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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC:  
RECORDS

**File Folder** BOLIVIA (SAFE 3) 11/29/1984-02/19/1985

**Box Number** 1

**Withdrawer**

KML 9/28/2011

**FOIA**

M10-353/1

DENNISON

59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
119807	PAPER	RE BOLIVIA	1	12/31/1984	B1 B3
119808	MEMO	CONSTANTINE MENGES TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE BOLIVIA <i>R 5/18/2015 M353/1</i>	1	2/1/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *CCM*

SUBJECT:

Request for Appointment -- Two Bolivian  
Democratic Opposition Leaders

Two Bolivian individuals who are leaders of the democratic groups would like to meet with you for about 20 minutes to give you a update on the situation there. Their American point of contact is Mr. Trackman of Los Angeles, California, who indicates that you met with these individuals two years ago at the Department of State. They are also requesting appointments with Ambassador Kirkpatrick and State Department officials.

Unless you have an objection, I would meet with them in any case and write you a brief report on their views. I met with them about two months ago.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to meet with these individuals on December 6 or 7.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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### *Collection Name*

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

To C 9M  
Date 11/28 Time 1615 ✓

**WHILE YOU WERE OUT**

M. Mr. Truckman  
of \_\_\_\_\_  
Phone 213/626-5086  
Area Code Number Extension

TELEPHONED	PLEASE CALL
CALLED TO SEE YOU	WILL CALL AGAIN
WANTS TO SEE YOU	URGENT
RETURNED YOUR CALL	

Message Wants to know  
about app & w/  
Mr. Truckman is  
seeing Chaman &  
Salvador?

Operator \_\_\_\_\_

President may resign this week.

Dec. 6 or 7

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CM -

Pair

Mr. Trackman (private citizen) called to see if you could meet with two Bolivians:

Mr. Salinas  
Mr. Chamas

You've apparently met with them before, and this is a follow-up meeting.

They have some very important information regarding the situation in Bolivia. There may be new elections.

They would also like to meet with Bud and/or Jeane Kirkpatrick.

(213) 626-5085

Can you see.

Yes ☒ No ☐

When Next week Mon - Tues pm

They'll fly up from Bolivia.

Linda 11/19/84 2:00 pm

WAS NOT  
COME  
DURING

I will request

Prefer to have  
you + Bud  
together  
Met w/ Bud at  
state.

Trackman

4

Dec. 6 OR 7

Would be  
better time

3 PM Dec. 6  
MEMO to BUD.



71-26

150

5

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 9, 1984

NOTE FOR CM

Mr. Trackman called again re getting another appointment with you to talk to Justo Chamas and Dr. Guido Salinas of Bolivia; they were here on October 18, and, at that time, you agreed to see them after the election. Trackman said they told him the situation was getting worse and their factions cannot be held back much longer. Trackman also mentioned that these these two gentlemen are also very interested in meeting with Amb. Kirkpatrick.

Do you want to meet with them?

Yes ☒ No ☐

When next Thursday OK

JH



Polivia

6

X

## THE PRESENT SITUATION IN BOLIVIA AND ITS OUTLOOK

1. After the negative results of the conversations sponsored by the Catholic Church, first with the political parties represented at Congress, later with the representatives of the private sector and finally with the Central Obrera Boliviana, the Nation is living in an atmosphere of unrest critically worsened by the general strike declared by the workers.

2. The first meeting organized by the Church, i.e., with representatives of the political parties, served only the purpose of deepening the confrontation of the Government against the opposition and also caused a division among the opposition parties themselves, as could be evidenced by the following: Acción Democrática Nacionalista ADN accepted that general elections be effected next year, under the present administration of President Siles Zuazo, and they also accepted that the present vice-president Jaime Paz Zamora be appointed as candidate for president of the Nation in the 1985 elections; this candidacy, of course, would be unconstitutional from all viewpoints. Unlike ADN, Victor Paz Estenssoro as the leader of MNRH, demands that Siles Zuazo resign his position as President and that the President of the Supreme Court of Justice preside over the 1985 elections. The reason behind Paz Estenssoro's request is obvious: the president of the Supreme Court belongs to MNRH and would be very helpful in rising Paz Estenssoro to power in said 1985 elections. The left-wing coalition, organized by the Central Obrera Boliviana led by Juan Lechín, and the Dirección Revolucionaria Unitaria DRU, have organized a kind of a "Political Assembly" - similar to the "Popular Assembly" that had been organized by Lechín during the government of General Juan José Torres (1970-1971) - and this Political Assembly is now in opposition to the celebration of general elections in 1985 and demands that Siles Zuazo complete his presidential period, which ends in 1986.

3. At the light of this situation, the opposition (ADN and MNRH), the MIR and the left-wing parties coalition are resorting to the Armed Forces to pull down the present government, in view of the total failure of the UDP, the social unrest and the complete economic-financial collapse in the Nation.

4. Two coups d'etat were on the way last week, as follows:

a) A military coup led by General Simón Sejas Tordoya, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, with the support of Gen. Maria Vargas Salinas and some commanders of small units stationed in La Paz and Cochabamba. This subversive movement was backed by the workers' leader Juan Lechín Oquendo and the left-wing parties who were opposed to the 1985 elections. The worst thing is that this subversive movement intended to substitute Hernán Siles for Gen. Sejas and establish a socialist government in Bolivia.

b) Another coup d'etat was being led by General Olvis Arias Chavez, General Commander of the Army, together with Gens. Raúl López Leytón, Chief of Staff, Arnoldo Pinto, Hermes Fellman, Mario Oxa and some off-duty members of the Armed Forces like Faustino Rico Toro and Norberto Salomón, as well as other military officers who are still active members at the Army. This coup was indirectly supported by Victor Paz Estenssoro's MNR and by some members of the ADN who do not agree with the electoralist policy of General Hugo Banzer, as well as by a group of technocrats displaced by the UDP and some private businessmen who got rich during the military governments, especially during the government of Hugo Banzer.

5. Both of these military coups were smartly pushed by the Muscovite Communist Party, as the Communist Party's main objective is

to achieve a dissociation within the Bolivian Armed Forces and cause a confrontation among military members, towards a civil war that would create a strain focus point in the southern part of South-america, similar to the one existing in Central America.

6. The above-mentioned military coups were momentarily offset by President Siles, thanks to the timely information of the ministries of the Interior and Defense. However, this situation may turn critical any moment if generals Simón Sejas Tordoya, Olvis Arias, Mario Vargas and Raul Lopez are not removed from the Armed Forces, as has been suggested to President Siles by the Minister of Defense.

7. At the light of his total political failure and the possibility of a Judgment of Responsibilities by Congress against him, due to his involvement in drug-traffic, President Siles Zuazo is preparing his withdrawal from office in a smart way. As an example of his intentions, he sent Mrs. Tamara Sanchez (a lady closely linked to the Siles Government) to London, accompanied by the President of Banco Central, Reynaldo Cardozo, to take office as a Commercial Attache; Siles Zuazo's close friends and assistants, Felix Rospigliozzi and Mario Roncal, do no longer attend political meetings ever since last week, but they visit the President's House late at night. Finally, President Siles "fell ill" according to official news releases.

8. At the light of the above briefly described situation, we have to maintain the unity at the Armed Forces and find a political way to face and solve the present situation that is being critically worsened by the hyperinflation and can give rise to a civil war organized by the Muscovite communists, Nicaragua and Cuba.

La Paz (Bolivia), December 3, 1984.



PROBLEMS THAT HAVE TO BE OVERCOME IN BOLIVIA  
IMMEDIATELY

I. DRUG - TRAFFIC

So far, a series of legal dispositions have been enforced, not only to limit or control the ever increasing production of coca leaves, but also to stop any increases in the production of cocaine sulphate and the traffic of this drug. The drug traffic enforcement has been entrusted to the Bolivian Police Department and to the Armed Forces and, ever since October 10, 1982, the Ministry of the Interior and the Consejo Nacional de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico - a Department depending on the Presidency of the Nation - have taken over this control.

Such governmental actions have been always improvised and circumstantial, with no continuity, resulting in an increase of the coca plantations and the coca sulphate production, under the corruption and immorality of the authorities in charge of the drug-repression. Top officials at the Executive Power became involved in this outlawed activity, including the President of the Nation. All of these officials are presently under investigation by a Commission of the Legislative Power, and the relevant Commission's Report on the investigation will be released in the next days.

Originally, the drug-traffickers started their activities in the Northern areas of Santa Cruz. Later, they moved to the Chapare Valley in Cochabamba. Subsequent to a military occupation of this valley, they settled in TOCO, located in the Province of Cliza on the high valleys of Cochabamba. New cocaine sulphate producing factories were set up at this place, as well as in Beni, Santa Cruz and the Chapare residues, where the traffickers' gangs keep in close touch with the international gangs through Brazil and Colombia. Unlike the above mentioned production centers, the Yungas Valley in La Paz (Chulumani, Coroico and Caranavi), produce cocaine hydrochlorate in small quantities, just to meet the demand of the foreign "hippy" young visitors who arrive there as tourists. This small production

in the Yungas Valley is generally confiscated by the authorities, just for the sake of showing that "an official action is being taken against cocaine production", and concealing their involvement in delictive activities with the large gangs.

The above brief outline can serve the purpose of re-planning the drug enforcement in Bolivia, on the basis of the following considerations:

1. Bolivian - American Committee for the Enforcement of Drug Traffic

This Committee should be established as an agency of the Presidency of the Nation, with the specific purpose of making out and implementing an economic and social plan for immediate execution at the areas where the drug traffic is most active.

2. A Trained Force

It is necessary to organize a force with qualified people that would be stationed in Chapare, the Northern area of Santa Cruz, Beni, the high valleys in Cochabamba and the Yungas in La Paz. The settlements or garrisons of the Trained Force would be supported by motorized military moving forces and the Air Force and by a special group for the control along the borders to Brazil, Peru and Chile. The trained forces would operate under the command of military officers of the three forces who would be stationed at the relevant sites for no longer than two years each officer, with salaries to be paid to them according to their rank and the responsibilities they would take over. Moreover, they would go through an intensive training with U.S. instructors at special training centers in Cochabamba, Beni and La Paz.

However, the problem of the financial support for the drug enforcement has not been taken care of, yet. The lack of funds is pushing the Bolivian drug enforcing agencies to tolerate and cooperate with the drug traffickers, against heavy payments (Bribes). It is therefore necessary to

determine the number of soldiers and units, their composition, salaries, food, weapons, cars, communications devices, etc. To sum up, this historical task for the welfare of mankind, initially requires the assistance of highly qualified U.S. experts in this field, and Bolivian civilian and military personnel of a solid moral integrity and patriotism. Thereafter, the mentioned Bolivian-American Commission could become a regional organization, with the integration of Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.

The problem of the drug repression should be closely associated with the planning and implementation of agricultural and cattle raising projects towards a gradual substitution of the coca plantations.

A consideration that should not be underestimated in the drug enforcement plan is the lure of gain of the coca producers, to avoid that the coca production be purchased by the traffickers. Adhering to such plan, a State agency should be established for the purchase of the coca leaves at the prices standing at the drug-traffic market.

In order to create a good attitude of the peasants, the activities of the existing bank branches in the coca growing areas should become dynamic, promoting agriculture through special credit lines by Banco Ganadero del Beni and Banco de Santa Cruz, which Banks, so far, have been promoting the drug traffic activities in Beni, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and La Paz.

The implementation of the drug enforcement and the plan for the substitution of the coca plantations, should be periodically evaluated by a Committee composed by the President of the Nation, Ministers of the Interior, Defense and Agriculture and the North-american and Bolivian experts in order to evidence the results, amend procedures, analyze the results and the personnel's behavior, as well as the performance of the military equipment, vehicles, food supply, fuel, ammunition, etc.



## II. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SOLUTIONS

The present economic problems in Bolivia can be summed up as follows: hyperinflation, a huge foreign debt and a deformed economic structure due to the breaking up of the various productive sectors, especially the agricultural sector's disintegration from the rest of the economy.

In spite of the fact that the inflation which is overwhelming the Nation is the result of structural causes, it was worsened by the inadequate economic policy of the Hugo Banzer Government and by the huge foreign loans that were poorly invested. These facts deepened the structural deformation of the economy inherited from the populist governments, i.e., they generated a demand based upon a fictitious income and not upon the Gross National Product or the exportations.

When the crisis broke out, they tried to overcome the situation by enacting offhand and contradictory measures that never stopped the public expenditures (which gave rise to the fiscal deficit and the increase of the monetary supply, a permanent increase of prices and the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar at the parallel market), and never promoted production or exportations, but just speeded up the inflationary process.

The structural deformation of the Bolivian economy, which is now complicated with the hyperinflation, is not only an inheritance from colonial times, but also the result of the unfinished revolution of April 9, 1952, a revolution that proved incapable of putting an end to the rural-urban disintegration by means of the Agrarian Reform. It did not even correct our economic dependence, nationalizing the main exportation sectors of our economy. And what is worse, the financial flow of the foreign loans did not amend the mentioned structural deformation either, because those funds were invested mainly in the tertiary sector of the economy and were used for the promotion of an industrial process that was highly dependent on the importation of inputs that were favored by an unreal fixed exchange rate of the U.S. Dollar.

If we take into account that the hyperinflationary process has been caused by the structural deformation of the Bolivian economy and by the unreal fixed exchange rate of the U.S. Dollar that has overrated the Bolivian Peso, as well as the policy of subsidies (political prices) of the basic food products and other essential items called "cheap groceries", it is vital to face those problems with realism, as otherwise any economic-financial adjustment measures would be useless and would just increase inflation.

However, due to the economic and social structure in Bolivia, the monetary problem has a top priority, but it is not being faced with the sense of reality, pragmatism and courage as it should, under the present circumstances.

We should not forget that, ever since 1952, the various stabilization and development measures were based upon a fixed unreal exchange rate, with subsidized prices that constantly increased the fiscal deficit, the money issue and the corruption, especially when allocating foreign exchange to privileged sectors at preferential rates, which caused the Dollar "Black Market" to appear, where the U.S. dollar was rated twice as high as the official exchange rate.

In consideration of the foregoing and due to the unprecedented economic crisis and the geopolitical location of Bolivia, a free exchange system has to be adopted, at the rates determined by the market forces. To put it better, the Central Bank shall participate only for the reception of the royalties and taxes of the foreign trade collected by the National Customs, and should stop all subsidies and political prices that are causing a lack of such subsidized goods and their smuggling to neighbor countries.

In turn, the wages and salaries have to be administered according to the production and the productivity, as there are presently some workers

sectors like Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB), Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL) and the State-owned banks, whose employees earn much higher salaries as compared with factory workers, construction workers, teachers, etc.

There is the need for a fiscal reform, especially the customs tariffs system reform which is completely obsolete and favors the maintenance of a fictitious industrial sector based on the importation of a high percentage of inputs, a situation that damages the activity of the creative companies and promotes smuggling, corruption and immorality among the State officials and employees.

The above policies are intended to face and solve the junctural crisis by offsetting the hyperinflation, amending the public expense and adjusting the balance of payments, towards a subsequent solution of the structural problem.

The economic and social integration of Bolivia fundamentally depends on the application of a well-defined and energetic policy for the reconversion of the State owned corporations and banks, especially of those producing ores and hydrocarbons, and on the investments of the private sector. To attain this end, it is essential that a By-Law or Direct Investments Law be enacted, which may promote the exploitation of minerals, especially gold, as well as hydrocarbons and the agricultural and cattle-raising industries.

The State-owned exporters should continue with their joint administration and co-partnership. Their production and financing costs have to be determined according to the international market prices of the products they export, thus eliminating the "workers unions salarialist and co-partnershipist aristocracy". To sum up, these measures are aimed at turning the State corporations and banks into promotion agencies for the economic and social development of the Nation.

For a promotion in the production of hydrocarbons, it is essential that the relevant regulations existing be amended and updated, in order to attract foreign capitals under the "Operations Contracts" or the joint venture systems.

On the other hand, the vertebration of the Nation has to be attained through the building of main roads and side-roads, with the aim of linking the Eastern tropics with the high plateaus in the West.

As concerns the agricultural problem, the production of adequate crops should be developed for local consumption, by means of small loans to be granted to farmers who own land of small or medium extensions.

The agricultural and cattle-raising sectors are closely linked to the drug traffic in some areas; in other areas, they are linked to smuggling activities. There is the need of an agrarian policy intended to protect the peasant, but such policy should be supported by loans, technical assistance, technical improvements and a system of marketing that may allow the peasants to get rid of intermediaries and transporters who pay them extremely low prices for their production, thus exploiting them in an unfair way.

The industrial sector should have a financial support in order to create the agricultural industry and take advantage of the Eastern tropics, so as to substitute the present industry, which is highly dependent on imported inputs and has no capacity for exportation and a high social cost. Also, the <sup>present</sup> ~~agricultural~~ <sup>is</sup> ~~industry should be~~ protected by the State by means of adequate customs tariffs regulations, special credits and a preferential rate of exchange for the U.S. dollar.

The craftsmen sector should also be stimulated by means of credits, because <sup>in</sup> our economic and social structure is important and constitutes the



social and political basis of stability, as has been evidenced by the total failure of the Central Obrera Boliviana's last general strike.

The proliferation of banks demand that they be integrated. They are profiting out of the importation trade and the foreign exchange that they are receiving from the Central Bank at an unreal fixed rate. They are not using their savings for the basic productive sectors of the national economy, i.e., the primary and secondary sectors.

We have gone over the inflation problem as well as the problems related to the economic and social structure, and should now step to the problem of our public foreign debt. The Bolivian exportation capacity is not even strong enough for the payment of the interests on the capital. Consequently, the foreign debt has to be rescheduled, especially with Argentina and Brazil. The United States, through the International Monetary Fund, should cooperate in laying the foundation for a positive understanding; otherwise, our temporal insolvency could become chronic.

Finally, in order to avoid a social impact worse than the one caused by the hyperinflation, it is by all means convenient to progressively reduce the fiscal deficit, as a substantial part of the economically active population, especially the middle-class population, is employed at the national public administration.

### III. MORALIZATION

The corruption and immorality are overwhelming the basic institutions in the Nation, especially the corruption originated in the drug-traffic. This outlawed activity has to be attacked with no procrastination in order to attain an atmosphere of morality, honesty and a respect for the laws that are in force.

Very drastic measures should be taken at the beginning, especially within the Armed Forces, the Police Department, the Ministry of the Interior and the National Council for Drug Enforcement. Whoever the offenders, the law should prosecute and punish them as real transgressors, accomplices, concealers of transgressors, etc.

This morality campaign will positively strengthen the Armed Forces, as the younger army officers and the public opinion, nationally and internationally, do all blame the drug traffic and its consequences, i.e., corruption and immorality. Consequently, they are claiming for a harsh punishment against all the offenders involved in drug traffic activities.

An Investigating Commission should be created for a joint work with the Bolivian-American Committee for Drug Enforcement. The mentioned Commission would accomplish all Judicial Police proceedings that are necessary prior to the legal prosecutions at the National Court and the military Court, where the relevant sentences will be passed, as set forth by our law.

Special judges should be appointed within the Judicial Power, in order to legally prosecute and punish all economic transgressions against the State. Such Court would punish transgressors, to the full extent of the law and the Drug Enforcement prosecution provisions.

Also, a Decree should be issued to amend the relevant existing provision against such offenders, to read as follows:

"In case of economic transgressions against the State (fraud, malversation, unlawful appropriation of State funds, etc.), the offenders will be sentenced to the payment of 150% of the basic amount of the economic injury against the State, imprisonment, exile, as the case may be, confiscation of their property and a suspension of their civil and political rights for a period no less than four years".

La Paz (Bolivia), November 30, 1984





January 18, 1985

*File  
Bringing*

*20  
FYI*  
*Memo  
to  
Hinkle  
Raymond*

Dear Senator Wallop:

Thank you for your January 9 letter to the President which you cosigned with Senator Helms, urging that the United States make a special effort to ensure that the upcoming elections in Bolivia are as free and open an election as possible.

In addition to bringing your comments to the President's attention, I have asked his foreign policy advisers to review your letter. You should be hearing further as soon as they have carefully studied your recommendation that a Presidential election observer team be dispatched to Bolivia. In the interim, please know that we appreciate your comments.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Malcolm Wallop  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO/KRJ/TJR/tjr

cc: w/copy of inc to W. Tapley Bennett,  
Legis Affrs, State - for DIRECT response  
cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - FYI

285602

ID # \_\_\_\_\_

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

FOUO 302  
4

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☐ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 85, 01, 16Name of Correspondent: Jess Helms☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Urge you to make a special effort to help the people of Bolivia by providing technical assistance and advice geared toward assuring as free and open an election as possible. Also suggest that you consider dispatching a Presidential election observer team to Bolivia in June.

## ROUTE TO:

## ACTION

## DISPOSITION

Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LAOGLÉ	ORIGINATOR	85, 01, 17	MM		85, 01, 18
NOS / Tally Bennett	Referral Note: R	85, 01, 18			1 1
	Referral Note:				1 1
	Referral Note:				1 1
	Referral Note:				1 1
	Referral Note:				1 1

## ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action  
C - Comment/Recommendation  
D - Draft Response  
F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary  
R - Direct Reply w/Copy  
S - For Signature  
X - Interim Reply

## DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered  
B - Non-Special Referral  
C - Completed  
S - Suspended

## FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer  
Code = "A"  
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: Letter sent to both signers

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# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

285602  
v

January 9, 1985

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Bolivia has a unique opportunity this year to bring to fruition the desires of its people for democracy through elections that are scheduled for June.

Yet those heartfelt wishes of the people can be frustrated if the elections are not perceived by the people and the world community as free, open and devoid of fraud.

The United States has the capability to assist the people of Bolivia in their return to full-fledged democracy. I cite the ongoing work of the Administration in other Latin American countries to provide assistance to properly-constituted election commissions. This technical assistance and advice is geared toward assuring as free and open an election as possible.

We urge you to make a special effort in the case of Bolivia. Bolivia deserves the best election assistance that the people of the United States can provide. At this point, there is no better way that the United States can show support for the democratic process in Bolivia than assisting in helping make the electoral process work properly.

In addition, since this is a most important event in Bolivia's history, we ask that you consider dispatching a Presidential election observer team to Bolivia in June, to observe the elections. Our experience is that such teams have a beneficial effect in the countries to which they are sent, and their reports are useful to Congress and the public.

Sincerely,

*Melton Waller* *Jane Helms*

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

0856

jt Belin

23

119808

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

ACTION

February 1, 1985

Menges

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *cc m/jh*

SUBJECT: Bolivia--Request for Ten-Minute Meeting  
With You Next Week

Two Bolivians (Justo Chamas and Dr. Guido Salinas), who are former senior government officials and who met with you at State, request ten minutes with you next week. They allege, through their US attorney, that the communists are moving to take power before the scheduled June 1985 elections and that the military has decided to stage a coup in February 1985.

I have asked DOD, CIA, and State to review information we have on trends there. The current consensus view is that the communist danger is great but that with General Lopez Leyton as the new Chief of Staff since late March 1984, there is a good chance that the elections will occur in June.

RECOMMENDATION:

Because of the Bolivian strategic situation and our information on extensive communist activities, I think it would be useful to have you meet these two individuals next week.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove *ccm*

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

BY *RW*

NARA DATE *5/18/15*

~~SECRET~~



February 19, 1985

Dear Senator Helms:

Thank you for the letter which you and four of your colleagues cosigned to the President regarding the Bolivian elections which are scheduled for June.

We appreciate receiving your thoughts in this matter and have shared a copy of your correspondence with the President's foreign policy advisers. You may be assured that they will carefully review and consider your suggestion that the United States provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that these elections are as free and open as possible. You should be hearing further as soon as there is any additional information to relay.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Jesse Helms  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

MBO:KRJ:krj

cc: w/copy of inc to Bob Turner, Cong Affrs, State - for  
DIRECT response

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat - FYI

*Letter*  
*24*  
*Feb-T*

*File*  
*Bolivia*

5

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985


Dear Senator Laxalt:

Thank you for the letter which you and four of your colleagues cosigned to the President regarding the Bolivian elections which are scheduled for June.

We appreciate receiving your thoughts in this matter and have shared a copy of your correspondence with the President's foreign policy advisers. You may be assured that they will carefully review and consider your suggestion that the United States provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that these elections are as free and open as possible. You should be hearing further as soon as there is any additional information to relay.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Paul Laxalt  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510



76

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985


Dear Senator Wallop:

Thank you for the letter which you and four of your colleagues cosigned to the President regarding the Bolivian elections which are scheduled for June.

We appreciate receiving your thoughts in this matter and have shared a copy of your correspondence with the President's foreign policy advisers. You may be assured that they will carefully review and consider your suggestion that the United States provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that these elections are as free and open as possible. You should be hearing further as soon as there is any additional information to relay.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Malcolm Wallop  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510



2X

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985


Dear Senator Warner:

Thank you for the letter which you and four of your colleagues cosigned to the President regarding the Bolivian elections which are scheduled for June.

We appreciate receiving your thoughts in this matter and have shared a copy of your correspondence with the President's foreign policy advisers. You may be assured that they will carefully review and consider your suggestion that the United States provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that these elections are as free and open as possible. You should be hearing further as soon as there is any additional information to relay.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable John Warner  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

77

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 19, 1985


Dear Senator Denton:

Thank you for the letter which you and four of your colleagues cosigned to the President regarding the Bolivian elections which are scheduled for June.

We appreciate receiving your thoughts in this matter and have shared a copy of your correspondence with the President's foreign policy advisers. You may be assured that they will carefully review and consider your suggestion that the United States provide technical assistance and advice to ensure that these elections are as free and open as possible. You should be hearing further as soon as there is any additional information to relay.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Jeremiah Denton  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12 Feb 1985

KATHY JAFFKE:

The attached congressional  
ltr to the President was fwded  
to Menges (NSC) during Feb. It's  
being returned to your office  
for appropriate handling.

Harold West  
NSC/S  
X3724

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

30

January 25, 1985

294951

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

Bolivia has a unique opportunity this year to bring to fruition the desires of its people for democracy through elections that are scheduled for June.

Yet those heartfelt wishes of the people can be frustrated if the elections are not perceived by the people and the world community as free, open and devoid of fraud.

The United States has the capability to assist the people of Bolivia in their return to full-fledged democracy. I cite the ongoing work of the Administration in other Latin American countries to provide assistance to properly-constituted election commissions. This technical assistance and advice is geared toward assuring as free and open an election as possible.

We urge you to make a special effort in the case of Bolivia. Bolivia deserves the best election assistance that the people of the United States can provide. At this point, there is no better way that the United States can show support for the democratic process in Bolivia than assisting in helping make the electoral process work properly.

In addition, since this is a most important event in Bolivia's history, we ask that you consider dispatching a Presidential election observer team to Bolivia in June, to observe the elections. Our experience is that such teams have a beneficial effect in the countries to which they are sent, and their reports are useful to Congress and the public.

Sincerely,

Jesse Helms

Paula Bennett  
John Warner

Malcolm Wallop

Jeremiah Denton