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A PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

/

Mr. Ronald Reagan

STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE COALITION

Richard D. Sellers, Chairman
316 Pennsylvania Ave., SE, Suite 203, Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone: (202) 544-4656

The Strategic Defense Initiative is Under Attack:

Budget Reductions

On June 20, 1985, President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1986 SDI Budget request was cut 33%, from \$3.7 billion to \$2.5 billion, in the first major Congressional debate on SDI. Only 104 Congressmen voted for the President's request. Further cuts are expected by the House Appropriations Committee this Fall.

Eroding Political Support

Senator Sam Nunn, an SDI supporter and ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, has predicted that if the current sentiment continues, SDI "will lose virtually all its political support in Congress within a year or two..." (Los Angeles Times, June 7, 1985).

Increasing Congressional Opposition

Congressional attacks against SDI are rising, as evidenced by the formation of the Congressional Coalition for the Peaceful Uses of Space and the introduction of a joint resolution by Congressman Steven Solarz and Senator Gary Hart calling on the President to abandon SDI during the Summit.

Soviet Opposition

The Soviet Union wants the United States and its allies to remain vulnerable to nuclear attack, a concept which forms the foundation of their opposition to SDI. According to White House spokesman Larry Speakes, "We don't see any signs of a shift in the Soviet position from their outright opposition to SDI." (UPI, July 26, 1985)

Soviet Propaganda

As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has warned, the Soviet Union is preparing a massive propaganda offensive against SDI preceding the scheduled summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in November. "Western republics will be presented with alluring prospects for large arms reductions and a stable peace if only the United States will give up the SDI, if only Britain and France will give up their nuclear deterrent...in other work, give up," said Prime Minister Thatcher in a speech before the International Democratic Union. (Washington Times, July 25, 1985)

Media Bias

Recent polling data has shown that 60% of Americans believe that the United States has a defense against Soviet nuclear attack, which is untrue. The 1972 ABM Treaty prohibits deployment of anti-ballistic missile defensive systems, however, 83% of Americans do not know of this treaty.

Lack of Public Awareness

The national media continues to display its bias against SDI, particularly through its frequent references to the program as "Star Wars". Surveys indicate that public opposition to SDI increases when this reference is used. At his January 10, 1985 news conference, President Reagan said that the phrase "Star Wars" gives "a false impression of what it is we are talking about....I wish whoever started that expression would take it back." SDI critic Senator Edward Kennedy started the term.

SDI Opposition

The major anti-defense organizations are committing their resources to increase public opposition to SDI. A coalition to coordinate this effort, the National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty, has been formed by the following organizations: Arms Control Association, Center for Education on Nuclear War, Common Cause, Council for a Livable World, Federation of American Scientists, Lawyers Alliance for Nuclear Arms Control, SANE, and the Union of Concerned Scientists. Also, UCS has started a major TV ad campaign against SDI.

The Strategic Defense Initiative Coalition Will:

- **Develop a broad-based, non-partisan coalition in support of SDI.**
- **Conduct a vigorous campaign to educate the general public and government officials on the value and necessity of SDI.**
- **Serve as a clearinghouse on SDI in order to develop a better understanding of the problem by the public, Congress, and the media.**
- **Publicize the activities of groups and individuals deeply committed to promoting SDI.**
- **Monitor press accounts of SDI and work toward policy of objectivity.**
- **Actively counter the activities of organizations opposed to SDI.**
- **Assist the efficiency and effectiveness of coalition members in promoting SDI.**

'Star Wars' Support Seen Eroding

Goldwater Points to Lack of Trust; Nunn Blames Reagan

LOS ANGELES TIMES

7 June 1985

By SARA FRITZ, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—President Reagan's "Star Wars" space-based missile defense system is losing support in Congress, despite several favorable votes in the Senate earlier this week, both Republicans and Democrats warn.

"All through this debate, it has become more and more obvious that members of this body do not trust" the program, formally known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) said.

Likewise, Sen. Sam Nunn of Georgia, ranking Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, predicted publicly that if the current sentiment continues, "Star Wars" will lose virtually all its political support in Congress within a year or two—suffering the same fate as deployment of the MX missile, which the Senate recently voted to cut in half.

Panel Cut Noted

Although the Senate voted four times Tuesday against proposals to slash "Star Wars" research funding below \$3 billion in fiscal 1986, Nunn noted that the committee already had trimmed \$800 million from the President's budget request for the program. In addition, he predicted that the House would cut the program's budget even further—perhaps as low as \$2.5 billion for next year.

"It's not in trouble with votes now, but neither was MX two years ago," Nunn said. "These are the kind of things you don't measure by votes—you put your nose in the air and smell. If you give it the old sniff test, there's an awful lot of uneasy feeling about SDI."

Nunn charged that the President himself has undermined support for "Star Wars" by overselling it as a program that will lead to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Indeed, the program had more support before Reagan began making that statement, which he frequently repeats, he said.

"I find very few people who are informed in this area in either party who even come close to the President's definition of SDI—and that's people who support the program," Nunn said. "I think it's a trap. If you define it that broadly, when the public finds out—and they will, the American people are intelligent—that this is not achievable, then there's going to be disillusionment, and we're going to have SDI in trouble."

Moreover, Sen. John H. Chafee

(R-R.I.) said that while Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has said that "Star Wars" research will produce a "thoroughly reliable and total" defense against Soviet offensive missiles, Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson, SDI program director, has stated: "A perfect . . . defense is not a realistic thing."

Chafee argued that development of anything short of a perfect defense would likely encourage the Soviet Union to increase its arsenal of offensive weapons to penetrate the U.S. space-based system. "The real danger is that the SDI program could invigorate the already-dangerous U.S.-Soviet military rivalry," he said.

In addition, some senators suggested that rapid development of a less-than-perfect "Star Wars" defense actually would work against the goal of arms control. According to Nunn, many members of Congress are highly skeptical about the President's commitment to negotiating an arms control treaty with the Soviet Union.

He noted that while the Soviets are demanding limits on "Star Wars" development in exchange for concessions on their part, Reagan has so far indicated that he is unwilling to consider such a bargain.

"It's awfully hard for me to see

how you can be flexible in arms control with a program you define as being one that will abolish nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth," said Nunn. "If I believed that, I wouldn't want to be discussing it in arms control negotiations, either."

Chafee also voiced a fear expressed by other senators that the development of "Star Wars" beyond the research stage would jeopardize the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union. The program calls for testing of a space-based ballistic missile defense, which is outlawed by the treaty. "Without the ABM treaty, the prospect of controlling offensive forces will be greatly reduced," he said.

Moreover, Nunn said that some members of Congress are questioning the Administration's motives in widely distributing SDI research money. "One thing causing a lot of people problems, including me, is that they are using these research projects to simply go out and buy intellectual support for the whole concept," he said.

Nunn said that he has written to Administration officials several times in the last two months asking for information on the research contracts, but his letters so far have gone unanswered.

Strategic Defense Initiative Votes

KEY

Y Voted for (yea).
 # Paired for.
 + Announced for.
 N Voted against (nay).
 X Paired against.
 - Announced against.
 P Voted "present".
 C Voted "present" to avoid possible conflict of interest.
 ? Did not vote or otherwise make a position known.

Democrats Republicans

ALABAMA	1	2	3	4	5	6
1 Callahan	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Dickinson	N	N	N	N	N	Y
3 Nichols	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Bevil	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5 Flippo	N	N	N	N	N	Y
6 Erdreich	N	N	N	N	N	Y
7 Shelby	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
ALASKA						
AL Young	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
ARIZONA						
1 McCain	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Udall	?	Y	N	Y	N	Y
3 Stump	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Rudd	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Kolbe	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
ARKANSAS						
1 Alexander	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Robinson	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Hammerschmidt	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Anthony	N	Y	N	Y	N	?
CALIFORNIA						
1 Bosco	N	N	N	Y	N	N
2 Chappie	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Matsui	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
4 Fazio	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Burton	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
6 Boxer	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
7 Miller	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Dellums	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
9 Stark	Y	Y	N	?	?	?
10 Edwards	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
11 Lantos	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
12 Zachau	N	N	N	N	N	Y
13 Mineta	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
14 Shumway	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
15 Coelho	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
16 Panetta	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
17 Pashayan	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
18 Lehman	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
19 Lagomarsino	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
20 Thomas	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
21 Fiedler	N	N	Y	N	Y	?
22 Meerhead	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
23 Beilenson	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
24 Waxman	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
25 Roybal	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
26 Berman	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N
27 Levine	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
28 Dixon	#	#	?	?	X	X
29 Hawkins	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
30 Martinez	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
31 Dymally	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
32 Anderson	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
33 Dreier	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
34 Torres	N	Y	N	Y	?	?
35 Lewis	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
36 Brown	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
37 McCandless	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
38 Dornan	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
39 Dannemeyer	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
40 Badham	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
41 Lawery	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
42 Lungren	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y

	1	2	3	4	5	6
43 Packard	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
44 Bates	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
45 Hunter	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
COLORADO						
1 Schroeder	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Wirth	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Strang	?	X	?	X	#	?
4 Brown	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5 Kramer	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
6 Schaefer	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
CONNECTICUT						
1 Kennedy	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Gejdenson	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Morrison	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 McKinney	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Rowland	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
6 Johnson	N	N	N	N	N	Y
DELAWARE						
AL Carper	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
FLORIDA						
1 Hutto	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Fuqua	N	N	N	N	N	Y
3 Bennett	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Chappell	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 McCollum	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
6 MacKay	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
7 Gibbons	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
8 Young	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
9 Bilirakis	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
10 Ireland	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
11 Nelson	N	N	Y	N	Y	#
12 Lewis	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
13 Mack	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
14 Mica	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
15 Shaw	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
16 Smith	N	#	?	#	X	?
17 Lehman	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
18 Pepper	X	X	?	#	X	#
19 Foscill	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
GEORGIA						
1 Thomas	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Hatcher	N	N	N	N	N	?
3 Ray	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Swindall	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Fowler	N	N	N	N	N	Y
6 Gingrich	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Darden	N	N	N	N	N	Y
8 Rowland	N	N	N	N	N	Y
9 Jenkins	N	N	N	N	N	Y
10 Barnard	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
HAWAII						
1 Hefel	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
2 Akaka	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
IDAHO						
1 Craig	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Stallings	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
ILLINOIS						
1 Hayes	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Savage	Y	Y	?	?	?	?
3 Russo	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 O'Brien	N	N	N	X	#	?
5 Lipinski	N	N	N	?	?	?
6 Hyde	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Collins	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Rostenkowski	?	?	?	?	?	?
9 Yates	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
10 Porter	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
11 Annunzio	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
12 Crane	N	N	Y	N	N	N
13 Fawell	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
14 Grotberg	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
15 Madigan	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
16 Martin	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
17 Evans	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
18 Michel	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
19 Bruce	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
20 Durbin	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
21 Price	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
22 Gray	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
INDIANA						
1 Visclosky	N	N	N	Y	N	N
2 Sharp	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
3 Hiler	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Coats	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Hillis	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y

	1	2	3	4	5	6
6 Burton	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Myers	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
8 McCloskey	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
9 Hamilton	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
10 Jacobs	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
IOWA						
1 Leach	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Tauke	N	N	N	Y	N	N
3 Evans	N	N	N	N	Y	N
4 Smith	N	N	N	Y	N	?
5 Lightfoot	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
6 Bedell	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
KANSAS						
1 Roberts	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Slattery	N	N	N	Y	N	N
3 Meyers	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Glickman	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Whittaker	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
KENTUCKY						
1 Hubbard	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Natcher	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Mazzoli	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
4 Snyder	N	N	Y	N	#	?
5 Rogers	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
6 Hopkins	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
7 Perkins	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
LOUISIANA						
1 Livingston	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Boggs	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
3 Tauzin	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
4 Roemer	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5 Huckabee	N	N	N	N	N	Y
6 Moore	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Breoux	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
8 Long	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
MAINE						
1 McKernan	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Snowe	N	N	N	N	N	Y
MARYLAND						
1 Dyson	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
2 Bentley	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
3 Mikulski	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Holt	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
5 Hoyer	N	N	N	Y	N	N
6 Byron	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
7 Mitchell	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Barnes	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
MASSACHUSETTS						
1 Conte	N	Y	N	N	N	N
2 Boland	N	N	N	Y	N	N
3 Early	N	N	Y	N	N	N
4 Frank	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Atkins	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
6 Mavroules	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
7 Markey	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 O'Neill	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
9 Moakley	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
10 Shudds	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
11 Donnelly	N	N	N	Y	N	N
MICHIGAN						
1 Conyers	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Pursell	N	N	N	Y	N	N
3 Walpe	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Siljander	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Henry	N	N	N	N	N	Y
6 Carr	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
7 Kildee	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Traxler	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
9 Vander Jagt	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
10 Schuette	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
11 Davis	N	N	N	N	N	Y
12 Bonior	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
13 Crockett	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
14 Hertel	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
15 Ford	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
16 Dingell	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
17 Levin	N	N	N	Y	N	N
18 Broomfield	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
MINNESOTA						
1 Penny	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Weber	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Frenzel	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
4 Vento	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Sabo	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
6 Sikorski	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N

1 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Dellums, D-Calif., amendment to the Price, D-Ill., amendment, to reduce from \$2.5 billion to \$954 million the authorization for the strategic defense initiative. Rejected 102-320: R 3-176; D 99-144 (ND 92-71, SD 7-73), June 20, 1985. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

2 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Mavroules, D-Mass., amendment to the Price, D-Ill., amendment, to reduce from \$2.5 billion to \$1.4 billion the authorization for the strategic defense initiative. Rejected 155-268: R 4-176; D 151-92 (ND 134-30, SD 17-62), June 20, 1985. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

3 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Courter, R-N.J., amendment to the Holt, R-Md., substitute for the Price, D-Ill., amendment, to increase from \$2.5 billion to \$3.7 billion the authorization for the strategic defense initiative. Rejected 104-315: R 97-83; D 7-232 (ND 0-161, SD 7-71), June 20, 1985. A "yea" was a vote supporting the president's position. (The Holt substitute subsequently was rejected

	1	2	3	4	5	6
7 Stangeland	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
8 Oberstar	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
MISSISSIPPI						
1 Whitten	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
2 Franklin	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Montgomery	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
4 Dowdy	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
5 Lott	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
MISSOURI						
1 Clay	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Young	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
3 Gephardt	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
4 Skelton	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
5 Wheat	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
6 Coleman	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
7 Taylor	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
8 Emerson	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
9 Volkmer	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
MONTANA						
1 Williams	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Marlenee	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
NEBRASKA						
1 Bereuter	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Daut	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Smith	N	N	N	N	N	Y
NEVADA						
1 Reid	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
2 Vucanovich	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
NEW HAMPSHIRE						
1 Smith	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Gregg	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
NEW JERSEY						
1 Florio	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Hughes	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
3 Howard	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Smith	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Roukema	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
6 Dwyer	N	N	Y	N	Y	N
7 Rinaldo	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
8 Roe	N	N	N	Y	N	N
9 Torricelli	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
10 Rodino	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
11 Gallo	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
12 Courter	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
13 Saxton	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
14 Guarini	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
NEW MEXICO						
1 Lujan	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Skeen	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Richardson	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
NEW YORK						
1 Carney	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Downey	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Mirazek	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Lent	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
5 McGrath	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
6 Addabbo	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
7 Ackerman	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Scheuer	Y	Y	N	?	N	N
9 Manton	N	Y	N	?	?	?
10 Schumer	N	Y	N	Y	?	?
11 Towns	?	?	?	?	?	?
12 Owens	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
13 Solarz	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
14 Molinari	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
15 Green	N	N	N	Y	N	N
16 Rangel	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
17 Weiss	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
18 Garcia	Y	Y	?	?	?	X
19 Biaggi	N	N	N	N	N	Y
20 DiGuardi	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
21 Fish	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
22 Gilman	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
23 Stratton	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
24 Solomon	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
25 Boehlert	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
26 Martin	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
27 Wartley	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
28 McHugh	N	N	Y	N	N	N
29 Horton	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
30 Eckert	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
31 Kemp	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
32 LaFalce	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
33 Nowak	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
34 Lundine	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y

4 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Dicks, D-Wash., amendment to the Price, D-Ill., amendment, to reduce from \$2.5 billion to \$2.1 billion the authorization for the strategic defense initiative. Rejected 195-221: R 12-167; D 183-54 (ND 147-11, SD 36-43), June 20, 1985. A "nay" was a vote supporting the president's position.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
NORTH CAROLINA						
1 Jones	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
2 Valenhe	N	N	N	N	N	Y
3 Whitley	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Cobey	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Neal	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
6 Coble	N	N	N	N	N	Y
7 Rose	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Helmer	N	N	N	N	N	Y
9 McMillan	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
10 Brayhill	N	N	N	N	N	Y
11 Hendon	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
NORTH DAKOTA						
Al Dorgan	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
OHIO						
1 Luken	?	?	?	?	?	?
2 Gradison	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Hall	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Oxley	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
5 Latta	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
6 McEwan	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 DeWine	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
8 Kindness	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
9 Kaptur	N	Y	N	Y	?	N
10 Miller	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
11 Eckart	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
12 Kasich	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
13 Pease	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
14 Seiberling	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
15 Wyllie	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
16 Regula	N	N	N	N	N	Y
17 Traficant	Y	Y	N	Y	N	Y
18 Applegate	N	N	Y	Y	?	?
19 Feighan	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
20 Oaker	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
21 Stokes	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
OKLAHOMA						
1 Jones	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
2 Synar	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Watkins	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
4 McCurdy	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5 Edwards	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
6 English	N	N	N	N	N	Y
OREGON						
1 AuCoin	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Smith, R.	N	N	N	N	N	Y
3 Wyden	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Weaver	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Smith, D.	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
PENNSYLVANIA						
1 Foglietta	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Gray	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Borski	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Kolter	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Schulze	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
6 Yatron	N	Y	N	Y	?	Y
7 Edgar	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Kostmayer	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
9 Shuster	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
10 McDade	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
11 Kanjorski	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
12 Murtha	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
13 Coughlin	N	N	N	N	Y	N
14 Coyne	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
15 Ritter	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
16 Walker	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
17 Gekas	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
18 Walgren	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
19 Goodling	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
20 Gaydos	?	?	?	?	?	?
21 Ridge	N	N	N	Y	N	N
22 Murphy	N	N	Y	N	N	N
23 Clinger	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
RHODE ISLAND						
1 St Germain	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
2 Schneider	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
SOUTH CAROLINA						
1 Hartnett	N	N	Y	N	Y	?
2 Spence	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Derrick	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
4 Campbell	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
5 Spratt	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
6 Tallon	N	N	N	N	N	Y
SOUTH DAKOTA						
Al Daschle	?	?	?	?	?	?

	1	2	3	4	5	6
TENNESSEE						
1 Quillen	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Duncan	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Lloyd	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
4 Cooper	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
5 Boner	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
6 Gordon	N	N	N	Y	N	N
7 Sundquist	?	N	Y	N	Y	Y
8 Jones	N	N	N	N	N	Y
9 Ford	Y	Y	?	Y	N	N
TEXAS						
1 Vacancy						
2 Wilson	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Bortlett	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Hall, R.	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Bryant	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
6 Barton	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
7 Archer	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
8 Fields	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
9 Brooks	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
10 Pickle	N	N	N	N	N	Y
11 Leath	N	N	N	N	N	Y
12 Wright	N	N	Y	N	?	?
13 Boulter	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
14 Sweeney	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
15 de la Garza	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
16 Coleman	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
17 Stenholm	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
18 Leland	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
19 Corns	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
20 Gonzalez	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
21 Loeffler	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
22 Delay	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
23 Bustamante	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
24 Frost	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
25 Andrews	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
26 Armey	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
27 Ortiz	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
UTAH						
1 Hansen	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
2 Monson	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
3 Nielson	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
VERMONT						
Al Jeffords	?	?	?	?	?	?
VIRGINIA						
1 Bateman	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
2 Whitehurst	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
3 Bliley	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
4 Siskiy	N	N	N	N	N	Y
5 Daniel	N	N	N	N	N	Y
6 Olin	N	N	N	N	N	Y
7 Slaughter	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
8 Parris	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
9 Boucher	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
10 Wolf	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
WASHINGTON						
1 Miller	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
2 Swift	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Bonker	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Morrison	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
5 Foley	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
6 Dicks	N	N	N	Y	N	N
7 Lowry	Y	Y	?	Y	N	N
8 Chandler	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
WEST VIRGINIA						
1 Mollohan	N	N	N	N	N	Y
2 Staggers	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
3 Wise	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
4 Rahall	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
WISCONSIN						
1 Aspin	N	N	N	Y	N	Y
2 Kostenmeier	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
3 Gunderson	N	N	N	N	N	Y
4 Kleczka	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
5 Moody	N	Y	N	Y	N	N
6 Petri	N	N	N	N	N	Y
7 Obey	Y	Y	N	Y	N	N
8 Roth	N	N	N	N	N	Y
9 Sensenbrenner	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
WYOMING						
Al Cheney	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y

5 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Holt, R-Md., substitute for the Price, D-Ill., amendment, to increase from \$2.5 billion to \$2.9 billion the authorization for the strategic defense initiative. Rejected 169-242: R 145-33; D 24-209 (ND 5-149, SD 19-60), June 20, 1985.

6 HR 1872. Department of Defense Authorization, Fiscal 1986. Price, D-Ill., amendment to authorize \$2.5 billion for the strategic defense initiative. Adopted 256-150: R 165-11; D 91-139 (ND 29-126, SD 62-13), June 20, 1985.

SPECIAL REPORT

The Public Wants Defenses

In political Washington, President Reagan's proposal for a space-based defense against incoming enemy missiles is considered highly controversial.

In fact, the idea of having any defense against such missiles has been unpopular in the Capital for upwards of two decades. Official policy since the 1960's has been in favor of dismantling missile defenses and related warning systems, and drastically reducing our air defenses. Anti-ballistic missile systems are specifically banned by the SALT agreements of 1972.

The theory behind this policy, called "mutual assured destruction," is that by leaving our civilian population open to attack, we will reassure the Soviets of our peaceful intent and encourage them to follow suit, creating a "stable balance of terror." President Reagan's strategic defense initiative has aroused tremendous opposition because it goes against this ruling doctrine.

Out in grass-roots America, however, a different set of attitudes prevails. One opinion survey after another shows the public is strongly in favor of missile defenses generally. President Reagan's proposal in particular. These surveys also indicate, however, that most Americans have until recently been unaware of the policy we are following under MAD.

The gap between the conventional Washington view of the subject and the attitudes of the public is revealed in opinion polls conducted by Sindlinger and Co., Penn and Schoen, and Arthur J. Finkelstein, among others. The results have been remarkably uniform — and overwhelming.

In 1982, for example, the Sindlinger organization conducted a survey on this subject for the Heritage Foundation. This analysis found that 86 per cent of those questioned favored having defenses against incoming missiles, compared to only 10 per cent opposed. A follow-up poll last year found 82.6 per cent in favor of such defenses.

This month, Heritage has released another survey conducted by Sindlinger, keyed to President Reagan's proposal. In this poll, 74 per cent of those replying said MAD strategy should be abandoned, and 77 per cent said the Reagan program, if it can be made to work, should be put in its place. Thus more than three-quarters of the people

questioned in these surveys consistently favor missile defenses.

Similar results appear in a 1984 poll conducted by Penn and Schoen for the Committee on the Present Danger. In this survey, asked if they favored plans to develop a space-based missile defense, 75 per cent of the respondents said yes, while 17 per cent said no. Asked if development of such defenses should continue even if there were a "nuclear freeze," 54 per cent said yes, compared to 34 per cent who said no.

Even more emphatic are the results of a more generalized question posed by Finkelstein early this year. Respondents were asked, "Do you want the United States government to defend Americans against Soviet missiles?" Ninety per cent said yes, and only four percent said no. A substantial plurality (45 per cent) said the present fraction of the defense budget devoted to this project was too little — compared to 31 per cent who said it was about right and 10 per cent who thought it was too much.

The finer details of these surveys are also of political interest. In the Finkelstein poll, for instance, favorable opinion of missile defense efforts drastically declined when the "star wars" label was added to it. Asked the question this way, only 38 per cent were in favor of the proposal, while 37 per cent were opposed. That finding suggests the label is a liability for the President, even though the issue itself is a plus.

Also significant is the fact that the issue has strong appeal to women — with whom the President's support is said to be comparatively weak. Backing for missile defenses among women, as reflected in these surveys, is virtually the same as that among men, and in the Sindlinger poll last year was even higher (85 versus 80 per cent).

Finally, there is the fact that many Americans have been unaware that it is currently official policy *not* to have defense against incoming missiles. Sixty per cent of Finkelstein's respondents thought the U.S. already had defenses against such attack, while 83 per cent didn't know that we have pledged ourselves to a treaty that prohibits deployment of these systems.

American News Service

Do you want the United States government to defend Americans against Soviet missiles?

	Yes	No	Don't know/refused
	90%	5%	5%
ALL:			
REGION: _____			
Northeast	91	4	6
South	89	5	6
Midwest	90	6	4
West	90	6	4
VOTING BEHAVIOR: _____			
Registered, always vote	90	5	5
Registered, usually vote	90	6	4
Registered, usually don't vote	85	7	9
Not registered to vote	90	4	6
IDEOLOGY: _____			
Conservative	94	3	3
Moderate	90	5	6
Liberal	85	8	7
SEX: _____			
Male	92	4	4
Female	88	6	6
AGE: _____			
18-25	92	5	3
26-40	89	6	5
41-55	91	6	4
56-65	91	2	7
Over 65	89	5	7
RACE: _____			
White	90	5	5
Black	88	7	6
MARITAL STATUS: _____			
Married	91	4	5
Single	89	6	5
Divorced/Separated	89	7	4
Widowed	89	6	6
MARITAL STATUS GENDER: _____			
Married Women	85	5	6
Unmarried Women	87	7	6
Married Men	93	3	4
Unmarried Men	91	6	3
RELIGION: _____			
Born Again	99	1	0
Other Protestant	92	4	4
Catholic	89	5	7
Jewish	100	0	0
Atheist Agnostic	86	12	2
PARTY IDENTIFICATION: _____			
Republican	94	3	3
Democrat	87	7	7
Independent	90	4	6
UNION HOUSEHOLD: _____			
Union	90	5	6
Non-union	90	5	5
EMPLOYMENT GENDER: _____			
Working Women	87	7	6
Non-working Women	89	5	6
Working Men	93	3	4
Non-working Men	93	4	3
EDUCATION: _____			
Less than High School	86	7	7
High School Graduate	92	3	5
Some College	91	5	4
College Graduate	91	4	5
Post Graduate	79	18	3
INCOME: _____			
Under \$10,000	86	5	9
Between \$10,001-\$20,000	94	4	2
Between \$20,001-\$30,000	91	5	4
Between \$30,001-\$40,000	94	4	2
Between \$40,001-\$50,000	93	1	6
Over \$50,000	89	4	8

A professional random sample public opinion survey of 1,005 Americans conducted in February, 1985 by Arthur J. Finkelstein of New York.

For further information: please contact: Richard D. Sellers,
P. O. Box 576, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35402

The United States government is spending less than 2% of the defense budget on finding out how to defend America against Soviet nuclear attack—Is that too much, too little or about right?

	Too much	Too little	About right	Don't know/ refused
ALL:	10%	45%	31%	15%
REGION: _____				
Northeast	11	42	33	14
South	9	46	30	15
Midwest	9	44	31	17
West	10	49	28	13
VOTING BEHAVIOR: _____				
Registered, always vote	9	44	29	17
Registered, usually vote	9	47	33	12
Registered, usually don't vote	10	46	31	14
Not registered to vote	13	42	34	12
IDEOLOGY: _____				
Conservative	7	46	33	14
Moderate	8	43	33	16
Liberal	18	46	24	12
SEX: _____				
Male	9	48	30	13
Female	11	41	31	17
AGE: _____				
18-25	9	56	29	6
26-40	11	48	30	12
41-55	7	41	32	20
56-65	14	47	26	14
Over 65	8	28	37	27
RACE: _____				
White	9	45	31	15
Black	20	39	31	10
MARITAL STATUS: _____				
Married	7	46	31	16
Single	14	48	32	6
Divorced/Separated	17	47	21	15
Widowed	13	26	37	24
MARITAL STATUS/GENDER: _____				
Married Women	9	44	31	16
Unmarried Women	15	36	32	18
Married Men	6	47	30	17
Unmarried Men	14	51	30	6
RELIGION: _____				
Born Again	8	50	32	11
Other Protestant	9	45	31	15
Catholic	10	46	31	14
Jewish	14	37	43	1
Atheist/Agnostic	12	37	30	21
PARTY IDENTIFICATION: _____				
Republican	5	45	34	16
Democrat	15	40	29	16
Independent	10	53	26	11
UNION HOUSEHOLD: _____				
Union	11	46	33	10
Non-union	9	44	30	17
EMPLOYMENT GENDER: _____				
Working Women	14	45	28	14
Non-working Women	8	38	34	19
Working Men	8	50	31	11
Non-working Men	9	45	32	14
EDUCATION: _____				
Less than High School	13	32	37	19
High School Graduate	7	46	31	14
Some College	9	51	26	14
College Graduate	11	39	33	16
Post Graduate	19	43	28	10
INCOME: _____				
Under \$10,000	9	37	28	26
Between \$10,001-\$20,000	9	44	36	11
Between \$20,001-\$30,000	9	50	28	14
Between \$30,001-\$40,000	5	51	32	12
Between \$40,001-\$50,000	16	54	21	9
Over \$50,000	9	36	34	21

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P. O. Box 576, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35402.

Did you know that the United States has a treaty with the Soviet Union *not* to protect Americans from a Soviet missile attack?

	Yes	No	Don't know/refused
ALL:	10%	83%	7%
REGION:			
Northeast	9	85	6
South	11	80	9
Midwest	10	84	6
West	9	84	7
VOTING BEHAVIOR:			
Registered, always vote	11	83	7
Registered, usually vote	9	84	7
Registered, usually don't vote	12	81	7
Not registered to vote	8	84	8
IDEOLOGY:			
Conservative	8	87	5
Moderate	11	81	8
Liberal	9	85	6
SEX:			
Male	11	83	6
Female	9	83	8
AGE:			
18-25	84	90	1
26-40	11	85	5
41-55	8	83	10
56-65	10	81	10
Over 65	13	77	11
RACE:			
White	10	84	7
Black	10	81	9
MARITAL STATUS:			
Married	9	84	7
Single	12	86	2
Divorced/Separated	8	85	7
Widowed	11	73	16
MARITAL STATUS GENDER:			
Married Women	8	85	8
Unmarried Women	11	81	9
Married Men	11	82	7
Unmarried Men	11	85	3
RELIGION:			
Born Again	11	88	1
Other Protestant	10	82	8
Catholic	8	86	5
Jewish	7	93	0
Atheist/Agnostic	14	79	7
PARTY IDENTIFICATION:			
Republican	5	88	7
Democrat	14	79	7
Independent	9	85	0
UNION HOUSEHOLD:			
Union	12	81	8
Non-union	9	84	6
EMPLOYMENT GENDER:			
Working Women	9	86	5
Non-working Women	9	82	10
Working Men	11	83	6
Non-working Men	11	83	6
EDUCATION:			
Less than High School	12	73	15
High School Graduate	8	86	7
Some College	10	84	6
College Graduate	10	87	3
Post Graduate	15	79	6
INCOME:			
Under \$10,000	12	78	10
Between \$10,001-\$20,000	8	85	8
Between \$20,001-\$30,000	9	87	4
Between \$30,001-\$40,000	11	83	6
Between \$40,001-\$50,000	4	90	6
Over \$50,000	9	83	9

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Does the United States have a defense against nuclear missiles today?

	Yes	No	Don't know/refused
ALL:	60%	26%	15%
REGION: _____			
Northeast	56	30	14
South	63	21	16
Midwest	62	23	16
West	58	31	11
VOTING BEHAVIOR: _____			
Registered, always vote	56	28	16
Registered, usually vote	64	23	13
Registered, usually don't vote	61	29	10
Not registered to vote	68	17	15
IDEOLOGY: _____			
Conservative	60	24	16
Moderate	60	25	15
Liberal	62	29	9
SEX: _____			
Male	57	32	11
Female	63	19	18
AGE: _____			
18-25	62	29	10
26-40	62	26	11
41-55	66	20	14
56-65	62	24	14
Over 65	42	29	30
RACE: _____			
White	60	26	15
Black	60	22	18
MARITAL STATUS: _____			
Married	56	25	15
Single	64	28	9
Divorced/Separated	58	28	14
Widowed	53	19	29
MARITAL STATUS GENDER: _____			
Married Women	63	19	18
Unmarried Women	63	20	17
Married Men	57	31	12
Unmarried Men	57	32	10
RELIGION: _____			
Born Again	58	25	17
Other Protestant	61	25	15
Catholic	62	27	12
Jewish	43	29	29
Atheist Agnostic	51	28	14
PARTY IDENTIFICATION: _____			
Republican	60	26	14
Democrat	62	24	14
Independent	55	27	17
UNION HOUSEHOLD: _____			
Union	60	27	13
Non-union	60	25	15
EMPLOYMENT GENDER: _____			
Working Women	66	21	13
Non-working Women	61	16	23
Working Men	60	31	9
Non-working Men	51	33	16
EDUCATION: _____			
Less than High School	51	23	26
High School Graduate	64	21	15
Some College	61	26	13
College Graduate	58	30	12
Post Graduate	57	38	6
INCOME: _____			
Under \$10,000	55	21	24
Between \$10,001-\$20,000	61	24	15
Between \$20,001-\$30,000	62	23	15
Between \$30,001-\$40,000	61	29	10
Between \$40,001-\$50,000	63	26	11
Over \$50,000	57	34	9

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What comes to mind when I say "Star Wars"?

	Don't know	Movie	President Reagan's program	Weapons/ space	Nuclear war/ weapons	Missiles
ALL:	8%	28%	15%	9%	5%	5%
REGION:						
Northeast	9	27	13	10	4	4
South	9	27	13	7	5	4
Midwest	10	31	12	9	6	6
West	4	28	22	12	4	4
VOTING BEHAVIOR:						
Registered, always vote	8	27	17	10	4	6
Registered, usually vote	7	31	15	10	5	4
Registered, usually don't vote	13	35	2	4	11	2
Not registered to vote	10	25	9	7	6	4
IDEOLOGY:						
Conservative	8	28	13	10	4	4
Moderate	8	26	15	10	6	5
Liberal	7	31	18	6	5	5
SEX:						
Male	6	24	15	12	4	3
Female	10	32	14	6	6	6
AGE:						
18-25	6	31	10	6	7	2
26-40	3	32	18	10	6	3
41-55	6	30	14	11	1	7
56-65	14	23	14	14	3	7
Over 65	22	16	14	6	4	5
RACE:						
White	8	28	15	10	5	5
Black	9	27	14	3	6	7
MARITAL STATUS						
Married	7	29	16	10	4	6
Single	6	28	13	9	7	2
Divorced Separated	4	28	17	6	7	4
Widowed	32	25	10	5	3	3
MARITAL STATUS GENDER						
Married Women	9	33	13	6	5	7
Unmarried Women	12	30	15	6	7	4
Married Men	4	24	18	14	3	4
Unmarried Men	8	24	11	10	5	1
RELIGION:						
Born Again	8	37	12	12	2	4
Other Protestant	8	28	15	8	5	5
Catholic	8	26	12	8	4	5
Jewish	4	36	12	20	4	0
Atheist Agnostic	2	32	30	6	4	4
PARTY IDENTIFICATION:						
Republican	7	30	13	9	5	4
Democrat	8	28	18	8	5	5
Independent	11	22	11	12	4	4
UNION HOUSEHOLD:						
Union	6	28	15	9	4	4
Non-union	8	29	15	9	5	5
EMPLOYMENT GENDER:						
Working Women	7	33	20	6	8	3
Non-working Women	13	32	10	6	4	8
Working Men	3	27	16	15	3	3
Non-working Men	13	17	15	7	4	4
HOUSING STATUS:						
Own	8	28	15	11	5	5
Rent	6	31	15	6	5	5
EDUCATION:						
Less than High School	18	27	8	5	5	1
High School Graduate	12	30	11	7	5	7
Some College	3	26	17	9	6	3
College Graduate	4	29	18	13	4	5
Post Graduate	1	27	26	18	5	2
INCOME:						
Under \$10,000	19	28	11	6	3	3
Between \$10,001-\$20,000	8	28	13	4	5	7
Between \$20,001-\$30,000	4	32	19	8	6	3
Between \$30,001-\$40,000	4	30	14	13	3	4
Between \$40,001-\$50,000	1	22	20	21	5	5
Over \$50,000	4	30	15	17	2	3

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Do you favor or oppose "Star Wars"? If you don't know, just say so.

	ALL:	Favor 38%	Oppose 37%	Don't know/refused 25%
REGION:				
	Northeast	35	39	26
	South	46	33	21
	Midwest	34	36	29
	West	40	40	21
VOTING BEHAVIOR:				
	Registered, always vote	38	37	25
	Registered, usually vote	39	35	26
	Registered, usually don't vote	30	43	28
	Not registered to vote	42	37	21
IDEOLOGY:				
	Conservative	44	28	28
	Moderate	39	37	24
	Liberal	31	52	17
SEX:				
	Male	52	30	18
	Female	25	44	31
AGE:				
	18-25	48	36	17
	26-40	42	39	19
	41-55	39	36	26
	56-65	34	30	36
	Over 65	24	40	37
RACE:				
	White	40	35	25
	Black	31	54	16
MARITAL STATUS:				
	Married	40	36	25
	Single	44	37	19
	Divorced/Separated	33	49	19
	Widowed	17	35	48
MARITAL STATUS GENDER:				
	Married Women	26	43	31
	Unmarried Women	23	46	31
	Married Men	53	29	18
	Unmarried Men	53	31	16
RELIGION:				
	Born Again	37	35	28
	Other Protestant	38	35	28
	Catholic	37	40	24
	Jewish	36	40	24
	Atheist/Agnostic	41	48	11
PARTY IDENTIFICATION:				
	Republican	48	26	26
	Democrat	29	47	24
	Independent	36	39	25
UNION HOUSEHOLD:				
	Union	39	40	20
	Non-union	39	36	26
EMPLOYMENT GENDER:				
	Working Women	24	48	28
	Non-working Women	26	42	32
	Working Men	55	29	16
	Non-working Men	47	30	23
HOUSING STATUS:				
	Own	38	37	26
	Rent	40	39	21
EDUCATION:				
	Less than High School	28	41	31
	High School Graduate	38	33	28
	Some College	38	42	20
	College Graduate	48	31	21
	Post Graduate	35	47	18
INCOME:				
	Under \$10,000	25	45	29
	Between \$10,001-\$20,000	40	34	26
	Between \$20,001-\$30,000	35	44	22
	Between \$30,001-\$40,000	48	29	23
	Between \$40,001-\$50,000	51	30	18
	Over \$50,000	46	36	18

A professional random sample public opinion survey of 1,005 Americans conducted in February, 1985 by Arthur J. Finkelstein of New York.

For further information: please contact: Richard D. Sellers,
P. O. Box 576, Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35402

A STAR IS BORN

Strategic Defense Has Unconditional Support

A Policy Review/Sindlinger Poll

After two decades of political disharmony, Americans are reaching a new consensus on some of the most important defense issues facing the United States since the birth of the bomb. Americans overwhelmingly support President Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as "Star Wars." Eighty-five percent favor developing a missile defense "even if it cannot protect everyone," and 69 percent even if it means "withdrawing from our existing arms control agreements" with the Soviets. Nearly three-quarters of Americans believe that a Star Wars system would "make the U.S. more secure."

As a solution to the current Soviet advantage in land-based missiles, more Americans favor developing the President's Strategic Defense system to a U.S. missile buildup or to a U.S./Soviet nuclear freeze.

These are the results of the *Policy Review/Sindlinger Poll* conducted between May 7 and May 27. Sindlinger & Company, Inc. of Media/Wallingford, PA surveyed 2,318 Americans in proportion to the population of the 48 contiguous states. Ninety-five percent of the original sample was interviewed.

The opinion poll also revealed that a very large number of Americans are not aware of a number of critical strategic advantages enjoyed by the Soviets. For example, 43 percent do not realize that the United States cannot protect itself from a Soviet nuclear attack, and two-thirds do not realize that Moscow is ahead of the United States in developing a Star Wars system.

The poll found that Americans strongly disapprove of current U.S. nuclear strategy, which relies on the threat of massive retaliation to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, while leaving the U.S. defenseless against a Soviet nuclear attack. Sixty-one percent believe that the current U.S. nuclear

strategy is "dangerous and does not sufficiently defend" the United States and 74 percent believe it "needs to be changed." If a missile defense can be made to work, 77 percent favor developing and deploying it over continued reliance on our current nuclear strategy.

In findings significant for the U.S.-Soviet arms talks and the status of the 1979 SALT II treaty, 90 percent favor continued arms talks with Moscow. Yet 68 percent of Americans believe that the Soviet Union "cannot be trusted" most of the time. In the event of Soviet cheating on arms control treaties, 92 percent believe the Reagan Administration should publicize the Soviet violations and 62 percent would favor an increase in U.S. defense preparations. Some 85 percent of Americans would not consider it a foreign policy failure were no agreement reached at the Geneva talks. As for SALT II, which expires at the end of this year, 51 percent oppose U.S. compliance beyond that date; only 43 percent favor U.S. compliance.

Americans appear to support the arms control process, as long as it does not weaken U.S. security. For example, 69 percent believe the United States should build the President's Strategic Defense system even if it involved "withdrawing from our existing arms control agreements" with the Soviet Union.

The poll found that American females are consistently more hawkish than their male counterparts. For example, when the Soviet Union violates its arms control treaties, only eight percent of American men would favor discontinuing further arms control talks, compared to 26 percent of American women. Similarly, while 96 percent of American men agree that the United States should engage in arms control talks with the Soviets, only 85 percent of American women do.

Part I. Arms Control

1) How do you rate your trust in the Soviet Union to live up to arms control agreements with the United States?

The Soviet Union is very trustworthy most of the time	2.5
The Soviet Union is trustworthy about half of the time	26.0
The Soviet Union cannot be trusted most of the time	68.0
No opinion	3.5


2) Do you agree that the United States should currently be engaged in arms control talks with the Soviet Union?

Agree	90.1
Disagree	7.1
No opinion	2.8

3) In the future, if the Soviet Union violates arms control treaties it has signed with the United States, do you believe we should . . .


Trusting Moscow

How do you rate your trust in the Soviet Union to live up to arms control agreements with the United States?




Abiding By Salt II

Do you recommend that the United States continue to abide by the terms of the unratified 1979 SALT II treaty that expires later this year?




Geneva Negotiations

If no arms control agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at the ongoing Geneva arms control talks would you consider this a failure in our foreign policy?




Opposing MAD

Do you think that the current U.S. strategy of threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation to defend the United States needs to be changed?




U.S. Security

Would the development of "Star Wars" make the United States more secure or less secure?



Star Wars vs. Arms Control

Would you favor U.S. development and eventual deployment of a "Star Wars" defense system even if it meant that the U.S. would have to renegotiate or withdraw from our existing arms control agreement with the Soviet Union?



A. immediately withdraw from the treaty?

Yes	37.5
No	54.0
No opinion	8.4

B. increase our defense preparation?

Yes	61.5
No	29.2
No opinion	9.3

C. publicize the Soviet violations?

Yes	92.3
No	4.1
No opinion	3.6

D. discontinue further arms control talks with the Soviets?

Yes	17.6
No	79.6
No opinion	2.9

E. continue to abide by the treaty?

Yes	64.1
No	30.5
No opinion	5.4

4) Although the United States never ratified the 1979 Salt II arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, our nation has abided by the terms of the treaty for the past five years. This treaty expires later this year, and it is

known that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty in five key areas. Do you recommend that the United States should continue to abide by the terms of the treaty?

Yes	42.9
No	51.0
No opinion	6.1

5) If no arms control agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at the ongoing Geneva arms control talks, would you consider this a failure in our foreign policy?

Yes	10.2
No	55.9
No opinion	4.5
Other (Soviets Union's fault)	29.3

Part II: "Star Wars"

1) Can the United States protect itself now from incoming nuclear missiles?

Yes	8.9
No	57.1
Not sure	17.6
Hope so	16.4

Thatcher warns of Soviet propaganda before summit

The Washington Times July 26, 1985

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher last night warned the Soviet Union is preparing a "massive propaganda" offensive preceding the scheduled summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in November.

In a speech interrupted with frequent applause, Mrs. Thatcher praised America's tradition of liberty tempered by responsibility and self-reliance.

Vice President George Bush, in earlier remarks, read a statement from President Reagan who was scheduled to attend but is recovering from surgery, which praised the IDU members for changing a negative trend in the world that democracy is "outmoded."

By its support for democratic institutions around the world, the IDU has truly created a "Democratic International," Mr. Reagan's statement said.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who also addressed the group, said peace won't be achieved in Central America as long as the Sandinista regime continues to build up its military and expands its influence outside Nicaragua.

"The idea of non-military or nego-

tiated solutions to conflicts in that region would be rendered meaningless," if Sandinista-sponsored violence persists, Mr. Weinberger said.

Other nations could "hem in" the Sandinistas by strengthening their own military forces, but that option would be costly and time consuming, he said.

"The resulting peace would be highly unstable, subject to being upset at any time by an infusion of Soviet or Cuban military aid," Mr. Weinberger said.

Deliveries of military weapons from the Soviet bloc continue to arrive in Nicaragua "in enormous quantities," Mr. Weinberger added.

To block Nicaragua's efforts to expand communism in Central America, Mr. Weinberger urged continued assistance to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and "other forces opposing totalitarian communism."

Western republics will be presented with alluring prospects for large arms reductions and a stable peace "if only the United States will give up the SDI, if only Britain and France will give up their nuclear deterrent ... in other words, give up," said Mrs. Thatcher, in a speech before the International Democratic Union.

"That we will not do," Mrs. Thatcher told the audience of 1,000 world political leaders, including senior members of the Reagan administration.

The IDU is a coalition of 22 conservative and moderate political parties whose goal is the promotion of democracy and pluralism around the world.

Leaders issued a communique and condemned South Africa's apartheid system and called on the government to begin talks with its black majority to promote reform.

"We condemn apartheid and call on the government to open a national dialogue with all racial groups with a view to introducing major reforms" that would guarantee equal participation of blacks in political life, conference Chairman Alois Mock of Austria told a news conference.

Mrs. Thatcher described the emerging new generation of Soviet leaders as "new brooms ... who will not be used to sweep away communism, [but] only to make it more efficient."

Soviet 'peace offensive' aims to halt 'star wars'

By Michael J. Bonafide
THE WASHINGTON TIMES FOREIGN SERVICE

GENEVA, Switzerland — The Soviet Union has embarked on a new "peace offensive" it hopes will bring maximum pressure to bear on the United States to scrap its "star wars" Strategic Defense Initiative, according to Western analysts.

The analysts predict that in the weeks and months ahead, leading up to President Reagan's planned summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Mos-

When these guys say "peace," reach for your helmet. An editorial, page 9A.

cow will orchestrate a series of rallies and demonstrations by peace groups in the West.

These would be similar to, but more intense than, the anti-nuclear campaign it waged in its failed effort to halt deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe.

The first salvo in the Kremlin's newly launched "peace" drive came last week in the form of an editorial in Pravda, the newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party.

Laying aside its anti-American diatribes, Pravda called for a new era of understanding and mutual cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

The call fell on receptive ears. One commentator for the British Broadcasting Corp. described the message as "a significant shift in Soviet policy" and the most "conciliatory mes-

sage Moscow has sent to Washington in quite some time."

In language reminiscent of the heyday of detente in the mid-1970s, Pravda warmly recalled the hookup of U.S. and Soviet spacecraft and urged that the two superpowers work toward returning again to those halcyon days.

The U.S. spacecraft Apollo 18, with astronauts Vance Brand, Thomas P. Stafford and Donald K. Slayton aboard, linked up in space with the Soviet vehicle Soyuz 19 in July 1975.

In the Pravda article, cosmonaut Alexi Leonov, who with Valeri Kubasov manned the Soyuz 19, remembered the mission and the meals and experiences shared with his American counterparts.

The Apollo-Soyuz flight subsequently became the centerpiece of an elaborate Soviet propaganda campaign to demonstrate the sweet fruits of detente.

In the Soviet Union, Apollo-Soyuz cigarettes became the rage, and huge replicas of the two spacecraft were hung from the ceiling of an enormous pavilion in Moscow's Progress Park, where an estimated 2 million Russians a year have since inspected the photographs, astronauts' gear and other memorabilia.

There is something at work here other than a simple desire to relive a time of reduced tensions between Moscow and Washington, one analyst said.

"What Pravda was really saying," a U.S. official here said, "is, 'look, detente was good for us, and it was good for you [the United States]. Let's let bygones be bygones and get on with the job of

building a better world.'"

"What Pravda did not say, though, was that we should build that better world according to our game plan. That is what the article implied. Detente was extremely successful for the Soviets, and it's little wonder that they would like to have it back," the official continued.

"What detente actually meant, and what Moscow means by it today," said another Western analyst, "is that if the United States lavishes enough economic benefits on the Soviet Union, it, in turn,

NEWS ANALYSIS

would develop so powerful an interest in good relations that it would reciprocate with restraint in foreign policy.

"Of course, few in the West ever bothered to try and understand the reason for Soviet aggressiveness, so detente was bound to fail before it started — at least from the West's point of view."

The idea of detente found an all-too-receptive audience in the West, especially in the United States, analysts say, and the allure has not diminished with time.

"When Moscow says, 'let's have detente again,'" said the U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, "it is saying, 'there is something we want.'"

"In the 1970s, it was massive credits and extremely advantageous trade terms. Today, it is a unilateral decision by the United States to forgo the space-based defense."

Soviet opposition to "star wars," as it has become popularly known, is the single most pressing concern to the Kremlin.

"Moscow is positively obsessed with this thing," said another Soviet observer.

"They obviously will stop at nothing to halt the American effort to develop an efficacious non-nuclear defense, and setting up abandonment of SDI as the quid pro quo for return of detente is one of the more transparent, and laughable, ploys they've mounted in a long time."

Analysts believe Moscow is motivated by several factors, not least among which is the apparent inability of Soviet technology to achieve what the United States hopes to prove feasible.

But the most important consideration to Moscow, most analysts say, is economic.

"Mr. Gorbachev has clearly signaled that the No. 1 item on his agenda is reforming the nation's industrial base," the U.S. official said.

"That would prove exceptionally difficult, probably impossible, if at the same time the Soviet economy were forced to come up with the billions of rubles necessary to match American" research and development resources, he said.

"The fact is, the Soviet cupboard is bare," he said. "So from a Soviet point of view, of course it makes more sense to wage a propaganda campaign. Compared to what it would cost to launch a major weapons program, the money spent on a new 'peace' overture may seem like a bargain."



The President's Strategic Defense Initiative

January 1985

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Presidential Foreword

Since the advent of nuclear weapons, every President has sought to minimize the risk of nuclear destruction by maintaining effective forces to deter aggression and by pursuing complementary arms control agreements. This approach has worked. We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war while protecting Western security for nearly four decades.

Originally, we relied on balanced defensive and offensive forces to deter. But over the last twenty years, the United States has nearly abandoned efforts to develop and deploy defenses against nuclear weapons, relying instead almost exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. We accepted the notion that if both we and the Soviet Union were able to retaliate with devastating power even after absorbing a first strike, that stable deterrence would endure. That rather novel concept seemed at the time to be sensible for two reasons. First, the Soviets stated that they believed that both sides should have roughly equal forces and neither side should seek to alter the balance to gain unilateral advantage. Second, there did not seem to be any alternative. The state of the art in defensive systems did not permit an effective defensive system.

Today both of these basic assumptions are being called into question. The pace of the Soviet offensive and defensive buildup has upset the balance in the areas of greatest importance during crises. Furthermore, new technologies are now at hand which may make possible a truly effective non-nuclear defense.

For these reasons and because of the awesome destructive potential of nuclear weapons, we must seek another means of deterring war. It is both militarily and morally necessary. Certainly, there should be a better way to strengthen peace and stability, a way to move away from a future that relies so heavily on the prospect of rapid and massive nuclear retaliation and toward greater reliance on defensive systems which threaten no one.

On March 23, 1983, I announced my decision to take an important first step toward this goal by directing the establishment of a comprehensive and intensive research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative, aimed at eventually eliminat-

ing the threat posed by nuclear armed ballistic missiles.

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a program of vigorous research focused on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of finding ways to provide a better basis for deterring aggression, strengthening stability, and increasing the security of the United States and our allies. The SDI research program will provide to a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge required to support a decision on whether to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems.

At the same time, the United States is committed to the negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements which bring real reductions in the power of the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To this end, my Administration has proposed to the Soviet Union a comprehensive set of arms control proposals. We are working tirelessly for the success of these efforts, but we can and must go further in trying to strengthen the peace.

Our research under the Strategic Defense Initiative complements our arms reduction efforts and helps to pave the way for creating a more stable and secure world. The research that we are undertaking is consistent with all of our treaty obligations, including the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

In the near term, the SDI research program also responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile (ABM) effort, which includes actual deployments. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to expand its ballistic missile defense capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. And, in the long-term, we have confidence that SDI will be a crucial means by which both the United States and the Soviet Union can safely agree to very deep reductions, and eventually, even the elimination of ballistic missiles and the nuclear weapons they carry.

Our vital interests and those of our allies are inextricably linked. Their safety and ours are one. They, too, rely upon our nuclear forces to deter attack against them. Therefore, as we pursue the promise offered by the Strategic Defense Initiative, we will continue to work closely with our friends and allies. We will ensure that, in the event of a future decision to develop and deploy defensive systems—a decision in which consulta-

tion with our allies will play an important part—
allied, as well as U.S. security against aggression
would be enhanced.

Through the SDI research program, I have
called upon the great scientific talents of our
country to turn to the cause of strengthening
world peace by rendering ballistic missiles impo-
tent and obsolete. In short, I propose to channel
our technological prowess toward building a
more secure and stable world. And I want to
emphasize that in carrying out this research
program, the United States seeks neither mili-
tary superiority nor political advantage. Our
only purpose is to search for ways to reduce the
danger of nuclear war.

As you review the following pages, I would ask
you to remember that the quality of our future is
at stake and to reflect on what we are trying to
achieve—the strengthening of our ability to pre-
serve the peace while shifting away from our
current dependence upon the threat of nuclear
retaliation. I would also ask you to consider the
SDI research program in light of both the Soviet
Union's extensive, ongoing efforts in this area
and our own government's constitutional respon-
sibility to provide for the common defense. I hope
that you will conclude by lending your own
strong and continuing support to this research
effort—an effort which could prove to be critical
to our nation's future.

Ronald Reagan

THE PRESIDENT'S STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

"What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?"

from President Reagan's March 23, 1983 Speech

The President's Vision

In his March 23rd address to the nation, the President described his vision of a world free of its overwhelming dependence on nuclear weapons, a world free once and for all of the threat of nuclear war. The Strategic Defense Initiative, by itself, cannot fully realize this vision nor solve all the security challenges we and our allies will face in the future; for this we will need to seek many solutions—political as well as technological. A long road with much hard work lies ahead of us. The President believes we must begin now. The Strategic Defense Initiative takes a crucial first step.

The basic security of the United States and our allies rests upon our collective ability to deter aggression. Our nuclear retaliatory forces help achieve this security and have deterred war for nearly forty years. Since World War II, nuclear weapons have not been used; there has been no direct military conflict between the two largest world powers, and Europe has not seen such an extended period of peace since the last century. The fact is, however, that we have no defense against nuclear ballistic missile attack. And, as the Soviet building program widens the imbalance in key offensive capabilities, introducing systems whose status and characteristics are more difficult to confirm, our vulnerability and that of our allies to blackmail becomes quite high. In the event deterrence failed, a President's only recourse would be to surrender or to retaliate. Nuclear retaliation, whether massive or limited, would result in the loss of millions of lives.

The President believes strongly that we must find a better way to assure credible deterrence. If we apply our great scientific and engineering talent to the problem of defending against ballistic missiles, there is a very real possibility that future Presidents will be able to deter war by means other than threatening devastation to any aggressor—and by a means which threatens no one.

The President's goal, and his challenge to our scientists and engineers, is to identify the technological problems and to find the technical solutions so that we have the option of using the potential of strategic defenses to provide a more effective, more stable means of keeping the United States and our allies secure from aggression and coercion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, many respected scientists, and other experts believe that, with firm leadership and adequate funding, recent advances in defensive technologies could make such defenses achievable.

What Is the President's Strategic Defense Initiative

The President announced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in his March 23, 1983, address to the nation. Its purpose is to identify ways to exploit recent advances in ballistic missile defense technologies that have potential for strengthening deterrence—and thereby increasing our security and that of our allies. The program is designed to answer a number of fundamental scientific and engineering questions that must be addressed before the promise of these new technologies can be fully assessed. The SDI research program will provide to a future President and a future Congress the technical knowledge necessary to support a decision in the early 1990s on whether to develop and deploy such advanced defensive systems.

As a broad research program, the SDI is not based on any single or preconceived notion of what an effective defense system would look like. A number of different concepts, involving a wide range of technologies, are being examined. No single concept or technology has been identified as the best or the most appropriate. A number of non-nuclear technologies hold promise for dealing effectively with ballistic missiles.

We do feel, however, that the technologies that are becoming available today may offer the possi-

bility of providing a layered defense—a defense that uses various technologies to destroy attacking missiles during each phase of their flight.

- Some missiles could be destroyed shortly after they launch as they burn their engines and boost their warheads into space. By destroying a missile during this boost phase, we would also destroy all of the nuclear warheads it carries at the same time. In the case of ICBMs, they would probably be destroyed before leaving the territory of the aggressor.

- Next, we could destroy those nuclear warheads that survive the boost phase by attacking them during the post-boost phase. During this phase we would target the device that sits on top of the missile and is used to dispense its warheads while it is in the process of releasing its cargo. By destroying this device, the post-boost vehicle, we can destroy all the warheads not yet released.

- Those warheads that have been released and survive, travel for tens of minutes in the void of space on their ballistic trajectories towards their targets. While we would now have to locate, identify, and destroy the individual nuclear warheads themselves, this relatively long mid-course phase of flight again offers us time to exploit advanced technologies to do just that.

- Finally, those warheads that survive the outer layers of defense, could be attacked during the terminal phase as they approach the end of their ballistic flight.

The concept of a layered defense could be extremely effective because the progressive layers would be able to work together to provide many opportunities to destroy attacking nuclear warheads well before they approach our territory or that of our allies. An opponent facing several separate layers of defenses would find it difficult to redesign his missiles and their nuclear warheads to penetrate all of the layers. Moreover, defenses during the boost, post-boost and mid-course phases of ballistic missile flight make no distinction in the targets of the attacking missiles—they simply destroy attacking nuclear warheads, and in the process protect people and our country. The combined effectiveness of the defense provided by the multiple layers need not provide 100% protection in order to enhance deterrence significantly. It need only create sufficient uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor concerning his ability to succeed in the

purposes of his attack. The concept of a layered defense certainly will help do this.

There have been considerable advances in technology since U.S. ballistic missile defenses were first developed in the 1960's. At the time the ABM Treaty was signed (1972), ballistic missile defense prospects were largely confined to the attacking nuclear warheads during the terminal phase of their flight using nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles. Since that time, emerging technologies offer the possibility of non-nuclear options for destroying missiles and the nuclear warheads they carry in all phases of their flight. New technologies may be able to permit a layered defense by providing: sensors for identifying and tracking missiles and nuclear warheads; advanced ground and spaceborne interceptors and directed energy weapons to destroy both missiles and nuclear warheads; and, the technology to permit the command, control and communications necessary to operate a layered defense.

In the planning that went into the SDI research program, we consciously chose to look broadly at defense against ballistic missiles as it could be applied across all these phases of missile flight: boost, post-boost, mid-course, and terminal. Although it is too early to define fully those individual technologies or applications which will ultimately prove to be most effective, such a layered approach maximizes the application of emerging technology and holds out the possibility of destroying nuclear warheads well before they reach the territory of the United States or our allies.

As President Reagan made clear at the start of this effort, the SDI research program will be consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the ABM Treaty. The Soviets, who have and are improving the world's only existing anti-ballistic missile system (deployed around Moscow), are continuing a program of research on both traditional and advanced anti-ballistic missile technologies that has been underway for many years. But while the President has directed that the United States effort be conducted in a manner that is consistent with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union almost certainly is violating that Treaty by constructing a large ballistic missile early warning radar in Siberia (at Krasnoyarsk) which is located and oriented in a manner prohibited by the Treaty. This radar could contribute significantly to the Soviet Union's considerable potential to rapidly expand

its deployed ballistic missile defense capability.

The United States has offered to discuss with the Soviet Union the implications of defensive technologies being explored by both countries. Such a discussion would be useful in helping to clarify both sides' understanding of the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and in clarifying the purposes that underlie the United States and Soviet programs. Further, this dialogue could lead to agreement to work together toward a more stable strategic relationship than exists today.

Why SDI?

SDI and Deterrence. The primary responsibility of a government is to provide for the security of its people. Deterrence of aggression is the most certain path to ensure that we and our allies survive as free and independent nations. Providing a better, more stable basis for enhanced deterrence is the central purpose of the SDI program.

Under the SDI program, we are conducting intensive research focused on advanced defensive technologies with the aim of enhancing the basis of deterrence, strengthening stability, and thereby increasing the security of the United States and our allies. On many occasions, the President has stated his strong belief that "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." U.S. policy has always been one of deterring aggression and will remain so even if a decision is made in the future to deploy defensive systems. The purpose of SDI is to strengthen deterrence and lower the level of nuclear forces.

Defensive systems are consistent with a policy of deterrence both historically and theoretically. While today we rely almost exclusively on the threat of retaliation with offensive forces for our strategic deterrence, this has not always been the case. Throughout the 1950's and most of the 1960's, the United States maintained an extensive air defense network to protect North America from attack by Soviet bomber forces. At that time, this network formed an important part of our deterrent capability. It was allowed to decline only when the Soviet emphasis shifted to intercontinental ballistic missiles, a threat for which there was previously no effective defense. Recent advances in ballistic missile defense technologies, however, provide more than sufficient reason to believe that defensive systems could

eventually provide a better and more stable basis for deterrence.

Effective defenses against ballistic missiles have potential for enhancing deterrence in the future in a number of ways. First, they could significantly increase an aggressor's uncertainties regarding whether his weapons would penetrate the defenses and destroy our missiles and other military targets. It would be very difficult for a potential aggressor to predict his own vulnerability in the face of such uncertainties. It would restore the condition that attacking could never leave him better off. An aggressor will be much less likely to contemplate initiating a nuclear conflict, even in crisis circumstances, while lacking confidence in his ability to succeed.

Such uncertainties also would serve to reduce or eliminate the incentive for first strike attack. Modern, accurate ICBM's carrying multiple nuclear warheads—if deployed in sufficiently large numbers relative to the size of an opponent's force structure, as the Soviets have done with their ICBM force—could be used in a rapid first strike to undercut an opponent's ability to retaliate effectively. By significantly reducing or eliminating the ability of ballistic missiles to attack military forces effectively, and thereby rendering them impotent and obsolete as a means of supporting aggression, advanced defenses could remove this potential major source of instability.

Finally, in conjunction with air defenses, very effective defenses against ballistic missiles could help reduce or eliminate the apparent military value of nuclear attack to an aggressor. By preventing an aggressor from destroying a significant portion of our country, an aggressor would have gained nothing by attacking in the first place. In this way, very effective defenses could reduce substantially the possibility of nuclear conflict.

If we take the prudent and necessary steps to maintain strong, credible military forces, there is every reason to believe that deterrence will continue to preserve the peace. However, even with the utmost vigilance, few things in this world are absolutely certain, and a responsible government must consider the remote possibility that deterrence could fail. Today, the United States and our allies have no defense against ballistic missile attack. We also have very limited capability to defend the United States against an attack by enemy bombers. If deterrence were to fail, without a shield of any kind, it could cause the death

of most of our population and the destruction of our nation as we know it. The SDI program provides our only long-term hope to change this situation.

Defenses also could provide insurance against either accidental ballistic missile launches or launches by some future irrational leader in possession of a nuclear armed missile. While such events are improbable, they are not inconceivable. The United States and other nuclear-capable powers have instituted appropriate safeguards against inadvertent launches by their own forces and together have formulated policies to preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict the future course of events. While we hope, and expect that our best efforts will continue to be successful, our national security interests will be well served by a vigorous SDI research program that could provide an additional safeguard against such potentially catastrophic events.

Today our retaliatory forces provide a strong sword to deter aggression. However, the President seeks a better way of maintaining deterrence. For the future, the SDI program strives to provide a defensive shield which will do more than simply make that deterrence stronger. It will allow us to build a better, more stable basis for deterrence. And, at the same time, that same shield will provide necessary protection should an aggressor not be deterred.

Insurance against Soviet Defensive Technology Program. While we refer to our program as the President's Strategic Defense Initiative some have the misconception that the United States alone is pursuing an increased emphasis on defensive systems—a unilateral U.S. action which will alter the strategic balance. This is not the case. The Soviet Union has always considered defense to be a central and natural part of its national security policy. The extensive, advanced Soviet air defense network and large civil defense program are obvious examples of this priority.

But in addition to this, the Soviets have for many years been working on a number of technologies, both traditional and advanced, with potential for defending against ballistic missiles. For example, while within the constraints of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union currently is upgrading the capability of the only operational ABM system in the world today—the Moscow ABM defense system.

The Soviets are also engaged in research and development on a rapidly deployable ABM system that raises concerns about their potential ability to break out of the ABM Treaty and deploy a nationwide ABM defense system within the next ten years should they choose to do so. Were they to do so, as they could, deterrence would collapse, and we would have no choices between surrender and suicide.

In addition to these ABM efforts, some of the Soviet Union's air defense missiles and radars are also of particular concern. The Soviet Union already possesses an extensive air defense network. With continued improvements to this network, it could also provide some degree of ABM protection for the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies—and do so all nominally within the bounds prescribed by the ABM Treaty.

Since the late 1960's, the Soviet Union also has been pursuing a substantial, advanced defensive technologies program—a program which has been exploring many of the same technologies of interest to the United States in the SDI program. In addition to covering a wide range of advanced technologies, including various laser and neutral particle beams, the Soviet program apparently has been much larger than the U.S. effort in terms of resources invested—plant, capital, and manpower. In fact, over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has spent roughly as much on defense as it has on its massive offensive program.

The SDI program is a prudent response to the very active Soviet research and development activities in this field and provides insurance against Soviet efforts to develop and deploy unilaterally an advanced defensive system. A unilateral Soviet deployment of such advanced defenses, in concert with the Soviet Union's massive offensive forces and its already impressive air and passive defense capabilities, would destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for twenty years.

In pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative, the United States is striving to fashion a future environment that serves the security interests of the United States and our allies, as well as the Soviet Union. Consequently, should it prove possible to develop a highly capable defense against ballistic missiles, we would envision parallel United States and Soviet deployments, with the outcome being enhanced mutual security and international stability.

Requirements for an Effective Defense

To achieve the benefits which advanced defensive technologies could offer, they must, at a minimum, be able to destroy a sufficient portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him confidence in the outcome of an attack or deny an aggressor the ability to destroy a militarily significant portion of the target base he wishes to attack. The level of defense system capability required to achieve these ends cannot be determined at this time, depending as it does on the size, composition, effectiveness, and passive survivability of U.S. forces relative to those of the Soviet Union. Any effective defensive system must, of course, be survivable and cost-effective.

To achieve the required level of survivability, the defensive system need not be invulnerable, but must be able to maintain a sufficient degree of effectiveness to fulfill its mission, even in the face of determined attacks against it. This characteristic is essential not only to maintain the effectiveness of a defense system, but to maintain stability.

Finally, in the interest of discouraging the proliferation of ballistic missile forces, the defensive system must be able to maintain its effectiveness against the offense at less cost than it would take to develop offensive countermeasures and proliferate the ballistic missiles necessary to overcome it. ABM systems of the past have lacked this essential capability, but the newly emerging technologies being pursued under the SDI program have great potential in this regard.

Current Programs

Today, deterrence against Soviet aggression is grounded almost exclusively in the capabilities of our offensive retaliatory forces, and this is likely to remain true for some time. Consequently, the SDI program in no way signals a near-term shift away from the modernization of our strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems and our conventional military forces. Such modernization is essential to the maintenance of deterrence while we are pursuing the generation of technologically feasible defensive options. In addition, in the event a decision to deploy a defensive system were made by a future President, having a modern and capable retaliatory deterrent force would be essential to the preservation of a stable envi-

ronment while the shift is made to a different and enhanced basis for deterrence.

Arms Control

As directed by the President, the SDI research program will be conducted in a manner fully consistent with all U.S. treaty obligations, including the 1972 ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems and components that are space-based, air-based, sea-based, or mobile land-based. However, as Gerard Smith, chief U.S. negotiator of the ABM Treaty, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1972, that agreement does permit research short of field testing of a prototype ABM system or component. This is the type of research that will be conducted under the SDI program.

Any future national decision to deploy defensive systems would, of course, lead to an important change in the structure of United States and Soviet forces. We are examining ways in which the offense/defense relationship can be managed to achieve a more stable balance through strategic arms control. Above all, we seek to ensure that the interaction of offensive and defensive forces removes first-strike options from either side's capability.

The United States does not view defensive measures as a means of establishing military superiority. Because we have no ambitions in this regard, deployments of defensive systems would most usefully be done in the context of a cooperative, equitable, and verifiable arms control environment that regulates the offensive and defensive developments and deployments of the United States and Soviet Union. Such an environment could be particularly useful in the period of transition from a deterrent based on the threat of nuclear retaliation, through deterrence based on a balance of offensive and defensive forces, to the period when adjustments to the basis of deterrence are complete and advanced defensive systems are fully deployed. During the transition, arms control agreements could help to manage and establish guidelines for the deployment of defensive systems.

The SDI research program will complement and support U.S. efforts to seek equitable, verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear forces through arms control negotiations. Such reduc-

tions would make a useful contribution to stability, whether in today's deterrence environment or in a potential future deterrence environment in which defenses played a leading role.

A future decision to develop and deploy effective defenses against ballistic missiles could support our policy of pursuing significant reductions in ballistic missile forces. To the extent that defensive systems could reduce the effectiveness and, thus, value of ballistic missiles, they also could increase the incentives for negotiated reductions. Significant reductions in turn would serve to increase the effectiveness and deterrent potential of defensive systems.

SDI and the Allies

Because our security is inextricably linked to that of our friends and allies, the SDI program will not confine itself solely to an exploitation of technologies with potential against ICBMs and SLBMs, but will also carefully examine technologies with potential against shorter range ballistic missiles.

An effective defense against shorter range ballistic missiles could have a significant impact on deterring aggression in Europe. Soviet SS-20's, SCALEBOARD's, and other shorter range ballistic missiles provide overlapping capabilities to strike all of NATO Europe. Moreover, Soviet doctrine stresses the use of conventionally-armed ballistic missiles to initiate rapid and wide-ranging attacks on crucial NATO military targets throughout Europe. The purpose of this tactic would be to reduce significantly NATO's ability to resist the initial thrust of a Soviet conventional force attack and to impede NATO's ability to resupply and reinforce its combatants from outside Europe. By reducing or eliminating the military effectiveness of such ballistic missiles, defensive systems have the potential for enhancing deterrence against not only strategic nuclear war, but against nuclear and conventional attacks on our allies as well.

Over the next several years, we will work closely with our allies to ensure that, in the event of any future decision to deploy defensive systems (a decision in which consultation with our allies will play an important part), allied, as well as U.S. security against aggression would be enhanced.

ASSERTIONS AND FACTS ABOUT SDI

Introduction

A key fact ignored by many critics of the Strategic Defense Initiative is that SDI is a research program, not a program to deploy weapons. The question of whether to proceed to deployment of an actual ballistic missile defense system would arise in the years to come when the SDI research generates options for effective defenses that are achievable and affordable.

Many misleading claims and charges are often made by critics of SDI:

Assertion: SDI means a radical change in the fundamental concepts of U.S. military-political strategy.

Fact: Fundamental U.S. and NATO defense policy is to avoid war through deterrence. A mix of offensive and defensive systems is fully compatible with that objective.

The purpose of SDI is to determine whether there are cost-effective defensive technologies that could enhance deterrence and increase stability.

Technological advances inevitably have profound military and political effects. The course of statesmanship is not to ignore the advance of technology, but to look ahead, to study the promise and potential pitfalls of these advances, especially in their implications for international security. That is precisely what SDI is designed to do.

Assertion: SDI will leave our allies defenseless and mean a return to "Fortress America".

Fact: The President made clear that no change in technology can or will alter our commitments to our allies. In particular, NATO's strategy of flexible response, which is the basis for deterrence and peace in Europe, remains as valid today as when it was first adopted in 1967. The President made our continuing commitment to our allies explicit in his March 1983 speech announcing SDI. Consequently, SDI is looking at the entire ballistic missile threat, including the shorter-range threat to our allies.

Assertion: The experts "know" that there is no point in even trying to defend against attack.

Fact: The history of the development of technology argues strongly against those who make

flat statements that something is technologically impossible. Advances in physics, data processing, and other fields offer ample justification to explore whether technologies in these and other fields can be applied to defend the United States and its allies. Arguments made by Western scientists over the feasibility of defending against ballistic missiles can only be resolved with further research.

This argument is also a favorite theme of the "concerned Soviet scientists" who argue in the West that the United States should refrain from even exploring whether it is possible to defend against offensive nuclear systems. In doing so, they carefully and intentionally refrain from noting the Soviet Union's own efforts at defense.

Assertion: Through SDI, the United States is unilaterally accelerating the arms race.

Fact: As noted, the Soviets are already hard at work on advanced technologies for BMD, including lasers and other directed-energy weapons. They also have active programs on more conventional approaches to BMD, including upgrading the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system in place around Moscow (the only ABM system in the world), and research and development on a new rapidly deployable ABM system.

These Soviet programs have been going on without regard to U.S. efforts. Most were underway many years before the President's speech on strategic defense. There is no reason to believe they would stop if we now decided to do no research of our own.

Moreover, during the past decade the Soviets have engaged in a massive build-up of all categories of offensive weaponry as well, despite the existence of the ABM Treaty and the Treaty's commitment to corresponding reductions in offensive (as well as defensive) capabilities.

Assertion: Effective BMD would be fantastically expensive, and easily negated by countermeasures.

Fact: Judgments of technological feasibility or possible costs (including offense/defense cost ratios) are highly premature. When not the product of prejudgment or bias, many critics' assertions betray a static approach to complex questions of evolving technology and strategic deterrence, both of which are by their nature, highly dynamic.

Assertion: Ballistic missile defenses are intended to give the United States a first-strike capability.

Fact: The United States does not seek a "first-strike capability" and we will not attempt to acquire one. The President has reaffirmed that we do not aim for a unilateral advantage in BMD.

In fact, effective defenses against ballistic missiles, by increasing the uncertainty a potential attacker must confront, would be a powerful disincentive to anyone contemplating a nuclear first strike. This disincentive to first-strike can be further enhanced by reductions of offensive ballistic missiles—precisely the objective we have been trying to achieve in arms control.

The basic U.S. arms control objective is to achieve balanced outcomes at the lowest possible level, with the forces of both sides deployed in a way that increases crisis stability. The U.S. strategic modernization program is designed both to provide incentives for the Soviets to move toward such an outcome, and to enhance deterrence and stability whether they do so or not.

Soviet commentators, of course, can be counted on to call any new U.S. weapon a "first-strike" system—they have even applied the term to the Space Shuttle. Comparable Soviet systems—including many deployed for years before their U.S. counterparts—never earn this sobriquet. Their discussion of the SDI research program is fully consistent with this pattern.

Assertion: SDI violates the ABM Treaty.

Fact: The United States does not and will not violate its treaty obligations. The ABM Treaty explicitly permits the kind of research envisaged under SDI, and all such research will be conducted within its constraints. Critics who claim that SDI would violate this treaty or others are simply wrong—often because they are critiquing an SDI program of a nature and direction of their own invention, rather than the research program the United States will actually carry out. Moreover, the Soviets have been conducting analogous research for many years. They have not called their research program a violation of the ABM Treaty—nor have we for that matter.

In contrast, the Soviet Union is constructing a large phased-array radar that will contribute to its ABM potential. Because of the location and orientation of this radar, it almost certainly constitutes a violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

The ABM Treaty provides for possible amendments and periodic review sessions in which possible changes can be discussed. When the SDI research has produced specific options to develop and deploy a BMD system, we would then address the question of availing ourselves of these procedures in order to modify the Treaty.

Meanwhile, however, the ABM Treaty specifically calls on the United States and USSR to take effective measures to reduce offensive nuclear weapons. The United States welcomes the Soviet Union's decision to return to such negotiations, which it has boycotted since late 1983.

Moreover, we have repeatedly told the Soviets we would like to discuss the implications of these new defensive technologies with them in a government-to-government forum. We have made suggestions about the venue and invited their ideas.

Assertion: SDI will mean "the militarization of outer space".

Fact: Recent Soviet propaganda has stressed the supposed need "to prevent the militarization of outer space". In fact, the Soviets have had a fully deployed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon for over a decade; it is the only such operational system in the world. (A U.S. ASAT is still under development.) In the late 1960's, the Soviets developed a Fractional Orbiting Bombardment System, involving an orbiting nuclear warhead—a system with no U.S. counterpart, then or now. Moreover, the "militarization of space" began in the late 1950's when the first Soviet ballistic missiles were tested. Thus, professed Soviet concerns about preventing the United States from "militarizing space" are disingenuous at best.

If a decision were made at some future time to deploy a BMD system, some components might well be based in space. Any such deployments would be defensive systems, aimed at preventing the use of weapons, which themselves go through space to attack targets on earth. It is hard to understand why it is wrong even to consider possible ways to use space to prevent nuclear devastation on earth.

Today, there are considerable "military" uses of space which directly help maintain stability and preserve the peace. Both the United States and the USSR, for instance, use space for such purposes as early warning and the monitoring of arms control agreements.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT SDI

Q: What is the Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which is sometimes referred to as "Star Wars"? Does it mean we have lost confidence in deterrence?

A: Our nuclear deterrent has kept the peace for almost forty years. It has prevented not only nuclear conflict but also direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and between East and West in Europe. At the same time, as President Reagan pointed out in March 1983, it is important to examine the potential contribution of defensive technologies to see if we can reduce the risk of war even further. He described the vision underlying his initiative in this way: "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack; that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reach our own soil or that of our allies? This could lead to a safer, more stable world in the future."

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is a research program to vigorously pursue important new technologies that can be used to create a defense against ballistic missiles which could strengthen deterrence and increase our security and that of our Allies. The research effort is designed to allow a future President and Congress to decide whether to go ahead with such a system. The Strategic Defense Initiative is fully consistent with all of our arms control treaty obligations.

Q: Why is the Administration pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative now?

A: For three basic reasons. First, a defense against ballistic missiles could significantly enhance deterrence and stability. Second, recent technological breakthroughs suggest that it may be possible to overcome the difficulties in defending against ballistic missiles. Third, the Soviets have long been hard at work in this area. We cannot afford to risk letting them gain a significant technological advantage that could in time be converted to a military advantage over us.

By pursuing SDI research now we learn more about the prospect for defense against ballistic missiles and have a prudent hedge against the possibility of a Soviet breakthrough in defensive

technologies and breakout or abrogation of the ABM treaty.

Q: Specifically, what are the Soviets doing in the area of strategic defense?

A: The USSR has long devoted many more financial and human resources than we have to strategic defenses. The Soviets maintain and are upgrading the world's only operational anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, which is in place around Moscow. They are building a new large phased-array radar in Siberia which almost certainly violates the ABM Treaty. The Soviets are also engaged in research and development on a potential ABM system which could be quickly installed and could form the basis of a nationwide defense if they chose to go ahead with such a system. In addition, for more than a decade and a half, the Soviets have been vigorously pursuing research in advanced technologies—including lasers and neutral particle beams—with application to ballistic missile defense.

Q: What is the difference between the Strategic Defense Initiative and ASAT's?

A: Both the Strategic Defense Initiative and our anti-satellite program aim at enhancing deterrence and strengthening strategic stability, but in different ways. Many of the technologies involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative research and the ASAT program are related. However, the ASAT program is a near-term effort to develop an anti-satellite weapon intended to redress a specific military imbalance. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a long-term research program to explore the future potential for defense against the threat of ballistic missiles and to provide insurance against any potential Soviet decision to deploy additional anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

Q: Is the Strategic Defense Initiative permitted under the ABM Treaty?

A: Yes. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. The ABM Treaty permits research. The United States and, to a greater extent, the USSR have had research programs since the signing of the Treaty.

Q: How would defenses against ballistic missiles work? What good would it do to defend against ballistic missiles if we could still be attacked by bombers and cruise missiles?

A: There are a number of possibilities that our research effort is investigating. For example, one is whether new technologies can be combined to form a defense network—perhaps a series of systems based on different technologies—which could defend against ballistic missiles. Such a system or set of systems would be designed to defend against ballistic missiles in various phases of their flight, i.e., during their initial launch, during the course of their flight, and as they approach their targets.

We are focusing on defenses against ballistic missiles because these missiles, with their speed, short warning time, and great destructive capability pose a greater threat to stability than do slower-flying systems such as bombers and cruise missiles. There are also efforts underway, however, to examine technologies for defending against bombers and cruise missiles.

Q: Won't the Strategic Defense Initiative lead to another arms race, and make the USSR even more reluctant to reduce offensive weapons?

A: The Soviet strategic defense program has existed—and will continue to exist—independently of U.S. efforts in this field.

Rather than stimulating a new arms race, the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative could complement our efforts to seek equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. This inter-relationship between offensive and defensive forces has long been an important consideration in our strategic thinking and in fashioning arms control agreements. To the extent that the SDI research proves successful and leads to the capability to defend against ballistic missiles, then those missiles could lose much of their offensive value. That, in turn, would increase incentives for both sides to reduce the numbers of ballistic missiles greatly.

Q: Would a missile defense system lead to a point where vital defense decisions would simply

be made by computers rather than by the President?

A: The United States has always placed the highest priority on ensuring that control of our deterrent forces remains in the hands of the President. Nothing in the Strategic Defense Initiative will change that. A major aim of the Strategic Defense Initiative research effort is to ensure maximum safety, reliability, and political control for any potential defensive system.

Q: Would having a ballistic missile defense mean that the United States would only protect itself and not the NATO Allies or Japan and our other Pacific security partners?

A: No. Our commitment to the defense of our allies remains intact. We will ensure that any defensive system which we might develop in the future would strengthen global stability and the security of our allies as well as of the United States. We are examining technologies for defense not just against ballistic missiles that can hit the United States, but also against the shorter range ballistic missiles that can strike our allies. We are consulting closely with our allies and other nations on the Strategic Defense Initiative and will continue to do so as the program progresses.

Q: How can we justify spending billions of dollars for research on something that might never be built?

A: Given the advances that the Soviet Union has made in this area, and the potential contribution that strategic defenses might make to deterrence, pursuit of this research program is a prudent and necessary investment in insuring our future. We estimate that Strategic Defense Initiative research will cost about \$26 billion in fiscal years 1985 through 1989—about \$20 a year for each American citizen.

If it succeeds in deterring war and at the same time reduces the importance and value of ballistic missiles, it will prove a worthwhile investment.

BIOGRAPHICAL PROFILE RICHARD D. SELLERS

Richard D. Sellers, Chairman of the Strategic Defense Initiative Coalition, has a proven record as one of the nation's most outstanding builders of grassroots coalitions in the nation.

Sellers has formed and led coalitions on a wide range of issues, including: opposition to the SALT II Treaty (1979), National Strategy of Peace through Strength Resolution (1980-1982), Gramm-Latta Bipartisan Budget proposal (1981), White House Working Group on Central America (1983), and opposition to the nuclear freeze (1983).

Sellers early knowledge of Congress was gained while working in the offices of former Alabama U. S. Senator John Sparkman and the late Congressman Walter Flowers.

Later, he served on the staff of the U. S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, receiving first-hand knowledge of both America's national defense priorities and shortcomings. Sellers resigned his position on the committee in 1979 to protest President Carter's nomination of Paul Warnke as Chief Negotiator for SALT II. He then coordinated Coalition for Peace Through Strength opposition to the SALT II Treaty, which was withdrawn from Senate consideration in 1979.

A small businessman, Sellers has served for the last four years as Chairman of the Alabama Small Business Administration Advisory Committee, appointed to the post by the Reagan Administration.

In recent years, Sellers has worked as a consultant to several conservative educational organizations, including the American Security Council, the American Conservative Union, High Frontier, the George C. Marshall Institute, the American Space Frontier Committee, and U. S. Senator Jeremiah Denton's National Forum Foundation.

Since President Reagan's March 23, 1983, address to the nation calling on the development of the SDI program, Sellers has actively pursued the education of the American public on the concept of SDI and its necessity for ensuring the continued security of the United States. For more than two years, he has chaired an informal SDI coalition, which has gained the attention of the national news media.

In a bipartisan campaign in support of the SDI program, Sellers was the only individual to testify before both the 1984 Democratic and Republican platform committees on SDI.

THE COALITION




INSIDER

REPORT OF THE COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH

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**Majority of U.S. House
of Representatives Now
Belongs To Coalition As
218th Member Joins**





Peace Through Strength REPORT

WASHINGTON, JUNE 1982

VOL. 1, NO. 4

We're Over The Top!



Sen. David Pryor (D.-Ark.), the 51st co-sponsor of the Peace Through Strength Resolution, is shown with Richard D. Sellers (left), the Coalition's Director of Congressional Affairs, and Sen. Edward Zorinsky (D.-Neb.). Pryor's support gave the Resolution a bi-partisan majority in both houses of Congress.

OVER TWO YEARS of hard work finally paid off for the Coalition for Peace Through Strength last month. All of the members of the Coalition's congressional division were very excited when word swept through both houses of Congress that we had finally made it. On May 28th, Sen. David Pryor (D.-Ark.) became the 51st Senator to co-sponsor the Peace Through Strength Resolution—and now the legislation has a bi-partisan majority in both chambers. Pryor's action was very significant because it means the resolution's prospects for passage have been greatly increased.

Sen. Ed Zorinsky (D.-Neb.), a Co-chairman of the Coalition, was instrumental not only in bringing Pryor on board but also in lining up many other co-sponsors as well.

The Senator told us the resolution's passage was vitally important for a number of reasons. "For the first time it will give us a national strategy of Peace Through Strength," Zorinsky said. He went on to say its consideration was particularly important at a time when defense critics are so active in both the budget debate and on the nuclear freeze.

Already, many lawmakers have been working behind the scenes to develop the best strategy for the Resolution's passage. The House version was introduced back in July of 1981. Now, with an identical resolution being introduced in the Senate, we are in a position to move toward final passage in the Senate Armed Services Committee, but it is stalled in the House Foreign Affairs Committee. □



