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E.O. 12065; GDS 6/22/87 (WATSON, ALEXANDER F.) OR-M
 TAGS: SNAR PEPR BL
 SUBJECT: NARCOTICS PROGRAMS IN BOLIVIA
 REF: A) LA PAZ 1820, B) STATE 153248

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: BECAUSE OF BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS, THE END OF THE PERIOD FOR EVALUATION OF GOB ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS JUNE 22 AND THE UPCOMING TERMINATION OF OUR SUPPORT FOR THE ALTERNATE CROP PROGRAM, THE USG SHOULD CONSIDER NOW THE FUTURE OF OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA. THIS CABLE DESCRIBES THE PROGRAMS IN EFFECT UNTIL THE GARCIA MEZA COUP OF JULY 1980 AND OFFERS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES. WE PROPOSE THAT, PROVIDED A BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT ABLE AND WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH US EMERGES, OUR THREE PRONGED PROGRAM BE CONTINUED. IT COMPRISES A CAMPAIGN AGAINST TRAFFICKERS, CONTROL OF COCA CULTIVATION AND MARKETING AND AN ALTERNATIVE CROPS EFFORT. ALL THREE ASPECTS ARE VITAL TO A SUCCESSFUL PROGRAM. FUNDS REMAINING FROM FY 78 AND FY 79 APPROPRIATIONS (NO NEW FUNDS WERE PROGRAMMED IN FY 80 OR FY 81) TOTAL APPROXIMATELY \$1.1 MILLION FOR COCA CONTROL AND \$456,000 FOR ALTERNATE CROPS. WE ESTIMATE THAT A MINIMAL PROGRAM FOR CONTROL IN FY 82 WOULD USE THE ENTIRE \$1.1 MILLION AVAILABLE, WHILE AN OPTIMAL PROGRAM WOULD REQUIRE \$2.5 MILLION. SIMILARLY, AN ESTIMATED MINIMAL PROGRAM FOR ALTERNATIVE CROPS WOULD REQUIRE \$1 MILLION IN FY 82, WHILE AN OPTIMAL PROGRAM WOULD

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COST ABOUT \$2 MILLION. AS NO FUNDS HAVE BEEN PROGRAMMED FOR BOLIVIA IN FY 82, SUPPORT FOR THE ALTERNATE CROPS PROGRAM (AND ANYTHING OVER \$1.1 MILLION FOR COCA CONTROL) WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM REPROGRAMMING OF INM'S FY 82 BUDGET. WE FURTHER PROPOSE CONTINUATION OF OUR MINIMAL EFFORT TO KEEP THE ALTERNATE CROPS PROGRAM ALIVE FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 81 DRAWING ON THE \$456,000 AVAILABLE FROM PRIOR YEARS. THIS PROPOSAL IS LAID OUT IN DETAIL IN SEPTEL. IN OUR ZBB PRESENTATION (IN ANOTHER MESSAGE), WE OFFER OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR FY 83. WE PROPOSE THAT WE LET OUR JUNE 22 EVALUATION DEADLINE SLIP, PERHAPS EXPLAINING THAT, AS A MONTH WAS LOST WHEN GARCIA MEZA PULLED THE MILITARY OUT OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORT BUT DORIA MEDINA'S GROUP HAS NOW BEEN RECONSTITUTED, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE AND EVALUATE A LITTLE LONGER. SUHC COOPERATION WOULD INVOLVE CONTINUED TDY DEA PRESENCE AND LIMITED ADDITIONAL FUNDING. FINALLY, IF THE ENVIRONMENT FOR AN EFFECTIVE NARCOTICS PROGRAM DOES NOT IMPROVE AFTER AUGUST 6, WHEN GARCIA MEZA SAYS HE WILL LEAVE THE PRESIDENCY, WE SUGGEST AN INTER-AGENCY REVIEW OF OUR OVERALL POLICY TOWARD BOLIVIA, INCLUDING OUR NARCOTICS PROGRAMS. END SUMMARY.
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3. INTRODUCTION. THIS WEEK IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO TAKE A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE PRESENT STATUS OF OUR NARCOTICS EFFORTS IN BOLIVIA AND THEIR FUTURE POTENTIAL. BUDGET PROPOSALS FOR FY 83 ARE BEING PREPARED. ON JUNE 22 THE TWO MONTH PERIOD WE ESTABLISHED FOR EVALUATING THE SUCCESS OF LTC ARTURO DORIA MEDINA'S ANTI-NARCOTICS CAMPAIGN AND OUR SUPPORT FOR IT EXPIRED. ON JUNE 30 THE MINIMAL ASSISTANCE WE HAVE BEEN PROVIDING TO KEEP AFLOAT PRODES, THE SEMI-AUTONOMOUS BOLIVIAN AGENCY MANAGING RESEARCH CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE CROPS IN COCA GROWING ZONES AND DEVELOPING PROGRAMS FOR CARRYING OUT CROP SUBSTITUTION, WILL END. WHILE WE MAY CHOOSE TO LET THE FIRST DEADLINE SLIP, IT IS URGENT THAT WE DECIDE NOW WHETHER OR NOT TO CONTINUE ASSISTANCE TO PRODES IN THIS FISCAL YEAR. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER CAREFULLY OUR PROGRAMS FOR FUTURE YEARS.

4. BACKGROUND. SOME BACKGROUND ON OUR OVERALL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA AND THE ROLE OF AN ALTERNATE CROP PROGRAM IN IT MAY BE USEFUL HERE. SEVERAL YEARS AGO, IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE THE RAPIDLY INCREASING FLOW OF COCAINE FROM SOUTH AMERICA INTO THE UNITED STATES, THE USG DEVELOPED MULTIFACETED PROGRAMS FOCUSED CHIEFLY ON PERU AND BOLIVIA (THE PRIMARY SOURCES OF COCA LEAVES FROM WHICH COCAINE IS DERIVED) AND COLOMBIA (THE PRINCIPAL REFINER AND EXPORTER OF COCAINE HYDROCHLORIDE). IN BOLIVIA, DESPITE US EFFORTS, ACREAGE DEVOTED TO COCA CULTIVATION HAS INCREASED, ACCORDING TO THE BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION, TO APPROXIMATELY 35,000 HECTARES WHICH PRODUCE SUFFICIENT COCA TO

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MANUFACTURE 120 TO 145 THOUSAND METRIC TONS OF COCAINE. LESS THAN THAT HAS BEEN PRODUCED BUT MOST IS SMUGGLED INTO THE US. THE

US EFFORT TO DEAL WITH THIS MAJOR PROBLEM IN BOLIVIA WAS DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL MAJOR STUDIES AND CONSULTATION WITH SEVERAL BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENTS. THIS EFFORT HAS COMPRISED THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. A. DEA AND STATE/INM SUPPORTED ACTION TO IDENTIFY MAJOR COCAINE MANUFACTURERS AND TRAFFICKERS, DISRUPT THEIR ACTIVITIES INCLUDING SEIZING COCAINE, APPREHEND AND PUNISH THEM, AND THEN TERMINATE THEIR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES.

B. STATE/INM SUPPORTED EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF COCA LEAVES. THIS INCLUDES LIMITATIONS ON THE AMOUNTS OF COCA PLANTED, HARVESTED AND MARKETING, INVOLVING A CAREFULLY MONITORED MARKETING AND TRANSPORTATION PROCESS AND SANCTIONS AGAINST THOSE WHO VIOLATE PRODUCTION LIMITS OR MARKETING CONTROLS. IT ALSO INCLUDES MECHANISMS TO ASSURE THAT LEGITIMATELY PRODUCED COCA IS DELIVERED AT FAIR PRICES TO LEGITIMATE CONSUMERS, SUCH AS MANUFACTURERS OF COCA TEA--A POPULAR BEVERAGE--AND MINERS AND FARMERS WHO TRADITIONALLY HAVE CHEWED COCA LEAVES, BUT NOT TO COCAINE MANUFACTURERS. ONE SUCH MECHANISM WHICH HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE STUDY IS AN "ESTANCO" OR MONOPOLY WHICH WOULD PURCHASE ALL LEGITIMATE COCA PRODUCTION AND FUNNEL IT TO APPROPRIATE CONSUMERS. THERE ARE ALSO OTHER POSSIBLE MECHANISMS UTILIZING THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHICH MAY BE LESS COSTLY THAN AN "ESTANCO."

CM A PROGRAM TO PROVIDE ALTERNATIVE CROPS FOR FARMERS WHOSE PRODUCTION OF COCA--RECENTLY A MOST LUCRATIVE CROP--WOULD BE SEVERELY REDUCED BY THE CONTROLS MENTIONED ABOVE. ALL OBSERVERS HAVE AGREED THAT SUCH A PROGRAM IS VITAL IF ANY BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT IS TO BE ABLE TO MUSTER THE POLITICAL SUPPORT NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE EFFORT TO CONTROL AND REDUCE COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING. SIMILARLY, THERE IS NO POINT IN UNDERTAKING A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO PROVIDE FARMERS WITH NEW CROPS UNLESS THIS IS IN CONJUNCTION WITH A VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT. THE TWO GO HAND IN GLOVE.

5. SINCE THE INCEPTION OF USG NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS IN 1977 WE HAVE COMMITTED RESOURCES TO EACH OF THESE COMPONENTS.
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A. DEA HAD A DISTRICT OFFICE IN LA PAZ FROM 1973 UNTIL JULY 1980. IT DEVELOPED SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION ON COCAINE TRAFFICKING IN BOLIVIA WHICH HAS RESULTED IN ARRESTS IN THE US AND ELSEWHERE.

B. STATE/INM PROGRAMMED A TOTAL OF \$3,359 MILLION IN FISCAL YEARS 1977, 78 AND 79 FOR THE CONTROL OF COCA CULTIVATION AND MARKETING. FROM THIS TOTAL, \$429,000 WAS DISBURSED IN FY 79 AND \$617,000 IN FY 80. AFTER JULY 1980 NO FURTHER DISBURSEMENTS WERE MADE.

OUR ASSISTANCE FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL WENT PRIMARILY TO THE NATIONAL DRUG POLICE (DNCSP) WITH SOME TRAINING ALSO PROVIDED TO THE CUSTOMS SERVICE. THIS CONSISTED OF COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT, AS WELL AS TRAINING. HIGHWAY CHECKPOINTS TO MONITOR SHIPMENTS OF COCA WERE ESTABLISHED. WHILE THE DRUG POLICE FORCE INCREASED IN SIZE AND WE SUCCEEDED THROUGH TRAINING IN IMPROVING THE SKILLS OF THE FORCE, LACK OF SUPPORT FROM HIGHER LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY AND ENDEMIC CORRUPTION PREVENTED THE DNCSP FROM BECOMING AS EFFECTIVE A FORCE AS WE HAD DESIRED. DURING THE CURRENT REGIME MANY OFFICERS HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED AND THE DNCSP HAS BEEN DEMORALIZED. UNDISBURSED FY 77 AND 78 FUNDS WERE DEOBLIGATED. REMAINING FROM FY 79 FUNDS AND STILL AVAILABLE FOR FUTURE COCA CONTROL PROGRAMS IS A TOTAL OF MORE THAN \$1.1 MILLION (\$561,000 IN PROWAG 90001 AND \$600,000 IN PROWAG 90003).
C. THE US BEGAN TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO PREPARE FOR A CROP SUBSTITUTION PROJECT IN FY 1977. THIS INVOLVED ESTABLISHING A BOLIVIAN INSTITUTION--PRODES-- AS A COUNTERPART FOR THE PROJECT, MAKING NUMEROUS

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STUDIES TO DETERMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVES, FIELD TRIALS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NURSERIES TO RAISE SEEDLINGS, THE SETTING UP OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION SERVICES, AND THE PRODUCTION OF TRAINING MATERIALS AND TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW CROPS AND ANIMALS TO FARMERS IN THE COCA PRODUCING REGIONS. DURING THE COURSE OF THE STUDIES, IT BECAME APPARENT THAT NOT ONLY THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW CROPS WOULD BE REQUIRED, BUT ALSO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO MAKE THESE CROPS ECONOMICALLY ATTRACTIVE. THIS WOULD INCLUDE IMPROVED FARM TO MARKET ROADS, PROCESSING FACILITIES FOR THE NEW CROPS (FOR EXAMPLE, FERMENTING AND DRYING FACILITIES FOR CACAO; PROCESSING FACILITIES FOR FRUIT, SUCH AS ORANGES, STRAWBERRIES AND PAPAYA; A BOXMAKING FACILITY TO IMPROVE THE WAY PRODUCE IS TRANSPORTED TO MARKET), FARMER INFORMATION SYSTEMS, AND SO FORTH. THEREFORE, THE TERM "ALTERNATE CROPS/REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT" WAS SUBSTITUTED FOR "CROP SUBSTITUTION."

6. BY THE MIDDLE OF 1980, THE STUDY/PILOT PROJECT PHASE OF THE PROGRAM WAS NEARLY FINISHED. MANY TECHNICAL STUDIES HAD BEEN COMPLETED, INCLUDING THOSE BY THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA RESEARCH TEAM THAT HAD SPENT ALMOST THREE YEARS IN BOLIVIA. TWO REPORTS HAD BEEN COMPILED MARKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A FULL SCALE ALTERNATE CROPS/REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. THESE REPORTS WERE PREPARED BY MASI AND GENERAL RESEARCH CORPORATION. BASED ON THE LATTER'S REPORT, USAID WAS CONSIDERING A \$35 MILLION FIVE-YEAR PROJECT. BY THIS TIME USG DISBURSEMENTS FOR THE ALTERNATE CROPS STUDY PROJECT TOTALLED \$2.2 MILLION. ALL THESE FUNDS WERE FROM THE FY 79 BUDGET OR EARLIER. AS IN THE CASE OF THE COCA CONTROL EFFORT, NO NEW FUNDS WERE PROGRAMMED IN FY 80 OR FY 81. DURING THIS PERIOD, PRODES DEVELOPED INTO A WELL-RUN, HIGHLY INDEPENDENT, VERY COMPETENT ORGANIZATION. ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE FOUNDER OF THE ORGANIZATION, IS ONE OF THOSE RARE BOLIVIAN BUREAUCRATS WHO CAN ATTRACT COMPETENT PEOPLE AND MOTIVATE THEM. HE HAS SURROUNDED HIMSELF WITH A NUMBER OF TOP RATE, EXPERIENCED BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT
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OFFICIALS AND TECHNICIANS, AND GETS THE MAXIMUM FROM A SMALL STAFF. HE ALSO HAS THE VISION AND LEADERSHIP ABILITY TO DIRECT A GREATLY EXPANDED PROGRAM.

7. FOLLOWING THE JULY 1980 COUP WHICH PUT INTO POWER A REGIME WITH HIGH RANKING MEMBERS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, WE SUSPENDED NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MINIMAL SUPPORT FOR PRODES IN ORDER TO KEEP THE INSTITUTION ALIVE, AVOID LOSS OF THE INVESTMENT ALREADY MADE AND THE EXPERIENCE GAINED, AND ALSO TO CONTINUE MAKING PREPARATIONS ON A REDUCED SCALE FOR A FULL SCALE PROGRAM LATER ON. SINCE THE COUP, THIS SUPPORT HAS TOTALLED \$543,000. IT HAS BEEN OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WOULD BE TEMPORARY AND OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL BE SUCCEEDED BY ONE MORE INTERESTED IN NARCOTICS CONTROL. THE CHANGE FOR WHICH WE HAVE BEEN WAITING MAY BE UNDERWAY NOW. REMAINING AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR THE ALTERNATE CROPS PROGRAM TOTAL \$456,000.

8. FUTURE PROGRAMS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN BOLIVIA MAY BECOME MORE CONDUCTIVE TO EFFORTS TO CURB THE FLOW OF COCAINE TO THE U.S. HOWEVER, RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR NARCOTICS PROGRAMS HERE ARE SCANTY (NOTHING HAS BEEN BUDGETED FOR FY 82). THEREFORE, NOW IS AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO DECIDE WHETHER WE WANT TO PURSUE SUCH A PROGRAM AND, IF SO, HOW MUCH IT WILL COST AND WHERE THE MONEY WILL COME FROM. THESE DECISIONS MIGHT BE INFLUENCED BY THE NATURE OF OUR PROGRAMS IN PERU AND COLOMBIA. OBVIOUSLY, FROM THESE DECISIONS WILL FLOW OTHERS CONCERNING WHAT MEASURES WE ADOPT IN THE SHORT RUN, INCLUDING THE REST OF FY 81.

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B. COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING CONTROL

(1) AN ON SITE SURVEY OF ALL COCA PLANTATIONS TO UPDATE INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE 1978 SURVEY. OUR RECENTLY COMPLETED AND VERY SUCCESSFUL AEROPHOTOGRAMMETRIC SURVEY WOULD BE INVALUABLE IN THIS REGARD. FIELDS WOULD BE MEASURED AND FARMERS REQUIRED TO DECLARE THE ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF THEIR PLOTS. EACH FARMER WOULD RECEIVE A CERTIFICATE INDICATING THE AMOUNT OF LAND HE HAD IN COCA AND THE YIELD.

(2) A SYSTEM, PERHAPS SIMILAR TO THE ONE DEvised BY MAJOR COSSIO (REF A) BUT NEVER IMPLEMENTED, FOR DETERMINING HOW MUCH COCA EACH FARMER (IN TRADITIONAL COCA PRODUCING AREAS) WOULD BE ALLOWED TO PRODUCE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, AS WOULD A TIMETABLE FOR REDUCING PRODUCTION TO THOSE LEVELS. AT THE END OF THE PROCESS, TOTAL PRODUCTION WOULD MEET LEGITIMATE NATIONAL DEMAND, ESTIMATED AT ABOUT 13,000 METRIC TONS ANNUALLY. (ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1980 HAS BEEN ESTIMATED TO HAVE BEEN AS MUCH AS 62,500 METRIC TONS AND THERE HAVE BEEN EXTENSIVE NEW PLANTINGS STIMULATED BY THE EXTRAORDINARY INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF COCA DURING THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME.)

(3) ALL COCA GROWN OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL AREAS WOULD BE DESTROYED.

(4) A SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING THE TRANSPORTATION AND MARKETING OF LEGITIMATE COCA WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. IT PROBABLY WOULD INCLUDE SPECIFIC COCA MARKETS AT APPROPRIATE LOCATIONS, CAREFULLY MONITORED WITH EITHER A STATE RUN "ESTANCO" OR A SYSTEM OF LICENSES FOR PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS. A SIMILAR SYSTEM WOULD BE ESTABLISHED FOR DELIVERY OF COCA TO LEGITIMATE CONSUMERS--COCA TEA MANUFACTURERS, MINE OWNERS WHO DISTRIBUTE COCA TO THEIR WORKERS, AND SMALL RETAIL

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OUTLETS--AT ESTABLISHED PRICES. WE BELIEVE THAT REASONABLY EFFECTIVE CONTROLS COULD BE ESTABLISHED BY PLAYING THE INTERESTS OF THE VARIOUS GROUPS IN THE MARKETING CHAIN AGAINST EACH OTHER. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE HIGHWAY CHECK POINTS AND UNPREDICATABLE INSPECTIONS OF VEHICLES TO ASSURE TRANSPORTERS WERE NOT RECEIVING MORE COCA THAN ALLOWED FROM GROWERS. (5) A SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING AIRPORTS, LAND BORDERS AND RIVERWAYS AGAINST THE ILLEGAL EXPORT OF COCAINE, TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE CUSTOMS SERVICE. INITIALLY, THIS WOULD PROBABLY CONSIST OF THE FORMATION, TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF A SPECIAL CUSTOMS TASK FORCE CHARGED WITH THESE RESPONSIBILITIES. (6) APPROPRIATE PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF ANY OF THESE RULES AND PROCEDURES.

C. ALTERNATE CROPS

(1) AN ALTERNATE CROP CAMPAIGN WHICH WILL PROVIDE TO THOSE FARMERS WHO COMPLY WITH COCA PRODUCTION LIMITS, SEEDLINGS AND SEEDS OF CROPS APPROPRIATE TO THEIR LOCAL CONDITIONS, AND ACCESS TO EXTENSION SERVICES AND MARKETS.

(2) DEVELOPMENT IN THESE AREAS OF INFRASTRUCTURE AND PROBABLY CREDIT FOR FARMERS AND INCENTIVES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR.

D. PUBLIC RELATIONS

(1) A NATIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS CAMPAIGN TO ADVISE THE POPULACE OF THE GOB'S PLANS AND DETERMINATION.

11. CHANCES OF SUCCESS

A AND B. THE SUCCESS OF EFFORTS TO DISRUPT COCAINE MANUFACTURING AND TRAFFICKING AND CONRTOL OF COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING WILL DEPEND ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON THE DEDICATION, HONESTY AND SKILL OF THE GOB. THESE QUALITIES ARE NOT PLENTIFUL IN BOLIVIA, SO WE MUST EXPECT SUCCESS TO BE PARTIAL AT BEST. NEVERTHELESS, IF A NEW BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE THE INTENTIONS SOME CLAIM IT WILL AND WOULD DEDICATE RESOURCES TO NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS AND, IF THE USG WERE TO USE ITS LEVERAGE WITH SKILL AND PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT, WE BELIEVE SIGNIFICANT HEADWAY COULD BE MADE. TRAFFICKERS' ACTIVITIES ARE WELL KNOWN AND INTELLIGENCE IS AVAILABLE. TRANSPORTATION IN BOLIVIA IS LIMITED AND EASY TO MONITOR, PROVIDED THE ARMED FORCES ARE NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE COCAINE BUSINESS. THE POTENTIAL FOR DISRUPTION IS SUFFICIENTLY GREAT, WE BELIEVE, TO SUGGEST THAT A SERIOUS CRIMP IN COCAINE PRODUCTION IS DISTRINCTLY POSSIBLE.

B. GIVEN EVEN PARTICAL SUCCESS OF THE PROGRAMS TO CONTROL TRAFFICKING AND COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING, PROSPECTS

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FOR THE SUCCESSFUL INTRODUCTION OF ALTERNATE CROPS WOULD BE HIGH. WHEN A COCA CONTROL SYSTEM WAS INTRODUCED IN MID-MARCH, PRODES RECEIVED A RECORD NUMBER OF REQUESTS FROM FARMERS FOR PLANTS AND ASSISTANCE IN GROWING OTHER CROPS. AFTER PRODES COMPLETED TWO SHORT COURSES FOR FARMERS ON THE CARE OF CACAO, 75,000 PLANTS (WHICH HAD BEEN SITTING IN AN IBTA NURSERY WITHOUT TAKERS) WERE DISTRIBUTED IN THREE WEEKS. PRODES HAS ALSO RECEIVED NUMEROUS OFFERS OF LAND, PRIMARILY FROM FARMER GROUPS, ON WHICH TO ESTABLISH NEW NURSERIES. THE DIRECTOR OF THE EXPERIMENT STATION AT SAN PEDRO TOLD NCU CHIEF LAST WEEK THAT COCA FARMERS IN THE YUNGAS, WHO PREVIOUSLY HAD HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE STATION WERE NOW REQUESTING ASSISTANCE. HAVING REALIZED THEIR VULNERABILITY TO CHANGES IN THE COCA MARKET, FARMERS WANT TO PROTECT THEMSELVES BY DIVERSIFYING. MARKET STUDIES FOR SEVERAL POTENTIAL ALTERNATE CROPS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND SHOW GOOD PROSPECTS FOR THESE CROPS TO PRODUCE REASONABLE INCOMES. IN MOST CASES, SUCCESS WOULD DEPEND UPON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE INCLUDED IN AN OVERALL ALTERNATE CROP/REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT. ON A DEMONSTRATION SCALE, PRODES HAS SHOWN THE ABILITY TO ORGANIZE AND EXECUTE SUCH PROJECTS. WE BELIEVE THAT AN EXPANDED PRODES COULD CARRY OUT THE INFRASTRUCTURE PHASE OF THE PROJECT.

12. COSTS.

A. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING LAW ENFORCEMENT.

TO SUPPORT THE EFFORT TO APPREHEND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND DISRUPT THEIR NETWORKS, WE WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING, AS WELL AS OPERATIONAL AND PERHAPS ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. AN OPTIMUM PROGRAM WOULD COST \$800,000 IN FY 82, WHILE A MINIMUM PROBABLY

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COULD BE CARRIED OUT FOR \$500,000. WE HAVE ESTIMATED AN OPTIMUM PROGRAM OF \$750,000 FOR FY 83 AND A MINIMUM PROGRAM OF \$535,000. THIS PROJECT WOULD HAVE SECOND PRIORITY.

B. COCA REGISTRATION AND CONTROL.

THE START-UP COSTS OF THE COCA REGISTRATION AND CONTROL EFFORT WILL BE HIGH. ON SITE REGISTRATION OF COCA PLOTS WILL BE BOTH TIME CONSUMING AND LABOR INTENSIVE. WHILE THIS COULD NOT REQUIRE EXPENSIVE INVESTMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT, WE WOULD HAVE TO PLAN TO COVER SOME OF THE LABOR COSTS. OUTSIDE CONSULTATION TO ASSURE THE ADEQUATE DESIGN AND EXECUTION OF THE PROJECT WOULD ALSO BE DESIRABLE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MARKETS AND CHECKPOINTS ALSO COULD BE COSTLY. BY LICENSING THE MARKETS TO PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS, HOWEVER, SOME OF THE CAPITAL COSTS COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR. WE ALSO WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF COCA CROPS. A NEW AERIAL SURVEY WOULD GREATLY ASSIST BOTH THE REGISTRATION AND CROP DESTRUCTION. FOR THESE PROGRAMS, WE ESTIMATE THAT \$1,000,000 WOULD BE REQUIRED IN FY 82. A MINIMUM PROGRAM WOULD COST \$600,000. FOR FY 83, WE HAVE ESTIMATED AN OPTIMUM LEVEL OF \$865,000 AND A MINIMUM LEVEL OF \$550,000. (SEE SEPTTEL ON ZBB.) ON THE CONTROL SIDE, WE WOULD ASSIGN FIRST PRIORITY TO THIS PROJECT.

C. CUSTOMS NARCOTICS CONTROL.

THIS PROGRAM WOULD INVOLVE TRAINING A SPECIAL CUSTOMS/ NARCOTICS TASK FORCE. AN OPTIMUM PROGRAM WOULD COST \$700,000 IN FY 82. HOWEVER THIS PROGRAM COULD BE POSTPONED UNTIL FY 83. FOR THAT YEAR WE HAVE ESTIMATED AN OPTIMUM PROGRAM OF \$710,000 AND A MINIMUM PROGRAM OF \$385,000. THIS IS THIRD PRIORITY AMONG THE CONTROL PROGRAMS.

D. IN SUMMARY, WE PROPOSE AN OPTIMUM LEVEL FOR CONTROL PROGRAMS IN FY 82 OF \$1,500,000 AND A MINIMUM LEVEL OF \$1,100,000. FOR FY 83, WE PROPOSE AN OPTIMUM LEVEL OF \$2,325,000 AND A MINIMUM LEVEL OF \$1,370,000. WE HAVE ENOUGH FUNDS REMAINING IN THE FY 79 NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS TO FINANCE THE MINIMUM LEVEL CONTROL PROGRAM FOR FY 82. ANY AMOUNTS ABOVE THE MINIMUM LEVEL WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM FY 82 FUNDS. WE UNDERSTAND FUNDS FOR BOLIVIA ORIGINALLY INCLUDED IN THE FY 82 BUDGET WERE DELETED. THEREFORE, ADDITIONAL FUNDING WOULD REQUIRE REPROGRAMMING FROM OTHER INM FUNDS.

E. ALTERNATE CROPS.

WE BELIEVE THAT A FULL SCALE ALTERNATE CROPS/REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM COULD BE DESIGNED AND APPROVED IN TIME TO BEGIN
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IMPLEMENTATION IN FY 83. IN THE INTERIM, ADDITIONAL FINANCING FROM INM FUNDS WOULD BE REQUIRED IN FY 82. A PROPOSAL FOR CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR PRODES FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 81 IS CONTAINED SEPTTEL. IT WILL NEARLY EXHAUST REMAINING FUNDS IN EXISTING (FY 78 AND FY 79) PROWAGS. THEREFORE, FY 82 FUNDING WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM REPROGRAMMED FY 81 OR FY 82 INM FUNDS.

WE HAVE FINANCED A SURVIVAL PROGRAM FOR PRODES THIS YEAR WITH APPROXIMATELY \$800,000 TO \$1,000.00 (DEPENDING UPON WHICH OPTION OF PROPOSAL IN SEPTTEL FOR THE REST OF THE FY IS ACCEPTED.) AN ABSOLUTELY MINIMAL PROGRAM FOR FY 82 WOULD REQUIRE \$1,000,000. A PROGRAM WHICH WOULD FULLY COMPLEMENT THE CONTROL PROGRAMS DESCRIBED ABOVE AND WOULD MORE FULLY PREPARE PRODES FOR A FULL SCALE PROGRAM WOULD COST \$2,000,000. EITHER PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ADDITIONAL PLANT NURSERIES, THE PURCHASE OF PLANT MATERIALS, EXPANDED FARMER EDUCATION PROGRAMS AND THE REPRODUCTION OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS. THE DIFFERENCE WOULD BE IN THE SCALE OF THESE ACTIVITIES.

THE USAID PROJECT BASED ON GENERAL RESEARCH CORPORATION'S REPORT WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ONLY ON THE CHAPARE. A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM ALSO MUST INCLUDE THE YUNGAS. THE YUNGAS COMPONENT WOULD BE SMALLER SINCE THERE IS LESS COCA PRODUCTION THERE AND MORE OF IT IS DIRECTED TO THE LEGAL MARKET. NEVERTHELESS, IGNORING THE YUNGAS WOULD LEAVE A GAP THAT MIGHT PROVE TO BE THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE PROGRAM. SINCE A LONG RANGE, COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM IS LIKELY TO BE QUITE COSTLY, WE MIGHT WANT TO THINK IN TERMS OF GOING TO CONGRESS WITH A SPECIAL REQUEST FOR FUNDING FOR THIS PROGRAM. WHETHER THE PROJECT SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY USAID, INM, OR BOTH WILL ALSO NEED TO BE CONSIDERED.

13. IF CONTINUATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE NARCOTICS CONTROL

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PROGRAM IN BOLIVIA IS DETERMINED TO BE IN THE U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST--AS WE BELIEVE IT IS, WE SHOULD BEGIN PROGRAMMING ITS NEXT PHASES IMMEDIATELY. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD TAKE STEPS NOW TO ASSURE THAT WE DO NOT VITIATE WHAT PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE. IN THE SHORT RUN, THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD NOT TERMINATE OUR CURRENT DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, LIMITED AS THEY MAY BE, BUT RATHER CONTINUE TO USE OUR LEVERAGE TO PUSH THE CURRENT REGIME INTO WHATEVER ACTION IT IS CAPABLE OF TAKING. THIS ALSO WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO FUTURE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE ARE DEADLY SERIOUS ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NARCOTICS ISSUE TO OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP WITH BOLIVIA AND ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE MEANINGFULLY WITH ANY SINCERE BOLIVIAN EFFORT. WE SHOULD LET OUR JUNE 22 DEADLINE SLIDE, PERHAPS EXPLAINING THAT, WHILE PROGRESS TO DATE HAS BEEN SLIGHT (REF B), IN LIGHT OF THE MONTH LOST AS A RESULT OF GARCIA MEZA'S WITHDRAWAL OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE AND EVALUATE A BIT LONGER. OF COURSE, THIS WOULD ENTAIL FURTHER FUNDING OF DORIA MEDINA'S GROUP AT ABOUT THE PRESENT RATE. NOT TO DO SO WOULD LEND CREDENCE TO CHARGES FROM GARCIA MEZA AND OTHERS THAT EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN INSUFFICIENT AND GIVE THE REGIME AN EXCUSE FOR TERMINATING DORIA MEDINA'S EFFORT.

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STATE FOR INM AND ARA; VIENNA FOR NARCOTICS CONTROL COORDINATOR;

DEA FOR ENA; DIA FOR IR BRANCH

E.O. 12065: GDS 7/1/87 (GEHRING, ROBERT A.) OR-O
TAGS: SNAR, PORO, BL, UN, UNFAC
SUBJECT: UN FACT FINDING MISSION ON NARCOTICS CONTROL TO COME TO BOLIVIA

REF: (A) VIENNA 6512; (B) VIENNA 7142

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. UN RES REP KRISHAN SINGH CALLED ON DATT AND NCU CHIEF JULY 1 TO INFORM THEM THAT, PENDING BOB APPROVAL, CARLOS CAGLIOTTI (REF B) WILL ARRIVE IN LA PAZ JULY 5 TO UNDERTAKE A 5-DAY FACT FINDING MISSION FOR UNFAC AND DND. TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CAGLIOTTI MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A) IN RESPONSE TO A REQUEST MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA TO THE SECGEN FOR ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD OF DRUG ABUSE CONTROL, UNFAC AND DND HAVE APPOINTED AN EXPERT TO UNDERTAKE A FACT FINDING MISSION TO BOLIVIA. THE EXPERT WILL IN NO WAY REPRESENT ANY ORGANIZATION OR GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH HE IS OTHERWISE EMPLOYED OR ATTACHED.

B) HAVING FIRST CONSIDERED THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM IN BOLIVIA, THE EXPERT WILL ASSESS THE REQUESTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA FOR ASSISTANCE AND WILL DISCUSS WITH THE APPROPRIATE BOLIVIAN AUTHORITIES THE TYPES OF ASSISTANCE THEY REQUEST WITH A VIEW TO IDENTIFY POSSIBLE PROJECTS.

C) THE EXPERT WILL ALSO ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE LONG TERM SUPPORT, INCLUDING FINANCIAL, TO A NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAM.

D) FOLLOWING THIS FACT FINDING MISSION THE EXPERT WILL PREPARE AND SUBMIT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL AND THE DIVISION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS ON HIS FINDINGS.

E) IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT ANY FUTURE UNFAC FINANCING FOR BOLIVIA WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS AND ANY UNFAC FINANCING OVER AND ABOVE THAT FORMERLY PROVIDED TO BOLIVIA WILL BE FROM CONTRIBUTIONS EARMARKED ESPECIALLY FOR THAT PURPOSE.

SINGH WAS TO SEE COL. ARTURO DORIA MEDINA, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AFTERNOON OF SAME DAY TO GET HIS APPROVAL OF MISSION.

3. SINGH SAID THAT HE THOUGH UN FELT OBLIGED TO RESPOND

TO BOLIVIAN REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE AND THIS WAS A MINIMAL RESPONSE. HE FULLY EXPECTED GOB, NEVERTHELESS, TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF VISIT, GIVING IT MAXIMUM PUBLICITY. SINGH ALSO EXPECTED GOB TO ATTEMPT WHITEWASH. HE ASKED EMBOFFS TO MEET WITH CAGLIOTTI AND TO GIVE HIM MORE BALANCED PICTURE. EMBOFFS AGREED TO MEETING.

4. SINGH SAID HE WOULD BE IN GENEVA WEEK OF JULY 12 AND EXPECTED TO WORK WITH CAGLIOTTI THERE ON HIS FINAL REPORT.

5. COMMENT: ONE-MAN, FIVE-DAY MISSION DOES INDEED APPEAR TO BE A MINIMAL RESPONSE TO BOLIVIAN REQUEST. LAST ITEM OF TERMS OF REFERENCE IS PARTICULARLY INTERESTING IN THIS REGARD, AS IT WOULD APPEAR SEVERELY TO LIMIT POTENTIAL FOR ANY UNFAC FINANCING OF PROGRAMS IN BOLIVIA UNDER PRESENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS. NEVERTHELESS, THE BOLIVIANS ARE CERTAIN TO HAVE A PUBLICITY FIELD DAY AND USE THE VISIT TO IMPROVE THE IMAGE OF THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME WITH REGARD TO NARCOTICS. IN FACT, AN ARTICLE APPEARED IN COCHABAMBA DAILY "LOS TIEMPOS" JUNE 30, ANNOUNCING THAT A UN COMMISSION WOULD ARRIVE JULY 15 TO WORK WITH THE NATIONAL COUNCIL WITH REGARD TO CONTROL AND REPRESSION OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, CONTROL OF COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING AND PREVENTATIVE EDUCATION. LA PAZ PAPERS DID NOT CARRY THE ANNOUNCEMENT. END COMMENT.
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E.O. 12065: XDS-4 9/3/01 (PRYCE, WILLIAM) OR-M
TAGS: SNAR, BL
SUBJ: EVALUATION OF COL. OCAMPO'S FIRST TWO WEEKS AS DIRECTOR
OF NARCOTICS COUNCIL

REF: (A) LA PAZ 5069
(B) LA PAZ 5337 (NOTAL); (C) LA PAZ 5377

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AF COL. RENE OCAMPO HAS BEEN DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING FOR JUST OVER TWO WEEKS. DURING THAT TIME, DEA SAIG, AND NCU CHIEF HAVE HAD FREQUENT MEETINGS WITH OCAMPO AND HIS STAFF, BOTH SEPARATELY AND TOGETHER. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS ON AND EVALUATES THE ACTIONS THAT OCAMPO HAS TAKEN IN THIS PERIOD. WHILE HE HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF POSITIVE STEPS, INCLUDING BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE HIS STAFF, PROCURING EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY, AND MAKING A PLAN FOR A CENSUS OF COCA PRODUCERS, HE HAS NOT YET TAKEN DECISIVE, CONVINING ACTION, SUCH AS THE ARREST AND DELIVERY TO THE US OF ONE OF THE FIVE TRAFFICKERS INDICATED IN THE US, DESTROYING OF COCA PLANTS OUTSIDE OF TRADITIONAL ZONES OF PRODUCTION, OR REGAINING CONTROL OF THE COCA MARKETING SYSTEM. WE RECOMMEND THAT WE CONTINUE OUR CURRENT POSTURE OF OBSERVING OCAMPO'S ACTIVITIES AND OFFERING ENCOURAGEMENT AND ADVICE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO REACT QUICKLY WITH ADDITIONAL ADVISORS AND PERHAPS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE IF THE EFFORT PRODUCES CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF ITS SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE. END SUMMARY.

3. REPRESSION OF TRAFFICKING: OCAMPO HAS RUN A NUMBER OF ANTI-TRAFFICKER OPERATIONS. ACCORDING TO A REPORT THAT HE HAS GIVEN US, FROM WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE (AUGUST 19) TO AUGUST 31, OPERATIONS IN LA PAZ, COCHABAMBA, AND SANTA CRUZ RESULTED IN THE CAPTURE OF 27 SUSPECTS AND 34.3 KILOGRAMS. DURING THE PERIOD, 6 DETAINEES WERE REMITTED TO THE MINISTERIO PUBLICO FOR PROCESSING THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND 13 WERE RELEASED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE.

4. NOT INCLUDED IN THIS REPORT WERE 20 FACTORIES DISCOVERED, ALONG WITH ONE PERSON KILLED AND 40 PERSONS ARRESTED IN A SERIES OF SIS OPERATIONS IN THE SANTA CRUZ AREA REPORTED IN THE PRESS AUGUST 30. ALMOST 30 KILOS OF COCAINE WERE CAPTURED IN THESE OPERATIONS.

5. ON FRIDAY, AUG 28 OCAMPO TOLD US THAT HE WAS RUNNING THREE SEPARATE OPERATIONS TARGETED AGAINST ROBERTO SUAREZ SR. "CAMACO" CHAVEZ AND WIDEN RAZUK. ALL THREE ESCAPED CAPTURE.

6. TO IMPROVE THE CAPABILITIES OF THE DRUG POLICE, OCAMPO HAS DECIDED TO ORDER WEAPONS FOR 45 MEN FOR OPERATIONS GROUPS BASED IN LA PAZ AND SANTA CRUZ. THESE GROUPS WILL BE MADE UP OF BOTH POLICE AND MILITARY MEN. THIS ARMS PURCHASE, FOR WHICH OCAMPO WILL SPEND OVER \$20,000, WILL BE REPORTED IN MORE DETAIL REF C

7. OCAMPO HAS REQUESTED FROM THE POLICE AND THE THREE MILITARY SERVICES THE RETURN TO THE COUNCIL OF THE OFFICERS TRAINED IN APRIL BY DEA. HE SAYS THAT HE HAS THE AGREEMENT OF THE HEADS OF THE THREE ARMED FORCES BUT BECAUSE OF THE CURRENT TRANSITIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION, THE MEN HAVE NOT YET REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL. HIGH LEVEL SOURCES CONFIRM THAT THE JUNTA HAS APPROVED THE TRANSFER OF THESE MEN.

8. OCAMPO HAS ALSO ORDERED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OF UNSPECIFIED VALUE FOR 20 MEN AND REPLACEMENT PARTS TO REPAIR 10 VEHICLES IN LA PAZ AND A SIMILAR NUMBER IN SANTA CRUZ COSTING ABOUT \$8,000.

9. ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 28, OCAMPO NAMED AND INSTALLED NAVY CAPTAIN JAVIER GUERRERO JEMIO AS HEAD OF THE DRUG POLICE (DNCS). LIKE OCAMPO, GUERRERO WAS RECENTLY HEAD OF DEPARTMENT KK (INTELLIGENCE), OF HIS SERVICE AND HAS NO PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING DRUG TRAFFICKING.

10. COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING CONTROL: ACCORDING TO OCAMPO HE RELIEVED ARMY M.P. MAJOR COSSIO AS HEAD OF COCA CONTROL AUG. 31,

Bolivia

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AND TOOK OVER DIRECT CONTROL OF THIS DEPARTMENT,
HIMSELF.

OTHER SOURCES, HOWEVER, TELL US THAT COSSIO IS STILL
IN CHARGE.

OCAMPO CLAIMS THAT THE SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLING COCA MOVEMENT
INITIATED BY COSSIO IS STILL IN OPERATION. THIS SYSTEM, AS
MODIFIED, LIMITED THE MOVEMENT OF COCA FROM THE CHAPARE AND
THE YUNGAS TO CENTRAL MARKETS IN SACABA OUTSIDE COCHABAMBA AND
EL ALTO OUTSIDE LA PAZ, RESPECTIVELY. THE AMOUNT FARMERS
COULD SEND TO THE MARKETS WAS LIMITED AND ONLY THE FARMER
HIMSELF OR ASSOCIATION LEADERS COULD TRANSPORT THE COCA. AT
THE MARKETS, ONLY RETAILERS, PURCHASES FOR THE MINES AND
MANAGERS OF SUB-CENTRAL MARKETS IN DEPARTMENTAL CAPITALS
COULD PURCHASE COCA IN FIXED AMOUNTS. OCAMPO ADMITTED,
HOWEVER, THAT IN FACT LITTLE COCA WAS MOVING THROUGH THE
LEGITIMATE MARKETS NOW, SPECULATING THAT MUCH WAS BEING SOLD
AND TRANSPORTED FROM THE CHAPARE ILLEGITIMATELY OR BEING PROCESSED
IN THE CHAPARE ITSELF. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD THIS FROM OTHER
SOURCES. HE SAID THAT CONTROL IN THE YUNGAS WAS BETTER. NCU
CHIEF PLANS TO ACCOMPANY OCAMPO ON INSPECTION OF THE CONTROL
SYSTEM FROM THE CHAPARE TO SACABA SEPT. 9.

11. OCAMPO HAS PREPARED BUT NOT YET GIVEN US A COPY OF A
PLAN TO UNDERTAKE A CENSUS OF FARMERS IN
CARANAVI ON SAT. SEPT. 5, TO EXPLAIN THE PLAN AND TO INITIATE
ALTERNATE CROPS PROGRAM. OCAMPO IS VERY ANXIOUS TO GET
THE CENSUS AND CROP PROGRAM UNDERWAY.

12. ALTERNATE CROPS:

OCAMPO WOULD LIKE TO HAVE NATIONAL COUNCIL CONTROL ALL ASPECTS
OF A PROGRAM TO REDUCE COCA PLANTINGS, INCLUDING THE INTRO-
DUCTION OF ALTERNATE CROPS AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF COCA
GROWING REGION. WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR OPINION THAT THE AGRI-
CULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT PART OF THE PROGRAM SHOULD
BE CARRIED OUT BY PRODES. WE HAVE POINTED OUT THAT, OF THE
THREE PARTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE COCAINE CONTROL STRATEGY---
REPRESSION OF TRAFFICKING, CONTROL OF COCA GROWING
AND MARKETING, AND ALTERNATE CROPS, AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION
EXISTS TO CARRY OUT ONLY THE LATTER PART. THE ORGANIZATION,
OF COURSE, IS PRODES. WE HAVE TOLD OCAMPO THAT WE BELIEVE
HE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON ORGANIZING THE OTHER PARTS OF THE
PROGRAM. WE HAVE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT COCA CONTROL PROGRAM
AND THE ALTERNATE CROPS PROGRAM REQUIRE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
TO THE FARMERS THAT CAN BE CARRIED OUT BETTER BY SEPARATE
CADRES OF OFFICIALS. OF COURSE, WE AGREE WITH OCAMPO, THAT
THE ACTIVITIES OF PRODES AND THE COCA CONTROL AGENCY MUST
BE CLOSELY COORDINATED IF EITHER PROGRAM IS TO ACHIEVE
ITS OBJECTIVES.

13. OCAMPO HAS NOT YET BEEN CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR
SEPARATE ORGANIZATIONS. HE HAS TWO SPECIFIC PROJECTS THAT WERE
PREPARED FOR HIM BY STAFF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF "QUINO" (CHINCHONA--A TREE, THE
BARK OF WHICH IS THE RAW MATERIAL FOR QUININE) AND
IMPROVED VARIETIES OF COFFEE IN THE YUNGAS. WE HAVE

POINTED OUT THAT WHILE BOTH PROJECTS APPEAR TO BE
ECONOMICALLY SOUND, THEY DO NOT, BY THEMSELVES, PROVIDE
A COMPREHENSIVE NOR ADEQUATE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM.
THEY DO NOT EVEN CONCENTRATE ON THE AREA THAT IS THE
PRIMARY SOURCE OF ILLEGITIMATE COCA, THE CHAPARE, BUT RATHER
ON THE YUNGAS, WHICH, WHILE IT SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED, IS
NOT THE PRIORITY AREA OF THE CONCERN. THE PROJECTS ARE
LOCATED ON THE FRINGES OF THE YUNGAS COCA GROWING AREA,
AND AS A CONDITION OF PARTICIPATION FARMERS WILL HAVE
TO PROMISE NOT TO PLANT COCA. OCAMPO NEVERTHELESS PLANS
TO GO AHEAD WITH THE PROJECTS. HE PLANS TO ANNOUNCE THE
QUINO PROJECT AT THE CARANAVI CONCENTRATION AUG 5.
THE PROJECT WILL BEGIN WITH 10 HECTARES AND BE ADMINI-
STERED BY FANAQUINA, THE MILITARY - OWNED QUININE PLANT.
OCAMPO IS ADVANCING FANAQUINA \$40,000 FOR THE PROJECT.

14. BUDGET: THE COUNCIL STILL HAS NO FIXED BUDGET.
OCAMPO HAD TOLD US THAT HIS MAIN SOURCE OF FUNDS IS THE
TAXES COLLECTED ON COCA LEAVES AT VARIOUS STAGES
OF ITS MOVEMENT THROUGH THE LEGAL MARKETING SYSTEM.

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EVIDENCE OF A SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE.

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THERE DOES NOT HOWEVER, APPEAR TO BE A VERY CAREFUL
ACCOUNTING OF THESE FUNDS.

15. OCAMPO HAS TOLD US THAT HE EXPECTS TO REMAIN AS
HEAD OF THE COUNCIL DESPITE POLITICAL CHANGES WHICH
MAY TAKE PLACE IN THE NEXT DAYS. HE ALSO PLEDGED TO
TURN OVER AT LEAST ONE OF THE BIG FIVE" NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKERS WITHIN 15DAYS.

16. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF REPORTS, BUT NO HARD EVIDENCE
TO DATE, WHICH CAST DOUBT UPON THE INTEGRITY OF
OCAMPO'S TEAM. WE HAVE ONE REPORT THAT OCAMPO'S CLOSEST
UNOFFICIAL ADVISOR, AN IMPORTER BY THE NAME OF JOSE
SCHAUB DIPS, IS CONNECTED TO TRAFFICKERS. OCAMPO
HAS KEPT ON ARMY CAPT. HELGUERO AS HEAD OF OPERATION
IN DNCSP. HELGUERO WAS APPOINTED BY ARMY COL. DERNANDEZ,
THE FORMER HEAD OF THE DRUG POLICE. LONG TIME EMBASSY
CONTACTS IN DNCSP HAVE STATED THAT HELGUERO HAS
LEAKED OPERATION PLANS TO TRAFFICKERS. OTHER SOURCES
ALLEGED THAT OCAMPO'S PRIVATE FLEET OF PLANES HAS BEEN
INVOLVED IN TRANSPORTATION COCA LEAVES. AT BEST, IF THESE
CHARGES ARE TRUE, OCAMPO'S EFFECTIVENESS WILL BE
LIMITED. AT WORST, OCAMPO'S INTEGRITY ITSELF IS OPEN
TO QUESTION.

17. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: OCAMPO'S RECORD
IS MIXED. HE HAS TAKEN SOME STEPS TO IMPROVE THE
ORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL. HE HAS PUT HIS OWN MAN
IN CHARGE OF CNCSP AND TAKEN OVER DIRECTLY THE DIRECTION
OF COCA CONTROL. HE HAS PUT TOGETHER A PLAN FOR A
CENSUS OF COCA PLANTATIONS. HIS PLANNING UNIT IS
STUDYING A REORGANIZATION OF THE COUNCIL. WE UNDERSTAND
ALSO THAT THE GOB MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND COORDINATION
INTENDS TO BECOME MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN DEVELOPING
AN ANTI-NARCOTICS PLAN. HE HAS HAD A NUMBER OF OPERATIONS
AGAINST TRAFFICKERS. HE HAS SHOWN A WILLINGNESS TO SPEND
MONEY, HAVING MADE A NUMBER OF EXPENDITURES TO IMPROVE
THE CAPABILITIES OF HIS OPERATIONS GROUP AND TO GET
AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS UNDERWAY. SO FAR, HOWEVER, HE
HAS NOT UNDERTAKEN ANY DECISIVE ACTION, SUCH AS THE
DESTRUCTION OF COCA FIELDS OUTSIDE THE TRADITIONAL
AREAS OF PRODUCTION OR THE CAPTURE OF ANY OF THE BIG
TRAFFICKERS. THE SYSTEM TO CONTROL MOVEMENT OF COCA
DOES NOT SEEM TO BE WORKING. HE HAS NOT YET PUT
TOGETHER A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF ACTION. FURTHERMORE,
SOME OF HIS CLOSEST ASSOCIATES HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF
BEING INVOLVED WITH TRAFFICKERS.

18. GIVEN THIS MIXED PICTURE, WE RECOMMEND THAT WE
CONTINUE OUR CURRENT POSTURE OF OBSERVING OCAMPO'S
EFFORTS AND OFFERING ENCOURAGEMENT AND ADVISE AS
APPROPRIATE. AT THE SAME TIME, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED
TO REACT QUICKLY, PROVIDING ADDITIONAL ADVISORS AND
PERHAPS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AS SOON AS THIS EFFORT
OR THAT OF A SUCCESSOR SHOWS CONVINCING

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E. O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SNAR, BL

SUBJECT: COL. RENE OCAMPO REPLACES GEN. CAMACHO AS HEAD OF NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING.

REF: LA PAZ 4953

1. COL. RENE OCAMPO MONJE WAS SWORN IN AS DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AUG 18 BY THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR, REPLACING RETIRED GENERAL FELIX CAMACHO. IN THE CEREMONY, THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR STATED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONTINUE THE FIGHT BY THE ARMED FORCES AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING UNDERTAKEN IN ORDER TO REVERSE THE BAD INTERNATIONAL IMAGE OF BOLIVIA CREATED BY THIS PROBLEM. OCAMPO PLEDGED TO WORK UNCEASINGLY IN ORDER TO DEFINITELY OVERCOME THE EVIL (OF TRAFFICKING). OCAMPO WAS AT HIS NEW DESK THUESDAY AFTERNOON.

2. CHARGE HAS MEETING WITH OCAMPO SCHEDULED AUG 20. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER OUR IMPRESSION OF HIS INTENTIONS AFTER THAT MEETING.

.....WATSON

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DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO PASS TO DIA AND USCINCSO
E.O. 12065: RDS-4 8/19/11 (WATSON, ALEXANDER F.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, BL
SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISES ACTION
REF: A) STATE 210893, B) STATE 212991

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NLRR M353/1 #120415
BY *RW* NARA DATE *5/18/15*

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. CHARGE MET AUGUST 19 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MARIO ROLON ANAYA AT THE LATTER'S HOME AND REQUEST. ROLON SAID HE WANTED TO ADVISE CHARGE PERSONALLY OF FOUR DECISIONS ARRIVED BY THE JUNTA DURING A CABINET MEETING EARLIER IN THE WEEK. THE DECISIONS WERE:

- (A) THAT THE REGIME WOULD TAKE QUICK AND SERIOUS ACTION TO DEAL WITH THE NARCOTICS ISSUE;
- (B) THAT THE NOTORIOUS SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SES) WILL BE DISBANDED AND REPLACED BY A NEW POLICE SECURITY UNIT. SIMILARLY ALL PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS WILL BE DISBANDED;
- (C) A PROGRAM FOR RETURNING BOLIVIA TO DEMOCRACY (WHICH ROLON SAYS HAS ALREADY BEEN PREPARED) WILL BE PUBLISHED SOON, PERHAPS NEXT WEEK. ROLON NOTED THAT THE PROGRAM PROBABLY WILL NOT INCLUDE SPECIFIC DEADLINES FOR THE VARIOUS STEPS IN THE PROCESS;
- (D) THE MINISTER OF FINANCE WILL ANNOUNCE A DISPOSITION TO ACCEPT WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THE IMF MAY MAKE ON BOLIVIAN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICY.

Ch Bolivia

3. FOR THE FIRST TIME ROLON EXPRESSED AN AWARENESS THAT A SINE QUA NON FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE US IS A TRULY SERIOUS EFFORT TO TACKLE THE COCAINE TRAFFICKING ISSUE. IN THE PAST HE HAS

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PRETENDED THAT THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME WAS
TAKING SUCH ACTION AND THAT EXPRESSIONS OF INTENTIONS,
EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT FOLLOWED UP BY ACTION,
WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. CHARGE DISCUSSED THE NARCOTICS
ISSUE IN SOME DETAIL AND ADVISED ROLON HE WOULD BE
MEETING WITH NEW NARCOTICS CHIEF OCAMPO THE FOLLOWING
DAY TO LAY OUT CLEARLY HOW THE USG SEES THE ISSUE
AND DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF PAST AND PRESENT US COOPERATION.

4. WHILE CHARGE WAS MEETING WITH ROLON, FINANCE MINISTER
COLONEL JAVIER ALCOREZA WAS ANNOUNCING TO THE PRESS
THAT QTE THERE EXISTS THE GREATEST DISPOSITION ON THE
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REF: A) STATE 210893, B) STATE 212891
PART OF THE MILITARY JUNTA OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE NATION TO MAINTAIN INALTERABLE
THE BEST RELATIONS AND UNDERSTANDING WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE WORLD BANK AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ORGANISMS WITH WHICH BOLIVIA
IS AFFILIATED. LIKEWISE, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO ANNOUNCE
OUR GREATEST DISPOSITION AND FAVORABLE INTENTION TO
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RESPONSIBILITY THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND
SUGGESTIONS THAT EMANATE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND AND THE WORLD BANK, AS WELL AS TO ADHERE
TO ALL OUR PROMISES CONTRACTED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ORGANISMS TO WHICH THE COUNTRY BELONGS UNQTE.

5. ROLON ASKED CHARGE WHETHER THE USG WOULD OBJECT
TO THE GOB'S SENDING ANOTHER SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO
WASHINGTON TO REPLACE JUSTO CHAMAS AND WORK WITH QUIROGA.
CHARGE SAID THE USG PROBABLY WOULD NOT OBJECT, BUT HE
SAW NO NEED FOR SUCH AN EMISSARY NOW THAT EFFECTIVE
COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE JUNTA HAD BEEN OPENED IN LA PAZ.
A SUBDUED ROLON ACKNOWLEDGED AGAIN THAT HE SUPPOSED
THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR WAS SERIOUS GOB ACTION ON
NARCOTICS, RATHER THAN FURTHER CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

6. COMMENT: ROLON WAS AWARE OF THE CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN CHARGE AND JUNTA MEMBERS TORRELIO AND
BERNAL AUGUST 12. MOREOVER, CHARGE PRESENTED THE
TALKING POINTS IN REF A TO FOREIGN MINISTRY
UNDERSECRETARY MOISES FUENTES IBANEZ AUGUST 4.
PRESUMABLY THEY ALSO WERE DISCUSSED AT THE CABINET
MEETING AUGUST 13 AT WHICH THE FOUR DECISIONS
ENUMERATED BY ROLON WERE REACHED. IT SEEMS CLEAR

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THAT OUR MESSAGE HAS GOTTEN THROUGH--EVEN TO ROLON--
AND THAT THE JUNTA IS ENDEAVORING TO ACT IN RESPONSE
TO OUR CONCERNS. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN, HOWEVER, WHETHER
THE EXPRESSIONS
OF INTENT WILL BE MATCHED BY SERIOUS ACTION.

7. NOTE: THE GOB EXPECTS AND IMF MISSION TO ARRIVE
AUGUST 26.
WATSON
BT


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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/20/87 (WALTERS, V.)

TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, BL, US

SUBJECT: CONVERSATIONS WITH BOLIVIAN INDUSTRY MINISTER

REF: (A) LA PAZ 4961, (B) STATE 210893

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BOLIVIAN INDUSTRY MINISTER LUCIO PAZ RIVERO, ACCOMPANIED BY BOLIVIAN OAS AMBASSADOR QUIROGA, HAD SEPARATE MEETINGS ON AUGUST 19 WITH AMBASSADOR VERNON WALTERS AND ARA SPECIAL ADVISOR GORDON SUMNER. IN BOTH MEETINGS, PAZ SAID THAT BOLIVIA WAS BESET WITH MANY PROBLEMS. INTERNATIONAL LEFTIST EXTREMISTS HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING FOR MANY YEARS TO PENETRATE THE GEOGRAPHICAL HEART OF SOUTH AMERICA. THEIR ATTEMPTS THUS FAR HAD FAILED, BUT BOLIVIA WAS NOW GREATLY WEAKENED AND NEEDED USG ASSISTANCE. HE SAID THAT THE RESOURCES OF THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS "MAFIA" WERE FAR GREATER THAN THOSE AVAILABLE TO THE GOB AND THAT WITHOUT AMERICAN AID, BOLIVIA COULD DO NOTHING.

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3. IN HIS CONVERSATION, AMBASSADOR WALTERS REVIEWED THE TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL B. THE USG WAS NOT SUPPOR-

TING ANY PERSON FOR PRESIDENT OF BOLIVIA. THAT WAS

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A DECISION BOLIVIANS ALONE COULD MAKE. THE LEVEL AND TONE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND WE WISHED TO RETURN TO MORE NORMAL RELATIONS, BUT THERE WERE PROBLEMS WHICH STOOD IN THE WAY OF THAT GOAL. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WAS NARCOTICS. GOB ACTION ON THE NARCOTICS ISSUE WAS ESSENTIAL IN ORDER TO OVERCOME EXPECTED STRONG CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO RESUMPTION OF NORMAL RELATIONS.

4. QUIROGA SAID THAT THE GOB HAD BEEN MAKING A CONCERTED EFFORT TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFICKING. THIS EFFORT HAD GONE UNRECOGNIZED, HE ALLEGED, BY THE USG BECAUSE OF THE LONG DELAYS IN TRANSMITTING ACCURATE INFORMATION FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN LA PAZ TO WASHINGTON ON WHAT WAS BEING DONE. HE SAID THE GOB DID NOT RECEIVE IN TIMELY FASHION THE NAMES OF THE FIVE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS WHOM THE USG WOULD LIKE TO SEE EXPELLED TO FACE TRIAL IN THE US. THE GOB WISHED TO KNOW WHAT SPECIFIC ACTIONS THE USG WOULD LIKE TO SEE NOW ON THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM. AMBASSADOR WALTERS TOLD THE BOLIVIANS HE WOULD CONSULT WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS AND BE IN TOUCH WITH MINISTER PAZ BEFORE HIS AUGUST 23 RETURN TO LA PAZ.

5. IN THEIR MEETING WITH GENERAL SUMNER, THE BOLIVIANS MADE THE SAME POINTS. GEN. SUMNER ALSO REVIEWED THE TALKING POINTS IN REFTEL B. QUIROGA AGAIN SAID THE GOB HAD DONE ALL THAT HAD BEEN ASKED AND INQUIRED WHAT MORE THE USG WOULD LIKE.

6. EARLIER IN THE DAY, JOHN SANFORD, STAFF DIRECTOR OF THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCE, ADVISED ARA/AND/B THAT HE HAD MET WITH THE BOLIVIANS AND INFORMED THEM THAT MANY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE BANKING COMMITTEE AND OTHER CONGRESSMEN WERE DISTURBED OVER THE INVOLVEMENT OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GARCIA MEZA REGIME IN DRUGS. WHILE THE USG WOULD ALWAYS BE READY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO A COUNTRY MAKING A SINCERE EFFORT TO CONTROL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ABSENT ANY CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF THE WILL TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM THE GOB SHOULD NOT EXPECT USG AID. HE SUGGESTED THERE WERE SPECIFIC THINGS, SUCH AS BLOCKING THE MOVEMENT OF COCA LEAF FROM THE CHAPARE TO COCAINE PROCESSING AREAS, WHICH THE GOB COULD DO ON ITS OWN WITHOUT MASSIVE FINANCIAL HELP FROM THE USG. (FYI: SANFORD WAS RESPONSIBLE

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FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE OVERSIGHT REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RANGEL AMENDMENT.) STOESSEL
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E.O. 12065: GDS 8/21/87 (GEHRING, ROBERT A.) OR-0
TAGS: SNAR, BL
SUBJ: MEETING WITH NEW DIRECTOR- GENERAL OF NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE
FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS CONTROL

REF: (A) LA PAZ 4872 (NOTAL); (B) LA PAZ 4953; (C) LA PAZ 4999

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: CHARGE, ACCOMPANIED BY OTHER MISOFFS, MET WITH
THE NEWLY DESIGNATED DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, COL. RENE OCAMPO
AUGUST 20. OCAMPO RECOGNIZED THAT HIS FIRST JOB WAS TO
ORGANIZE THE COUNCIL AND ITS DEPENDENCIES IN A RATIONAL WAY AND
DEFINE ITS TASKS. HE OUTLINED HIS PLANS FOR REORGANIZATION
AND FOR NAMING NEW PERSONNEL. CHARGE DESCRIBED U.S. THINKING
ON COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH THAT WAS REQUIRED TO REDUCE COCAINE
FLOW. HE ALSO DESCRIBED PAST U.S. ASSISTANCE BUT STATED HE
WAS NOT IN POSITION TO PROJECT FUTURE ASSISTANCE. CHARGE
ALSO BROUGHT UP PROBLEM OF LACK OF CONTINUITY IN NARCOTICS
EFFORT AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE
WITH PAST EXPERIENCE IN NARCOTICS WORK WHO MIGHT USEFULLY BE
RECALLED TO THE EFFORT. OCAMPO STATED THAT COUNCIL WILL
REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE RULING JUNTA. CURRENTLY, THE COUNCIL HAS NO
INDEPENDENT BUDGET, HOWEVER. HE SAID THAT MUCH U.S. EQUIPMENT
WHICH HAD BEEN DONATED IN THE PAST IS SIDELINED, OFTEN FOR VERY
INEXPENSIVE REPAIRS, BUT THAT THERE WAS NO MONEY TO MAKE THESE
REPAIRS. FOR THE MOMENT, OCAMPO SEEMED MORE INTERESTED IN ADVICE
THAN FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE. IT WAS AGREED THAT DEA SAIC AND
NCU CHIEF WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH
OCAMPO. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE MET NEW DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL
FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, COL RENE
OCAMPO, MORNING OF AUGUST 20. CHARGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY
DEA SAIC, DATT, NCU CHIEF AND POLOFF. POLICE COL. GUIDO
LOPEZ, CHIEF INSPECTOR OF DNCSP (THE DRUG POLICE) ALSO
ATTENDED MEETING.

4. OCAMPO BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HIS FIRST TASK WAS TO FORM
A VIABLE ORGANIZATION. ON TAKING OVER THE NATIONAL COUNCIL,
HE FOUND WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS A FLOATING BODY, "WITHOUT HEAD
OR FEET", I.E. A BODY WITHOUT REAL FORM OR DIRECTION. HE ASKED
FOR ADVICE IN ORGANIZING THE COUNCIL AND DEFINING ITS TASKS.

5. THE COUNCIL HAS TWO DEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS, THE DNCSP AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF COCA REGISTRATION AND CONTROL, AS WELL AS
A SMALL STAFF OF ITS OWN. OCAMPO SAID THAT HE WOULD BE
LOOKING FOR NEW DIRECTORS FOR BOTH DEPENDENCIES; COL. FERNANDEZ
RESIGNED AS THE DIRECTOR OF DNCSP LAST MONTH, AND MAJ. COSSIO
WILL LEAVE COCA CONTROL NEXT MONDAY. OCAMPO SAID THAT HE
WOULD LOOK FOR OFFICERS FROM THE OTHER SERVICES (IE THE

NAVY AND ARMY, OCAMPO IS AN AIR FORCE OFFICER) FOR THESE
POSITIONS IN ORDER TO BETTER ASSURE COORDINATION AND INTEREST
AMONG ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES. HE INTENDED TO
RETAIN IN DNCSP COL. LOPEZ AND ARMY CAPT. JAVIER ELGERO AS
HEAD OF OPERATIONS. LOPEZ WAS THE FIRST DIRECTOR OF THE
DNCSP AND IS WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN TO THE MISSION.

6. OCAMPO SAID THAT HE ALSO INTENDED TO INTEGRATE THE VARIOUS
PARTS OF THE COUNCIL MORE CLOSELY. FOR INSTANCE, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE SECTIONS WOULD BE COMBINED. HE WAS CONSIDERING
WHETHER PRODES SHOULD ALSO BE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
COUNCIL. OCAMPO SAID THAT THE OPERATIONS UNIT OF DNCSP WOULD
THAKE THE LEAD IN OPERATIONS AGAINST TRAFFICKERS. ARMED
FORCES UNITS WOULD BE CALLED UPON TO ASSIST AS REQUIRED.

7. OCAMPO ALSO PLANNED TO NAME DR. AGREMONT
AS LEGAL ADVISOR IN THE COUNCIL, AND A MR. SIMBRON
AS THE NEW PROSECUTOR FOR THE LA PAZ DISTRICT COURT.

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BY *RW* NARA DATE 5/18/15

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OCAMPO CHARACTERIZED THE LATTER AS FORCEFUL AND INCORRUPTIBLE.

8. CHARGE COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE A NUMBER OF OTHER PEOPLE, WHO HAVE HAD NARCOTICS EXPERIENCE, AND IN SOME CASES U.S. TRAINING, AND WITH WHOM WE HAVE WORKED IN THE PAST, BUT WHO IN THE LAST YEAR HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO OTHER POSITIONS. SOME OF THESE PEOPLE MIGHT USEFULLY BE RECALLED TO THE COUNCIL NOW, HE SUGGESTED. LOPEZ ANSWERED THAT WHEN THE COUNCIL WAS FORMED, ALL OF THE DNCSP INSPECTORS WERE REPLACED, IN ORDER TO REMOVE A LARGELY CORRUPT FORCE. HOWEVER, HE SAID HE WOULD NOW LOOK AMONG FORMER NARCOTICS POLICE OFFICERS AND TRY TO RECALL THOSE WHO HAD BEEN COMPETENT AND UNCORRUPTED.

9. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, OCAMPO SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WILL REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE JUNTA. IT IS NOT PART OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR. TO ANOTHER QUESTION HE REPLIED THAT THE COUNCIL HAS NO BUDGET. IT DRAWS FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE DNCSP AND COCA CONTROL TO FINANCE MINIMAL NEEDS. THE LACK OF ADEQUATE FUNDS WAS A SERIOUS PROBLEM, HE SAID.

10. THE CHARGE OUTLINED OUR THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO NARCOTICS CONTROL; THAT IS, THAT A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM TO REDUCE COCAINE PRODUCTION AND EXPORT BOLIVIA MUST INCLUDE THREE ELEMENTS; THE DISRUPTION OF TRAFFICKING NETWORKS, THE REDUCTION OF COCA LEAF PRODUCTION AND CONTROL OF LEAF MOVEMENT AND AN ALTERNATIVE CROP PROGRAM. ALL THREE PRONGS ARE ESSENTIAL; NONE CAN ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF REDUCING THE FLOW OF COCA FOR LONG WITHOUT THE OTHER.

11. THE CHARGE ALSO REVIEWED PAST U.S. ASSISTANCE TO BOLIVIA AND GAVE OCAMPO A STATICAL SUMMARY OF U.S. EXPENDITURES FROM 1979 THROUGH 1981. IN THE DISCUSSION OF PAST U. S. ASSISTANCE IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD PROVIDED CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND VEHICLES. OCAMPO SAID MOST OF THIS EQUIPMENT WAS OUT OF SERVICE. HE SAID THAT IN MANY CASES ONLY MINOR REPAIRS WERE NEEDED THAT WOULD COST VERY LITTLE, BUT NO FUNDS FOR REPAIRS WERE AVAILABLE.

12. THE CHARGE ALSO BROUGHT UP THE PROBLEM OF CONTINUITY. FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, THERE HAVE BEEN A SUCCESSION OF GOVERNMENTS AND EVEN MORE CHANGES IN PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO NARCOTICS WORK. FURTHERMORE, NONE OF THE PAST GOVERNMENTS HAD REALLY TACKLED THE PROBLEM OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ENERGETICALLY. ONCE AGAIN WE WERE STARTING ALL OVER AGAIN WITH NEW PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF NARCOTICS CONTROL. WE WERE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH OCAMPO TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE BUT HOPED THAT OCAMPO WOULD BE ABLE TO PUT TOGETHER AN ORGANIZATION THAT WOULD SURVIVE CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTS AND PERSONNEL.

13. THE CHARGE ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO SAY WHAT KIND OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE THE U.S. WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE. HE SUGGESTED THAT OCAMPO FIRST GET HIS ORGANIZATION SET UP AND PLANS FORMULATED, THEN WE COULD

SIT DOWN AGAIN TO SEE HOW WE COULD HELP.

14. OCAMPO SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE HEAD OF AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE IN COLOMBIA WHO REPORTED A GROWING CONNECTION BETWEEN EXTREMIST GROUPS AND NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. HE SAW THIS AS A N IMPENDING DANGER TO BOLIVIA. HE HAS ALSO BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIS FORMER AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE COUNTERPARTS IN OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES.

15. DEA SAIC INFORMED OCAMPO OF A MEETING THAT DEA BRASILIA IS TRYING TO ORGANIZE IN COOPERATION WITH BRASISLIAN COUNTERPARTS OF NARCOTICS CHIEFS FROM COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU AND BRAZIL. HE SUGGESTED BOLIVIA MIGHT ALSO WANT TO ATTEND. OCAMPO EXPRESSED AN INTEREST.

16. AT THE END OF THE MEETING, IT WAS AGREED THAT DEA SA RIVERA AND NCU CHIEF GEHRING WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH OCAMPO AS HE ORGANIZED THE COUNCIL.

17. COMMENT: OCAMPO SEEMED EAGER TO GET A HOLD ON HIS NEW ORGANIZATION. HE READILY ADMITTED HIS LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN THE FIELD, BUT NEVERTHELESS, SEEMED ALREADY TO BE FORMULATING PLANS FOR REORGANIZING THE COUNCIL AND GETTING IT TO WORK. HE SEEMS TO BE MORE THOUGHTFUL THAN WAS LT COL DORIA MEDINA, WHO WAS EAGER TO RUSH INTO ACTION IN ORDER TO MAKE QUICK, IMPRESSIVE STRIKES AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS. OCAMPO SEEMS MORE ATTUNED TO ORGANIZING FOR THE LONG HAUL.

18. AS DID GENERAL BERNAL (REF A), OCAMPO ASKED FOR ADVICE RATHER THAN FINANCIAL HELP FOR THE PRESENT. SLP TEL MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW WE SHOULD RESPOND TO THIS REQUEST. END COMMENT.

WATSON

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E.O. 12065: RDS-1 8/24/11 (WATSON, A.F.) OR-M
TAGS: PINT, NARC, BL
SUBJECT: BERNAL REQUESTS INFORMATION ON OFFICERS INVOLVED
IN NARCOTICS

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AIR FORCE COMMANDER AND JUNTA MEMBER GENERAL WALDO BERNAL CALLED DATT GREEN DURING THE LATE MORNING OF AUGUST 24 TO REQUEST A MEETING WITH CHARGE TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS THE REGIME IS ENCOUNTERING IN ITS INVESTIGATION OF MILITARY OFFICERS ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. BERNAL SAID HE HAS REPORTS THAT CERTAIN OFFICERS ARE INVOLVED BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE ENOUGH SPECIFIC INFORMATION TO BRING THE INDIVIDUALS TO TRIAL. THE GENERAL ADDED THAT THE JUNTA HAS DECIDED TO TAKE ACTION BUT WILL NEED THE HELP OF DEA OR OTHERS TO DEVELOP THE NECESSARY EVIDENCE. HE INSISTED THAT SUCH COOPERATION BY DEA WOULD BE KEPT VERY CONFIDENTIAL.

3. BERNAL SAID THAT NEW ANTI-NARCOTICS COUNCIL CHIEF COLONEL RENE OCAMPO VISITED SANTA RUZ OVER THE WEEKEND AND REPORTED THAT COCAINE PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING IN MONTERO HAS INCREASED. THE GENERAL FEARS THE TRAFFICKERS ARE TESTING THE JUNTA WHICH MUST RESPOND IMMEDIATELY.

4. BERNAL MAY BE REACTING AT LEAST IN PART

SIT: PUBS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

LA PAZ 5110

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/10/05

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TO ACCUSATIONS PUBLISHED IN A PAID ADVERTISEMENT
BY FORMER EDUCATION MINISTER AND REPORTED
COCAINE TRAFFICER COLONEL ARIEL COCA AGUIRRE.
AUGUST 23 IN THE SANTA CRUZ DAILY "EL MUNDO."
COCA ACCUSED BERNAL OF QUOTE NOT HAVING MORAL
AUTHORITY OR SOLVENCY TO REASSIGN ME. THE
PEOPLE RECALL THE APPOINTMENT OF ALL HIS
RELATIVES IN CUSTOMS OFFICE AND CONSULATES
IN BRAZIL, MIAMI AND WASHINGTON. UNQUOTE.
COCA GOES ON TO ACCUSE BERNAL OF BETRAYING GARCIA
MEZA AND ASSERTS QUOTE THE JUNTA CANNOT AND SHOULD
NOT CONTINUE TO GOVERN UNQUOTE. IN THIS REGARD HE
MENTIONS INVOLVEMENT OF THE JUNTA MEMBERS IN
THE GAIBA PRECIOUS STONES SCANDAL, NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING AND NEPOTISM, AS WELL AS THE INFAMOUS
PAKISTANI RICE DEAL CONCLUDED BY JUNTA MEMBERS
AND NAVY COMMANDER ADMIRAL PAMMO DURING THE
PADILLA REGIME IN 1978-79. COCA CALLS FOR THE
JUNTA TO RESIGN AND THE ARMED FORCES TO SELECT
A PRESIDENT.

Blum

5. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE IT TO BE IN OUR INTEREST
TO CONVEY TO BERNAL INFORMATION THE US MAY HAVE
ON THE INVOLVEMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING IN WHATEVER DETAIL DEA AND OTHER
AGENCIES BELIEVES IS APPROPRIATE, AS WE DID IN THE
CASE OF ALFREDO PINTO LANDIVAR. THIS
MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER DISCORD IN THE BOLIVIAN
ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR SINCERITY
IN HELPING THE JUNTA ATTACK THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM
AND JUST MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO A DISRUPTION OF COCAINE
TRAFFICKING.

.....WATSON
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BY RW NARA DATE 5/18/85

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INFO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 4755

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LA PAZ 5545

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 9/11/01 (PRYCE, WILLIAM T.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, BL, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TORRELIO

REF: (A) LA PAZ 5337, (B) STATE 241805

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

Chakista

P Bolivia

2. SUMMARY: DURING COURSE OF PRIVATE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TORRELIO AT HIS HOME LAST NIGHT, CHARGE NOTED THAT USG WAS ENCOURAGED BY HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS THUS FAR AND HOPED THEY WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY CONCRETE ACTIONS ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF NARCOTICS, ACTIONS WHICH COULD LAY THE BASE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONSHIPS BOTH COUNTRIES SEEK. TORRELIO SAID HE HAD NOT ORIGINALLY SOUGHT THE PRESIDENCY, BUT HAVING ACCEPTED IT, HE WAS FULLY DETERMINED TO DO HIS BEST TO LEAD THE COUNTRY OUT OF THE MORAL AND ECONOMIC MORASS IN WHICH IT FINDS ITSELF; THAT HE WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE NEED TO MOVE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND WAS IN FACT DOING SO ALTHOUGH THE TASK WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE TRAFFICKERS HAD SO MANY RESOURCES; THAT HE NEEDED MORE DEA AGENTS TO HELP IN THE FIGHT; THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS ALSO FULLY AWARE OF THE NEED TO TAKE STRONG ECONOMIC MEASURES AND INTENDED TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE IMF ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD ALSO BE DIFFICULT AND TAKE A LITTLE TIME; THAT HE INTENDED TO CLEARLY DISTANCE HIMSELF FROM THE GARCIA MEZA GOVERNMENT; THAT HE WAS SENDING FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER COL. LUIS ARCE TO ARGENTINA, BUT WOULD PROSECUTE HIM FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IF HE GOT PROOF, THAT HE HAD NO ONE REPRESENTING HIM PERSONALLY IN WASHINGTON AT THIS TIME; THAT HE INTENDS TO DROP HIS ROLE AS ARMY COMMANDER NEXT WEEK. TORRELIO REPEATED THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION THAT HE BADLY

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NEEDS "FULL RECOGNITION" TO HELP HIM TAKE THE DIFFICULT STEPS HE KNOWS ARE NECESSARY. COMMENT: WE MAY WISH TO CONSIDER A SLIGHT AUGMENTATION OF THE DEA STAFF, BOTH TO OFFER SOME POSITIVE RESPONSE TO TORRELIO'S REQUEST AND TO BE BETTER ABLE TO SEE WHETHER HE IS REALLY MAKING THE SERIOUS EFFORTS AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS HE CALIMS. END SOMMENT END SUMMARY.

3. UPON RECEIPT OF DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION (REF B), I MET ALONE WITH PRESIDENT TORRELIO FOR OVER AN HOUR AT HIS PRIVATE RESIDENC ELAST NIGHT (SEPTMBER 10). I OPENED THE CONERSATION BY NOTING THAT THE USG WAS ENCOURAGED BY HIS AND HIS GOVERNMENT'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS THUS FAR AND HOPED THAT THEY WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY ACTIONS WHICH COULD LAY THE BASE FOR THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BOTH COUNTRIES WEEK. IN THE ENSUING CONVERSATION, I TOLD HIM REPEATEDLY THAT THE USG IN FACT WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS, BUT THAT AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR PREVIOUSLY, IT WAS ABSOUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT HE TAKE SIGNIFICANT, CONCRETE CLEARLY DEMONSTRABLE ACTIONS AGAINST NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS IN ORDER FOR US TO BE ABLE TO DO SO. I MENTIONED TURNING OVER THE FIVE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS WE HAD INDICTED, ARRESTING AND KEEPING UNDER DETENTION OTHER MAJOR TRAFFICKERS, THE SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF LARGE AMOUNTS OF COCAINE (50 TO 100 KILOS), AND FULL-SCALE EFFORTS TO KEEP COCA LEAF (HOJA DE COCA) FROM REACHING SANTA CRUZ AS EXAMPLES OF WHAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR.

4. TORRELIO RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE WAS FULLY DETERMINED TO MOVE EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS BUT THAT THIS WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT BECAUSE THE TRAFFICKERS HAD SO MANY RESOURCES AS COMPARED TO THE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THAT COL. OCAMPO'S ANTI-DRUG OFFICE HAD HIS FULL SUPPORT AND WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BEING GIVEN ADDITIONAL RESOURCES, MENTIONING WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT WHICH ARE BEING ORDERED FROM THE UNITED STATES, AND THE REASSIGNMENT OF AGENTS WHO HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY TRAINED BY THE DEA. HE SAID HE WAS VERY PLEASED TO LEARN OF THE PERMANENT RETURN OF A DEA AGENT, AND REPEATED IN STRONG TERMS HIS PREVIOUS REQUEST MADE AT LAST WEEK'S LUNCHEON (REF A) THAT WE SEND ADDITIONAL DEA OR OTHER ANTI-NARCOTICS AGENTS TO HELP HIM FIGHT NARCOTIC TRAFFICKERS ESPECIALLY IN THE PLANNING OF A LONG TERM PROGRAM. HE ASSERTED THAT UNDER THE DIRECTION OF MAJOR COSSIO, WHO HE DESCRIBED AS A STRONG DYSNAMIC PERSON DOING A GOOD JOB (IT DID NOT SEEM APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO MENTION OUR-BT

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AMEMBASSY BONN 101
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 2208
AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 4762
AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3673
AMEMBASSY LIMA 7578
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AMEMBASSY PARIS 665
AMEMBASSY QUITO 2115
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 5610

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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/16/87 (STRASSER, DANIEL A.) OR-P
TAGS: PDIP, PEPR, PINT, SNAR, BL, US
SUBJ: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ROMERO
REF: LA PAZ 5514

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: IN A SEPT. 15 MEETING, WITH EMBOFFS AT A PRIVATE HOME, FOREIGN MINISTER ROMERO CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED HIS INTEREST IN WORKING TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE US, PRESSING FOR ACTION ON THE NARCOTICS FRONT AND MOVING THE GOVERNMENT TOWARDS DEMOCRACY. HE WISHES TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US TOWARDS THESE ENDS. THE TORRELIO GOVERNMENT, HE RECOGNIZES, IS WEAK AND FACES MANY OBSTACLES FROM WITHOUT AND WITHIN. ROMERO HOPED THE UNITED STATES WOULD HELP MOVE THE GOVERNMENT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BY DEMONSTRATING SOME SUPPORT. END SUMMARY.

3. CHARGE AND EMBOFFS (POL/ECON CHIEF AND INFORMATION

SIT: PUBS
EOB: FONTAINE, PIPES, RENT
WHSR COMMENTS: POSSIBILITY FOR A SLOW DAY

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LA PAZ 5610

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/18/15

P. Belva

OFFICER), AT INVITATION OF PROMINENT LA PAZ NEWSPAPER OWNER CARLOS SERRATE REICH, MET SEPT. 15 INFORMALLY AND PRIVATELY AT SERRATE'S HOME WITH BOLIVIA'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER, GONZALO ROMERO. ALSO PRESENT WAS ROMERO'S DAUGHTER, ANA MARIA CAMPERO.

4. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE JUST AFTER ROMERO HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT GIVEN FRONT PAGE HEADLINE TREATMENT IN THE SEPT. 16 PRESS STATING THAT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM IN THE REESTABLISHMENT OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE US (SEPTELS). IN OUR CONVERSATION, ROMERO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE IN BOLIVIA WERE ALREADY NIPPING AT THE HEELS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WHICH HAD ONLY BEEN IN OFFICE FOR 10 DAYS. CLEARLY, HE SAID, SOME TIME WAS NECESSARY TO GET THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES OFF THE GROUND. ROMERO SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT TORRELIO, HE WAS CONVINCED OF THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERITY. DESCRIBING TORRELIO AS A "GOOD AND RELIGIOUS MAN", HE SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS PRACTICALLY OBSESSED WITH THE ISSUE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS.

5. ROMERO INDICATED THAT HE HAD A COMMITMENT FROM THE PRESIDENT TO MOVE TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION, BUT THAT THIS PROCESS WOULD HAVE TO COME IN STAGES. HE NOTED ALSO THAT THE EUROPEAN AMBASSADORS IN LA PAZ SEEM TO EMPHASIZE NOTHING ELSE BUT HUMAN RIGHTS. (IN AN ASIDE HE SAID THAT AT A RECENT RECEPTION, THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR HAD DOGGED HIM AROUND THE ROOM INSISTING THAT THE GOVERNMENT ALLOW THE RETURN TO THE COUNTRY OF EXILED POLITICAL AND LABOR LEADERS.)

6. ROMERO CLEARLY INDICATED THAT THOSE IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION SUCH AS HIMSELF WHO ADVOCATED INCREASED LIBERALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY, NEEDED ALL THE HELP THEY COULD GET IN DEALING WITH THE MILITARY ELEMENTS OF THE REGIME. AS AN EXAMPLE OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY MENTALITY, HE NOTED THAT IT HAD PRACTICALLY BEEN DECIDED WITHIN THE CABINET TO COMPLETELY ELIMINATE THE CURFEW WHEN ON THE DAY OF THE CABINET MEETING TO DECIDE THE ISSUE, THE MOVEMENT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT (MIR) CONDUCTED ITS PROPAGANDA EFFORTS (REFTTEL); THE MILITARY IN THE CABINET REACTED BADLY, AND THE RESULT WAS ONLY A LIMITED REDUCTION IN THE CURFEW. ROMERO ALSO ASKED IF WE COULD USE OUR INFLUENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT TO INSIST ON THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SES), WHICH ROMERO CONSIDERED TO BE LITTLE MORE THAN AN ARMED GROUP OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS.

7. ROMERO SAID THAT THE TORRELIO GOVERNMENT WAS "AS WEAK AS A NOODLE". HE KNEW THAT NORMALIZATION AWAITED SOME CONCRETE STEPS BY THE GOVERNMENT ON THE NARCOTICS FRONT. HOWEVER, HE HOPED THAT THE US COULD "DO SOMETHING" TO HELP SHORE UP THE

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WEAK REGIME. HE WAS NOT SPECIFIC IN THIS REGARD, BUT HE FELT THAT SOME STATEMENT BY THE US INDICATING INTERIM SATISFACTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS WOULD BE HELPFUL.

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3674
AMEMBASSY LIMA 7579
AMEMBASSY LONDON 510
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8. ON THE NARCOTICS ISSUE, ROMERO SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT DID INTEND TO TAKE STEPS. BOLIVIA FACED GREAT DIFFICULTY HOWEVER, IN DEALING WITH THE POWERFUL NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. THE CHARGE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE US ATTACHES TO CONCRETE ACTIONS IN THIS REGARD. STATEMENTS OF INTENTIONS WERE GOOD BUT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH TO BRING ABOUT NORMALIZATION. (MRS. CAMPERO URGED THAT THE GOVERNMENT TAKE STEPS IMMEDIATELY IN THIS REGARD AND NOT SATISFY ITSELF WITH SIMPLE DECLARATIONS.) ROMERO SAID THAT ONE OF THE STEPS WHICH MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING WOULD BE FOR THE GOB TO BEGIN A FORMAL LEGAL PROCESS AGAINST THE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS, PARTICULARLY THOSE CITED BY THE US WHICH WOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP TOWARDS THEIR PROSECUTION. THE CHARGE SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE AN INITIAL STEP, BUT ULTIMATELY, THE GOB SHOULD BE WORKING TOWARDS HANDING THOSE INDICTED IN THE US OVER TO THE US AUTHORITIES VIA LAW ENFORCEMENT CHANNELS, SINCE FORMAL EXTRADITION WOULD TAKE TOO LONG. THIS WAS NOT THE ONLY CONCRETE STEP THAT THE GOB COULD TAKE, HOWEVER, HE ADDED. EFFORTS

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TO CAPTURE LARGE QUANTITIES OF COCAINE, TO MOVE TO EFFECTIVELY CUT OFF THE FLOW OF COCA LEAF TO SANTA CRUZ AND GENERAL HARASSMENT OF THE COCAINE TRAFFICKERS WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT STEPS.

9. THE CHARGE ALSO MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE OF ACTIONS BY THE GOB TO PUT THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY IN ORDER. THIS WAS VITAL TO MEET IMF CRITERIA FOR A STANDBY AGREEMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT WE WERE SURPRISED BY RUMORS CIRCULATING THAT THE BOLIVIAN AIR FORCE WAS MOVING TO MAKE A MAJOR PURCHASE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FROM BELGIUM. ROMERO SAID THAT THESE RUMORS WERE TRUE AND THAT HE WAS ALSO PREOCCUPIED WITH THIS PROBLEM. HE SAID HE WOULD RAISE THE MATTER IN CABINET.

9. COMMENT: IN THIS INITIAL MEETING WITH ROMERO AS FOREIGN MINISTER, WE WERE STRUCK BY HIS SINCERITY, GOOD INTENTIONS, AND WILLINGNESS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US IN DEALING WITH MAJOR ISSUES FACING US/BOLIVIAN RELATIONS. IT IS ALSO EVIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT ROMERO'S INFLUENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT IS LIMITED. TORRELIO IS STILL HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON MILITARY LEADERS WHO HELPED PUT HIM IN OFFICE. INDIVIDUALS IN THE GOVERNMENT SUCH AS ROMERO WHO ARE SEEKING THE END OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND THE REESTABLISHMENT OF DEMOCRACY CLEARLY BELIEVE THAT WITHOUT US DISCREET ASSISTANCE, THEY WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PULLING THE TORRELIO GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THESE OBJECTIVES.

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INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 AID-07 INR-10 CIAE-00 ICA-11 10-15
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STATE FOR INM AND ARA

DEA FOR FRL

DIA FOR IR BRANCH

USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: SNAR, BL

SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT DECLARES CRUSADE AGAINST NARCOTICS
TRAFFICKING

1. (U) SUMMARY: BOLIVIAN PRESS MINISTER ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOB IS DETERMINED TO MAKE THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING A NATIONAL CRUSADE, INVOLVING THE ENTIRE CITIZENRY, NOT JUST THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. HE SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL PROVE ITS INTENTIONS WITH ACTIONS, NOT JUST WORDS. HE SAID THE CRUSADE WILL INCLUDE CONTROL OF COCA PRODUCTION AND MARKETING AND CROP SUBSTITUTION. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) AFTER A CABINET MEETING, WED SEP 16, BOLIVIAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION JAIME HUMEREZ ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOB FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING WILL NOT BE LIMITED JUST TO THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUGS, BUT WILL ALSO HAVE THE CHARACTER OF A NATIONAL CRUSADE AND THE GOVERNMENT WILL TAKE LEGAL ACTIONS WITHOUT HESITATION AGAINST ANYONE INVOLVED IN TRAFFICKING. HE SAID THAT THE ENTIRE POPULACE WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORT IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE NEGATIVE IMAGE THAT TRAFFICKING HAD BROUGHT ON THE COUNTRY AND THAT HAD CAUSED THE COUNTRY SO MUCH DAMAGE.

3. (U) THE MINISTER CONTINUED THAT APPARENTLY OTHER COUNTRIES HAD NOT TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THAT SINCE THE ASSUMPTION OF GENERAL TORRELIO AS PRESIDENT, A NEW DYNAMIC HAD ENTERED THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL HAD TO THE PRESENT, BEEN WORKING SILENTLY TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION IN TRAFFICKING, BUT WILL NOW GIVE MORE PUBLICITY TO ITS WORK. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL DEMONSTRATE THE PRIORITY THAT IT HAS GIVEN THE FIGHT AGAINST TRAFFICKING NOT JUST WITH WORDS BUT ALSO WITH ACTS.

4. (U) THE MINISTER WENT ON THAT THE "CRUSADE" WILL INCLUDE CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF COCA AND THE GRADUAL SUBSTITUTION OF OTHER CROPS. HE SAID WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, THAT THE SUBSTITUTION OF COCA WILL BE A LONG TERM PROJECT THAT WILL REQUIRE A GREAT DEAL OF INTERNA-

TIONAL COOPERATION, AS PERU AND COLOMBIA HAVE RECEIVED. HE SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS SEEKING ASSISTANCE FROM INTERESTED COUNTRIES.

5. (LOU) COMMENT: THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO MAKE THE RIGHT NOISES. IT IS NOTABLE THAT THE MINISTER ACCEPTED ONCE THE EXISTENCE OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND NOTED THE DAMAGE CAUSED TO THE COUNTRY BY THE BAD IMAGE BOLIVIA HAD RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THE TRAFFICKING, RATHER THAN BLAMING THAT BAD IMAGE ON THE "INTERNATIONAL LEFTISH PRESS" AND BLAMING THE PROBLEM OF TRAFFICKING ON CONSUMER COUNTRIES, AS RECENT BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE DONE. THE QUESTION REMAINS, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE TORRELIO GOVERNMENT CAN OR WILL MATCH ITS WORDS WITH DEEDS. END COMMENT.

.....PRYCE

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INFO DEA HQS WASHDC
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STATE FOR INM AND ARA, DEA FOR FRL, DIA FOR IR BRANCH,
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/18/87 (GEHRING, ROBERT A.)OR-O
TAGS: SNAR, BL, CGEN
SUBJ: GOB NULLIFIES 1981 NARCOTICS LAW

1. (U) SUMMARY: THE SUBSECRETARY OF JUSTICE OF THE MINISTRY ON INTERIOR ANNOUNCES THAT NARCOTICS CASES WILL BE PROSECUTED VIGOROUSLY AND SUSPENDS THE NARCOTICS LAW OF 1981, REINSTATING THE LAW OF 1979, BECAUSE OF DIPLOMATIC PROTESTS AGAINST THE DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS OF THE 1981 LAW. NEWSPAPER-EDITORIAL CALLS FOR THE RELEASE OF NAMES OF MAJOR TRAFFICKERS AND UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NARCOTICS ISSUE FOR THE RENEWAL OF NORMAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. MINISTER OF INTEGRATION CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL HELP TO COMBAT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. MILITARY ATTACHE SOLOMON SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORT, CLAIMING HIS OWN INNOCENCE OF INVOLVEMENT IN TRAFFICKING. END SUMMARY.
2. (U) THE SUBSECRETARY FOR JUSTICE OF THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ROLOONDO SIMBRON VELASCO, STATED TO THE PRESS THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, THAT HIS OFFICE WOULD ACT DRASTICALLY AND WITH ENERGY TO PROSECUTE NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS. HE SAID THAT HE WAS REQUESTING IMMEDIATELY INFORMATION FROM THE DISTRICT PROSECUTOR AND THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE FIGHT AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING REGARDING PENDING NARCOTICS CASES WITH REGARD TO HOW THESE CASES WERE BEING PROSECUTED. HE SAID THAT ALL THOSE IMPLICATED IN NARCOTICS WOULD BE SEVERELY PUNISHED. HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD INVESTIGATE CHARGES MADE IN AUGUST BY HIS REDECESSOR REGARDING IRREGULARITIES IN EARLIER JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS.
3. THE SUBSECRETARY ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAS SUSPENDED THE NARCOTICS LAW OF MAY 5, 1981 (DECRETO LEY 18254), REPLACING IT WITH THE PREVIOUS NARCOTICS LAW OF 1979, WHILE A NEW LAW WAS BEING DRAFTED. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE LAW OF 1981 HAD INCLUDED DISCRIMINATORY PENALTIES FOR FOREIGNERS AND STATED THAT THIS WAS THE REASON FOR SUSPENDING THE LAW. HE CITED AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN WHICH THE U.S. SAID THAT THE LAW SHOULD BE CHANGED WITH REGARD TO ITS UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF BOLIVIAN AND FOREIGNERS. ONE LA PAZ NEWSPAPER, EL DIARIO, EMPHASIZED THIS STATEMENT BY HEADLINING ITS ARTICLE "AT THE SUGGESTION OF THE USA, THE LAW ON NARCOTICS IS NULLIFIED."
4. (U) LA PAZ DAILY "HOY" ON SEPT. 18 CARRIED A LEAD EDITORIAL ON COMBATTING NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, ENTITLED "THE LIST". IN SUMMARY, THE EDITORIAL SAID: THE CHANCELLOR HAS LAID THE CARDS ON THE TABLE, MAKING IT CLEAR THAT THE RENEWAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPENDS UPON EFFECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. THE MINISTER OF INFORMATION HAS ANNOUNCED A NATIONAL CRUSADE AGAINST ILLICIT COCAINE TRAFFICKING. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DONE FROM THE FIRST DAY, IS NOW COMING TO LIGHT. FOR MORE THAN A YEAR, THE NAMES OF THE REAL TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN HIDDEN, LETTING THE STAIN SPREAD, COMPROMISING THE HONOR OF ALL

THE CITIZENS OF BOLIVIA, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN. THERE IS ONLY ONE ROAD FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO TAKE; THE RELEASE A LIST OF THE LEADING TRAFFICKERS AND TO BRING THEM TO JUSTICE. THE REESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE IMAGE OF THE COUNTRY, PARTICULARLY WITH THE US, REQUIRES JOINT ACTION AGAINST NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AS WELL AS COMPLETE RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AS HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY NORTHAMERICAN DIPLOMATIC SOURCES. WE BELIEVE THAT GEN. TORRELIO'S GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THIS.

5. (U) ALSO IN HOW, AN ARTICLE REPORTED THAT THE BOLIVIAN MINISTER OF INTEGRATION, EDGAR MILLARES, STATED IN LIMA THAT IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO COMBAT NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING WITHOUT HELP FROM THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES. HE SAID, NEVERTHELESS THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ACT DRASTICALLY AGAINST THE TRAFFICKERS.

6. (U) IN STILL ANOTHER ARTICLE IN HOW, COL. NORBERTO SOLOMON, THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY ATTACHE IN CARACAS, WAS REPORTED AS SUPPORTING THE GOVERNMENT'S MEASURES AGAINST TRAFFICKING AND IN THE FIELD OF CROP SUBSTITUTION. HE SAID THAT THE FIGHT AGAINST TRAFFICKING SHOULD NOT BE THE TASK JUST OF THE MILITARY, BUT OF ALL THE PEOPLE OF BOLIVIA. ASKED ABOUT CHARGES RELATING SOLOMON HIMSELF TO NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING, THE COLONEL SAID THAT HE WILL DEFEND HIMSELF BEFORE THE LAW AND THAT HE HAD ALREADY PROVED HIS INNOCENCE PUBLICALLY. AS ONE PROOF OF HIS INNOCENCE, HE CITED HIS DIPLOMATIC VISA FROM THE US WHICH IS VALID THROUGH MAY, 1984.

7. (C) COMMENT: THE NARCOTICS ISSUE IS ONCE AGAIN RECEIVING DAILY PRESS COVERAGE. AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT IN PREVIOUS REPORTS, HOWEVER, BOTH THE TONE AND CONTENT OF THE COVERAGE IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF 1ST YEAR. IT APPEARS TO BE MORE SERIOUS AND LESS PRONE TO LAY THE BLAME FOR BOLIVIA'S PROBLEM ON OTHERS. NEVERTHELESS, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT IS MAKING THE RIGHT NOISES, WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR CONCRETE ACTIONS NOT ONLY TO PROVE THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENT, BUT ALSO ITS ABILITY TO CARRY OUT AN EFFECTIVE ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAM.

8. (C) BOLIVIANS ARE WELL AWARE OF THE ASSISTANCE THE US HAS PROVIDED TO COLOMBIA AND ESPECIALLY THE ANTI-NARCOTICS ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS RECENTLY ANNOUNCED IN PERU. IS AND WHEN THIS GOVERNMENT DOES PROVE ITS INTENT AND CAPABILITY WITH CONCRETE ACTIONS, A PROMPT REACTION FROM US WILL BE ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY TO PROVE OUR GOOD FAITH, BUT ALSO TO ENABLE THIS GOVERNMENT TO RETAIN SUFFICIENT SUPPORT TO CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS.

9. (U) WITH REGARD TO THE NARCOTICS LAW, THE 1979 LAW ALSO INCLUDES DISCRIMINATORY PENALTIES FOR FOREIGNERS, BUT NOT AS SEVERE AS THOSE OF THE 1981 LAW. EMBOFFS HAVE HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH NATIONAL COUNCIL OFFICIALS WORKING ON A NEW LAW AND WE EXPECT THAT THE NEW LAW WILL ELIMINATE THE DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS.

PRYCE

of Bolivia

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