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
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MX MISSILES



HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, NEWS CLIPPING & ANALYSIS SERVICE, 695-2884

Adelman Testifies in Committee**U.S. Plans to Deploy MX Missile**

c. 1983 N.Y. Times
News Service

WASHINGTON — The Reagan administration plans to deploy 100 MX missiles unless the Soviet Union agrees to give up the great majority of its 818 medium and heavy land-based strategic missiles, Kenneth L. Adelman, director of the Arms Control Agency, said in a statement released Tuesday.

Adelman told Sen. Charles H. Percy, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, that the MX was a response to "a massive buildup" in Soviet intercontinental missiles. In an authorized statement, he said the administration would go forward with MX "unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this buildup and forgo their heavy and medium ICBMs."

Strong senatorial advocates of arms agreements like Sens. William S. Cohen, R-Maine, and Sam Nunn, D-Ga., called the position impractical and said they had grave doubts that Moscow would accept it. One senior administration official also said it was not "realistic" to expect the Soviet Union to accept such terms to stop the MX, which had its first successful flight

test last week.

Administration officials acknowledged that Adelman's letter made it sound as though Moscow would have to give up all existing heavy and medium-sized ICBMs but they said that was not the intent. The wording, they said, was "unfortunate" and "a little less tidy than it should have

been."

Nonetheless, these officials said that Adelman had correctly outlined a position that would impose even tougher reductions on Moscow than the current American negotiating proposal in Geneva. There, the United States has demanded that Moscow reduce its inventory of medium SS-17 and SS-19 missiles and

heavy SS-18 ICBMs from 818 to 210.

An Arms Control Agency official said Adelman's letter meant that the Soviet Union would have to agree to even deeper cuts for the administration to give up plans to deploy 100 MX missiles.

Since Moscow has already characterized the current American proposal

as unfair, one senior administration official said that "realistically, it's just not in the cards" for the Soviet Union to accept the terms Adelman set out and "for us to give up MX."

Later, a White House official said the Adelman letter was "not a signal" to the Russians and should not be interpreted too precisely. "We're not negotiating in public," he said.

"If the Soviets have got a proposal to get us to give up MX, let them come forward with it," this official

added. "But it's unlikely that they'd make a proposal that would cause us to give up MX."

In late May, the administration won crucial votes in the House and Senate to fund flight-testing of the controversial MX missile but the missile still lacks an approved basing system. Major new legislative tests lie ahead this month on a bill authorizing production of the missile in 1984.

Eighteen Republican senators wrote President Reagan on May 26 saying

that their support for flight-testing MX "does not represent a consensus on the need to deploy 100 MX missiles" but rather the first step in a process requiring the administration to reformulate its arms position, develop a smaller single-warhead missile, and accept a scheme to gradually phase down Soviet and American strategic arsenals.

Tuesday, Cohen, a leader in this group, said he thought the new Adelman formulation on MX was impractical.

Congress Is Told MX Won't Be Scrapped

WASHINGTON (UPI) — The Reagan administration told Congress Tuesday it will not scrap the new 10-warhead MX nuclear missile unless the Soviet Union gives up its medium and heavy missiles.

In a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Arms Control Director Kenneth Adelman said, "The president has made clear that the scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reduction agreements."

"The MX is the U.S. response to a massive buildup of Soviet ICBMs over the last 10 years, and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this buildup and forego their heavy and medium ICBMs, the U.S. will go forward with MX."

The letter was sent last Thursday in response to a question from Sen. Claiborne Pell, D-R.I., asking under what circumstances the United States would abandon the MX.

Committee Chairman Charles Percy, R-Ill., in releasing the letter, said, "This is the first time the administration has publicly indicated it would accept a fair trade."

The administration has been engaged in a bruising battle with Congress over the MX, which will be the

hardest-hitting weapon in the U.S. arsenal. Lawmakers have given the go-ahead for development of the missile, but insisted President Reagan adopt a more flexible stand on arms control talks with Moscow.

Percy said the Adelman response was akin to the "zero-option" plan advanced by the administration to cancel planned deployment of 572 U.S. Pershing-2 and cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviets dismantle their intermediate-range missiles arrayed along the NATO front.

He said the proposed new trade-off would involve the Soviets dismantling 650 of their heavy SS-18 and SS-19 intercontinental missiles.

The new administration posture was met with skepticism from Democrats.

Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., testifying on behalf of a bipartisan "build-down" proposal to reduce the total number of missiles by eliminating two old nuclear warheads for new one built, said, "That letter establishes that the MX is indeed a bargaining chip — the only question is the price."

While doubting that the United States could persuade the Soviets to give up its advantage in long-range missiles, Nunn said the Adelman response showed "some flexibility. There is some price for which the administration would forego the MX."

Sen. William Cohen, R-Maine, who with Nunn is the originator of the build-down proposal endorsed by Reagan, called the ICBM trade-off "impractical. The Soviets are going to reject it out of hand. The ICBMs are the heart of their strategic force."

Cohen testified that he would no longer support the MX in future Senate votes so as not to give the impression that the build-down proposal is merely "a meaningless link in the process of procuring the MX missile."

The administration, in its latest published assessment of Soviet military power, rates the multiple-warhead SS-18 and SS-19 "the world's most lethal ICBMs." They are housed in hardened silos to ensure survival of a retaliatory force in the event of a U.S. attack.

The administration contends the Soviets have designed their missile force for an attack against the U.S. ICBM force. It is this purported imbalance in heavy missiles that the MX is intended to redress.

Cohen also criticized unnamed members of the administration to the build-down, under which each side would dismantle two warheads for each new one built.

The opposition, he said, "would not only undermine the integrity and negotiability of the concept, but would directly contravene the president's repeated personal pledge to seek stability at equal and lower levels of strategic forces."

MX Issue Upsets Democrats

By PATRICIA KOZA

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A revolt is brewing among Capitol Hill Democrats over the MX, and the issue may erupt into open rebellion during the next crucial vote on the giant nuclear weapon.

Two recent events indicate the depth of frustration among opponents with the refusal by the party leadership to take a position on the MX.

Democrats expressed their concern at a 2 1/2-hour party caucus June 14, called on a petition signed by 112 members and circulated by a freshman from California.

The issue: why the House leadership broke with the majority of Democrats and supported President Reagan in a critical MX vote last month.

The second event occurred barely an hour later at an anti-MX rally on the Capitol steps, when both Sens. Edward Kennedy, D-Mass., and Gary Hart, D-Colo., chastised those who endorsed MX.

"Any Democrat who thinks we can purchase peace by voting for MX ought to be ashamed of himself," Kennedy declared.

Democrats, who consider themselves the party of arms control, last month forced Reagan to adopt a more flexible arms control policy as part of the deal for deploying 100 of the 10-warhead weapons in existing Minuteman missile silos.

Reps. Les Aspin, D-Wis., Norman Dicks, D-Wash.,

and Albert Gore Jr., D-Tenn., led a group of moderate Democrats who obtained a written agreement from Reagan to seriously seek arms control. The president wrote a similar letter to several similarly concerned senators.

In return, the House and Senate voted to release \$825 million in engineering and flight-testing funds that had been "fenced" in the 1983 budget.

But now some Democrats are beginning to feel as if they've been flim-flammed — both by the leadership and by the moderates who led the turnaround from December, when both houses had put the skids on MX.

And both Aspin and Dicks have indicated they will re-evaluate their positions if Reagan does not moderate his position on arms control beyond the sketchy outlines he provided for the new round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Geneva.

It fell to a freshman, Jim Bates of California, to circulate the petition that convened the caucus.

"If we weren't going to take a position on defense as a party, I wanted to know why," he said.

Other sources said seven or eight Democrats who voted to release MX research funds last month will switch their positions on a vote scheduled in mid-July to authorize production funds for 27 missiles.

At least 25 or 30 of the 91 Democrats who joined 148 Republicans in the May vote would be needed to turn MX around yet again.

Aspin, formerly an MX opponent, warned rejection of the missile program by Democrats would rob the party of an opportunity to use it as a key campaign issue next year.

"If we give him this, then it's up to the president to get an arms control agreement and we can hold him accountable," Aspin said.

Among the prominent party members who supported the MX last month were Democratic leader James Wright Jr., D-Texas, and whip Thomas Foley, D-Wash.

"I thought it might have been a mistake if the Democratic leadership had taken a partisan stance and had been seen as obstructing the defense of the country," Wright said.

But other Democrats question whether the party has not already given up that spot by failing to take a stand — particularly when its leading presidential contenders oppose MX.

The issue will be a crucial one for the party as the pro- and anti-MX forces heat up their lobbying in the coming weeks.

Anti-MX Views Not Church Council Backed

The president of St. Paul's Lutheran Church Council said today the use of its facility for the June 3 statement of opposition to the MX missile project by regional churchmen "in no way implies that the congregation supports such a statement."

At the same time Alice Iverson, the St. Paul's Council head, released a signed statement by the Rocky Mountain Synod bishop of the Lutheran Church in America and his assistant that their signatures to the anti-MX statement were matters of their own personal conviction.

The press conference held by an organization called the Regional Council for Ministries in Impacted Areas was signed by 42 clergy including the Roman Catholic archbishop Denver, the Catholic bishop of Cheyenne and the Episcopal bishop of Wyoming.

Also signing it were Bishop Franklin C. Heglund of the Lutheran Rocky Mountain Synod and his assistant, the Rev. Richard A. Magnus.

Said the statement issued by Mrs. Iverson: "The use of St. Paul's Lutheran Church as a facility (for the press conference) in no way implies that the congregation supports such a statement. The congrega-

tion has not taken a stand on the issue and as in most of our congregations there are people on both sides of the issue and some who have not decided."

Of Bishop Heglund and his assistant, Mrs. Iverson's statement added that their signatures "are a matter of deep personal conviction and may or may not be the position of other members of the Rocky Mountain Synod, Lutheran Church in America."

"Titles used were for identification only," Mrs. Iverson' statement said, "not to indicate representation of others."

It was repeated in a separate signed statement issued by Heglund and Magnus from the the Lutheran synod office in Denver.

The June 3 statement said, among other things: "We, the undersigned leaders of Christian communities with regional responsibilities in several western states of the United States, do hereby express our opposition to the testing, production and deployment of the MX missile system. We want to note that our opposition to the MX missile system is not limited to possible deployment in Nebraska and Wyoming, but extends to any proposed deployment anywhere in the United States.:

Wallop: 'Prosperous Success'

Praise Heaped on MX Test Firing

By S.M. GETZUG

Eagle Staff Writer

Last week's test firing of the controversial MX missile was a "prosperous success" and should aid in easing some critics' opposition to the ten-warhead missile, said Sen. Malcolm Wallop, R-Wyoming.

In an interview with reporters Tuesday, Wallop said the successful test flight should also help the missile's chances of clearing congressional hurdles.

"I think it (test-firing) helped in that had it failed, it would have been yet another ground for opposition to it," Wyoming's senior senator said. "But the launching was such a prosperous success — that will not be an argument that we will face."

Still, he said, some "opponents will simply not back off on the basis of the successful test."

Wallop said those individuals still undecided as to

whether the country needs the weapon will most likely make their decisions based on "additional things" such as "President Reagan's continued commitment to arms control..."

Launch of the unarmed missile — dubbed "peacekeeper" by the Pentagon — proceeded without incident Saturday at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in what military officials called a "stupendous"

inaugural test firing.

On other defense related issues, Wallop reiterated his opposition to a nuclear freeze resolution currently being considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He hopes the resolution will be killed in the Senate.

"I believe it would tie the president's hands in his ability to negotiate arms reductions," Wallop said. "It is

short-sighted and would freeze us in place with an antiquated delivery system which is no match for the Soviet Union right now."

Wallop said a nuclear freeze would give the Soviets a "distinct advantage" in projecting its power and influence throughout the world.

Wallop also said the media "overplayed" the arrests of some 1,100 anti-nuclear demonstrators during nationwide protests Monday staged for the "International Day of Nuclear Disarmament."

The Republican senator said he does not believe the protestors represented majority views of most Americans who believe a unilateral disarmament is not the answer to conflicts between the world's two superpowers.

Wallop said the media placed too much importance on those protests and they "probably got more coverage than the million people who came to express their longing for freedom when they saw the Pope...in Poland."

MX Hinges on Perception of Reagan's Arms Reduction

By LEONARD FAMIOLIETTI
Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — The administration could lose this fall's MX battle if President Reagan fails to convince Congress that he is serious about arms reduction with the Soviet Union.

The next administration-Congress MX battle is expected in late September when Congress votes on the funding for the controversial weapon and other Defense Department systems.

Reagan's July victory in the Senate (58-41) for production of 27 Peacekeeper missiles was described as "a fragile consensus" by Sen. Paul Trible (R-Va.).

"Unless the administration demonstrates a good-faith intention to bring about an arms reduction treaty, it (the concen-

sus) may very well evaporate," Trible warned.

Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) predicted that the MX won't survive in the House unless President Reagan can show progress in arms control negotiations.

The Senate legislation authorizes the building of 21 missiles for deployment and six as spares and test vehicles, as requested by the Air Force, as part of a \$188 billion FY 1984 Defense Authorization Bill. The bill includes \$4.7 billion for MX production and additional research.

An AF source told *Air Force Times* that the congressional support for MX indicated that the chances are good that "we will get most of what (has been) asked."

A Senate amendment also requires the President to provide Congress with an assessment of future MX procurement on arms control and strategic weapons deployment.

In another vote, the Senate rejected a motion that would have eliminated funds for deployment as tied to a White House plan for basing 100 MX missiles in refurbished Minuteman silos starting around late 1986.

The Senate, however, did approve language calling for the Soviet Union and the United States to move ahead in developing single-warhead missiles. It is hoped such a move would make them less desirable targets than the multi-warhead missiles, thus reducing the chance of attack by either side and an all-out war.

On July 20, the House provided a 220 to 207 victory for Reagan when it approved MX production, but 14 hours later decided to limit production to only 21 missiles at a cost of \$2.2 billion. It eliminated the missiles to be set aside as spares and for testing.

Legislative Lucre Fees for Congressmen From Interest Groups Doubled in Past Year

Defense Industry Forks Out Money to MX Adherents; \$4.5 Million in Honoraria Seminar at Kentucky Derby

By Brooks Jackson
And Edward F. Pound

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL.

WASHINGTON—No member of Congress fought harder to save commodity traders from taxes on their trading profits than Rep. Martin Russo of Illinois. Now Chicago traders have returned the favor by paying the Democratic congressman \$3,000 in fees for a day's work.

Similarly, units of Avco Corp., which stands to profit greatly if full production of MX missiles is ordered, paid \$4,000 in a single day to Rep. William Chappell, a Florida Democrat and an MX booster who sits on the subcommittee overseeing the Pentagon's weapons budget.

And Rep. William Dickinson of Alabama, the top-ranking Republican on the Armed Services Committee and a tireless fighter for increased military spending, says he pocketed a \$10,000 "Defense Industry Award" from a nonprofit group whose board is dominated by executives of weapons suppliers.

Despite recent attempts to limit them, such special-interest payments are rampant and growing. House and Senate members report being paid \$4.5 million last year in honoraria, mostly for speaking engagements. The total is more than twice the \$2.2 million paid in 1980. Lawmakers give some of the money to charity but about 90% goes into their pockets.

Advertisers' Fee List

Frequently, those paying the fees want favors from Congress. The cable-television

industry, which is panting after a bill to strip local governments of much power to regulate and tax cable systems, paid at least \$29,500 in fees to 20 House members and seven senators last year. The billboard industry, seeking to weaken further the Highway Beautification Act, paid at least \$67,000 to 25 senators and 24 House members. A dozen major military contractors paid \$60,000 to nine members of the House military appropriations subcommittee.

And increasingly, the fees are augmented by expenses-paid trips to places such as Florida, California, Hawaii, Bermuda and other resort areas. Last year, for example, the Electronic Industries Association paid \$200 each to 17 members of Congress to attend a four-day "legislative roundtable" at the South Seas Plantation at Captiva Island, Fla. Sessions lasted only four hours a day, leaving plenty of time for fishing trips, golf and tennis tournaments and swimming. About half the members brought their wives, whose expenses also were paid.

A few members of Congress refuse to accept such fees. Rep. Philip Sharp, a Democrat from Muncie, Ind., says "It seems to me that it just borders on, has the potential for, corruption."

But many more display the attitude stated—with unusual frankness—by Missis-

issippi Rep. Trent Lott, the third-ranking Republican in the House: "If they want me to give up a weekend with my kids, they better have it someplace good, and I feel I am enti-

led to remuneration." Mr. Lott was speaking of a trip to the Kentucky Derby he took last year with his wife, with all expenses paid by Brown & Williamson. The trip was to attend a seminar titled "Current Public Issues Facing Tobacco," for which Mr. Lott also received a \$2,000 fee from the tobacco company.

Vote-buying is denied all around, but groups say candidly they use fees as bait to lure lawmakers to indoctrination sessions that they hope will affect future legislation, at least indirectly.

Chicago commodity traders set up a program for just this purpose five years ago. Clayton Yeutter, the president of the Mercantile Exchange, says, "Members of Congress simply did not understand what the futures industry was all about."

Commodity Traders' Friend

Almost every week of the year, the Merc and the Chicago Board of Trade pay a member of Congress to come to the Windy City for a tour of the exchanges, and to make some remarks at a luncheon with exchange executives. The standard fee is \$1,000 for a House member, \$2,000 for a senator.


A House member who received triple the usual fee was Rep. Russo, but it wasn't because he had to learn more. Mr. Yeutter says the extra-large fee was paid because Mr. Russo had done more. In particular, Rep. Russo crusaded in 1981 to preserve for traders the lucrative tax-deferral advantages of a trading device known as the straddle. The attempt failed, but Mr. Yeutter says even so, "Marty has simply done more in terms of the time and effort he's spent (helping the industry) than probably any other member of Congress."

Mr. Russo concedes he didn't expend much effort preparing for his \$3,000 day's work, which involved speaking to three small groups of futures-industry officials. He says he made brief, prepared remarks to each but spent most of the time fielding questions.

The congressman says he has "a great deal of concern" that voters will interpret the fee as a payoff. But he says he doesn't feel anyone was trying to influence him and sees no reason to limit speaking fees. "I'm not embarrassed by honoraria," he says.

Also unembarrassed is Florida's Rep. Chappell, who personally received \$12,000 of the \$60,000 given by weapons makers to members of the military-appropriations panel. Rep. Chappell reported getting \$8,000

House and Senate Honoraria



Source: Democratic Study Group

issippi Rep. Trent Lott, the third-ranking Republican in the House: "If they want me to give up a weekend with my kids, they better have it someplace good, and I feel I am enti-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

LEGISLATIVE LUCRE...CONTINUED

from Avco units, \$2,000 from Lockheed and \$2,000 for two appearances at Pratt & Whitney engine plants.

On one day last year, Nov. 22, he got \$4,000 for two Avco visits. In the morning he says he spent two hours at the company's plant in Stratford, Conn., which makes engines for the Army's M-1 main battle tank. He told plant officials that "the M-1 tank was here to stay," the congressman recalls.

Later the same day the congressman toured the Avco plant in Wilmington, Mass., which was chalking up record profits mainly because of its work on the reentry portion of the MX missile. The company's annual report says this division has "superior growth potential," especially if the MX is approved for full production. Rep. Chappell's words must have been music to the ears of officials there. "I told them in my view it (the MX) was a system that was needed if we were to drive the Soviets to the negotiating table," Mr. Chappell says.

He, too, says he doesn't feel influenced by the money, and he says \$4,000 seems fair pay for his day's work. "If I were a practicing lawyer, I would expect there would be many days I could earn a whale of a lot more than that," he says.

Federal law limits speaking fees to \$2,000 per appearance, but this doesn't prevent multiple appearances. The American Bankers Association paid \$5,000 for three appearances last year by Democratic Rep. Doug Barnard of Georgia, an ex-banker who sits on the House Banking Committee.

The biggest single payment last year went to Alabama's Rep. Dickinson, who accepted \$10,000 from the American Defense Preparedness Association. The \$2,000 limit didn't apply because the money was given as an award rather than as a speaking fee. The prize money came largely from donations by corporations. The citation praised the congressman for his work in office, including "outspoken and sustained support of defense preparedness" and "unstinting efforts in behalf of research and development, military installations and facilities and force readiness."

Money to Charity

The \$10,000 prize has been given annually since 1978, but all other recipients have turned the money over to charity, an association spokesman says. (This year's recipient was Sen. John Tower, the Texas Republican who heads the Armed Services Committee.) But Rep. Dickinson needed the money and kept it, his spokesman says. "Mr. Dickinson is not a wealthy man," he adds.

Indeed, a big reason so many lawmakers are hustling speaking fees is that House and Senate pay—despite a 15% raise just voted

by the Senate—is falling far behind inflation. The congressional salary, which is \$69,800 a year for both the House and Senate as of July 1, buys only 62% of what it did 14 years ago, when pay was \$42,500.

One of the busiest speakers last year was Sen. Alphonse D'Amato, a New York Republican, who logged 42 speaking engagements and was paid \$56,825 in fees. He says he would prefer to see a big pay raise and a ban on such fees, which he says cause a "negative perception" of Congress by the public. But meanwhile, he says, he simply needs the money.

Attempts to limit honoraria aren't entirely effective. Federal law limits House members to taking no more than \$20,800 in fees or other earned income. Yet the total has nearly doubled in two years to \$2.1 million and theoretically could swell to more than \$9 million without any increase in the limit.

Senate Sets Limit

There hasn't been any limit on Senate honoraria totals since 1981. The Senate just voted to raise pay immediately to the same level as the House and to accept the same \$20,800 limit on honoraria. That limit won't take effect until next year, however, so this year's total could turn out to be even higher than last year's \$2.4 million.

In any case, nothing prevents a lawmaker from taking speaking fees from groups seeking specific legislative favors. For example, Rep. James J. Howard, a New Jersey Democrat, spoke at the outdoor advertisers' convention in Palm Springs last year and was paid \$1,000. Mr. Howard is the chairman of the House Public Works and Transportation Committee and supported a provision, sought by the billboard lobby, that would have eliminated federal funds from the billboard-removal program established in the Highway Beautification Act. The provision died in a Senate-House conference.

The only restraint is imposed by the \$2,000-per-appearance limit and the requirement for yearly disclosure of all such fees. Defenders of the system like to point out that some journalists, mainly syndicated columnists and television-news celebrities, command higher fees and don't have to disclose them. One trade-association lobbyist, who paid \$1,000 apiece to a score of congressmen last year, puts it bluntly: "You know who the highest ones are? The ones that cost the most? Journalists!"

But the journalists, at least, prepare their own remarks. "What gets you" about some congressional speakers, complains another trade-group official, "is that after you agree to pay them, some of these guys have the gall to ask you to write their speech."

THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION AND THE "WINDOW OF COERCION"

BLAIR STEWART



THE AUTHOR: Mr. Stewart is a Senior Scientist with JAYCOR, a research and development firm. A former U.S. Air Force officer, he has an extensive background in the development of ICBM weapons systems, including Minuteman II, Minuteman III and MX. Before leaving the Air Force, he served as a staff officer in the Office of the Special Assistant for MX Matters, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. He is a 1968 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy and holds a masters degree in industrial systems engineering.

IN BRIEF

The Scowcroft Commission has rendered the nation a signal service by turning away from the fear that heretofore preoccupied and debilitated American strategic planning and weapons decisions — the "window of vulnerability" — instead focusing realistically on the principal threat emergent in the strategic nuclear imbalance: a "window of coercion." The term refers to the possible options and attendant psychological-political advantages that a preponderance in prompt and potent countermilitary ICBM firepower gives to the Soviet Union in a variety of contingencies short of all-out nuclear war. It describes a turning around of the "extended deterrent" that has underpinned America's protective guarantee to its allies. And it explains a greater Soviet propensity for risk-taking, which already seems to be in evidence today. The silo-emplacement of MX missiles recommended by the Commission offers at least a start toward redressing dangerous and widening asymmetries in the strategic equation.

In April of this year, President Reagan's Commission on Strategic Forces reported its findings after almost four months of hearings, briefings and deliberations.¹ It may have come as a surprise to some that the Commission, rather than focus merely on the issue that evoked it into being — namely, the modernization of the ICBM force of the United States — instead produced a comprehensive analysis of overall U.S. strategic policy, as well as a broad rationale for U.S. strategic force modernization.

The Scowcroft Commission is to be commended for its achievements, particularly as these were wrought under the difficult and

distracting circumstances of an acrimonious debate over nuclear forces in general and the MX program in particular. The Commission has realistically assessed the magnitude of the modernization tasks before the United States and laid out a logical plan pointing to a credible and viable U.S. deterrent posture of the future.² The nation through its elected representatives now faces the choice of following the course charted by the Commission or continuing to wallow in a morass of indecision and debate that now stretches over the better part of a decade and that, against the background of the onerous lead-times applying to modern weapons systems, threatens to

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED

foreclose any path to any firm strategic ground whatsoever.

The Scowcroft Commission achieved its breakthrough to reason by laying aside the most contentious and debilitating technical issue surrounding U.S. strategic force modernization: namely, that of coping with what has been characterized as the growing vulnerability of the U.S. land-based ICBM force to a Soviet ICBM attack — popularly described as the “window of vulnerability.” Rather, the Commission centered its findings on the real window of vulnerability for the 1980s: namely, the potential position of the Soviet Union, derived from its expanding strategic arsenal, to direct various forms of intimidation against the United States and its allies. We may call this the “window of coercion.”

Coercion as a Fact of International Life

The phenomenon of “coercion” is difficult enough to define in the abstract. It refers to a process whereby a person or a collectivity of persons — a group, a nation, an alliance of nations — is induced by fear to behave in ways that are in variance with his (its) interests or intentions. It involves tangibles: the means of coercion. But it also entails a host of intangibles: principally the mutual perceptions and psychologic interactions between the would-be coercer and his target. The process of coercion may be explicit: e.g., the victim of a hold-up hands over his wallet. But it can also be implicit: e.g., a witness to the hold-up fails to take action because he fears reprisals. Unless he openly admits the cause of his behavior, the fact of coercion has to be adduced.

In international relations, coercion is rarely explicit — principally because no nation, unless it is actually defeated on the battlefield, is willing to acknowledge openly that it was forced or induced by the fear of reprisals to act in ways contrary to the best interests of its citizens. Nevertheless, coercion has been practiced between nations — and their antecedents — since the beginning of time. It has been practiced mainly through the fact of superiority of power and the threat, explicit or implicit, of the use of that power.

Americans, although they are familiar with coercion in their everyday lives, tend to be peculiarly insensitive to it as a factor of inter-

national relations. Perhaps this is so because as a nation we have never been exposed to coercion by superior military power — and, more generally, we are not experienced players on the chessboard of global power politics. By contrast, Europeans know the phenomenon only too well: they know it almost instinctively on the accumulated basis of historical experience. After all, coercion is at the heart of the feared “Finlandization” of Western Europe. The term denotes a process whereby the fact of clear Soviet military superiority on the continent would gradually elicit certain behavior patterns of obedience — of “anticipatory deference” — to Soviet preferences on the part of West European nations. Many contend that this process already is very much in evidence today.

If Americans have difficulty grasping the role of coercion in international relations generally, they are even more hard-put to sense its application to the nuclear arena. The concept of “minimum deterrence,” which still entices many U.S. strategic theorists, is based on the proposition that beyond a certain (undefined) level of opposing nuclear capabilities and threatened levels of destruction, additional capabilities by one or the other side are in effect meaningless because that superiority cannot be actually invoked in an attack, lest it trigger a reprisal of “unacceptable” proportions upon the attacker.

The members of the “minimum deterrence” school may or may not be right in their assumption that an intercontinental nuclear duel will thus be prevented between the two superpowers: let us hope that their assumption is never put to the test. Yet, they are clearly and dangerously on shaky ground in limiting their projection strictly to the contingency of an all-out strategic nuclear exchange. They fail to consider: (1) the possible use of margins of nuclear superiority for military actions short of the all-out exchange, (2) the belief (by the superior power) and/or the perception (by the inferior power) that the assets may be thus used, (3) more generally, the effect that the acknowledged fact of superiority will have on the actions and behavior of the superior and inferior power in their global competition, and (4) the effect of perceptions of superior power on the behavior of “third countries” in the global competition.

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED*The Growing Imbalance*

The very fact that responsible leaders in the United States — including the members of the Scowcroft Commission — have evinced growing concern about the shifting nuclear balance is in itself testimony to the real and psychological consequences of the growing imbalance. Moreover, the Scowcroft Commission, in both its analysis and recommendations, showed that the principal menacing threat in the emerging situation is seen not so much in the sheer numerical aspects of the shifting nuclear equation, but rather in the growing imbalance with respect to the more “usable” parts of this equation: i.e., those forces that are capable (or perceived to be capable) of carrying out missions against military targets on the other side, as contrasted with essentially reprisal raids against “soft” population and industrial centers.

This imbalance is the result of a decade-long Soviet ICBM modernization program which has provided the Soviet Union with an unprecedented capability to neutralize hardened military targets. The bulk of this capability resides in the 5,000 relatively high-yield warheads now deployed on 308 SS-18 and 330 SS-19 ICBMs. Although the precise accuracy of these missiles — particularly under the operational conditions of an actual conflict — is still subject to debate, they are far more effective than their predecessors.³ The Soviet missiles are housed in super-hardened launch facilities.

This potent ICBM force not only provides the Soviets with a capability to threaten hardened U.S. and allied military assets, but it also provides a prompt, highly flexible Soviet threat against the entire spectrum of U.S. and allied military targets.

The reverse, however, is not true: the aging force of U.S. Minuteman ICBMs has relatively little capability to place at risk the majority of high-value, hardened military targets in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Given the continuing momentum of Soviet ICBM modernization (as evidenced by the flight-testing of two new Soviet ICBMs), this imbalance can only grow in the future.

Soviet Options and the “Extended Deterrent”

The superiority by the Soviets in promptly responsive, hard-target-kill ICBMs is not merely an abstract phenomenon hovering in

the background of the U.S.–Soviet competition; rather, it is a potent military capability designed to achieve at least the following potential Soviet military objectives in the event of a war:

- To support a doctrine of preemption.
- To strike at the offensive capability — both nuclear and non-nuclear — of the United States and its allies.
- To disrupt and negate U.S. and allied C³I.
- To limit damage to the Soviet military, leadership and territory.
- To aid Soviet ground forces in the seizure and occupation of territory.
- To achieve potentially decisive, overwhelming advantages early in a conflict.
- To allow Soviet domination of the nuclear escalation process during the early hours of a war.
- To win the war.

The starkly emergent fact is that this superiority in prompt firepower donates to the Soviet planner who pursues these objectives certain options in less-than-all-out nuclear war — options that by their very existence (let alone their actual invocation) could exert definite leverage on the flow of a potential conventional conflict, particularly in the European theater. For example, if a crisis in Europe were to deteriorate into a military conflict, the Soviets now would appear to possess several nuclear options, among them:

- A prompt ballistic missile attack on U.S. strategic forces and the U.S. national C³I system.
- A prompt ballistic missile attack on NATO airfields, C³I and nuclear forces.
- The withholding of a meaningful portion of Soviet strategic nuclear forces which were not required for the initial missions.
- Where possible, the avoidance of U.S. and allied population centers.
- The brandished threat of escalation to all-out central war if the United States were to retaliate.

If the Soviets and we believed that a prompt, Soviet countermilitary attack had a strong

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED

probability of success — and if U.S. response options primarily were limited to slow and relatively ineffective strikes against hardened Soviet military targets or prompt attacks on the Soviet population, industry and relatively soft military targets — then in a situation where Soviet general purpose forces attacked and were on the verge of success, the mere existence of these Soviet nuclear options might cause the United States to withhold any kind of nuclear response, even one needed to avoid defeat on the conventional battlefield.⁴

The real import of these Soviet options is thus addressed to the phenomenon of the “extended deterrent.” For more than two decades after World War II, the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” that symbolized the central commitment of the United States to its allies in Western Europe was the clear function of U.S. superiority in both strategic and theater nuclear weapons. That superiority in effect gave to the United States the *additional* capabilities — beyond those needed to deter an attack on the United States itself — to enforce the deterrent against conventional or nuclear aggression in the heart of Europe. Under the NATO strategy of Flexible Response, a superior nuclear arsenal and firepower provided the United States with the essential means of controlling the process of escalation in a European conflict.

Today, not only have the Soviets blunted this “extended deterrent,” but they are in effect turning it around. Their own *usable* strategic and theater nuclear armies provide a potential cover for Warsaw Pact armies thrusting into Western Europe. *They* are now in a position to control the process of escalation.

One can speculate that it is the gradual (if imperfect) recognition of this drastic change in the strategic environment that looms large behind the peace movement and growing anti-NATO and anti-nuclear sentiments in Western Europe today.

Coercive Power and Risk-Taking

Beyond the realm of more-or-less direct implications of superior strategic nuclear firepower for conflict beneath the intercontinental threshold, there is the murkier question alluded to earlier: How and to what extent does the very possession of superior capabilities

affect the general policies and actions of the superior power, and how does it influence the behavior of the inferior power? More specifically: Have the accelerating Soviet political-military offensive — and the evidently greater Soviet propensity for risk-taking — been influenced by the margins of superiority in Soviet strategic nuclear firepower?

The question is admittedly a nebulous one because it involves a correlation between national power and national behavior that can only be inferred from circumstantial evidence — all the more so in the case of the Soviets, who are not in the habit of spelling out their strategies, let alone the motivations behind them. Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence for a strong linkage between mounting Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities and emboldened Soviet behavior on the world stage is persuasive.

First of all, let us accept the proposition that if a nation's relative military strength is a factor in its basic behavior — particularly its predilection toward aggressive or cautious policies — then nuclear forces obviously have to be adjudged today a strong part of that motivational context. Nuclear forces remain the cornerstones of superpower military capabilities. They represent the apex of military capacity. They exert inherent leverage over conventional military forces. They embody — at least for the foreseeable future — the ultimate military threat a nation can brandish against a potential adversary.

Second, the Soviets learned of the power of the nuclear bludgeon the hard way — from the lessons of their own strategic inferiority in the 1950s and 1960s. The climactic lesson came in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when they were forced to back away, ignominiously, from a confrontation with the United States. It can hardly be deemed a coincidence that the concerted Soviet strategic buildup which has wrought their present posture was launched largely after that traumatic experience. The Soviets recognized the value of the strategic nuclear “trump-card” in a crisis. In line with their own doctrine of maximal “freedom from risks,” they had to aspire to that trump-card if they were to break out from their postwar containment and to pursue the strategy of truly global sweep ordained by Marxist-Leninist precepts.

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED

Third, and in the same vein, is it a coincidence that Soviet actions beyond their immediate domain were relatively low-keyed for about a decade after 1962, and that the outward thrusts of power — into Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere — unfolded in earnest in the mid-1970s, a time when the incipient shifts in the strategic balance were becoming evident (and were beginning to be recognized in the United States)? Other factors undoubtedly entered into this equation: e.g., the emergence of new opportunities for Soviet influence in revolutionary upheavals in the Third World, the expansion of Soviet military projection capabilities (chiefly naval and air) and America's preoccupation in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, it must be assumed that the Soviet leaders were more emboldened in exploiting those opportunities in the lengthening shadow of their strategic nuclear arsenal.

Finally, we can derive some judgments from contrasting episodes. In 1962, as we have noted, Khrushchev had to yield in Cuba, withdrawing his missiles in the face of a fairly confident American challenge (with all of its nuclear dimensions) and leaving behind a Cuban satellite that was reduced to a strictly defensive stance. During the past several years we have received a steady stream of reports of a buildup of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, along with an influx of weaponry that the U.S. Secretary of Defense has characterized as "nuclear-capable." At the same time, the Soviet-Cuban conflict strategy is quickening in parts of Central America and the Caribbean. Does this not bespeak a rise in "risk-taking"? Does not, elsewhere, the Soviet introduction of SA-5 missiles and Soviet personnel in Syria testify to the same phenomenon? And do not the relatively muted American responses to these events also trace the changes between 1962 and 1983?

In short, there is fairly clear evidence of a relationship between shifts in the strategic balance and the propensity for risk-taking in the arenas below, and the concern for the future in this respect shines through the pages of the Scowcroft Commission's report.

Closing the Window

The United States can close the "window of coercion" only by restoring parity in all

important mission categories of strategic weaponry. This is a point which for much too long has eluded U.S. arms control theorists and those who make it their business to assess the U.S.-USSR nuclear balance. Although it is important that the United States strive for balance in the so-called static measures of strategic forces, it is equally important to ensure that no asymmetries in vital capabilities or missions open between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. This applies particularly to capabilities that might provide decisive advantages in the event deterrence were to fail and, short of the extreme contingency, give to the Soviets increasing leverage over the potential battlefields of less-than-all-out nuclear war and more generally over the flow of international politics and perceptions.

The Scowcroft Commission has articulated in great depth the evolving nature of deterrence and the deterrent role of U.S. strategic forces — particularly in a world where Soviet military power has grown awesome. To paraphrase the Commission, deterrence is a state of mind conditioned by the Soviet leadership's perception of both the U.S. will to respond in a crisis *and* the U.S. military capability to retaliate effectively against those assets most valued by the Soviet state — namely, those assets which constitute their tools of control and power. Specifically, the Commission believes these assets to be: (1) the Soviet leadership itself; (2) the Soviet command and control system; and (3) Soviet military forces.

The United States needs the ability to confront the Soviet leadership with the excruciating question: would they be worse off if they chose to attack?⁵ In the Commission's opinion, this can best be achieved by both a U.S. demonstration of national resolve to upgrade its strategic arsenal and the deployment of highly capable strategic forces which can pose a day-to-day, high-profile threat against the target sets which constitute these Soviet assets — namely, Soviet command and control facilities, military command centers, plus ICBM silos and nuclear and other storage sites.⁶

It is this underlying requirement which prompted the Scowcroft Commission to recommend the deployment of the MX missile as rapidly as possible — despite the continued controversy over its basing mode. The counter

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED

military attributes of the MX — prompt responsiveness, accuracy, targeting flexibility and numbers of deliverable warheads — will provide a badly needed and heretofore missing element in the U.S. deterrent posture: the capability to confront the Soviet Union with a U.S. option to respond *promptly* against the Soviet state's most valued assets. This condition would counter what is now an intermediate Soviet nuclear option, raise the threshold of nuclear war, and hence enhance U.S. deterrence of Soviet military actions and high-risk strategies.

The Question of "Stability"

In moving to offset Soviet strategic advantages, the United States should rightly concern itself with the impact on nuclear stability of any strategic modernization option it elects to pursue. Suffice it to say that the MX missile has created more than its share of controversy on this difficult subject, and the Commission's recommendation to deploy MX in existing ICBM silos will add fuel to the controversy. Bluntly put, the deployment of MX in Minuteman silos is counter to the traditional mechanisms of "crisis stability" that U.S. Congresses have been lectured on by the Defense Department for at least a decade. Consequently, opponents of MX silo-basing continue to raise claims such as: "If MX is not survivable, it cannot deter; silo-basing of a hard-target-kill-capable ICBM is destabilizing; and silo-basing will only provide the Soviets with an incentive to strike first."⁷

Countering these contentions first entails some definition of the troublesome notion of "stability." Ideally, stability might be defined as a condition in which potential adversaries are mutually deterred from taking military action in a crisis or confrontation. Traditionally, stability between the United States and the Soviet Union has been characterized as a function of the numbers and capabilities of strategic, theater and general purpose forces on both sides; furthermore, stability theoretically existed in the recent past because, on the whole, a rough balance had been perceived among these factors.

In order to work, stability should not be vulnerable to technological breakthrough and

should minimally be disturbed by quantitative changes in military force levels. Additionally, it should not be disrupted by a sudden shift in alliances, nor be jarred by geographical deployments of important weapon systems — e.g., Soviet nuclear systems in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, stability is a complex and dynamic phenomenon.

With this as background, consider the effects of the Commission's MX recommendations on stability. It is probable that, if polled, not a single member of the Scowcroft Commission would disagree with the proposition that a highly capable, survivably based U.S. ICBM force most likely would offer the best prospects for stability. However, to its credit, the Commission has faced reality: after a decade of controversial and debilitating search, the United States has been unable to find a solution to the ICBM survivability problem (to the extent to which it exists) which is technically viable, affordable and politically acceptable. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union has relentlessly pursued a program to upgrade *both* the capabilities and survivability of its own ICBMs.

Hence, the current Russian advantages in ICBM firepower are too important and potentially intimidating to remain uncontested. The MX missile, which is now ready for flight-testing and can be deployed in Minuteman silos starting in 1986, can at least begin to correct the dangerous and truly "destabilizing" asymmetry in U.S.-Soviet countermilitary capabilities.⁸

The relative survivability of ICBMs is merely one factor in the complex stability equation.⁹ The United States has reached the point where it either must do *something* to turn around the adverse trends in strategic force capabilities, or accept the consequences of its own inaction. U.S. decisionmakers and the Congress must ask themselves: What is the price of stability, however defined? If the answer is increased Soviet coercive potential and adventurism and a prospectively dire narrowing of U.S. options in the event of war, is "stability" to be bought at such a prohibitive price? Can we afford additional delay in U.S. ICBM modernization until we can satisfy a self-imposed, rigid model of what we believe *might* constitute "stabilizing" ICBM forces?

SCOWCROFT COMMISSION...CONTINUED*A Critical Time for Decision*

The signal accomplishment of the Scowcroft Commission is thus twofold. First, it has correctly focused the national debate on the central implications of the shifting strategic balance, rather than its narrower technical dimensions — a bold step in the face of the legacy of nearly a decade of debilitating debate. In the process, it has placed the nation squarely before a choice.

There are other parts of the Commission's

recommendations that have received deserved attention, notably the proposal to seek the development of a force of small, mobile, single-warhead missiles, as well as some more ambiguous notions in the controversial field of ballistic missile defenses. These are significant contributions to the nation's future agenda. But there is an immediate and urgent agenda. To borrow the words of a noted American sports figure, when it comes to redressing a widening disparity in strategic capabilities, "the future is now."

NOTES

1. See "Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces" (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, April 1983).

2. In brief, the Scowcroft Commission's specific modernization recommendations are: a) a vigorous effort to improve strategic force C³; b) continuation of the Trident submarine construction and Trident II (D-5) missile development programs; c) continuation of current efforts to improve air-breathing strategic forces; d) extensive R&D on ABM systems; and e) comprehensive ICBM modernization. ICBM recommendations are: 1) the prompt deployment of 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos; 2) initiation of engineering design of a small, single-warhead ICBM; and 3) a technology program to resolve hardness uncertainties with respect to ICBM silos, shelters and mobile vehicles.

3. Scowcroft Commission's Report, p. 4.

4. For further discussion of this subject, see this author's article, "MX and the Counterforce Problem: A Case For Silo Deployment," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1981, pp.16-26.

5. Scowcroft Commission's Report, pp. 2-6.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 6. Also see, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1982* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 41.

7. It is this author's opinion that the ICBM survivability issue merely has become a convenient and effective roadblock to MX deployment on the part of Congressional opponents. It is doubtful that those who raise the specter of survivability every time an MX basing mode is proposed to the Congress are truly in favor of *any* meaningful modernization of the U.S. ICBM force.

8. At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to discuss the rationale behind 100 MX missiles and the effect of the number deployed on near-term stability. There is a certain target set in the Soviet Union

consisting of high-value, blast-resistant assets, which MX should hold at risk. Clearly, 1,000 MX weapons (10 on each missile) would not saturate this target set — thereby avoiding the appearance of a disarming U.S. first-strike capability. However, with 1,000 MX warheads the U.S. at least can threaten the Soviet SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs (comprising the bulk of their prompt counter-military capability) plus a number of high-priority command and control targets. Conversely, any number below 100 MX missiles — say 50 — would lessen the deterrent value of a U.S. capability.

9. A disturbing side-effect of this ICBM survivability debate is a growing popular belief that the United States should place most of its strategic ballistic missiles in survivable submarines at sea. Unfortunately, this tends to ignore the tremendous costs associated with maintaining the required numbers of on-station, on-alert and C³-connected SSBNs to place at risk the vast numbers of targets in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the SSBN force is grossly inefficient at achieving destruction of many of the targets alluded to by the Commission — primarily because of its range and accuracy limitations. It is highly conceivable, therefore, that even though the U.S. SSBN force has high survivability, its war-fighting inadequacies might preclude it from being a decisive factor if the United States found itself solely dependent on its SSBNs in a nuclear war.

In short, the SLBM is no match for the ICBM when it comes to damage effectiveness against most of the potential high-value targets in the Soviet Union. One wonders if this is not a contributing factor behind the Soviet Union's choice to deploy most of its offensive nuclear firepower in the form of quickly reacting, flexible and broadly capable ICBMs.



Congress and the Arms Control Process

Through restrictive and questionable use of the appropriations process, Congress has enthusiastically entered the realm of arms control negotiations and the development of strategic doctrine. Traditionally this prerogative has been left to the President and the executive branch. Congressional assertiveness in arms control has generated increasing concern in the White House and on Capitol Hill. Never before has the Congress placed on a President in the midst of delicate negotiations the number of legislative fetters that the 97th and present Congresses have levied against President Reagan. The result has been to stall the very negotiations which the supporters of such legislation maintain are their primary goal.

Controlling the escalation of sophisticated military hardware is an issue that began long before nuclear weapons were introduced on the battlefield in August 1945. Societies have grappled with the question for a large portion of the twentieth century and in earnest in the two decades since the Cuban missile crisis.

With the introduction of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons able to inflict escalating levels of destruction in time of war, public and congressional concern has been focused on arriving at an acceptable method of controlling the use of nuclear weapons and decreasing or phasing out their production and deployment.

For a multiplicity of reasons, the former goal has been met, at least since 1945. It is therefore the latter, the question of halting the continued production of nuclear weapons and their deployment, which has generated the most interest over the course of the last three decades.

Over the past few years, however, the interest in halting the production of nuclear weapons, rather than simply controlling their spread, has increased markedly. The issue of arms control and nuclear arms production has become one of the divisive issues in American politics for the 1980s, and has been the focus of a disproportionately large amount of legislative effort in the last two sessions of Congress.

MEASURING CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Congress has always participated actively in the arms control process since dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union began in the early 1960s. The nature of legislative input into the arms debate, however, has changed markedly since the first talks with the Russians during the Kennedy Administration and the early negotiations that led to the SALT treaties of the late 1960s and 1970s.

The Congress has traditionally acted in an "advise and consent" role in consultation with the President to carry out direct arms control policy and negotiations with the Soviet

Union. Congressional leaders were kept informed to the extent necessary through presidential meetings and selective closed hearings with appropriate committees and Hill leadership.

The nature of congressional action on the SALT treaties was purely after the fact. That is, the Congress refrained from impinging on the nation's arms control policy during and before the negotiations, recognizing the vital necessity of supporting a combined U.S. diplomatic effort at the bargaining table devoid of partisan congressional politics. The Congress carefully avoided any legislative initiative that would undercut the President's claim of "full and complete" congressional support during the talks. Even during Jimmy Carter's pursuit of SALT II, critics in Congress remained silent during the talks in the hope that a viable and workable agreement could be engineered; they recognized that dissent would only detract from the strength of the nation's negotiating position.

That is not to say that serious and protracted debate did not take place after both SALT agreements were concluded. Following the completion of the SALT I treaty, congressional concern surfaced in the form of hearings and sharp criticism on the floor, culminating in legislation modifying the Treaty and placing exact stipulations on the future of U.S. adherence to the Treaty based on the results of future Soviet and U.S. action. Public Law 92-448, drafted by Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), stipulated "The Congress . . . urges and requests the President to seek a future treaty that, *inter alia*, would not limit the United States to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits provided by the Soviet Union."

Debate on the SALT I agreement was predicated primarily on this amendment. Though the amendment was intended to clearly set the tone of the U.S. negotiating position in any subsequent discussions with the Soviet Union on the question of strategic arms limitation, the key point is that the entire debate and subsequent amendment to the treaty were pursued in the Congress after negotiations with the Soviets were concluded, not before or during the negotiating process.

The same pattern was followed during the SALT II process, resulting in an even more intensive and divisive legislative debate. Opposition in the Senate was so strong that the SALT II treaty never reached the Senate floor for ratification, though the United States continues to abide by its basic provisions. Again, the entire legislative controversy took place after formal negotiations concluded.

The attitude of the Congress toward the question of arms control and presidential prerogative versus the legislative

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CONGRESS AND ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

branch's growing insistence on legally mandating the course of strategic negotiations is a recent congressional phenomenon initiated in the last two years.

Through the legislative process, Congress has attempted to circumvent the traditional prerogative of the President to set the pace and scope of the arms control talks and associated issues and to assume themselves the selection and production of nuclear weapons and negotiations with our allies concerning the deployment of U.S. strategic weapons on foreign soil.

This relatively recent tendency of the Congress to legislatively limit the presidential powers of negotiation and treaty making represents a surge in congressional power at the expense of the executive branch which will seriously be curtailed due to the recent Supreme Court decision limiting the extent of the legislative veto. Even so, the use of non-binding resolutions and budget authority represent two significant ways in which the arms control policy may be disrupted by the excessive use of legislative power during the negotiating process. This congressional tactic is best exemplified in the nuclear freeze debate that has occupied an inordinately large amount of legislative attention over the last two years.

FREEZING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN THE START TALKS

Early in the 97th Congress, liberal members of the House put forth a series of amendments which would unilaterally curtail the U.S. production and deployment of nuclear weapons on the proviso that the Soviet Union participate in a "mutual and verifiable" fashion.

The House has acted twice on similar measures, once at the end of the 97th Congress and again last May, in the current session. During both debates, critics of the freeze concept pointed to a number of dangers for the nation's defense if the United States chose to limit its ability to produce and deploy weapons systems comparable to those which the Soviet Union has already deployed and continues to produce in alarming numbers today.

In addition to the obvious military risks, the freeze movement and the legislative motivation behind it also present a serious challenge to the ability of the United States, and the President as the head of state, to pursue arms agreements with the required amounts of flexibility and authority.

Proponents of the various freeze resolutions have made no attempt to disguise the fact that one of the prime motivations behind the freeze is to dilute presidential authority in the negotiations process and to give that responsibility to Congress through legislation which drastically constrains the parameters of presidential power in the negotiations process. Rep. Les AuCoin (D-Ore.), during debate last March, confirmed the political nature and intent of the freeze campaign: "The freeze movement was born because this government (the Reagan Administration) is doing too much to prepare for war and not nearly enough to prevent it."

The answer, according to Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), is to keep the President from being allowed to threaten the construction of additional nuclear weapons, even as a "bargaining chip" to be used to gain Soviet concessions during the START talks, or future negotiations. "It is the feeling of the nuclear freeze movement that there are enough bargaining chips," Markey insisted.

Though tacitly denied by its supporters, the nuclear freeze movement is pushing the United States dangerously close to unilateral disarmament by preventing the replacement of aging or vulnerable systems. Opponents of the freeze resolution have consistently maintained that throughout their history, U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations, or any major military agreements, have required a U.S. negotiating position based on real and perceived military strength. The success of reducing the mutual arsenal of nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union rests on the principle of parity, as Congressman William L. Dickinson (R-Ala.) rhetorically warned: "Will we freeze where we are, which puts us in a position of less than parity ... and then negotiate?"

Though the House has accepted a few amendments which allow the nation's strategic arsenal to be "modernized," freeze proponents promise to oppose the production and deployment of the MX, the Trident II and other supposed "first strike weapons." In short, they are targeting every major system intended to place the nation on a sound footing from which to seek Soviet concessions at the bargaining table.

Supporters insist that the freeze initiative as passed again by the House on May 4, 1983, in no way constrains the President in the Administration's talks with the Soviet Union. These same legislators, however, refused to support an amendment by Rep. Dan Lungren (R-Calif.), which would have specified that the freeze resolution was "not binding on the president or his negotiators in the conduct of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks."

The net effect has been precisely that, however. The liberal supporters of the freeze who successfully engineered the passage of the resolution have always maintained, through the specific legislation they have either supported or opposed, that the intent of the resolution would be to stipulate the nature and number of new strategic systems the United States could build, regardless of Soviet actions. A report prepared by the House Foreign Affairs Committee came to a similar conclusion, arguing that the freeze resolution "mandated" specific guidelines for the President in the conduct of foreign policy. This directly contravenes the constitutional responsibility of the President to negotiate treaties on behalf of the nation.

The precedent created is disastrous on several levels. First, the Congress has demonstrated that delicate negotiations can be dragged into the arena of partisan politics and used primarily as a tool to attack a President with only secondary concerns for the ultimate security interests of the United

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CONGRESS AND ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

States. Second, the constitutional division of power which recognizes the necessity of but one diplomatic voice speaking for the nation has been blatantly ignored and with damaging result. And third, the ultimate self-proclaimed goal of the freeze supporters in Congress, that of a world free from the threat of nuclear war, is clearly endangered by denying the United States the opportunity to negotiate as an equal strategic power. Though the resolution will most certainly not achieve any binding legal status, the precedent is a dangerous one. The effect can already be seen in the recent House vote on MX missile funding, which would render any president's ability to carry on legitimate arms control policy virtually impossible.

MX HELD HOSTAGE

The most recent vote on the MX released \$625 million this year for continued basing mode studies and flight testing. But the MX weapon system is being held hostage by the Congress which stipulates that its ultimate deployment must be based on an assessment by the legislature of the President's success in negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva. Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) summarized the basis for Senate support of the new funding measure: "My vote is a tentative vote, it is based on what the President does on arms reduction." Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.) reinforced Specter's view, adding, "I am reluctantly willing to agree to this appropriation, but only on one condition. . . . The Administration must produce some evidence [that it] is willing to adopt a new arms control strategy."

Indeed the subsequent approval of additional funds for the MX missile will be contingent on congressional review, a legislative assessment of the President's record of arms talks with the Soviet Union in the current round of the START talks in Geneva. Even in light of the Supreme Court's decision limiting the legislative veto, the Congress can still exercise its right to deny future funding for production and deployment.

The logic behind the legislator's action is at once difficult to understand and critically flawed. The future decision of whether the United States will deploy a new and apparently threatening weapon against the increasing superiority of Soviet land-based strategic ICBMs rests in large measure with the actions of the nation against whom the missile is to be targeted. That is, if the Soviets refuse to negotiate seriously at the talks presently underway in Europe on the premise that the United States is not bargaining in good faith, the Congress of the United States has indicated that the funds will not be approved for continued production of the MX. In essence, the Soviets have the ability to effectively influence U.S. strategic policy to their advantage by merely insisting that the talks are not in their interest and refusing to compromise.

Senator Jackson pointed out the importance of holding firm on the production of the MX missile as an important indication of the nation's commitment to increasing its strategic strength if Soviet compromises and reductions in nuclear production were not forthcoming: "The MX is absolutely necessary as an incentive to the Soviet leaders to persuade them that it is in their national interest to seek strategic arms reductions. Given our ten year debate on the MX program, what credibility would the Soviets place in statements of our intent to deploy a small, single-warhead ICBM sometime in the 1990s?"

Like the freeze, the MX funding battle has taken on a clearly ideological quality which threatens the strength of the U.S. negotiating position in Geneva in the short term and the basis of strategic negotiations in the long term.

In an attempt to usurp the Administration's option of laying the fundamentals of the nation's strategic policy, the Congress has allowed the more liberal elements of both major parties to manipulate the United States into a position that allows for little flexibility at the negotiating table and serves to weaken the President's ability to seek a viable agreement from a position of strength. Contrary to the liberal promise, the Soviet Union has shown no propensity to curtail production of nuclear weapons except when the United States was solely in possession of a particular system or technology which presented a clear and credible danger to their nuclear survivability. The much heralded ABM Treaty of SALT I is a clear example of a "concession" on the part of the Soviets after being confronted with an obvious U.S. technological advantage in strategic capability.

Unilateral Cutbacks in U.S. Strategic Forces Since 1975*

1983	*Production funds for the MX missile denied *54 Titan II missile launchers scheduled for deactivation
1982	*ALCM procurement total cutback *MX funding denied *Pershing II program scaled back *Chemical weapons funding cut
1981	*Planned MX deployment of 200 missiles halved
1980-81	*10 Polaris submarines with 160 SLBMs deactivated
1977-82	*Trident submarine construction cut back and delayed *Trident II missile development postponed
1977-81	*ACLM, GLCM, SLCM production delayed and cut back
1979	*400 Hound Dog cruise missiles deactivated
1978	*SRAM production line closed
1978	*Minuteman III ICBM production line closed-100 missiles cancelled
1977	*250 B-1 bombers cancelled (In 1981 100 bombers were reordered)
1975	*Single U.S. ABM site deactivated

*Since 1967 the number of strategic launchers has steadily declined due to attrition. The chart above does not include the large number of tactical nuclear and chemical weapons that have also been cut back, dismantled or deteriorated beyond servability.

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CONGRESS AND ARMS CONTROL...CONTINUED

The U.S. propensity to cancel strategic programs in the name of international stability and "detente" is exemplified by the chart on the top of page three. The United States has failed to procure a major strategic system in any quantity since the signing of the first SALT I agreement, while the Soviet Union has increased its own strategic arsenal at an alarming rate. The message is clear but somehow lost on many Congressmen: The state of U.S.-Soviet negotiations is not a determining factor in the Soviet Union's decision to expand its strategic arsenal. The rate of growth remains threateningly high whether a perceived state of "detente" exists or not.

Congressional action on the MX has provided the Kremlin with the opportunity to impact significantly on U.S. strategic doctrine. The result is, unfortunately, predictable.

CONCLUSION

The Congress has spent an inordinate amount of legislative effort on relatively unimportant and even damaging aspects of the strategic arms question. The nuclear freeze has commanded a large amount of congressional time with no positive result for the U.S. nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, it has served to distract the United States from the major arms control question of the current talks: Does the record of Soviet compliance with the first two SALT agreements, and particularly the international ban on the use of chemical weapons, warrant U.S. consideration of any new agreements with the USSR? However, almost no congressional hearings or inquiries have been launched to refute or confirm mounting evidence of continued violation of both the strategic arms agreements and the ban on the use of chemical and biological weapons.

Hence, the Congress operates at present within an unrealistic frame of reference when it comes to the question of arms control. The notion of a nuclear free world is a laudable goal and one which appeals to the conscience of the American people. But the congressional approach to reaching that goal is based on the ignorant assumption that the small oligarchy which controls the Soviet Union shares the same benign hope for the future. The history of Soviet armed aggression against its neighbors and overseas, coupled with the unprecedented growth in all facets of the Soviet military over the past decade, indicates that the Kremlin's world view does not at all resemble that of the United States. U.S. negotiators misunderstood Soviet intentions and motivations in the 1960s and 1970s. The 98th Congress is making the same mistake today.

Little child shall lead them

The complex and painful subject of arms control occupies about as much space in the news as any other subject.

There is one exception that it is hoped is only temporary. That is the blatant emphasis in Washington on the case of the Carter campaign papers.

Aside from that, most of the world has been occupied intensely for more than a year with a bewildering number of proposals concerning the reduction of arms, especially nuclear.

The variety of approaches has been almost infinite. They have ranged from zero nuclear missiles to the most recent one advocating more missiles but fewer warheads.

The thought of combining the two major negotiations in Geneva also has been expressed. Those are both of long-standing and little progress. The START discussions, formerly SALT, have to do with strategic weapons and the other negotiations concern the opposing forces in Europe, especially the shorter range nuclear weapons.

One non-productive result of that idea has been to generate some reported bickering between the U.S. members of both negotiat-

ing teams. Further on the subject of bickering is the running argument, not only in the United States but throughout NATO and kept alive by the Kremlin, that President Reagan doesn't really have much interest in arms control agreements.

To what extent that contentious and muddled situation has brought on major movements supporting the nuclear freeze or "no first use" of nuclear weapons is not clear. What is clear, however, is that Moscow is orchestrating a massive campaign of peace conferences and public protest in support of those concepts.

Soviet President Yuri Andropov has been active personally in adding to the general confusion. He has proposed, for example, making the Baltic region a nuclear-free zone. At the same time he has made threats directly and indirectly to increase Soviet nuclear missiles in Europe substantially if NATO goes ahead with the shipment of U.S. missiles to Europe.

Andropov has applied the same formula to Central America. It is the classic, even though atomic, carrot-and-stick method.

Meanwhile, the U.S. defense budget debate is injecting its share of confusion into the scenario of



Glen W. Martin

peace-seeking.

In recent weeks it has been reported that committees of both the House and Senate have supported the modernization of the strategic triad — the MX, the Trident and the B-1.

Last week, however, several senators made it clear that they were going to try to sabotage the MX program. Most of the senators involved are declared or potential Democratic presidential candidates. That, of course, introduces the domestic political factor rather heavily in what should be a unified, bipartisan effort.

The administration is not entirely without blame. The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, whose appointment was controversial from the beginning, also has suggested the possibility of canceling the MX. But the president maintains that bargaining can be

successful only from a position of strength.

Peace through strength is traditional in the United States and has been cited by many of its presidents beginning with George Washington.

Nevertheless, many clerics and academicians of various persuasions also have joined the fray. Although most of them are probably well-meaning, they have added to the obfuscation of the arms control issue.

To top it off, accusations and recriminations are flung back and forth between Moscow and Washington. Recent headlines typify the jousting:

- "Soviet Demands Seen Imperiling Talks in Geneva."
- "Pravda Say U.S. Blocks Arms Talks."
- "Superpower Thaw? U.S. Relations With Soviets Are Improving."

Adding to this disarray are two factors in addition to the confusion about the facts.

One is the highly emotional nature of the issue. That condition always makes understanding and agreement much more difficult. The endless agony in Ireland is a case in point, not to mention the Middle East.

The other factor that saps confidence in the general outlook for arms negotiations is the evident disunity that arises from all of the disparate actions.

The importance of unity itself in arms control was perceived more than 50 years ago by Salvador de Madariaga, Spain's ambassador to the old League of Nations. He noted that unity, albeit forced, existed in the Soviet bloc, but not freedom. On the other hand, the West enjoyed freedom but suffered from disunity.

Meanwhile, an 11-year-old American girl, Samantha Smith, was invited to the Soviet Union by Andropov. The invitation resulted from a letter to him from Samantha raising some pertinent questions about nuclear war and avoiding it.

If she can escape becoming a Communist propaganda event, it would be remarkable if an intelligent and attractive child could, by her own initiative, enable some of the road blocks to effective arms control to be surmounted.

A biblical prophecy would be fulfilled: "The wolf also shall dwell with the lamb . . . and a little child shall lead them."

SAN DIEGO UNION

31 July 1983

Star Wars indeed

When Ronald Reagan announced his support for an actual defense against nuclear attack this spring, the idea was dismissed out of hand as a Star Wars concept, light years from reality. Yet a few days ago, the Air Force used a laser weapon to shoot down five consecutive sidewinder missiles moving at 2,000 miles an hour. E.T., call your office.

Unfortunately, the Pentagon seems apathetic — even negative — about proposals to build a defensive shield not in the next century, but now.

Defense expert John Gardner, head of a Pentagon study on defense technology, testified in April that there are “no technological barriers” to building a non-laser fleet of satellites capable of knocking out about 98 percent of any Soviet missile attack, and doing it by 1987. Yet when Gardner solicited help from in-

dustry contractors in July, he specifically asked them *not* to “emphasize early deployment.” He said the United States is looking for plans that will take until the “post-2000 era” to begin.

Mr. Gardner’s argument, and the argument of many critics of strategic defense, is that most of the quick-to-deploy systems would knock out “only” 95 to 99 percent of a Soviet attack. In other words, they would save 50 to 150 million lives, but that’s not good enough for nuclear war.

That may or may not be valid strategy. Nuclear physicist Edward Teller argues, convincingly, that a fast, cheap, but crude defense system is precisely what’s needed. Early defenses would immediately close the vulnerability of U.S. missiles (at less than the MX will cost). And they would solve some of the technological

kinks that any defense system will face — like how to defend our defensive satellites against attack themselves.

Then, when more exotic technology comes along, we’ll be ready.

Valid or not, all these strategic points are, well, strategic — not technological.

Reagan science adviser George Keyworth has been overseeing that report — due on the President’s desk by October — from the White House. We suggest Mr. Keyworth draft a swift memorandum reminding Mr. Gardner that his job is to conduct research, not manipulate grand strategy.

What a shame it will be if that memo is never sent — and a proposal to end the madness of Mutual Assured Destruction strategies gets buried in the “out” file of a Pentagon bureaucrat.

A needed missile

Both the U.S. nuclear deterrent and its arms reductions position will be strengthened somewhat by this week's Senate approval of the new MX. On both grounds, a beefing up of the nation's land-based arsenal is justified — yes, even at an ultimate cost of some \$40 billion — and although MX is not everything it could be, it is needed and now.

For all its size and accuracy, those were but two of the pluses that originally recommended it. But there is a serious shortcoming. Its main rationale was the need for a land-based missile impervious to a Soviet first strike — a need born of the increasing vulnerability of fixed-position Minuteman silos. Yet as approved, those same vulnerable silos will hold at least the first batch of MX missiles — the 27 of an eventual 100 that will be deployed beginning in 1986.

From shell game to dense pack, some 30 assorted basing modes have been rejected — some because of costs, others because of feasibility, and all, in some measure, because of politics. Still, scrapping the missile altogether would leave the nation dependent years into the future on the Minuteman, itself becoming obsolete in light of

Soviet technological advances, and puny beside the "heavy" missiles Russia now deploys. For a couple of reasons, MX is a worthy replacement.

The size of the MX, each of which will carry 10 independently targetable warheads, makes it more than three times more destructive than the largest existing U.S. land-based missile. Moreover, its range is longer and its accuracy more precise — and it won't be quite so vulnerable as Minuteman. According to the Air Force, extra silos could provide "deceptive basing," and it will have greater resistance to the effects of nuclear blasts.

The hangup in Congress, of course, was mainly on the question of whether procurement of MX would escalate the arms race. The Soviet buildup, particularly in the above-noted heavy missiles, has already put us in a catch-up position — a position Russia fails to acknowledge in its limitations proposals. And certainly any freeze talk without MX would only freeze U.S. arsenals at below parity. The Reagan administration has shown its willingness to negotiate for arms reductions, and is making progress toward START talks.

Clearly, the lack of an impregnable basing system envisioned for MX makes it less the deterrent it might have been. But U.S. commitment to countering the Soviet-weighted balance of terror is one more tool to force the Russians to the bargaining table — the sort needed to reduce the nuclear threat.

Cranston on the Issues

Someone has said that all you need to do to get an idea of what kind of a president California's liberal Sen. Alan Cranston would make is to put him on TV for a few minutes. But it is perhaps just as instructive to *read* some of his words, such as we have had the opportunity to do in a couple of speech texts issued by his office in the past few days.

Let us take up first the matter of confirming Paul Volcker for a new term as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Cranston said he was voting against the confirmation of Volcker for another term, and we presume he did so, not because of any "personal objection" to Volcker but because "he is the architect and symbol of a cold, cruel and callous economic policy."

"It has deliberately produced recession and high unemployment, bankruptcies and foreclosures and has broken the fair expectations of working men and women, business people, farmers and homeowners, that they should have a reasonable opportunity to earn a decent living and lead a dignified life."

Considering what Ronald Reagan inherited from the Carter administration in January, 1981, we would say that at least something has worked.

Please recall that it was the liberals in Congress who were first resisting any attempt to deal with the recession from anything other than pouring more money from the treasury onto the raging fires of inflation which only made them burn more fiercely.

Cranston doesn't offer any solution. The only conclusion one can reach is that he would have resorted to the time-etched liberal formula of pumping more tax dollars into the economy, which caused the economic debacle in the first place.

That is Cranston on economics and fiscal policy. Let's now turn to Senator Cranston on defense and foreign relations.

The Californian also said he was voting against the \$2.5 billion funding for the MX missile contained in the Defense Authorization Bill, asserting, "The best step we could take now for our national security is to kill the MX program once and for all."

While Cranston carefully avoids any commitment to opposition totally to shoring up our national defense, he suggests that the MX program is flawed because of changes that have been made in its basing mode, asserting that the administration said it would be more survivable under the dense pack system and then changed to the Minuteman hardened silo alternative.

Mr. Cranston seems to be saying, too, that the MX has been around *too long*. But what he neglects to say is that it has been around for 10 years and its basing modes have been switched because of the intransigence of Congress and the opposition of the disarmament, anti-nukes and assorted pacifist groups.

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
Cranston accuses the administration of engaging in "political theater and rhetorical bombast" in pushing the present MX program through Congress, adding, "Finding a justification for the MX has proved a thorny problem for the Reagan administration. After several blue ribbon commissions studied the problem, the last, the Scowcroft Commission, declared that we need the MX to demonstrate 'national will' to the Soviet Union."

Calling this a "weak and unconvincing argument," Cranston who had also claimed that the MX is a "more accurate, lethal and threatening weapon" than Minuteman III, contends that it "does not demonstrate 'national will' to deploy a weapons system that has no satisfactory basing mode and has no clear strategic mission."

But this doesn't make sense; certainly it has a strategic mission, and Cranston proves it by pointing to the MX as being "more accurate, lethal and threatening" than the Minuteman or presumably any of our present missile systems. He claims the Soviet Union "already knows we are deadly serious about our commitment to defend our allies and our national interests." But are they, really; are they convinced when our chief strategic reliance is on a missile system that is 25 years old and has markedly less destructive potential than what the Soviets can throw at us?

Again Cranston doesn't offer any alternative; what we are doing is *bad* and he is against it. Al Cranston doesn't have to go on TV to point up his weaknesses; all one needs to do is read these two statements and conclude that he would make possibly the worst president we could ever have.





EDITORIALS:

- | | | |
|------------------------------|--------------|-------|
| 1. SAN DIEGO UNION | 31 July 1983 | (-) |
| 2. NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYNE | 29 July 1983 | (+) |
| 3. WYOMING STATE TRIBUNE | 30 July 1983 | (mix) |

MX MISSILES



HARRY ZUBKOFF, CHIEF, NEWS CLIPPING & ANALYSIS SERVICE, 695-2884

Panel Urged to Suggest New Arms Stance

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The special bipartisan commission that recently recommended deployment of MX nuclear missiles should "get back into business" and suggest changes in Reagan administration negotiating positions at the strategic arms reduction talks (START) with the Soviet Union, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said yesterday.

In a letter to commission Chairman Brent Scowcroft, Aspin said the 11-member President's Commission on Strategic Forces "is just about the only body of people with the chance to bridge the ideological void" between the administration and many Democrats and moderate Republicans who doubt administration sincerity in seeking arms accords with the Soviets.

At a news conference, Aspin said that even though the administration may not like an outside commission recommending changes in White House negotiating positions it would be the best way to deal with the doubters, bolster declining congressional support for the MX and perhaps reach agreement with Moscow.

Aspin said that "If the administration wants to keep the bipartisan consensus on the deployment of MX . . . it has also got to have a bipartisan arms-control policy." He said the administration has made progress but still has "very little credibility" on arms-control issues.

Allowing Democrats, through the commission, to have a greater say in the negotiating stance, Aspin said, would give resultant bipartisan policy a better chance of surviving the 1984 election intact no matter who wins. This might end, he said, the constant discarding by one administration of its predecessor's policy in the complex arms-control field.

President Carter discarded President Ford's initiatives, and President Reagan has overturned Carter's efforts, he noted.

Rather than writing Reagan, Aspin said, he wrote to Scowcroft to urge the commission to play a "prominent role" in arms control because, if the president reinvoles the commission, political suspicion would be raised.

Although Aspin said he has no assurance about how his request will be received, he made clear that it had been discussed with Scowcroft and the White House and that Scowcroft would hold a news conference within a few days to announce a new effort by the commission.

Aspin denied that his proposal would throw a monkey wrench into the Geneva talks even though recent progress there has been reported.

In June, Reagan ordered that the commission's life be extended but said he did not intend to have it alter internal White House positions at the arms talks.

Aspin said the United States would submit a new proposal at the next round of the START

talks to begin Oct. 6. He said he hopes the commission can recommend changes in time for inclusion in that proposal and that the White House will accept the changes.

The START negotiations deal with reducing the number of intercontinental-range missiles and bombers on both sides.

The original Scowcroft commission of well-known former government officials and public figures from both parties was appointed by Reagan last year in an effort to solve the five-year question of what to do with the MX.

The commission recommended deploying 100 missiles, but also recommended a move away from the big, multiple-warhead MX missiles to smaller, single-warhead weapons, something favored by arms-control advocates. It also urged pressing ahead with negotiations but made few detailed recommendations in that regard.

Many congressional moderates have supported the MX on the basis of administration acceptance of the commission report and its pledge to press ahead on arms control. Aspin is a pivotal figure among them.

He noted that winning margins on MX votes in Congress recently have declined sharply and predicted that, if the moderates abandon the missile this fall, it will certainly lose in the House. He said it might even lose in the Republican-controlled Senate if the White House does not come through on promises made to key senators to include in a revised START proposal the so-called "build-down" plan for reductions.

Aspin said this situation gives the moderates "more leverage than ever . . . to nudge the administration toward a more bipartisan arms control policy" with Democrats making greater contributions.

He said the U.S. negotiating stance is still "murky" and has not been explained well to Congress or the public.

He said, for example, that the administration timetable for big cuts in the Soviet arsenal of very large missiles is unclear. If the administration plans to force such cuts quickly, that will never lead to agreement, he said.

Aspin said he doubts that a START agreement can be reached before the 1984 presidential election, but that some agreement in principle might be reached similar to the accord at Vladivostok reached by President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1975.

Aspin urges arms-curb changes

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Representative Les Aspin (D, Wis.), asserting that the Reagan administration lacks credibility on arms control, yesterday urged the bipartisan Scowcroft commission to formulate arms-negotiating proposals that both liberals and conservatives could support.

Without such a new approach, Mr. Aspin told a press conference, the MX intercontinental missile — keystone of the administration's strategic weapons program — could go down to defeat in Congress.

With crucial new votes on the MX lying ahead, Mr. Aspin undertook a political maneuver that at first look seemed to short-circuit the White House and call for direct intervention of an outside panel in framing the nation's proposals for negotiating with the Soviet Union.

On closer observation, however, it seemed fair speculation that his move was part of an orchestrated effort which would bring the desired response from the Scowcroft commission and administration willingness to sit still for the undertaking.

The commission, headed by retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft, was originally set up by President Reagan to devise a basing plan for the MX at a time when administration plans were being thwarted in Congress.

With bipartisan representation, the commission proposed building 100 MX missiles, developing a new and small missile for the future and pursuing new arms-control approaches. Mr. Reagan endorsed the panel's package.

With pursuit of arms control as a quid pro quo, Mr. Aspin and several other moderate-to-liberal Democrats formed a coalition that backed the MX and enabled the administration to win two victories in the House.

Now the time is coming for House votes on appropriating money for the production of the MX, which the

House earlier endorsed as a policy matter.

The outcome is in doubt.

Mr. Aspin said yesterday that earlier MX approvals were contingent on a new approach to arms control — "the core concern of many of us" — but many in Congress and in the public "fail to see any progress in arms control."

While he himself generally accepts what the administration is seeking to do in Geneva talks and in pursuing development of the small missile, Mr. Aspin contended there were two problems:

First, most arms-control developments take place behind closed doors. Second, "the administration lacks credibility so it cannot just describe changes in general terms and win nods of approval."

Arms control has not been delivered, he said, and "people are wary of being snookered."

In his letter to General Scowcroft, Mr. Aspin urged that proposals be developed on three major arms-control issues in order to produce "an honest and bipartisan position."

These issues, on which liberals and conservatives have varying positions, involve the "throw-weight" or total destructive power in superpower nuclear arsenals, limitations on bombers (as well as missiles), and provision of incentives for both sides to move gradually away from big missiles carrying multiple warheads.

Since military bureaucracies do not like to dismantle weapons, Mr. Aspin said, the reductions in total destructive power and in multiheaded missiles should be harnessed over a period of years to "the natural bureaucratic drive to replace aging weapons."

MX Panel Urged to Alter Arms Treaty Plan

By CHARLES MOHR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 29 — Representative Les Aspin urged the President's Commission on Strategic Forces today to put forward a new, "bipartisan" and more flexible proposal for a treaty to reduce intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Mr. Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat whose vote and influence in the House were credited with helping the White House win an early victory on the MX missile earlier this year, said rejection of his advice was likely to result in a defeat for the program when Congress votes on appropriations for the weapon in the fall.

Mr. Aspin, a member of the Armed Services Committee and a former Pentagon official, made his proposal in a news conference this afternoon and in a letter to the chairman of the commission on strategic forces, Brent Scowcroft, a retired Air Force lieutenant general. Representative Aspin said he had also advised the White House of his suggestion and asserted that "some people in the Administration think it's a good idea."

Report Is Expected Soon

The Congressman said his suggestion was "put forward in the expectation that it is going to happen" and that the commission would be able to report on a bipartisan arms control proposal in "about a month."

General Scowcroft, who was national security adviser to President Ford, had no immediate comment, but one official said Mr. Scowcroft was likely to make a statement later in the week.

The 11-member commission was appointed by President Reagan to save the MX missile program, which became endangered last year when Congress rejected the President's proposal to base the missile in a tight cluster, a system called dense pack. The panel's report linked a recommendation that 100 of the missiles be deployed in fixed silos with recommendations that the United States develop a small, single-warhead missile and pursue a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union that would lead to equal numbers of warheads of roughly equivalent explosive power.

Reagan Changed Early Plan

Mr. Aspin and some other key Democrats stressed that they viewed the Scowcroft recommendations as a "package."

Mr. Reagan did modify his original strategic arms reduction proposal by raising a proposed limit on missile launchers upward from 850 and later by dropping a demand that each power be limited to only 2,500 warheads on land-based missiles. However, Mr.

Aspin said today that the President's position was "murky" and that it seemed to many members of Congress to amount to a nonnegotiable demand that the Soviets dismantle most of their nuclear arsenal.

Representative Aspin said permitting the Scowcroft commission to "get back in the arms control business here" would tend to convince skeptical members of Congress that Mr. Reagan's arms control intentions were credible. A "bipartisan" negotiating proposal would also help in ultimately achieving the necessary consent of two-thirds of the Senate to any treaty, Mr. Aspin said.

No 'Ultimatums' As Yet

Support for the Scowcroft recommendations as "a package" by Mr. Aspin and by Representatives Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee and Norman D. Dicks of Washington, both Democrats, figured in the House vote last month to authorize production of the MX.

Mr. Aspin said he was issuing no "ultimatums" and was "on board with the Scowcroft package" as long as the White House was seen to be keeping its end of the bargain. But he added that if Democrats such as himself, Mr. Gore and Mr. Dicks abandon the President, "MX goes down in the House."

He later said that while he did not now contemplate changing his vote, the missile would be defeated anyway unless the White House made a more flexible arms control proposal when negotiations resume in Geneva on Oct. 6.

Mr. Aspin did not offer a detailed negotiating position himself, but in a paper accompanying his letter to Mr. Scowcroft, he suggested several broad principles. One involved the issue of throw weight, which is the weight of warheads, guidance equipment, warhead dispenser and decoys that a missile can lift. The Soviet Union, which has developed much larger missiles than the United States is believed to have about 13 million pounds of throw weight on 2,300 missiles, in contrast to about 4.5 million pounds on 1,000 American ballistic missiles.

The Congressman said the Administration's demands that the Soviet Union rapidly give up its throw weight advantage caused Congressional liberals to doubt that Mr. Reagan was negotiating in "good faith." But Mr. Aspin said that liberals who believed that the issue of throw weight was unimportant were mistaken.

"A possible compromise," he wrote to Mr. Scowcroft, "would provide for substantial reductions in Soviet throw weight, but over a number of years" so that it could be part of a normal modernization cycle when aging missile systems are replaced.

WYOMING EAGLE

28 August 1983

Pg. 1

Group Maps Its MX Fight

By ROSIE HARTY
Sunday Staff Writer

In a press conference in Casper Saturday, members of the Wyoming Nuclear Freeze Coalition announced that they aren't ready to give up the fight against the MX missile in the state.

The coalition, with 1,500 members scattered throughout the state, held a meeting "to plan strategies" and announce the establishment of newly-formed anti-MX groups in Gillette, Cody, Lander, Worland and Wheatland, according to chairperson Jeff Zacharakis-Jutz.

"The MX is not necessarily coming to Wyoming," he said, adding the group hopes to mount a campaign of "education and awareness" to mobilize what they see as a sizeable percentage of state residents opposed to the missile, and in favor of a bilateral, verifiable nuclear freeze.

Groups in several cities are planning walkathons as fundraisers for the coalition's efforts and as a demonstration of opposition, he said. The coalition is also planning to publicize "informational forums" between the Air Force and other groups opposed to the MX missile, sponsored by the League of Women Voters. Zacharakis-Jutz said the group is now ironing out "scheduling problems" but is tentatively planning public forums in Gillette, Casper, Laramie and Rock Springs.

The coalition has also begun work on a grant from the state to bring in speakers to represent both sides of the debate on a nuclear freeze.

Part of the meeting's purpose, he said, "was to encourage Wyoming people to become involved in the MX issue."

"We really want to concentrate on getting Wyoming people to speak out," he said.

Only a small portion of the state's residents strongly favor the missile and its deployment and that number is steadily declining, he said. He pointed to a survey by the conservative Wyoming Heritage Foundation which showed a decline in support for basing the missile in Wyoming. Based on 410 responses, the poll showed 57 percent favored the missile, as opposed to 64 percent in a poll taken for Senator Alan Simpson.

Zacharakis-Jutz said there are

enough current supporters of the MX that are "soft" and can be persuaded against the missile to make a difference in the state. He said the group hopes to work with them "in a positive way."

"There are a lot of people who will be changing their mind," he said. "In Utah, they first accepted the MX, and then rejected it. It can happen here."

Zacharakis-Jutz said group members believe Cheyenne is not as well-informed on all sides of the MX, and not aware that some people in other parts of the state oppose it strongly.

"People in Cheyenne really need to know that the feeling is different in other parts of the state," he said.

The economic benefits of the MX "are clouding" the basic facts surrounding the missile, he said.

"People in Cheyenne are not getting all the information," he said. "They're still grabbing on desperately to the hope that it's going to create jobs and that's not going to happen."

"The people of Cheyenne are being taken down the primrose path."

The freeze coalition works with

groups like the Tri-State Anti-MX Coalition and Western Solidarity against the MX, but focuses its attention on building support for a state-wide freeze resolution. Zacharakis-Jutz said the group had a good following, and presented strong testimony at legislative hearings on a bill concerning a freeze motion last year "that went on for hours." The motion was frozen in committee, but the coalition plans to launch another drive for the 1985 legislative session and their organization is working with neighboring states and groups that have launched successful freeze campaigns in their states.

"It's easy to get behind the freeze — the network nationwide is very strong," he said. "Wyoming is one of the weaker states because we have a difficult system to get a referendum in."

Developing support in Wyoming for the freeze won't be accomplished overnight, he added, but Wyoming can catch up with the national momentum.

"It's a matter of education and awareness," he said. "We've spent 20 years developing a nuclear mentality and it's going to take time to change that."

WETA-TV, PBS NETWORK

7 August 1983

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

From the Editor's Desk

WETA-TV
PBS Network

August 7, 1983 11:30 A.M.

Washington, D.C.

Arms Control

RICHARD HEFFNER: Joining me today is Robert Kurvan (?) of the New York Times Editorial Board. Also with me here at the Editor's Desk is Walter Isaacson, associated editor of Time magazine. And our guest in Washington is United States Senator Charles Mathias, Republican from Maryland, Chairman of the powerful Senate Rules Committee.

* * *

WALTER ISAACSON: I'd like to get to the subject of arms control, if I could for a minute. What is your feeling now on the MX? You sort of tied it in with the President's sincerity to bargain with Moscow on strategic arms limitations talks. Are you going to support the MX the next time it comes up?

SENATOR CHARLES MATHIAS: I have supported the MX through the authorization process because I thought that that was an essential element in the Scowcroft Report. The Scowcroft Report was a carefully balanced recommendation that we go forward with a limited deployment of MX, but with a rather radical change in our arms control negotiating posture.

Now, we've put up our ante. We have agreed to the limited MX deployment. The authorization process has passed through the Senate. It's now up to the President to put up his ante. And I hope that he will do so. And if he does, then I think we can continue to work in the kind of coordinated way which the Founding Fathers conceived when they wrote the Constitution.

AF General 'Pleased' by Response to MX

The MX missile site east of Cheyenne, Wyo., 'is still a target in the Soviet view,' no matter what sort of weapons are deployed there, said Brigadier Gen. Gordon Fornell.

By PAT MCGRAW

Denver Post Staff Writer

The installation of 100 MX missiles in existing silos east of Cheyenne, Wyo., makes the area no more of a military target than it has been for about two decades, an Air Force defense expert said in Denver last week.

Brigadier Gen. Gordon Fornell said the site "is still a target in the Soviet view," no matter what sort of weapons are deployed there.

He characterized most residents in the Cheyenne area as viewing the MX deployment of the MX as "taking out a less-capable missile and replacing it."

The general, special assistant for MX matters at Air Force headquarters at the Pentagon, was in Denver to review programs at Lowry Air Force Base, where personnel are being trained to set up and maintain the missiles, each armed with 10 nuclear warheads.

Though the plans to replace the aging Minutemen missiles with the MXs has met with resistance from antiwar groups, the 46-year-old pilot said his agency has been "very pleased and encouraged" by the response to the program by residents in the vicinity of the silos.

He added that the below-ground silos do not disturb wildlife. "A

cow can come up and rub against the fence while the (silo) hums away," explained Fornell.

The first missiles were put into silos in 1963 on the windswept and barren missile site where the borders of Wyoming, Colorado and Nebraska converge. The MX missiles would spread from southeastern Wyoming across the border into Nebraska.

Fornell added that the Air Force is aware of, and will try to do something about about construc-

tion activity at the silos that has brought "a boom-or-bust cycle" to the area's economy.

During a discussion with The Denver Post's editorial board, Fornell said replacing the old missiles with the new ones is all the Air Force has planned for the area.

He said a program to "harden" the silos to enable them to better withstand an attack isn't envisioned at the moment, though "there is some potential in construction techniques" that might

lead to reconstruction later on.

Likewise, he said, there are no plans to protect the new missile with an anti-missile system. That approach, Fornell said, makes sense when all of the attacking missiles "have to come down the same funnel" to reach their objective. It wouldn't make sense in this case, because the missiles are spread out over hundreds of square miles.

Though another missile system involving smaller missiles in mobile launch vehicles already is

being discussed, Fornell said the MXs are expected to serve as part of the American arsenal past the year 2000.

The first flight test of the MX was completed successfully on June 17, and another is scheduled later this month.

Though the question of whether to deploy such a system has been debated hotly, Congress now appears committed to the program and the Air Force is proceeding on an established timetable.

Hearings on the environmental impact of the project are planned for late October and early November, and Fornell said the Air Force hopes to have a final report ready for the Environmental Protection Agency by June 1984.

Kimball Awaits MX Deployment Calmly

KIMBALL, Neb. (UPI) — City Administrator Robert Arraj, who watched the Air Force replace its Atlas missile system with Minuteman missiles in area silos, calmly awaits the proposed deployment of the MX.

Calling his western Nebraska community of 3,600 residents unique, Arraj said, "Kimball has always welcomed whatever." He said deployment of the MX in existing Minuteman silos promised "more pros than cons" for his community.

He said he has received few negative comments from residents about the Air Force's plan to deploy 100 MX in silos on the Warren Air Force Base in western Nebraska and eastern Wyoming. Kimball is near the center of the base's 200-silo field.

"It's just been a way of life," Arraj said of being surrounded by missiles. "We haven't even given it a second thought." He predicted deployment of the MX would have no psychological impact upon residents.

Both the Kimball and Sidney city councils have voted to support the basing of the MX missiles in their areas.

Kimball also has organized a citizen military affairs committee that is working with the Air Force to coordinate deployment of the MX in Kimball County.

Save America Now, a group endorsing the MX deployment, has members in both communities.

At a Save America Now meeting in April, spokesman Wayne Robbins, a for-

mer Kimball mayor, said, "You're either for America or against America. We better just draw a line and have our representatives get on one side or the other so we know who to vote for. It's the first duty of every American to stand up for this country's defense."

A gray plastic model of the Titan 1 sits in Arraj's office. An actual Titan has been sitting in the Kimball park for more than a decade.

Townpeople objected vehemently in 1980 when representatives from Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota asked if they could have the missile to put in a military museum. The military dropped its request.

"The timing is perfect," Arraj said of the plan that officials say would mean

road construction and work at the silos probably starting next year.

Kimball's population dropped 15.2 percent during the 1970s while Kimball County's population dropped 18.8 percent. Those figures showed the area lost a higher percentage of residents than any other region in Nebraska during that time.

Local, state and federal officials are unsure how many employees would be drawn to the Kimball area for deployment of the MX.

Martha Beaman, state policy research analyst, said the Air Force has yet to decide if it will put a staging area near the Kimball area. Employees are dispatched from staging areas each day to work on the missile deployment.

Ms. Beaman said a staging center might be put in Kimball or the Air Force might dispatch workers solely from the Cheyenne area.

Arraj said he believed the Air Force and a consulting firm it hired to prepare an environmental impact statement would address anything that might be involved with the missile deployment.

"I personally can find no fault with the military," Arraj said of his past dealings with them.

Kirkbride's Fight Against MX Based on Protecting Family

MERIDEN (UPI) — Rancher Linda Kirkbride says she would like to concentrate her energies on raising her three children and tending her garden on the family's 60,000-acre spread.

But for Mrs. Kirkbride, 34, the presence of Minuteman silos on the ranch has shaken up those priorities.

All three silos are to house MX, or Peace-

keeper, missiles as early as 1986 if the deployment in eastern Wyoming and western Nebraska becomes a reality.

So Mrs. Kirkbride became a co-founder of Wyoming Against the MX in an area that draws its lifeblood from jet fuel and names its streets after nuclear weapons.

Her role as spokesperson for rural

MX opposition took her to the Soviet Union in December 1982 on a journey called "Ranchers for Peace."

"It was really a while there that I thought, 'Should I really be speaking out on this? Should I be involved?' And now I just have no qualms at all about where I stand and how I feel," she said in a recent interview on a patio opening onto the windswept Wyoming range.

Mrs. Kirkbride said she wonders about the future of her ranch and family if the MX comes.

"They pass four missile silos on their way to school," she says, nodding toward her three children, adding she wanted them to be aware of what was in the silos and why it was there.

Four generations of Kirkbrides have ranched near Cheyenne, and the family prides itself on its affinity for the land.

"We'd like to pass it on pretty much just as we found it," she said.

"I just want to go putz in my garden and raise my kids like everybody else does, and this was just something that has really interrupted our lives," she said.

Mrs. Kirkbride, a Baptist from Lubbock, Texas, said she also feels a "kind of spiritual commitment" to try to stop the MX. She said today's military decisions will affect her children.

"Those little guys ... have to undo these things, and it's so complicated now and complex and there are no easy solutions ... if there is anything to undo, that is.

"One more nuclear weapon is not going to make either country any safer. That's the big lie, and both sides have got to get more serious at the bargaining table," she said.

Presidential Panel Urged To Tackle Arms Control

WASHINGTON (UPI) — Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., a key figure in congressional acceptance of a presidential panel's recommendations on the MX missile, called on the commission Monday to draft a new strategic arms proposal.

Congressional sources said the commission is expected to take up the task, despite some concerns in the administration about the bipartisan group taking the lead in arms control, and hopes to have some recommendations in time for

resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Oct. 6 in Geneva. A commission spokesman said the panel has not yet received the letter but added he expected there would be a response.

"Arms control was one of three legs of the commission's proposal last spring," Aspin said in a letter to retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft, chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. "It is obviously the weakest leg and needs atten-

tion if the Scowcroft package is to be a reality."

The Scowcroft commission recommended last April that about 100 MX missiles be deployed in existing Minuteman silos, that work begin on developing a small, mobile single-warhead missile and that the administration fashion a new approach to arms control.

Reagan enthusiastically accepted the recommendations and recently extended the life

of the commission with a broad mandate of monitoring progress toward its suggestions.

Congress narrowly approved procurement of the MX and has broadly endorsed the small-missile concept, dubbed "Midgetman."

"I think it is essential that the Scowcroft Commission now move into high gear for the specific purpose of helping to frame an arms control position," Aspin said in the letter. "This would require the commission to consult broadly with liberals and with conservatives for the purpose of outlining an

arms control position that would have broad bipartisan support."

Aspin is one of a key group of moderates in the House and Senate who have agreed to back the controversial, 10-warhead MX nuclear missile if it is linked to arms control. Development of a small, mobile missile is seen as a move toward greater stability because they would make less tempting targets.

The group was instrumental in bringing a turnaround in Congress on the MX this year, following votes last December that had put a hold on the 10-warhead strategic nuclear weapon.

Troubles for MX and nerve gas

The Reagan administration's plans to deploy MX missiles and to produce nerve gas could run into serious difficulties when congress reconvenes on September 12th. The first hurdle will be a vote on the defence authorisation bill, whose terms have been worked out by a conference committee of the senate and house of representatives. The second will come later when congress debates the appropriation of funds for MX.

The house of representatives rejected new production of nerve gas in a 216-202 vote on June 15th; the senate approved it only after the vice-president, **George Bush**, broke a 49-49 tie on July 13th. In conference, delegates of the house of representatives went along with the senate.

Now the chairman of the house foreign affairs committee, **Clement Zablocki**, says he has turned against voting for the MX because it is included in the authorisation bill providing for production of nerve gas. He says he will vote against it and claims to be able to take 10 formerly favourable votes into the opposition. If he carries out his threat, Zablocki could stop MX production as well as nerve gas. Alternatively, the administration might decide to withdraw the plan to produce nerve gas.

A potentially more serious difficulty for the MX will come in the appropriation debate. Congress has had serious doubts about MX since it was first told that MX had to be mobile to avoid destruction by Soviet missiles and is now being asked to approve its installation in permanent silos. Congressional leaders also want to see some clear signs of movement by the administration in arms-control negotiations with the Soviet Union to match a decision to go ahead with the MX. Votes on MX in the authorisation debates were close: 58-41 in the senate and 220-207 in the house.

As the appropriations debate approaches there are increasing complaints in congress and the administration over the apparent lack of movement by the president to press forward with his commitment (given during the authorisation debate) to arms control. Suspicious senate-house conferees tied approval of MX to the development of the much smaller "midgetman" intercontinental missile. This was intended to oblige the administration to adopt a more vigorous negotiating policy since under the Salt agreements with the Soviet Union it may develop only one new missile—and this is the MX. A new agreement must be found for "midgetman".

In the White House, the word is that the president has gone as far as he can go in the negotiations in Geneva. On Capitol Hill, however, congressional experts say that the appointment of **Robert McFarlane**, deputy national security adviser, as Reagan's special Middle East envoy means that arms-control advocates have lost their best supporter in the president's entourage.

One of Reagan's close advisers, retired **Lieutenant-General Brent Scowcroft**, would like to see more action. Some critics say the secretary of state, **George Shultz**, has no time for the complex issue of arms control and the new head of the arms control and disarmament agency, **Kenneth Adelman**, has no political influence. They would like to see the widely respected **Paul Nitze**, now in charge of negotiations on tactical nuclear forces in Geneva, brought back to Washington and put in charge.

Nuclear Carrots and Sticks

A stern congressional warning, a new flutter from Andropov

It has always been an unlikely alliance: liberal Democrats joining with the Reagan Administration to save the controversial MX missile. But Congressmen Les Aspin of Wisconsin, Norman Dicks of Washington, and Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee never promised their support with no strings attached. When the Scowcroft Commission's report on strategic forces came out last April, the three were widely credited with engineering the package's major *quid pro quo*: congressional support for the MX in exchange for the Administration's good-faith pursuit of a U.S.-Soviet arms-control deal. So far the Congressmen have delivered on their end. Since the report's publication, the MX has survived two funding votes in the House. But as doubts about Reagan's intentions to de-

liver on his end of the bargain have grown, support has slipped. The most recent authorization vote in the House, in July, passed by a scant 13-vote margin.

Aspin has now publicly put the Administration on notice that it must modify its arms-control policy or Congress will begin to starve the MX. In a letter to retired Air Force Lieut. General Brent Scowcroft, made public last week, Aspin called on the commission Scowcroft chairs to formulate a new U.S. proposal for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and recommended that the Administration agree to substitute the commission's version for its own. The letter also outlines broad suggestions for modifying the U.S. stance at START.

Aspin made clear that his vote and those of other pro-MX Democrats hinge on arms-control progress. Said he: "People aren't about to be snookered." That message is not new. Aspin, Dicks and Gore sounded the same warning in early August at a private White House meeting with National Security Adviser William Clark. But the pressure is being turned up at a time when both the START talks and

the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks in Geneva are in a deep-freeze.

For its part, the Administration can certainly point to some signs, however slight, of an increased pace in the dialogue with Moscow. Last week both countries signed a multiyear grain pact, and the U.S. ended its restrictions on the sale of pipe-laying tractors to the Soviets. Most intriguing of all was an offer from Soviet Leader Yuri Andropov. He seemed to suggest, for the first time, that the Soviets might now be willing to destroy 81 of their 243 SS-20s in Europe so as to equal the number of British and French missiles targeted at the Soviet Union. He said the U.S.S.R. "would liquidate all the missiles to be reduced."

Even if the latest Andropov statement

means what it seems to, it will hardly bridge the gap between the superpowers' positions in Geneva, since the U.S. refuses to count the British and French nuclear forces in the INF talks and since the Soviets are making their offer contingent upon the cancellation of all new Pershing II and cruise missile deployment. Moscow's central purpose is almost surely to impress West Europeans with its flexibility and thus to encourage opposition to the installation of those new American missiles, due to start later this year.

The White House is mindful of the potential 1984 election benefits of progress in arms control. But it insists that the MX is an essential bargaining lever to achieve that goal. Still, the growing congressional pressure is sure to widen the already existing split between the Administration's moderates, who favor an arms-control agreement in part to help re-elect Reagan, and its hard-liners, who remain deeply suspicious that the Soviets will ever negotiate seriously. The key defense appropriations votes in the Senate could come very close to the scheduled resumption of the START talks in early October. ■

Is MX a Bargaining Chip?

WARREN AIR FORCE BASE, Wyo. (UPI) — The deployment of 100 MX missiles is believed enough to persuade the Soviet Union to cooperate in an arms reduction agreement, but an Air Force official says the situation could change someday.

"It is viewed by the administration that the deployment of 100 missiles would provide the necessary negotiation leverage to give the Soviet Union the incentive to seriously reduce their arms," Capt. Mike McMullin said.

A spokesman for the office of the special assistant for the Peacekeeper from Air Force headquarters in Washington, McMullin recently was interviewed about the plans for MX deployment near Cheyenne.

The Air Force has dubbed the MX the Peacekeeper, saying the missile is the countermilitary might needed to deter the Soviets and others from using their nuclear weapons against the United States.

Plans call for 100 MX missiles to be placed in existing Minuteman silos in Wyoming and western Nebraska. The silo field includes 200 silos and spans 12,600 square miles. An existing 100 Minuteman missiles would be left in place.

"Without that (MX) deployment, the president feels and so do the START negotiators feel that they're virtually helpless," McMullin said.

Critics of the MX have suggested citizens would be powerless to limit the number of missiles deployed once production started. Some have said the 100 figure is a bargaining chip to use against the Soviets.

"The president is flexible in his arms control approach," McMullin said. "He's not suggesting that, 'Hey I will make this a bargaining chip or that it is a bargaining chip.'"

"But what he has said is that it (100 missiles) gives us that negotiating leverage that we desperately need to bring the Soviets to the table seriously ... It gives us a bargaining position and strength," McMullin said.

He said the Air Force plans to produce 223 missiles, of which 100 would be deployed, probably starting in 1986.

The other 123 missiles would be used as spares and for testing, he said. Periodically, missiles are pulled from the Warren silos, their warheads removed and the missiles taken to Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., for test firing.

Twenty test launches are planned before the 100 MX would be deployed. The remaining 103 would be used to replace deployed missiles that were removed from the silos for testing or that had to be replaced because of malfunctions.

When asked if 100 MX would be enough to deter the Soviets from using their missiles, McMullin said it was based on the existing and projected threat.

"A lot of it is conditional. It is conditional on what the

Soviet response is to our deployment, it's conditional upon what happens in the ongoing strategic arms reduction talks," McMullin said.

He said a small mobile missile with one warhead is being considered for the mid to late 1990s.

SALT II, an unratified treaty McMullin said both countries are using, had been set to expire in 1985. It would have limited the two major arms powers to one new intercontinental mis-

ile system each.

"None of us are fortune tellers," McMullin said, adding it is unlikely more than 100 MX might be deployed because of the time required to get authorization for missile funding and production.

"You have to take it over a five-year defense plan and what's going to happen in that time. So for us to sit here and predict what's going to happen ... beyond the five-year period is very difficult," he added.

WYOMING EAGLE

26 August 1983

MX Support Down

CASPER (UPI) — A recent poll for the conservative Wyoming Heritage Foundation says there has been a slight decline in support for basing the MX missile in Wyoming, compared with a poll done in May.

The foundation's annual poll was conducted by Research Services Inc. of Denver earlier this month.

Among the questions asked: "As you probably know, one plan has been announced that would locate the MX missile near Cheyenne. From all you have heard or read about the MX missile system, do you favor or oppose locating the MX missile in Wyoming?"

Of 410 respondents, 57 per-

cent said they favored putting the MX in Wyoming, 36 percent were opposed and 7 percent had no answer, the foundation said in a news release today.

A similar question in a poll of 500 people for Sen. Alan Simpson, R-Wyo. in May showed 64 percent in favor, 30 percent opposed and 6 percent undecided.

"Among industry groups, foundation executive director Harry Roberts, said today, "we found that 76 percent of those in construction favored the MX, along with 71 percent in agriculture, and 66 percent of those in business trades.

"By age group, the most opposition came from those 18 to 24 years old — 49 percent of whom oppose the MX — and those over 65, with 51 percent in opposition."

Roberts said the foundation has taken no position on the MX and was releasing the poll results as an informational service.

Other results of the poll showed Republicans favored the MX by a margin of 60 percent to 28 percent. Democrats opposed the basing plan, with 50 percent against it and 38 percent favoring it.

WYOMING STATE TRIBUNE

26 August 1983

Heritage Foundation Paid for Own MX Poll

CASPER (UPI) — The conservative Wyoming Heritage Foundation says it paid for a recent poll showing a slight decline in support for basing the MX missile in Wyoming, compared with a poll done for Sen. Alan Simpson, R-Wyo., in May.

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Nebraska Rancher 'Ground Zero' If MX Missile Comes

SIDNEY, Neb. (UPI) — To Marian Lenzen, deployment of the MX, or Peacekeeper, missile means the sacrifice of agriculture and to her, that does not make much sense.

"Agriculture is the United States' greatest strength," the 55-year-old rancher said. "It's the one thing we've got that Russia has never ever been able to duplicate or even come close to. And yet, you're going to come out here and sacrifice your agriculture for a missile that isn't even needed?"

Mrs. Lenzen is a co-founder and director of Nebraskans Opposed to MX, or NO-MX.

Largely rural in make-up, NO-MX works with farm groups to try to stop the planned deployment of the 100 missiles in Wyoming and Nebraska.

"There's more to national defense and national security than a stockpile of weapons," she said. "I think it depends on a strong economy, healthy people, educated minds; that contributes just as much as nuclear weapons."

Thirty-one Minuteman silos in Nebraska are targeted for MX deployment, and Mrs. Lenzen said she and other area residents take that as a personal threat to their health and well-being.

"As far as I'm concerned I'm Ground Zero if the MX comes into Kimball County and Banner County ... I'm going to have my bag packed, I'm going to have it sitting at the back door and I'm going to be ready to get the hell out of here," she said.

"I am prepared to live with the Minuteman because I've lived with it for 30 years. But that doesn't mean I have to accept the MX," Mrs. Lenzen said.

"People ask me, 'What's

the difference?' My God, there's a hell of a lot of difference," she said. "If there wasn't any difference, then why do we need the MX?"

Mrs. Lenzen also said there are plenty of other ways the money could be put to better use.

"We've got \$200 billion deficits staring us in the

face, we have an increase in malnutrition in children, we have people living in deserted buildings in our cities, living in their cars and trailers, camping all up and down the canyons and the Rockies, millions of people unemployed, and yet we're going to blow \$20 billion on an MX missile? I just can't see it," she said.



JAN JOHNSON, a local poet and musician, will provide entertainment at a fund-raising spaghetti dinner hosted by the Tri-State MX Coalition. The dinner, Aug. 19 at 6:30 p.m. at St. Mark's Parish Hall, will feature updated information on the MX and how it may effect Wyoming residents.

MX Coalition Hosts Dinner

The Tri-State MX Coalition will host a spaghetti supper followed by entertainment and the latest MX information on Friday, Aug. 19 at 6:30 p.m. All members of the coalition and the public are invited to participate in the event which will be held at St. Mark's Parish Hall, 19th and Central.

Entertainment will be provided by Jan Johnson, who will accompany herself on the autoharp. There will also be a slide show and material will be available to send Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) the message to vote against further MX deployment legislation.

Cost of the dinner will be

\$4.50 for individuals and \$9 for families.

"This fall will see important votes for MX funding coming up and we are committed to letting Senator Simpson know that the majority of people in Wyoming don't want the MX here," Coalition member Linda Kirkbride said. "After seeing the price of the MX increase dramatically this summer as Congress is asked to buy 223 rather than the original 100 MX missiles, opposition to the deployment in Wyoming is growing. The event on Friday will provide a good way for people to share information and enjoy good food and fun."



SAUCE TESTER—The Tri-State MX Coalition will host a spaghetti supper followed by entertainment and the latest MX information August 19, at 6:30 p.m. at St. Mark's Parish Hall, 19th and Central. All members of the

public and the coalition are cordially invited to participate in the event. Here Father Richard Hitt seems anxious to test Jan Johnson's spaghetti sauce. Johnson is practicing for the dinner August 19th.

MX Coalition Asks WHC Who Will Pay

United Press
International

The Tri-State MX Coalition has called on the Wyoming Highway Commission to decide who will pay for improvement and maintenance of roads in Laramie County that would be used for access during deployment of MX missiles.

"Although appropriations for the deployment of the MX have not yet passed Congress, the Wyoming Highway Department is advertising bids for stockpiling materials for the road work," said Sister Frances Russell, coordinator of the coalition. "We believe that it is appropriate at this time to ask if the Air Force will pay for the improvements or will the taxpayers of the state or of the counties."

Sister Russell said the Nebraska Highway Commission has agreed that the federal government should pay for the surfacing of 80 miles of roads in Banner and Kimball counties that lead to the 31 Minuteman III sites proposed to house MX missiles in its state.

The Nebraska commission also wants the Air Force to pay for strengthening of two bridges and 12 culverts so they can support the trucks that haul the huge missiles to

the silos.

The estimated cost of the work in Nebraska is \$18.5 million, and it remains unclear whether the Air Force will pick up the tab.

"Will the Wyoming Highway Commission demand that the Air Force pay for the improvements as the Nebraska commission has done, or will we remain 'Willing Wyoming,' allowing the Air Force to set the rules?" Sister Russell asked.

WYOMING EAGLE

18 August 1983

Pg. 1

Rock Springs Wants Air Force to Talk MX

ROCK SPRINGS (UPI) — Green River and Rock Springs are more than 250 miles west of where the U.S. Air Force plans to plant the MX missiles, but a group of protesters wants the Air Force to hold a meeting in the area.

Members of Sweetwater County Residents Against MX, known as SCRAM-X, Tuesday night convinced the city councils in the two cities to ask the Air Force to bring their information programs to the two southwest Wyoming cities.

The Green River City Council decision was unanimous; the Rock Springs City Council decision was split 7-1 over the strenuous objections of Mayor Keith West.

"I just don't want to have the city involved in any degree of activism that won't help the city," West said Wednesday.

He said opponents of the MX are just looking for forums for their fight.

"I've got enough problems in Rock Springs without trying to figure out how to run the national government on MX missiles," said West.

He said he will comply with the council's decision and write a letter to the Air Force asking them to conduct a public meeting in Rock Springs on Sept. 8 or 9. But that is the end of it for him, he added.

SCRAM-X presented the Rock Springs City Council with petitions bearing 150 signatures of people opposed to the MX.

Liaison Officer Assigned

By GARY LONG
Eagle Staff Writer

After a first week on the job spent laying the groundwork, Air Force Capt. Michael C. McMullin says he hopes to insure there is a smooth transition to deployment of the MX—Peacekeeper missile in Wyoming and Nebraska.

The Air Force on Monday opened a Peacekeeper liaison office in the federal office building at 21st and Capitol, with McMillan as its head. McMillan's assignment is to work with local, county state and federal agencies to see that deployment of the MX is an orderly process.

The Air Force plans to deploy 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman III silos in southeast Wyoming and western Nebraska. Congress has approved funds for the first 21 of the missiles but has yet to make the actual appropriation.

McMillan said construction at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne could start as early as late spring, 1984 with missile site construction to start in late 1985, and deployment of the first 10 missiles scheduled for late 1986.

Air Force estimates of

the number of workers that will be required for MX construction have fluctuated between 1,500 and 2,000 since President Reagan first proposed deployment under the command of the 90th Strategic Missile Wing at Warren. McMullin said the Air Force hopes to have concrete employment and other figures regarding deployment by mid-September.

The liaison officer said he spent this week making courtesy calls to local state and federal officials, and added he views his job "in the positive sense that MX—Peacekeeper deployment can be accomplished in an orderly manner."

He also pointed out he is not assigned to Warren, but that his commanding officer is Brig. Gen. Gordon E. Fornell, special assistant for the Peacekeeper program at the Pentagon.

The decision to base the liaison office in downtown Cheyenne, said McMillan, was made so that it would be accessible to the general public as well as state, local and federal officials.

McMullin also is to make speeches concerning the MX to various civic groups, answer

questions on the system, clarify policy matters, and identify issues associated with deployment. He also is to serve as liaison with the state's congressional delegation and attend meetings concerning MX deployment.

McMullin was stationed at Warren from 1974 to 1979 as a Minuteman III missile crew member, and as a plans officer and executive support officer to the 4th Air Division. His most recent assignment was in the Peacekeeper office at the Pentagon as executive officer and arms control project officer.

He said he and his family are happy to be returning to Cheyenne and view the area as their home.



Capt. McMullen

Nebraska Waiting for Reports From AF to Study MX Impact

United Press International

Nebraska officials await reports from the Air Force on the impact of the proposed deployment of the MX missile before conducting studies of their own.

Martha Beaman of the state Policy Research Office of Lincoln said she was waiting for the Air Force to release its environmental impact statement and a socioeconomic impact statement.

The Air Force plans to deploy 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos on Warren Air Force base in southeastern Wyoming and western Nebraska starting in 1986.

She said the state would conduct some impact studies after the Air Force releases its reports. Public hearings would be conducted on the EIS, which is expected to be released by October.

Ms. Beaman said the federal socioeconomic study probably would concern primarily Wyoming because the population shift would occur there first.

She said Nebraska's state officials primarily would study the impact of additional workers and road construction upon the southern Panhandle.

Improvements will be required before rural roads can support the vehicles that will transport the MX missiles to the Minuteman III silos.

The road work probably would begin in 1984. The state Roads Department

has asked for \$18.5 million to pave a system of transport for the missiles.

The missiles are expected to be transported in vehicles that are heavier than a semi-trailer truck, Air Force Capt. Mike McMullin of Washington has said.

The Air Force has yet to decide if it will establish a staging area near Kimball. Employees are dis-

patched from staging areas each day to work on missile deployments.

Ms. Beaman said a staging center might be put in Kimball or the Air Force might dispatch workers solely from the Cheyenne area.

"We're keeping up with what's going on, but it's too early to make any predictions," Ms. Beaman said.

WYOMING EAGLE 22 August 1983 Pg. 2

MX Air Force Liason Office Opens Here

United Press International

The Air Force has announced it has opened a liason office in the Federal Building in Cheyenne to handle questions and concerns about the MX missile.

One hundred MX missiles, re-named the "Peacekeeper" by President Reagan, are scheduled to be deployed in existing Minuteman III silos in Wyoming and Nebraska.

Selected to head the liason office is Capt. Michael McMullin, who has worked with the MX office in the Pentagon as executive officer an arms control project officer and who previously served at F.E. Warren

Air Force Base at Cheyenne as a Minuteman missile crew member.

The Air Force said McMullin will work with local, county, state and federal agencies to ensure the deployment of the MX is accomplished in an "orderly manner."

Other duties would include giving speeches explaining MX deployment, answering citizens' questions on the MX, attending local government meetings and working as a liason with the Wyoming congressional delegation.

McMullin Named to Head Peacekeeper Liaison Office

The Air Force announced recently that it has opened a Peacekeeper liaison office in the Federal Building here with Capt. Michael C. McMullin as head.

McMullin was assigned to head the office by the secretary of the Air Force, Verne Orr. Earlier this year, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger advised the Air Force to open an office in Cheyenne that would represent him and the Air Force in all matters pertaining to the deployment of the Peacekeeper in Wyoming and Nebraska. After an intensive screening process throughout the Air Force, McMullin was selected for the job.

McMullin's job is to ensure that the concerns and issues that arise from the deployment of the Peacekeeper are worked out by the Air Force and the Department of Defense. He will report directly to Brig. Gen. Gordon E. Fornell, special assistant for the Peacekeeper in the Penta-

gon. McMullin will work with local, county, state and federal agencies to ensure that the deployment of the Peacekeeper missile system is accomplished in an orderly manner. He will be the conduit and extension of the Air Force for the states of Wyoming and Nebraska.

Other duties McMullin will accomplish include: speeches, answering questions on the system and policy matters, identifying issues associated with deployment, attendance at meetings with local, county, state and federal agencies, liaison with the congressional delegations.

The office is located in Room 8007, Federal Center, Cheyenne, 82001 and the telephone number is 772-2828.

McMullin returns to Cheyenne where he served as a Minuteman III missile crew member, a plans officer and executive support officer to the Fourth Air Di-

vision commander from 1974 through 1979.

He is a graduate of Brigham Young University with a degree in communications. He received his commission through ROTC as a distinguished graduate in 1974. His last assignment was in the Peacekeeper office in the Pentagon as the executive officer and arms control project officer. Prior to this assignment, he served for a year in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, D.C. His medals include the Meritorious Service Medal, the Outstanding Unit Award and the Senior Missile Badge.

McMullin was notified July 20 that he has been selected for promotion to the grade of major.

"I am very happy to be returning to Cheyenne. My family and I consider this to be our home," he said. "I look upon this assignment as the highlight of my career, but more importantly, I want to let the people of Wyoming and Nebraska know the Air Force and the Department of Defense will do everything possible to make the deployment of the Peacekeeper missile system an orderly process."



CAPT. MICHAEL C. McMULLIN was recently assigned to head a Peacekeeper liaison office the Air Force will be opening in Cheyenne.

MX gives U.S. ability to fight a nuclear war, 'makes one more likely'

The writer, a professor of political science at Purdue University, is a fellow of the World Policy Institute and a member of the Committee for National Security. He has lectured and published widely on U.S. nuclear strategy.

By LOUIS RENÉ BERES
Special to The Courier-Journal

The Reagan administration's justification for MX has undergone a curious metamorphosis. For the first time since this weapon system emerged from the drawing boards, a president of the United States has admitted that a nuclear-war-fighting capacity, not survivability, is the true purpose of MX. Although it has been something of a tacit admission — one made necessary by the obvious limitations in placing new counterforce missiles in old silos — it is an admission with far-reaching implications.

The Reagan administration surely does not want a nuclear war. It does believe, however, that the adequacy of our deterrence posture is dependent on the capacity to fight such a war. But this is an erroneous belief. The Soviet Union is no more likely to be deterred by an adversary that has announced its intention to dominate escalation during a nuclear war than by one that remains content with the capacity for "assured destruction."

In assessing the anticipated effects of various attack scenarios, Soviet leaders would be unmoved by the prospect of "losing" more in a nuclear war than the United States. Indeed, there is no reason to believe that these leaders would calculate that absorption of any U.S. nuclear reprisal could fall within "acceptable" levels, unless, of course, they were convinced that a U.S. first-strike were imminent, an expectation made more likely by deployment of MX.

Rejecting the plausibility of limited nuclear war, the Soviets already calculate on the basis of total nuclear effort by both sides. It follows that since the U.S. search for a nuclear-war-fighting capability heightens Soviet fears of an American first-strike, this search actually degrades this country's security. Moreover, MX weapons that are counterforce targeted to conform to nuclear-war-fighting doctrines of deterrence will have significantly reduced deterrent effect, since their use in a second strike would produce substantially less damage to the U.S.S.R. than would extensive "countervalue" (countercity) attacks.

These facts notwithstanding, the U.S. position tying MX to improved deterrence is contingent on the expectation that a Soviet first-strike would be limited. This is the case because if the Soviet first-strike were unlimited, this country's retaliation would hit only empty silos. Yet there is no reason why the Soviets would ever choose rationally to launch a limited first-strike against the United States. Understandably, the Soviets quite naturally fear that the MX is geared to achieving a first-strike capability against their nation.

In response, the Reagan administration argues that the Soviets have a refring and reconstitution capability with their missiles and that even an unlimited first-strike would take place in several successive stages. Hence, the MX, used in retaliation, would not necessarily hit only empty silos. It would also hit silos that might otherwise spawn weapons to enlarge the damage of the Soviet first-strike.

Even here, however, the administration argument is devoid of correct reasoning. Contradicting its own stated rationale for MX, which is that it will strengthen deterrence by creating a nuclear-war-fighting capacity, this argument accepts the likely prospect of a nuclear war and the probable failure of deterrence.

Oriented entirely to actual nuclear-war fighting, it concerns itself — together with plans for multilayer ballistic-missile defense, air defense and civil defense — exclusively with *intra-war* damage limitation. Yet, there would be very little of the United States left to protect after the first round of Soviet attacks had been absorbed.

In this connection, we must remember that the United States doesn't even target Soviet submarine-launched nuclear weapons (SLBMs). And the MX-counterforce strategy makes Soviet attacks more likely in the first place by signaling U.S. first-strike intentions. Looked at in cost-benefit terms, therefore, it is incontestable that the alleged damage-limitation benefits that would accrue to the United States from its MX forces during a nuclear war are greatly outweighed by that weapon system's deterrence-undermining costs.

This conclusion underscores the central flaw in current U.S. nuclear strategy. By encouraging a climate of strategic interaction wherein the Soviet Union must exist in a continuing and increasing expectation of attack, the United States compels its adversary to take steps to strike first itself. Naturally, these steps are perceived as aggressive in turn, and in "reaction" to apparent Soviet military designs an unstoppable cycle of move and countermove is initiated. The net effect, of course, is insecurity for all concerned.

Where are we heading? The direction seems to be one of unrestrained nuclear competition. Vitalized by an exaggeratedly tragic expectation of Soviet intentions, this competition will lead to the expression of all the poison and impotence of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. In its drowning of any remaining hopes for long-term cooperative security with the U.S.S.R., the MX deployment will offer a routinization of omnicide that may ultimately project Armageddon from desolate imagination to reality.

White House Would Eye New Ideas From Panel On A-Talks

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

SANTA BARBARA, Aug. 30—The White House, reacting to a proposal from Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), said today it would make "maximum benefit" of any new suggestions by the Scowcroft commission regarding strategic arms talks with the Soviets.

Aspin urged the President's Commission on Strategic Forces Monday to put forward a new, "bipartisan" and more flexible proposal for a treaty to reduce intercontinental nuclear missiles.

Presidential spokesman Larry Speakes told reporters here that the administration would "hold our own counsel" on the question of a new negotiating position.

But he said the administration, which is now reviewing its position during the current recess in the Geneva talks, would "seek maximum ben-

efit" from any commission suggestions.

The commission is chaired by retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, who was national security affairs adviser to President Ford.

In a report earlier this year, the commission called for deployment of the MX missile and the development of a small, single-warhead missile while also urging the pursuit of arms control agreement with the Soviets.

Scowcroft is expected to respond to Aspin in the next few days.

Speakes said President Reagan's original mandate for the commission was "broad" and included arms control issues as well as the MX.

A vote is expected on MX appropriations shortly after Congress reconvenes Sept. 12. Aspin warned that the administration would lose the vote unless it agreed to a new, more flexible bipartisan negotiating position in Geneva.

The White House has been concerned about a slippage in congressional support for the MX, but Speakes did not say whether Aspin's specific suggestion would be accepted.

Reagan tells vets peace is an aim and not a policy

By Jeremiah O'Leary
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

SEATTLE — President Reagan yesterday told the American Legion national convention that the so-called "peace movement" is making the same mistake made by Neville Chamberlain of viewing peace as a policy instead of an objective.

Continuing his campaign-style oratory during his three-week stay in the West, Reagan said, "Today's so-called 'peace movement,' for all its modern hype and theatrics, would wage peace by weakening the free.

"My heart is with those who march for peace. I'd be at the head of the parade if I thought it would really serve the cause of peace. But the real peace-makers are people like you who understand that peace must be built on strength."

When Reagan's motorcade arrived at the Seattle convention center, he was greeted by several hundred demonstrators for the nuclear freeze movement and several other peace groups. Seattle is the home base of the new Trident submarine and attracts numerous pickets against nuclear arms.

But thousands of Legionnaires cheered loudly when Reagan entered the hall and was introduced as both the president of the United States and as a member of Pacific Palisades Post 283 of the American Legion.

Reagan covered much the same ground as he did in his address earlier this month to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, charging that past

American leaders hesitated or naively hoped for the best while the Soviet Union was left free to pile up new nuclear arsenals without any real incentive to negotiate arms reductions seriously.

He said weakness inevitably leads to trouble and can only encourage the enemies of peace and freedom. But he said that by being strong and resolute, the United States can keep the peace and even reduce threats to peace.

The president said he has kept his pledge to strive for arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union but declared, "We will not, we cannot, accept anything that would be detrimental to our security."

He said the MX Peacekeeper missile and the program to develop a new, small single-warhead missile are critical to the nation's present and future safety. These weapons will ensure stability and deterrence by making it clear that Soviet aggression would never pay.

Both programs, Reagan said, are an essential incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously for genuine arms reduction because modernization goes hand-in-hand with deterrence.

"Many of our critics willfully ignore this interrelationship and focus their attention on some single point which does not address the central issue," Reagan declared.

"Often it's based on wishful thinking or downright misinformation. Our country has never started a war and we have never sought, nor will we ever develop, a strategic first-strike capability. There is no way that the MX, even with the remaining Minuteman force, could knock out the entire Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile force."

Reagan said the U.S. negotiating positions in the strategic and intermediate nuclear force talks in Geneva have been strengthened, but he asked the Legionnaires for their support as the administration approaches the next legislative round on appropriations for the MX this fall.

For the first time, he said, the Soviets are willing to talk about actual reductions in the strategic arms negotiations and are showing movement in the Vienna talks on verification measures needed to negotiate reductions in the conventional forces.

The president said an issue of critical importance to all Americans is the responsibility of peacemaker, which is the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy, but he declared the nation has no intention of becoming policeman to the

world.

He said the U.S. commitment to be a peacemaker means supporting its friends and defending its interests, most visibly in Central America, the Middle East and Africa.

He said that is why the United States supports a security shield in the Caribbean basin for nations threatened by the determination in Moscow and Havana to impose alien totalitarianism with bullets instead of ballots. He said the only purpose for the U.S. military exercises in the region other than training is to demonstrate America's commitment to the free aspirations and sovereign integrity of its neighbors.

There is a parallel U.S. commitment in Africa for economic development and the growth of democracies, he said. American economic aid is four times larger than is spent on security assistance in Africa, contrasted with Soviet military aid that outpaces other assistance by a ratio of seven-to-one.

"Add more than 40,000 Soviet and surrogate military personnel stationed in Africa and it's no wonder that Africa is rife with conflict and tension," Reagan said. "Naked external aggression is what is taking place in Chad today. In Chad, the U.S. is a partner in a multinational economic assistance package designed to get this tragically poor and strife-torn country on its feet. Without protection from external aggression by Libya, there can be no economic progress."

Reagan did not mention the arrival in Chad of French troops and war planes, a sore subject with

France's President Francois Mitterand.

Administration Debates Arms Cuts With Congress As Well As the Soviets

Some in Congress, upset over lack of progress in arms reduction talks, demanded a revised Administration stance in return for their support of the MX missile.

BY MICHAEL R. GORDON

The MX missile soared through Congress recently when the Senate and the House passed authorization bills that provide for procurement, testing and deployment of an initial lot of the 10-warhead missiles.

On the surface, the votes for the MX seemed to be an endorsement of the Reagan Administration's contention that the missile is needed to modernize the U.S. strategic arsenal, increase the capability to strike "hardened" Soviet targets and strengthen the hand of U.S. arms control negotiators in Geneva. But for many Members of Congress, there is a larger issue at stake. For them, the vote was a referendum on the Administration's pledge to reform its arms control proposals.

Support of the MX has been "our part of an agreement with the Administration to proceed with a militarily controversial program in exchange for a strong commitment to proceed seriously and immediately with a reformulation of the U.S. START [strategic arms reduction talks] proposal." William S. Cohen, R-Maine, told the Senate on July 20.

That agreement may still be in jeopardy, despite the congressional show of support for the MX. As Cohen warned, unless the Administration makes major revisions in its arms control philosophy, the vote on the MX could turn out differently when the appropriations bill comes around.

While much attention has focused on U.S. talks with the Soviet Union in Geneva, the Reagan Administration is involved in an equally delicate arms control negotiation in Washington. One key factor in these informal talks is congressional skepticism about the practicality of the Administration effort to force a major restructuring of the Soviet strategic nu-

clear forces through a START agreement. Another is pressure on the Administration to commit itself immediately to a mutual U.S.-Soviet plan to "build down" their nuclear forces. At present, it is difficult to see how the Administration and congressional moderates will ultimately paper over their differences.

The basis for the current confrontation was laid in 1982, when the State Department, the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the White House tried to hammer out a formal negotiating position for the START talks.

A key concern of Administration hardliners was to limit the "throw-weight" of Soviet missiles—the amount of payload they can carry. "Limiting throw-weight has been Ed Rowny's obsession for 10 years in conjunction with his close ally, Richard Perle," said a participant in the interagency negotiations, referring to START negotiator Edward L. Rowny and Richard N. Perle, assistant Defense secretary for international security policy. Eugene V. Rostow, former director of the arms control agency, was another strong proponent of restricting throw-weight.

The Soviet Union possesses a decided lead over the United States in missile throw-weight. The Soviet force of land and sea-based missiles is capable of carrying about five million kilograms. In contrast, the U.S. land and sea-based missiles carry about two million kilograms, according to the State Department.

The Soviet Union has concentrated on land-based missiles, which represent more than half of its launchers and carry 75 per cent of its deliverable nuclear weapons. Many of these land-based missiles are large, liquid-fueled systems such as the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. The United States has a more evenly distributed triad of bombers and land and sea-

based missiles and has stressed the development of smaller, solid-fueled Minuteman missiles.

Nonetheless, some conservatives see the Soviet lead in throw-weight as an advantage that has political and military significance. The 1979 strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) prohibited the Soviet Union from taking full advantage of its lead in throw-weight by restricting the number of warheads that could be placed on a single missile. But, for SALT critics, that was not good enough because it left the Soviet Union with the technological option to "break out" of the agreement by putting many more warheads on their missiles than the treaty allowed. The large throw-weight of a missile also makes it possible to carry large warheads.

Perhaps more important, conservatives who have portrayed the Soviet Union's heavy land-based missiles as a first-strike threat to the U.S. Minuteman missile force have seen reductions in throw-weight as a "real" arms control measure that would reduce the Soviet arsenal of medium and heavy missiles, something that SALT II did not require.

But other experts view the emphasis on throw-weight as a fruitless quest to pressure the Soviet Union to dispense with the most prized elements of its strategic forces. To single out throw-weight as the basis of an arms control agreement is "to pick out the coin of the realm which is most difficult to negotiate," said William G. Hyland, a former deputy national security adviser under President Ford.

"Throw-weight is political poison," added a congressional staffer associated with moderate House MX supporters. "No matter how you work it technically, when the Administration says throw-weight, Congress reads that as no agreement."

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DEBATES...CONTINUED

Some experts also argue that warheads provide a better measure of the arms balance than throw-weight because they say that improvements in accuracy minimize the advantages of destructive power and that warheads represent the potential number of targets that may be struck. If bombers are included, the United States has about 2,000 more warheads than the Soviet Union. Not counting bomber-delivered weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union both have roughly 7,000 warheads on their land and sea-based missiles. (See *NJ*, 4/16/83, p. 800.)

GETTING STARTED

As it turned out, the negotiability of a proposal based on throw-weight was a key concern during the 1982 wrangle over the initial U.S. START position. As those deliberations began, the arms control agency stressed the need to shape a negotiating position based on the weight of new warheads added to each side's arsenal and sought to relate warhead weight to missile throw-weight.

The arms control agency also proposed a limitation on warheads, though this restriction has wide support and several other agencies claim authorship of it.

The office of the Defense Secretary, in the person of Perle, stressed the need to deal with throw-weight directly.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff put forward a proposal that emphasized deep reductions in the number of land and sea-based missile launchers to 850. The United States has 1,593 missile launchers with 7,109 warheads; the Soviet Union has about 2,400 missile launchers with about 7,000 warheads.

The State Department favored higher launcher limits but later lined up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The department also opposed couching an agreement in terms of throw-weight.

As the START position was hammered out, compromises were struck that resulted in a patchwork agreement. "It was a bit of a Chinese menu," acknowledged a White House official.

The START plan was divided into two phases, and it was agreed that throw-weight would not be directly addressed in the first. Instead, throw-weight would be indirectly restricted through "collateral constraints." For example, the over-all number of warheads that could be placed on land and sea-based missiles was limited to 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 could be mounted on land-based missiles.

The proposal stipulated that there would be a series of launcher limits. Within the over-all limit of 850 launchers, no more than 210 in the Soviet force could be for medium and heavy land-based missiles: the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. A further sub-limit of 110 was set for the SS-18, the largest Soviet missile. The Soviet Union has about 770 SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, 308 of them SS-18s.

In the second phase of the talks, throw-weight would be taken up directly. According to a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the objective would be to reduce U.S. and Soviet throw-weight to below present U.S. levels. Discussion of air-launched cruise missiles—a major Soviet concern—would also be postponed until this phase of the talks.

The United States, however, soon took up the issue of bombers and air-launched cruise missiles after the Soviets raised it, and in the third round of the talks last winter proposed a limit of 400 on bomb-

This "brokered" START position attracted considerable criticism. For one thing, the severe restrictions placed on missile launchers preserved or, under some projections, even worsened the ratio of Soviet warheads to U.S. missiles.

"Ironically, neither of the two most politically prominent proposals, the nuclear freeze and the President's deep-cuts approach, does much to solve the problem of strategic vulnerability that undermines crisis stability," concluded the report by the Carnegie Endowment panel of former government officials and defense specialists.

"If the Soviets had accepted our START proposal, we would have had to reject it," said Paul C. Warnke, chief SALT II negotiator and director of the arms control agency during the Carter Administration.

The President's Commission on Strategic Forces, chaired by retired Gen. Brent Scowcroft, more gently chided the Administration's START proposal in its re-



Richard N. Perle, a Pentagon official, Edward L. Rowny, U.S. negotiator at the START talks, and Eugene V. Rostow, former head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (from left), are outspoken proponents of limiting the throw-weight of Soviet missiles.

ers and a counting rule that held that each bomber carrying cruise missiles would be considered to have 20 missiles. Sea-launched cruise missiles have never figured in the formal U.S. negotiating position, partly because they present formidable verification problems.

As some officials tell it, the dividing line between the two phases of the talks was deliberately left ambiguous. On some occasions, START negotiator Rowny suggested that both phases of the talks had to be completed before a new treaty would be signed. But according to a State Department official, the agencies had received "presidential guidance" to be ready to implement the first phase of the proposed agreement before the second phase was concluded in the unlikely event that the Soviets agreed with the U.S. position.

cent report. Along with its other recommendations to deploy up to 100 MX missiles and commence developing a small, mobile missile dubbed "Midgetman," the Scowcroft commission recommended dispensing with limits on missile launchers in favor of limits on warheads.

Privately, some Administration officials agreed with this criticism. One said the low launcher limit was established in part to give the public the impression that the Administration was pushing for deep reductions. Other officials noted that the original launcher limit was proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the 850 figure had more to do with the Air Force's and Navy's procurement plans than with efforts to craft a stable strategic balance.

In effect, low launcher limits helped the case for the planned multi-warhead

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

DEBATES...CONTINUED

missiles, such as the MX, by blocking the option to produce a large number of single-warhead missiles. Moreover, this approach reflected what the military might opt for in any event.

"The United States could comply with START limits by retiring all 450 single-warhead Minuteman II missiles (the oldest in the inventory), along with 50 Minuteman III missiles [with three warheads each] in order to clear the way for deployment of 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads apiece," noted the Carnegie report. Nor would the proposal prevent the deployment of 100 B-1B bombers and thousands of cruise missiles. The deployment of Trident II submarine-launched missiles could also go forward.

But the proposed launcher limits would be far tougher on the Soviets, whose land-based missiles would be subject to special restrictions under the START proposal. As the Carnegie report noted, "A major restructuring of the land-based Soviet strategic force, which carries 75 per cent of Soviet warheads and striking power, would be necessary."

STARTING OVER

In the wake of the Scowcroft commission report and calls by advocates of small one-warhead missiles to drop the launcher limits or raise them dramatically, the Administration took a second crack at formulating a START proposal. In the interagency deliberations last spring, the arms control agency, now under the stewardship of Kenneth D. Adelman, pushed once again for a limit on throw-weight. (For a look at Adelman and the agency, see box, pp. 1626-27.)

In private discussions with Members of Congress and their staffs, Adelman outlined a proposal that would establish a throw-weight limit higher than that carried by U.S. missiles but substantially lower than that of Soviet missiles.

The idea behind the proposal would be to secure "equal rights" to the same amount of throw-weight. But the proposal would not necessarily result in "equal limits" because the United States would not exercise its right to build up to its throw-weight ceiling.

This proposal is billed by its proponents as a more flexible way of addressing the throw-weight question than setting limits on Soviet heavy and medium missiles. Such an agreement would allow the Soviet Union to decide which missiles it wanted to keep.

Some congressional staffers who have

discussed this notion with Adelman, however, maintain that the Soviet Union would find it unacceptable. "Our view is that the Soviets would have a difficult time trusting us," said one.

A State Department official argued that the throw-weight limits discussed in some interagency meetings would provide little flexibility in practice and would in effect require the same drastic reductions in throw-weight as under the previous START proposal.

During the second round of interagency talks, however, Adelman was not the most influential proponent of basing an agreement on throw-weight. Perle, representing the Defense Department, also pushed for throw-weight restrictions. But at the last minute, an official said, "Perle struck a deal with the Joint Chiefs of Staff" and left the arms control agency as the sole proponent of direct throw-weight limits. With the Joint Chiefs, Perle favored altering the 850 limit but

positional, a House staffer reported, Perle called Norman D. Dicks, D-Wash., a key House moderate who has attempted to tie MX production to reform of the Administration's arms control policy, and complained that the Administration had been forced to back away from throw-weight under pressure from Congress.

Some congressional staff members read this call as a sign that Perle's influence within the Administration was waning. "Perle and Rowny's wings have been clipped," said one.

In contrast, an Administration official suggested that Perle's call to Dicks was a bit of political theater designed to give House moderates the impression that they were prevailing over Perle on key issues when in fact only "minor adjustments" to the START proposal were made. The Soviets have reportedly been far more concerned about the sub-limits on their medium and heavy missiles than on the over-all 850-missile limit.

Another difference between the superpowers lies in the treatment of bombers. The United States has argued that missiles are potential first-strike weapons and need to be subjected to a separate limit. The Soviet Union, which has fewer long-range bombers than the United States, favors subjecting missiles and bombers to a single ceiling.

STARTING TO WORRY

Some moderate congressional supporters of the MX continue to question the Administration's intentions, although there is a diversity of views among the moderates. House Members, led by Les Aspin, D-Wis., Dicks and Albert Gore Jr., D-Tenn., have

sought assurances from the Administration that it would be flexible in the START negotiations, especially on sensitive issues such as the limits on heavy missiles. And, until recently, some staffers had been encouraged by signs that the White House might be moving to assume more direct control over the arms control process.

In July, for example, the White House established a special committee, chaired by national security adviser William P. Clark, to manage arms control policy. Committee members include Perle; Fred C. Ikle, Defense undersecretary for policy; Kenneth W. Dam, deputy secretary of State; Richard R. Burt, assistant secretary of State for European Affairs; Adm. Jonathan Howe, director of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs; and Adelman and others.



Paul C. Warnke, chief SALT II negotiator and head of the arms control agency during the Carter Administration: "If the Soviets had accepted our START proposal, we would have had to reject it."

leaving the sub-limits on Soviet medium and heavy missiles.

The State Department favored raising the launcher limit as well as the launcher sub-limits on medium and heavy missiles.

The final outcome, in May, produced a draft treaty that would raise the launcher limit from 850 to a higher level—perhaps 1,200—to be negotiated. The low limits on medium and heavy Soviet missiles, spelled out in the original START proposal, were left on the negotiating table, as was the 2,500 ceiling on the number of warheads that could be mounted on land-based missiles. The United States, however, took the position that such restrictions were negotiable and invited Soviet suggestions on alternative ways to deal with throw-weight. A separate ceiling was proposed for bombers.

After the revision of the START pro-

DEBATES...CONTINUED

The White House also has moved to beef up its arms control expertise by naming Ronald F. Lehman II as senior director of the NSC's arms control unit. Lehman previously worked under Perle at the Pentagon as deputy assistant Defense secretary for international security policy.

Another addition to the NSC is Christopher M. Lehman, no relation to Ronald Lehman but the brother of Navy Secretary John Lehman. He had previously served as director of the office of strategic nuclear policy in the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

For House moderates, by far the most important personality was Robert C. (Bud) McFarlane until his recent appointment as successor to special Middle East envoy Philip C. Habib. House moderates conceived of McFarlane as a pragmatic White House conservative likely to encourage a compromise position on arms control, largely in the interest of improving President Reagan's prospects for reelection.

"McFarlane was the key," said an aide to a Democratic House Member, who said McFarlane had influenced Reagan's recent speeches on arms control while draft speeches by Perle and other hard-liners had been rejected. House MX moderates were not consulted about McFarlane's appointment as Middle East envoy and are distressed at his departure from the arms control area. "Who in the hell do we talk to now?" asked another staffer.

In general, House moderates have little confidence in the flexibility of START negotiator Rowny, who also draws criticism from some conservative Administration officials. They compare him unfavorably with Paul H. Nitze, chief negotiator to the talks on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, also in Geneva.

In meetings with the White House, House moderates have suggested, but not demanded, that Rowny be replaced.

House moderates have tried in other ways to bind the Administration to various Scowcroft recommendations. Aspin, for example, successfully pushed an amendment to the 1984 defense authorization bill that would link deployment of the MX to the development of the single-warhead Midgetman missile.

Specifically, that amendment would restrict to 10 the number of MX missiles that could be deployed before a Midgetman prototype had undergone a flight

test. Also, no more than 45 MX missiles could be deployed before the Midgetman missile entered full-scale engineering development.

Aspin's amendment would also limit the Midgetman to 33,000 pounds—a restriction that Aspin explained was intended to prevent the Air Force from transforming it into a larger "Tubbyman." The amendment did not encounter Administration opposition—and is in line with Air Force plans.

Moderate MX supporters in the Senate are troubled by the Administration's arms control position. Cohen and Sen. Sam Nunn, D-Ga., who favor a "build-down" proposal under which more than one warhead would be retired for every new warhead that was deployed, have complained that the Administration has not gone far enough in reforming its arms control policies. In his speech last month, Cohen complained that he saw "reluctance" on the part of the Pentagon to approach a build down "in a positive



Congressional moderates such as Rep. Les Aspin (left) and Sen. William S. Cohen say Reagan Administration flexibility in the arms control talks is needed in return for support of the MX missile.

way," though he praised McFarlane and Shultz for their cooperation.

Cohen warned that if the Administration did not incorporate a build-down proposal in its current negotiating stance, he would side against production of the MX missile by the time the Defense appropriation bill came around.

Administration officials have tried to maintain support from congressional moderates for their strategic program by arguing that the Administration's military buildup and its tough negotiating line will induce the Soviets to make some significant concessions.

Specifically, Perle told reporters that recent Soviet counter-offers in START showed the virtues of the Administration's hard-line approach. The Soviets would set an over-all limit on missiles and bombers at 1,800—down from the 2,250

ceiling that the SALT II treaty would have eventually imposed. The Soviet proposal would set a 1,080 limit on land and sea-based missiles with multiple warheads, compared with a 1,200-missile limit in SALT II.

While Perle said he saw the Soviet moves as steps "in the right direction," he also argued that the concessions were not significant because they did not seriously affect the Soviet Union's medium and heavy missiles.

The Scowcroft commission, for its part, may play the role of matchmaker between supporters and foes of throw-weight restrictions in the Congress and the Administration. In a recent meeting with House Members, Scowcroft said his panel would study ways to include bombers in an agreement that regulated throw-weight. Such an inclusion could facilitate a START accord because the United States has a lead in bombers and it would narrow the U.S.-Soviet throw-weight gap.

This approach would present many technical difficulties, however. Some Pentagon officials agree, for example, that bomber and missile throw-weight cannot be equated because bombers would have to face an extensive Soviet air defense system.

Other experts, such as Hyland, argue that the best prospect for an agreement involves using warheads as the primary measure of strategic power and merging the START talks and the parallel negotiations on intermediate range nuclear weapons. Throw-weight, Hyland maintained in an interview, would inevitably be reduced as a by-product of deep reductions in the number of warheads and missile launchers.

He argued, however, that some throw-weight limits were appropriate for the new single-warhead missiles being developed by the Soviet Union and the United States, to ensure that such missiles could not be transformed into weapons that would carry many warheads.

Whether the gap between Congress and the Administration will be bridged is not clear. Some experts maintain that the outcome of the domestic negotiations will determine the success of any arms control negotiations with the Soviets.

"We've got to create a situation where the Soviets can't play one part of the American body politic off against the other," said R. James Woolsey, a former Navy undersecretary and a member of the Scowcroft panel. "Somehow we've got to get it together." □

August 15, 1983

Defense Daily

Page 240

FORMER AF OFFICIAL SAYS MX THREE TIMES AS CAPABLE AS SS-18

A former Air Force official, who opposes deployment of the MX ICBM, says that the U. S. is not catching up with the Soviet heavy SS-18 ICBM by deploying the MX but instead instituting a new arms spiral by introducing a weapon with three times the hard target capability of the Soviet weapon.

Dr. Robert M. Bowman, director of advanced space programs for the Air Force in the Carter Administration and now president of the non-profit Institute for Space and Security Studies, specifically took exception to the statement by Sen. James McClure (R-Ida.) that the Soviets have already deployed "820 new ICBMs equivalent to our MX" (Defense Daily, Aug. 10), including 330 SS-19s, 308 SS-18s and 150 SS-17s.

"The fact is, the Soviet's don't have any ICBMs equivalent to our MX," Bowman said. "The Pentagon index for measuring a weapon's hard-target kill potential rates the MX three times as capable as the best Soviet missile--the SS-18."

[The 308 SS-18's now deployed by the Soviets each carry 10 warheads. The 100 MX which the U. S. plans to begin deploying in 1986 will also carry 10 warheads, although they will be smaller than their Soviet counterparts.]

Bowman said the assertion made by McClure, and earlier by others, that the Soviet warheads are more accurate than U. S. warheads is simply not true.

The former Air Force official reported that the most accurate Soviet warheads have a CEP (Circular Error Probable) of "about 1200 feet" while U. S. accuracies, actual and projected, are as follows:

* Minuteman III ICBM	700 feet
* MX Peacekeeper ICBM	300 feet
* Pershing II IRBM	130 feet
* Tomahawk Cruise Missile	60 feet

Bowman said that a July 1983 study conducted by E-Systems shows that the Soviets "are still 5 years behind the U. S. in accuracy improvements" (see contrasting view by Defense Department, Defense Daily, July 25, p. 124).

He added that since 65 percent of U. S. strategic warheads are on bombers and submarines at sea compared to only 4 percent for the Soviets, "even our present Minuteman missiles present a greater first-strike threat to Soviet forces than theirs do to ours."

Aspin asks panel to set arms plans

By Walter Andrews
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF

Rep. Les Aspin, D-Wis., who led Democrat support in the House for the MX missile, said yesterday the Scowcroft commission should be used to formulate new arms control proposals.

The Wisconsin Democrat criticized the administration's own arms control proposals as vague and murky.

It was President Reagan's Scowcroft commission (named after its chairman, retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft) which put together the package that was instrumental in getting congressional approval of the MX missile.

"Approval of the MX was clearly contingent on a new approach in arms control. . . . The arms control part of the package has not been delivered. People are wary of being snookered," Aspin told a Capitol Hill press conference.

Aspin said the Scowcroft commission should play a major role in formulating a bipartisan arms control package for the Oct. 6 Geneva Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

"Without that, the administration will lose its MX. That's not a threat from anyone who's voted for the MX; it's simply a description of the political realities," Aspin commented.

He noted that in the last House authorization vote of 220 to 207, support for the MX had deteriorated to 13 votes, down from a margin of 53 in an earlier vote. Congress will vote on the actual money appropriation for the MX sometime after it returns from the summer recess next month.

Aspin said Democrat supporters of the MX will use the leverage

gained from the latest close vote to "make it (arms control) a bipartisan approach."

One benefit, he observed, could be a continuing U.S. arms control policy and not abrupt changes each time a new administration comes into office.

Aspin said the odds are against an arms control agreement being reached with the Soviets on intercontinental nuclear weapons before the presidential elections in 1984, although a statement of principles could be achieved.

"A basic outline of the thing can be done fairly quickly," he said.

Aspin placed his proposal for a bipartisan approach in a letter to Scowcroft.

The congressman said he had discussed the proposal with some unnamed officials in the White House, but added, "I've gotten no

the United States had sought to place specific limits on warheads, missiles and bombers, large missiles and the total nuclear payload capability or throw weight of these weapons.

Earlier this year, in a more flexible approach, the United

"Approval of the MX was clearly contingent on a new approach in arms control. . . . The arms control part of the package has not been delivered. People are wary of being snookered," Aspin told a Capitol Hill press conference.

assurances. . . I'm not talking from assurances."

Aspin said Reagan's support is essential if the bipartisan approach is to work.

Scowcroft is out of town, and could not be reached for comment. The chief U.S. negotiator in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, also was out of town. His office declined comment on the Aspin proposal.

In its original START proposals,

States proposed to keep the firm limit of warheads at 5,000 and put aside all the other restrictions to which the Soviets had objected.

In its more flexible approach, the United States offered to negotiate a throw weight limit somewhere between the 1.8 million kilogram capability of American weapons and the 5.6 million kilogram capability of the Soviets.

In effect, the ball was thrown in the Soviet's court.

The 'Peacekeeper' Foments

Unrest On Plains

By Paula Ditrack
Of United Press International

KIMBALL, Neb.

THEY CALL IT the Peacekeeper, but some western Nebraska and eastern Wyoming residents wonder how 100 MX missiles with 10 warheads each could be called peaceful.

Others say they would welcome deployment of the missiles with open arms because they love their country.

The Air Force has dubbed the MX the Peacekeeper, saying the missile is the countermilitary necessary to deter the Soviets from using their nuclear weapons against the United States or its allies.

Plans call for the missiles to be placed in existing Minuteman silos on Warren Air Force Base. The silo field includes 200 silos and spans 12,600 square miles. An existing 100 Minuteman missiles would be left in place.

Critics of the MX have suggested that citizens would be powerless to limit the number of missiles deployed once production

started. Some have said the 100 figure is a bargaining chip to use against the Soviets.

THE PEOPLE who live on the windswept plains are seldom polled about the Air Force plans. When asked individually, their answers are as diverse as the land on which they live.

Linda Kirkbride, a rancher in rural Laramie County, Wyo., said she would like to concentrate her energies on raising her three children and tending her garden on the family's 60,000-acre spread.

But for Mrs. Kirkbride, 34, the presence of three Minuteman silos on the ranch has shaken up those priorities. All three silos are to house MX missiles if the deployment becomes a reality.

So Mrs. Kirkbride became a co-founder of Wyoming Against the MX in an area that draws its lifeblood from jet fuel and names its streets after nuclear weapons.

Her role took her to the Soviet Union in December, 1982 on a journey called "Ranchers for Peace."

To Marian Lenzen of Sidney, Neb., deployment of the missiles means the sacrifice of agriculture and that to her does not make much sense.

"Agriculture is the United States' greatest strength," the 55-year-old rancher said. "It's the one thing we've got that Russia has never been able to duplicate or even come close to. And yet, you're going to come out here and sacrifice your agriculture for a missile that isn't even needed?"

Mrs. Lenzen is a co-founder and director of Nebraskans Opposed to MX, or NO-MX.

"As far as I'm concerned, I'm ground zero if the MX comes into Kimball County and Banner County. . . I'm going to have my bag packed, I'm going to have it sitting at the back door and I'm going to be ready to get the hell out of here," she said.

She said she was prepared to live with the Minuteman, but not the MX.

"People ask me, 'What's the difference?' My God, there's a hell of a lot of difference," she said. "If there wasn't any difference, then why do we need the MX?"

FORTY MILES to the west in Kimball, Neb., City Administrator Robert Arraj calmly awaits the proposed deployment of the MX.

Arraj, who watched the Air Force replace its Atlas missile system with Minuteman missiles in area silos, said Kimball was unique.

"It's just been a way of life," Arraj said of being surrounded by missiles. "We haven't even given it a second thought."

Both the Kimball and Sidney city councils have voted to support the basing of the MX missiles in their areas.

Save America Now, a group endorsing the MX deployment, has members in both communities.

At a Save America Now meeting in April, spokesman Wayne Robbins, a former mayor of Kimball, said: "You're either for America or against America. We better just draw a line and have our representatives get on one side or the other, so we know who to vote for. It's the first duty of every American to stand up for this country's defense."

The Critical Link Between MX Funds, Arms Control

By JOSEPH KRAFT

Before leaving town for a vacation in California, President Reagan's national-security adviser, William P. Clark, set the machinery rolling toward the next step in arms-control policy. The problem is to integrate congressional support for defense appropriations with progress in U.S.-Soviet negotiations. The answer, almost certainly, will be a new call on the bipartisan presidential commission headed by Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

At present the decisive forum for discussion is the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, an interagency panel created last month and headed by Clark. Besides Clark, those participating include Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam; Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle; the arms-control administrator, Kenneth A. Adelman, and, from the National Security Council staff, Ron Lehman. Assistant Secretary of State Richard R. Burt and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, though on vacation last month, are also members.

In a break with the conventional norm, the group has held sessions with leading Democratic defense experts from Congress. Among others, Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) have been consulted. Out of the conversations has emerged a clear sense of the link between defense appropriations and arms control.

Defense appropriations are critical because, unless the President can win congressional authority for his projected military buildup, the Soviets are under no pressure to come to terms on arms control. The rhetoric of Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, however, has not impressed Democratic experts. They find many flaws in his basic approach, and have fixed on one difficulty in particular—the scheme for basing the new multi-warhead MX missile.

After two projected basing schemes failed to win congressional support, the President appointed the Scowcroft commission. In its report in April the commission recommended installing 100 MX missiles in existing silos and then moving toward a small mobile weapon with a single warhead, the Midgetman. The theory was that the 100 larger weapons could be used as a bargaining chip in an arms-control deal. The Midgetman could be deployed in ways fostering a ratio between the number of U.S. weapons and the number of Soviet targets, entirely consistent with arms control.

The defense Democrats in Congress bought the Scowcroft commission concept.

But, being uncertain of the President's commitment to arms control, they moved to keep MX appropriations on a short string, doling out money bit by bit in return for manifest progress in the negotiations with the Soviet Union.

In the last legislative test the House supported the authorization of funds for the MX by less than a score of votes. Since then there has been an erosion of Democratic backing for the MX, with all leading presidential candidates coming out against it. The vote on appropriations for the missile is set for the fall. Aspin and other Democratic supporters of the MX concede that unless they have some new step forward in arms control to show for their troubles they will not be able to hold a majority for appropriations.

The negotiating situation dovetails exactly with the legislative requirement. Under pressure from Congress and the European allies, Reagan has already moved from his original bargaining position. But progress in the talks on Intermediate Range Forces or Euromissiles, clearly awaits the test of political strength that will come when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization moves to deploy 572 Pershing 2 and cruise missiles in Germany, Britain and Italy this fall. The so-called START talks on intercontinental missiles are hung up on American proposals for major cutbacks in Soviet blockbuster missiles—the SS-18s and 19s.

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FUNDS...CONTINUED

The Scowcroft commission, being both bipartisan and expert, is ideally suited to redefine the U.S. position for the START talks. Aspin suggested such an assignment informally when he met with Clark's group. Having consulted colleagues in Congress, he is now putting the idea in writing.

So far no decision has been made, and some elements in the Clark group oppose the suggestion. The Pentagon has never liked ceding strategic planning to the Scowcroft commission. Clark's own staff has said that giving another assignment to the commission would be a confession of incompetence by the Reagan Administration. But the State Department sees in the commission an ally against the Defense Department hawks. If Secretary of State George P. Shultz climbs aboard, the need to push the MX appropriation past Congress would prove decisive. The Scowcroft commission would be back in business, and arms control would still have a future.

Joseph Kraft is a syndicated columnist in Washington.

THE LINCOLN STAR

24 August 1983

Pg. 34

Orr: Farmers welcome MX

Air Force secretary makes stopover enroute to Washington

U.S. Air Force Secretary Verne Orr said Tuesday he believes the prospect of having MX missiles based in Minuteman silos in western Nebraska is being greeted with enthusiasm by area farmers.

"I think this has been accepted by most farmers," he said. "In fact, some of them speak with pride, like, 'My MX in the back 40.'"

The Air Force plans to place 100 MX missiles — each with 10 nuclear warheads — into existing Minuteman silos in the Nebraska Panhandle, eastern Wyoming and several other states.

Nevada and Wyoming also have been very supportive, Orr said, but Utah has been a bit anxious about the situation.

Orr spoke for about 10 minutes at the Nebraska Air National Guard base in Lincoln Tuesday, during a refueling stop enroute to Washington, D.C., from Hill Air Force Base at Ogden, Utah.

He said his visit to Utah dealt with the recent shortage of spare military parts for the U.S. Air Force.

"Over the past 1½ years, prices for spare parts in our weapons system have been growing much faster than they should — and they were overpriced to begin with," Orr said.

Too little attention was paid to the spare parts problem between 1974 and 1979, according to Orr. "And only now are those spare parts hitting the shelves in bases like this (Lincoln)."

Orr said the Air Force is developing several programs to ease the situation, such as more active competition for suppliers and improved bidding procedures.

Orr also said:

— Americans have a good fighting edge over the Soviets in view of the fact that American-built planes in Lebanon scored 90 victories to the Soviet planes' two.

— The Air Force is starting to provide better equipment to its guard and reserve bases, rather than favor the active bases.

— He is working to improve "people programs" of the Air Force — better housing and increased travel expenses.

Pro-defense climate expected in Congress

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington — Key congressional and administration sources expect firmer support for the Reagan defense program but no immediate effort to increase it in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's destruction of a South Korean airliner.

It may now be easier to win forthcoming votes on the MX missile, the centerpiece of the strategic nuclear weapons part of the program, but much still will depend on President Reagan's seriousness and flexibility on arms control, several sources said.

Over the longer term much will depend on Soviet actions regarding the airliner incident, arms-control negotiations and other issues, they said.

On the matter of defense in general, Senator Robert C. Byrd (D, W. Va.), the minority leader, said that the "upside" to the plane incident could be "even stronger support" in Congress. There would certainly not be a reverse effect — attempts to cut — he said.

The first test — which is unlikely to be much of a test at all — is due next week when the House and Senate are scheduled to vote on the fiscal 1984 defense authorization bill.

This policy measure authorizes the later appropriation of \$187.5 billion — \$10.5 billion less than the administration requested — for research; development and purchase of weapons and equipment, and operations and maintenance of the forces in the year starting October 1.

The measure carries \$4.8 billion for the MX and for start-up work on a small intercontinental missile that is favored by congressional arms-control advocates.

The airliner's destruction may further diminish the chances of a challenge to MX funds next week, as Representative Les Aspin (D, Wis.) suggested yesterday. He is a leader of a

group of liberal-to-moderate Democrats supporting the MX and simultaneously demanding progress on the small missile and on arms negotiations with Moscow.

The next real challenge to the MX had been expected later in the fall when the main defense appropriations bill, now being written in committees, reaches the House floor. The bill provides the funds authorized in the policy measure and, additionally, money to pay the forces.

A challenge still is expected then. Majorities for the weapon in the House have been narrowing, and opponents have planned to make a major effort during the appropriations debate, probably in November. By then much in U.S.-Soviet relations could change, or seem to change, and thereby affect voting.

Representative Jim Wright (D, Texas), the House majority leader, said the airliner incident had "enhanced the president's chances" of winning on the MX in the fall appropriations votes. Mr. Wright has voted for the missile once this year and against it once.

The first reaction of various informed congressional and administration sources was that significant change in the defense program, if any were to result from the shooting incident, would show up in the president's fiscal 1985 budget, to be sent to Con-

gress in January.

Cut severely this year, by their own standards, administration officials may seize on the incident as rationale for seeking a bigger increase next year than they might otherwise have thought politically possible.

Mr. Reagan had proposed a 10 percent increase, after compensating for inflation, for fiscal 1984. Congress has drawn the line at 5 percent. The internal defense debate in the administration now is about how much of an increase to request for 1985. The airliner incident may embolden planners to go for 10 percent.

Moscow's behavior in the meantime will have a heavy influence on decisions to be made between now and December.

Republican leadership sources said yesterday there is no plan now to try to get an increase in the 1984 measure coming up next week.

The reason is clear-cut. The authorization bill was fashioned by a Senate-House conference committee during long hours after bruising debates in both houses preceding their passages of separate measures.

With all constituencies now reasonably well satisfied, no one apparently is eager to reopen a debate on more defense, which could in turn lead to reopening the whole issue of domestic spending and taxation.

Critics Encouraged by Close Votes:

MX Survives Heavy Attacks As Congress OKs Defense Bill

President Reagan's plan for the MX missile retained its numerically comfortable but politically tenuous Senate majority July 26, when a move to delete MX procurement funds from the fiscal 1984 defense authorization bill (S 675) was rejected 41-58.

The move was led by Gary Hart, D-Colo., and Mark O. Hatfield, R-Ore.

Senators lined up essentially as they did May 25, when the Senate approved the start of MX flight tests. The pro-MX majority consisted of most Republicans and a dozen Democrats who typically take a hard line on defense issues.

The only change in the July 26 tally compared with the earlier vote was Bob Packwood, R-Ore., who had voted for flight testing but opposed the fiscal 1984 authorization. (*Vote 214, p. 1583; May 25 tally, vote 114, Weekly Report p. 1084*)

The Senate then rejected 42-57 an amendment by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., that would have barred deployment of MX. Lawton Chiles, D-Fla., joined the anti-MX side of that vote. (*Vote 215, p. 1583*)

But Hart, the leader of a group of about 15 MX opponents who had filibustered the bill for nearly two weeks, claimed a victory far more significant than the gain of one vote.

"A case [against the missile] has been made and not refuted," he told reporters after the vote.

The case Hart and his allies had emphasized was that MX would make the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance more dangerous because of the decision to deploy it in existing missile silos, which are vulnerable to Soviet missile attack. The deployment would force the United States to adopt a policy of "launch-on-warning," the critics said, placing the U.S. nuclear force on a hair trigger to be pulled at the first sign of enemy attack.

Public and congressional unease

over that prospect would be exacerbated by a general rise in international tensions arising from the volatile situation in Central America, Hart predicted. (*Story, p. 1535*)

Since the House had approved MX in its version of the defense bill by a margin of only 13 votes, he said, there is a good chance of killing procurement of the missile when Congress takes up the defense appropriations bill later this year, unless there is a radical improvement in prospects for a U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement.

Defense Bill. After rejecting the anti-MX amendments, the Senate passed S 675 on July 26 by a vote of 83-15. (*Vote 217, p. 1583*)

The House version (HR 2969) was passed several hours later, 305-114, early on July 27. (*Vote 261, p. 1586*)

The Senate bill authorizes about \$186 billion for weapons procurement, military research and operating costs. The House bill authorizes \$187.4 billion for the same programs.

(The Senate bill had included nearly another \$13 billion for military construction and for nuclear weapons programs run by the Department of Energy. But by unanimous consent,

those two sections were removed from S 675 and passed as amended versions of separate bills: HR 2972, authorizing military construction and S 1107, authorizing the Energy Department's military programs.)

Major differences between the two bills include initial production of a new type of lethal chemical weapons called binary munitions — rejected by the House — and more optimistic Senate estimates of the impact of inflation. (*House action, earlier Senate action, Weekly Report p. 1483*)

Senate MX Debate

During the nearly two weeks that Hart and his allies tried to draw the pro-MX faction into debate, they attacked the new missile for its impact on arms control and on the state of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear balance.

How to Negotiate?

All parties to the battle seemed to endorse the view that the long-term goal of U.S. nuclear arms policy should be abolition of large, accurate multiple-warhead (MIRV) missiles such as the MX, the 600-plus Soviet SS-18s and SS-19s already deployed and the new Soviet SS-24, currently undergoing flight tests.

This was the position of a White House advisory panel chaired by former presidential national security adviser Brent Scowcroft which proposed the MX plan now pushed by the administration. (*Weekly Report p. 727*)



Sen. John Tower



Sen. Gary Hart

—By Pat Towell

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MX SURVIVES...CONTINUED

The argument is that if both nuclear superpowers deploy roughly the same number of MIRV missiles, the balance of nuclear terror will be unstable because whichever side attacked first could, theoretically, destroy its opponents' missiles while retaining a large part of its own force for subsequent attacks.

That threat would be obviated if MIRVs were replaced with small, single-warhead missiles, it is argued, since either power then could destroy

its opponent's missiles only by using up its own. An amendment by Carl Levin, D-Mich., endorsing that proposition was approved 92-6. (*Vote 216, p. 1583*)

According to MX supporters, including the Scowcroft panel and the administration, deploying 100 MXs in existing silos would boost the chances of negotiating the eventual abolition of MIRVs by posing the same kind of threat against the Soviet missiles that they currently pose against the U.S.

missile force.

"The Soviets do not enter into arms control out of some benevolent desire for peace," Tower said, but rather when "there is a compelling military rationale for doing so." In this view, the 1972 treaty limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) was the model of how to cut an arms control deal with Moscow: Only after Congress had agreed to build a U.S. ABM system did the Russians agree to a treaty limiting their own similar weapons.

But MX opponents underscored a different bit of arms control history — the deployment in the early 1970s of the very MIRV missiles that currently are the source of strategic instability. That began as a U.S. effort to have a military edge over Soviet forces but resulted simply in the Russians matching the U.S. weapon, they argued.

"I defy any senator to cite one weapon system we have built that has brought the Soviets closer to the bargaining table," Hart said. "There are not any."

Moreover, the critics argued, it is unrealistic to expect Russia to abandon the large land-based MIRVs that make up the vast bulk of its nuclear force, and for the administration to insist that it do so is a sign that Washington is not seriously seeking an arms control agreement.

The statement of administration arms control chief Kenneth L. Adelman that MX would be abandoned in return for dismantling of the Soviet MIRV force was "offering to swap a moo for a cow," according to Patrick J. Leahy, D-Vt.

How to Deter

In the last days before the Senate MX vote, opponents increasingly turned to the argument that MX would increase the problem of MIRV-caused instability in the nuclear balance. This was because the new missile would pose a lethal threat to the Soviet missile force but would itself be vulnerable to a Soviet first strike.

Time and again, Hart and his allies quoted to MX supporters their own demands (made in earlier years) that the new missile be based in launchers that would not be vulnerable to Soviet missiles.

Against that background, the critics warned, deployment of MX in existing missile silos that are admittedly vulnerable would appear to Moscow a radical change in U.S. policy. "There is one and only one inescapable conclusion that the Soviet strategic planners could come to," said Dale Bumpers, D-Ark., "and that is that [MX] is not a weapon to deter [but] a weapon which will be used as a first strike weapon."

The result, critics warned, would be that both the U.S. and Soviet missile forces would have to be on a hair trigger, ready for instant launch at the first sign of an enemy attack.

If a warning of attack were received, no matter how ambiguous,

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MX SURVIVES...CONTINUED

Hill Arms Control Moderates Decry Move

Senate moderates are concerned over the likelihood that Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan's deputy national security assistant, will no longer be White House congressional liaison on arms control.

The removal of McFarlane from day-to-day involvement in arms control policy negotiations on Capitol Hill led Larry Pressler, R-S.D., to join eight Senate Foreign Relations Democrats July 27 in overriding their chairman, Charles H. Percy, R-Ill. They succeeded in scheduling a meeting Aug. 2 — prior to a five-week congressional recess — to debate the nuclear freeze and other arms control proposals; Percy had scheduled the meeting for Sept. 20.

Pressler is one of at least 20 senators demanding that the administration propose a U.S.-Soviet agreement to "build-down" nuclear arsenals by dismantling two existing nuclear weapons for each new one deployed.

In tandem with a group of House moderates, the build-down proponents — many of them with clear reluctance — have provided critical support for the MX missile in return for administration promises of a more flexible arms control posture.

But McFarlane has been the principal interlocutor between the administration and the congressional moderates. After he was named the administration's new Middle East trouble-shooter July 22, Pressler became suspicious that the resulting personnel shuffle would delay presentation of a final build-down proposal until November or December.

(Though McFarlane will retain his position as deputy to national security assistant William P. Clark, it is assumed he will be unable to continue his central role as liaison with congressional moderates.)

"They're going to get three or four [pro-MX] votes out of us before we get the [build-down] information," Pressler protested to a reporter.

Though he opposes the current version of the nu-

clear freeze resolution backed by most Foreign Relations Democrats, Pressler said, he helped them reschedule the committee meeting on the freeze in hopes that a modified freeze resolution might be reported by the panel and would spur the administration to quicker action on the build-down proposal.

Pressler will try to amend the freeze resolution to let the president seek a build-down of U.S. and Soviet forces to much lower and equal levels, before freezing.

Trusted Interlocutor

McFarlane won high praise from leading members of the MX-for-arms-control congressional group, who viewed other administration officials involved in arms control policy with suspicion — for their supposed hostility to arms control — or contempt — for their supposed ignorance.

According to members and aides privy to the discussions, McFarlane was a tough but honest negotiator who defended administration arms control positions, but with enough political realism to sense the limits of congressional tolerance. Moreover, they say McFarlane had the political stature within the administration to press for accommodation with congressional skeptics on some points and — once accommodations were agreed to — to state their case to opponents within the administration, particularly those in the Pentagon.

In addition to his impatience with the prospect of delay on the build-down proposal, Pressler lamented the departure of a trusted point of contact with the administration for the arms control moderates: "I don't know who we're going to talk to now," he said.

Albert Gore Jr., D-Tenn., a leader of the House moderate bloc, was one of many others to echo Pressler's concern.

"One person doesn't make or break policy," Gore cautioned, but McFarlane's importance to the White House-Congress negotiations was "hard to overstate," he said.

With so few administration officials trusted by the swing group of congressional moderates, Gore said, former White House national security assistant Brent Scowcroft and the bipartisan nuclear arms advisory panel that he chairs will have to become "a lot more active than they have been" in shaping administration policy, Gore said, or the administration's arms control posture could be "in great jeopardy."



Sen. Larry Pressler

"You have got nine minutes to decide whether or not the third world war has already begun," said Moynihan. "It is in effect letting a machine decide."

The only other possible outcome of deploying MX in vulnerable silos would be eventual abrogation of the ABM treaty in an effort to protect the missiles, the critics warned.

that Moscow might fear a U.S. attack.

"I wish the opponents of our ICBM modernization were as concerned about the instability associated with the Soviet... first strike capability as they are about our efforts to redress it," he complained.

MX would not make the U.S. missile force more dependent on a

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MX SURVIVES...CONTINUED

Tower and his allies insisted that the planned MX deployment was neither as threatening to the Russians nor as vulnerable as the critics said.

The planned deployment of 100 MXs, each with 10 warheads, would be too small to mount an effective first strike against the Russians, Tower said. And he dismissed the prospect "launch-on-warning" policy, Tower argued, because it would take years before the Soviet nuclear force is technically capable of simultaneously attacking U.S. ICBMs and bombers.

On the other hand, MX's extreme accuracy — superior to the current Minuteman missiles — would strengthen deterrence, according to Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash.

"By restoring our ability to retaliate promptly against hardened targets, such as the Soviet command and control centers," Jackson said, MX would "make it clear that a nuclear attack would never pay off."

House Floor Action

House passage of HR 2969 came on the eighth day of a debate that sprawled over two months, largely because of delays occasioned by the politics of MX.

In the hectic final hours of debate on the bill, late in the evening of July 26, the House adopted an amendment that would add \$350 million to the total fiscal 1984 defense budget. By a standing vote of 112-90, it moved forward by three months (to Jan. 1, 1984) the effective date of the 4 percent pay raise for military personnel mandated by the bill. (Since the military payroll is not covered by the authorization bill, this did not increase the amount authorized by the bill.)

Supporters insisted that the amendment by Dennis M. Hertel, D-Mich., was consistent with the first budget resolution.

Another amendment, by G. William Whitehurst, R-Va., that would have similarly extended from six months to nine months the 4 percent pay hike for civilian Pentagon employees, was rejected by voice vote.

Retired Pay. The House shouted down an amendment by Stan Parris, R-Va., that would have repealed:

- the six-month delay on the effective date of the next cost-of-living increase for military retirees, and
- the cap on future cost-of-living increases for military retirees less than 62 years of age.

Parris represents a suburban Washington district that includes a large military retired population.

Apart from the MX issue, the House took the following actions during July 21, 22 and 26. (*Earlier House action, Weekly Report p. 1198*)

Arms Control Issues

Pershing II. An amendment by Ronald V. Dellums, D-Calif., to delay until Dec. 31, 1984, any deployment of Pershing II missiles in Europe was rejected 101-320. (*Vote 259, p. 1584*)

Deployment in West Germany of the first nine Pershing IIs is scheduled for December 1983, despite strong German opposition. They are the first of a planned U.S. force of 108 Pershings and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), all of which would be able to hit Soviet territory from launchers in Western Europe. NATO agreed in December 1979 to deploy the U.S. missiles to counter Moscow's force of some 300 triple-warhead SS-20 ballistic missiles, which are able to strike any target in Europe.

NATO allies are committed — evidently with varying degrees of enthusiasm — to establish a rough parity with the Soviet Union in the category of long-range, land-based nuclear missiles in Europe. Accordingly, it appears that at least some part of the planned deployment will proceed unless the SS-20s are abolished by U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks in Geneva.

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MX SURVIVES...CONTINUED

Dellums' central argument against Pershing II echoed a major argument against MX: that the missile is so accurate, and could strike its target in so little time, that it would arouse Soviet fears of a NATO first strike. Under those circumstances, he warned, Soviet weapons would be put on a "hair-trigger" status, and world peace would depend on the reliability of Soviet computers.

But Dellums was deserted on the issue by some members who seemed to share his concern about the destabilizing aspect of MX. For example, Dan Glickman, D-Kan., concurred with Dellums that the Pershing posed a very serious threat to Soviet targets. But that very fact makes the missile a useful prod in the Geneva negotiations to limit such weapons, Glickman said.

Anti-satellite Testing. By nearly a 2-1 vote the House also rejected an amendment by John F. Seiberling, D-Ohio, that would have barred flight tests of an anti-satellite missile (ASAT) unless authorized in separate legislation. (*Vote 250, Weekly Report p. 1518*)

During earlier House action on HR 2969, an amendment was rejected that would have deleted funds to purchase components to begin building the ASAT. (*Weekly Report p. 1198*)

Liberal arms control advocates have warned that once ASAT is tested, it will be very difficult to negotiate a U.S.-Soviet ban on anti-satellite weapons. This is because the U.S. weapon — a 20-foot-long missile fired in midair from an F-15 fighter plane — is so small that, once it was tested, Soviet reconnaissance satellites could not verify that it had not been deployed.

According to the Pentagon, Moscow has a crude anti-satellite weapon already deployed on large ballistic missiles. But proponents of an ASAT ban insist that dismantling of so bulky a weapon could be verified by U.S. intelligence methods.

The basic argument against the test ban was that the Soviet Union would not agree to negotiate an ASAT ban unless confronted with a threat to its own space satellites.

Procurement Reforms

Evidently unwilling to make very substantial cuts in Reagan's weapons procurement request, the House added to the bill two amendments intended to attack widely publicized instances of mismanagement in Pentagon weapons procurement.

Test Oversight. By voice vote, and with the consent of Armed Services Committee leaders, the House agreed to an amendment by Jim Courter, R-N.J., establishing an independent Pentagon office to supervise the so-called operational tests of new weapons.

Operational tests are intended to establish whether new weapons can meet their design specifications in realistic combatlike conditions when operated by military personnel rather than laboratory technicians.

In recent months, allegations have abounded that the operational tests of several major weapons — including the Maverick, air-launched anti-tank missile and the Divad anti-aircraft tank — have been designed to show the equipment in a good light, rather than realistically to test its suitability for combat.

Pentagon officials contend that creation of a new test oversight office would simply add to the already impacted layers of bureaucracy that prolong the gestation period of new U.S. military equipment. But that contention has carried little weight against much more widespread fears that inadequate testing might endanger U.S. troops by equipping them with unworkable weapons.

Supporters of Reagan's defense buildup — Courter among them — have cited an additional reason for trying to tighten up the testing process: a fear that public perceptions of

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...g increases. ... will under-
Courtier's amendment would cre-
ate the position of director of opera-
tional testing, to be filled by a civilian
presidential appointee. No major
weapon could be put into full produc-
tion until the secretary of defense and
to the congressional Armed Services
and Appropriations committees on the
weapon's performance in its opera-
tional tests and on the adequacy of the
test program.

Spare Parts. The House also
agreed by voice vote to an amendment
by Bill Nichols, D-Ala., requiring the
Pentagon to report by June 1, 1984, on
the status of various proposed reforms
in the procurement of spare parts.

Troops in Europe

An amendment adopted by voice
vote expressed the sense of Congress
that Japan, Canada and the European
NATO members should shoulder a
heavier share of the burden of alliance
defense, lest they "endanger the vital-
ity, effectiveness and cohesiveness" of
their alliances with the United States.
The extent to which some allies con-
tributed to mutual defense is "not
commensurate with their economic re-
sources," according to the provision.
By a 329-82 vote that language,
proposed by Ike Skelton, D-Mo., was
substituted for language by Patricia
Schroeder, D-Colo., that would have
required a 29,000-person reduction in
the number of U.S. troops stationed
abroad. (Vote 255, p. 1584)

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supplies with a total value
billion. (Vote 260, p. 1586)





Generally good support, but not quite enough

A last-minute pep talk to the MX Peacekeeper team at the championship pull of the Boeing Employees Good Neighbor Fund tug-of-war competition last week was delivered by Brig. Gen. Gordon E. Fornell, the U.S. Air Force special assistant for Peacekeeper matters. Fornell

was in Seattle for discussions of Boeing Aerospace Company ballistic systems activities. Despite his strong moral support, the Peacekeeper team succumbed to the powerhouse team from BAC Facilities.

—photo by Ryan Kuehn

AF Gen. Fornell optimistic about Peacekeeper

by Don Brannon

The man responsible for U.S. Air Force congressional liaison regarding the MX Peacekeeper program is optimistic, but acknowledges there are still tough obstacles ahead. Brig. Gen. Gordon E. Fornell, the Air Force special assistant for Peacekeeper matters, talked about the program and its future while he was in Seattle last week for discussions concerning Boeing Aerospace Company's Ballistic Systems Division projects.

"Considering the Peacekeeper program's cyclical history, progress has been exceptional," he said. "It is a measure of the program's vitality that we are still with the 1986 initial deployment goal.

"We have the technology, and we're on schedule," he said. Fornell noted that the first missile test flight last June was "nearly perfect," and that the second is planned for this fall. He pointed out that

the pressure is on Boeing to develop and prepare a test silo at Vandenberg Air Force Base for a flight in mid-1985.

"There is very little slack in that schedule, but I'm confident that you can do it," he said.

Peacekeeper's most difficult problem is neither technical nor schedule, but

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GEN. FORNELL...CONTINUED

rather political, Fornell said. Authorization of program continuation recently passed congress by a narrow margin, and the forthcoming debate on the money appropriations bill will be "every bit as tough," he said. But he is optimistic:

"We built up momentum during the authorization debate. We have a successful first flight behind us, and we are making good progress in basing design and development. So more and more we are able to answer the questions needed by congressional members as they prepare to vote."

Gen. Fornell gave much credit for Peacekeeper support to the Scowcroft Commission, which earlier this year conducted an in-depth review of the nation's strategic situation, and made a number of recommendations that the Reagan administration is now moving to accomplish.

"The commission did a brilliant job in assessing the United States' strategic requirements and in designing a comprehensive package that considers both defense needs and political realities," the general said.

Part of that package includes basing 100 Peacekeeper missiles in silos now containing Minuteman missiles at War-

ren Air Force Base near Cheyenne, Wyo. BAC activities are directed toward design and development of the hardware needed to accomplish the basing.

Fornell, who began active duty with the Air Force in 1958, said working with the citizens and officials of Wyoming and Cheyenne has been one of the most gratifying experiences of his career. The Air Force and civic leaders are cooperating to prepare for the expected increase in construction and operational activities associated with Peacekeeper deployment in the Cheyenne area.

Boeing will establish a work force there in 1985.

Regarding the future of the nation's defenses, Fornell is confident. He noted that voluntary recruiting is up, more people are proud to be in uniform, leadership is experienced and the public is becoming increasingly aware of the need for a strong defense.

"The future looks good," he said.

A Revealing Poll

One of the intriguing findings of the Wyoming Heritage Foundation poll conducted early in August on the attitude of Wyoming residents' toward the MX deployment in this state is not the general overall sentiment. That shows that 57 percent of Wyoming residents favor putting the MX in Wyoming, 36 percent were opposed and 7 percent were undecided.

But aside from that, the really interesting fact is that in southeastern Wyoming, there is much greater favorable sentiment toward the MX. Of the 104 residents surveyed in this part of the state, 66 percent favored the MX deployment, 29 percent opposed it and 5 percent had no opinion.

This contrasts with the next most favorable area, southwestern Wyoming, where 59 percent favored, 38 percent opposed and 3 percent had no opinion; northwestern Wyoming where 57 percent favored, 36 percent opposed and 7 percent were undecided; and northeastern Wyoming, where 53 percent favored, 35 percent opposed it and 12 percent were undecided.

For reasons best known to itself, the polling organization, Research Services Inc. of Denver, ran a separate survey on Natrona County which showed only 44 percent favored the MX deployment there, 45 percent opposed it and 11 percent were undecided.

That latter may be the reason why we are beginning to see news stories emanating from Casper instead of Cheyenne about anti-MX organizational activity; recently the Casper Star-Tribune, which has been in the forefront of anti-MX editorializing in this state, featured a story about Cheyenne's Catholic nun, Sister Frances Russell, speaking at an anti-MX meeting there. She, of course, was a leader in the Tri-State MX Coalition which for over the past year has centered its activities in southeastern Wyoming, especially the Cheyenne area.

We are also treated to a report in the Sunday paper that something called the Wyoming Nuclear Freeze Coalition which apparently has succeeded to the mantle of opposition to the MX, has announced that it is not ready to give up the fight against the MX. A leader of this group identified in the news story as one Jeff Zacharakis-Jutz says a campaign of "education and awareness" is being planned by the group and it is going to stage "walkathons" and fund-raising events to support its campaign.

We seem to have heard all this before. Where? Right here in Cheyenne by the Anti-MX Coalition.

But the Heritage Foundation poll suggests that with all of the fulminations that have been delivered against the

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REVEALING POLL...CONTINUED

MX by this group and church leaders such as the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Church bishops, the campaign to turn Wyoming people against the MX has notably failed, and particularly in the part of the state that is apt to be the most affected by its presence. Local residents have not been scared or impressed by the "ground zero" tactics of the anti-MXers.

Precisely why Natrona County shows a preponderance of opposition to the MX is a mystery. But whatever the case, the poll does show that most Wyoming people support the missile deployment and most importantly those in the part of the state most to be affected are strongest in their support of it.

NEW YORK NEWS

25 August 1983


Keeping the peace

President Reagan said some sensible things to the American Legion in Seattle Tuesday, showing that he understands the importance of the peace issue. It'll be one of the main topics in next year's election, and Reagan fired off another salvo in the direction of his opponents by denouncing what he called their campaign of "modern hype and theatrics."

He said, "We have no intention of becoming policeman to the world, but we have a responsibility to help our friends." We agree heartily with that: The U.S. has just pulled its AWACS and F-15s out of Egypt, where they were keeping an eye on Libya's invasion of Chad. It's a war that has nothing to do with us, and can safely be left to French gendarmes.

Reagan reminded his audience that the best way to keep the peace is to prepare for war. Appeasement doesn't work. He also said that peace was an objective, not a policy. In fact, it's a condition that has survived since 1945 in Europe, North America and Japan, thanks to the nuclear deterrent and constant diplomacy. Peace is not an automatic consequence of all those missiles and ships.


We certainly need strong defenses, but we don't need the MX, Tridents, B-1s, battleships and poison gas all together. We don't need to speed up the arms race. Above all, we need serious negotiations with the Soviets on nuclear disarmament. Reagan claims they show "encouraging movement." We haven't noticed it. There's going to be a serious diplomatic confrontation with the Soviets in Europe this fall and Reagan seems sadly unprepared for it.



CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 6 September 1983

Bridge or barrier?





EDITORIALS

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| 1. | WYOMING STATE TRIBUNE | 29 August 1983 | (+) |
| 2. | NEW YORK NEWS | 25 August 1983 | (-) |