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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
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Withdrawer

DLB 2/18/2010

File Folder CO020 (150000-339999)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 45

SYSTEMATIC

241

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
85040	CABLE	LA PAZ 07125 R 5/3/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS	1	11/7/1983	B1
85041	MEMO	CONSTANTINE MENGES TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: BOLIVIA -- REQUEST FOR TEN-MINUTE MEETING WITH YOU NEXT WEEK R 5/8/2023 M353/1 #119808 RW, 5/18/2015	1	2/1/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1983

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FG006-07

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

FROM: CARLTON TURNER

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Congressional Delegation from
Bolivia (For your information)

Today I met with members of the Bolivian Congress: Dr. Lindo Fernandez, member Chamber of Deputies and former Vice Minister of Labor; Mr. Lino Perez, Member of the Chamber of Deputies and retired Commander and Colonel of the National Police; Mr. Victor Andrade, Senator, farmer, former Minister for Foreign Affairs, and former Ambassador to the United States; and Mr. Hector Ormachea, First Vice President of the Bolivian Senate and former manager of the National Bank of Bolivia. Earlier they met with Senators Hawkins (R-FL), DeConcini (R-AZ), and Cochran (R-MS), and Congressman Gilman (R-NY).

Senator Andrade, as spokesman, raised the following issues:

- Narcotics agreements we have with Bolivia. He would like to see the scope expanded and availability of resources increased.
- He expressed concern over the Hawkins Bill that would tie our foreign economic assistance to the recipient country's making a specific percentage reduction in illicit drug production. He believed that it would be very difficult to evaluate and would create many hard feelings. He indicated that Bolivia will pass needed new laws to support the agreements.
- He expressed his dismay over past Bolivian government involvement in narcotic trafficking, and the shame brought on his country.

Senator Ormachea presented the following points:

- Bolivia is concerned and aware of the scope of the drug problem and hopes others will appreciate the difficulty of their bringing it under government control.

- He is appreciative of help being given by the United States.
- As the First Vice President of the Senate, he presides over the Senate but this trip was important enough to leave that duty with the Second Vice President.
- He stressed that implementation of the agreements, signed by President Siles on August 11, 1983, must be expedited.

My comments to this delegation were that these agreements were very significant since we had desired such an agreement since 1976. I relayed that I understand that a letter is being prepared for President Reagan to send to President Siles encouraging expeditious implementation of the agreements.

I brought up the issue of 150 policemen being trained for narcotic control but not having adequate equipment. Failure by Bolivia to adequately arm their police will be interpreted negatively and would be detrimental to both the U.S. and Bolivia. Congressman Perez, former officer in the National Police, reminded me of the mistrust between the police and army; and that the army does not want to provide the police with equipment. I stated to him that we were not talking about armaments for war, but about sidearms and transportation. He agreed that the police needed communications equipment, laboratories, sidearms, transportation, general foot gear, helicopters, boats, trucks, etc.

We also discussed resources such as technical experts to help others better understand the complete range of drug abuse and enforcement problems. I told him we could arrange for technical assistance. He asked that we communicate our activities to reduce drug abuse to Bolivia via USIA. All the Bolivians agreed this would be helpful. I also agreed to provide some assistance in education/prevention efforts.

This was followed by a general discussion of areas of Presidential concern, high-level involvement in our drug abuse program by the Vice President, First Lady and key cabinet members. We closed by discussing the horrendous price we are paying because of past liberal attitudes on drug abuse; and that this Administration does not support decriminalization or legalization of any illicit drug. I mentioned the increased suicide rates, youth arrests, and homicides in this country, and that the Surgeon General had concluded that the lowering of the health conditions in the segment of our population ages 15-24 was caused by drugs and alcohol.

The Bolivians encouraged me to visit in the spring of 1984 to evaluate the implementation of our agreements.

cc: Jack Svahn
Roger Porter
Ken Cribb

WVS

C. F.

188840PD

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HE006-01

FG011

F0009

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1983

Dear Rayburn:

Per our conversation yesterday, attached is the cable I mentioned regarding President Siles.

More later. Regards.

Sincerely,

Carlton E. Turner, Ph.D.
Special Assistant to the President
for Drug Abuse Policy

Mr. Rayburn Hesse
International Narcotics Matters
Department of State
Room 7333
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20520

*Attached cable received from Cuban Ambassador in
Bolivia concerning proposed Presidential letter
to President Hernandez Siles of Bolivia regarding
agreements regarding anti-narcotics cooperation*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) 11/2/10

Confidential attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01
SIT577

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TOR: 311/1435Z

DISTRIBUTION: EOB TURN /001
WHSR COMMENT: DR. TURNER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LA PAZ 07125
WHITE HOUSE FOR DR. CARLTON TURNER
STATE FOR INM AND ARA
E.O. 12356: NA
TAGS: SNAR, BL
SUBJECT: PROPOSED LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO
PRESIDENT SILES ON NARCOTICS
REF: TURNER/CORR TELCON OF 11-4-83

1. DR. CARLTON TURNER SUGGESTED TO THE AMBASSADOR
(REF.) THAT THE EMBASSY RECOMMEND TO THE WHITE HOUSE
THE TEXT OF A LETTER WHICH WOULD BE SENT FROM PRESIDENT
REAGAN TO BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT SILES -- IT WOULD EXPRESS
SATISFACTION AT THE SIGNING OF RECENT BILATERAL ANTI-
NARCOTICS AGREEMENTS AND THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD BE
IMPLEMENTED EXPEDITIOUSLY. WE THINK THAT IS AN
EXCELLENT IDEA; PROPOSED TEXT FOLLOWS.

2. DEAR PRESIDENT SILES:
-- I HAVE LEARNED WITH GREAT SATISFACTION OF THE
SIGNING LAST AUGUST OF SEVERAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN OUR
GOVERNMENTS IN THE FIELD OF ANTI-NARCOTICS COOPERATION,
A MATTER OF GREAT CONCERN TO ME AND TO THE PEOPLE OF
THIS COUNTRY. I WISH TO CONGRATULATE YOU FOR HAVING
TAKEN THE FIRST IMPORTANT STEPS WITH US TO PROTECT
BOTH OF OUR PEOPLES FROM THE SCOURGE OF COCAINE.
-- WE NOW ENTER INTO THE MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS
OF SEEING FULFILLED THE PLANS AND COMMITMENTS MADE IN
THOSE AGREEMENTS. WITH HARD WORK, CONTINUING MUTUAL
GOODWILL AND A SENSE OF URGENCY, WHICH THE DANGER OF
COCAINE TRAFFICKING PRESENTS TO THE HEALTH OF OUR
PEOPLES AND TO THE INTEGRITY OF OUR GOVERNMENTS,
I AM CONFIDENT THAT WE WILL PREVAIL.
-- IN THIS MUTUAL TASK I AM ENCOURAGED BY THE
SUPPORT FOR ANTI-NARCOTICS MEASURES WHICH YOU HAVE
EXPRESSED TO MEMBERS OF MY ADMINISTRATION DURING THE
PAST YEAR. I COUNT ON YOUR OWN CONTINUED INTEREST
FOR OUR MUTUAL SUCCESS, JUST AS I PLEDGE MY OWN.
WITH WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS AND WISHES OF SUCCESS
FOR YOUR DEMOCRATIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
END TEXT. CORR
BT


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Authority NSC/State Wawers
DATE 5/2/2019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 22, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE III

THROUGH: JACK SVAHN
FROM:  CARLTON TURNER
SUBJECT: Equipment for Bolivian Police

Attached is a letter I received from Ambassador Ed Corr in Bolivia. His letter is self explanatory. We must overcome this obstacle before we can expect much from Bolivia and I will be working with Ed on this.

Any suggestions you might have would be appreciated.

cc: Roger Porter



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

La Paz, Bolivia

30 NOV 1983

November 10, 1983

The Honorable
Carlton E. Turner
Special Assistant to the President
for Drug Abuse Policy
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Carlton,

Last week when we spoke on the telephone you requested that I inform you of any issues that are impeding greater progress on narcotics control, and I immediately suggested the U.S. legislative restriction on providing arms and ammunition to foreign police forces. This is a limitation that grew out of our concern for human rights and false allegations that the Agency for International Development's (AID) Public Safety Program (a program aimed at creating modern police forces in developing countries) had contributed to human rights violations.

Section 482 (b) of chapter 8 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1983, which authorizes funds for international narcotics control, provides that "funds authorized to be appropriated by this section shall not be made available for the procurement of weapons or ammunition under this chapter." This prohibition apparently derives from an earlier general prohibition on assistance to police (U.S. Code 22 Section 2420, 1976 edition), which I recall was repealed in order to permit only narcotics-related assistance to foreign police forces.

Currently, this restriction is impeding our efforts to enable the Bolivian Police to take the offensive against well-armed traffickers in Bolivia. During the 1952 Bolivian Revolution the Police joined on the side of the people against the military. The Armed Forces regained power in 1964 and aside from a brief period, they ruled Bolivia until last year. Their resentment against the Police has been so great that they kept the Police on a starvation budget and have allowed only about ten percent of the Police to possess arms.

At this point, with the Bolivian Government committed to sending a sizeable police para-military force into major coca production areas, where trafficking flourishes and where armed traffickers number in the hundreds, the need for adequate weapons is paramount. In effect, weapons are the cutting edge of both the effort to break up the trafficking and of later, equally important efforts to reduce coca production by eradication, crop substitution, propaganda, etc. None of these efforts can get underway without public order and there can be none without prior police enforcement. One of our major efforts now is to get the Armed Forces to transfer adequate arms to the Police for use in cocaine control. I believe we will ultimately have success, but after an uphill battle and not within the desired time frame.

The question of law and order as a prerequisite for successful economic and social development has been treated amply in the literature. Our support for human rights, and I believe I personally am one of our country's strongest advocates for human rights, has, however, caused us to draw back from aid to police forces. I think this is a mistake that needs to be re-dressed and would add greatly to our ability to help governments implement more effective narcotics control programs throughout the world.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Ed

Edwin G. Corr
Ambassador

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F0003.02

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 20, 1985

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Thank you for your letter of January 7 regarding the difficult problems presently facing Bolivia. I share your concern about Bolivia's alarming economic decline and the potential threat this represents to its fragile democracy. Your renewed efforts to mobilize international support for Bolivia, especially in the critical period until the June Presidential elections, are much appreciated.

As you know, the United States Government has strongly supported Bolivian democracy since the restoration of civilian government more than two years ago. Fostering democracy throughout the hemisphere continues to be a principal objective of my administration.

Consistent with this policy, we have actively supported the Siles Government both politically and economically over the past two years. We have repeatedly expressed, publicly and privately, our strong support for continued constitutional rule and our objections to any attempt by political or military elements to disrupt democratic processes. We will continue to do so.

Over \$200 million in United States aid has been provided to Bolivia since October 1982. We remain prepared, within our budgetary limitations, to consider additional resources. However, our ability to release further aid is influenced by the willingness of the Bolivian government to help itself. We are currently examining the economic measures announced by the Siles government on February 9 and will be factoring them into considerations of future assistance.

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Because of the importance we attach to the survival of constitutional order in Bolivia, the U.S. Government is reviewing the possibility of additional resources and will do its share to help ensure free and honest elections.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

His Excellency
Dr. Javier Perez de Cuellar
Secretary General of the United Nations
New York

~~SECRET~~

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2

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C. F.

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

February 1, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: CONSTANTINE C. MENGES *cc m/jh*

SUBJECT: Bolivia--Request for Ten-Minute Meeting
With You Next Week

Two Bolivians (Justo Chamas and Dr. Guido Salinas), who are former senior government officials and who met with you at State, request ten minutes with you next week. They allege, through their US attorney, that the communists are moving to take power before the scheduled June 1985 elections and that the military has decided to stage a coup in February 1985.

I have asked DOD, CIA, and State to review information we have on trends there. The current consensus view is that the communist danger is great but that with General Lopez Leyton as the new Chief of Staff since late March 1984, there is a good chance that the elections will occur in June.

RECOMMENDATION:

Because of the Bolivian strategic situation and our information on extensive communist activities, I think it would be useful to have you meet these two individuals next week.

Approve _____

Disapprove *ccm*

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED

Authority *M353/1 #17808 RW, 5/18/2015*
BY *dh* NARA DATE *5/8/2023*

NSC #8500856

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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Paul Thompson	<u>3</u>	<u>T</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4/7</u>	<u>W</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt - <u>WLP</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>P</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>8</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 01 FEB 85 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM MENGES

DOC DATE 01 FEB 85

KEYWORDS: BOLIVIA

AM

CHAMAS, JUSTO

SALINAS, GUIDO

SUBJECT: BOLIVIA REQUEST FOR 10 MINUTE MTG WITH MCFARLANE

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

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FOR ACTION

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FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WVS

February 25, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN A. SVAHN

FROM: CARLTON E. TURNER

SUBJECT: Bolivia

Attached, for your information, is a letter I received from Nils Noya, a long time friend and associate. Nils has consistently provided accurate information on the situation in Bolivia.

He plans to attend the PRIDE Conference in Atlanta and will speak to the First Lady of Bolivia during the second part of Mrs. Reagan's First Lady to First Lady conference.

15 FEB 1985
2180

Santa Cruz, February 7, 1985

Mr. Carlton E. Turner, Ph. D.
Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500
U. S. A.

Dear Carlton:

The Republican succes during the last elections was very gratifying for me. I am firmly convinced that this new four-year period will bring a new perspective for world politics.

The last events derived from the economic, social, political and moral crisis in my country have clearly demonstrated the involvement of the highest authorities of this government with international narcotraffic and can give you a frame for reference about the actual situation reigning in Bolivia.

In addition, we have to take into account that currently the "Bolivian-style" democracy has been confounded and turned around making the governing syndicates (unions) anarchical and chaotic.

It is very possible that Bolivia, in a short time, turns into another Nicaragua or El Salvador, where fighting between brothers will put an end to the hope of these countries, their human capital.

The Bolivian government is apparently realizing some efforts to control drug elaboration and traffic, all this to gain the favor of Reagan's Republican Government. But nobody ignores that from the highest to the lowest levels, government employees are involved in cocaine traffic at levels a hundred times greater that at those carried out by the "de facto" governments.

This situation causes at the moment a real chaos in the production of raw materials for survival, chaos brought about by the continuous strikes that paralyze the country and cause millonaire losses that we are unable to support.

Due to all this, and the decrease in employment and low incomes, a sub-culture has appeared that forces a lot of people to turn to cocaine and coca paste production in unforeseen proportions as a means of survival.

Many farmers and other people with no education are dedicated exclusively to the production of coca paste. Many citizens as well are involved in elaboration, commercialization and consumption of this drug. This octopus has even reached professional circles, buying lawyers, physicians, policemen and armed forces, leaving Bolivia without any hope for the future.

///

Even though we are a country rich in natural resources, we lack a real policy that will be carried out with pride, honesty, dignity and decency to overcome this crisis and to plan for a better future.

Statistics demonstrate that drug-producing countries present a great amount of drug addicts, which in proportion surpass those of large cities of the States and we, unfortunately, do not have resources to treat or rehabilitate them.

Therefore, C. T., I think that the policy against drugs and mainly cocaine production must be dealt with from a global point of view in order to obtain really positive results in the producing as well as in the consuming countries.

I am perfectly aware that we are dealing with powerful maffias, but with adequate policies we can find solutions.

This, therefore, is a cry for help from a country that in the short term will be involved in a civil war or will suffer starvation of the magnitude of Biafra or Bangladesh, and the love and dedication I feel for my country makes me write you about how to improve current conditions in Bolivia.


Bolivia needs concrete and direct cooperation, a cooperation that will seek economic independency for the Bolivians, but an independency brought about by the Bolivians themselves. Up to now we have survived on the basis of loans and donations which instead of solving the problems burden the individuals and the country itself with a permanent dependency, mainly mental.

Until now, the fight against narcotraffic has made rich only a few without causing any problems to the criminal organizations, which protected by their political positions, traffic openly and without any hindrance. The number of drug addicts in our cities, addicts mainly to coca paste, increases in unseen proportions. There are no treatment or rehabilitation centers because the economic conditions do not cover any possibility of constructing or implementing specialized hospitals, nor are there any resources for professionals who want to devote themselves to the difficult task of recovery and rehabilitation of these people as productive citizens once more. As you can see, the problem is huge and with little hope of being solved. In this, we need a hand.

I would like to have you in this city so that you can see the problems and advantages that we have here and you are cordially invited to come and visit us.

I do not know if I have given you a comprehensive view of the situation, I hope I have, and if you need any further information, please contact me.

My family and I wish that this new year brings the best for you and your family, and hoping to hear from you soon, I remain,

Yours truly,

Luis D. Noya

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BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT VIEWS PRESENTED TO THE

WESTERN HEMISPHERE CONFERENCE

ON

NARCOTICS CONTROL

BOLIVIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEBRUARY 1, 1985

In acknowledgement to the kind invitation from Senator Paula Hawkins that a representative from the Government of Bolivia attend this Western Hemisphere Conference on Narcotics Control, we wish to convey to all those present some of the views of my government, but we want first, in behalf of President Hernán Siles Zuazo, to congratulate Senator Hawkins for her excellent initiative, which will allow us to exchange recommendations and experiences to jointly combat better this scourge that castigates us all.

The Bolivian Democratic Government has made resolute efforts in its fight against drug trafficking, as the recent official report of the O.A.S. which is enclosed, acknowledges in spite of the gravest economic crisis that has beset the country as a legacy of the past dictatorial regimes and as a result also of the natural disasters caused by the El Niño current. This fight has been carried out on unequal terms due to the almost complete lack of resources and also because the government, faithful to its democratic essence and its constitutional origin, has acted always obeying the letter of the law and respecting the civil rights of the citizens. Such behavior has abusively been taken advantage of even by the groups connected with drug trafficking.

Narcotics traffickers are very adept of forming alliances with the anti-democratic opposition. Nevertheless, the Government of Bolivia has decided that its number one priority will be the elimination of the narcotics mafia from our country and the liquidation of the cocaine industry. There are strong ethical and political reasons for

undertaking a frontal battle against narcotics traffickers. The use of cocaine has brought about serious psychological, moral and social deterioration. Significant political problems have arisen because the drug manufacturers and traffickers constitute a state within a state, and consequently, they do not respect the law. In addition, they are in connivance with opposition sectors who have historically violated human rights and shown total disregard for rational and efficient government within the rule of law.

In addition to the more well known names that are mentioned by the press and television of the United States and Bolivia, it is estimated that there are in the country around one hundred drug traffickers -among small, medium and large- middle men who gather the product in the country and "exporters" who sell it to the Colombians "importers", who in turn are also middlemen between the refiners and final exporters.

This attempt to halt drug trafficking is even more difficult given our serious economic problems which can be summarized as follows: The average life expectancy in Bolivia is the continent's lowest at 47 years; 80% of the population earn less than the minimum wage of \$30 a month, and one half of the children under the age of 6 are undernourished. A few days ago the President of the World Bank, Mr. Clausen, stated that in some countries of the Hemisphere, like Bolivia and Haiti, the extension of poverty is the same as the southern part of the Sahara in Africa. We are confronting now an inflation of 3,000 per cent a year, possibly the worst in the world and the production cost of

Bolivia's main legal export, tin, is currently greater than the world market price. That is why we cannot attend, at present, our external debt of \$3,849 million contracted during the former military governments.

I

From time immemorial the cultivation of the coca leaf in Bolivia is a legal activity, although, naturally, the transformation of the leaf into cocaine is an offense punished by law. But so long as this distinction is maintained, difficulties are posed on the ways and means to control, reduce or eradicate the crops, since farmers, in good or bad faith, will always sustain that in producing the coca leaf they are not violating the law.

Until this mid century the country produced around 700 tons annually for traditional uses. The Explosion in the coca growing occurred during General Banzer's government, when in 1977 it had already reached 25.000 tons. It is estimated that the production has increased almost four times up to the present. The matter is even more serious since due to the high prices offered by the drug traffickers, the traditional consumption destined to chewing, which was estimated in 8,000 annually, would have gone down to a figure not greater than 500 tons.

From the standpoint of the farmer, it is unquestionable that there is no other crop that nearly approaches the prices obtained with the

coca leaf, which unlike other plants requires no special care. In the Chapare region, four crops are gathered annually with an average output of 651 kilos per crop and 2,605 kilos per year, whereas in the La Paz, Yungas area, three crops are taken, with an average output of 236 kilos per crop and 710 per year.

II

In order to evaluate the enormous size of the task of controlling drug trafficking, it would be worth pointing out that the eastern provinces of the country have territorial areas which are equivalent to various European countries or American states: Santa Cruz has an area of 142,800 sq. miles (about the size of Montana), Beni has 82,200 sq. miles (about the size of Idaho) and Pando has 24,300 sq. miles (about the size of West Virginia). That immense region is practically unpopulated since, on the average, there is under one inhabitant per sq. km. or under 2.6 inhabitants per sq. mi. It is crossed by large rivers but there are few roads and 90 percent of transport is done through aircraft belonging to LAB (the Bolivian airline), the Air Force or private concerns. The tree vegetation in large extensions is exuberant and tall, and is known as "gallery forest" since actually long tree galleries grow along the rivers, forming ideal spots to carry any type of activity which can not be detected from above.

III

Whereas drug trafficking corrupts the institutions' top levels, it

is easy to imagine the havoc caused among the judicial circles (a matter which has been denounced to the Congress by the President himself, Dr. Siles Zuazo), lesser hierarchy officers, soldiers and police agents; even much more if one considers the inflationary process which has sent salaries plummeting down to average levels of \$20 to \$30 per month for employees of the public administration.

The Bolivian public opinion was not spared a surprise by the fact that well known figures connected with drug trafficking, and in some cases caught "red handed" in the United States, have been released by the American authorities and returned safely to our country. Among them, we may mention Roberto Suárez Levy, son of Roberto Suárez Gómez and Alfredo Gutiérrez, who appeared on the list of the DEA, aired in Mike Wallace's "60 Minutes" program, in 1981.

IV

The progression price-wise is as follows: one kilo of coca paste was worth in mid-1984 around \$300 in Bolivia. After processing in Colombian laboratories, where cocaine base is dissolved in ether and added hydrochlorine acid, it reaches \$20,000 per kilogram, which in New York, according to the media, is traded for the staggering amount of \$500,000.

A report on drug trafficking prepared by the U.N.O. indicates that cocaine alone introduced in the United States from Colombia, represents a value which fluctuates between \$500 and \$4,000 million

annually. It is estimated that today there is not in the world another product or activity which derives a profit so disproportionate as that of drug trafficking, in which one invested dollar at the beginning of the growing state is multiplied by a factor of 500 to 1,000 when it reaches the consumer market.

In addition to the immense disbursement in acquiring the drug, it is estimated that the consumption habit gives rise in the United States to about 26 billion dollars annually in loss of productivity of the drug addicts, medical expenses and funds for the fight against drug trafficking. It has not been figured out, since it involves imponderables, the value of the damage caused by drug addiction in terms of traffic accidents, crime and marriage failures.

V

As a result of the assassination of the Minister of Justice of Colombia, Mr. Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, in April 1984, the drug trafficking mafia of that country was somehow disarticulated when various of its chieftains had to run for cover to Panama. Nevertheless, as revealed by the press, a good part of the Bolivian production is now going to Brazil, through a border extending 1,946 miles, the longest that Bolivia has, practically without surveillance; and Argentina. One of the chieftains of the Italian mafia, Tomasso Buscetta, who was captured in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and transferred to Rome, has revealed that he directed a complex smuggling operation of cocaine from Peru

and Bolivia to Europe and the United States.

The police from Braxil have stated that Buscetta is only one among the several family bosses of the mafia that operates in that country and that this is one skirmish won, but in order to fight the real war against this crime, the law forces need money to buy informers, to carry out the meticulous investigation of commercial transactions, bank accounts, etc. and require also airplanes, communication equipment, etc. The conclusion arrived at by the Brazilian police is the following: "The United States and Europe who received the cocaine, would find here an investment of high cost but effective. If they do not make that investment, the mafia will win".

VI

Eradication of coca is difficult, as coca-specific herbicides have not yet been developed. Enforced eradication and crop substitution by detectives and police-strike squads have generally met with widespread resistance by peasant coca growers, whose livelihood is threatened. The coca leaf, grown for thousands of years in the Andes, has nutritional, medicinal, and ritual significance and is an integral part of the daily life of most Bolivian peasants.

The inadequacies of the coca substitution as the only approach to the problem can be quickly demonstrated by a brief examination of Bolivia's truly desperate economic situation.

The ineffectiveness of the current coca policy lies largely on the lack of viable substitute crops which are as lucrative as coca,

as well as the scarcity of the funds allocated to promote the social and economic development of the population concerned. As the economic crisis becomes worse, compounded by last year's floods and droughts, increasing numbers of Bolivian peasants (around 30,000 families) have turned to coca as the most attractive source of income. The substitution approach has been unable to provide as yet the sufficient economic incentives to peasant coca growers to substitute other crops for coca. Coca outcompetes crops such as rice, bananas and citrus because it is less disease-prone, yields a harvest 3-4 times annually, and is more resistant to climatic variations. It is one of a few crops that was not affected by last year's droughts and floods, which destroyed one third of Bolivia's agricultural output. Cultivation of coca has the advantage that it requires no mechanization or other large investments. It is also labor intensive, creating employment opportunities for a migrant population. Substitute crops may need expensive imported mechanized farm tools or chemical fertilizers.

In the face of grim economic forecasts, today's alternative to coca leaf growing and cocaine production for many poor Bolivians is very simple -- starvation. In short, it looks that many people will continue to engage in this illegal business so long as the benefits outweigh the risks. The United States committed around \$5 million in the last two years in Bolivia to combat the powerful cocaine traffickers, in a project which relied heavily on police enforcement and paramilitary might. Unfortunately, due to the economical and social

situation that we have outlined, it has not been possible yet, to carry on the four agreements signed with the United States on coca eradication.

We think that any intent of seeking ways to link economic aid to Bolivia's progress in combatting the drug problem will be sterile and self-defeating. The proposed legislation to condition U.S. bilateral aid to Bolivia on a 15 per cent annual reduction in coca production, unfortunately neglects the extreme demands currently on Bolivia's economy, the role of coca in the Bolivian society, the violence and power of the international narcotics mafia and the natural reluctance of a democratic government to resort to coercion to force recalcitrant peasants to change to less productive crops. Furthermore, economic sanctions on countries whose economies have become tied to the black-market dollar may merely exacerbate their dependence on the drug business.

As an alternative policy, it would do better to work with Bolivian peasant farmers and organizations to develop an aggressive and realistic incentive program that would take into account the historical and contemporary role of the coca leaf in the Bolivian society, but also deal with the large international drug traffickers. The call is for a U.S. policy that is comprehensive and not targeted at further victimization of one social class, poor Bolivian peasants who grow the coca leaf,

VII

The Government of Bolivia occupied militarily the vast Chapare area, expelling the narcotraffickers, but the subsequent provision of prohibiting the sale of coca leaf provoked, as a reaction, a hunger strike of more than five thousand peasants who marched into Cochabamba. The reduction of the coca crops must go simultaneously with immediate economic and social development, and that is the reason for the agreements, signed with the United States in August 1983, not having been yet implemented.

The Government does not have available small airplanes, boats, nor helicopters and not even small modern arms as the ones the drug traffickers possess. During the last operation carried out in November 1984, to capture Roberto Suárez Gómez, the narcotrafficker's "King", for which the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration provided the resources to the Ministry of Interior to cover fuel and other expenses, this fact was dramatically verified, since even for lack of fuel the occupation of farms, which was contemplated under the original plan had to be postponed. The National Committee on the Fight Against Drug Trafficking does not have its own premises, nor prison facilities for male and female detainees, computer facilities which will permit to carry out an inventory of the coca leaf production and the licenses granted for the legitimate purchase of coca, nor vehicles for staging the operations. The salaries earned by their officers, similar to those paid by other state institutions, constitute, under the economic crisis the country is going

through, an excuse to accept bribes. The same thing happens with the judiciary and the customs service.

The present agreements with the United States imply a contribution on the part of this country of around 57 million dollars within a period of five years.

There is another agreement signed in November 1984, with United Nations UNFDAC for \$20 million for coca substitution in the Yungas area of La Paz.

Since the signing of the Agreements, for various reasons, a minimal part of that sum has been spent on training, uniforms and food for the UMOPAR group (an specialized police squad) and fuel expenses in several operations.

"Vision" magazine (8/10/84), in a special report on drug trafficking entitled "Crime against Humanity", prints the opinion of its correspondent at La Paz on the United States contribution: "Many believe here that such an amount is ridiculous if compared to the magnitude of the problem and with the fact, undoubtedly, that the United States being the principal consumer of cocaine in the world, it should bear the greater part of this burden".

VIII

Bolivia has been proposing in the U.N.O., O.A.S., as well as through the chanceries of the neighboring countries, the urgent need for adopting a common policy in the fight against drug trafficking and

is confident that agreements will be reached shortly with the governments of Peru, Argentina, Brazil and particularly Colombia to achieve that goal.

Rightly so states Colombia's President, Belisario Betancur: "To confront the drug's multinational organization, it will be necessary to set up also a multinational against the drug".

Through an initiative presented by Bolivia, the XIV O.A.S. Assembly held in Brasilia in November 1984, it was agreed to convene a regional conference on the problem, which should meet during the first quarter of this year.

It is clear that neither Bolivia nor any other producer country, in particular, can face this scourge alone, both for lack of resources and the undeniable fact that it is the demand generated in the consumer countries that is at the root of the problem and is, therefore, a shared responsibility.

Bolivia's plight is the same as that of Colombia (or other producing countries) as recently stated in an editorial of "The Washington Post": "Unfortunately, the drug trade gets worse. The demand is great, the supply easy to replace. We Americans know this, but often we do not accept all the implications of it. For the demand is primarily an American demand. Without it, countries, such as Colombia, which are struggling to hold on but do not have the substantial resources and the strong social institutions of the United States, would not be undergoing this trauma. For the Colombians are making a mighty effort, one extending far beyond

the American preoccupation with law enforcement (necessary as that is) and one costing them far more in basic social stability than the American drug problem (terrible as that is) costs the United States. Americans are attentive to Colombia's role in contributing to the supply of drugs. Colombians could be forgiven for wondering if Americans are half as attentive to their role in creating the demand".

Further, given the size of this scourge in Bolivia and the number of people involved in the growing, transportation and commercialization of the coca leaf, the problem cannot be confronted from a simplistic standpoint of repression, since it has become already a social problem of great magnitude. With that perspective, the amounts allotted by the U.S. Government, under the terms of the agreements to repress drug trafficking and reduce the coca leaf growing areas, are clearly insufficient and a much greater effort from that country, and from the other consumer countries, will be necessary if they really want to reduce the impact of this scourge on their own societies and to collaborate towards the economic and social progress of the countries in which the raw material of the drug is produced.

REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE DESIGNATED BY THE
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA,
TO LOOK INTO ACTION TAKEN IN THAT COUNTRY TO DEAL WITH THE
PROBLEM OF THE TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS

Through note OEA/SG/539/84 dated October 22, 1984, the Government of Bolivia asked the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to send a high-level Committee to look into action taken by that Government to control and curb the preparation of and the traffic in cocaine.

The Secretary General received the request from the Government of Bolivia, and decided to send the Committee as he had been requested to do.

Through its resolution CP/RES. 414 (588/84) of October 24, 1984, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States decided "To support the request of the Government of Bolivia and endorse the decision taken by the Secretary General to send the high-level Committee requested."

In his note of October 31, 1984, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States informed the Government of Bolivia that he had taken the initial steps necessary to provide the cooperation requested, and that he had established the following terms of reference for the work of the Committee:

- a. To look into action taken by the Government of Bolivia, on the site, for the control and repression of the preparation of and the traffic in cocaine, including a study of the efforts made by the national authorities in this area.

- b. To look into the group of economic, social and repressive mechanisms and measures essential for eradicating the preparation of and the traffic in cocaine in Bolivia, as part of an international effort to attain that goal.
- c. To make recommendations to the Government of Bolivia in order for it to implement a comprehensive program for the control and repression of the preparation of and the traffic in cocaine as part of an international plan and for it to prevent corruption in agencies involved in that effort.

The Committee was composed of the following members designated by the Secretary General: Dr. Antonio Rosario of the Dominican Republic, who served as Chairman of the Committee; Dr. Juan Manuel Castulovich of Panama, and Mr. Samuel Eaton of the United States. Serving as advisors from the General Secretariat were Messrs. Irving G. Tragen, Executive Advisor of the Executive Secretariat for Economic and Social Affairs, and Alberto O. Tolosa, Senior Legal Officer of the Secretariat for Legal Affairs. In Bolivia, the Director of the Office of the General Secretariat, Dr. Samuel Echalar, provided valuable advisory services, given his knowledge of the society and his contacts, which made it easier for the group to carry out its assignments. Mr. Echalar also provided administrative support for the Committee.

The Committee wishes to express its deep appreciation to the authorities of Bolivia for their unstinting support to its efforts, and for paving the way for the interviews it held with various officials and company and union leaders who wished to meet with it or with whom the Committee wished to learn about the many approaches to the problem of the ever-increasing cultivation of coca leaf and the production of and traffic in cocaine, some of which coincided with and others of which did not coincide with those of the authorities themselves.

After travelling to various places in Bolivia and holding numerous interviews as reported in the appendix, the Committee was able to reach its own opinions and make its own assessments, which are set forth in this report.

A. COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEM OF THE TRAFFIC IN
NARCOTIC DRUGS IN BOLIVIA

A.1. The coca leaf: traditional cultivation and
surplus production

The Committee must point out that a basic factor that must be taken into account when considering any type of action to deal with the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs is the traditional cultivation and use of the coca leaf in the rural population. The chewing (acullico) of that leaf in its natural form, among the indigenous populations of the area, dates back to centuries ago, to pre-Colombian culture. The Bolivian society at large and the Government itself have told the Committee, through their representatives, of the respect that exists in Bolivia for this tradition.

Because of that factor, the cultivation and sale of the coca leaf have always been legal. However, at present, traditional consumption is tending to decline, largely because the young people do not always follow the tradition of chewing the leaf. Nevertheless, because of one factor external to the traditional culture, namely the traffic in narcotic drugs, the widespread cultivation of the leaf has increased much beyond the traditional needs. It is calculated that requirements for traditional consumption is below 20,000 tons; present cultivation, however, exceeds 100,000 tons; in other words, more than 80,000 tons of surplus are available each year, thus providing the raw material for the illegal traffic in narcotic drugs.

No studies have been done on the relationship of interdependence between the legal and illegal economies, and it would perhaps be difficult to conduct such a study given the clandestine nature of the business of the traffic in narcotic drugs. However, this aspect of the problem, the importance of which should not go unheeded, was brought to the attention of the Committee in several interviews.

On one partial aspect of the problem, there is concern about the relationship between substances, the trading of which is legal, such as kerosene, ether, acetone, etc., which are used for the production of cocaine (also called "precursors") and the business of the traffic in narcotic drugs. This is an area where no domestic regulations exist and which also would require international cooperation on the part of the governments of the states from which those substances come when they are imported legally or smuggled.

A.3. The legal framework

Added to the aforementioned factors discussed, in the complexity of the problem under consideration is another factor, the legal aspects involved. There is no unified legislation, or organized system to deal with the problem from a legal standpoint. It has been explained to the Committee that there are a number of rules emanating from supreme decrees and other legal instruments. The diversity of these rules makes it difficult for the executive branch of the State to apprehend and punish offenders involved in the traffic in narcotic drugs.

Moreover, up to the time that the Committee left Bolivia on November 30, 1984, neither the Executive Branch nor the Legislative Branch has been able to establish a single legal instrument, which is the wish that had been expressed by both, although there are bills emanating from both Branches that are subject to study. The confusion in the area of rules therefore contributes to the support for the illegal activities.

A.4 The corrupting effect

During the last two decades, the traffic in narcotic drugs has been consolidating its economic power through bribery and other forms of corruption. These are directed not only towards the high levels of government but also to public officials, who, from positions more directly responsible for controlling and repressing illegal activities, by accepting financial rewards, have weakened and largely rendered the governmental infrastructure ineffective in the control of this matter. The fact that the relatively low pay of public servants has contributed to this situation has not been discounted. By way of example, the Committee has been informed that the present salary of a judge is the equivalent of \$30,00 a month and that that of agents having direct responsibility in the fields is the equivalent of \$20.00 a month. In referring to this aspect of the control of the traffic in narcotic drugs, the Committee wishes to note that it was able to ascertain the deep concern that the corrupting effect has on officials and social leaders who are opposed to these practices and who represent the feeling of the huge majority of the population that have described that fight as the fight for national dignity against a moral cancer that corrodes the society and demoralizes the country in the international sphere. The Committee, in all humility and out of a deep feeling of respect for the history of the Bolivian people, shares the hope expressed by its healthiest elements that that crisis will be surmounted.

B. ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF BOLIVIA
TO COMBAT THE TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS

Action taken by the Government of Bolivia to combat the traffic in narcotic drugs has been directed at the international level and also within the country itself. In this latter field, in the exercise of the sovereignty of the Bolivian State within the national territory, that action has focused on two levels: the repressive action of the State against an illegal activity and action taken to promote crops and economic activities to replace illegal ones or related activities.

The Committee wishes to note the fact that since August 1984 the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs has intensified, and that in previous periods, some action to repress that illegal activity has been taken. However, neither the recent actions nor the previous action has been sufficient to achieve the desired effect.

B.1. The international aspect

The Committee has been told that a basic principle of the battle waged by Bolivia against the traffic in narcotic drugs is that such a campaign can only be successful if undertaken within the framework of effective international cooperation that is suited to the magnitude of the problem at hand. The international nature of the criminal business of traffic in narcotic drugs, the huge amount of money available in both production and distribution and consumption areas, the weakness of a state that has been affected by a deep economic crisis, and the need to coordinate intergovernmental efforts and the efforts of international organizations to deal jointly with a many-sided evil is such that the international aspect of that battle is essential.

The Committee points out that the Government of Bolivia has taken steps and has expressed its concern in various forums and has requested specific actions from international organizations, particularly the United Nations and the Organization of American States, in order to establish a base of international cooperation to its internal efforts. Moreover, in its bilateral relations with the United States, the governments of the two countries, in August 1983, signed four agreements on projects related to the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs. In addition, the Government of Bolivia has signed an agreement with the United Nations Fund for Control of Drug Abuse, in November 1984, aimed at replacement of crops in the Yungas the La Paz region and the economic and social promotion of that zone, in an amount of US\$20,000,000, and through an agreement with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), it has undertaken a development project in the El Chapare zone in an amount of US\$58,000,000.

Likewise, it should be pointed out that on August 11, 1984, the Presidents of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela signed in Quito, Ecuador, along with the Representative of the President of Peru, the President-elect of Panama, the Coordinator of the Junta of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua, and the Vice President of Panama, the "Declaration of Quito against the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs", in which that activity is forcefully condemned as a "crime against mankind", and the international organizations are urged to aid the governments in eradicating that evil.

It should also be pointed out that within the Organization of American States the Delegation of Bolivia has carried on much activity to promote interest by its organs and agencies and has sponsored or cosponsored resolutions aimed at activating the mechanisms of the Organization to connect it with the solution of the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs.

The Committee points out the importance of international cooperation to eradicate the traffic in narcotic drugs, taking into account the fact that in the production of cocaine, the coca leaf grown in Bolivia is the origin of perhaps the largest percentage of all the world production of that drug. At the same time, the Commission emphasizes the need for effective coordination among international organizations to avoid a duplication of expenditures and, above all, to make the battle against this international scourge more effective.

B.2 The internal aspect

While international cooperation is essential in the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs, it cannot take the place of national efforts, both in the producing and in the consuming countries. From the angle of the action of the Bolivian authorities, it may be said that a start has been made in actions to combat the traffic in narcotic drugs, which for various reasons, have not yet reached the magnitude and effectiveness required in order to eliminate or substantially reduce the narcotic drug traffickers' activities within the national territory.

It is important to point out that no plan has yet been put into execution that would lead to a reduction of the surplus production of coca leaf.

B.3. Establishment of the National Committee to Combat the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs

In March 1983 the Bolivian Government established the Comité Nacional de Lucha contra el Narcotráfico (National Committee to Combat the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs), appointed by the President of the country and having as members representative of the following Ministries: of Foreign Affairs and Worship; Interior, Migration, and Justice; Planning and Coordination; National Defense; Rural and Agricultural Matters; and Social Welfare and Public Health.

That Committee has very broad powers for projecting, planning, and directing the policy of the State both in the aspects of suppression of the traffic in narcotic drugs and in matters regarding the cultivation of coca. However, because of various reasons connected with the internal evolution of the institutional life of the Bolivian Government, on which this Committee does not have competence to express an opinion, the Bolivian Committee did not begin resolute actions against the traffic in narcotic drugs until the second half of 1984. This Committee had the opportunity to visit the headquarters of the Bolivian Committee and to hear details from its Chairman and officials regarding the actions undertaken against drug offenders and see seized cocaine and cells holding some offenders. In its trips through the interior of Bolivian territory, this Committee also visited installations that are usually reached by aircraft, and in sometimes by very small aircraft, where, under the shelter of the long distances and the difficulties of access to the places by land transportation, some narcotic traffickers had, before their occupation by the national authorities, dens and laboratories for processing the coca leaves.

From the aircraft supplied by the authorities, in making a broad sweep over the territory of El Beni --a scarcely populated zone richly endowed for cattle raising, which is its main legal economic activity-- this Committee could see innumerable strips of land prepared as aircraft landing strips (it was informed that there are more than one thousand of these), which are an eloquent indication of the difficulties in pursuing the illegal business. It was also explained to this Committee that from those landing strips aircraft can go back and forth to processing centers abroad.

The work of the authorities in charge of combatting the traffic in narcotic drugs consists in detecting, either by information received or by indications visible from the air, where a criminal activity exists, and to land without forewarning in order to arrest the offenders, if possible, and to seize the elements of evidence of the crime, if the information and indications were true.

The Bolivian Committee gave this Committee a general plan of activities for the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs, dated November 29, 1984, when this Committee was still in Bolivia. That general plan is appended to the Committee's report.

B.4. Military Occupation of the El Chapare Region

One of the means that the authorities used to try to control and, eventually, eliminate the illegal activity of the traffic in narcotic drugs was the military occupation, in August 1984, of the region of El Chapare, a zone that in the last few years has become the big producer of coca leaves and that, because of the lack of authorities, was a sanctuary for the traffickers in narcotic drugs and a point of arrival of thousands of farm and city workers seeking a lucrative job in a national situation of unemployment.

The Executive Branch, by Supreme Decree of July 31, 1984, declared El Chapare a Military Zone and ordered its occupation by the National Army. Two weeks later, while trying to avoid confrontations with the farmers installed there who were defending their way of life and apparently had been taught by the traffickers in narcotics to offer resistance, as was explained to this Committee, the Army proceeded to reestablish order and authority in that vast zone.

The occupation of El Chapare was an important landmark in the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs, but it, in cutting off or considerably reducing the means of living of the farm workers installed there (about 30.000 families), caused the appearance of other social problems since up to now nothing has been done to facilitate the substitution of other crops for the cultivation of and other activities related to coca.

In this connection, there is a project for development of agricultural and agroindustrial activities in El Chapare, with financial assistance from USAID, as part of the program of Development of the Bolivian Tropics.

This Committee has been informed that this project has been delayed in its implementation, partly because of the lack of control by the Government in El Chapare. It is hoped that with the occupation of El Chapare, it will be possible to implement this project and continue to work of reduction of the production of coca leaf in the region, to be replaced by other crops, although there are doubts about the viability of the project, if the military forces occupying the zone are replaced by police forces, because of the latter's lack of means.

B.5. Difficulties in the action against the traffic in narcotic drugs

This Committee was able to verify, by sight and by conversations with various authorities and leaders of the community, the great difficulties in the way of effectively combatting the traffic in narcotic drugs, an illegal business that possesses more powerful and more abundant means (of communications and transport, for example) than do the authorities in charge of eliminating that business. The three main obstacles to effective action are the following:

a. Lack of unity of view

One notes in Bolivia a lack of unity of view on the importance of the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs and the way to combat it. A definite unity of view would give an opportunity for achieving a national consensus, which would be the basis for the expression of a resolute political will, seriously aimed at the purpose of combatting the evil in its roots.

b. Lack of resources and means

Considerable economic resources and means are needed in Bolivia to support an intensification of the actions against the traffic in narcotic drugs.

Until a dynamic economic policy is put into execution --which is basic for the future-- it will have to be considered that the largest part of the financial resources now needed should come from international cooperation. Needless to say, the determined political will mentioned above must ensure that the international financial aid will be used for the specific purposes for which it is intended.

An appendix to this report gives a list of elements that the National Committee to Combat the Traffic in Narcotic Drugs considers as a minimum for making the campaign against the narcotic drug traffic more effective.

c. The corrupting effect of the traffic in narcotic drugs

Mention was made earlier in this report of this difficulty in the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs.

It need only be added that the agencies in charge of the campaign against the traffic in narcotic drugs must be made professional and technically qualified, to avoid the practice that this Committee was told is followed in some cities, of using parapolice (or volunteer) groups, considered as "honorary" collaborators.

B.6. Stimulation of the development of replacement crops and economic activities. National development.

This Committee considers that a merely repressive approach to the problems of the traffic in narcotic drugs will not be sufficient

to achieve solutions acceptable both to the authorities and the people of Bolivia and to the international community. Without denying the importance of that aspect, it is obvious that the basic thing in that problem is to provide sources of work through economic

and social development, and that his development requires a coherent and integrated approach of government action that will offer a suitable climate for productive investments. Without adequate planning and sustained action to achieve acceptable economic and social goals, it would not be possible to achieve the development of the enormous riches of the Bolivian national territory as a means for overcoming the growing dependence of sectors of the body of the society on a degrading and vile activity that antisocial elements use mainly for their own profit.

Programs such as that of USAID and that of the United Nations should prove to be extremely useful as experiments aimed at the systematic organization of a definite policy in the battle against the traffic in narcotic drugs. But they themselves, in their size, are insufficient to face the requirement of overall development.

A coherent national action of abroad scope, among all the branches of the Government, that will offer, in turn, opportunities for productive investments directed toward genuine national development, is basic in order definitively to solve the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs in the territory of Bolivia.

The Committee considers that international cooperation can and should play an important role, as a complement to the national effort, through action that is coordinated among all the interested organizations, especially the Organization of American States and the United Nations. Coordination and complementarity between the regional approach and the worldwide approach is essential for solving the problem of the traffic in narcotic drugs.

C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The problem of the production of and the traffic in cocaine is complex, multinational, and of critical importance. It cannot be dealt effectively with magic formulas, or with just one kind of measures, or with isolated measures in one country or another. Intensive efforts are required in a broad range of both national and international measures.

Efforts in Bolivia

- C.1 Bolivia has begun a battle against the production of and traffic in cocaine, especially in the last few months, but there is still much to be done.
- C.2 Given the importance of the battle against the production of and traffic in cocaine, it is essential that this topic be dealt with in an apolitical way and that all the sectors of the Bolivian society do what they can to reach a national consensus in support of this battle. To achieve this national consensus it is necessary, first, that the Government show its leadership, by contributing the necessary resources complementary to those provided internationally; by the approval of legislation that does not now exist; by an intense publicity campaign against the production of and traffic in cocaine; and with other actions and programs. At the same time, it is desirable that other sectors of the society, such as private enterprise, the church, civic committees, professional associations, and labor unions, implement campaigns in support of the battle against the production of and traffic in cocaine.

- d. The full implementation of programs of support to agricultural production and agroindustrial activities in the regions of El Chapare and Los Yungas, as alternatives to the production of coca leaves.
- e. The progressive implementation of the programs of reduction of the cultivation of coca leaf to the amount necessary for traditional uses.
- f. Regulation of the control, importation, and marketing of all the "precursor" elements that serve for the production of cocaine.

International Efforts

It is absolutely necessary that the intensified national effort in the battle against the production of cocaine and the traffic in narcotic drugs have greater international cooperation as a counterpart. The following may be pointed out as elements of this greater international cooperation:

- a. An increase in the national programs against the traffic in narcotic drugs in all the countries producing and consuming cocaine, so that the efforts to reduce production will be matched with the efforts to reduce the demand. As a part of these programs, a greater effort in the consuming countries in the pursuit of the traffic in narcotic drugs and reduction of consumption as a means to discourage the production of coca leaf in excess of the traditional direct consumption.
- b. A considerable and sustained increase in financial assistance to Bolivia in the battle against the production of cocaine and the traffic in narcotic drugs, in order to

make possible the execution of programs, both of economic development and of repression, of the necessary scope.

- c. Implementation, without loss of time, of the programs already pointed out, with the indispensable international cooperation.
- d. Implementation of programs of exchange of information on the traffic in narcotic drugs among the affected countries in the regions.
- e. Study of the possibility of executing programs of international coordination and control over precursor elements used in the production of cocaine.
- f. Carrying out research studies to determine to what extent coca leaves may be used as a raw material in legal industrial projects.
- g. Coordination between the activities of the United Nations and those of the OAS to avoid duplication of costs and efforts.

Washington, D.C. United States of America. December 7, 1984.

Antonio Rosario
Chairman of the Committee

Juan Manuel Castulovich

Samuel Eaton