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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC:
RECORDS

File Folder CHILE (06/09/1986-06/12/1986)

Box Number 91713

Withdrawer

DLB 1/26/2005

FOIA

F95-028/5

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20

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
3315	MEMO	NICHOLAS PLATT TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE ON CHILEAN TRANSITION: PINOCHET UNBUDGING R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	1	6/9/1986	B1
3316	LETTER	REAGAN TO PINOCHET, RE: US-CHILE RELATIONS R 8/22/2011 M304/1	3	3/19/1986	B1
3317	LETTER	PINOCHET TO REAGAN, RE: US-CHILE RELATIONS, UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION R 8/22/2011 M304/1	6	4/17/1986	B1
3318	CABLE	#091936Z JUN 86	3	6/9/1986	B1
3319	CABLE	#092217Z JUN 86 R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	3	6/9/1986	B1
3320	CABLE	#101954Z JUN 86 R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	2	6/10/1986	B1
3321	CABLE	#101651Z JUN 86 D 7/15/2008 F95-028/5	3	6/10/1986	B1 B3
3322	CABLE	#102053Z JUN 86 R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	2	6/10/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
3323	REPORT	CHILE, PAGES 7-9 AND ONE UNNUMBERED PAGE PAR 7/15/2008 F95-028/5	4	6/11/1986	B1	B3
3324	CABLE	#111827Z JUN 86 D 7/15/2008 F95-028/5	1	6/11/1986	B1	B3
3325	REPORT	THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CHILEAN POLITICS: WHAT FUTURE ROLE R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	8	6/11/1986	B1	
3326	CABLE	#122119Z JUN 86 R 10/21/2010 F1995-028/5	3	6/12/1986	B1	

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

NSC/S PROFILE

CONFIDENTIAL

ID 8604133

RECEIVED 23 MAY 86 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM PINOCHET, AUGUSTO

DOC DATE 17 APR 86

PLATT, N

09 JUN 86

KEYWORDS: CHILE

HS

Chile

SUBJECT: PRES PINOCHET OF CHILE LTR TO PRES IN SPANISH

ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR PRES SIG

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

TILLMAN

BURGHARDT

RODMAN

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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8618032 3315
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

4133

June 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Correspondence on Chilean
Transition: Pinochet Unbudging

Pinochet has responded to the President's letter of March 19 by again shrugging off the President's concerns on human rights and democracy. His reply (delivered to the NSC May 22 with a copy to the State Department) accuses the U.S. of meddling with "certain statements" made by members of the this Administration. He puts aside international criticism of human rights violations as the result of errors or a double standard toward Chile.

Pinochet's reply indicates he remains reluctant to allow a genuine transition to democracy. Although he writes that by early next year laws establishing political parties (promised before) and electoral rolls (a necessary but limited technical step) will be promulgated, Pinochet seems prepared to hold back on any significant steps which would seriously address concerns of the democratic opposition--despite the signs of increasing polarization.

The latest Pinochet-Reagan exchange is part of a sustained effort begun in early 1985 to use presidential correspondence to bring directly to Pinochet's attention our growing concern over his failure to take concrete steps to implement a transition. Unless prospects for a more receptive attitude on the part of Pinochet improve markedly, we favor holding off new substantive presidential messages.

The most recent exchange of presidential letters is attached.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

(DECL: OADR)

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NLRR P95-0228/5 #3315

BY RW NARA DATE 10/21/02

and we wish to conduct our relations with your country in a manner that always respects the right of the Chileans to make those vital national decisions.

At the same time, however, and in the same spirit of honest friendship in which your letter spoke of the dangers of direct involvement by the United States in your internal affairs, I feel compelled to note there are continued indications of deep divisions within Chilean society regarding the pace and nature of the transition, as well as disturbing manifestations of political confrontation and terrorist violence. In the absence of established legal channels to measure the relative strength of political preferences, no one can be sure how the people of Chile want to proceed. Our public calls for dialogue, reconciliation and consensus are not intended to take sides on sensitive internal issues, but rather to encourage all Chileans of good will to work together to find the quickest and most effective means to restore democracy. To that end, we will remain alert to all concrete signs of progress toward that goal, bearing in mind the importance of such progress for deepening bilateral cooperation.

Finally, I would like to express my satisfaction that your government's decision last year to work with the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission initiated a process which enabled us to break the Soviet/Cuban-inspired pattern of discrimination against your country in discussions of human rights problems. As officials of your government were aware, we carried out broad consultations with democratic governments in Europe and Latin America. We developed and approved a consensus resolution which, while acknowledging the existence of problems, does not repeat the harsh and unbalanced language of past resolutions which were passed over our objections, but rather encourages your government to consider the positive recommendations of the Special Rapporteur. While we must guard against further efforts by extremist left-wing groups to manipulate human rights issues, we are convinced that there are concrete steps which your government can take which

will improve the situation and allow us to eliminate the vestiges of the double standard. Ambassador Barnes stands ready to work closely with you on these and all other issues.

Please be assured, Mr. President, that the policy of this administration will remain fully consistent with the noble goals proclaimed at the outset of the difficult historical stage through which you and your fellow commanders have guided your country. Our firm hope is to work with you to make those goals a reality.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
President of the Republic of Chile
Santiago

3314
PREL
1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

As your government enters its sixth year under the Constitution of 1980, I would like to take advantage of this occasion to continue our valuable exchange of views carried on most recently through my letter of November 7, 1985 and your thoughtful response of December 17, 1985.

At the outset, I wish to reiterate the willingness of my government to work closely with your country on all matters of mutual interest, to include those many international issues on which we take a common stand against Soviet and Cuban expansionism. We know full well that the resolute actions of you and the broad majority of freedom-loving Chileans prevented the consolidation of a permanent communist beachhead in South America, a feat which has earned you the unceasing hostility of the Soviets. We respect that historic achievement and want to do all we can to ensure that the painful steps taken in 1973 lead surely to the establishment of a strong and effective democracy, capable of satisfying the aspirations of the Chilean people and defending the independence of the Chilean nation.

Consistent with this vision, our policy of support for transition to democracy, to which you have reiterated your commitment, has been carefully designed to avoid any effort to promote a specific timetable, formulation or mechanism for that transition. As you noted in your letter, foreign involvement in the Chilean political process would raise serious disadvantages and risks. We are fully conscious of the risks inherent in such situations,

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NLRR MID-304 #3316

BY RW NARA DATE 8/22/11

Augusto Pinochet Ugarte
Captain General
President of the Republic of Chile

Santiago, April 17, 1986

Mr. President:

It is with great interest and attention that I have read your letter of March 19, sent me through your Ambassador on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of my Constitutional term, 1981-1989.

Your comments allow me to confirm once more the willingness of your Government to work closely with my country on matters of mutual interest, particularly on issues on which we take a common stand against Soviet-Cuban expansionism.

Likewise I take special satisfaction in your recognition that it was our resolute actions and those of the broad majority of the Chilean people which made it possible in 1973 to end the Soviet attempt to transform Chile into a Communist society.

Your recognition that this historic achievement has earned us the unceasing aggression of the Soviet empire is also a clear sign of your solidarity with us. You are well aware that many misunderstandings and hostile attitudes have been added to that aggression as well.

I greatly appreciate, as well, the value of your desire that the difficult steps taken in 1973 lead with certainty to the establishment of a strong and effective democracy, able to satisfy the aspirations of the Chilean people and defend their independence.

In that context, I also appreciate the fact that there exists a dynamic economic relationship with your Government, important and mutually advantageous. It pleases me to point out the recognition that members of your Administration and of private financial organizations have accorded Chilean efforts to face, adequately and responsibly, the

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NLR 100-304#3317

BY RW - 8/22/11

problems deriving from the recent world economic crisis. This has certainly put my country in a position of leadership among other states of the region that were similarly affected.

This clear evaluation of our reality allows us to have positive hopes for solid understanding on your part and on the part of your Administration of the firm commitment of my Government and of the majority of the Chilean people to continue along the path toward democracy and economic development.

Furthermore, I note that you have an essential factor for understanding the contemporary Chilean situation very clear: For the first time in world history, Marxism-Leninism took over a government utilizing a democratic electoral process and, above all, in a long-lived and well-reputed democracy, such as ours was.

Various hypotheses may be advanced as to political situations which assist Communist accession to power. In the case of Chile, it has been proven that a democratic system without adequate safeguards and protection may be utilized for such nefarious results. In our case, that is a fact, not a hypothesis.

The impelling motivation that led the nation to promote and support the military takeover of 1973 was precisely the desire of the multitudes for democracy and their rejection of the manner in which democracy was being destroyed in Chile by a Communist party absolutely subservient to the Soviet Union.

That vocation indeed has led us, in a very cautious way, to reorganize democratic life in our country, so as to reestablish it in full, able to defend itself from any such mortal threat as it suffered in the past.

A simple examination of the attitude of the Government since 1973 clearly shows its constant commitment to limiting its own power.

The Constitution approved in 1980 is a significant step in that direction.

Within that process, we may emphasize a progressive and diversified effort in national activities moving Chile day by day closer to the inherent characteristics of a free society. Because of the

socialist trend in Chile during the past 40 years, our country had been losing such valuable qualities at an accelerating pace. That socialist tendency, without a doubt, facilitated Marxism's road to power.

Confirmation of the abovementioned attitudes and facts should serve as a solid foundation for confidence as to the implementation of the remaining stages in our democratic objectives.

Only the promulgation of political laws regulating the electoral process and the operation of political parties remain for the total exercise of citizen rights. Both initiatives, as is public knowledge, are in the preparatory stages, and it is the decision, not only of the Executive Power, but of the Legislative as well, to implement them in the near future, with adequate lead time for their exercise in due form, in accordance with the demands of an authentic democracy.

We believe that a period of no more than two years previous to the Constitutionally mandated plebiscite for the end of this Presidential term is adequate for enrolling citizens in the Public Electoral Registration to allow present currents of opinion to coalesce and organize into active political parties.

Noting that you and your Administration are fully aware, as you tell me in your letter, of the disadvantages and risks of any foreign involvement in the Chilean political process, I would like to express my satisfaction with your solemn manifestation that your Government wants to avoid any effort to promote a specific timetable, formulation or mechanism for the transition different from that set by the people of Chile in 1980.

Within the spirit of honest friendship with which I have referred to the inappropriateness of any involvement of your country in our internal affairs, I feel that it is appropriate now to state that certain divisions and manifestations of political confrontation and terrorist violence which you say you have noted in Chilean society come not so much from the circumstances you mention as from the existence of political projects antagonistic to those approved by the people in their Constitution, and to the presence of forces that would like to impede the transformation of our country into a secure and effective democracy. Such an accomplishment would be contrary to their purpose of imposing a Marxist Socialist society.

X

Perhaps the most conflicting situation that my Government must face is that created by those sectors that, in spite of their names and the apparent democratic attitude of some of their leaders, do not in practice favor advances toward full democracy, as they do not accept the decision of the majority and assume obstructionist positions in denial of the present legal situation.

That is why my Government must demand that political sectors give clear and real definitions of such values as property and liberty. Without betraying and risking the essence of our commitment, we cannot, naively, allow joint activities with the Communist Party which would favor their revolutionary strategy.

Experience demonstrates that alliances with Communism redound only to the favor of Communism. Similarly, it is clear that vague agreements, with no real substance, by their very indefiniteness on essential matters, are not useful as a solid base for an effective political program.

In reference to United States interest in our internal affairs, we must deplore certain statements made by members of your Administration which have in no way facilitated the task to which my Government is sovereignly committed. On the contrary, such statements hamper the normal evolution of the political transition, show a lack of understanding of conditions in Chile, strengthen our more radical adversaries and, in the long run, obstruct understanding among Chilean democratic forces.

Although, in your opinion, there is no intention of taking sides in our internal affairs when a high ranking official in your Administration calls for a dialog, reconciliation and consensus, I feel it important to point out to you that such a call should, in any case, be preceded by others calling for the achievement of favorable conditions for such a dialog, reconciliation or consensus. Such previous condition is a clear stance against Soviet-Cuban expansionism, in all its scope. That is a basic condition. To the extent that it may be satisfied, it will eliminate fears of a repetition of the situation which occurred during the period 1970-1973.

7

If what you are looking for is an effective democracy, in order to appear less unjust, those calls should also be directed to those who, far from cooperating with democracy, have opted for revolutionary violence, search for anarchy or openly support the Soviet-Cuban strategy.

We are sure that, to the extent that these situations are understood, our bilateral cooperation can improve.

As you know, Mr. President, our Government and our Armed Forces have a commitment of honor to our fellow citizens to conduct the Nation toward an effective democracy. Although we are a small country, ours is a proud and sovereign people and throughout our history we have dealt with numerous attempts at foreign intervention.

We have an unchangeable commitment to advance toward our objectives, whatever difficulties lie ahead, and you may be sure, Mr. President, that we shall never depart from our charted course, nor from the fulfillment of our sworn task. I also want to assure you that, with the same energy that we overcame a virtual civil war in 1973, we will be able to avoid allowing the nation's present institutional process to be utilized, directly or indirectly, by the totalitarian purposes of Marxist groups.

Concerning the subject of human rights, I should like to remind you that my Government gave full cooperation to the United Nations Special Rapporteur despite multiple legal and political irregularities proven on previous occasions.

Nevertheless, I want to tell you, in advance of the specific response that my Government will give that matter, of our profound uneasiness that, in spite of his assurances, the mission of the Special Rapporteur has suffered from serious procedural faults, interference in our internal affairs and a lack of veracity in its conclusions. In addition, it continues to maintain the double standard applied to Chile in the past. Once again we see ourselves as victims, in our attempts to be open, to the work of international personnel submitted to strong and negative pressures.

Considering all these inaccuracies, it seems strange to us to note the position taken by countries such as yours, highly regarded as friendly, before the United Nations Human Rights Commission.

9

Nevertheless, because of our own convictions, we shall renew our efforts to enforce the rights of our fellow citizens with ever more efficiency, as provided for in our Constitution, a duty Chile now performs in a much more circumspect manner than many other nations in the world.

You may be sure, Mr. President, that my Government will continue to be with you in all those projects that represent common interests, especially in those matters concerning your fight against Communism. Along with many other free countries, we find ourselves obligated to defend ourselves from terrorist aggression promoted abroad. For that reason we entertain great hope because of the attitude you have adopted on this issue.

Finally, I should like to express to you our intention of maintaining contact with your present Representative in Chile so as to provide him, as cases arise, with the information on Chilean conditions necessary for a correct appreciation of the situation and for the appropriate management of our bilateral relations. Similarly, I am interested in having the same facilities with your Government provided Ambassador Errázuriz, the person I have instructed to provide Your Excellency with whatever elements of information and analysis you may require.

Mr. President, I remain

Sincerely yours,

/signed/ Augusto Pinochet Ugarte

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
3318	CABLE #091936Z JUN 86	3	6/9/1986	B1

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN JOSE 05522

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, UNHRC-1, PREL, CI, CS
SUBJECT: CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS - VOLIO TO STAY ON;
- REQUESTS ANOTHER ASSESSMENT AND MEETING
- IN GENEVA

REF: (A) SANTIAGO 3261, (B) STATE 167464

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS ACTION REQUESTS, SEE
PARAGRAPHS 9 AND 11.

3. POLOFF MET WITH UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR
FERNANDO VOLIO JUNE 4 TO DELIVER AMBASSADOR
BARNES' MESSAGE CONTAINED IN REF A. POLOFF
ALSO INFORMED VOLIO OF AMBASSADOR SCHIFTER'S
SUPPORT FOR HIS WORK AS NOTED IN REF B,
MAKING POINT THAT REPLACEMENT OF VOLIO WOULD
BE DIFFICULT GIVEN SOVIET BLOC AND AFRICAN
CHAIRMANSHIPS OF THE UNHRC IN 1987 AND 1988.

4. VOLIO THANKED BOTH AMBASSADORS BARNES AND
SCHIFTER FOR THEIR SUPPORT AND AMBASSADOR
BARNES IN PARTICULAR FOR REPORT IN REF A.
VOLIO STATED THAT HE PLANS TO CONTINUE HIS
WORK AS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR BOTH FOR THE REASONS
CONTAINED IN REF A AND BECAUSE THE CHILEAN
GOVERNMENT HAS NOT BROKEN FAITH WITH HIM.

5. VOLIO NOTED THAT HE SPOKE BY TELEPHONE
JUNE 2 WITH AMBASSADOR CALDERON ABOUT HIS
MANDATE. CALDERON STATED THAT HE COULD NOT
MEET WITH VOLIO PRIOR TO THE WEEK OF JUNE 23
IN GENEVA. CALDERON REPORTEDLY IS ENGAGED IN
DRAFTING THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
TO VOLIO'S RECOMMENDATIONS.

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F95-028/5 #3319

BY RW NARA DATE 10/21/10

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SAN JOSE 5522

DTG: 092217Z JUN 86 PSN: 010962

6. VOLIO REPORTS THAT HE EMPHASIZED TO CALDERON THAT THE GOC MUST RESPOND NOT JUST TO HIS REPORTS ON SPECIFIC CASES OF ABUSES CONTAINED IN CHAPTER 3, BUT ALSO TO HIS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE. HE POINTED OUT THAT PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE ARMY AND THE STUDENTS WOULD BE REDUCED IF THE ARMY CEASED ITS OCCUPATION OF THE UNIVERSITIES, AS HE HAS REQUESTED. CALDERON REPORTEDLY UNDERTOOK TO RESPOND TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS, AND STATED THAT HIS RESPONSE WILL BE AN EXHAUSTIVE ONE.

7. VOLIO SAID THAT CHILE NEEDS OUTSIDE PRESSURE TO MOVE TOWARD IMPLEMENTATION OF HIS RECOMMENDATIONS AND TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN GENERAL. IN RESPONSE TO POLOFF'S QUERY AS TO WHAT SORT OF PRESSURE, VOLIO ASKED THAT USG REPRESENTATIVES IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH GOC OFFICIALS FOCUS ON THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT HIS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE ALSO ASKED THAT WE CONTINUE TO MEET WITH MODERATE OPPOSITION ELEMENTS IN AN ATTEMPT TO STRENGTHEN AND INSPIRE THEM, EVEN IN THE FACE OF GOC UNWILLINGNESS TO TREAT WITH THEM.

8. VOLIO REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF IN THE NEED FOR GENUINE PROGRESS TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN CHILE. WITHOUT THAT, HE SAID, THE GOC'S FORMAL COOPERATION WITH HIM IS STERILE. VOLIO SAID HE MADE THE SAME POINT TO CALDERON.

9. REGARDING THE ISSUE OF PROGRESS, VOLIO REITERATED HIS APPRECIATION FOR AMBASSADOR BARNES' MESSAGE, AND REQUESTED ANOTHER REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ALIANZA POPULAR. IS IT GAINING STRENGTH? IS IT WANING? CAN IT PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT TO DISCUSS THE NATIONAL ACCORD? WHAT ARE ITS CURRENT OBJECTIVES? VOLIO STATED THAT IF THE EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE FALTERS, VIOLENCE WILL RESULT AND PINOCHET WILL BE THE WINNER.

10. VOLIO STATED THAT GIVEN RECENT
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SAN JOSE 05522

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PHUM, UNHRC-1, PREL, CI, CS
SUBJECT: CHILE HUMAN RIGHTS - VOLIO TO STAY ON;

EVENTS IN CHILE IT WOULD NOT BE PRUDENT
FOR HIM TO VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE;
THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD PLAY INTO THE
HANDS OF THE COMMUNISTS. IF HE WERE
TO MAKE A TRIP IN THE NEAR FUTURE IT
WOULD BE TO MONTEVIDEO TO MEET WITH
EXILES. BY DECEMBER, HOWEVER, VOLIO EXPECTS
THINGS TO CALM DOWN. HE HOPES TO VISIT
CHILE IN THAT TIME-FRAME.

11. VOLIO STATED THAT HE WOULD LIKE
TO MEET -- DISCREETLY -- WITH US
OFFICIALS IN GENEVA THE WEEK OF JUNE
23 TO EXCHANGE VIEWS.

TAMBS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 SANTIAGO 3694 DTG: 101954Z JUN 86 PSN: 012831
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 SANTIAGO 03694

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, CI
SUBJ: PINOCHET RULES OUT ELIMINATION OF 1989
PLEBISCITE, SEES CAMPAIGN AS "US" VERSUS "THEM"

REF: SANTIAGO 3610

1. (C) SUMMARY: IN A PRESS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 6, PRESIDENT PINOCHET ASSURED HIS LISTENERS THAT THE NEXT PRESIDENT OF CHILE WOULD BE CHOSEN BY PLEBISCITE IN 1989, AND THAT IT WAS THE DUTY OF ALL GOOD CHILEANS TO ENSURE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. HE ATTACKED THE OPPOSITION FOR THEIR UNPATRIOTIC BEHAVIOR AND FOREIGN SUPPORT, AND STATED HIS VIEW THAT THE CHOICE IN 1989 WOULD BE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MARXISTS. PINOCHET PROMISED THAT ALL POLITICAL LAWS WOULD BE IN PLACE BEFORE 1989 AND THAT THE ELECTORAL REGISTRY LAW WOULD BE IN FORCE THIS YEAR. HIS MESSAGE WAS DIRECTED AT THE MILITARY AS MUCH AS ANYONE, BUT WE THINK HE TAKES A RISK BY TRYING TO EMBARK THE MILITARY ON HIS RE-SELECTION JOURNEY. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) PRESIDENT AUGUSTO PINOCHET HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 6. THE CONFERENCE, OPEN ONLY TO THOSE JOURNALISTS ACCREDITED TO LA MONEDA AND WITH ALL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BEFOREHAND, HAD BEEN BALLYHOODED AS A TIME FOR REVELATIONS CONCERNING PINOCHET'S PLANS FOR 1989. IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE, PINOCHET SPOKE ON A VARIETY OF TOPICS, RANGING FROM DECENTRALIZATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM TO THE 1989 PLEBISCITE.

3. (U) PINOCHET GAVE NO INDICATION THAT THE POLITICAL TRANSITION AS OUTLINED IN THE 1980 CONSTITUTION COULD OR WOULD BE ALTERED. HE REITERATED THAT THE CONSTITUTION IS FIXED AND IMMUTABLE AS A REFLECTION OF THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (THE 1980 PLEBISCITE) AND THAT THEREFORE THE PLEBISCITE OF 1989 WILL DETERMINE WHO WOULD BE PRESIDENT OF CHILE FROM 1989 TO 1997. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 1989 ELECTION, SAYING THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN BLOCKING THE MARXIST THREAT. ACCORDING TO PINOCHET, THE PLEBISCITE WAS MORE THAN A MERE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, SINCE "TO

WIN THIS PLEBISCITE IS A CHALLENGE FOR AUTHENTIC DEMOCRATS, FOR SUPPORTERS OF WORK AND ORDER, FOR ANYONE WHO BELIEVES IN LIBERTY AND IN CHILE."

4. (C) PINOCHET LASHED OUT AT THE OPPOSITION AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY. HE ACCUSED THEM OF DEALING IN DEMAGOGUERY AND ILLUSIONS, THAT THEIR ONLY DESIRE WAS POWER AND THAT THEY HAD NO FEELING FOR REALITY OR THE NATION. PINOCHET STATED THAT THE OPPOSITION WAS CONSTANTLY SEEKING FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL AID FROM OUTSIDE OF CHILE IN ORDER TO APPLY POLITICAL PRESSURE THROUGH INTERNAL AGITATION. HE ACCUSED THE OPPOSITION OF BEING BEHIND THE CAMPAIGN OF RESISTANCE TO THE PROCESS OF DECENTRALIZING THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND VOWED THAT THE PROCESS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT (SEE REFTL). HE LAMPOONED THE OPPOSITION MAGAZINES, STATING THAT THE PEOPLE OF CHILE COULD SEE THROUGH THEIR LIES AND HEAVILY-FUNDED ANTI-GOVERNMENT CAMPAIGNS. PINOCHET AVERRED THAT HE WAS OPEN TO DIALOGUE WITH ALL LOYAL AND SINCERE SECTORS, FOR THE BENEFIT OF CHILE, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS, EXCLUDING, OF COURSE, THOSE GROUPS THAT PROFESSED TOTALITARIAN DOCTRINES OR OBEYED FOREIGN POWERS. IN ADDITION, HE WOULD EXCLUDE THOSE GROUPS THAT PROFESSED A DEMOCRATIC BASE BUT PERSISTED IN ATTACKS ON THE PUBLIC ORDER IN CONJUNCTION WITH EXTREMISTS. (COMMENT: FOR PINOCHET, THIS WOULD EXCLUDE THE CENTER AND CENTER-LEFT OPPOSITION.)

5. (U) POLITICAL LAWS
THE PRESIDENT PROMISED THAT ALL THE RELEVANT POLITICAL LAWS WOULD BE IN EFFECT BEFORE THE 1989 PLEBISCITE

IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE POLITICAL PARTIES -- WHICH HE REFERRED TO AS "CURRENTS OF OPINION" -- SUFFICIENT TIME TO ORGANIZE. ALTHOUGH HE DEMURRED WHEN ASKED TO BE MORE SPECIFIC AS TO A TIMETABLE, HE PROMISED THAT THE ELECTORAL REGISTRY LAW WOULD BE IN EFFECT BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR.

6. (C) COMMENT: PINOCHET DOES NOT LIKE PRESS CONFERENCES AND HE HAS HELD ONLY A FEW IN RECENT YEARS. SUDDENLY HE HAS TWO WITHIN LESS THAN A MONTH. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS TRYING TO GET ACROSS A MESSAGE AND DID NOT HAVE THE HANDY OCCASION OF A SCHEDULED ADDRESS TO DO IT. PERHAPS HIS POLITICAL BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 SANTIAGO 03694

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, CI
SUBJ: PINOCHET RULES OUT ELIMINATION OF 1989

ADVISERS THINK THAT HE CAN ENHANCE HIS IMAGE WITH A PRESS CONFERENCE, AS THEY DO IN DEMOCRACIES, AS OPPOSED TO THE SPEECHIFYING OF AUTOCRATS. IN ANY EVENT, THE MESSAGE IS THAT SPECULATION ABOUT AN OPEN ELECTION INSTEAD OF A PLEBISCITE IS GROUNDLESS AND, FOR THE MILITARY, PERHAPS EVEN CAREER-JEOPARDIZING. FOR PINOCHET, WINNING THE PLEBISCITE IS THE DUTY OF ALL GOOD CHILEANS, INCLUDING THOSE OF "ORDER" (READ MILITARY PERSONNEL), FOR ONLY THROUGH A SUCCESSFUL PLEBISCITE CAN CHILE'S DEVELOPMENT AND LIBERTY BE ASSURED AND THE RETURN OF THE MARXISTS BE PREVENTED. PINOCHET IS FULLY AWARE THAT THE NOTION OF OPEN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAS BEEN GAINING GROUND EVEN IN CONSERVATIVE CIRCLES, WITH STRONG SUPPORT FROM PEOPLE WHOSE MOTIVES CANNOT BE SUSPECT, SUCH AS FORMER MINISTER SERGIO ONOFRE JARPA AND THE NATIONAL UNION. THE PRESS CONFERENCE IS PINOCHET'S WAY OF KICKING OFF THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, AND HIS PLATFORM IS BLATANT: ME OR MARXISM, THE GOVERNMENT OR THE COMMUNIST-INFILTRATED AND FOREIGN-FINANCED OPPOSITION. THE EFFECT ON MILITARY AND CONSERVATIVE OPINION OF THIS ATTEMPT TO COMPROMISE THE ARMED FORCES WITH HIS CANDIDACY FOR RE-SELECTION REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT WE CANNOT HELP THINKING THAT IT WILL HURT HIM IN THE MEDIUM TO LONG-TERM. JONES
BT

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y T E X T

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ELAB, CI
SUBJ: AIFLD IN CHILE

REF: BUENOS AIRES 4799

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

2. CHILE IS ENTERING A VERY DELICATE PERIOD IN ITS TRANSITION TOWARDS A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT, A PROCESS WHICH WILL HOPEFULLY TERMINATE IN 1989. THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT SHOULD PLAY A KEY ROLE IN THIS PROCESS, AS AFTER CLOSE TO 13 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE, IT REPRESENTS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING ORGANIZED PRESSURE GROUPS IN CHILE. THE POLITICAL PARTIES, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND THE COMMUNISTS, APPEAR TO HAVE HAD THEIR INTERNAL STRUCTURES WEAKENED BY LACK OF CONTACT WITH THE VOTERS. THE UNION MOVEMENT, THEREFORE, THOUGH GREATLY REDUCED IN STRENGTH BY THE LABOR LAWS, STILL RETAINS AT LEAST SOME OF ITS TIES WITH THE WORKING CLASS, AND WILL MORE AND MORE BE DRAWN INTO THE POLITICAL ARENA BY POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS SEEKING TO EXPAND THEIR APPEAL AND SUPPORT AMONG THE WORKERS. THE NEED FOR INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS AS BOTH SEEK TO HALT EXPANSION BY THE COMMUNISTS WITHIN THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND AMONG THE WORKERS. THE INTRANSIGENCE OF PRESIDENT PINOCHET IN ESTABLISHING A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION HAS INCREASED THE INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN OPPOSITION CIRCLES, AND ENHANCED ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS IN EVENTUALLY REESTABLISHING A CENTRAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION DOMINATED BY THEIR SUPPORTERS UNLESS THE DEMOCRATIC GROUPS CAN CONSOLIDATE THEIR OWN FORCES EARLY IN THE GAME.

3. THE ABILITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC FORCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS, HOWEVER, IS COMPLICATED BY THE SPLIT WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION MOVEMENT, A SPLIT BASED ON DISAGREEMENT OVER TACTICS TO BE USED DURING THE TRANSITION PERIOD. PART OF THE UNION MOVEMENT, PRIMARILY REPRESENTED IN THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRATIC WORKERS (CDT), TAKES A LONGER TERM VIEW OF THE SITUATION, AND CALLS FOR NON-VIOLENT CHANGE, WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THE COMMUNISTS, WHICH WOULD HOPEFULLY GUARANTEE THE EXISTENCE OF AN AUTONOMOUS DEMOCRATIC TRADE UNION MOVEMENT AFTER PINOCHET DEPARTS. THE LESS EXPERIENCED DEMOCRATIC UNION LEADERS, REPRESENTED IN THE NATIONAL WORKERS COMMAND (CNT), ARGUE THAT THEY MUST WORK WITH ALL OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT PINOCHET GOES, AND THEY THINK THEY CAN CONTROL THE COMMUNISTS.

4. AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, THE CDT DEPENDS ON THE ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT OF THE AIFLD TO KEEP IT FUNCTIONING IN THE FACE OF OFTEN HOSTILE RIVAL TRADE UNIONS AND AN INDIFFERENT GOVERNMENT. RECENT EVENTS HAVE SHOWN THAT THE PRESENCE OF AN EXPERIENCED AIFLD CPD IS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THIS SOMETIMES DELICATE RELATIONSHIP ON AN EVEN KEEL. THE SENSITIVE STAGE OF THE CDT'S REQUEST FOR ICFTU AFFILIATION, AND THE AFL-CIO'S DESIRE TO SEE THIS TAKE PLACE IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT UNNECESSARILY HARM ITS OWN RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF THE ICFTU (WHO SUPPORT THE DEMOCRATIC UNION LEADERS IN THE CNT), MAKES IT EVEN MORE IMPERATIVE THAT THE AIFLD HAVE A SEASONED VETERAN ON HAND DURING THE NEXT FEW YEARS TO ASSIST THE CDT.

5. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES' PARALLEL PLEA (RETEL) FOR ASSIGNMENT OF AN EXPERIENCED AIFLD REPRESENTATIVE TO ARGENTINA, WE ARE PLEASED THAT AIFLD HAS DESIGNATED AUGUSTIN TORRES-LAZO TO RETURN TO CHILE AS THE CPD. HE HAS KNOWN THE CHILEAN LABOR LEADERS FOR OVER 20 YEARS, AND HAS FILLED THIS CPD SLOT TWICE PREVIOUSLY. WE BELIEVE HIS EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH THE CHILEANS, AND HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THEIR HISTORY, WILL AID GREATLY BOTH THE CDT LEADERS AND THE DEMOCRATIC UNION LEADERS IN THE CNT TO FIND COMMON GROUND ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR SHARED GOAL OF DEMOCRATIC RULE AND THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRATIC, AUTONOMOUS TRADE

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E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

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(b) (1)
(b) (3)

Chile

Special Analysis

CHILE:

Pinochet and the Military

Political agitation in Chile may pit senior military officers against President Pinochet, especially if the protest movement continues to grow over the next few months and the President relies exclusively on heavyhanded measures to contain the opposition. Although Pinochet still enjoys strong support in the all-important Army, the increasingly tense political atmosphere might lead senior officers to demand that he show more flexibility toward the moderate opposition and agree that Chile will return to civilian rule when his term ends in 1989.

[] the frequency of antiregime protests and bombings has increased in recent months and [] some hardliners in the government favor reimposing the state of siege that was lifted a year ago. The opposition wants to organize a stream of demonstrations and civil disobedience actions—including a 48-hour national strike early next month—to persuade the armed forces that Chile is ungovernable under Pinochet's policies. []

The Military's Unease

Pinochet has repeatedly asserted that he will not negotiate with the opposition, modify the constitution—which allows for his reelection in a presidential plebiscite in 1989—or speed up political liberalization. Three of the four members of the military junta and a growing number of senior officers, along with many civilian advisers, want Pinochet to step down in 1989, legalize political parties, and begin the transition to civilian rule. []

The President has ignored these recommendations and launched an intensified effort, led by the Army, to crack down on protesters. He has, in effect, militarized Santiago during recent demonstrations and has ordered armed sweeps of slum neighborhoods to intimidate the poor. []

Pinochet's recent tendency to override or ignore the wishes of senior officers is eroding his standing with the armed forces. []

[] His recent use of the Army instead of the Carabineros—the national police—to control protests has greatly irritated many Carabineros. []

continued

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By LoJ, NARA, Date 7/15/08

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The Chilean Military

Army

The 60,000-member Army is politically and militarily dominant. Its representative and those of the other three services on the junta share power formally with the President and function as Chile's legislature. Pinochet is the Army commander; the vice commander, General Santiago Sinclair, was a close presidential adviser until his appointment last year. His predecessor, General Julio Canessa, was elevated to the junta.

The highly disciplined Army officer corps professes strong loyalty to Pinochet, the constitution, and the need to eradicate far-left influences from Chile, but it is divided into hardliners and moderates. The latter are in the minority, but sentiment appears to be growing in the officer corps for a withdrawal from politics by 1989. There is precedent for the Army to remove its commander—it did so in 1973, just before the coup against Allende—and for close coordination between the Army and the other services in planning antigovernment actions.

Air Force

The Air Force, with about 13,000 men, is generally considered the most liberal of the services, and its commander and representative on the junta, General Fernando Matthei, frequently speaks out against Pinochet's hardline policies. Pinochet forced Matthei's even more outspoken predecessor to resign in 1978.

Navy

The Navy, with about 23,000 personnel, probably has less political weight than the Air Force and possibly the Carabineros. Its commander and representative on the junta, Admiral Jose Merino, is somewhat unpredictable and has occasionally opposed Pinochet. Most recently, he voted against reimposing the state of siege. Most Navy officers probably favor a return to civilian rule in 1989.

Carabineros

The militia-like national police number about 28,000 career personnel but are generally considered to have less prestige than the other services. The force's commander and junta member, General Rodolfo Stange, is highly regarded but has become increasingly irritated by Pinochet's reliance on the Army for crowd and riot control.

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11 June 1986

~~Top Secret~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Cracks in the Military

Some officers may already be considering whether to confront Pinochet.

[REDACTED]

believe that sentiment is growing within the Army to challenge Pinochet if he remains obdurate on reform.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Pinochet is worried about fissures within the military but has concluded that repressive measures against the opposition will force the military to close ranks behind him.

[REDACTED]

Outlook

Pinochet's strategy may backfire because unease throughout the armed forces is likely to grow if he persists in his current policies. Nevertheless, it is not clear which, and how many, officers might confront the President or how Pinochet would react to a direct challenge. Any successful move against Pinochet almost certainly would require support from most of the more than 50 active-duty Army generals, as well as senior officers from the other services.

[REDACTED]

Pinochet probably would defy any group that did not clearly represent a united officer corps, but, if faced with an insurmountable challenge from a powerful group, he might temporarily agree to its demands.

continued

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[REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, he probably would try to regain full control of decisionmaking, overcome opposition within the Army, and remain in power beyond 1989. [redacted]

DIA Comment: DIA believes it is premature to suggest that the senior officer corps is sufficiently unified or motivated to press President Pinochet to change his electoral plans for 1989 or that such a stage will be reached in the next few months. Even if the civilian moderate opposition gained significant strength over the next few months and made common cause with the radical left, the officer corps would be far more likely to close ranks behind Pinochet than to confront him.

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Chile



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS
AND
RESEARCH

(U) THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND CHILEAN POLITICS:
WHAT FUTURE ROLE?^{1/}

Key Judgments

The prominent role played by the Catholic Church in the ousters of Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines suggests that the Chilean church may play a similar role in a possible future change of government in that country. Almost 90 percent of the Chilean population is Catholic, although church attendance is much lower--around 15 percent.

The Chilean Bishops Conference has taken an increasingly active part in the political life of the country, although it professes to be concerned solely with moral problems. Last year the Cardinal of Santiago, Juan Francisco Fresno, engineered an agreement of representatives of 11 political parties, ranging from the moderate right to segments of the socialist left. The parties' "National Accord for the Transition to Full Democracy" appeared to provide a viable alternative to President Augusto Pinochet.

On April 7, 1986, the Chilean bishops issued a statement titled "Justice or Violence" which went beyond their normal call for dialogue. It urged swift enactment of political laws and other urgently needed "revisions" to the Constitution to defuse the climate of violence which, the bishops warned, was threatening to destroy the country. The bishops' statement has refocused attention on the constitutional reform issue and has received guarded but generally favorable reaction from both

^{1/} This paper is based largely on research conducted by Dr. Paul E. Sigmund, Princeton University, under INR's Scholar-Analyst Program.

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Report 1277-AR
June 11, 1986

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/21/10

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pro-government sources and moderate opposition leaders. Although it did not recommend specific steps to reform the Constitution, most lay and political leaders interpreted the statement as a plea for free elections in 1989.

The bishops in the past have criticized Gen. Pinochet for his human rights record and have called for a prompt return to democracy, but this is the first time that the church has referred directly to the government's Constitution, perhaps the most important point at issue between the military government and the opposition. Under the Constitution, approved in a controversial referendum in 1980, a plebiscite is to be held in 1989 to approve a single presidential candidate--who may be Pinochet--named by the military commanders in chief for the next eight-year term. If the candidate wins he becomes President; if he loses there would be a full-scale election in which Marxist parties probably would be banned. A partly elected congress would take office in 1990.

Despite the growing activism of many younger priests and the laity, the divided Catholic hierarchy has not reached the point of calling for Pinochet's ouster if reforms are not made. Whether pressures from within the church or Pinochet's intransigence will lead church officials to adopt a clearer stand against the government remains to be seen. Church-state relations continue to be discussed prominently in the Chilean press, especially in view of the scheduled visit of Pope John Paul II in early 1987. The Pope's visit gives Fresno a bargaining chip because cancellation could cause serious problems for an increasingly isolated Pinochet government. Despite current tensions, it is now more likely that, in the longer term, the church will play an important, mediating role in Chile's difficult transition to democracy.

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The Church in Chile Today

References to the Chilean Catholic Church in most cases indicate the official spokesmen for the church, the 30 Chilean bishops, especially when they make public declarations in the Bishops Conference (Conferencia Episcopal). However, the term also includes the clergy--the diocesan priests and nuns, who are directly subject to the bishops, and the members of the religious orders, organized on a worldwide basis and technically also subject to the local bishop. Slightly fewer than half of the priests in Chile are foreign born, most of them members of the religious orders.

Chilean bishops in recent years have encouraged the Catholic laity to take an increasingly active role both in official church organizations and in unions, student and youth groups, professional associations, and political parties (e.g., the Christian Democratic Party) that, while not officially church sponsored, are influenced by church teachings. Church-affiliated schools are especially influential in Chile at the private secondary school level (e.g., the Jesuit Colegio San Ignacio and St. George's School of the Holy Cross Father). Church publications such as Mensaje, Solidaridad, and Pastoral Popular are also influential.

On the university level, the church formerly controlled and now strongly influences the Catholic Universities of Santiago and Valparaiso, although both institutions now receive more than half of their budgets from the state (from 1973 until recently both were run by military "delegate-rectors"). Much of the financing of the church's activities, in particular its research institutes, soup kitchens, and human rights organizations, comes from abroad, especially from international aid groups, the French and German churches, and foundations.

The Church's Historical Role in Politics

During the 19th century, the Chilean church was closely associated with the Conservative Party. The association ended after the separation of church and state in 1925, and especially after the rise of the Christian Democratic Party in the 1950s and 1960s. The appointment in 1958 of Raul Silva Henriquez as Archbishop, later Cardinal, of Santiago was resisted by conservatives because of his known "progressive" tendencies; but he was able to work successfully with the rightist Alessandri government between 1958 and 1964.

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- 2 -

During those years the Vatican and the Chilean bishops took a more active interest in reform, partly in response to the challenge of the Cuban revolution. They promoted agrarian reform (beginning with church lands), worked with labor and slumdwellers, and provided much of the thinking behind the program of the Christian Democratic Party, led by Eduardo Frei. (Frei won a landslide victory in 1964 over Salvador Allende, candidate of the socialist-communist coalition, the FRAP.) During the Frei administration, however, a sector of the church that was disappointed with the slow progress of reform became radicalized; at the same time, a group of lay Catholics organized the Chilean Society for Tradition, Family, and Property (TFP) to fight Frei's agrarian reform program.

Thus, by the time of the next presidential election in 1970, the three-way split of candidacies among Jorge Alessandri (independent conservative), Radomiro Tomic (Christian Democrat), and Allende (candidate of the left-wing coalition, Unidad Popular) was matched by similar divisions into right, center, and left within the church and church-related groups. When Marxist candidate Allende won the presidency, leftist priests and intellectuals organized the Christians for Socialism movement. Members held a continent-wide meeting in 1972 and adopted resolutions declaring that a Marxist analysis was the only possible option for Christians. The bishops had already issued a letter ("The Gospel, Politics, and Socialism") which argued that although it was possible for a Christian to be a socialist, certain forms of socialism (such as Marxism-Leninism) were opposed to Christianity. The bishops finally condemned the Christians for Socialism movement for politicizing religion, but the decision to do so was published only two days after the September 11, 1973, coup that overthrew Allende.

The Church and the Coup

The bishops' response to the coup was divided. Some of them, including Fresno, the present Cardinal of Santiago, then Bishop of La Serena, hailed the military for delivering the country from Marxism; others, including Cardinal Silva, spoke in more ambiguous terms. When the nature of the post-coup regime became apparent, the church organized an ecumenical Committee for Peace to aid the victims of persecution and to assist foreigners stranded in Chile. When the government several years later formally requested that the committee be dissolved, the Cardinal replaced it with the Vicariate of Solidarity, which continues to carry out important relief and legal work in the area of human rights.

Silva also supported the establishment of the Academy of Christian Humanism, a sort of internal university in exile, for professors and intellectuals who were removed from the universities by the post-1973 military purge. At present, more than

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- 3 -

100 researchers and professors are associated with various programs of the Academy, all of them supported from outside sources.

When unemployment climbed as a result of the regime's economic and social policies, the church organized soup kitchens and cooperatives in poor areas. Beginning in 1974, it issued a number of episcopal letters critical of the regime's violations of human rights. Silva began to make increasingly strong statements against the continuation of military rule, while the bishops strongly criticized 1) the snap plebiscite on the government that Pinochet called in January 1978 and 2) the September 1980 referendum on the draft constitution which had been hastily rewritten to give Pinochet 8-16 years in power beginning in March 1981.

The church thus became a shelter for those persecuted by the regime, whether intellectuals, trade union leaders, or the poor, and more and more it identified with opposition to the Pinochet government. Yet, because the church represented Christian values against atheistic Marxism, there were serious limits on what the government could do against it.

The collapse of the free-market model beginning in 1982, widespread unemployment, and the emergence of a broad-based protest movement put strong pressure on the regime and church-state tensions became even more evident. Cardinal Silva's attainment of the canonical retirement age of 75, however, seemed to offer some possibility of a diminution of church opposition. When the Vatican announced the appointment of Juan Francisco Fresno as Silva's successor as Archbishop of Santiago, Mrs. Pinochet is reported to have declared, "God has answered our prayers."

The Role of Cardinal Fresno and the National Accord

In initial interviews, Fresno described himself as primarily pastoral in orientation, thus implying that in contrast to his predecessor, he would adopt a political low profile. From the outset, however, there were tensions between church and state. They came to a head about a year after Fresno's appointment when the government imposed a state of siege, strictly censored the media, refused to allow the Spanish-born head of the Vicariate of Solidarity to return to Chile after he had traveled abroad, and stepped up raids on slum neighborhoods to arrest government opponents.

In response, Fresno issued a Pastoral Letter which was read in all the churches, even though its publication by the media was prohibited. The letter denounced the government's human rights violations and the suffering imposed on the poor by the regime's economic policies. It condemned "subversive violence" (the bombings and power outages carried out by the extreme left) and

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"repressive violence" (the actions of the government intelligence and police agencies). Finally, it called for a day of prayer for the poor and for the victims of violence.

In 1985 Fresno took a more directly political step, supported by the Vatican which was increasingly concerned that a Nicaragua-style polarization would develop and be exploited by the powerful Chilean Communist Party. In July he appointed three prominent Catholic laymen to negotiate with the leaders of the political parties on a set of common principles to govern a transition to democracy.

The resulting National Accord for the Transition to Full Democracy, published in late August, called for a reform of the 1980 Constitution to make possible direct elections of a Congress and President, full guarantees of civil and political rights to be protected by a Constitutional Tribunal (which, however, could outlaw anti-democratic parties), a promise to the military of no special courts for human rights cases, and a mixed economy in which private property was guaranteed but the needs of the poor were given priority. The accord was endorsed by the representatives of 11 parties, with only the extreme right and extreme left (including the communists) refusing to sign.

Since August 1985 the accord has become the major focus of political discussion. Its most important drafter and spokesman is Sergio Molina, former economics minister under the Frei government (1964-70), and its political purpose is to persuade the military that a responsible civilian alternative to Pinochet exists. Since its publication, strains have emerged among the signatories. The most rightist of the parties involved, the new National Union Movement (MUN) headed by Andres Allamand, opposes proposals for civil disobedience; and some of the socialists are concerned about the nonparticipation of the communists, who in the meantime continue support for terrorist campaigns.

Nevertheless, Fresno has continued to give the accord his public support--even when, as during his Christmas meeting with Pinochet, the President directly rebuffed his efforts to promote a dialogue on the subject. Fresno met with Pinochet again in March 1986, ostensibly to discuss the Pope's visit next year. It was not clear whether the accord was mentioned in their conversations.

Fresno is attempting to maintain his position as a neutral figure in politics. At the same time he is trying to promote a democratic opening--a difficult feat when most Chileans perceive that Pinochet wishes to remain in power as long as possible and to delay at least until 1990 a return to civilian rule. Within his own Bishops Conference Fresno must maintain a balance between the more radical bishops (such as Jorge Hourton, one of his auxiliary

bishops in Santiago, and the bishops in Punta Arenas and Copiapo); the moderates (Bernardo Pinera of La Serena); and more conservative figures (the Bishop of Puerto Montt). He must also maintain working relations with lay leaders like Jaime Guzman and other prominent Catholics who are linked to the government. On March 11, however, amid an escalation of bombings and power outages carried out by the extreme left, the bishops issued a statement urging the government to "listen to its citizens" as "an important part of the Chilean people asks for change in politics and government."

The Future Role of the Church

Despite erosion of support for the accord, it apparently will remain an important expression of a broad centrist consensus in Chilean politics and a valid point of reference for future negotiation initiatives. And, given Fresno's known conservative credentials and pastoral style, it is difficult for Pinochet to accuse him of leftist or subversive sympathies. The accord also has given Sergio Molina a certain prominence as a leader of the moderate opposition who is not formally associated with the interneccine battles within and between the parties. The prestige of the church and its leadership remains high. Its organs of communication and publicity are well organized, and its concern about future communist influence well known.

The next step is not yet clear. What new initiatives can be taken to promote a return to civilian rule? Last November Pinochet removed Gen. Raul Benavides, the army representative on the ruling Junta, reportedly for favoring a dialogue with the accord group. The navy and air force Junta representatives have made mildly positive statements about a dialogue, only to be contradicted by Pinochet. The more militant members of the accord and other opposition groups are calling for "social mobilization," even a general strike, to force negotiations between the armed forces and the opposition.

So far there are no indications that social mobilization is likely in the immediate future--although many Chileans see late 1988 and 1989 as the time when some kind of overall national political agreement must be reached, with the likely result being the end of Pinochet's rule. Whether such negotiations take place then, or sooner--for example, in connection with the impending visit of the Pope in 1987--the church, in particular Cardinal Fresno, is likely to play an important mediating role.

More problematic is the church reaction in the event of an escalation of violence, polarization, and confrontation. It is difficult to imagine Fresno taking the kind of militant position adopted by Cardinal Sin in Manila earlier this year. Fresno seems uncomfortable in the role of political activist and would prefer

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- 6 -

to occupy himself with more pastoral pursuits. But other church leaders, especially at the lower levels of the Catholic Church hierarchy, might press for greater politicization. Such pressure already is being felt at the top by Chile's more conservative bishops.

The network of church-controlled communications is as effective in Chile as it was in Haiti and the Philippines--including the radio station of the Santiago archbishopric, Radio Chilena, and the Christian Democratic-controlled Radio Cooperativa, which broadcasts throughout the country. Thus, while personality factors and the continuing support of Pinochet by the army make Chile different from the other two countries, future developments may make the role of the church look increasingly similar.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SANTIAGO 03756

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PSCUL, PINR, PGOV, CI
SUBJECT: POLL ON UNIVERSITY STUDENT ATTITUDES

REF: (A) SANTIAGO 3356

1. (U) SUMMARY: IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1985, THE ACADEMY OF CHRISTIAN HUMANISM (AHC), A CENTER-LEFT THINK TANK, CONDUCTED A POLL AT THREE UNIVERSITIES IN CHILE. THE RESULTS WERE REVEALED ONLY TWO WEEKS AGO. THE POLL INDICATED THAT STUDENTS WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CHOSEN FIELD OF STUDY AND THE ACADEMIC QUALITY OF THEIR UNIVERSITIES. THERE WAS OVERWHELMING AGREEMENT THAT STUDENTS SHOULD HAVE AN ACTIVE VOICE IN HOW THEIR UNIVERSITY IS RUN. THE VAST BULK OF THE STUDENTS, 85 PERCENT, IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES AS CENTRIST, CENTER-LEFT OR CENTER-RIGHT. THE MAJORITY FAVORED STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN TRYING TO PRESSURE THE REGIME, WHILE 29 PERCENT FAVORED THE USE OF STREET PROTESTS AND CALLS FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE. HOWEVER, ONLY 20 PERCENT SAID THEY PARTICIPATED IN ACTIVE EFFORTS TO FREE JAILED STUDENT LEADERS, THE MOST BURNING ISSUE ON CAMPUSES DURING THE LAST YEAR. AHC ANALYSTS SAY THE RESULTS SHOW PRONOUNCED MODERATE ATTITUDES IN THE STUDENT BODY THAT CAST DOUBT ON CHANCES FOR MOBILIZING LARGE NUMBERS OF STUDENTS FOR PROLONGED ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS LEADERS ARE AWARE OF THE RESULTS AND AHC ANALYSTS THINK THAT THEY HAVE WEIGHED ON THE STUDENT LEADERS' DECISIONS TO HUSBAND THEIR ENERGIES FOR MORE OPPORTUNE MOMENTS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) THE POLL ENCOMPASSED 1001 STUDENTS AT CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY (420 STUDENTS), CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AT VALPARAISO (167) AND UNIVERSITY OF CHILE (414). THE QUESTIONS WERE PRINTED, AND THOSE POLLED FILLED OUT THE FORM IN THE PRESENCE OF A POLLSTER.

3. (U) THREE BASIC AREAS COVERED IN THE POLL INCLUDED STUDENT/CAMPUS ISSUES; STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT; AND STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN NATIONAL ISSUES. ANSWERS TO THE FOUR QUESTIONS IN THE FIRST CATEGORY REVEALED THAT THE

MAJORITY OF STUDENTS WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR CHOSEN FIELD OF STUDY, THAT THEY BELIEVED THEIR RESPECTIVE UNIVERSITIES WERE AT LEAST ADEQUATE ACADEMICALLY, AND THAT THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY WAS CONSIDERED TO HAVE THE BEST ACADEMIC PROGRAM.

4. (U) THE SECOND AREA OF THE POLL REVEALED OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR ACTIVE STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN UNIVERSITY POLITICS. THE MAJORITY SUPPORTED THE ELECTION OF DEPARTMENT HEADS BY FACULTY MEMBERS ALONE OR BY FACULTY AND STUDENTS HAVING A ROLE IN THE SELECTION PROCESS. ONLY A SMALL MINORITY SAID THE SYSTEM SHOULD REMAIN AS IS, THAT IS, DIRECT APPOINTMENT BY THE RECTOR (WHO IS APPOINTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AT THE PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES). THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY SAID STUDENTS SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT. ONLY ONE PERCENT SAID STUDENTS SHOULD NOT. MORE THAN 84 PERCENT AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE STUDENT/FACULTY COOPERATION TO CONFRONT UNIVERSITY PROBLEMS. THE LARGE MAJORITY SAID THEY VOTED IN STUDENT ELECTIONS, BUT LESS THAN FOUR PERCENT DESCRIBED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN STUDENT POLITICS GENERALLY AS "VERY ACTIVE."

5. (U) ASKED ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL POLITICAL PREFERENCES ON A SCALE OF 1 (FAR LEFT) TO 10 (FAR RIGHT), THE VAST MAJORITY (85 PERCENT) IDENTIFIED THEMSELVES IN THE RANGE OF CENTER-LEFT TO CENTER-RIGHT (BETWEEN 3 AND 8) AND ONLY SLIGHTLY MORE WERE ON THE CENTER-LEFT THAN ON THE CENTER-RIGHT. NEARLY 50 PERCENT ON THE AVERAGE WERE ESSENTIALLY CENTRISTS (THE 4TH, 5TH AND 6TH DECILES). (COMMENT: THESE RESULTS ARE SURPRISINGLY SIMILAR TO THE POLL TAKEN OF THE SANTIAGO POPULATION AS A WHOLE (REFTEL) ✓

6. (U) WHILE AN OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE STUDENTS SUPPORTED THE USE OF PRESSURE FOR STUDENT OR NATIONAL CAUSES, PARTICULARLY FOR CAMPUS CAUSES SUCH AS THE IMPRISONMENT OF STUDENT LEADERS, THERE WAS MUCH LESS BACKING FOR MILITANT ACTION. APPROXIMATELY 29 PERCENT APPROVED OF CALLS FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND PROTEST MARCHES IN THE EVENT THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE NATIONAL ACCORD. (THE POLL WAS TAKEN BEFORE PINOCHET SAID IN DECEMBER 1985 THAT "THE LEAF HAD BEEN TURNED OVER" ON THE ACCORD). 45 PERCENT OF THE STUDENTS ADVOCATED LESS PROVOCATIVE FORMS OF PROTEST SUCH AS COLLECTING SIGNATURES, HOLDING MEETINGS AND MAKING STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS. SLIGHTLY OVER 20 PERCENT OF BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 SANTIAGO 03756

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: POLL ON UNIVERSITY STUDENT ATTITUDES

THE STUDENTS SAID THAT THEY HAD PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY IN EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF JAILED STUDENT LEADERS. A LARGE NUMBER SAID THAT THEY OPPOSED PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS BECAUSE THEY LEAD TO VIOLENCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ONLY 5 PERCENT SAID THAT THE STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD DO NOTHING AND WAIT FOR 1989 IF THE GOVERNMENT IS UNWILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE OPPOSITION.

7. (U) THOSE POLLED WERE ALSO ASKED WHAT THEY BELIEVED WAS THE ACTUAL SITUATION IN CHILE, RANGING FROM VERY GOOD TO VERY BAD. 72 PERCENT SAID BAD OR VERY BAD, 22.4 PERCENT SAID NORMAL, AND ONLY 2.1 PERCENT SAID GOOD OR VERY GOOD. CONCERNING THE FUTURE SITUATION, 68 PERCENT SAID THE SITUATION WOULD BE THE SAME OR WORSE AND 20.4 PERCENT BELIEVED THE SITUATION WOULD IMPROVE. ON THE OTHER HAND, MORE THAN 75 PERCENT ON THE AVERAGE WERE EITHER SLIGHTLY OPTIMISTIC (40 PERCENT) OR VERY OPTIMISTIC (35) ABOUT THEIR PROFESSIONAL FUTURES, VERSUS 20 PERCENT WHO WERE PESSIMISTIC BECAUSE OF A LACK OF JOB OPPORTUNITIES.

8. (U) ANOTHER QUESTION ASKED WHICH WAS THE BEST POLITICAL ALLIANCE TO DIRECT THE STUDENT MOVEMENT. THE RESULTS ON THIS QUESTION WERE NOT CONCLUSIVE, ALTHOUGH OVER 50 PERCENT AGREED THAT THERE MUST BE A BROAD-BASED COALITION OF GROUPS, WITH MOST IN FAVOR OF NO EXCLUSIONS WHATSOEVER. A CONSIDERABLE PERCENTAGE FAVORED EXCLUDING PRO-GOVERNMENT GROUPS. INTERESTINGLY, AN AVERAGE OF ONLY 10 PERCENT VOTED FOR THE EXCLUSION OF THE LEFTIST POPULAR DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT (MDP) FROM ANY SUCH COALITION, AND 6 PERCENT APPROVED OF EXCLUDING THE "RIGHT".

9. (C) COMMENT: EMBOFF DISCUSSED THE POLL WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SCIENTIST WHO DESIGNED AND IMPLEMENTED IT, CARLOS HUNEUS. HE AND OTHERS AT THE AHC WERE STRUCK BY THE CENTRIST ORIENTATION OF THE STUDENTS AND BY THEIR STRONG PREFERENCE FOR MODERATE MEANS OF PROTEST AGAINST THE UNIVERSITY AUTHORITIES AND THE

GOVERNMENT. THE AHC PROFESSORS BELIEVE THESE RESULTS MEAN THAT RELATIVELY FEW STUDENTS WILL BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS, AND THAT WILLINGNESS TO CARRY ON SUCH ACTIVITIES FOR A PROLONGED PERIOD IS LOW INDEED. HUNEUS HAS SHARED THE RESULTS OF THE POLLS WITH THE PRESIDENTS OF SEVEN UNIVERSITY STUDENT FEDERATIONS CONTROLLED BY CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (INCLUDING ALL THE LARGE ONES), SO THAT THEY CAN TAKE THE POLLS INTO ACCOUNT IN CONSIDERING THEIR STRATEGIES FOR THE REST OF 1986. HE COMMENTED THAT THE STUDENT LEADERS WERE SOBERED, AND HE THINKS THIS MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN THEIR DECISION TO CALL OFF STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS IN MAY, IN ORDER TO HUSBAND LIMITED STUDENT ENTHUSIASM FOR DEMONSTRATIONS.

10. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS, ENCOURAGED BY TEACHERS, HAVE KEPT A GOOD NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN SANTIAGO AND SOME OTHER CITIES IN A STATE OF TURMOIL FOR WEEKS OVER THE ISSUE OF DECENTRALIZATION (SANTIAGO 3610). MOREOVER, UNIVERSITY STUDENT LEADERS HAVE NOT GIVEN UP ON DEMONSTRATIONS. RATHER, THEY ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE NEED TO USE THEIR RESOURCES JUDICIOUSLY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE STUDENTS HAVE SCHEDULED A NATIONWIDE UNIVERSITY AND SCHOOL STRIKE FOR MONDAY JUNE 16, WHICH MAY BE EXTENDED MORE DAYS IF SUCCESSFUL. THE IDEA IS TO TEST THE WATERS FOR SUPPORT OF A MAJOR STRIKE ON JULY 2 AND 3 TO COINCIDE WITH THE PLANNED NATIONAL WORK STOPPAGE OF THE CIVIC ASSEMBLY. THE POINT IS THAT ALTHOUGH A MINORITY OF THE STUDENT BODY FAVORS STREET DEMONSTRATIONS AND STRIKES, A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER ARE ABLE TO CREATE TURBULENCE IN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM.

11. WE ARE SURPRISED BY THE DEGREE OF OPTIMISM ABOUT PROFESSIONAL CAREER OPPORTUNITIES, GIVEN THE CONTRARY FORECASTS STUDENTS HAVE OVER THE COUNTRY IN GENERAL AND THE DOOM-SAYING THAT PERVADES THE OPPOSITION, WITH WHOM MOST OF THE STUDENTS IDENTIFY. WE WOULD ADD THE CAUTIONARY NOTE THAT RECENT STUDENT ELECTIONS (SUBJECT OF SEPT) HAVE ON THE AVERAGE SHOWN INCREASING SUPPORT FOR THE EXTREME LEFT WING COALITION, THE DEMOCRATIC POPULAR MOVEMENT (MDP). THUS, WE CONCLUDE THAT WHILE PERSONALLY HOPEFUL AND DISINCLINED TO VIOLENCE, THEY ARE PESSIMISTIC

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PAGE 01
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ABOUT THE COUNTRY AND WILLING TO JOIN WITH THE
MDP OR ANYONE ELSE TO SEEK CHANGE. END COMMENT.
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