, we don't see dialogue itself as a panacea to these problems. Unless the Soviet Union is prepared to change its international behavior and show genuine signs of moderation, I am not optimistic about significant improvements in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Nsc

January 25, 1982

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HAIG-GROMYKO MEETING

Q: Given your longstanding belief in linkage, why proceed with the Haig-Gromyko talks, let alone consider a summit when Soviet behavior in Poland and Afghanistan continues to be so negative?

A: -- I believe that during periods of increased tension it is particularly important that the Soviets know exactly where we stand on critical issues. This is the primary reason that Secretary Haig is meeting with Gromyko.

-- The steps we have taken in response to Soviet actions toward Poland make it very clear that no aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship can be insulated from the adverse impact of unrestrained and irresponsible Soviet international behavior. As to the summit, our position remains clear -- we are not opposed in principle but such a meeting would have to be carefully prepared and there would have to be a reasonable chance of concrete achievements.

Stat

January 22, 1982

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January ²⁶25, 1982

Q: What can you tell us about the meeting between Secretary Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko?

A: The Secretary discussed the full range of U.S. - Soviet relations. But the principle ^{focus} was on Poland and its impact on East-West relations as a whole. As you know, he also raised other pressing problems, Afghanistan, our concerns about Cuban activities in Central America and Africa and the continuing arms buildup in Cuba. Arms control issues also were discussed. And we raised a number of bilateral issues, principally in the area of human rights. The meeting was very frank and Secretary Haig expressed the depth of our concern over this issue.

155/810

26
January 25, 1982

POSITION ON GRAIN EMBARGO

Q: Would you give any thought to reimposing the grain embargo which both American and European critics say would be the most effective step against the Soviets?

A: -- This Administration has always been opposed to selective embargoes which single out the farm sector to bear the burden of trade sanctions. Any export controls which impact on agricultural commodities would have to be part of a broader trade embargo.

Q: Have we discussed a joint grain embargo with our Allies?

A: -- The NATO communique of January 11 underscored the fact that Soviet actions toward Poland make it necessary for the Allies to examine the full range of future economic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union.

Spot

26
January 25, 1982

FRENCH-SOVIET GAS ACCORD

Q: Do you have any comment on the French-Soviet gas accord?

A: -- We have no reports of this other than from the press as yet. Of course, we are disappointed by this development.

State

January 25, 1982

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WESTERN
EUROPE

US/EC TRADE

Q. Is a new trade war developing between the US and Europe on steel and agriculture?

A. Trade relations between the US and Europe are extensive and vitally important to the overall economic strength of the Western alliance. That we are experiencing a number of trade disputes at this point (steel, agriculture, etc.) is not unusual or surprising, especially in the context of the economic slow-down which is being experienced both here and in Europe. We intend to keep a high-level perspective focused on these problems. Secretaries Haig, Baldrige and Block and Ambassador Brock met in December with President Thorn of the European Commission to discuss these problems. We expect a high-level delegation from the European Commission to come here in early February. Through such meetings, we seek to represent our interests in a strong and forceful way to preserve open markets and fair play in competition for markets. But we do so mindful of the larger political and strategic interests that bind the US and Western Europe.

NSC

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1881

1881



HUMAN
RIGHTS

26
January 18, 1982

ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

Q: As you look back over the first year of this Administration, how would you characterize the Reagan human rights policy?

A: -- Concern for human rights and individual freedom has always been the central element of our foreign policy.

-- We have a human rights policy framework which helps to ensure an evenhanded application of human rights standards; a competent and committed Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Elliott Abrams; and an obligation to this nation and the world to defend and promote the cause of individual liberty.

Q: The Administration seems to use quiet diplomacy with our friends and public castigation with our enemies -- isn't this a double standard?

A: -- Our purpose is to be effective, and the most effective way of acting will vary. Obviously, where we have good, friendly relations with a country our private diplomatic efforts have a greater chance of working. This isn't a double standard on human rights -- it's a judgment on how to be effective.

State

January 18, 1982

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1981

LEAKS

January ²⁶18, 1982

Leaks

Q: What led you to issue the recent directive on leaks?

A: Since coming into office, I have been increasingly concerned by this Government's inability to protect vital national security information. There has been a virtual hemorrhage of sensitive information, which has hampered our ability to conduct an effective foreign policy. Leaks have compromised sensitive intelligence sources and methods, have precluded options we might otherwise have followed, and have damaged ongoing policies.

250

January ²⁶ 18, 1982

Leaks

Q: What kind of damage has been done by leaks thus far in the Administration?

A: First, some leaks have resulted in the compromise of sensitive intelligence sources and methods. Simply put, this endangers lives and our security and cannot be tolerated. Secondly, in several important cases, leaks to the press have adversely affected the discussion of highly sensitive foreign policy decisions. We recognize the legitimate state of tension that exists between the press and the Executive Branch. We believe, however, that the necessary balance between reporting the news and discharging proper Government functions has been disrupted, and this Directive is an attempt to restore that balance.

050

January ²⁶18, 1982

Leaks

Q: Doesn't NSDD-19 represent a sharp departure from past practice?

A: NSDD-19 is simply a reaffirmation of existing laws, under which it is a criminal offense to disclose classified information in an unauthorized manner. In the past, however, enforcement of these laws has tended to be irregular, and the new Directive makes clear that this Administration is committed to enforcement by all legal means.

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January ²⁶ 18, 1982

Leaks

Q: Doesn't this directive amount to an abridgment of freedom of the press, upon which an informed citizenry must depend?

A: No, it does not. We are not seeking to muzzle the press. We realize it is important to keep the press informed, and this Directive will not limit legitimate access to Government officials. All we require is that contacts with the press be cleared in advance and reported briefly afterward. This is not censorship, but rather an effort to make certain that what goes to the press is a clear reflection of what the Government is trying to do.

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26
January 18, 1982

Leaks

Q: The Directive states that "all legal methods" will be used to investigate leaks. Could you elaborate further on this statement?

A: I have asked Judge Clark to develop specific procedures to implement the policy guidelines that have been established, and it would be premature to go into detail until these procedures have been developed. However, I can assure you that the procedures will require that techniques be utilized in a manner that furthers the purpose of the investigation without abridging constitutional rights.

Nsc

1. Chemical Weapons - 1981 Supplemental built the plant
1983 Budget funds the juice
2. Haig would not set a date for START.
3. ABM - slow.
4. SSG - chaired by Vice President
5. MIG-23 - Don't confirm intelligence.
6. Classification Executive Order - under development.
7. CBS program on Vietnam.
8. El Salvador.
9. Cuban economy \$8 - 10 million/day.
10. Caribbean Basin Initiative.
11. Special Negotiations for Autonomy Talks - No.
12. Killing of Lt. Colonel in Paris -- no evidence yet of a
direct Libyan involvement.
13. Poland - Allied response -- better than we had expected.
14. Polish situation getting worse.
15. General Jaruzelski's January 25 speech. Disappointment.
Nothing good -n martial law, prompt release of prisoners, etc.
16. Haig-Gromyko meeting.
17. French-Soviet Gas Accords - Disappointment. However, no
firm information.
18. Leaks - NSDD-19 says take legal action to protect information
the release of which would be detrimental to best interest
of U. S.