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Terrorism: The Fallacy of "Root Causes"

MOSHE DECTER

Recent events have once again highlighted the horrific role of terrorism in world affairs today: in Paris, the French leftist terrorist group, Direct Action, assassinated the head of Renault; in Lebanon, a terrorist suicide mission killed two terrorists and six Fiji soldiers attached to UNIFIL (United Nations International Force in Lebanon); in London, an Arab terrorist was convicted and sentenced to 45 years in prison for attempting to bomb an El Al airplane carrying nearly 400 passengers at Heathrow Airport; in West Berlin, two Arab terrorists were convicted, and sentenced to the maximum terms of 14 and 13 years in prison for bombing the German-Arab Friendship League, an Arab social club in West Berlin, seriously injuring nine people and damaging the building.

As acts of terrorism proliferate, the claim is frequently advanced that nothing can be done to stanch the hemorrhage of these outrages unless their "root causes" are addressed. The spread of terrorism in the Middle East and beyond is almost invariably attributed to the Arab-Israeli conflict, and specifically to the "grievance" felt by the Palestinian Arabs who in desperation seek redress in "armed struggle," their euphemism for terrorism.

While it is obvious that Israel has long been the particular target of terrorist actions, it is perhaps insufficiently appreciated that terrorism has by no means been limited to Israel. Indeed, terrorism is a pathological contagion that has plagued much of civilized society in the past quarter-century, and it can best be understood when placed in a broader political/historical context.

To cope with terrorism effectually, it is necessary to understand the nature of the beast, and it would be best to begin with a definition of terrorism that distinguishes it from ordinary conventional warfare.

However hideous warfare may be, it nevertheless follows certain rules and laws. Regular military forces seek to defeat the enemy by destroying or neutralizing his armed forces. Soldiers use violence in obedience to the orders of the legal authorities in their society, against military enemies designated as such by legally constituted authorities. Above all, in warfare the objects of the violence are military targets.

The purpose of terrorism is to inspire fear through the use of violence against non-combatants — in order to gain political ends. It abides by no rules. It avoids mil-

itary targets. Its victims are virtually invariably unarmed, undefended, unwary civilians. The terrorist murders, maims, kidnaps, hijacks, tortures, bombs and menaces the innocent without the justification of military necessity, since the object is to terrorize, not to perform military tasks. Terrorists specialize in attacking targets that are forbidden to military belligerents. Violence is the instrument of first resort.

Terrorism strikes at two different kinds of targets: it strikes at the powerful and prominent pillars of society — high officials, judges, business leaders — as well as at the institutions that represent the existing democratic order. It strikes, in random attacks, at the civilian population at its ordinary daily activities — children in schools, customers in department stores, cafes, and restaurants, travelers on planes and ships and at airports and train and bus stations.

Here a distinction should be drawn between terrorism and violent crime, for crime, too, is unauthorized violence against persons who are not at war. The difference lies not in the nature of the act, but in the perpetrator's intention. Terrorism is political, not personal; it is done in the name of some political end, motivated by some public purpose.

But the fact that the purpose is political, that the terrorist is moved by his "ideals," does not thereby render the act of violence moral, nor does it confer legitimacy on it. Nor does public purpose make an arrested terrorist a political prisoner.

If "understanding" were to be extended to the "root causes" of the terrorists' "grievances," they would have *carte blanche* to murder. Explanations of terrorists' motivations and aspirations effectively function to justify terrorist acts.

This fashionable "understanding" is a form of moral confusion. All over the world there are groups — ethnic, religious, social, political, tribal — with a variety of grievances; there are many different ways of interpreting their root causes — meanwhile innocent people are slaughtered. Mass murder is mass murder, and no grievance can justify it, nor will pusillanimous "understanding" or "explanation" avert, ameliorate, or eliminate it.

Terrorism is, in fact, an international phenomenon the brunt of whose vicious assaults has been especially borne by Western European democracies. Hardly any

MOSHE DECTER, former editor of *The New Leader* and *Near East Report*, has written widely on Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs.

The most that can be hoped for from pursuit of the "peace process" is an agreed, non-belligerent *modus vivendi* between the two countries. To an extent larger than is perhaps realized, such an understanding already exists. Soon after 1967, at Israel's initiative, two bridges across the Jordan river were thrown open to the passage of travelers and goods. About one million persons take advantage of this crossing, in both directions, each year. There is heavy traffic of goods, notably agricultural produce of the West Bank sold to Jordan and to Arab markets beyond. Jordan has from the start, with Israel's consent, paid salaries to many of its former West Bank officials (and pensions to others). Israel last year appointed the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Nablus as mayor of that town: it would not have done so without first consulting the Jordanian government on his acceptability.* The fruitful contacts, in practice,

* That the mayor, Zaafar al-Masri, was assassinated a few months later, on March 2, 1986, illustrates tragically how ruthless, and how efficient, are the enemies of any rapprochement between Israel and Jordan. "Credit" for the murder was at once claimed by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habash, a Christian, as well as by the terrorist group of Abu Nidal. Both these organizations are based in Damascus. Some PLO leaders condemned the murder. Jordanian notables attended the funeral in Nablus.

are not the sporadic meetings between King Hussein and the heads of Israel's government but those that take place on the middle and lower levels.

This informal *modus vivendi* has sprung, not too systematically, from the exigencies of the situation and from the determination of both governments not to find themselves needlessly involved in disputes that could easily escalate, leading to disaster. No doubt a more binding, more far-reaching, more lasting agreement can be negotiated, if the two countries do not set themselves too ambitious a goal. This would lead not to a treaty of formal peace but to a promise of peaceable coexistence in the best interests of both — and of the inhabitants of the West Bank without distinction. No harm would be done if for many more years sovereignty over this area rested in abeyance, as it has done since 1917. With all due respect to the optimists, not every problem in the world can find its perfect solution. It is enough that human rights be ensured, and that the populations concerned, be they citizens of Israel or of Jordan, enjoy the social, cultural, and economic advantages to which human beings are entitled. If the "peace process" can bring this about, without reaching for the impossible, it will have justified the thought and the efforts all sides have been lavishing on it. ■



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Western democratic nation has been immune to it. We have become accustomed to hearing the names of such groups as Direct Action in France; the African National Congress; the Red Army Faction (formerly the Baader-Meinhof gang) in West Germany; the Japanese Red Army; the Red Brigades of Italy; the Basque ETA in Spain; the Irish Republican Army; Turkey's Grey Wolves; the Armenian ASLA.

Terrorist gangs attack in an effort to cause a general crisis of confidence and a consequent collapse of a society. Terrorism seeks to create a climate of fear. It is nothing less than an aspect of absolute, total war, because its goal is the absolute destruction of a society, and it accepts annihilation of innocent persons as an appropriate means. It views the whole of a society as the enemy, and all members of a society as appropriate objects for violent action.

Another phenomenon has surfaced along with "ordinary" terrorist activity — state terrorism. Some states use terror strategies and tactics, employing their own personnel, or, more often, proxy forces of various kinds. States like Syria, Iran, Libya, and Iraq organize, direct, and support proxy terrorist forces, provide moral support and every conceivable kind of practical assistance to the terrorists (arms and ammunition, training, funds, diplomatic cover for the transport of weapons and the use of false passports, etc.). These are lawless states engaged in lawless action.

Striking evidence of Syria's involvement has emerged in three recent criminal trials — in London, West Berlin, and Ankara — in which voluminous evidence has been adduced testifying to Syria's decisive role in organizing and directing murderous actions abroad.

The common denominator in the three terrorist trials is the central role played by key operatives of Syrian intelligence. The trials amply demonstrate the involvement of Syrian intelligence in the preparation, execution, and control of terrorist operations, and in the supply of arms and ammunition to terrorists.

The London/Berlin trials are crucially linked by the fact that the controller of the terrorists in both was Lt. Col. Haitem Said, a central figure in Syrian intelligence. Said is deputy to Brig. Gen. Muhammed al-Kholi, commander of Syrian Air Force intelligence, a confidant of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and a pillar of international terrorism, with close ties to terrorist groups in Iran, Libya, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the Middle East and Europe.

They are also linked by the fact that two brothers were involved — Nezar Hindawi in London, Ahmed Hazi in Berlin — and that Hindawi also played a secondary role in the Berlin operation.

Hindawi was tried and convicted in a London court in October, 1986. The evidence and testimony in his case

were devastating.*

In Ankara, where judicial proceedings are still going on at this writing, six Palestinian Arabs are on trial for the assassination on July 24, 1985, of Ziad Saafi, first secretary of the Jordanian Embassy in Ankara. Two other terrorists and a Syrian diplomat — all of whom have disappeared — are being tried *in absentia*.

According to the indictment and the evidence presented at the trial, the Syrian, Darush al-Baladi, second secretary at the Syrian embassy in Ankara, ordered the Palestinian Arabs to murder the Jordanian diplomat, and provided them with weapons and ammunition for their mission.

The eight Palestinian Arabs are members of the Abu Nidal gang; some of them also belong to Islamic Jihad, a fundamentalist terrorist movement that operates in the Syrian-controlled sectors of Lebanon. The prosecution detailed the connection of Abu Nidal with Syrian intelligence, as well as the ties between the Palestinian terrorists with al-Baladi, who vanished from the scene just before the trial opened.

The Syrian Embassy in Ankara was the headquarters of the operation. The terrorists, charged with gathering intelligence information as well as preparing further terrorist acts in Turkey, were in regular contact with their controller in the Embassy, where they received their instructions.

The indictment also links the men on trial with four other terrorist actions: the September 6, 1986 attack on the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, in which 21 persons were killed; a 1983 attempt to plant a bomb on an Alitalia flight; the attempted car bombing of a U.S. officers' club in Izmir in 1983; the killing of a Palestinian student in Ankara, in 1982.

Trials similar to those in London, Berlin and Ankara are pending in Genoa, Karachi, Vienna, and Madrid, and are expected to expose the links between the terrorists and Syrian intelligence in each case, further to reveal Syrian involvement in international terrorism.

The use of terror and intimidation stands at the very foundation of Assad's regime and is exploited by Syria to advance its interests *vis-à-vis* not only Israel, but Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and others in the Arab world.

There are some 2,000-2,500 terrorists operating in Syria and in Syrian-occupied Lebanon as elements of the "liberation front" fully supported by Damascus. Among them: the Abu Nidal group, the Abu Musa faction of the PLO, Al Saiqa, the Habash Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Hawatmeh Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Syria provides them military, political, financial, logistical, and diplomatic aid and cover.

Of the 20 suicide missions in Lebanon in the past year, the murder of the Fiji UNIFIL contingent being

* See Marlo Lewis' "Libya and Syria: Retribution?", in the November, 1986 issue of *Midstream*.

the most recent, there is no doubt that a significant portion is sponsored and directed by Syria, either alone or in conjunction with Iran. For a long time now, Assad has praised such suicide missions as emblematic of heroism, as "the contribution of the individual to his people and to his homeland." Assad frequently touches on this in his speeches. In one he told how he himself, when still an air force pilot, had volunteered for a kamikaze mission.

Syrian communal and educational institutions are regularly named after these suicidal "heroes" who died in Lebanon. On Assad's initiative, this theme has become an important instrument in internal Syrian indoctrination. In the education of "revolutionary youth," special emphasis is placed on the high value of self-sacrifice.

Indeed, terrorism is deeply rooted in the traditional culture of violence in the Arab/Muslim world, where turbulence and instability are endemic. Hundreds of thousands have been killed, innumerable others wounded and left homeless, and much national treasure wasted in wars, terrorism, subversion, *coups d'état*, political assassinations, executions, massacres, and the murder of prisoners of war. Since 1948, for example, there have been some 40 successful revolutions in Arab states.

Assad himself came to power in just such a coup in 1970. He maintains his regime at home, and advances his policies abroad, through the manipulation of police power and terror.

The victim of terrorist attack has the right, in custom-

ary international law and in common sense, to a wide range of responses, varying from diplomatic to military. (Britain broke diplomatic ties with Syria after the London trial of Hindawi demonstrated Syria's official culpability.)

It is in this context that the terrorism directed against Israel by the various factions of the PLO and the other terrorist groups, and by the Arab states who support and finance it, is to be comprehended. The terrorist objectives — and those of their state sponsors — are to bring about the collapse of the State of Israel, to drive out most of the Jews now living there, and to establish an Arab state in what is today Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza strip (eventually also to include Jordan).

These objectives, however much they may be camouflaged when Westerners are addressed, are simple and stark. They permit little or no compromise, except possibly for temporary, tactical reasons. They are objectives that long antedate the creation of Israel in 1948; they motivated Arab terrorism against the Jewish community of Palestine as long ago as the 1920s and 30s. *It is the very existence of Israel — of an independent, sovereign and equal Jewish community in the region — that is the "grievance."*

That is the "root cause" of the conflict, and so long as the terrorists — and the Arab states that support, finance and manipulate them — can count on misguided "understanding" in the West, they will persist in their determination to annihilate Israel. As with all terrorist "grievances," this one cannot be addressed rationally or treated reasonably. It has to be resisted, unconditionally, until the Arabs accept reality and recognize Israel's historic legitimacy and natural rights. ■



FOR YOUR INFORMATION

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April 1987

Palestine National Council Meeting

1. The deliberations of the Palestine National Council -- the political arm of the PLO -- in Algiers, April 20-25, clearly demonstrate once again that the PLO remains fully committed to rejection of peaceful negotiation, to terrorism against Israel, and to confrontations with Arab states that seek peace.

2. The PLO's bellicose intention was reiterated by Yasser Arafat's pledge "to continue the war against Israel until victory...The Palestinian people will not rest until an independent Palestinian state has been established with Jerusalem as its capital."

3. The PLO's reinforced intransigence was further signalled at the PNC conclave by the return to PLO ranks of two of the most extremist and radical terrorist factions -- the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by George Habash) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (led by Nayef Hawatmeh).

4. Arafat expressed readiness to welcome back within the PLO the Syrian-based Abu Nidal terrorist faction. The two were actually prepared to reach an understanding on basic principles, but differed on factional representation in PLO institutions.

5. Another leading terrorist participant was Abu Abbas, whose extradition is sought by the United States for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer on the hijacked ship, Achille Lauro. Abu Abbas received a seat on the PLO's Executive Committee.

6. Decisive further indications of PLO intransigence are:
(a) explicit formal renunciation of Arafat's 1985 agreement with Jordan's King Hussein aimed at seeking peaceful negotiations;
(b) renewed rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 242;
(c) opposition to Egypt on account of its peace treaty with Israel;
(d) rejection of the Camp David Accords, the Autonomy Plan, and the Reagan Plan.

7. The belligerent nature of the PNC discussions constitutes another lost opportunity for the Palestinian Arabs to find peace. As Foreign Minister Shimon Peres put it: "Arafat's declarations represent a national misfortune for the Palestinians, who are bound to pay a heavy price for this error....Arafat's abandonment of a joint course with King Hussein was predictable, virtually natural. Those who want war can now turn directly to Arafat. Those Palestinians who seek negotiations know the address -- Hussein. Those who want permanent terrorism can turn to the PLO."

8. The PNC meeting shows that the PLO remains an obstacle to the peace process and cannot be regarded as a partner for peace.

PLO

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLO BILL

TALKING POINTS

(1) Nothing in this Bill would limit in any way the unquestioned constitutional right of anyone to express any view in support of the PLO.

(2) What the Bill would do is to make it unlawful to take money from the PLO or to operate an office financed by the PLO. If American citizens want to finance such activities on their own, this is not affected by this Bill.

(3) The courts have long recognized that political money enjoys much less absolute constitutional protection than political speech. For example no candidate for federal office is permitted to accept any financial contributions from abroad.

(4) The power of the President and the Congress to regulate foreign commerce, including the sale of services, is well established in law and jurisprudence.

(5) Denying the PLO the right to operate an office has many similarities to the closure of the Libyan and Iranian missions.

(6) The arguments against this Bill amount to an implausible assertion that the PLO has a constitutional right to operate on our shores.

THE POWER OF THE U.S. TO CLOSE THE PLO OFFICE IN NEW YORK

1) Since 1947, the United States has reserved and frequently exercised the right to exclude from its territory delegates, representatives, and invitees of the United Nations. This power is reserved in Section 6 of PL 80-357:

Nothing in the [Headquarters] Agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens...

2) The United States has exercised this right on hundreds of occasions. A noteworthy recent example was the order by the State Department in March 1986 that the Soviets must cut their U.N. Mission personnel from 275 down to 170. The Soviet Union complied with the State Department order.

Another noteworthy example was the action of U.S. Ambassador George Bush on October 6, 1972, excluding a senior official of the Syrian Foreign Ministry from joining the Syrian delegation at the UN, on the grounds that he had been involved in recruiting individuals for the PLO.

3) The rights of a Permanent Observer Mission at the UN are much less than those of a member State of the Organization. Indeed, neither the Charter nor the Headquarters Agreement makes any reference nor confers any rights to such a mission. In October 1982, the United Nations Legal Counsel noted that:

There are no specific provisions relating to permanent observer missions in the Charter, the Headquarters Agreement or the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

4) The United Nations Office of Legal Affairs has ruled that:

Permanent Observer Missions are not entitled to diplomatic privileges or immunities under the Headquarters Agreement or under other statutory provisions of the host state...If they are not listed in the United States diplomatic list, whatever facilities they may be given in the United States are merely gestures of courtesy by the United States authorities.

5) The United States has the authority to regulate foreign missions under the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (as amended by the Foreign Missions Act). Under Section 204:

(a)...Benefits may be provided to or for that foreign mission...on such terms and conditions as the Secretary [of State] may approve.

(b) If the Secretary determines that such action is reasonably necessary on the basis of reciprocity or otherwise -

(1) to facilitate relations between the United States and a sending State,

(2) to protect the interest of the United States.

Under Section 201:

(a) The Congress finds that the operation in the United States of foreign missions...and the official missions to such [international] organizations...is a proper subject for the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.

(c) The treatment to be accorded to a foreign mission in the United States shall be determined by the Secretary.

CLOSING THE PLO OFFICE

Recent events have reaffirmed the extremism of the PLO and its adherence to terrorism. In response, Egypt closed the PLO offices on its soil. It is time for the United States to join Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, and close the PLO office in our nation's capitol.

At the meeting in Algiers (April 20-26, 1987) of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the PLO adopted an extreme line towards Israel, drawing George Habbash's Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and other "rejectionist" groups back into the PLO fold. Mohammed "Abu" Abbas, convicted mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking, attended the PNC and was reelected to the Executive Committee of the PLO. This makes a mockery of Arafat's earlier pledge to punish those responsible for the Achille Lauro.

The PLO also abandoned its accord with Jordan's King Hussein (which provided for a joint PLO-Jordanian delegation at an international peace conference.) In addition the PLO agreed to curtail ties with Egypt because of Egypt's relations with Israel. In retaliation, Egypt closed all PLO offices on its territory. Morocco also ordered closed all PLO offices and Jordan did likewise last year. The United States should do no less.

While the PLO ostensibly renounced terrorism outside of Israel and the "occupied territories" (a pledge it has made and broken many times before) it reaffirmed the use of terror against Israel. Timed to coincide with the Algiers meeting, PLO terrorists attacked northern Israel.

By closing the PLO office, the US has the opportunity to reaffirm its commitment to the PLO-repudiated peace efforts of Arab moderates such as King Hussein and President Mubarak. It will send a message to the PLO that the United States supports a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and rejects terrorists as inadmissible parties to negotiation.

The US has accorded the PLO every opportunity and incentive to moderate its views. The PLO persists however in seeking Israel's destruction and refusing to accept UN resolutions 242 and 338. At the PNC, Arafat pledged that "...the Palestinian rifle shall not be laid down until we reach Palestine. All Palestine... Halt this Iraqi-Iranian war...Direct the rifles, all the rifles, at Palestine, to liberate it, to extract it, to free it from the claws of Zionism and colonialism...we shall maintain fighting contact with this Israeli enemy until we record the victory of our revolution....We are together and side by side until we liberate Jerusalem, and until we liberate Palestine."

The United States needs to respond to the growing worldwide acceptance of the PLO, the latest example of which is the consideration being paid by the World Tourism Organization, a branch of the United Nations, to grant observer status to the PLO. The PLO's contribution to international tourism has been one which many may find hard to fathom. Closing the PLO office will provide a strong riposte to such a trend.

Since the feasibility of closing the PLO office was initially examined, much evidence has emerged, much of it obtained by the Denton Committee hearings, about the activities of the PLO office and of the concomitant problems resulting from its presence. PLO offices in Europe were shown to have been used for terrorism while representatives from the PLO have been shown to be using their office to tour America sowing their message of hate.

The recent report by the Congressional Research Service verified that there was no insurmountable constitutional hurdle to closing the office and that Congress had the power to enact legislation to that purpose. One of the obstacles to closing the office has been the assertion that the Justice Department lacked the power to do so. Congress should pass the legislation for Justice to act.

The revelations of the Iran "arms for hostages" deal damaged the fight against international terrorism. In its aftermath, closing the PLO office would provide the United States an opportunity to publicly reaffirm its fight against international terrorism. It would show that the murderers of Americans such as Cleo Noel and Leon Klinghoffer that such acts would not go unanswered.

Egypt, Angered, Shuts P.L.O. Offices

By PAUL DELANEY
Special to The New York Times

ALGIERS, April 27 — Egypt closed offices of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Cairo and Alexandria today in an angry reaction to harsh criticism from the P.L.O.'s legislative body, which concluded its session here Sunday.

The move surprised P.L.O. leaders here, who had held the session of the Palestine National Council to reconcile rivalries among the Palestinian guerrilla factions. The Palestinian leaders immediately accused the Reagan Administration and Israel of having put pressure on Egypt to take the action.

But the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Esmat Abdel-Meguid, after meeting with President Hosni Mubarak, announced that Cairo was acting "to put an end to this insolence" by its P.L.O. critics.

In a statement issued today in Cairo, the Foreign Minister said that "all P.L.O. offices except those that deal with labor and women's affairs" would be shut down, "because of the aggressive attitude of the Palestine National Council."

A Symbolic Break

The P.L.O. offices that include a diplomatic mission and smaller bureaus for Palestinians living, working and studying in Egypt.

argued the case for a Palestinian homeland and has supported the P.L.O.'s claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

Mr. Abdel-Meguid said today that despite the decision to shut down the P.L.O. presence, Egypt would not stop supporting the Palestinian cause in the peace process.

The P.L.O. and most Arab countries severed ties with Egypt after it signed the treaty with Israel in 1979. But Egyptian links with the organization were restored after Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, visited President Mubarak in 1983.

Egypt becomes the second country sympathetic to the Palestinians to retaliate against the P.L.O. less than a year. Last July, Jordan closed the P.L.O. offices there after the senior P.L.O. official, Yusef al-Najjar, who is also known as a cause of P.L.O. seism.

"The P.L.O. refused to recognize Egypt's great sacrifices for the Palestinian people," the Egyptian statement said today. "The P.L.O. leaders are men out to profit from intrigue and maneuvers. But our decision today won't end Egypt's support for Palestinians. Egypt will continue to support the struggle of the Palestinians."

President Mubarak had sent an envoy to the meeting to warn that Egypt would react if the resolution were adopted. Mr. Mubarak later called home the Egyptian delegation that walked out. Today, Palestinian delegates and leaders expressed shock and surprise over Egypt's decision.

"There's no doubt in my mind that pressure was put by the United States and Israel to do it, but it's an overreaction by him," said Salwa Abu Khadra, a P.L.O. delegate. "I didn't expect it."

At a news conference before word of the Egyptian reaction reached here, Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a hard-line Marxist guerrilla group, not only attacked the United States and Israel, but also blamed Jordan and Morocco. He had helped lead a strong resolution against

JORDANIAN'S CLOSE ARAFAT'S OFFICES Move Reflects Hussein's Fight Against P.L.O. Chairman

By JOHN KIFNER
Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, July 7 — In a growing struggle with the P.L.O., Jordan today closed all 25 offices of the P.L.O. in the Kingdom, the first step in a move to force the P.L.O. to accept a new leadership.

Mr. Arafat, who broke with the P.L.O. in February over the issue of its effort to agree on peace with Israel, has since then been in Jordan, where he has been working to build a new leadership.

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Morocco Orders Closure of 'All' PLO Offices N221040 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1027 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Algiers, 22 Apr (WAKH) — It has been learned from informed Palestinian sources at the PNC session currently being held in Algiers that the Moroccan king's representative, Ahmed ben Souda, has withdrawn from the PNC meetings due to the presence of Saharan President Mohamed Abdelaziz.

These sources told a WAKH correspondent at the PNC that Morocco has ordered the closure of all PLO offices in Morocco.

It is to be noted that King Hassan II delivered a speech last night criticizing the participation of Polisario Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz in the PNC session. King Hassan II said that he has issued instructions preventing any Moroccan from taking part in any Palestinian meeting or conference from now on.

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The P.L.O. Office in Washington

United States Senate

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MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS
ROBERT C. BYRD, WEST VIRGINIA
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
DENNIS DECONCINI, ARIZONA
PATRICK J. LEAHY, VERMONT
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALABAMA
PAUL SIMON, ILLINOIS

DENNIS W. BIEDO, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
DIANA L. WATTEMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL
MELINDA KOUTSOUMPAS, CHIEF CLERK
MARK H. GUTENSTERN, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA, CHAIRMAN

ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN P. EAST, NORTH CAROLINA

HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, OHIO
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALABAMA

ALICE R. MILDEN, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Oct 17, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

The Palestine Liberation Organization has publicly taken responsibility for the attack on Israeli soldiers and their families this week near the Western Wall in Jerusalem, and has vowed to step up such terrorist attacks. This is just the latest of a multitude of violent acts of terrorism by this outlaw organization.

You have been a leader in the fight against terrorism and condemning the PLO's long-established policy of bombings, kidnappings, hijacking, extortion and murder. Accordingly, we call upon you today to use every available legal option to order the closing of the PLO office in Washington, D.C. That office, according to its own registration statements filed with the Department of Justice, receives \$250,000 a year from its parent body, the head of the terrorism empire. We are outraged that an organization whose mandate is terror is allowed to operate freely in our nation's capital.

Signed,

SENATORS GRASSLEY, DOLE, KASTEN, MCCONNELL, SPECTER, D'AMATO,
LAXALT, PRESSLER, HEINZ, QUAYLE

great Senator from Louisiana invested in this institution and Nation.

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR PAUL LAXALT

Mr. INOUE. Mr. President, I wish to express my sentiments on the impending retirement of PAUL LAXALT from this body. We will lose a respected and able Senator, and I will lose a dear friend.

Senator LAXALT and I have both served on the Appropriations Committee throughout the past 12 years of his service in the Senate. During that time we have on most occasions been on the same side of issues, but frequently found ourselves in opposite positions. I would speculate that our voting records are probably as divergent as any other two Senators.

I point out our contrasts as an illustration of how the U.S. Senate can and should serve as a deliberative body that places the interests of our Nation above political differences. Where we have differed, we have done so within the Senate rules of discourse and debate that encourage the full discussion of legislation, and done so within a spirit of collegiality that promotes rather than hinders the work of this body.

Senator LAXALT has left his imprint in the legislative record in domestic and international affairs. His sensitive handling of a diplomatic mission to the Philippines earlier this year helped to avoid bloodshed while preserving United States relations with this ally. He is a man of his word; an individual of integrity.

Mr. President, I am certain that we have not seen the last of PAUL LAXALT. Wherever his future endeavors may lead him, I wish to express my good wishes to PAUL LAXALT and the sense of loss that will be felt by his departure.

UNMASKING THE FACE OF TERROR

Mr. DENTON. Mr. President, as many in this body may know, the Security and Terrorism Subcommittee on the Committee of the Judiciary, has held numerous hearings on terrorism related security issues. One series of hearings has dealt very specifically with the Palestine Liberation Organization and its support for, and practice of the most heinous terrorist acts.

In the past 20 years, the PLO has fashioned a cult of righteous violence, an ideology of terrorism. Terrorism has not only been justified as a military necessity but has been glorified as a reclamation of Arab dignity. But where is the dignity of taking innocent lives, whether it be the murder of Leon Klinghoffer aboard the *Achille Lauro*, the murder of 15 innocent bystanders in the Rome and Vienna airports or the murder of five passengers aboard TWA flight 840, including an 8-month baby and a yet-to-be-born child or the murders of helpless worshipers in an Istanbul synagogue?

It is clear that the PLO is a terrorist organization. As then candidate Ronald Reagan stated on September 3, 1980, "President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so." During the same campaign, George BUSH noted:

The PLO—and let there be no doubt this—is nothing more or less than international Ku Klux Klan, pledged to hatred, violence and the destruction of the values and free institutions we hold dear.

More recently, on April 8, 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese declared:

We know that various elements of the PLO and its allies and affiliates are in the thick of international terror. And the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat must ultimately be held responsible for their actions.

Referring to the fight against terror, Mr. Meese states:

You don't make real progress until you close in on the kingpins.

Mr. President, there is no mistake about it, Yasser Arafat is one of the kingpins of world terror. He is ultimately responsible for terrorism committed by Fatah the main wing of the PLO directed at Americans, Israelis and other innocent citizens. For example:

According to the public record, Arafat's wing of the PLO and affiliated factions have been responsible for the murder of at least 35 Americans, the wounding of at least 40 Americans and the kidnapping of at least 6 Americans.

Arafat is directly linked, through his top aides, to such major atrocities as the murder of U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, the *Achille Lauro* piracy and the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, and the terror campaign of the Black September. Black September is nothing more than a non d'guerre for the PLO.

Over the past year, Arafat's anti-American threats have been explicit. On November 13, 1985, he stated:

We are on the threshold of a fierce battle—not an Israeli-Palestinian battle but a Palestinian-U.S. battle. (*AL-Ahali*, 11/13/85).

This past January, Arafat reasserted his hostile position on the United States:

The Arab "strategy should take into consideration that . . . the enemy is the same, be he Israeli or the United States." (*ARUNA*, 1/3/86).

Arafat has continued to call for the destruction of Israel through terrorism. Recently, he reiterated these orders:

I don't simply want, I demand, more (commando) operations, and more resistance against this occupation. (*Arab News*, 11/11/85).

As President Reagan noted in a July 8, 1985 address to the ABA:

We must act against the criminal menace of terrorism with the full weight of the law, both domestic and international. We must act to indict, apprehend and prosecute those who commit the kind of atrocities the world has witnessed in recent weeks.

Mr. President, yesterday PLO terrorists struck again. They hurled hand grenades near the western wall of King Solomon's Temple in Jerusalem. These grenades were thrown at a group of 300 new Israeli Army recruits of the Givati Infantry Brigade who had just completed a swearing-in ceremony at the wall, the last remnant of the temple that was effectively destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD.

These grenades killed one civilian and injured 66 people gathered for the ceremony. Among those injured were 32 civilians, including 13 women and 7 children.

Full responsibility for this despicable attack was claimed by the military spokesman for the PLO from the Palestine Center in Cairo. He said:

This heroic act confirms the decision on escalation adopted by the Palestinian leadership at its last meeting when it undertook to continue the policy of armed struggle against the Zionists and colonialist cancer throughout our Palestinian soil.

The PLO representative in Cairo, Tayat Abd Al-Rahim, told the French News Agency on October 15, that the decision under which the Jerusalem attack was carried out was taken by the Supreme Military Council of the Palestinian Center in Baghdad 10 days ago.

Mr. President, we must recognize the PLO for what it is—we must deny it acceptance or legitimacy at every turn. We should make every effort to close its office in the Nation's Capital and treat its representatives and leaders with the contempt and disdain they so richly deserve. This is an issue which I will continue to follow closely and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Thank you, Mr. President.

RETIRING SENATORS

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR HART

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, with the retirement from this body of the senior Senator from Colorado (Mr. HART), the Senate will lose one of its most creative thinkers. But, fortunately, the Nation will continue to hear from the Senator. His will be a voice to be reckoned with in the next Presidential elections.

The Senator has distinguished himself as a critic of our Nation's military policy. He has been a leader in the so-called military reform movement. He has raised important questions about whether buying increasingly expensive and complex weaponry necessarily buys us a more effective defense. He has stressed the importance of high morale, cohesion, skill, and the readiness of our troops to successfully fight when called upon.

I have served with Senator HART on the Senate Budget Committee. There have been few voices in the Senate who have spoken more clearly about what this Nation's budgetary priorities ought to be. Senator HART has been an advocate for investment in this Na-

**PLO CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR JERUSALEM BOMB
ATTACK**

CAIRO, Oct 15, Reuter - The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) today claimed it was responsible for an attack on Israeli soldiers near Jerusalem's Wailing Wall, a PLO official said today.

One person was killed and about 70 were wounded when three hand grenades were thrown at a crowd of soldiers and relatives, Israeli police and security sources said.

The official, Osama Sharab, in a telephoned statement quoted a PLO military command spokesman as saying that a special unit operating inside Israel carried out the "heroic operation in response to the decision taken by the Palestinian leadership to escalate military action inside occupied Palestine."

The spokesman said a unit of "Martyr Kamal Edwan" operating inside Israel executed the operation.

Sharab told Reuters the decision to escalate military operations inside Israel was taken by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat.

The Washington Times

PAGE 6A / TUESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1986

Shamir takes over as Israeli premier under 2-party pact

By Andrew Meisels
SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

JERUSALEM — Yitzhak Shamir yes-
ing out the grenade attack are Moslem
fundamentalists who have said they were
recruited by the PLO for the job, defense
officials said.

The three men in their 20s said they
carried out their attack seeking the lib-
eration of sacred land so a fundamen-
tal Islamic state can be established there,
a defense official said.

Shmuel Goren, coordinator for West
Bank affairs, said on Israel Radio, "It was
definitely an act of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization. The men were con-
scripted by the PLO."

HEARD ON CAPITOL HILL

PLO: At Home in Washington

At a time when the United States is urging action against international terrorism, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continues to operate an office in the nation's capital. But Washington's hospitality toward the PLO may be running out as Congress and the Justice Department investigate the Palestine Information Office's (PIO) activities.

In documents filed with the Justice Department, the information office states that it is wholly supported by the PLO. Last year, the PIO received \$280,000 from the PLO to "bring the views of the Palestinian people . . . to the attention of the American people as well as to government officials throughout the U.S."

The office disseminates publications, arranges speaking tours and meets with foreign diplomats, mostly from Arab and East European countries. Last year, PIO staff members conducted their first meetings with Congressmen on Capitol Hill.

A State Department spokesman defended the operation of the PIO office saying that it may engage in diplomatic activity as long as it is registered as a foreign agent and staffed by permanent residents of the United States. The same activities, performed by non-U.S. residents working as diplomats, would be illegal since the United States does not recognize the PLO.

The Senate recently adopted a measure introduced by Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.) directing the Justice Department to investigate whether the PIO is in full compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Although the office has been open since 1978, the Justice Department, which oversees the activities of foreign agents in the United States, has never conducted an on-site evaluation of the PIO's activities.

Speaking to the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations recently, Attorney General Edwin Meese revealed that the Justice Department already has begun to look into charges that the PIO might be engaged in activities for which it is not registered. Should the investigation reveal that the PIO is acting in violation of FARA, its continued operation would be called into question.

The renewed interest in the PIO follows two hearings conducted earlier this year by the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. Subcommittee Chairman Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.) called the sessions to examine the role of Yasir Arafat and the PLO in international terrorism and to explore how the United States can respond.

In his opening remarks, Denton decried

the PLO's "cult of righteous violence" and asked committee members to assess how Arafat can be made accountable for his actions through the "full weight" of U.S. resources and international law.

Throughout the hearing, Denton called for tighter control of PLO activity in the United States in order to prevent the terrorist organization from "building a terrorist infrastructure and expanding their propaganda machine within this country." A Justice Department witness said he could not assure the committee that "any and all [PIO office] activities are legal."

Testifying before the committee, Lautenberg expressed his concern that the PIO office in Washington might be used as a base for terrorism and urged that it be registered under the Voorhis Act, a statute applied to organizations which engage in civilian military activity and advocate the violent overthrow of a government. The act would require the PLO to disclose the full extent of its operations and funding. Citing reports that the PLO offices in Europe have been used in planning terrorist attacks, Lautenberg said: "The fear that this Washington office could be used as a base for terror is not farfetched. . . . We should not take that chance."

—J.R.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Israeli Leader Asks U.S. to Shut Down PLO

Shultz Reported to Caution Shamir on Increasing Settlements

WR 10/19/86 A41

Associated Press

TEL AVIV, Oct. 18—Prime Minister-designate Yitzhak Shamir has asked Secretary of State George P. Shultz to close the Palestine Liberation Organization's offices in the United States, Israel Radio reported today.

The report said Shamir had written to Shultz, stating that the PLO offices in Washington and New York should be closed because the guerrilla organization has claimed responsibility for the grenade attack Wednesday night in Jerusalem that killed one man and wounded 69 persons.

The Foreign Ministry was unavailable today to confirm the report.

The radio also quoted Shultz as saying he hoped Israel's settlement policy in the occupied territories would not change after Shamir became prime minister, which is expected soon under the terms of a power-sharing agreement between the two major parties in Israel.

Conservative settlement groups and politicians in Shamir's Likud bloc have called for building 20 new settlements over two years on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israel captured the West Bank from Jordan and the Gaza Strip from Egypt dur-

ing the 1967 Mideast War. Under the 25-month administration of Prime Minister Shimon Peres, four new settlements were built.

Shultz also said he was worried that Israeli leaders would try to change the existing arrangements governing the Temple Mount, a holy site to both Jews and Moslems in the old, walled city of Jerusalem.

The site is administered by a Moslem religious council and Jews are not allowed to pray there. Some conservative Israelis have demanded that Jews take partial control of the temple and be allowed to pray at the site.

DEPT.-10/16/86

Jerusalem
Bombing

Q State Department reaction to the terrorist bombing in Jerusalem and the Israeli retaliation today?

MR. MARTINEZ: We issued a statement yesterday condemning the bombing in Jerusalem. The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms this reprehensible act of terrorism directed against a group of Israelis who had just attended a religious ceremony at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. We further condemn all those elements in and out of the PLO who have asserted responsibility for this appalling act, which claimed among its victims both Israelis and Arabs. These elements do a terrible disservice to the cause of peace between Arabs and Israelis, and to the Palestinian people. We extend our deepest sympathies to the victims of this crime. As to the latter part of your question, we would simply say that we deplore this continuing cycle of violence in the region.

Q But Pete, in that same vein, would you also urge restraint on the part of the Israelis? Or is their retaliation acceptable?

DEPT.-10/16/86

4-2

MR. MARTINEZ: As I said, we deplore the continuing cycle of violence in the region. Yes?

Q Do you have anything on the situation in Mozambique?

MR. MARTINEZ: In what respect?

Q Well, the reports that the government is about to be overthrown, and rebels occupy two-thirds of the country.

MR. MARTINEZ: I have nothing in particular about those reports;

CONTINUED ON PAGE 5-1

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

State Dept Noon Briefing
Oct 20 1986
Briefed: Charles Redman

Q Will the State Department take any action on Prime Minister Shamir's request that the U.S. close the Palestine Information Office in Washington, following the PLO's claim of responsibility for last week's bombing?

MR. REDMAN: First of all, your question makes the assumption that there have been certain communications and certain requests. And on that score, as I said earlier, I am not confirming that in any way. Let me just say on the PLO office that you refer to, that the office is an information office staffed entirely by U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents. And on that basis, I'd refer you to the Department of Justice, which has responsibility for enforcing the relevant statutes, for details.

Q What about the complicity aspect of the question? Have you had anything to say about who might have -- sorry I wasn't here Friday.

MR. REDMAN: No. I don't think we've had anything to say on that.

~~New York Times~~ April 13 86 P. 12
In Europe, P.L.O. Comes Under Close Watch

By HENRY KAHN

Special to The New York Times

ATHENS, April 12 — In a

David Kimche, director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, said in an interview in Jerusalem that people attached to P.L.O. offices in Europe were preparing a support structure for terrorist operations. He described this activity as recruiting, renting safehouses, providing identity documents, choosing potential targets and collecting operational intelligence.

According to Prof. Paul Wilkinson of Aberdeen University in Scotland, a specialist in Palestinian movements, "there are several kinds of people employed in P.L.O. offices," and "they are all ready to do violence."

European and Israeli officials and scholars who specialize in Palestinian affairs said each P.L.O. mission in Europe had on its staff a specialist in clandestine operations, including terrorism.

In December 1984, Abu Tayeb, who is described as the commander of Force 17, an elite military unit of Al Fatah, reported to a meeting of other senior officials that he had reorganized the unit's representation at P.L.O. offices in Europe in preparation for future actions. Israeli security officials said Force 17 representatives in Europe were stocking weapons.

According to the Project on Terrorism of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University, terrorist acts attributed to Palestinians last year more than doubled in number over 1984, from 32 to 67. The center said Al Fatah, the P.L.O. group that Mr. Arafat heads, carried out 13 of these actions.



October 2, 1986

MEESE SAYS JUSTICE DEPT. PROBING PLO OFFICE ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON

NEW YORK, Oct. 1 (JTA) — Attorney General Edwin Meese told the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations Tuesday that the Justice Department was "looking very carefully" into the activities of the PLO office in Washington and hinted that the office might be closed down.

Responding to a question following an address to the Conference, Meese said the Department was "taking certain steps to see if there was any violation of law" in the PLO's activities in Washington. He added: "We will not allow that office to aid terrorists or to be a source of support for terrorists anywhere." The Attorney General said there were "sensitive aspects" to the situation that he said "may affect actions we may take." The PLO was permitted to open a so-called information office in Washington during the Carter Administration.

On other issues, the Attorney General said an early decision was expected on whether to bar President Kurt Waldheim of Austria from the United States as a former Nazi. The Presidents Conference and other groups have called on the Administration to refuse entry to Waldheim under the "watch list" provision of the immigration law.

Meese said that he deplored recent "leaks" emanating from his department that charged various Israeli officials with wrongdoing. "I share your remorse at these leaks, which are a matter of great distress to me personally and to this Administration," he said.

He declined to comment on the case of confessed spy Jonathan Pollard, noting only that sentencing would take place in November. "I hope that other problems" related to the case "will conclude rapidly," he added.

**Violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)
Committed by the Palestine Information Office (PIO)**

1) Section 2(3) of FARA requires "A comprehensive statement of the extent ...to which [the] foreign principal is...financed or subsidized, in whole or in part, by any government of a foreign country ..."

The PIO's registration statement of April 17, 1978, item 8(b) states that the PLO is not subsidized by any foreign government. The same registration, item 9, states to the contrary that the PLO is financed in part by "direct financial aid from Arab states."

In none of the original or subsequent statements has the PIO reported the extent to which its foreign principal is financed or subsidized in whole or in part by any government of a foreign country.

2) Section 2(3) of FARA also requires a "comprehensive statement of...the character of the business or other activities" of the foreign principal.

The PIO registration states that the nature of the business activity of its foreign principal, the PLO, is "a representative and democratic organization dealing with the political, social and economic affairs of the Palestinian people" (PIO registration statement April 17, 1978 item 8(a))

Secretary of State George Shultz stated that "The PLO has been involved in recent weeks, as in the past, in acts of terror and violence." Attorney General Edwin Meese stated that "We know that various elements of the PLO and its allies and affiliates are in the thick of international terror." It is clear that the PIO has failed to provide a "comprehensive" description of the PLO's activities.

3) According to Section 2(3), the foreign agent must file a "the name and address of every foreign principal for whom the registrant is acting..."

The PIO describes its foreign principal as "the PLO" and the address as "Tunis, Tunisia." Because the PLO is an umbrella organization, this is an unresponsive answer. Is the PIO, for example, controlled by the PLO's 11 member executive committee, including Abu Abbas? Or is it controlled by the central committee of Fatah, of which Salah Khalaf is a prominent member? The registration fails to provide the required information of who are the controlling parties within the foreign principal. This goes to the heart of the question of whether the Washington office is involved in terror.

4) Section 2(9) of FARA requires "Copies of each written agreement and the terms and conditions of each oral agreement... by reason of which the registrant is performing...any activities which require his registration hereunder."

To determine whether the PIO office in Washington acts in support of the terrorist philosophies of its foreign principal, much more specific information is required about the services it performs for its parent organization.

ENFORCEMENT

The rules that have been issued under Section 8 of FARA provide that a registrant must cease activity as an agent of a foreign principal no more than 10 days after receiving notification from the Attorney General that there is a deficiency in the registration statement, unless the agent files within these 10 days an amended statement that is in full compliance with the Act and the rules.

The Attorney General may also make application to the appropriate U.S. district court for an order enjoining a person from continuing to act as an agent of a foreign principal, or for an order requiring compliance with any appropriate provision of the Act or regulation thereunder. (Section 8(f,g))

HEARING ON ARAFAT'S PLO AND TERRORISM
Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism
April 23, 1986

In reference to the Palestine Information Office in Washington:

Sen. Denton: "Two weeks ago The New York Times reported that PLO offices in Europe are supporting terrorist operations by, quote, 'Recruiting, renting safe houses, providing identity documents, choosing potential targets and collecting operational intelligence,'...Can you assure this subcommittee that the PLO office in our nation's capitol, irrespective of its composition, is not involved in supporting terrorism and will not be used to foment terrorist violence in the United States?"

Mark Richards (Justice Department): "No, Senator, I would not give you those assurances that they are not engaged in those activities. I am not in a position to assure that any and all activities of any organization is necessarily legal. I am suggesting that what we are aware of at the present time is consistent with the law."

Mary Mochary (State Department): "There is nothing that we can do about [closing the PIO in Washington] because it is manned exclusively by legal resident aliens or American citizens."

Mark Richards (Justice Department): "The office, as reflected in their registration statement, is engaged in activities that are perfectly legal ...I do not believe that, since they have registered, that we have engaged in an on-site review...[Their] submissions do appear to be in order...The decision to make an on-site review...is triggered primarily by some indication that the submissions are incomplete or inaccurate or some bases for concluding that there may be noncompliance with the FARA requirements."

Sen. Denton: In view of the amount and degree of terrorism for which the PLO is responsible, it might be expected that you would have reviewed their books and records...with respect to the Irish operating in this country, you have a rather fulsome record of inspections dealing with the provisional wing of the IRA, but I don't see a parallel conscientiousness affecting the PLO..."

Disposition:

EDITOR'S NOTE: This article follows a three-month examination of the activities of the Palestine Liberation Organization's Washington office.

The Palestine Liberation Organization's liaison office in Washington DC has long been funded by a special \$280,000 annual appropriation directly from PLO headquarters. An examination of how that money is spent reveals that the PLO office in America is engaged in far reaching political lobbying throughout the Arab American community, and among key Communist bloc diplomats in Washington in its efforts to influence American policy. As such, it may be exceeding its legal basis for existence, an informational effort hoping to promote better understanding between the Palestinian and American peoples.

The office's effectiveness revolves around its director Hasan Rahman, technically an employee of the Arab League, who maintains a busy and expensive schedule of meetings and luncheons across the nation. Last year alone, Rahman spent approximately \$34,700 in travel expenses. His 1985 itinerary included visits to the Arab community of San Juan, Puerto Rico January 4 and March 26, the Arab community in Boulder, Colorado May 16, and a July 6
--More--

gathering of Detroit-based Ramallah Palestinians in Knoxville, Tennessee.

Rahman is also a frequent speaker at numerous Arab conventions in Washington. During one six-week period last year, for example, Rahman was invited to speak to the April 30th U.S. Arab Chamber of Commerce annual meeting, the May 4 National Association of Arab Americans convention, and the June 7 General Union of Palestinian Students convention, all held in the nation's capital.

INFORMATION ONLY

The PLO's Washington office is permitted by the Justice Department under the guise of attempting to promote better understanding between Palestinians and the American people. But in fact, the office makes little effort to reach any groups other than Arab Americans, and functions chiefly in the Arabic language. The purpose is to maintain moderate Arab American solidarity with PLO activities, including "the armed struggle" against Israel. As such, the office is less of an "information office" than a lobby-cum-diplomatic mission for the PLO.

In its diplomacy, the PLO office pursues and equally narrow clientele-- almost exclusively senior officials of Arab and Communist bloc embassies. For instance, during the summer of 1985, Rahman held a June 11 luncheon meeting with Hungarian press
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counsel Bela Juszal at the Bacchas restaurant. Two days later, and then again July 2, Rahman met with Czech counselor Zdenek Sokol at the Shazan restaurant. Sokol, reached at the Czech Embassy--expressed outrage that his private meetings with Rahman would become known. The Czech diplomat declined to characterize his talks with Rahman, except that they involved "a fellow in Prague."

But Rahman's most frequent Communist bloc contact is with Oleg Derkovsky, first secretary of the Russian Embassy. They met

for journalists and campus representatives. Among journalists, Rahman's most frequent contacts are Washington Post columnist Richard Cohen and David Ignatius of the Post's Sunday pages. Two notable meetings earlier this year include a luncheon date with British author Alan Hart, Yassir Arafat's biographer, and an office party for East Jerusalem newspaper editor Hanna Seniora, whose close liaison with the PLO is well known.

Recent campus lectures include two at Washington's American University February 28 and March 18 of last year, and a third April 11, 1985 at Suffolk University in Boston. Briefings are generally held in Rahman's office, include one June 4 last year
--More--

for 22 students from Monroe Community College and faculty and a second one ten days later for students of Duke University's Islamic-Arabic Organization. Rahman generally limits his campus efforts to programs arranged or controlled by Arab Americans.

The profile of the PLO's office activities resembles that of any diplomatic mission. But as one Israeli diplomat expressed it, "That is precisely the point. They are functioning with their colleagues as diplomats-- business as usual." State Department sources however denied that the PLO office's diplomatic activity constitutes de facto recognition. And the Justice Department was uncertain whether such activities went beyond the narrow public information operation the office is permitted by the Foreign Agents Act.

But Senator Jeremiah Denton (D-Alabama), chairman of the Senate Committee on Terrorism and Security, when notified by this reporter of Rahman's regular meetings with Communist bloc senior diplomats, responded, "This new information is of extreme importance in evaluating just what the PLO does, and the Justice Department must take this into consideration." A Denton staffer asserted flatly that the PLO bureau was not authorized to engage in diplomacy.

CASH FLOW

Combining the office's domestic communications with its
--More--

acknowledged role as a conduit to the PLO infrastructure overseas, it is no wonder that the major expense of the office after salaries is telephone, postage, telex and telegram. In the last twelve months alone, Rahman's office has spent more than \$45,500 in communications. That figure can almost be doubled if the rental cost of photocopy, facsimile, telephone and telex machines is added. Those expenses dwarf all other office expenditures, except salary. Rahman is paid \$254,000 by the Arab League. Five or six other employees, some working part-time, draw a total of between \$75,000 and \$80,000 per year.

Automobiles registered in Virginia are at the office's disposal to facilitate Rahman's busy schedule. Shuttling between appointments costs the office as much as \$150 per week just in parking costs.

The whole question of PLO assets and cash flow in the United States has recently been raised by lawsuits such as the one launched by relatives of Leon Klinghoffer who are seeking millions in damages for Klinghoffer's murder on the Achille Lauro last fall. In recent years, the PLO's annual stipend of \$280,000 has been transferred to Washington via two \$140,000 disbursements made at six month intervals, funneled either through the PLO's Information Office or the Palestine National Fund. In the past, these have been more than enough to cover the office's expenses,
--More--

leaving a \$5000 to \$7000 cash reserve each year. But several

according to Justice Department documents, the PLO's Washington office was compelled to obtain a \$50,000 bank loan.

This development comes amid conflicting published reports about the PLO's finances. No one knows how many billions the PLO's worldwide business empire is worth. However, its annual operating budget is in financial chaos as a result of factional disputes within the PLO itself, and declining oil revenues and raising antagonism from such states as Libya, Syria and Iran, which traditionally tithe to the PLO. According to a recent report in Forbes, the Palestine National Fund allots \$50 million annually for all its diplomatic missions around the world, including its UN Mission in New York, and the liaison bureau in Washington.

Such missions consume sixteen percent of the PNF's total 1985 \$310 million budget. At the same time, income from investments, Palestinian taxes and subsidies from Arab nations amount to only \$155 million.

Palestine National Fund director Jaweed Shusseini was quoted earlier this year in the London newspaper Voice of the Arab World as conceding that the PNF suffers from a growing deficit, currently some \$300 million. The PLO's unwillingness or
--More--

organizational inability to liquidate assets to erase the deficit has become a potential threat to operations, according to informed sources. Arafat himself has called for a 25 percent cut in monies spent on diplomatic missions until the cash crunch is resolved. This might explain why the Washington PLO office was compelled to borrow \$50,000 to make ends meet.

PROPAGANDA OR INCITEMENT

Of course, the greatest concern of government officials reviewing the PLO office's status is whether they are directly or indirectly engaged in any terrorist activities. For example, eighteen months ago, Force 17 was reorganized from Arafat's personal bodyguard detail into an elite commando corps operationally based at PLO representative offices throughout Europe. Fears that the PLO might use their Washington office for the same purposes have prompted PLO critics such as Senator Denton to press for a Justice Department cancellation of the PLO bureau's status under the Foreign Agents Act.

Thus far, no definitive action has been taken. But Denton insists, "We are continuing our investigation, and our efforts pressing the Justice Department to force full disclosure by the PLO in Washington under the foreign agents." Ironically, in an earlier declaration to this reporter, PLO office director Rahman bragged, "They [Congress] cannot shut us down. Only the
--More--

Department of Justice can."

While there is no evidence that the PLO in Washington is involved in terrorist actions, it appears they are willing to incite support for terrorism as part of their efforts in the Arab-American community. A case in point is Falastin Althawra which translates to "Palestine Revolution", an official PLO magazine published in the Middle East, generally Syria. The Washington office distributes "about 100 to 150 copies" of the magazine, according to Justice Department documents. Thus far, the Justice Department is unaware of the magazine's content because they have not yet obtained a translation. But sources familiar with the publication assert that it openly supports terrorism, which it calls "the armed struggle."

At press time, full translations of Falastin Althawra could not be arranged. But a Library of Congress Arabist did examine for this reporter one copy at random, the March 10, 1984 number. "This publication supports and reports on all the activities of

articles are political, but some report on the armed struggle as well, that is Palestinian defense," he added. For example, one article described the wave of suicide bombings against Israeli and South Lebanese Army units as "no doubt opening new horizons
--More--

in the popular war against the Zionist presence."

.. The Justice Department is mandated to carefully monitor the dissemination of propaganda by entities subject to the Foreign Agents Act. Materials which incite the American public, or promote criminal acts-- such as terrorism-- can disqualify a regulated office, according to those familiar with the law. "If that office is disseminating Falastin Althawra, and that publication indeed supports and encourages terrorist acts," declares Sen. Denton, "it may be the most disturbing revelation yet [about that office]." Denton's office promised an immediate investigation into the magazine's content and whether it violates the understandings under which the PLO is permitted to operate in our nation's capitol.

Edwin Black is the author of The Transfer Agreement: The Untold Story of the Secret Pact Between the Third Reich and Jewish Palestine (Macmillan), winner of the Carl Sandburg Award for the best nonfiction of 1984. His weekly syndicated column is published by Jewish papers in 33 cities.

TALKING PAPER

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Information Division - Jerusalem

PLO OFFICES: TOOLS FOR TERROR

The PLO's offices in various countries around the world serve as an important tool in a variety of activities designed to realize that organization's political, propaganda and terrorist objectives. In the pursuit of their activities, PLO representatives often take advantage of their quasi-official position to act in violation of local laws; on several occasions, they have been warned by the host government to refrain from illegal activity.

Illegal Operations

Side by side with open activities, PLO offices also engage in clandestine operations:

- * PLO offices run networks of agents and collaborators for the collection of data and other information on Israelis and Israeli institutions. This information is passed on to PLO headquarters and becomes part of the decision-making process in the perpetration of terrorist actions around the world.
- * Most PLO offices maintain unofficial representations of terrorist bodies (including Fatah security personnel from the departments of Abu Jihad, Abu Iyad, Abu al-Houl and others), responsible for the recruitment and activities of the above-mentioned agents. They also serve as points of contact and communication with underground terrorist cells in Israel and Judea-Samaria-Gaza.
- * The PLO also acts as a mediating element with the local authorities on behalf of terrorists who have been apprehended after committing a terrorist operation.
- * PLO offices provide forged documents and other forms of cover for terrorists and for Palestinian Arabs who have run afoul of the law.

The involvement of PLO representatives abroad in terrorist activities, in violation of the local law, is here detailed, by world regions.

IN EUROPE (Western and Eastern)

Austria: Gazi Hussein, PLO representative at UNIDO, with official status with the Austrian Foreign Ministry (since 1 March 1980), was expelled from Austria in August 1981 for his involvement in an attempt to smuggle weapons and explosives into the country.

Britain: The PLO office in London underwrites all transportation costs of Arab students studying in England who volunteer for Fatah.

Germany (West): Abdallah Faranji, the PLO representative in Bonn, was expelled from West Germany in wake of his involvement in the murder of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich in September 1972, but in 1974 he was permitted to return. On 11 May 1979, an Arab terrorist, Ibrahim al-Bas, was arrested in Paris, en route from Beirut to Frankfurt, carrying explosives as well as Faranji's telephone number.

Holland: In November 1982, the PLO representative-designate, Abu ar-Rahman Alawi, participated in a demonstration in Amsterdam in which he attacked Israel and the United States in terms which - in the words of a warning issued by the Dutch Foreign Ministry to the Syrian ambassador - exceeded what was permitted under Dutch law. The Foreign Ministry indicated that Alawi's participation in the demonstration constituted interference in internal Dutch affairs.

Italy: In 1979, the PLO office in Rome mediated with the local authorities on behalf of George Habash's PFLP in a missile-smuggling episode. In 1982 it interceded with the authorities for the release of two PFLP members (an Arab and a German) who had been jailed for terrorist activity. In the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in October 1985, the PLO office in Rome mediated between the PLO hijackers and the Egyptian authorities. Since the arrest of the hijackers by the Italians, the PLO office in Rome has been handling the legal aspects of the case.

Portugal: Assam Basiso, the PLO representative in Lisbon, was admonished by the Portuguese Foreign Ministry, in January 1986, for taking advantage of his status in the country by making exaggerated public pronouncements regarding the presence in Portugal of radical Palestinian terrorists. The Foreign Ministry viewed these pronouncements as a propaganda exercise aimed at drawing a distinction between the PLO and radical Palestinian groups, following the terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December 1985.

Soviet Union: In February 1985, Soviet security authorities declared former PLO representative Sahr Habash persona non grata for his involvement in currency smuggling; he later left the country.

Spain: In the early 1970's, a former PLO representative in Spain, Salah Ka'kabani, recruited candidates for terrorist organizations. Another former PLO representative, Mandr Dejeni, maintained ties with European underground groups and was linked with the attack on the Egyptian embassy in Madrid on 15 September 1975. One of Dejeni's aides assisted the PLO's Abu Abbas faction in hijacking a KLM plane from Malaga on 5 September 1976.

Sweden: On 25 January 1986, an employee of the PLO's Stockholm office was arrested carrying a forged Libyan passport. The Swedish newspaper, Svenska Dagbladet (18 February 1986) reported that a request had been submitted for the man's expulsion, noting that Eugene Malhouf, the current PLO representative in Sweden, had admitted that the man was in the PLO office's employ. According to the newspaper, Swedish security police had already suspected this man last year of planning terror operations in Sweden.

Switzerland: Daoud Barakat, former PLO representative in Switzerland (today PLO representative in Austria), was involved in the 1972 murder of Israeli athletes in Munich and in the 1973 attempted attack on the Schoenau camp for Soviet Jewish emigrants in Austria. He also helped gather information on potential Israeli targets.

ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Cyprus: A former PLO representative in Nicosia, Zachariah Abd ar-Rahim, engaged in smuggling weapons into Lebanon via Cyprus. He also maintained ties with subversive elements in Cyprus [and with the underground movement affiliated with Andreas Papandreou, today Greece's prime minister.]

Turkey: In July 1979 Ribhi Halum (see Brazil), headed an Arafat-affiliated delegation that mediated in the Saika (PLO) takeover of the Egyptian embassy in Ankara, in the course of which two security men had been killed and 20 persons held hostage. Two months later, the PLO opened an office in Ankara, headed by Halum. In October 1982, in the wake of Halum's call to forbid the flying of the Israeli flag in Ankara, he was warned by the Turkish foreign minister not to interfere in Turkish foreign policy.

In Arab League States

Jordan: The activities of the PLO's office in Amman are restricted and usually have to be coordinated with the Jordanian government. Arafat's own bureau, in operation since 1980 and headed by Ahmad Najib, was closed in July 1986. Also closed at the same time was Fatah's "Western Front" headquarters, headed by Abu Jihad.

Qatar: In February 1981, two senior PLO officials were expelled for having criticized Qatar's internal situation.

Somalia: A former PLO representative in Somalia, Ismail Abdallah al-Khattib, was involved in an attack on the Israeli embassy in Thailand on 28 December 1972, and planned a terror attack in Australia in 1973.

Sudan: In February 1981, the PLO representative in Khartoum, Khaled Abdallah Ramadan (known also as Abu Hitham), and his three aides were expelled for their overt opposition to the government. Abu Hitham had also publicly threatened to murder the members of an Arab music combo in a Khartoum night club if they continued playing a certain tune. The personal behaviour of Abu Hitham and his aides was described as "inappropriate."

IN LATIN AMERICA

Brazil: On 23 October 1973, Ribhi Halum, then PLO representative at the Arab League office in Brazil (travelling on an Algerian passport), was which was to have been smuggled into Brazil for terrorist operations in that country. In 1979, Farid Sawan, current PLO representative at the Arab League office in Brazil, published an indictment against then-Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin; the government notified Sawan that this was a violation of Brazilian law and requested him to cease dissemination of the pamphlet. In 1980, despite government objections, he organized a tour of Lebanon for a delegation of Brazilian parliamentarians.

IN ASIA AND OCEANIA

Japan: A former PLO representative in Japan, Anwar Abd ar-Rahman, while working in the local Arab League office (situated in the Algerian embassy), made contacts with members of Japanese underground organizations which aided the PLO and other Arab groups in their terrorist activities abroad, and even tried to recruit Japanese volunteers into the terrorist organization. He was expelled from Japan about 15 years ago.

Pakistan: A former PLO representative in Karachi, Abd ar-Rahman Abu Mazen, was expelled from Pakistan in February 1984 for his ties with opposition elements in the country. Also expelled, in the wake of this incident, was the head of the PLO representation in Islamabad, Khir ad-Din Abd ar-Rahman.

IN AFRICA

Ethiopia: In 1985 the Ethiopian government expelled the PLO representative for a time because he had manifested support for the Eritrean rebels by taking part in their convention at Khartoum in January of that year.

Uganda: Until the 1979 revolution, when PLO representation in Uganda came to an end, the PLO representative in Kampala, Khaled al-Sheikh, had been involved in the following activities: gathering intelligence on the Kenyan embassy in Lusaka and on the port of Mombasa; maintaining ties with African underground groups such as those in Mozambique and Rhodesia; participating in planning reprisal actions in Kenya for the role that country had played in the Entebbe rescue operation in 1976; assisting in an attempt to obtain some 700 Kenyan passports from a Kenyan civil service employee; participating, with Idi Amin, in negotiations with the terrorists at Entebbe.

Appendix

COUNTRIES WHOSE GOVERNMENTS HAVE WITHHELD
PERMISSION TO OPEN A PLO OFFICE

Argentina: In October 1985, the PLO representative in Brazil, Farid Sawan, asked Argentine President Alfonsín to study the possibility of allowing the PLO to open an office in Buenos Aires. The request has not been fulfilled, apparently for security reasons.

Australia: A "Palestinian information office" was opened in Melbourne in December 1982, directed by Ali Kazak, an Australian citizen. It has not been recognized by the Australian government as a PLO office but, rather, as defined above. In December 1982, Australian Foreign Minister Anthony Austin Street stressed that, under Australian law, Australian citizens cannot be barred from opening offices for any purpose, and that the Foreign Ministry had denied the PLO permission to open its own office. When, in October 1983, Ali Kazak met with Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, the Minister asserted that he had met with Kazak as "an Australian citizen, director of a Palestinian information office, but not as a representative of the PLO."

Indonesia: Though it agreed "in principle," in 1976, to allow the PLO to open an office, the Indonesian government has not permitted such an office to be opened, fearing that it would be exploited by extremist Moslems for anti-government operations.

Lebanon: The PLO office in Beirut was shut down in September 1982, in the wake of Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee, the expulsion of PLO forces and the closing down of PLO facilities and installations in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Chairman Arafat's efforts to get Prime Minister Rashid Karame to permit the reopening of the PLO's Beirut office have been unsuccessful.

New Zealand: New Zealand's stand on the question is similar to Australia's. The Foreign Ministry's position is that, while there are no grounds to prevent the opening of privately-based information offices, the material to be disseminated by such an office, if opened in Wellington, would be monitored by the government. The office itself would not have diplomatic status.

Norway: The PLO was to have opened an office in Oslo in early 1985, but the Norwegian Ministry of Justice, in an official decision gazetted in January 1985, rejected the PLO's request on the grounds that disputes among various factions of the organization had aroused fears of security problems.

Oman: PLO efforts to open an office in Oman have been unsuccessful. Oman fears the possibility of subversive activity in its territory, in view of Palestinian bodies' support of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Dhofar.

Philippines: The Philippine government has repeatedly rejected PLO requests, since 1977, for permission to open an office in Manila. The most recent such rejection was confirmed by the foreign minister in March 1985. Apparent motivation for the rejection: political and security considera-

Singapore: PLO efforts to open an office in Singapore have been unsuccessful. The reasons appear to be rooted in political and security considerations.

Thailand: PLO efforts, since 1982, to open an office in Bangkok have been unsuccessful. Thailand's negative position is based primarily on security considerations.

Uruguay: PLO and Arab League efforts, in Uruguay, to persuade the Foreign Ministry to allow the PLO to open an office in Montevideo have been unsuccessful. The government apparently fears that such an office would serve as a base for terrorist operations.

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Sources Say Italy To Refuse New PLO Representative
LD240942 Kuwait KUNA in English 0848 GMT 24 Apr 86

[Text] Rome, April 24 (KUNA) — KUNA has learned here that the Italian Government has decided not to accept the appointment of new PLO representative here. The well-informed sources said the decision was taken earlier following the transfer from here of Fouad Bittar who was assigned to Athens.

In spite of the PLO role in settling the hijacked *Achille Lauro* cruiser last October, Italian officials have been at odds with PLO representatives and have decided to reconsider the status of the PLO office in Rome. The Italian government, the sources added, may entrust an Arab Embassy to look after the interests of the Palestinians in Italy following closure of the PLO office. Egypt, noted the sources, is the favored embassy to take over the interests of Palestinians.

Italian officials have been at odds with PLO representatives and have decided to reconsider the status of the PLO office in Rome.

U.S. PLO Envoy on Move To Close Information Office
LD020902 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0719 GMT 2 May 86

["Margo Nahhul Dispatch" — KUNA byline]

[Text] Washington, 2 May (KUNA) — Hasan 'Abd al-Rahman, PLO representative in the United States, last night [as received] issued a strong warning about moves in the United States to close the PLO's Information Office and to bring to trial any person connected with it, even if only a sympathizer.

'Abd al-Rahman told a press conference here that Congress, the U.S. Administration and Jewish organizations have launched an intensive campaign "to strip the PLO of its legitimate character and to deprive its institutions and staff of such legitimacy, and consequently to deal with it as a terroristic organization in the United States." He called for a discussion of this campaign and an explanation of its dimensions at the forthcoming Arab summit conference. He said he acquainted the Council of Arab Ambassadors in Washington with the dimensions of this question during its meeting last Tuesday [29 April].

'Abd al-Rahman told KUNA that the campaign has been in existence a long time but "this is the first time it has acquired such concentration and intensity." He pointed out that while in the past statements were made attacking the PLO in the United States, there are now attempts to bestow a character of legitimacy and legality on such attacks.

"Abd al-Rahman said that during a Senate Judicial Committee meeting on 23 April, numerous discussions took place on the issue of "the combat of terrorism." Some participants in the debate called for the promulgation of laws under which the PLO could be described as a "terrorist organization," and consequently create pretexts to close down the Palestinian Information Office in Washington and terminate the PLO's mission to the United Nations in New York.

He warned against the attempts taking place in this regard which involve the possibility of asking him to appear before the courts in his capacity as a representative of a "terrorist" organization. The same would apply to the rest of the staff of the Palestine Information office.

Fatah's Khalaf on Aftermath of Al-Masri Killing
PM130937 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
12-18 Mar 86 p 17

[Interview with Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, member of the Fatah Central Committee and in charge of Palestinian revolution security, by *AL-MAJALLAH* correspondent in Tunis; date not given]

Answer: We consider action in the occupied territories as the principal action. In 1974, our PNC adopted a resolution halting external operations in response to the Arab countries' wishes and in return for their recognition of the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Some of us believed that there was some hope looming on the horizon, although others believed that liberation could be achieved only with the gun. Now, if we look back in the light of the experiences we have been through, we find that the result has been more setbacks and conspiracies against our revolution and people and attempts to renege on the obligations to the Palestinian people and the PLO.

The result was also that certain parties began challenging the PLO, thinking it had become a lifeless body. For this reason I believe the resolution in question should be revised, as should the Cairo declaration, particularly since the other side has violated it and is continuing its operations against us. I say that all our previous military and diplomatic policies should be revised, particularly since certain people have come to believe we have become a burden on them. I declare here that we have recommenced clandestine operations, that we are in the process of expanding these operations, and that we shall expand them and shall prove this shortly.

become a burden on them. I declare here that we have recommenced clandestine operations, that we are in the process of expanding these operations, and that we shall expand them and shall prove this shortly.

Questions about the Palestine Information Office (PIO)

1. Last week, the New York Times reported that PLO offices in Europe are supporting terrorist operations by "...recruiting, renting safehouses, providing identity documents, choosing potential targets and collecting operational intelligence." It also asserted that PLO offices have specialists in terrorism who are ready to do violence.
(New York Times 4/13/86)

The United States permits the PLO to maintain an office just a few blocks from here on 818 18th St. N.W. Can you assure this committee that the PLO office in our nation's capitol is not involved in supporting terrorism and will not be used to foment terrorist violence in the U.S.?

2. In 1978, when the Carter Administration allowed the PLO to open an office, there was little opposition. We are now waging a war against terrorism.

In light of continuing PLO atrocities against Americans, has the decision to keep the PLO office open ever been reviewed? How can you justify a PLO office operating in the United States?

Would you have allowed Hitler to open a Nazi party office here in 1943?

Can you tell this committee about any other terrorist organization that has official representation in this country? Why do we permit the PLO office to operate?

4. Recently, the Syrian foreign minister defended his decision to let the Abu-Nidal office operate in Syria by saying "Abu-Nidal has an office in Damascus-a political and information office that has no connection with terrorism. We do not even allow the presence of a knife in this office." The Administration has given a similar explanation of its policy toward the PLO office in Washington: "As long as the office...complies with all...relevant laws...it is entitled to operate under the protection the First Amendment provides."

How can we expect Syria to close the Abu-Nidal office when we won't close Arafat's office right here in Washington?

5. The PIO is registered as a foreign agent with the Justice Department but has not registered as required under the provisions of the Voorhis Act. (Title 18, Section 2386 of the Criminal Code) Isn't this failure to register a violation of U.S. law? If not, why not? If yes, are you planning to prosecute?

(Registration under this act would require the PLO to disclose their funding sources and military activities)

6. Last August, The New York Times reported that the PLO had a world-wide investment portfolio of over 6 billion dollars and that some of that money is invested in the United States in several corporations and in real estate. (New York Times 8/18/85)

Can you tell us how much PLO money is invested in America and where it is invested? Don't you think the financial infiltration of the PLO in our country should be investigated? Can you provide this committee with a profile of PLO financial assets and investments in the United States?

7. I have documentation here showing that PLO members (identified by police officials) have been arrested for various crimes around the U.S. including gun and cash shipments, narcotics, food stamp fraud, arson and insurance fraud, attempted smuggling and wire fraud and conspiracy.

Isn't it time to launch a formal full scale investigation into PLO criminal activities in the U.S.?

6. According to the PLO registration, PLO officials spend a lot of time giving lectures and speeches around the United States. Should we really allow the world's most bloodthirsty terrorist group to depict itself to our high school and college students as just another idealistic movement?

Reagan Administration Policy on the PLO Office

Q: Will the Department be doing anything about closing the PLO office?

A: By way of background, the PLO Information Office, which was opened in 1978, listed the Palestine Liberation Organization as its "foreign principal" and has been registered with the Justice Department, in accord with the Foreign Agents Registration Act as amended. As long as the office regularly files reports on its activities as an agent of a foreign organization with the Justice Department, complies with all other relevant laws, and is staffed by Americans or legally resident aliens, it is entitled to operate under the protection the First Amendment provides. (posted at the State Department, February 17, 1981)

"-- The PLO Information Office is registered under the Foreign Registration Act of 1938, as amended, with the Department of Justice and is subject to the provisions of that legislation.

"--So long as that office regularly files reports with the Department of Justice on its activities as an agent of a foreign organization, complies with all other relevant U.S. laws, and is staffed by Americans or legally resident aliens, it is entitled to operate under the protection the first amendment of the Constitution provides.

"--The operation of the PLO Information Office neither reflects nor requires the approval of the United States government." (posted at the State Department, March 30, 1986)

Carter Administration Policy on the PLO Office

On November 22, 1976 Robert L. Funseth, speaking for the Department of State, announced that there was no legal impediment to bar the PLO from opening a Washington office.

According to State the PLO could disseminate information provided it registered with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (22 U.S.C. 611-618) and conforms to U.S. laws. (citation: Department of State News Briefing, DPC 218, Nov. 22, 1976)

**The Palestine Information Office is in Violation of the Voorhis Act
(Title 18, Section 2386 of the Criminal Code)**

The PLO has an office in Washington, D.C., known as the Palestine Information Office (PIO), which opened in 1978. The office is registered with the Department of Justice under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. However, it has failed to register, as required, under Section 2386 of the U.S. Criminal Code, known as the Voorhis Act.

Section 2386 requires organizations to register separately with the Attorney General if they are subject to "foreign control" and engage in "civilian military activity." An organization is considered to be under "foreign control" if it "solicits or accepts financial contributions... from... an international political organization." The PIO, in its own registration statements under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, admits it is financially supported by the PLO, at a rate of approximately \$250,000 per year. An organization is engaged in "civilian military activity" if it "gives instruction to, or prescribes instruction for, its members in the use of firearms or other weapons..., engages in any military or naval maneuvers or activities..., or engages in any other form of organized activity which in the opinion of the Attorney General constitutes preparation for military action." The Voorhis Act also requires registration of organizations if one of their purposes is the "seizure or overthrow of a government or subdivision thereof by the use of force, violence, military measures, or threats of any one or more of the foregoing." The Palestinian National Covenant (1968), the official PLO charter which has been reaffirmed every year since 1968, states that "the establishment of Israel is null and void, whatever time has elapsed..." and that, "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine...." (Articles 9 and 19).

Registration under the Voorhis Act would require, among other things, "a detailed statement of the assets of the organization, and of each branch, chapter and affiliate of the organization, the manner in which such assets were acquired...; a detailed description of the activities of the organization, and of each chapter, branch, and affiliate of the organization...; and a description of all firearms or other weapons owned by the organization, or by any chapter, branch, or affiliate of the organization, identified by the manufacturer's number thereon." Organizations that fail to register are subject to criminal penalty: "Whoever violates any of the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

The legislative intent of the Voorhis Act, is indicated by the Report of the House of Representatives (No. 2582 June 17, 1940): "Democratic government is threatened by the presence of private organizations engaging in military activities or preparing their members for an attempt at a forcible seizure of power and overthrow of constitutional government... At the present time there is no ground established in law whereby a law-enforcing agency of the United States government can effectively curb the activities of these types of organizations."

The PIO has been permitted to operate in Washington, D.C. on the condition that it obeys all U.S. laws. On November 22, 1976 a State Department spokesman said that the U.S. would not bar the PLO from opening an office in Washington, D.C. *provided* that it was registered with the Justice Department and conformed to all U.S. laws. This condition was reaffirmed by the Reagan Administration in February, 1981 when a spokesman said that the PIO could continue to operate as long as it "regularly files reports on its activities as an agent of a foreign organization with the Justice Department [and] complies with all other relevant laws." But in fact the PIO has not complied with the requirements of Title 18, Section 2386.

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE VOORHIS ACT

WHAT IS DOJ'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "EVERY ORGANIZATION SUBJECT TO FOREIGN CONTROL WHICH ENGAGES IN CIVIL MILITARY ACTIVITY." The proper interpretation is an organization under foreign control which performs the military acts defined by the Act even if there is no intent to overthrow the U.S. Government. Thus, the critical point is the combining of foreign influence with military training. If this clause was intended to apply only to the overthrow of the U.S. Government it would have included the phrase "political activity" since that term is defined to be limited to the U.S. or a state. An organization covered by this section would be, for example, a group funded by an Irish Political Party where the members engage in domestic military activity of the type described by the Act (e.g. instructs its members in terrorist activity). The PLO would probably only fall within this definition if it performs "civilian military activity" in the United States although an argument could be made that the place of the military activity is irrelevant.

WHAT IS DOJ'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "EVERY ORGANIZATION, THE PURPOSE OR AIM OF WHICH, OR ONE OF THE PURPOSES OR AIMS OF WHICH, IS THE ESTABLISHMENT, CONTROL, CONDUCT, SEIZURE, OR OVERTHROW OF A GOVERNMENT OR SUBDIVISION

THEREOF BY FORCE . . . ?" The key aspect of this clause is that it does not use the words defined in Section (A) of the Act: "political activity", "foreign control" or "civilian military activity." Rather, it simply covers all organizations seeking the overthrow of a "government" (small "g") by force regardless of "foreign control" or "civilian military activity." Richard's argument that the statute was defined to cover only "internal subversion" is wrong. Congress would have used the term "political activity" (which is limited to the overthrow of a domestic government) in this clause if that was all it was intending. Moreover, instead of stating "a government" it could have used the terminology used in the "political activity" definition ("the Government of the United States . . . "). It is clear that this provision applies to any organization advocating the overthrow of any government by force. There is no requirement that "military activity" occur within the United States. Therefore, the PLO would without a doubt be covered and therefore the PLO should also be subject to the Act.

INCIDENTS OF REPORTED PLO CRIME

There is strong evidence linking the PLO to racketeering activity in the United States over the last fifteen years. Investigators believe that the PLO has organized crime rings involving narcotics, fraud, arson and smuggling.

GUN AND CASH SHIPMENTS

*** In a raid on a Memphis, Tennessee warehouse, Federal agents uncovered a shotgun, machine gun and \$9,500 in cash which they believe were intended to be shipped to Jordan. An undercover agent reported that the owners of the warehouse had informed him that they were members of the PLO. One suspect reportedly said the weapons were "to kill Jews."

(The Commercial Appeal (Memphis), 1/18/86)

NARCOTICS

*** In March, 1984, sixteen people were charged in connection with smuggling 16,000 pounds of hashish, valued at \$670 million from Lebanon into North Carolina. U.S. Attorney Sam Currin stated that the 1981 incident had been perpetrated with the aid of the PLO.

(UPI, 3/14/84)

*** A New York Times story of February 8, 1984 reported that individuals in Detroit had smuggled at least 1000 pounds of heroin from Lebanon's Bekka Valley. A Federal agent also disclosed that Detroit is a center for illegal shipments of arms to the Middle East.

** In his article "Drugs for Guns," Nathan Adams quoted Western intelligence and law enforcement estimates that the PLO purchases 40% of its light weapons with narcotics from its laboratories in the Bekka.

(Readers Digest, 11/83)

*** In December, 1979, the son of the bursar of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was arrested in Pennsylvania preparing to sell large quantities of cocaine. U.S. Federal agents reportedly discovered that the profits were going to Beirut to purchase ammunition.

(Jerusalem Post, 5/29/80)

FOOD STAMP FRAUD

*** A food stamp trafficking ring was uncovered in New York, Denver, Chicago and San Francisco in early 1980. Forty seven Palestinians were arrested in connection with \$400,000 of fraudulent food stamp purchases. One federal law enforcement agency alleged that profits were being donated to the PLO.

(Wall Street Journal, 2/7/80)

Despite Agriculture Department testimony that the accused were not acting under any single control, three congressmen, Reps. William Wampler (R-Va), Dawson Mathis (D-Ga) and Steven Symms (R-Id) pointed to PLO involvement. Mathis stated: "This is a pretty scary thing when you think about U.S. tax dollars...financing an organization like the PLO. It appears there is some kind of collusion between these people to use U.S. tax dollars to finance the PLO."

(AP, 2/7/80)

ARSON AND INSURANCE FRAUD

Officials have determined that a rash of New York City grocery store fires in the late 1970's was the result of arson. Insurance profits were allegedly funneled to the PLO.

(New York Post, 7/30/79 and 12/15/79)

(Passaic (NJ) Morning News, 12/14/79)

A Jordanian arrested for arson stated: "the PLO expects sizeable contributions from the arson insurance profits."

(Passaic Morning News, 12/14/79)

An informant told police: "we bring our insurance money to the PLO office in New York."

(ibid)

ATTEMPTED SMUGGLING AND WIRE FRAUD

New York engineer Paul Ajlouny was arrested in September, 1978 in what prosecutors called "a scheme to set up an independent telecommunications network for the PLO." Ajlouny described himself as "counsel and advisor to the PLO mission in New York." He is currently the editor of the pro-PLO newspaper, Al Fair. Ajlouny had made several illegal phone calls to PLO headquarters in Beirut and was convicted of trying to smuggle communications equipment out of the country.

(New York Times, 9/27/79 & 11/24/79)

AUTO INSURANCE FRAUD

According to the New York Times and the Washington Post, the PLO is believed to have earned millions of dollars from an auto insurance scheme in the 1970's. Carried out mostly in California, the racket was called "the biggest insurance fraud the California Highway Patrol has ever dealt with." After interviewing some of the suspects, one investigator stated: "There's no question about it that it is political; these people are just front people for the PLO."

(New York Times, 2/19&20/77)

(Washington Post, 2/21/77)

*** California Highway Patrol investigators believe there was a link between this alleged PLO-inspired insurance fraud scheme and the attempted extortion of \$250,000 from a Lake Tahoe hotel in 1977. Two men were arrested and convicted of extortion.

(New West Magazine, 2/26/79)

CONSPIRACY

*** In 1972, FBI agents raiding the Arab Information office in Dallas discovered the plans of a Fatah assassination squad to murder American Jews.

(New West Magazine, 2/26/79)

*** In 1973, several members of Fatah were arrested in New York and accused of "planning to bomb businesses owned by supporters of Israel."

(AP, 11/30/78)

PLO Financial Holdings in the United States

In addition to criminal activity, the PLO has enlarged its income through its financial holdings in the United States.

*** The Arab Bank Ltd., widely known as the "PLO bank," has a branch office in New York and owns 7% of UBAF Arab American Bank in New York. In 1978, Arab Bank Ltd. was reported as holding a 60 to 100 million dollar portfolio of PLO finances.

(Wall Street Journal, 9/7/78)

*** Abdul-Majeed Shoman, chairman of the Arab Bank Ltd., was formerly the PLO finance chairman.

(Reuters, 2/14/85)

*** Chemical Bank of New York confirmed that it holds an account for the PLO.

(New York Times, 1/10/85)

*** More than 70 million dollars in PLO money was invested in U.S. property through six Caribbean firms, according to a testimony before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs. A Miami real estate consultant stated that five Arabs had formed a real estate syndicate that had conducted arms sales to the PLO and had invested the profits in Florida and Texas real estate.

(New York Times News Service, 4/13/83)

*** The PLO's portfolio reportedly includes holdings in several U.S. corporations and real estate concerns.

(New York Times Magazine, 8/18/85)



Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

March 9, 1987

TO :

FROM : American Law Division

SUBJECT: Whether Congress May Close Local Foreign Information Office and
Compel Departure of Foreign Observer Group at the United Nations

Reference is made to your inquiry of February 2, 1987, requesting information on the above matter. Specifically, you ask whether Congress may by law effectively shut down the local Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Information Office and cause the departure of the PLO observers at the United Nations.

Although the described actions raise sensitive legal and policy problems, there seems to be no insurmountable constitutional hurdle in connection with the proposal's first prong so long as it is not intended to "enforce a policy of making decisions to exclude based on the content of applicant's political beliefs, but ... to exclude applicants who are members of or connected with particular foreign governments." Bork, J., dissenting, Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1062, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1986). As to the proposal's second prong, notwithstanding certain guarantees in the United Nations Headquarters Agreement, 22 U.S.C.A. § 287 note, regarding UN invitees (§ 11) and visitors (§ 14), and, entry, generally, for UN purposes (§ 13), section 6 of Annex 1 makes it clear that neither impairs the right of the United States to safeguard its own security and control the entrance of aliens into its territory.

The following observations are by way of preliminary and are subsumed by any remarks hereafter made relative to the principal matter under considerations. As the proposal previously referred to is simply a proposal at this time, there is no regulatory or administrative scheme which would permit an assessment of its constitutionality as applied. Accordingly, our comments are confined to the power of Congress to enact legislation having the previously described purposes.

Also, the materials which you furnished us indicate that the local PLO office was established pursuant to an agreement which the Department of Justice is alleged to have rationalized as "promoting understanding." Aside from a promise to act in accord with the laws of the United States, neither that nor the other sources that you supplied us is very informative concerning the terms of the agreement. Assuming that the agreement was entered into on the basis of some statutory grant of authority, the enactment into law of the above described proposal, all things being equal, would effectively cut out the basis of that agreement. "Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked." INS v. Chadha, 462 S. Ct. 919, 955 (1983).

The information supplied by you describes the PLO entities in question as engaging in something more than providing information and observing UN activities. It is asserted that the local information or liaison office is funded by annual appropriations from PLO headquarters. The head of the office, a nonimmigrant alien and an employee of the Arab League, is said to be engaged in far reaching political lobbying of the Arab American community and among key Communist bloc diplomats in Washington in order to influence American policy. He is described as functioning as a diplomat and concern has been expressed about direct or indirect

involvement in terrorist acts. Various violations of law are alleged including, among other things, noncompliance with Foreign Agents Registration Act reporting requirements. 22 U.S.C.A. § 611 et seq.

If the foregoing assertions, allegations, and charges can be substantiated, various ways are available under existing law to affectively close down the local office. In addition to criminal penalties and injunctive relief, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C.A.

§ 618(a), (b) and (c), authorizes deportation of any alien who is convicted of violating, or conspiring to violate any provision of FARA or its implementing regulations.

The Federal Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 951, requires that persons, other than diplomatic or consular officers or attaches, who act as agents of a foreign government notify the Secretary of State before acting in the United States on behalf of that foreign government. The Voorhis Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 386, requires that organizations subject to foreign control which engage in political or civilian military activity register with the Attorney General. Federal law, 50 U.S.C.A. § 851, requires, the registration of persons who have knowledge of or have received instruction in, espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage tactics of a foreign government. Violation of any of these activities may already subject a nonimmigrant alien to deportation generally 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1182, 1251, and especially such persons who are allowed into the United States on condition that they will observe the laws of the United States. E.g., Narenji v. Civiletti. 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979).

In the case of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), the Court turned aside a First Amendment challenge to the Attorney General's refusal to waive the ineligibility of a Communist editor who had been invited to participate in academic conferences and discussions. Under United States

law excludable aliens include, among others, Communists. Citizens who asserted a First Amendment right to have him enter and to hear him, sought to enjoin the enforcement of the law. Because the plenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has long been recognized and its conditional exercise has been delegated to the Executive, the Court held

... that when the Executive exercises this power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who seek personal communication with the applicant. 408 U.S. at 770.

See, also, Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, cert. granted 55 U.S.L.W. 424 (12/15/86).

Observations made by Judge Bork who dissented in the last mentioned case are not without relevance to the matters under considerations. He said:

... The government does not here enforce a policy of making decisions to exclude based on the content of the applicant's political belief, but has instead chosen to exclude applicants who are members of or connected with particular foreign governments. By wrongly equating the two policies, plaintiffs mischaracterize the United States' action as "content-based censorship." ... Even if that were correct, as I have already shown, plaintiffs would not automatically prevail in the legal context of visa denials. It is idle to pretend that the United States is attempting to prevent certain ideas from reaching the American people. Those ideas are part of our domestic and international political discourse and their expression in this country is fully protected by the First Amendment. Kleindienst demonstrates that the additional right to have particular aliens come here to express those ideas is limited by our government's plenary power over the admission of aliens. But, in any case, plaintiffs' description of what is taking place here is wrong. The existence of ideological differences between the United States and a foreign government does not mean that a denial of visas to persons affiliated with that government is an exclusion resting solely on the content of the applicants' political beliefs. Classifications of the sort involved here have been upheld in the past against first amendment challenges. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1965) upheld restrictions on travel by American

citizens to Cuba. Preventing Americans from traveling to a foreign country is certainly not less serious constitutionally than preventing that country's citizen from coming here. The government's actions at issue in these cases obviously withstand the limited judicial scrutiny defined by the Kleindienst standard. 785 F.2d 1043.

Similarly, the fact that the local PLO office is partly in the business of communicating information does not for that reason alone insulate the head of the office from immigration requirements, whether as an unadmitted and nonresident alien (see, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182) or as an admitted alien who has engaged or who engages in activities that would have made him excludable or subject to deportation (see e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251). The charges described above arguably would make the head of the local PLO office a potential deportee.

To repeat, the reason for this result is that the power to exclude aliens is "a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune from judicial control." Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). Accordingly, when the power is exercised for a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, "the courts will neither look behind the exercise ..., nor test it by balancing its justifications against ... First Amendment interests. ..." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770.

One important difference between exclusion and deportation, however, is that in the latter circumstance both an admitted immigrant and nonimmigrant alien have certain due process rights, namely notice and an opportunity for hearing, which must be respected before he or she may be expelled. See, e.g., Sang v. Esperdy, 210 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In contrast, " ... an unadmitted and nonresident alien, ha[s] no constitutional right of entry to this country as a nonimmigrant or otherwise." Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. at 762.

As noted at the outset, the United States in the UN Headquarters Agreement has made certain commitments to that body as host, including respect for officers, members, invitees and observers. At the same time, it has made clear that these undertakings will be honored to the extent that they are consistent with national security and do not interfere with the federal power to control the entrance of aliens into United States territory. Accordingly, assuming that the PLO UN observers are engaging in the previously described activities, their expulsion seems feasible. See annexed excerpt from Whiteman, 7 Digest of International Law 90 (1972). Although it raises substantial international legal and policy complications, Congress may affect the domestic consequences of a treaty. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

Ordinarily the purposes sought to be accomplished by the proposal are executed by the President either by a grant of statutorily delegated authority, as in the case of excludable aliens, or in the discharge of his constitutional authority to receive ambassadors and as sole organ of foreign relations. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). However, if the President approves the proposal's enactment into law, arguably his action signals conformity with the result. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

Once again, we emphasize that our conclusion assumes the accuracy of the assertions, allegations, and charges described above. As indicated, if true they may establish grounds for expelling persons in question under existing law.

The materials that accompanied your request are annexed hereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

Raymond J. Celada
Raymond J. Celada
Senior Specialist In
American Public Law

3, TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1987

Egypt, Angered, Shuts P.L.O. Offices

By PAUL DELANEY
Special to The New York Times

ALGIERS, April 27 — Egypt closed offices of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Cairo and Alexandria today in an angry reaction to harsh criticism from the P.L.O.'s legislative body, which concluded its session here Sunday.

The move surprised P.L.O. leaders here, who had held the session of the Palestine National Council to reconcile rival factions among the Palestinian guerrilla factions. The Palestinian leaders immediately accused the Reagan Administration and Israel of having put pressure on Egypt to take the action. But the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Esmat Abdel-Meguid, after meeting with President Hosni Mubarak, announced that Cairo was acting "to put an end to this insolence" by its P.L.O. critics.

In a statement issued today in Cairo, the Foreign Minister said that "all P.L.O. offices except those that deal with labor and women's affairs" would be shut down "because of the aggressive attitude of the Palestine National Council."

A Symbolic Break
The P.L.O. offices that include a diplomatic mission and smaller bureaus of Palestinians living in Egypt.

argued the case for a Palestinian homeland and has supported the P.L.O.'s claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Mr. Abdel-Meguid said today that despite the decision to shut down the P.L.O. presence, Egypt would not stop supporting the Palestinian cause in the peace process.

The P.L.O. and most Arab countries severed ties with Egypt after it signed the treaty with Israel in 1979. But Egyptian links with the organization were restored after Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, visited President Mubarak in 1983.

Egypt becomes the second country sympathetic to the Palestinians to shut down the P.L.O. offices. Last July, Jordan closed its P.L.O. offices.

senior P.L.O. official who is also a cause of P.L.O. seism.

"The P.L.O. refused to recognize Egypt's great sacrifices for the Palestinian people," the Egyptian statement said today. "The P.L.O. leaders are men out to profit from intrigue and maneuvers. But our decision today won't end Egypt's support for the struggle of the Palestinians."

President Mubarak had sent an envoy to the meeting to warn that Egypt would react if the resolution were adopted. Mr. Mubarak later called home the Egyptian delegation and surprise over Egypt's decision. "There's no doubt in my mind that pressure was put by the United States and Israel to do it, but it's an overreaction by him," said Salwa Abu Khadra, a P.L.O. delegate. "I didn't expect it."

At a news conference before word of the Egyptian reaction reached here, the Egyptian Marxist guerrilla group, a hard-line attacked the P.L.O. not only but also blamed Jordan and Israel. He had helped lead a strong resolution against

JORDANIANS CLOSE ARAFAT'S OFFICES

Move Reflects Hussein's Fight Against P.L.O. Chairman

By JOHN KIFNER
Special to The New York Times

CAIRO, July 7 — In a growing struggle with Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. leader, the Jordanian group in the divided Palestine Liberation Organization today announced that it was closing all 25 offices of the P.L.O. in Jordan.

King Hussein of Jordan, who broke with Mr. Arafat in February over the P.L.O.'s refusal to agree on peace talks, has since then been closing P.L.O. offices in Jordan. Mr. Arafat's headquarters are in Jordan.

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As a result of the closings, relations between King Hussein and Mr. Arafat appeared to plunge toward their lowest point since 1970, when Jordan expelled Palestinian guerrillas. There was a reconciliation in 1984, when King Hussein invited Mr. Arafat to hold a Palestinian National Congress in Amman.

In recent weeks, according to Palestinian sources, Jordan has been trying to induce Mr. Arafat to leave the West Bank to Jordan. Mr. Arafat has refused to do so.

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Morocco Orders Closure of 'All' PLO Offices
JN221040 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1027 GMT 22 Apr 87

[Text] Algiers, 22 Apr (WAKH) — It has been learned from informed Palestinian sources at the PNC session currently being held in Algiers that the Moroccan king's representative, Ahmed ben Souada, has withdrawn from the PNC meetings due to the presence of Saharan President Mohamed Abdelaziz.

These sources told a WAKH correspondent at the PNC that Morocco has ordered the closure of all PLO offices in Morocco. It is to be noted that King Hassan II delivered a speech last night criticizing the participation of Polisario Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz in the PNC session. King Hassan II said that he has issued instructions preventing any Moroccan from taking part in any Palestinian meeting or conference from now on.

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

DECEMBER 30, 1985

A warrant for the PLO chief?

ARRESTING ARAFAT

JUST WHEN the Reagan administration thought it had hit upon a relatively painless approach to the problem of international terrorism, it finds itself juggling a hot potato. The new approach consists of treating terrorism as simple criminality and pursuing terrorists with the instruments of law enforcement. The hot potato is the proposal now bouncing around somewhere between the State and Justice departments to seek the arrest of Yasir Arafat.

There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Arafat was complicit in the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*: he supplies funds to Abul Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front, and he conferred with PLF leaders several times during the weeks that the hijacking was being prepared. But this is not the crime for which the U.S. government is considering trying to arrest him. Instead, the State Department is reexamining the case of the murder of two American diplomats in Khartoum in 1973.

The reexamination has been spurred both by the new interest in using legal instruments against terrorism and by revelations that U.S. intelligence possesses a taped intercept of Arafat personally ordering the Khartoum murders. U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Vernon Walters recently confirmed in an interview with journalist Edwin Black that when he was deputy director of the CIA in 1973 he had been told of the existence of such a tape. Although he had not heard the tape himself (Arabic being one of those languages that the multilingual Walters does not speak), he said that the existence of the tape "was common knowledge at the time among all sorts of people in the government."

A warrant for Arafat is not likely to lead to his arrest. It would serve, though, to keep him out of the United States, and thus away from the U.N. In theory, it could also keep him out of countries that have extradition treaties with the United States, although judging from Italy's refusal to hold Abbas—a much smaller fish—it is hard to imagine that many of our allies would arrest Arafat on our behalf.

The more important consequences would be symbolic. A warrant would signal the end of the notion that Arafat can be transformed into a genuine peacemaker. And because it would dismay some U.S. allies, it would show that the administration is willing to incur diplomatic costs in the interests of a serious counterterrorist policy.

THE KILLINGS in Khartoum occurred after eight terrorists seized hostages at a reception at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The eight, who identified themselves as members of "Black September," demanded the release from prison of Sirhan Sirhan, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and a group of Fatah members being held in Jordan. When their demands were not met, the terrorists selected the three Westerners among the hostages—U.S. Ambassador Cleo Noel, Charge d'Affaires George C. Moore, and Belgian diplomat Guy Eid—and methodically machine-gunned them after first allowing them to write farewell notes to their families and then beating them.

A day later, the terrorists surrendered to Sudanese authorities after a lengthy round of transoceanic communications involving, among others, Arafat and the vice president of Sudan. Sudanese President Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri, who took the operation as a galling affront to Sudanese dignity, went public at once with evidence showing that it had been run out of the Khartoum office of Fatah. The top Fatah official in Khartoum had fled for Libya the morning after the seizure, leaving behind in his desk drawer a written copy of the plans for the operation. His number two led the assault on the embassy.

It also soon emerged in numerous news reports that the command center for the operation was in Beirut, whence were transmitted both the order to kill the three diplomats and the subsequent order to surrender. Indeed, according to the Sudanese government, when the "executions" were not carried out promptly on deadline, a prodding message was transmitted: "What are you waiting for?"

A month later the *Washington Post* reported that Arafat "was in the Black September radio command center in Beirut when the message to execute three Western diplomats . . . was sent out last month, according to western intelligence sources." The *Post* reported that "Arafat's voice was reportedly monitored and recorded." The *Post* said that according to its sources it was unclear whether Arafat himself, or his deputy, Abu Iyad, "gave the order to carry out the executions. . . . But they have reports that Arafat was present in the operations center when the message was sent and that he personally congratulated the guerrillas after the execution. . . ."

The story, which was denied by a spokesman for Arafat, made less impact then than it might today because Arafat had yet to achieve the kind of respectability that he enjoyed after 1974, when the Arab League declared the PLO "the sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people and when Arafat made his triumphant appearance at the U.N. General Assembly.

And, in the avalanche of news on the Watergate scandals, the Arafat/Khartoum story was largely forgotten un-

til this year when the Reagan administration announced its new antiterrorism strategy, a strategy that at first seemed little more than a face-saving gesture. The administration hardly seemed serious when it announced after this summer's TWA hijacking that it had identified the individual perpetrators and was taking a warrant for their arrest. After all, any extradition request to Lebanon would have to be addressed to that nation's justice minister, Nabih Berri, the very man who had negotiated on behalf of the hijackers. But a few months later, when U.S. jets intercepted the four *Achille Lauro* hijackers over the Mediterranean and the U.S. government sought to secure custody from Italy of Abul Abbas, the policy began to look more substantial.

That, and rumors about the existence of the Arafat tape, about which Ambassador Walters subsequently confirmed his secondhand knowledge, inspired Charles Lichenstein, who served as a deputy U.S. representative to the U.N. under Jeane Kirkpatrick, to press the administration for legal action. Lichenstein, now a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, says, "Yasir Arafat is a criminal under both international law and U.S. law, and I believe he should be both identified and dealt with as a criminal."

The Justice Department says only that it has the matter "under review." Lichenstein, who has been pressing the matter for weeks, says that though he "remain[s] hopeful" about governmental action, "I'm not holding my breath." The Justice Department will not only evaluate the strength of the legal case against Arafat, it will also solicit the views of the State Department, whose Near East Bureau is sure to oppose action against Arafat. The bureau, which has day-to-day management of the American-sponsored Middle East peace process, has been working on the assumption that Arafat and the PLO must eventually play a part in it.

Lichenstein urges that if the case against Arafat is legally sound, the administration should pursue it "on principle." But he also denies that a conflict exists between the demands of principle and those of diplomacy. He acknowledges that the governments of Jordan and Egypt demand a role for the PLO in the peace process, but he says that those governments need "to come to grips with the fact that Arafat is a terrorist," and that even if Arafat wished to, "he cannot deliver the PLO" on behalf of peace. The PLO, he says, "is not the key to peace, but the greatest obstacle to it."

In a recent interview with *Insight* magazine, Arafat, with customary exaggeration, said about the Israeli raid on his Tunis headquarters, "I can't forget that the American administration, the American president himself declared his blessing to kill me." The question Lichenstein is raising is whether the president should forget that Arafat himself declared his blessing, and more, on the killing of two American diplomats.

JOSHUA MURAVCHIK

Joshua Muravchik is a fellow in residence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

NEAR EAST REPORT

WASHINGTON WEEKLY ON AMERICAN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

VOL XXIX NO. 34 AUGUST 26, 1985

EDITORIALS

Jordan's Intentions—and the PLO's

The Prime Minister of Jordan, Zayd al-Rifai, could not have been more clear. Speaking on Amman television on Aug. 17, Rifai was asked if the "next step" in the peace process would be "direct negotiations with Israel. . . ." He responded vehemently. "We are talking about a U.S.-Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue. To us, this absolutely does not mean Israel. The correct thing is that this should absolutely not concern Israel. We are now concerned about the dialogue with the United States which we hope would lead to other steps leading, in turn, to an international conference attended by all the parties concerned."

Later he said that he was not particularly concerned about a Jordanian dialogue with the United States. "We as a government hold constant dialogues with the United States and can always hold dialogues. However, we are now speaking about a dialogue between the Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation and the U.S. delegation."

There it is in a nutshell. Jordan is not seeking negotiations with Israel. Its current moves "should absolutely not concern Israel." Its goal is a U.S. "dialogue with" (which means recognition of) the PLO. It is then no surprise that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy did not achieve any sort of agreement with Amman when he visited Jordan earlier this month. The American and Jordanian goals are diametrically opposed. Amman wants U.S. recognition of the PLO and an international conference which would include the Soviets. It does not want direct negotiations with Israel. The U.S. positions are the opposite.

There are some in Washington (and certainly in Amman) who believe that the logjam would be broken if only Yasir Arafat would accept United Nations Resolutions 242 and

338. Then, supposedly, the United States could talk to the PLO and ultimately the Israelis could too.

The problem with this scenario is that Arafat's verbal acceptance of 242 and 338 wouldn't change anything. Both U.S. law and Reagan Administration policy require that the PLO not only unambiguously accept 242 but also that it clearly recognize Israel and renounce terrorism. That cannot be achieved by an Arafat statement (which could be retracted and which would bind no one). It could only be achieved by the convening of a PLO National Congress which would amend its constitution, the 1968 PLO National Charter. That charter repeatedly endorses "armed struggle" as "the only way to liberate Palestine." It calls the existence of a Jewish state in any part of Palestine "entirely illegal, regardless of the passage of time. . . ."

In 1974, the National Congress met again and restated its 1968 goals. This time it shrewdly added that it would set up a state in any part of Palestine which "will be liberated" (meaning the West Bank and Gaza). However, it made clear that any such step would only be "a stage in the pursuit of its strategy . . ." for the "liberation of the whole of the soil of Palestine."

That is why National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane told Senator Rudy Boschwitz that the U.S. won't deal with the PLO until "that organization *formally* (emphasis ours) recognizes Israel's right to exist and disavows terrorism." The Administration should tell the same thing to King Hussein, who can tell it to Arafat. Neither Washington nor Jerusalem is looking for a change in nuance or rhetoric. It is substance which counts, and it is the substance of the PLO position (as well as Jordan's) which seems sealed in cement.

VIEWING THE NEWS

Rabin Watches Jordan

Israel's Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin is concerned about the PLO's growing presence in Jordan. According to *Davar* (Aug. 18), Rabin says that the Lebanon war failed to "eliminate the threat of terror in Lebanon, but caused the transfer of the terrorist command to Jordan where they are ten times as dangerous. . . ."

In a speech in the northern border town of Nahariya, Rabin made the same point (*Kol Yisrael*, Aug. 16). "All the terrorist mechanisms of all the key terror organizations escaped from Lebanon. None of the key terrorists were hurt or liquidated. The key systems were not damaged or eliminated. Today, most of these systems are

located in Amman rather than in Beirut or Damascus. . . ." He said that the current terror problem "is not on our northern border but within the territories we control. We should address ourselves to this problem with patience and without hysteria."

Rabin added that if the PLO presence in Jordan becomes threatening to Israel, "we will have to deal with it either directly or indirectly."

Squatters Evicted

The Israeli Army on Aug. 20 evicted a group of right-wing Knesset members from a Hebron apartment that they had been living in for five days. The apartment was in the center of the West Bank city, in the

heart of the so-called Casbah. The order to evict the M.K.'s came from Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin who said that "in 1979 the Likud government decided that no land or house would be purchased inside densely populated [Arab] towns . . . without the prior approval of the defense minister. No defense minister has given his consent to this purchase. . . ."

He said that he agreed with the 1979 decision and would enforce it. He said that there was a "problem involved in an attempt by a few people to purchase property in the heart of large Arab population centers." He added that "democracy in Israel will be undermined if everyone takes the law into his own hands."

(Continued)

ON CAMPUS

Working Within The System

One hundred and twenty pro-Israel student activists from 51 campuses met in July at the University of Maryland to exchange strategies and discuss Middle East issues with experts.

Their forum was the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's two-day National Political Leadership Training Seminar. The students represented a wide range of colleges and universities—some with small Jewish enrollments, others with histories of anti-Israel activity.

"The politics, atmospheres, and demographics of their schools vary, but the students are united in their support for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship," said Jonathan Kessler, head of AIPAC's Political Leadership Development Program.

Leading discussions on effective campus activism were Nathan Siegel, who organized his Duke University classmates into congressional caucuses; Mark Rosen, who led a response campaign to anti-Israel propaganda at Yale; Michelle Katz, who directed a lobbying campaign on the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement from her University of Alabama sorority; and Michael Rutland, a black pro-Israel activist from Indiana University, who described his experiences in organizing blacks and Jews to lobby for aid to Israel.

"There is nothing as exciting as hearing from another activist how an impact was made," said Gil Fried of Palo Alto, Calif. "To be an activist in the 80's is to be a pioneer, utilizing approaches that work, rejecting those that don't, trying new ap-

proaches. . . . The lessons of Yale apply to Berkeley; those of Michigan apply to Florida State."

AIPAC Executive Director Thomas A. Dine, speaking on the first day of the conference, told the students, "You've proven you can do it, but you must do more. I know your potential, but you must reach your potential in every battle. We need you."

Workshops, led by experts such as Bill Morton, former head of the NAACP's youth division, and Win Meiselman, president of the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting, were designed to increase the students' knowledge of nuts and bolts organizing. The sessions focused on the media, politics, lobbying, and coalition building.

Because the campaign to discredit Israel is increasingly active, this year's NPLTS also emphasized techniques to combat the anti-Israel effort, with workshops on "The Anti-Israel Lobby" and "Propaganda Response Techniques."

"We teach and we learn at the same time," said Jeffrey Parness of the University of Michigan, who worked as a volunteer in Rep. Paul Simon's successful 1984 campaign against Sen. Charles Percy. "I teach what I've done, I learn what everyone else has done, and I'm learning from the professionals. . . . All the enthusiasm you absorb makes you want to do more."

Seven Canadian college students participated. "Each campus is an incubator in which new approaches are tried," said Marcel Weider of Toronto. "As a result of

attending NPLTS two years ago, I brought a new sophistication to my campus. I've come back to show what we did and see how other students have worked on their campuses." Weider convinced four of his compatriots to attend their first NPLTS. "We rented an Oldsmobile in Toronto for 225 Canadian dollars," said Weider. "It took us only nine hours to drive."

Ten Christian students also attended the weekend conference. "I always felt I was on my own as a Christian friend of Israel," said Kathy Rappolt, a senior at the University of the South (Sewanee). "Now I see I'm part of a community, that there are resources available to me. I'm going back to campus with new ideas of how to motivate my non-Jewish friends."

While several of the workshops were led by students, AIPAC professionals also took their turn on the podium. Steve Silberfarb and Douglas Freeman (legislation), Rachel Weinberg (lobbying), Brian Abrahams and Seth Kaye (campaign activism) and Barry Spielman (the anti-Israel lobby) became involved in pro-Israel activism after attending previous National Political Leadership Training Seminars.

"Today's students have assimilated the lessons of their predecessors," said Kessler. "They know how the system works, and they know how to work within the system." □

—Brooks Fudenberg

Brooks Fudenberg is on the staff of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee.

VIEWING . . . Continued

The ending of the Hebron sit-in has political ramifications. Prime Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin have demonstrated that they are prepared to use force—if necessary—to block West Bank settlements which the government considers to be provocative or ill-advised. It also raises the possibility that the National Unity government could fall over this issue. Labor's ministers opposed the Hebron squatters while Likud's representatives strongly backed them. Likud ministers point out that Hebron has been an important Jewish city since Biblical times. Its original Jewish population did not leave voluntarily but was slaughtered in anti-Jewish pogroms by Arabs in 1929 and 1936.

They add that the Hebron apartment in question originally belonged to Jews and was recently sold to Jews in a legal transaction.

Rabin rejects that argument. "Have we settled Shefaram because the Sanhedrin [Jewish high court] was located there? I believe that all these comparisons with the past are simply stupid and have no relevance for the policy of Israeli governments" (*Kol Yisrael*, Aug. 19).

Envoy Delayed

The Israeli Foreign Ministry has decided to delay sending its new ambassador to South Africa. A ministry statement said that it was not known when the envoy

would assume his post.

The decision to delay was interpreted in many quarters as part of Israel's continuing effort to disassociate itself from the apartheid regime. In recent weeks Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir have both condemned South African racial policies.

In South Africa, the Jewish Board of Deputies, the coordinating body for the 120,000-member community, officially voted to condemn apartheid and to endorse calls for the complete elimination "of all provisions in the law which discriminate on the grounds of color and race." The Jewish community is the only white community in South Africa to officially call for an end to the system of minority rule. □

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PERSPECTIVE

Secretary Shultz Hangs Tough

The respected *Middle East Policy Survey* quoted one "well-placed analyst" as saying that the Reagan Administration will use virtually anything to justify the much-delayed arms sale to Jordan. Speaking of the Casablanca Arab League summit, he said, "If they clobber Hussein, [Secretary of State George] Shultz will argue that the arms are needed for the King's protection, and if they support Hussein, Shultz will argue that the arms will provide momentum for the peace process."

The results of the summit were more ambiguous than that. King Hussein wasn't "clobbered." However, neither did he get the endorsement of his Feb. 11 accord with PLO chief Yasir Arafat that he wanted. After it "noted" the accord, the meeting adjourned without further movement or comment. Jordan's Foreign Minister Taher al-Masri chose to construe this as meaning that the Arab League gave its "blessing" to the pact, but few neutral observers would go that far. Hussein wasn't clobbered at Casablanca. But he wasn't blessed either.

By the same token, one can say that Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy wasn't clobbered by the Jordanians during his latest Middle East tour. But he didn't accomplish any breakthroughs.

Murphy had embarked on his visit with the apparent goal of meeting with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. However, before doing so, Murphy needed certain assurances and agreements from King Hussein: First, that any international peace conference would not include the Soviet

Union. Second, that the PLO would not be invited to join the negotiating process until it had accepted United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. Third, that any U.S. meeting with a joint delegation would be followed by face-to-face negotiations with Israel.

Hussein would have none of it. He told Murphy that he was committed to both an international conference (with Soviet participation) and to including the PLO in peace talks. Upon arriving in Jerusalem from Amman, Murphy told Israeli officials that Hussein is disappointed with the U.S. position on those points. According to Israel Defense Forces Radio (Aug. 16), Murphy reported that Hussein "still believes that 1985 is the decisive year with regard to the peace process and that he is capable of convincing Arafat to make the necessary moves."

The Israeli government is increasingly skeptical about Hussein's intentions. Prime Minister Peres is believed to hope that Washington's firm position will lead the King to change his. Foreign Minister Shamir feels that his own predictions have been confirmed. He never expected anything to come out of the Jordanian-PLO agreement except, perhaps, U.S. pressure on Israel to deal with the PLO—and perhaps a U.S. nod in Arafat's direction. Both Peres and Shamir are impressed with Secretary of State Shultz's seeming resoluteness on this score. Even Shamir reportedly is convinced that the United States is not about to ram the PLO down Jerusalem's

throat. There is some feeling that Murphy might be inclined to soften the U.S. position on Arafat and company but that he is being held back by Shultz, who personally shares Israel's antipathy toward the PLO.

At this point, then, there seems to be no significant movement on the Jordanian front and accordingly no possible justification for an arms sale to the Jordanians. And that gets back to the *Middle East Policy Survey's* prediction. The Administration can claim that the very fact of Hussein's inflexibility requires that he be softened up with new U.S.-supplied arms.

The Administration's main problem with that argument is that it simply would not wash on Capitol Hill. Seventy-three Senators—a strong majority—have already gone on record in support of the Kennedy-Heinz resolution which bars new arms to Jordan until that nation agrees to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. It would be close to impossible for the Administration to argue that it has persuaded Amman to agree to anything even close to that.

Accordingly, the arms sale option should be dead. The fact that it isn't—that so many well-placed observers in Washington believe that the Administration will propose a sale to Jordan (and Saudi Arabia) in the fall—testifies to the influence of those State and Defense Department officials who believe that giving the Arabs the ability to make war with Israel will lead them to make peace instead. The logic there defies comprehension but it is time-honored, if nothing else. —M.J.R. □

FOR THE RECORD

Suicide Bomber's Interview

Any doubt about Syria's backing for the suicide bombings that have killed hundreds of Lebanese, Americans, and Israelis should have been dispelled by an interview on Damascus television on Aug. 17. The interview was with Abdullah Mohammed Khalid Abdul al-Qadir, a Syrian who was killed in a suicide bombing in south Lebanon. The interview with him was shown after his death.

It began with an introduction by the newscaster: "An eagle from the Lebanese national resistance has recorded with his blood a new page of sacrifice and heroism in southern Lebanon. . . . Before his martyrdom, hero martyr [al-Qadir] saluted Arab Syria and its leader, the symbol of the Lebanese resistance, President Hafez Assad." The interview followed, excerpts from which are printed below.

Interviewer: "In your opinion, what is

the method by which we can expel the Zionist enemy from our Arab territory?"

Al-Qadir: "Our party and our leader Assad have taught us that peoples who struggle for their freedom and progress must triumph, that their struggle requires sacrifices so that they can teach lessons to the enemy. . . . We are a sacrifice for our Arab nation in defense of our people. As struggling President Hafez Assad said: The best weapon with which we can face the enemies is the human being who insists on courting martyrdom."

Interviewer: "Comrade, since you are from Syria, what is the motive for your martyrdom on Lebanese territory?"

Al-Qadir: "It is out of my faith in the pan-Arab nature of the battle and the unity of the fate and destiny of the Arab nation. Even though I am from Syria, there is no difference for me if I perform my pan-Arab

duty in any Arab spot, be it in Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine. This is because the enemy is not against Lebanon alone or Syria alone. This is what our leader Hafez Assad taught us."

The posthumous interview is notable on several counts. First, the fact that it was carried on state-controlled Syrian television represents an official endorsement of suicide bombings. Second, the "martyr's" statement shows that Syria's imperial ambitions remain unchecked and is part of the government's line. Al-Qadir like Assad, is ready to "perform my pan-Arab duty in any Arab spot, be it in Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine." The prevalence of this view explains why Hafez Assad's enemies list includes Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, and even the PLO. Each of the "entities" (a favorite Syrian word) claims land which Damascus views as its own. □

BACK PAGE

Presidents: Future and Past

It can't be true—but it is. The *Washington Post* (Aug. 11) is already looking at the crop of presidential candidates for the November 1988 election. I guess you can't start planning—or worrying—too soon. But publishing polls 39 months before election day does seem a bit excessive.

It's hard to imagine that these polls are worth much. In August 1973, I doubt that there was a single person outside of Plains, Georgia who believed that the next President to be elected would be Jimmy Carter. In August 1977, no poll would have predicted the presidency of Ronald Reagan either. Nevertheless, both ex-governors were elected while the more widely touted candidates escaped both the burden and the glory.

Even those who question the significance of early polls cannot resist looking at them. After all, it is fun knowing who's up and who's down even if there is no lasting importance to any of it.

So here they are. According to the *Washington Post-ABC* poll, the most popular Democrat is Ted Kennedy (with Gary Hart a strong number two). The most popular Republican is George Bush, with nobody breathing on his heels. The most surprising finding on the Democratic side is that Lee Iacocca, the president of Chrysler, is about as highly regarded as Kennedy and Hart.

New York's popular governor Mario Cuomo and architect of Reaganomics Rep. Jack Kemp each get some good and some bad news from the poll. Each of these possible candidates is regarded positively by about 20% of poll respondents, with only about 10% harboring negative views. However, over 60% of respondents have no strong views about either of them. Cuomo's public recognition will, no doubt, rise dramatically by 1992 and he probably can wait until then. (He plans to run for reelection for governor in 1986 and does not seem to be actively seeking the 1988 nomination.) But Kemp is already putting together a national staff for 1988. Its first goal has got to be to make Kemp the kind of household word that George Bush already is.

The poll has one other political tidbit that is worth considering. It is that Jimmy Carter (55% favorable, 39% unfavorable) is doing far better in the contest for favorite ex-president than Richard Nixon (28% favorable, 64% unfavorable). Carter's rating is virtually the reverse of what it was when he left office. Nixon's rating is pretty much what it was when he resigned 11 years ago.

Beyond the polls, though, both Carter and Nixon remain important figures for those who care about Israel and its security. Carter's principal legacy is the Camp David peace treaty, which remains the only

peace treaty ever between Israel and an Arab state. Today, the Israeli-Egyptian peace seems to be deepening, particularly on the trade and tourism fronts. Israel's border with Egypt has remained secure and Cairo seems no longer to consider war with Israel an option. This is close to miraculous and Carter deserves a great deal of credit for it.

As for Nixon, he earned a major place in Israel's history when he authorized the unprecedented airlift that helped save Israel from defeat in 1973. Twelve years later, Israel has still not completely recovered from the Yom Kippur attack by Egypt and Syria which cost it more than 3,000 lives and \$12 billion. It began with Syrian and Egyptian forces overrunning Israeli positions in the Sinai and on the Golan Heights. In its attempt to push back the attackers, the Israelis reached deep into their arsenal. After a week of war, they appeared to be running out of equipment and ammunition.

It was then that Nixon gave the order for the airlift. Unprecedented in scope, the airlift consisted of 706 flights between the United States and Israel. Deliveries during the 700-ton-a-day airlift included tanks, helicopters, missiles, electronic equipment and ammunition. In the end the United States delivered 22,985 tons of equipment across the 6,400 mile lifeline. Nixon's airlift helped turn the tide.

Carter and Nixon. Two very different Presidents who, each in his own way, made a significant contribution to a secure Israel. As for the rest of their records—including, in Nixon's case, the assault on the Constitution called Watergate—they are for the historians to appraise and the pollsters to rate. But the '73 airlift and the Camp David treaty speak for themselves.

—M.J.R.

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NEW YORK TIMES 1 January 1986 Pg. 5

New Terrorists: 'Kids Who Are Trained to Go Out and Kill'

By JOHN TAGLIABUE
Special to The New York Times

ROME, Dec. 31 — The attacks mounted by Palestinian terrorists on the Rome and Vienna airports bear a new brand of terrorism that European security officials say poses severe new challenges.

Evidence gathered by the investigators in both cities indicates that the assaults were carried out by young Palestinians who were guided from the Middle East to Western Europe by a network of experienced Arab and, possibly, European supporters, working behind the scene.

Security officials say this pattern runs through a string of recent Arab terrorist attacks in Italy, including the hijacking in October of the Italian cruise liner Achille Lauro. They say the pattern distinguishes the attacks from previous actions in Europe attributed to Middle Eastern terrorists that, the officials say, seem to have been masterminded and carried out by the same people.

The distinction is troubling to European security officials, because it suggests that hard-line Palestinian groups, such as the Fatah Revolutionary Council, which is thought to have directed the airport attacks, or the Palestine Liberation Front, considered the authors of the Achille Lauro hijacking, can avail themselves of broad logistical support in a number of cities in Western Europe.

It also confronts European security officials with the intractable task of uprooting an obscure terror network whose members seem to offer assailants crucial support while themselves remaining in the background.

"In the past the people involved worked by themselves," said a Middle Eastern diplomat who follows terrorist activities. "They were of high caliber, and they were usually assured important positions after the action."

"Now there are the professional planners, and the kids who are trained to go out and kill," he went on. "When they go out, the professionals wait by the television."

The pattern, he said, tends to reflect changes in terrorist methods in the Middle East, where conflicting groups have resorted increasingly to using youthful suicide commandos.

The security officials say the emergence of the European network may be a result of the same sense of desperation in some Palestinian circles, such as student groups, that are considered responsible for the changed tactics in the Middle East.

Terrorists Tend to Be Young

As in the Middle East, the terrorists who are exported to Europe tend to be young. The only survivor of the four Palestinians who hurled grenades and sprayed automatic weapon fire at Rome's airport last week, was born 19 years ago in the Palestinian refugee district of Shatila in Beirut. He told Italian investigators his name was Mohammed Sarham.

Similarly, at least two of the four Palestinian activists jailed in Italy for the Achille Lauro hijacking were teen-agers, and one had to be retried last November when birth records supplied by Lebanon revealed that he was 17 years old — not 19 as he had told his questioners —

and thus too young to be tried as an adult under Italian law.

Hassan Aatab, a baby-faced Palestinian who threw a bomb into the British Airways office on the Via Veneto last September, wounding several people, was 16 years old.

But Mr. Sarham, like other Palestinians seized here in recent months, described a network of older more experienced supporters, some of whom met him and his confederates on arrival in Europe and supplied them with aid and instructions.

In connection with the Achille Lauro hijacking, the investigators in Genoa, where the case is being tried, have uncovered traces of several experienced Palestinian activists who were involved in smuggling the arms and explosives into Italy and instructing the youthful hijackers from behind the scene.

The European Connection

The apparent presence of Europeans, in addition to Arab nationals, in the network, is also troubling to security officials. Mr. Sarham, when questioned by the Italians, said the weapons used in the airport attack were supplied to him and his accomplices by helpers who the police believe were Europeans.

Ali Minour, a Palestinian who was seized last April when he fired a bazooka at the Jordanian embassy here, said he had received the weapon from a woman he said was either Italian or French. Mr. Aatab, the terrorist in the British Airways bombing, said the explosives he used were given to him by a tall, blond man he knew only as "the Belgian."

The investigators here point out that tenuous links have been uncovered in the past between Arab extremists in Europe and domestic terror organizations, such as Italy's Red Brigades. Italian newspapers speculated in recent days that the Soviet-designed automatic weapons the terrorists used might have come from as yet undiscovered Red Brigades arms caches, or from organized-crime weapons supplies.

But justice officials have denied there is hard evidence of such links, and they describe them as "working hypotheses."

Police investigators also concede that they have few concrete leads to follow in sweeping out the presumed terror nests. The police here have assumed for some time that a "conspiratorial apartment" might exist near the city center for use to store arms or false documents.

But searches in the city, near the main train station, in recent days failed to turn up such an apartment. And officials admit that the assumption that such hideouts exist is based on an analogy with the domestic terror organizations, such as the Red Brigades.

But they say the support might be organized out of cheap hotels that the planners could change readily, or from diplomatic missions of countries such as Iran or Libya that tend to support the aims of extremist groups such as the one that carried out the airport attacks.

The involvement of diplomatic channels cannot be excluded, security officials say, because of past incidents in which suspected terrorist have used diplomatic passports from Arab countries such as Iraq.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

REPORT...Continued

vide increased support to the group, and Abu Nidal himself and many of the groups operations may have moved there within the last 12 months.

The group probably has several hundred members, although an accurate count is difficult. We believe the group has a number of cells throughout Western Europe and the Middle East and makes use of the large number of Palestinian students studying abroad, sometimes involving them in operations after only perfunctory training. These new recruits, for example, were involved in the five grenade attacks staged by the group in 1985.

Current Operations And Trends

Based on the style of Abu Nidal attacks, it is evident that the group is willing to cause indiscriminate casualties. Apart from assassinations of particular individuals, Abu Nidal operations through November 1985 resulted in nearly 70 deaths and 201 wounded among innocent bystanders — and the number could have been much higher if the Jordanian airliner attack in Athens had been successful. In the previous year, 111 died in the crash of a Gulf Air jet on which an Abu Nidal bomb may have exploded.

The Abu Nidal group has concentrated on attacking Jordanian interests since 1984. These attacks were provoked by the Jordanian agreement to host the P.N.C. meeting in November 1984 and King Hussein's February accord with Arafat to restart the stalled Middle East peace process. Abu Nidal operatives are thought to have assassinated former West Bank mayor and Palestinian moderate Fahad Kawasmeh in December 1984 shortly after his election to the P.L.O. Executive Council. The anti-Jordanian/P.L.O. campaign has not abated. As long as Jordanian and P.L.O. efforts toward Middle East peace negotiations continue, attacks against both Jordanian and Palestinian targets probably will also.

Aside from the attack on Alia offices in Madrid in July and the attempt to down a Jordanian airliner over Athens in April, other incidents involving Jordanian targets in 1985 have included:

¶The Nov. 24 assassination of a Palestinian in Amman.

¶The murder of a Jordanian publisher in Athens in September.

¶A plot to assassinate the Jordanian Ambassador to Greece in August.

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NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE 1 Jan 86 Pg. 1

Lax Security Aided Terrorists At Two Airports, Experts Say

BY EVANS JOHNSON
New York City Tribune Staff

The airport massacres in Rome and Vienna on December 27 might have been prevented or minimized if earlier security warnings and requests had been forcefully acted upon, according to intelligence experts.

Terrorists firing Kalashnikov assault rifles and flipping hand grenades burst into airports in Rome and Vienna at 9 a.m. as throngs of holiday travelers waited to board planes. Including three terrorists, 15 people died during or after the attack on the El Al Israel Airlines counter inside Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport. As many as 70 people were wounded.

In Vienna, one terrorist and two travelers died, and 47 more were wounded as the gunmen assaulted an El Al departure lounge at Schwechat Airport.

Terrorists captured alive in both countries carried Moroccan passports, but indicated they were Palestinians loyal to either the main PLO faction, Al Fatah, headed by Yasser Arafat, or to the shadowy Abu Nidal group, allegedly opposed to Arafat.

The toll in the Rome attack was particularly severe because the El Al counter is near those of Trans World Airlines and Pan American World Airways. According to employees of Italy's national carrier, Alitalia, security at da Vinci was very lax.

"The controls are ridiculous," employee Ferdinando Calitri told Italy's *Corriere Della Sera* newspaper. "Any terrorist could enter without danger, place a time bomb in the toilets and get away easily."

"At international departures you often go in with just a passport, without showing a ticket," Calitri said.

Corriere quoted another, unnamed employee as saying, "It's just too easy for terrorists to come in and out without any danger. They could plant 1,000 bombs."

However, according to at least three security organizations, the airports had ample warning that a terror strike was imminent.

Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Interpol said the afternoon of the attacks that they had issued warnings in November, saying European airports might be targets for terrorist attacks during the holiday season.

The Paris-based Interpol (the International Criminal Police Organization) said

airports in Europe were told in November to be on alert but did not mention specific airlines.

In Washington, an FAA spokesman said the agency also warned airlines and airports serving Europe and the Middle East about the possibility of terrorist activity during the holidays.

More importantly, in Rome the director of Italy's military intelligence (SISMI), Adm. Fulvio Martini, told the newspaper *La Repubblica* Sunday that his Secret Service alerted authorities of a possible operation against the airport several days before the attack.

"We did very well what had to be done, that is an intelligence job, of information," Martini said. "We do not have the same task as the police. It is not up to us to put our hands on the attackers."

Martini asserted that the terrorists had trained in Iran, but had traveled to Italy from Syria, possibly by boat. Other security officials said the terrorists apparently arrived by train via Switzerland.

Italy's Defense Ministry said later that Martini's remarks did "not express the thought of the government." Western diplomats interpreted that as an effort to deflect criticism of Italy's relatively close relations with Syria and Iran.

Martini also predicted further attacks soon, but probably not inside Italy. "I don't think the next blow will be launched against Italy," he said. "I think it will be outside. A few days will pass, but not too many. The wild dogs of Middle East terrorism are not the kind to allow much hope of a truce."

Martini said SISMI had "obtained a list of airports where an attack was being studied." He mentioned the airports at Athens, Madrid and Nicosia, Cyprus, as among those considered by terror groups.

A security specialist with close ties to Israeli intelligence told the *New York City Tribune* that the Italian government had repeatedly turned down requests from Israel to separate EL Al passenger operations from those of other airlines, thereby allowing Israeli guards to maintain heightened security.

Following the 1972 massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich, West Germany, EL Al had been allowed to construct separate, more secure facilities there.

The government in Jerusalem had asked other European states to permit

KIDS...Continued

The announcement from Tunis this week that passports used by the terrorists in Vienna were among Tunisian identity documents that had been confiscated in Libya, has buoyed the suspicion here that Libyan officials, despite official denials, may have played some support role in the airport attacks.

REPORT...Continued

¶ The murder of a Jordanian diplomat in Ankara on July 24.

¶ A rocket attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Rome in April.

The group has also targeted British interests. ROSM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping in March 1985 of a British journalist in Lebanon and the assassination of British diplomats in India and Greece in 1984. The purpose of the attacks probably is to force the U.K. to release group members imprisoned for the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London in June 1982.

Even before the recent attacks on Vienna and Rome airports, Abu Nidal had begun to concentrate his field of operations in Western Europe. Although his targets have been his usual enemies, e.g. British, Israeli, moderate Arab, he has become very indiscriminate about injuring bystanders. The relatively relaxed controls in Western European countries has been conducive to his operations there. The pattern of concentrating his efforts in Europe has coincided with the strengthening of his links with Libya. The likelihood of Libyan financing, safehaven and logistical assistance should be very helpful to his future international terrorist operations.

similar arrangements at their airports, but they had refused, the security specialist said. In New York, El Al was allowed to enhance its security at Kennedy Airport in the late 1970s, he said.

Because the El Al counter was not isolated in Rome, Israeli security guards could not adequately screen travelers, he said, adding that had El Al been set apart, the passengers at the neighboring terminals would possibly not have been slain or injured. As it was, in Israel the guards have been heralded as heroes in the media, since they are believed by Israeli intelligence to have been the ones who finally put down the assault in Rome by shooting the terrorists.

Although the PLO emphatically denied responsibility for the attacks, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres charged Sunday that by permitting the PLO to open quasi-diplomatic offices in their capitals, some European nations had in effect sanctioned Palestinian terrorism.

"I'm not just speaking of terror," Peres

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EDITORIALS/COLUMNISTS

LIBYAN SANCTIONS

A Measured Response -- "President Reagan's decision to sever all of this country's economic ties to Libya strikes us as a measured and appropriate response to what Mr. Reagan aptly termed the 'outlaw regime' of Col. Moammar Khaddafy. Although the move may not have a significant immediate impact, it has great symbolic value and paves the way for possible additional steps in the future." (Dallas Times Herald, 1/9)

The Last Card -- "Will economic sanctions do in the egregious Col. Khadafy? Not a chance of it, the less so with Western Europe likely to wimp out on President Reagan's Libyan quarantine.... This is war, if hardly of the conventional sort. Khadafy declared it; Abu Nidal wages it. The United States can fight back, or it can slink away into fearful darkness." (Dallas Morning News, 1/9)

What's a President to Do? -- "Libya is a unique offender even by the tolerant standards of international law. And wantonly killing innocent passengers in an airport is a declaration of war against civilization. Mr. Reagan is right to respond carefully; his responsible choices so far are severely limited. The way to enlarge them is to share the evidence of Libya's complicity." (New York Times, 1/9)

Khadafy: Libyan Madman -- "Nobody in his right mind would advocate going to war, but we are already at war because of these continued terrorist attacks. It may be that the only way to stop them is to destroy the base from which they operate. And if that base happens to be in Libya, so be it. The longer we let the situation remain as it is, the more we can look forward to our citizens and our property suffering the destructive consequences." (Forth Worth Star-Telegram, 1/5)

Libyan And Our Timid Allies -- "In most cases, economic sanctions are not very effective. They have been tried and found wanting. But in some cases they can have a punitive effect, and may be appropriate in showing displeasure. Libya has depended upon its huge oil supplies and jacked-up international market prices to support its domestic economy and its dangerous military buildup that threatens its neighbors. With the world now experiencing an oil glut and falling prices, Libya is especially vulnerable. If all the Free World quit buying Libyan oil, that would be a punishing blow to the terrorist-supporting government of wild man Moammar Khadafy." (Chattanooga News-Free Press, 1/6)

The Next Step in Libya -- "Heads of governments around the world might want to ponder the last line of President Reagan's Tuesday night statement announcing tighter economic sanctions against Libya: 'If these steps do not end Qaddafi's terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken.' The illusions are evaporating. The world, if need be, could manage quite well without Libyan oil. The Soviets are preoccupied with a war they can't end in Afghanistan and are roundly hated by most of the East Europeans they claim as allies. The West, grown tired of being victimized by terrorists, is inching its way up to retaliation. Who is the most tempting target? One guess." (Wall Street Journal, 1/9)

LIBYAN SANCTIONS (continued)

Against Qaddafi -- "It has become cliché that Mr. Reagan began by promising swift vengeance against terrorists and that his actual record constitutes a humbling education in political reality. The President might have spared himself some grief by picking a more modest course. The principle source of grief, however, lies not in any politician's embarrassment but in terrorism itself. It is awful, it is difficult to deal with, and it continues. It continues against principal targets such as Israel and the United States and against countries in Europe that have tried to set themselves apart.... Rather kindly, Mr. Reagan this week offered the allies an alibi, saying that economic considerations may keep Europe from joining the new American sanctions. But he also said that 'Americans will not understand other nations moving into Libya to take commercial advantage of our departure.' This is a modest but necessary marker. Internationalism, Europeans surely would agree, cuts both ways." (Washington Post, 1/9)

A School of Pariahs -- "At President Reagan's press conference, it was apparent that many reporters there doubted the existence of a 'terror network.' Maybe it was their aversion to conspiracy theories or the dread of having to acknowledge yet another organized enemy. Whatever the case, reports on the terror network have filled the papers for years.... This Soviet-terrorist connection should be remembered at summit time. Muammar Qaddafi might be 'flaky,' but lonely he is not." (Washington Times, 1/9)

Khadafy's Confession -- "All nations should earnestly work for peace in the Middle East and a fair resolution of the Palestinian question. But peace cannot be bought by kow-towing to the threats of an irrational dictator. The U.S., Israel and the rest of the civilized world should continue to aim toward the kind of aggressive, 'focused' response to the airport outrages that President Reagan has advocated -- one that seeks to clearly identify those responsible and then to punish the guilty in an appropriate manner." (Birmingham News, 1/5)

Europe, Japan Should Join Crusade to Strangle Libya -- "How many more civilians need to be blown apart in airports, how many embassies must be bombed, how many more diplomats need to be gunned down before the industrial nations get backbone enough to strike back at the patrons of this wanton violence? Retaliation by the gun is a slippery business, morally and practically, and Israel is sometimes poorly served by the nature of its vengeance. The Reagan Administration correctly believes any retaliation ought to be specifically against the killers in a preventive way, not a general fragging of some Palestine Liberation Organization group and bystanders." (Dayton Daily News, 1/3)

Dealing With Col. Khadafy -- "The time has come for this country to end its preoccupation with our sins and begin to deal out some punishment for transgressions against us. And this can happen only with the restoration of faith and authority in an elected head of state to do what is appropriate to safeguard the national security. The only proper and effective response to a Col. Khadafy is a combination of the public outrage expressed by President Reagan backed up by the kind of quiet diplomacy for which we haven't had the stomach in some time. We need not only the capability, but also the tolerance." (Chicago Tribune, 1/9)

FOREIGN MEDIA REACTION

PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

"President Reagan has acted with speed and an apparent lack of equivocation in severing his country's links with Libya. He has acted alone, has taken a risk, has done so with courage and, for that, deserves congratulations."
(London Times, Britain)

"In waving his big stick, Reagan falls into the trap. Terrorism is seen as an international problem but no one in Europe wants to make war with Qaddafi."
(La Croix, France)

"Prisoner as he is of his popularity and its consequent responsibilities, Ronald Reagan could do neither too much nor too little. He decided to do the minimum -- which, at least for now, is also the most he can rationally allow himself...."
(La Repubblica, Italy)

"The President had no choice but to cut all economic ties to Libya.... If there is any way at all to bring Mr. Qaddafi back to his senses it is this one -- provided that the West Europeans participate...."
(Die Welt, West Germany)

"There's more than Qaddafi behind terrorism in the Near East.... Certainly, Qaddafi plays an important role in supplying and training the many diverse Arab terrorist groups. But the battles between the various Palestinian factions will continue without doubt even if the Colonel's influence is appreciably reduced."
(Le Devoir, Canada)

"Let's start off this year with the statement that the anger over terrorism will mostly be powerless...unless those who wish to fight terrorism are prepared to pay the economic price. Based on all verbal opinions so far, Europe hasn't been prepared to do that yet."
(Trouw, Netherlands)

"There can be absolutely no doubt about the moral justification for the American measures against Libya.... It was a wise decision by President Reagan to limit his reactions to economic sanctions.... Reagan says he has irrefutable evidence of Qaddafi's role as a terrorist. We believe Reagan. It is our hope that the President's appeal for support will get a more positive response as time goes on...." (Aftenposten, Norway)

"The Austrian and Italian airport attacks by followers of Mr. Abu Nidal were murderous and unforgiveable but they do not justify America getting itself ranged against the entire Arab world. And this is what is happening. The Islamic countries are drawing up an agreement to support Libya in the wake of the American saber rattling...."
(Irish Press, Ireland)

"The U.S. threat against Libya becomes ever more real in the context of the increasingly advertised doctrine of 'neoglobalism,' known also as the 'Reagan Doctrine.'..."
(Narodna Mladezh, Bulgaria)

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WASHINGTON POST 8 January 1986 Pg. D-1

Billig Wants Jury Trial

Surgeon Told Navy of Problem, Lawyer Says

By Chris Spolar
and Barbara Vobejda
Washington Post Staff Writers

Cmdr. Donal M. Billig revealed to Navy recruiters before he was commissioned that his surgical competence had been questioned by a New Jersey hospital, but Bethesda Naval Hospital officials found out only when Billig's ex-wife threatened to expose his past a year later, according to arguments made during two separate courts-martial yesterday.

That chronology became apparent during the courts-martial of Billig and Cmdr. Reginald E. Newman, charged with lying about his role in the recruitment of the doctor in 1982.

Billig, the former head of cardiothoracic surgery at Bethesda, is charged with involuntary manslaughter of five patients there. He pleaded not guilty to the charges yesterday and opted for a jury trial rather than trial by military judge.

The case against Billig moved closer to trial as Capt. Philip Roberts, the judge, overruled strong objections from the doctor's defense attorney and agreed that the prosecution could bring preserved human hearts into the courtroom for jurors to examine.

Roberts said the hearts, which prosecutors said would be examined with the use of gloves, would help the jurors understand how the organ works. The specimens would not be allowed if, when they are brought into the courtroom, Roberts found them to be "tasteless," he added.

That decision came minutes before the prosecution revealed that Bethesda Naval Hospital officials were first informed in 1983 of previous surgical problems facing Billig, only when his ex-wife said she would tell officials about his practice at Monmouth Medical Center in New Jersey. In 1980, a review panel of doctors there said the surgeon lacked good judgment, proper motivation and honesty. Billig later resigned from the hospital and surrendered his New Jersey license.

"His experience at Monmouth

only surfaced when his former wife threatened him with blackmail," Lt. Cmdr. Joseph VanWinkle, prosecutor, said at the pretrial hearing yesterday. VanWinkle and Navy spokesmen later refused to elaborate.

Billig's defense attorney, Lt. Stephen Baker, later said that Billig, who had been divorced from his first wife, Marilyn, was threatened by her after he had not met some alimony payments. Bethesda Naval Hospital then was told and inquired into the problems at Monmouth, he said.

It was unclear yesterday whether Billig's ex-wife informed Bethesda officials or the doctor did after the threat.

As Billig's attorneys prepared for jury selection at the Navy Yard, the first witnesses testified in Newman's trial, held at Bolling Air Force Base. Former Pittsburgh recruiter Lt. Cmdr. Jerry D. Penn, who also is charged with lying about his part in recruiting Billig in 1982, said Billig was open about his troubles at Monmouth.

Moreover, Penn testified, Billig wrote "yes" when asked on a Navy questionnaire if there was anything in his past Navy officials should be aware of. But that answer was later changed by someone in the Pittsburgh recruiting office at the instruction of Newman, Penn's superior based in Washington, according to Penn.

"I understood that I was to change [the answer] from a yes to a no," Penn testified. "I don't remember if I changed it, but it was changed."

Newman told Penn the Monmouth information "was not pertinent," Penn said. "He agreed with my opinion [that the Monmouth controversy] was a matter of some professional jealousy on the part of his accusers," Penn said.

Newman is charged, among other things, with lying about whether he supplied information about Billig's record to officials responsible for reviewing the professional qualifications of applicants. Prosecutor Lt. Elizabeth Dean, in her opening statement, said Newman also lied when he told officials that Monmouth had is-

NEW YORK TIMES
8 January 1985 Pg. 1

Why Reagan Shuns Force

Risks of Armed Action Are Seen as Too High

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — For the third time since taking office five years ago, President Reagan has examined the possibility of a military strike against Libya and again chosen to limit actions to diplomatic and economic measures.

News Although he said tonight that Libya had engaged in the equivalent of "armed aggression" against the United States, Mr. Reagan decided against military force, his aides said, because he felt it would raise unacceptable risks.

Analysis An Administration official said the main risks involved the fate of more than 1,000 Americans in Libya, an outbreak of explosive anti-Americanism in Arab countries and the possibility that American planes could be downed over Libya.

Strains in the Alliance

In addition, Mr. Reagan has personally insisted that any target for retaliation be clearly identified with the actual terrorists. The President's intelligence advisers could not satisfy that requirement.

Given these uncertainties, Mr. Reagan chose the least dangerous course by limiting his reaction for the time being and renewing a warning of stonger measures. He said that if these steps did not end Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi's terrorism, "I promise that further steps will be taken."

In the past, Mr. Reagan also was extremely cautious in dealing with the Libya. Despite singling it out as an "outlaw nation" at the start of his Ad-

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sued a letter indicating Billig had left his post there in good standing.

Dean said yesterday the Navy may drop some of the charges against Penn, in light of new evidence and his testimony. Penn has been given immunity for his statements in the Newman case.

Newman's defense attorney, Lt. Cmdr. Irving Warden, in opening arguments, said he would question the credibility of some prosecution witnesses.

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ministration in 1981, he rejected a military strike against it unless there was evidence that such an attack would be in response to a specific action.

The first sanctions, mostly limited to appeals to Americans in Libya, then numbering more than 6,000, to leave, were instituted after intelligence reports of a Libyan "hit squad" being sent to the United States to assassinate public officials. Mr. Reagan reportedly took the position that if any officials were killed, then military action would be appropriate.

In 1982, another review of relations with Libya led to the decision to ban the import of oil from there, but Mr. Reagan showed no interest in a military response, officials said. The only time military action was used against Libya was in August 1981 when two carrier-based F-14's shot down two Soviet-made Libyan planes that challenged the right of the Sixth Fleet to sail into the Gulf of Sidra.

The effect of Mr. Reagan's steps today was to virtually sever all remaining direct American commercial ties with Libya. But they have also set the stage for a new squabble within the Atlantic alliance if he presses the allies to impose sanctions on Libya. John S. Whitehead, the Deputy Secretary of State, is supposed to go to Europe soon to try to win some allied support, which until now has been lacking.

Trade Down Sharply

The effect of the President's action seemed anticlimactic because American trade, which in 1980 reached a high of \$7.6 billion, had already dropped to less than \$300 million for the first 10 months of last year. Moreover, since the sanctions do not apply to foreign subsidiaries of American companies, their effect was even more muted.

Subsidiaries were not included because Secretary of State George P. Shultz wanted to avoid a direct clash with the Europeans reminiscent of the feud in 1981-82 over American efforts to block subsidiaries in Europe from helping build the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe.

Since the Administration had already imposed economic sanctions on Libya in 1981 and 1982, the most significant being the ban on all imports of Libyan oil, there was an expectation by some in Washington last week that the President might choose a military option in the aftermath of the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports last month.

The Administration maintained that the gunmen involved in those attacks had been from the Palestinian faction led by Abu Nidal, which it said had been aided by Libya.

"Libya," the President said tonight, "has engaged in armed aggression against the United States under established principles of international law."

The Defense Department had positioned the Sixth Fleet for a military strike, put Air Force bombers on alert in Britain and moved men and equipment to Sicily. But in examining the

Europeans raise their bid for British helicopter firm

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

LONDON — The battle for the ailing British helicopter firm Westland intensified yesterday, as a European consortium leapfrogged a bid from Sikorsky of the United States and Fiat of Italy by offering \$105 million for a 29.9 percent stake.

The bid, from British Aerospace, Britain's General Electric Company, Aerospatiale of France, Agusta of Italy and Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm of West Germany, represents an increase of \$1.26 million from their earlier offer, and compares with Sikorsky-Fiat's new \$103.6 million offer announced Sunday night.

Both bids include offers to guarantee work for Westland, but debate has largely centered on what type of work the company would be involved in, and how it fits in with Britain's strategic interests.

Leading the battle for the Europeans has been Defense Secretary Michael Heseltine, who today issued new warnings that the firm would be banned from future European defense contracts if the battle was won by U.S. interests.

Mr. Heseltine, who has been given powerful political backing in his views by Karl-Heinz Narjes, vice president of the EEC commission for industry, is pitted against Industry and Trade Secretary Leon Brittan, who favors the Sikorsky-Fiat offer.

Domestically, Mr. Heseltine is looking increasingly isolated, political analysts said here yesterday.

Sources close to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she was becoming increasingly

irked by Mr. Heseltine's actions and a series of leaks to the press that have served to strengthen the European position.

Several MPs in the governing Conservative Party suggested that the defense minister was now faced with either resigning or giving in.

The Europeans have offered to guarantee 1.8 million hours of work for the new firm, spread over three years, while Sikorsky-Fiat has offered two million, spread over five years, during which the firm would turn out Sikorsky's Black Hawk helicopter, a sales success in the United States but not in Europe.

Company Chairman Sir John Cuckney has already urged shareholders, who meet to discuss the question on Jan. 14, to accept the Sikorsky-Fiat bid, and today he gave fresh emphasis to his support.

Noting that Sikorsky-Fiat would put the Black Hawk into production at Westland if it won the deal, he said that this was a proven craft and compared favorably with three European projects that are still on the drawing board.

Taking the European option, he suggested, would transform the company into a "manufacturer of spare parts" or possibly bankrupt it.

Mr. Heseltine has said that the company would be guaranteed an order for six military Sea-King helicopters if the European proposal wins. Citing "national and strategic interests," he has also warned that the British army — Westland's biggest buyer — had no intention of buying Black Hawks.

possibilities, Mr. Reagan decided, according to aides, that there were more reasons not to bomb Libya than to do so.

New Call to Americans

Several considerations were cited by aides. They said they were troubled by the 1,000 to 1,500 Americans living in Libya, in defiance of Mr. Reagan's previous requests that they leave. Even though the Administration believes they were given fair warning to leave, Washington was concerned that they not be taken prisoner in the event of an American attack. That is why Mr. Reagan again included a call tonight for all Americans to leave Libya and a warning that Libya would be held responsible should any harm befall them.

Mr. Reagan was also insistent that any target be clearly and unambiguously linked to the Abu Nidal group, a position shared by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger but not by Mr. Shultz or Robert C. McFarlane, the former national security adviser. Mr.

McFarlane argued on Sunday in a television appearance that there was enough evidence linking Libya to past acts of terrorism to carry out a military attack without waiting for a "smoking gun."

Aides said Mr. Reagan was concerned that American planes might be shot down by the newly acquired SAM-5's in Libya, which would turn the retaliation into a fiasco. Moreover, diplomatic messages from the Middle East warned that any American military attack on Libya would provide extremists with a field day throughout the Arab world and wreck chances for any progress in peace talks.

Administration officials insisted, however, that in limiting his actions tonight to severing American economic relations with Libya, the President was not permanently forsaking the use of force. They said it was important to take seriously his warning about "further steps."

"The next time military will be the only option," one official said.

Have you heard the persistent whispering that the Palestine Liberation Organization secretly controls a \$5 billion investment empire and is growing richer all the time? Forget it.

Terror's bottom line

By Hesh Kestin

THE PALESTINE Liberation Organization is going broke. Saddled with surprisingly extensive health care and education programs, diplomatic missions and widows' and orphans' benefits, plus the military budget, Yasir Arafat presides over a political enterprise with a voracious, nine-figure appetite for cash. Unfortunately for the PLO chief, his ability to feed that appetite diminishes with each month.

FORBES interviewed dozens of diplomatic, intelligence and investment sources in the Middle East, the U.S. and Europe to assemble a reliable balance sheet for the Palestine Liberation Organization. It shows that, while the PLO's income from investments and contributions last year totaled about \$154 million, its expenses came to at least \$310 million. And since its costs of doing business are increasing, that deficit is growing inexorably. Which means that Arafat's tattered umbrella organization, which for now holds together eight disparate terror groups, could well collapse.

For U.S. interests in the Middle East, this is almost certainly not good news, since Washington sees the PLO as a moderating influence among Arab terrorist factions. Little-known fact: When the Israelis finally forced Arafat to abandon his Lebanon headquarters, the U.S. secretly paid \$4 million to \$5 million to evacuate up to 12,000 defeated PLO fighters from Beirut harbor in 1982. Washington kept it secret by having the U.K. government charter ships of the Cyprus-based Sol Lines and then repaying the British. To further tangle this tale, the Saudis now say they later reimbursed the U.S. Murky doings, but the think-

ing was clear: No matter what the world thinks of the PLO, it's the only bargaining agency the Palestinians have. Without it, as each PLO subgroup vies for leadership, we'll see more terrorism, not less.

Arafat's following hardly lends itself to orderly direction. PLO fighting forces, 12,000 to 14,000 strong, and about 4.6 million Palestinian civilians are scattered throughout 18 Middle East and North African countries. Of these, nearly half live in Israel, the Gaza Strip or on the west bank of the Jordan River.

The PLO is clearly in financial trouble and has begun playing the sort of slow-pay, no-pay games typical of the cash-starved. In Cyprus, for example, a diplomatic and operational key spot, where the PLO has always paid its bills, the local office recently had to have its arm twisted to pay for damages caused by a bomb in a house it rented, and a travel agency is suing for nonpayment of air tickets. Both claims total less than \$15,000.

Here's the expanding expense side of the PLO balance sheet:

- Diplomatic and propaganda offices in some 100 countries cost about \$50 million a year. Arafat has called for a 25% cut. No chance. The PLO's U.N. observer office, for example, now in its own five-story brick town house worth up to \$3 million on Manhattan's posh Upper East Side, won't be moved to a scruffier neighborhood. Loss of this front of respectability would erode PLO stature.

- In 7 hospitals (in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria) and 20 clinics, the PLO offers Palestinians free medical services through the Palestine Red Crescent. Annual cost is \$20 million. Arafat can't cut his Red Crescent without losing grassroots support—besides,

his brother runs it.

- Sons of the Fallen is a providing widows and heirless Palestinian "martyrs" with per capita free education. This costs \$10 million a year, and, as one PLO official admitted, every year there are more martyrs and higher costs. It could further rip the PLO apart.

- To keep its place in the minds of Arabs living in Israel, the PLO controls by Israel since 1967. The PLO normally spends about \$90 million a year. That supports highly



Alan Reingold

colleges, where some 15,000 Palestinians study (6,000 more are studying abroad, mostly in the Eastern bloc), subsidizes newspapers and pays for legal defense of captured terrorists.

An Arab convicted of terrorism routinely has his house torn down by Israeli authorities. Just as routinely, the PLO provides money to rebuild. It also lends money for housing, farming and small businesses. Now, though, it has cut these payments and subsidies to one-third their normal level. But there's a limit to parsimony. King

Hussein of Jordan vies for power by moving money into the West Bank as well. He pays salaries, for example, to ex-civil servants in the area he controlled from 1948 to 1967. Without losing influence, the PLO can't cut back indefinitely.

• And all this is aside from the expense of providing for up to 14,000 fighting men: salaries, uniforms, shelter, transport, food, medicine, intelligence, communications, training, propaganda and dependent families. Apart from the cost of weapons,

which the Russians are probably subsidizing, the tab is not less than \$100 million. And this doesn't include another \$10 million to support some 400 bureaucrats sitting in Tunis and supposedly running the show. Cutting back on their offices, villas, cars and perks could set off a palace revolt. And trimming among the field troops might provoke a replay of 1983, when 4,000 PLO fighters opted for Syrian support and turned their guns on Arafat's mainstream forces. In addition, as more PLO forces return, Lebanon is

going to take more money in the coming years, not less.

• The PLO also has an odd assortment of miscellaneous expenses in Third World countries, what it calls "friendship" projects. For instance, it operates at least four large and unprofitable model farms in Africa, and most recently had to dump \$30 million into a new \$100 million cement plant in South Yemen. Why? South Yemen was one of the few countries to take PLO troops after the Beirut evacuation. "A very marginal deal," said a banker close to it. "Rent."

So the PLO has few, if any, places to cut expenses. And the income side is even grimmer. Its finances suffered a severe blow when the PLO was driven out of Lebanon. Through its control of the ports, the PLO was able to import its own goods duty-free while charging "customs" for everyone else's. Sweetheart agreements with Eastern bloc countries brought cement and steel in at below-market prices, allowing PLO dominance of the Lebanese construction industry. (From a single captured Beirut warehouse, Israel carted away steel valued at \$30 million.) At the height of its power, PLO factories profitably employed over 6,500 people making everything from army boots to films. The take from such traditional Lebanese cottage industries as smuggling and drug-running went, too.

The PLO's constituent terror groups have their own money—terror is, unfortunately, a cheap and cost-effective way of making your voice heard. But as one intelligence officer put it, "There's enough cash for terrorism but too little for a government-in-exile." Basically, the umbrella organization has only three sources of income, all unstable or drying up:

• At the 1978 Baghdad summit to promote Arab solidarity in the face of Israeli-Egyptian peace, seven countries pledged a total of \$3 billion over ten years. Some countries reneged entirely, others just partly. Now only Saudi Arabia pays—a total of \$29 million last year, far short of its \$87 million commitment.

What happened to Arab solidarity? Declining oil revenues is the common excuse. But to Kuwait, for example, whose budget last year was \$9.4 billion, an annual donation of \$47 million is peanuts. The real explanation is the PLO's own political and military decline: Arab nations are less afraid of the organization than they were. Kuwait is simply paying a far smaller sum as bomb insurance to the PLO's subgroups. Libya has its own band of terrorists and refuses to pay at all.

• Taxation, voluntary or otherwise, is another source of funds. In theory, the PLO taps the pockets of 2.7 million Palestinians outside of Israeli control (Jerusalem taxes the 2 million within) through Arab governments, which tax resident Palestinians on the PLO's behalf. But only Kuwait, a sixth of whose population is Palestinian, regularly forks over—last year's take was \$10.5 million. Other countries simply pocket the tax.

Wherever they are, Palestinians give out of sentiment or to cover themselves from the wrath of emissaries putting on the bite. But high estimates put revenues at less than \$25 million a year from both taxes

The PLO's ominous balance sheet

Its growing expenses and shrinking income are a grim and virtually certain indicator that terrorism will only get worse.

Income (millions)

Return on \$1 billion in investments (mainly U.S. and Western European securities)	\$100.0
Saudi Arabian support	29.0
Voluntary contributions	14.5
Taxes collected from Palestinians in Kuwait	10.5
Total	154.0

Expenses (millions)

Military operations	\$100
Subsidies: housing, legal defense, publications, businesses and colleges in Israeli-administered territories	90
Representative offices worldwide	50
Survivors' benefits (Sons of the Fallen)	40
Health services (Palestine Red Crescent)	20
Administrative headquarters in Tunis	10
Total	310

Note: All figures are for 1985.

and contributions—not a lot, not about to grow.

• This leaves investments, and don't believe what you read in some newspapers about a \$5 billion portfolio on which the PLO rakes in a cool \$1 billion a year. According to sources close enough to smell the ink, the PLO has no more than \$1 billion out making \$100 million, most of it in U.S. and Western European paper, plus U.S. blue-chip stocks. A conservative and highly liquid portfolio. The PLO, pushed from one country to another, is understandably property-averse. And it fears that other nations may seize what property it still has.

Some PLO money is managed by the \$13.5 billion (assets) Arab Bank Ltd. Group of Jordan, which handles the PLO's working accounts. It is al-

most certainly part-owned by the PLO. A close friend of Arafat sits on the board, and the bank has been a pillar of Palestinian nationalism for decades. Aside from 97 offices (2 in New York, 23 in 23 countries, 2 secret branches in Nablus and Jerusalem), the bank is supposedly abandoned by Arafat after the Six Day War. The Jerusalem office is in a travel agency where loans are processed; it is the Arab money change on the street.

When your uncuttable revenues reach \$310 million and your income is half of that, you need bread. Where can Arafat turn to the Soviets? They support the PLO, Arafat's enemy. The only ally for the PLO is not East but West.

But who wants Arafat? His résumé could be written in blood. In February he walked out of a promising agreement with King Hussein, joined by a former intelligence chief, has all but agreed to replace Arafat by a man willing to jaw with the Jews.

Not our business? If the PLO falls apart, the ensuing terror is going to make M. Qaddafi look like W. D. Abu Abbas, architect of the 1982 Lauro incident, has already threatened to bring terrorism to America.

But if the U.S. really means to keep the PLO from falling apart, it probably has to do at least three things: (1) Pressure the Saudis and waitis to back a more moderate leader and withdraw their support from Arafat. (2) Provide discreet aid through Palestinian moderate help the PLO keep itself intact. (3) cash-starved firm, he who brings the banker has power. (3) Declare war on PLO radicals who keep knocking off the moderates.

It may not work. The economic mention may not be strong enough to alter the political. But acting now to stabilize the PLO might be a better investment than paying ransom to freelance assassins that haunt the Middle East. Consider what happened in Beirut: Seventeen months of paying to get Arafat & Co. out, the U.S. had to evacuate 1,200 U.S. Marines. So Washington made still more cash payoffs to Lebanese militias: guarantee the Marines' safety as they withdrew.

Now, as the PLO faces near bankruptcy, may in fact be the last opportunity to influence it. After all, no firm is as amenable to constructive change—or as dangerously prone to destructive fragmentation—as one that is going broke. ■



Address by Ambassador Meir Rosenne

PLO

@ AIPAC Conference

April 6, 1986

Terrorism: Who is Responsible, What can be Done

I will speak today on the problem of terrorism -- who is responsible for it, and what can be done to combat it.

Whenever I address the problem of terrorism, my mind is assailed by searing images which I cannot escape:

* The slaughter of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics.

* The execution of Leon Klinghoffer, shot and pushed into the sea.

* The killing of the 11-year old daughter of the American journalist at Rome airport.

* The standing ovation given to Yasser Arafat by the United Nations in 1974, when Secretary General Waldheim greeted him, and he sat with his gun in the chair reserved for Presidents.

* The standing ovation at the 1980 World Conference on Women in Copenhagen, afforded to the PLO terrorist Leila Haled, who hijacked a plane.

* The terrorist holding his hand over the mouth of the pilot of TWA Flight 874 at Beirut airport last year.

TERRORISM

Forbes

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PLO

Terror's bottom line

By Heath Kestin

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The PLO is clearly in financial trouble and has begun playing the sort of slow-pay, no-pay games typical of the cash-starved. In Cyprus, for example, a diplomatic and operational key spot, where the PLO has always paid its bills, the local office recently had to have its arm twisted to pay for damages caused by a bomb in a house it rented, and a travel agency is suing for nonpayment of air tickets. Both claims total less than \$15,000.

Here's the expanding expense side of the PLO balance sheet:

- Diplomatic and propaganda offices in some 100 countries cost about \$50 million a year. Arafat has called for a 25% cut. No chance. The PLO's U.N. observer office, for example, now in its own five-story brick town house worth up to \$3 million on Manhattan's posh Upper East Side, won't be moved to a scruffier neighborhood. Loss of this front of respectability would erode PLO stature.

- In 7 hospitals (in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria) and 20 clinics, the PLO offers Palestinians free medical services through the Palestine Red Crescent. Annual cost is \$20 million. Arafat can't cut his Red Crescent without losing grassroots support—besides, his brother runs it.

- Sons of the Fallen is a PLO arm providing widows and heirs of Palestinian "martyrs" with pensions and free education. This costs \$40 million and, as one PLO official ruefully ad-

mitted, every year there are more martyrs and higher costs. Cutbacks could further rip the PLO apart.

- To keep its place in the hearts and minds of Arabs living in areas controlled by Israel since 1967, the PLO normally spends about \$90 million a year. That supports highly politicized colleges, where some 15,000 Palestinians study (6,000 more are studying abroad, mostly in the Eastern bloc), subsidizes newspapers and pays for legal defense of captured terrorists.

An Arab convicted of terrorism routinely has his house torn down by Israeli authorities. Just as routinely, the PLO provides money to rebuild. It also lends money for housing, farming and small businesses. Now, though, it has cut these payments and subsidies to one-third their normal level. But there's a limit to parsimony. King Hussein of Jordan vies for power by moving money into the West Bank as well. He pays salaries, for example, to ex-civil servants in the area he controlled from 1948 to 1967. Without losing influence, the PLO can't cut back indefinitely.

- And all this is aside from the expense of providing for up to 14,000 fighting men: salaries, uniforms, shelter, transport, food, medicine, intelligence, communications, training, propaganda and dependent families. Apart from the cost of weapons, which the Russians are probably subsidizing, the tab is not less than \$100 million. And this doesn't include another \$10 million to support some 400 bureaucrats sitting in Tunis and supposedly running the show. Cutting back on their offices, villas, cars and perks could set off a palace revolt. And trimming among the field troops might provoke a replay of 1983, when 4,000 PLO fighters opted for Syrian support and turned their guns on Arafat's mainstream forces. In addition, as more PLO forces return, Lebanon is

going to take more money in the coming years, not less.

• The PLO also has an odd assortment of miscellaneous expenses in Third World countries, what it calls "friendship" projects. For instance, it operates at least four large and unprofitable model farms in Africa, and most recently had to dump \$30 million into a new \$100 million cement plant in South Yemen. Why? South Yemen was one of the few countries to take PLO troops after the Beirut evacuation. "A very marginal deal," said a banker close to it. "Rent."

So the PLO has few, if any, places to cut expenses. And the income side is even grimmer. Its finances suffered a severe blow when the PLO was driven out of Lebanon. Through its control of the ports, the PLO was able to import its own goods duty-free while charging "customs" for everyone else's. Sweetheart agreements with Eastern bloc countries brought cement and steel in at below-market prices, allowing PLO dominance of the Lebanese construction industry. (From a single captured Beirut warehouse, Israel carted away steel valued at \$30 million.) At the height of its power, PLO factories profitably employed over 6,500 people making everything from army boots to films. The take from such traditional Lebanese cottage industries as smuggling and drug-running went, too.

The PLO's constituent terror groups have their own money—terror is, unfortunately, a cheap and cost-effective way of making your voice heard. But as one intelligence officer put it, "There's enough cash for terrorism but too little for a government-in-exile." Basically, the umbrella organization has only three sources of income, all unstable or drying up:

• At the 1978 Baghdad summit to promote Arab solidarity in the face of Israeli-Egyptian peace, seven countries pledged a total of \$3 billion over ten years. Some countries reneged entirely, others just partly. Now only Saudi Arabia pays—a total of \$29 million last year, far short of its \$87 million commitment.

What happened to Arab solidarity? Declining oil revenues is the common excuse. But to Kuwait, for example, whose budget last year was \$9.4 billion, an annual donation of \$47 million is peanuts. The real explanation is the PLO's own political and military decline: Arab nations are less afraid of the organization than they were. Kuwait is simply paying a far smaller sum as bomb insurance to the PLO's subgroups. Libya has its own band of terrorists and refuses to pay at all.

• Taxation, voluntary or otherwise, is another source of funds. In theory, the PLO taps the pockets of 2.7 million Palestinians outside of Israeli control (Jerusalem taxes the 2 million within) through Arab governments, which tax resident Palestinians on the PLO's behalf. But only Kuwait, a sixth of whose population is Palestinian, regularly forks over—last year's take was \$10.5 million. Other countries simply pocket the tax.

Wherever they are, Palestinians give out of sentiment or to cover themselves from the wrath of emissaries putting on the bite. But high estimates put revenues at less than \$25 million a year from both taxes

The PLO's ominous balance sheet

Its growing expenses and shrinking income are a grim and virtually certain indicator that terrorism will only get worse.

Income (millions)	
Return on \$1 billion in investments (mainly U.S. and Western European securities)	\$100.0
Saudi Arabian support	29.0
Voluntary contributions	14.5
Taxes collected from Palestinians in Kuwait	10.5
Total	154.0

Expenses (millions)	
Military operations	\$100
Subsidies: housing, legal defense, publications, businesses and colleges in Israeli-administered territories	90
Representative offices worldwide	50
Survivors' benefits (Sons of the Fallen)	40
Health services (Palestine Red Crescent)	20
Administrative headquarters in Tunis	10
Total	310

Note: All figures are for 1985.

and contributions—not a lot, not about to grow.

• This leaves investments, and don't believe what you read in some newspapers about a \$5 billion portfolio on which the PLO rakes in a cool \$1 billion a year. According to sources close enough to smell the ink, the PLO has no more than \$1 billion out making \$100 million, most of it in U.S. and Western European paper, plus U.S. blue-chip stocks. A conservative and highly liquid portfolio. The PLO, pushed from one country to another, is understandably property-averse. And it fears that other nations may seize what property it still has.

Some PLO money is managed by the \$13.5 billion (assets) Arab Bank Ltd. Group of Jordan, which handles the PLO's working accounts. It is al-

most certainly part-owned by the PLO. A close friend of Arafat's sits on the board, and the bank has backed Palestinian nationalism for 56 years. Aside from 97 offices (2 in New York) in 23 countries, 2 secret branches exist in Nablus and Jerusalem, areas supposedly abandoned by the Arab Bank after the Six Day War. The Jerusalem office is in a travel agency where loans are processed; its cashiers are the Arab money changers down the street.

When your uncuttable expenditures reach \$310 million and your income is half of that, you need more bread. Where can Arafat turn? The Soviets? They support the Syrians, Arafat's enemy. The only alternative for the PLO is not East but West.

But who wants Arafat? First, his résumé could be written in blood. Second, only in February he walked out of a promising agreement with Jordan to sit down and negotiate with Israel. King Hussein, joined by a former PLO intelligence chief, has all but called for Arafat's replacement by a moderate willing to jaw with the Jews.

Not our business? If the PLO falls apart, the ensuing terror is going to make M. Qaddafi look like W. Disney. Abu Abbas, architect of the *Achille Lauro* incident, has already threatened to bring terrorism to America.

But if the U.S. really means to keep the PLO from falling apart, it will probably have to do at least three things: (1) Pressure the Saudis and Kuwaitis to back a more moderate PLO leader and withdraw their support from Arafat. (2) Provide discreet U.S. aid through Palestinian moderates to help the PLO keep itself intact. In a cash-starved firm, he who brings the banker has power. (3) Declare covert war on PLO radicals who keep knocking off the moderates.

It may not work. The economic dimension may not be strong enough to alter the political. But acting now to stabilize the PLO might be a better investment than paying ransom later to freelance assassins that haunt the Middle East. Consider what happened in Beirut: Seventeen months after paying to get Arafat & Co. out, the U.S. had to evacuate 1,200 U.S. Marines. So Washington made still secret cash payoffs to Lebanese militias to guarantee the Marines' safety as they withdrew.

Now, as the PLO faces near bankruptcy, may in fact be the last, best opportunity to influence it. After all, no firm is as amenable to constructive change—or as dangerously prone to destructive fragmentation—as one that is going broke. ■

AIDL RESEARCH REPORT

P.L.O. and Palestinian-Inspired Terrorism, 1982-1985: The Continuing Record of Violence

AIDL RESEARCH REPORT

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P.L.O. AND PALESTINIAN-INSPIRED TERRORISM, 1982-1985:

THE CONTINUING RECORD OF VIOLENCE

Overview

In the three years since chairman Yasser Arafat and thousands of his gun-toting Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists were expelled from Lebanon in the wake of Israel's "Operation Peace for Galilee," the PLO, its allies and other violence-prone Palestinians have carried out terrorist actions on an average of once a week in locations around the world.

Since September 1, 1982 when Arafat and his gunmen sailed out of Beirut harbor and dispersed to Tunis and other places in the Arab world, Palestinian terrorists, as in the 15 previous years, have waged continuous warfare against Zionism and the Jewish state of Israel but have struck at the capitals and major cities of other countries worldwide:

Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bogota, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Lanarca, London, Madrid, Marseilles, Milan, New Delhi, Nicosia, Paris, Quito, Rome and Vienna.

All these cities have been the scenes of terror by the PLO, its allies and other armed Palestinians. The main target has been Israel and most of the victims there have been Jews. But innocent and unarmed citizens of countries far from the Middle East itself, and of all religious faiths and nationalities, have also been casualties and mankind itself has been victimized.

Even some of the Palestinians' fellow Arabs, perceived by them as too willing to make peace with Israel, have been targets. (Issam Sartawi, with a widespread reputation as a moderate within the PLO itself, was shot to death while in Portugal during April, 1983.) The capitals of Arab states perceived as too moderate towards Israel -- Amman and Cairo -- have likewise been the scenes of Palestinian-inspired terror.

In the wake of the 1982 defeat it suffered at the hands of the Israelis in Lebanon, the PLO was not only dispersed and its infrastructure destroyed but it has undergone a process of dissension and fragmentation. The PLO has always been an umbrella group for assorted violent factions committed to the destruction of Zionism and Israel. But since 1982, new terrorist groupings and regroupings have emerged.

The PLO's ideological root -- the concept of "revolutionary armed struggle" to eliminate Israel -- has remained unchanged. It remains unchanged because the PLO has always known that it could not defeat Israel militarily and has instead used a continuing war of terror against the Jewish state, but waged in streets and cities around the world.

It might have been hoped that with its 1982 defeat in Lebanon, the destruction of its infrastructure there, and its dispersion to Tunis and other Arab countries, the PLO's terrorist activities would subside. But that has not been the case.

The hijacking of the "Achille Lauro" during October, 1985, epitomized, in a sense, the true nature of the campaign of terror waged by the PLO, its allies, and other Palestinian terrorists. The target was an Italian cruise ship. The terrorized were 431 passengers and crew of various nationalities. The victim was an American Jew bound to a wheelchair who was shot in the head and thrown into the sea.

The PLO is Not a Monolith

The PLO was designated in 1974 as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" but it is not, and never has been, a monolith. Before its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, where it had brought violence, turmoil and civil war to a peaceful country after being expelled from Jordan in September, 1970, the PLO was essentially an umbrella organization for eight terrorist groupings. Since its expulsion from Beirut in 1982, divisions within the PLO have taken new forms.

- * Fatah, Arafat's own major organization within the PLO, was racked by dissension over his leadership. A harder-line faction critical of Arafat and led by Col. Saed Abu Musa, broke away from Arafat's mainline Fatah group and allied itself with Syria. With Syrian support, Abu Musa was instrumental in expelling Arafat from Lebanon a second time, late in 1983, after the Fatah chieftain had returned there in September of that year.

- * The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) comprises three factions within the PLO. One of these is led by Mohammed Abul Abbas -- known as Abu Abbas -- who is a close Arafat ally and supported Arafat when the PLO broke up into pro-Syrian and pro-Arafat segments during 1984. In return, Arafat personally, and successfully, proposed Abbas for election to the PLO's ruling 11-member Executive Committee at the November, 1984 meeting of the Palestine National Council in Amman. An October 11, 1985 New York Times dispatch described the Abbas faction as "little more than an extension of Mr. Arafat's own El Fatah group" -- a significant fact in view of the role played by the Abbas PLO faction in the recent "Achille Lauro" hijacking and the murder of an American-Jewish passenger. The Abbas faction is headquartered in Iraq.

A second PLF faction is led by Taalat Yacoub and is aligned with Abu Musa's anti-Arafat grouping. It is mainly based in Lebanon.

A third PLF faction, headed by Abdul Fitah Ghanem, is reported to have taken over the offices of the Palestine Liberation Front in Syria, and is Syrian-controlled.

- * In March, 1985, Col. Musa's breakaway Fatah faction joined five other PLO factions in establishing the Palestine National Salvation Front, with headquarters in Damascus. The Front, supported by Syria, strongly opposes Arafat's policies as leader of the PLO. Among the other factions in the Front are George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which is Marxist-Leninist in orientation and three pro-Syrian groups within the PLO umbrella -- the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), led

by Ahmed Gibril, the Popular Struggle Front, and Saiqa. It was with the PFLP-GC that Israel, in the Spring of 1985, exchanged 1,150 Arab prisoners, mostly terrorists detained for their activities, for three Israeli prisoners of war held by the PFLP-GC. Some observers have blamed this exchange for the upsurge of terrorism in the latter part of 1985, both inside Israel and elsewhere in the world.

- One PLO faction that is critical of Arafat's leadership, but remains independent of Syrian control, is the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) led by Naif Hawatmeh. This Marxist-Leninist group is oriented toward the Soviet Union. It has refused to join the PLO Executive Committee or the National Salvation Front.

- Another Palestinian terrorist group that is outside the PLO umbrella is the Abu Nidal faction. Abu Nidal is the war name for a Palestinian terrorist, Sabri al Banna, who was expelled from the PLO in 1974 on charges of plotting the death of Arafat. This group has struck at Jewish targets and at Arab targets it feels may be willing to come to terms with Israel.

[There is another source of terrorism in the Middle East: The Shi'ite Moslem groups headquartered in Lebanon, some supported by the Khomeini regime in Iran, who have turned to terrorism in the past several years both in the Middle East and elsewhere. Their targets have included Israelis, Americans, and Jews in other parts of the world. While their methods are similar to those of the Palestinian terrorists, they are not considered allies or proxies of the PLO and have shown hostility to the Palestinians.]

Hijacking of the 'Achille Lauro'

Even though the PLO is fragmented, the group and its allies have not wavered in their ideology of "armed struggle" or commitment to the destruction of Israel; terrorism continues to be the main manifestation of their continuing struggle. It was one of the smaller factions of the PLO, the Arafat-oriented PLF group headed by Mohammed Abul Abbas, which carried out the recent hijacking of the Italian cruise ship "Achille Lauro," an act which attracted world-wide attention.

The four PLF terrorists hijacked the ship on October 7, 1985 as it left Alexandria, Egypt. The "Achille Lauro" was on an 11-day Mediterranean cruise, with a stop scheduled in Ashdod, Israel. The terrorists originally planned to launch their terrorist attack as soon as the ship reach Israel.

Their weapons, however, were discovered on board. The terrorists took over the ship at gunpoint with 431 passengers and crew as prisoners. They made their demands known: that 50 Arab prisoners held by Israel be released. Among these were PLF members, the most prominent of whom was Sami al Qantari, who led a terrorist attack on the Israeli town of Nahariya in April, 1979 and killed an Israeli father and his four-year-old daughter. The terrorists forced the "Achille Lauro" to sail toward Syria. Off the Syrian port of Tartus, they demanded that the Syrians press for the release of the 50 prisoners by Israel.

To underscore their intent, they threatened to kill passengers. Then they carried out their threat. Leon Klinghoffer, a 69-year-old wheelchair bound New Yorker, and a Jew, was the victim. He was shot in the head and his body was thrown into the sea.

The Syrian government refused to grant the hijackers' demands, and the "Achille Lauro" turned back toward Egyptian waters. There the hijacking ended. PLF leader Mohammed Abul Abbas had flown to Cairo, and was able to negotiate a deal for the terrorists: they would be given safe passage out of Egypt if they released the ship. (It was the same Abul Abbas who claimed responsibility on behalf of the PLF for the terrorist act in Nahariya in 1979 whose perpetrator the hijackers of the "Achille Lauro" were trying to free.)

Despite American objections, and the murder of an American citizen by the terrorists, the Egyptian government decided to send the four terrorists out of Egypt on an Egyptian airliner. The plane carrying the terrorists was intercepted over the Mediterranean, in international waters, by U.S. Navy planes, and was forced to fly to Sicily. There the terrorists were taken over by Italian troops.

The body of Leon Klinghoffer washed ashore in Syria, and was turned over to American representatives. An autopsy proved beyond doubt that he had been shot in the head despite denials by various PLO officials.

Terrorism Continues Unabated

Even after the Achille Lauro episode had ended, and the international attention it attracted was subsiding, PLO and Palestinian-inspired terrorism continued:

-- On October 9, a fire bomb was thrown at Israeli soldiers in Jenin, on the West Bank. There were no casualties.

-- On October 10, in Barcelona, Spain, the bodies of two Israeli merchant seamen, who had been missing for several days, were found. They had been murdered. An elite PLO unit, Force 17, claimed responsibility for the murders.

-- On October 13, a 70-year-old Israeli merchant was attacked from behind with an axe while shopping in a store in Khan Yunis, on the Gaza Strip.

-- On October 14, a gasoline bomb was thrown at an Israeli bus near Ramallah, on the West Bank. One passenger was wounded.

-- On October 18, an Israeli tourist guide who was leading a Danish family through an ancient church on the West Bank near Nablus, was attacked by terrorists. He was stabbed.

-- Also on October 18, a Jewish man was stabbed in the back, as he was shopping in the Gaza Strip.

-- In still another terrorist attack on October 18, firebombs were thrown at a school bus carrying Jewish students near the village of Shaked, on the West Bank. No one was hurt.

-- On October 20, a bomb exploded at a marketplace in Beersheba. There were no injuries.

-- Also on October 20, a bomb exploded near a bus stop on a street in Jaffa. One passerby was injured.

The Malta Hijacking

On November 23, 1985, armed terrorists described as Palestinians by the Egyptian government and calling themselves members of "Egypt's Revolution," hijacked an Egyptian airliner bound from Athens to Cairo with 91 passengers and six crew aboard, and diverted it to Malta. After collecting passports, according to the airliner captain, the terrorists began methodically to shoot passengers and threatened to kill one every fifteen minutes. They started with two Israeli women, the first of whom was shot "at point blank range," the captain said, and thrown from the plane.

Later, the captain said, there were other shootings, six in all, but he said he was able to persuade the terrorists to allow nine women to leave the plane.

Between the shootings, the captain said, one hijacker talked with him about the Arab cause and the Palestinian problem. When Egyptian forces started storming the plane, the captain said, the hijackers threw three grenades into the plane's passenger cabin, devastating the airliner and killing many more on board.

Arafat's 'Cairo Declaration'

In early November, following a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo, Yasser Arafat said that the PLO would limit its armed assaults to targets in Israel and Israeli-controlled territories and that those carrying out actions outside Israel or the territories would be punished if unarmed civilians were harmed. While condemning terrorist acts against unarmed civilians outside Israel, Arafat emphasized that attacks would continue in Israel and the territories over which it gained control in 1967, and reaffirmed the PLO's commitment to armed struggle against Israel "in all possible ways."

Israeli officials dismissed Arafat's statement as a public relations tactic designed to improve the PLO's image in the West, and foresaw no change at all in PLO terrorism. Simcha Dinitz, a member of the Israeli parliament and former Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., observed that Arafat's statement meant that "stabbing Jews on their way to prayers at the [Western] Wall will be permitted, but killing Americans on a ship will be forbidden."

Arafat's statement, moreover, made clear that the PLO remains inherently committed to terror and that he did not reject terror as a key PLO tactic.

What Arafat said in effect was that terrorism against unarmed non-Israeli civilians outside Israel itself, and outside the territories over which Israel gained control in 1967, has been counterproductive. He said:

"Incidents have affirmed the PLO's conviction that terrorist acts committed outside have adverse effects on the Palestinian people's cause and disfigure their legal resistance for freedom."

In other words, in his so-called "Cairo declaration," Arafat said that terrorism is neither evil nor illegitimate per se but that in the present period, at least, terrorism is not in the PLO's best interests when carried on outside Israel. For the present, Arafat said, the terrorist spigot outside Israel should be turned off. It can, of course, be turned on again whenever the PLO finds it expedient.

Arafat, moreover, is unable -- or unwilling -- to control all the Palestinian terrorist groupings, underscoring the disingenuous nature of his statement and of his declaration that those committing terrorist acts outside Israeli-held territory would be punished if unarmed civilians were harmed.

Conclusion

In the past three years, since the PLO was expelled from Beirut, terrorism has been "business as usual" for the PLO, its factions, its allies, and other Palestinian terrorists around the world. Although Israel has been the main target, the terrorism has been transnational.

Arab governments, some described as "moderate," have supported the PLO and kept it alive. The United Nations supports the PLO and accords it honor and respect. The PLO has been allowed to open and maintain offices in countries around the world.

Despite this patina of respectability, the PLO refuses to make peace with Israel, and accept Israel in the community of nations. Despite their splits and disagreements over tactics, the PLO and other Palestinian terrorists remain united by the one goal that has always bound them together -- the destruction of the State of Israel.

#

A CHRONOLOGY

P.L.O. AND PALESTINIAN-INSPIRED TERRORISM:

SEPTEMBER, 1982 TO OCTOBER, 1985

1982

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
9/15/82	Rome, Italy	A bomb exploded near the central synagogue while David Levy, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister was addressing the congregation.	-	-	-
9/16/82	Madrid, Spain	A Kuwaiti Embassy official was shot to death and his driver wounded.	1 killed 1 wounded	Kuwaiti Spanish	A Palestinian claiming to be a killer was arrested.
9/18/82	Brussels, Belgium	Four Jewish worshipers were wounded in a machine-gun attack on a synagogue during Rosh Hashanah services.	4 wounded	Belgiums	The attack was traced to the Abu Nidal faction.
9/23/82	Bogota, Colombia	Terrorists riddled the Israeli ambassador's house with bullets and tossed bombs at the house.	-	-	-
9/27/82	Frankfurt, West Germany	Bombs exploded in front of a travel agency specializing in trips to Israel, and in front of the offices of Sperry Rand Corp., which manufactures equipment used to produce weapons for export to Israel.	1 killed 1 wounded	German German	-
9/29/82	Milan, Italy	A bomb was detonated in front of the door of the city's main synagogue.	-	-	Four terrorists belonging to the Communists Organized for Proletarian Liberation, were charged with the attack. The group was linked to several extreme left-wing terrorists organizations working in tandem with the PLO.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
10/9/82	Rome, Italy	Terrorists threw hand grenades and fired submachineguns at worshippers leaving a synagogue, killing a 2-year-old boy and wounding 34.	1 killed 34 wounded	Italian Italians	The attack was traced to the Abu Nidal faction. In March, 1985, a Palestinian who had just finished serving a prison sentence in Greece for smuggling explosives was extradited to Italy to stand trial for the synagogue attack.
10/20/82	Hebron, West Bank	An Israeli civilian was stabbed in the back as he walked through the marketplace.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
10/24/82	Tel Aviv, Israel	A bomb planted near the central bus station station was found and defused.	-	-	-
11/7/82	Gaza Strip	A grenade tossed at an Israeli Army jeep was thrown into the street where it exploded, killing and wounding 5 Arabs	1 killed 4 wounded	Arab Arabs	-
11/21/82	Tel Aviv, Israel	A bomb exploded at a bus stop near the central railroad station.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
11/26/82	Quito, Ecuador	A bomb exploded at the Israeli Embassy.	2 killed 2 wounded	Ecuadorans Ecuadorans	Terrorists from El Salvador including Palestinian elements, were believed responsible.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
12/82	Ra'anana Tel Aviv & Petach Tikva	A terrorist gang was broken up after carrying out several attacks. In Petach Tikva, 3 were killed and 25 wounded.	3 killed 25 wounded	Israelis Israelis	The terrorists belonged to Fatah.
12/82	Tel Aviv, Israel	Half a dozen bombs had been left in bus stations around the city over a period of several weeks.	-	-	-
12/14/82	Herzlia, Israel	A bomb exploded aboard a bus. All passengers had been evacuated, so there were no casualties	-	-	-

1983

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1/8/83	Tel Aviv, Israel	Terrorists attacked a bus with grenades.	12 wounded	Israelis	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
1/18/83	Kfar Saba, Israel	A car driven by an Israeli civilian struck a mine. The driver was injured.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
1/30/83	West Bank	An Israeli woman passenger of a passenger car was hit in the head by a rock thrown through the windshield, and died two weeks later.	1 killed	Israeli	-
2/15/83	Gaza Strip	An Israeli was shot to death by terrorists in a Gaza market.	1 killed	Israeli	-
2/25/83	Israel	Five Bedouin were killed and four wounded when their vehicles hit mines in the central Negev area.	5 killed 4 wounded	Israeli (Bedouins)	
2/26/83	Marseilles, France	A bomb was placed in a crowded Jewish meeting hall, where children were about to stage a Purim show. The bomb was found and defused.	-	-	-
4/10/83	Albufeira, Portugal	Issam Sartawi, a Palestinian moderate, was shot to death.	1 killed	Arab	The Abu Nidal faction claimed responsibility. However, there was a report that a PLO revolutionary court, presided by Yasser Arafat, had sentenced Sartawi to death.
5/9/83	Amman, Jordan	Offices of two American organizations were damaged by explosives.	-	-	-

1983

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
5/10/83	Gaza Strip	An Israeli civilian was shot to death while shopping in a market.	1 killed	Israeli	-
5/19/83	Troy, AL	A heavily armed Palestinian who stored ammunition in an artificial leg killed one and wounded four others.	1 killed 4 wounded	American 3 Arabs visiting the U.S. and 1 American	Authorities said the perpetrator might be linked to the PLO.
6/28/83	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb exploded in a supermarket.	2 wounded	Israelis	-
7/3/83	Beitshean, Israel	Two Katyusha rockets were fired from Jordan at Beitshean.	-	-	-
7/7/83	Hebron, West Bank	An Israeli yeshiva student was stabbed to death in a marketplace.	1 killed	Israeli	-
7/10/83	Lebanon	Two Italian journalists were kidnapped by a PLO group and taken to Syrian controlled territory.	2 kidnapped	Italians	-
8/1/83	West Bank	Terrorists fired at a car on the Nablus-Tulkarm road, wounding the two Israelis in vehicle.	2 wounded	Israelis	-
8/23/83	Athens, Greece	A PLO official was shot to death.	1 killed	Arab	A faction of Fatah claimed responsibility for the killing.
8/31/83	London,	Two bombs exploded in London, one damaging an	-	-	-

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
9/13/83	Hamburg, West Germany	An Israeli businessman was shot to death.	1 killed	Israeli	The September 17 Sabra and Shatila Organization claimed responsibility for the killing.
9/24/83	Nablus, West Bank	A hand grenade was tossed into a municipal parking lot.	5 wounded	2 Israelis 3 Arabs	-
9/83	Cairo, Egypt	Seven Palestinians were arrested in Cairo attempting to bomb several targets in the Egyptian capital.	-	-	The 7 were members of the Abu Nidal faction.
10/5/83	Lebanon	A car bomb killed a pro-Israeli Moslem militia commander.	1 killed	Lebanese	The PLO said that the man was a traitor to the Arab cause, and had been killed by Lebanese and Palestinian resistance fighters.
10/13- 11/12/83	Amman, Jordan Rome, Italy New Delhi, India, Athens, Greece	There were several bombings in Amman, and Jordanian envoys in Rome, New Delhi and Athens were shot and wounded.	5 wounded	Jordanians	Jordanian intelligence has linked the Abu Nidal faction to all the attacks.
11/20/83	Paris, France	A terrorist riding a motorcycle hurled a bomb into a Jewish-owned restaurant, injuring 30 diners.	30 wounded	French	-
11/28/83	Nablus, West Bank	An Israeli civilian was attacked with an axe in the city's market place.	1 wounded	Israeli	-

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
12/83	Athens, Greece	A woman unwittingly carried a bomb-laden suitcase for an Arab terrorist group from Athens to Tel Aviv, and Tel Aviv to London aboard El Al, Israel's airline. The bomb malfunctioned.	-	-	The terrorist group responsible was the 15 May group, based in Iraq and led by Abu Ibrahim, a Palestinian.
12/3/83	Bangkok, Thailand	Terrorists fired a rocket-propelled grenade at the Israeli Embassy, punching a hole through a wall.	-	-	-
12/6/83	Jerusalem, Israel	A terrorist bomb exploded inside a crowded bus, killing and wounding 50 people.	6 killed 44 wounded	5 Israelis 1 American Israelis	The pro-Arafat faction of the PLO claimed responsibility for the bombing. A dissident PLO faction also claimed responsibility.
12/19/83	Nablus, West Bank	A molotov cocktail was tossed at an IDF patrol.	-	-	-
12/24/83	Malta	A gunman shot at and slightly wounded Israel's top diplomat in Malta.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
12/29/83	Madrid, Spain	A gunman shot and killed a Jordanian Embassy employee and wounded another.	1 killed 1 wounded	Jordanian Jordanian	The attack was traced to the Abu Nidal faction.
12/29/83	Hampton, VA	A bomb scare forced the evacuation of 3,500 shoppers from a mall.	-	-	A man identifying himself as a member of the PLO phoned in bomb threat.

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
12/31/83	Marseilles, France	A bomb exploded at the city's railroad s and another aboard a train 120 miles to the north on its way to Paris.	5 killed 50+ wounded	French French	The Armed Arab Struggle, a terrorist organization linked to the international terrorist Carlos the Jackal, claimed responsibility for the attacks.

1984

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1/1/84	Rome, Italy	A bomb exploded in front of the office of El Al, Israel's airline.	-	-	-
2/28/84	Jerusalem, Israel	Two terrorist grenades exploded on a busy shopping street.	21 wounded	17 Israelis 4 Arabs	Two Palestinian groups claimed responsibility - the DFLP and the Abu Nidal faction. Yasser Arafat praised the bombing.
3/7/84	Ashdod, Israel	A terrorist bomb exploded aboard a bus.	3 killed 9 wounded	Israelis Israelis	The Abu Nidal faction claimed responsibility for the bombing.
3/24/84	Amman, Jordan	A bomb exploded outside a hotel, and another was found near the U.S. and British embassies was defused.	2 wounded	Jordanians	The Abu Nidal faction claimed responsibility for the attack.
4/2/84	Jerusalem, Israel	Three terrorists armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades attacked shoppers on a busy street in the middle of the city. One terrorist was killed, the other two captured.	1 killed 48 wounded	Arab (terrorist) Israelis	The DFLP, led by Naif Hawatmeh, claimed responsibility for this attack. This was confirmed by Israeli security forces.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
4/5/84	Jerusalem, Israel	Two terrorist bombs were found, thanks to alert Israeli citizens, and defused.	-	-	-
4/12/84	Tel Aviv, Israel	Four terrorists hijacked an intercity bus and held the 35 passengers as hostages. IDF troops stormed the bus, killing two of the hijackers. The other two were later killed by Israeli soldiers, as was disclosed in an official report on the incident.	5 killed 7 wounded	1 Israeli 4 Arabs (terror- ists) Israelis	The PFLP, led by George Habash, claimed responsibility for the hijacking.
4/23/84	Qalqiliya, West Bank	A terrorist bomb exploded at the side of the road.	2 wounded	Israelis	
5/3/84	Nicosia, Cyprus	A Palestinian journalist, reportedly opposed to Yasser Arafat, was shot to death.	1 killed	Arab	A caller from the Arab Popular Liberation Movement blamed Arafat supporters for the act.
5/11/84	Hebron, West Bank	Two terrorists armed with pistols and grenades infiltrated the West Bank from Jordan. They ran into an IDF patrol and were killed in a shootout.	2 killed	Arabs (terror- ists)	Documents found on the scene identified the terrorists as members of Fatah. A Damascus-based group, the Fatah Interim Leadership said that two of its men had been killed in a clash with the IDF.

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6/5/84	Golan Heights	Four terrorists infiltrated from Syria. They were spotted by an IDF patrol and captured.	1 wounded	Arab (terrorist)	-
6/5/84	Cairo, Egypt	An Israeli diplomat was shot at from a passing car and slightly wounded.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
6/28/84	Mediterranean Sea	An Israeli gunboat exchanged fire with a boat carrying PLO terrorists leaving a terrorist training base on an island. The boat was sunk, and all aboard drowned. Five Israeli sailors were wounded in the exchange.	5 wounded	Israeli	-
7/18/84	Mediterranean Sea	Israeli gunboats seized a Lebanese ship which was involved in a PLO attempt to land terrorists in Israel. The ship had lowered a dinghy several weeks earlier with four terrorists aboard to launch an attack. The assault failed.	-	-	-
7/26/84	Kibbutz Neve Eitan, Israel	Two Katyusha rockets were fired at this settlement.	-	-	-
8/10/85	West Bank	An Israeli soldier was found shot to death near an Arab village.	-	-	-
8/15/84	Jerusalem, Israel	A 12-kilogram bomb (26 lbs.) was discovered in the trunk of a car parked on a busy street. It was defused safely.	-	-	Painted on the bottom of the car were the words "Fatah" and "Sabra and Shatila."
8/20/84	Paris, France	A bomb exploded outside the Paris branch of Bank Leumi.	-	-	-

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9/14/84	Rafah, Gaza Strip	The mayor of this Gaza Strip town was assassinated on his way home from a mosque.	1 killed	Arab	According to Damascus Radio, he was assassinated for collaborating with the Israeli authorities.
9/17/84	Beersheba, Israel	An intercity bus was sprayed with gunfire on a highway south of the city. A car following the bus was also hit.	7 wounded	5 Israelis 2 Arabs (in the car)	The attack occurred on the second anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres in Lebanon.
9/23/84	Mediterranean Sea	An Israeli gunboat intercepted a dinghy with five terrorists aboard, forcing it to land in Israeli-held territory in southern Lebanon. In an exchange of fire with an IDF patrol, three terrorists were killed, and the other two captured.	3 killed	Arabs (terrorists)	-
9/24-25/84	Jerusalem, Israel	Two terrorist bombs, one in a supermarket and the other in the underground parking lot of an apartment building, were found and safely defused.	-	-	-
10/4/84	Nicosia, Cyprus	A bomb-laden car exploded in a parking lot outside the Israeli embassy.	-	-	A PLO faction led by Col. Said Mussa claimed responsibility for the bombing.
10/6/84	West Bank	Three heavily armed terrorist infiltrated from Jordan on Yom Kippur. All were killed in a shootout with an IDF patrol.	3 killed 1 wounded	Arabs (terrorists) Israeli	-

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type of PLO and Arab Terrorism</u>	<u>Victims and Casualties</u>	<u>Nationality of Victims</u>	<u>Comment</u>
10/15/84	Nablus, West Bank	A terrorist bomb exploded close to a bus carrying Israeli school children on a tour.	7 wounded	Israelis	-
10/22/84	Bethlehem, West Bank	An Arab from a local refugee camp murdered an Israeli man and woman with a stolen army weapon.	2 killed	Israelis	-
11/3/84	Yardena, Israel	Two Katyusha rockets were fired at this Jordan Valley moshav.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
11/12/84	Vienna, Austria	A bomb exploded outside the El Al office.	-	-	-
11/19/84	Ramallah, West Bank	A grenade tossed at the car of the acting mayor of the town, an Israeli, failed to explode.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility saying that the attempt had been successful.
12/17/84	Tel Aviv, Israel	A hand grenade was tossed at a bus as it passed a vegetable market.	3 wounded	Israelis	Both the PLO and the PFLP claimed responsibility for the attack.

1985

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1/16/85	Jordan Valley, Israel	A katyusha rocket was fired at the Jordan Valley from inside Jordanian territory.	-	-	-
1/26/85	West Bank	A firebomb was thrown at a car driven by an Israeli civilian, severely wounding him. He died several days later.	1 killed	Israeli	-
1/31/85	West Bank	A bus enroute to Hebron from Jerusalem was fired upon by terrorists.	2 wounded	Israelis	-
2/4/85	Ramallah, West Bank	A soldier standing on guard outside a government building was shot to death.	1 killed	Israeli	George Habash's PFLP claimed responsibility for the murder.
2/23/85	Paris, France	A bomb exploded at the entrance of the Paris branch of the British-owned Marks & Spencer department store.	1 killed 15 wounded	French 13 French	Several European terrorist groups claimed responsibility but French police felt that Palestinian terrorists were the most likely perpetrators.
2/26/85	Jerusalem, Israel	Two bombs were discovered and safely defused.	-	-	-
3/7/85	Hebron, West Bank	A car driven by Jewish settlers in the area triggered a roadside bomb.	-	-	-
3/21/85	Rome, Italy; Athens, Greece; Nicosia, Cyprus	Bombs exploded in offices of the Royal Jordanian Airlines in all three cities.	5 wounded	?	Black September claimed responsibility for all three attacks. Officials felt that the Abu

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					Nidal faction had adopted the Black September name for these operations. The original Black September PLO terrorist group active in the early 1970's was thought to have disbanded.
3/29/85	Paris, France	A terrorist bomb exploded inside a movie theater showing Jewish films.	20 wounded	French	-
3/31/85	El Bireh, West Bank	An Israeli civilian was shot to death while waiting for a bus.	1 killed	Israeli	The DFLP claimed responsibility for the murder.
4/3/85	Rome, Italy	A rocket was fired at the Jordanian Embassy.	-	-	As in the March 21 attacks, Black September claimed responsibility.
4/4/85	Athens, Greece	A rocket was fired at a Jordanian airliner with 75 passengers and crew aboard as it was preparing to take off from Athens airport. The projectile struck the plane but failed to explode.	-	-	As in the March 21 and April 3 attacks, Black September claimed responsibility.
4/7/85	Petach Tikva, Israel	The battered body of an Israeli soldier who had been brutally murdered was found just south of the city.	1 killed	Israeli	-
4/19/85	Jerusalem, Israel	An Israeli cab driver shot to death.	1 killed	Israeli	-

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4/19/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A small bomb exploded in a city street	-	-	-
4/20/85	Mediterranean Sea	Israeli gunboats sank a freighter with PLO terrorists aboard on their way to attack a target in Tel Aviv. Eight terrorists were captured and 20 drowned.	20 killed	Arabs (terrorists)	A PLO leader in Amman confirmed that the terrorists had been on their way to attack a "military" target in Tel Aviv.
4/25/85	Gaza Strip	An Israeli civilian was stabbed several times as he walked through the market place in Khan Yunis.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
4/25/85	Kiryat Malachi, Israel	A bomb was discovered in the town. It exploded as a police sapper was attempting to defuse it. The sapper was slightly injured.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
4/28/85	Tiberias, Israel	A rocket-propelled grenade was fired from Jordanian territory at an Israeli patrol.	-	-	-
5/85	Cairo, Egypt	A grenade hit an apartment next to the Israeli Embassy.	-	-	-
5/8/85	Mediterranean Sea	Israeli gunboats sank a rubber dinghy with 5 Palestinian terrorists on board as it headed for the Israeli shore. All 5 died.	5 killed	Arabs	-
5/28 and 5/30/85	Afula, Israel	A bomb exploded in the town's center, and two days later, another bomb exploded near the central bus station.	-	-	-
6/6/85	London, England	A Jewish-owned travel agency was damaged in an in an early morning explosion.	-	-	-
6/12/85	Jerusalem,	Three terrorist bombs exploded at bus stations in the city.	-	-	-

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6/17/85	Jerusalem, Israel	Two small bombs exploded in the city, one in Ramot injuring a woman, and the other in the French Hill area causing no injuries.	1 wounded	Israeli	The PLO claimed responsibility for both explosions.
6/18/85	Tel Aviv, Israel	Two large bombs were found, set to explode during peak shopping hours. Both devices were safely defused.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for planting the devices.
6/18/85	Genoa, Italy	The local office of the Israeli-owned Zim shipping company was damaged by a bomb.	-	-	-
6/19/85	Kiryat Gat, Israel	A terrorist bomb exploded near the town's industrial area.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
6/24/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb exploded near a bus stop in the northern part of the city. An eight-year old boy was injured.	1 wounded	Israeli	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
6/26/85	Tel Aviv, Israel	A bomb exploded near the beachfront.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the bombing.
6/27/85	Beth Shemesh, Israel	A terrorist gang murdered two Israelis.	2 killed	Israelis	The gang was composed of residents of a town that was known as a hot-bed of support for the PLO.
7/8/85	Holon, Israel	A bomb exploded at the town's bus station.	5 wounded	Israelis	-
7/10/85	Haifa, Israel	A bomb exploded outside the Haifa district court. Another bomb was safely defused.	-	-	-

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7/11/85	Ashkelon, Israel	A bomb exploded near a hotel.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for both explosions.
7/11/85	Hadera, Israel	A bomb exploded in the main shopping area of the town.	-	-	-
7/19/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A Hebron man attacked a group of young summer campers in the center of the city.	5 wounded	Israelis	-

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7/24/85	Ankara, Turkey	The acting Jordanian ambassador to Turkey was shot to death.	1 killed	Jordanian	As in the March 21, April 3 and April 4 attacks Black September claimed responsibility.
7/26/85	Afula, Israel	Two Israeli teachers, missing for several days, were found murdered.	2 killed	Israelis	Israeli police attributed the murders to Arab terrorists.
7/29/85	Nablus, West Bank	Two terrorists were killed in an explosion while trying to prepare a car bomb.	2 killed	Arabs (terrorists)	-
7/30/85	Nablus, West Bank	An Israeli was shot in the back and killed.	1 killed	Israeli	The Abu Musa faction of the PLO claimed responsibility for the murder.
7/31/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb planted outside a grocery store was found and safely defused.	-	-	-
8/6/85	Nablus, West Bank	Gasoline bombs were tossed at an Israeli border patrol.	2 wounded	Israelis	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
8/10/85	Hebron, West Bank	An Israeli civilian was stabbed while walking through the marketplace.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
8/11/85	Bangkok, Thailand	A bomb exploded near the Israeli Embassy.	-	-	-
8/20/85	Netanya, Israel	A bomb-laden car was discovered in the central bus station. The area was evacuated and the device was detonated by the bomb squad.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for setting the device.

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8/20/85	Cairo, Egypt	Terrorists firing machine guns shot and killed an Israeli diplomat and wounded his wife and secretary as they drove to work.	1 killed 2 wounded	Israeli	A group calling itself Egypt's Revolution claimed responsibility.
8/23/85	Milan, Italy	Two bombs, near Jewish targets, exploded simultaneously. One was near the El Al office, the other near a Jewish social club.	5 wounded	Italians	-
8/23/85	Ashkelon, Israel	Two explosive charges were found and safely defused.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for setting the device.
8/24/85	North Galilee, Israel	Katyusha rockets were fired into northern Galilee from south Lebanon.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
8/24/85	Tulkarm and Jenin, West Bank	Palestinian terrorists shot at Israelis in the West Bank towns, killing one in Tulkarm and one in Jenin.	1 killed 1 wounded	Israeli Israeli	Three groups, the PLO, Force 17 - an elite PLO group which is part of Yasser Arafat's personal security team - and the Abu Nidal faction all claimed responsibility for the murders.
8/24/85 and 8/31/85	Mediterranean Sea	A yacht carrying eight PLO terrorists was captured, and a week later another vessel with PLO terrorists on board was apprehended. Both groups of terrorists were planning to attack targets inside Israel.	-	-	The PLO terrorists were members of Force 17.

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8/27/85	Istanbul, Turkey	The local office of El Al Israel Airlines was damaged by a bomb.	-	-	-
8/29/85	Jerusalem, Israel	An Israeli civilian was stabbed in the neck near the Damascus Gate.	1 wounded	Israeli	A young Arab from a village near Hebron on the West Bank was charged with the attack.
9/2/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb exploded in the Gilo suburb.	6 wounded	Israelis	The PLO and the Abu Musa faction of the PLO claimed responsibility.
9/3/85	Hebron, Israel	Two Israeli soldiers were victims of knife attacks.	1 killed 1 wounded	Israeli Israeli	-
9/5/85	Gaza Strip	An Israeli civilian was attacked with a knife as he was delivering gasoline to a local service station.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
9/5/85	Nablus, West Bank	Terrorists threw two gasoline bombs at a bus passing the area. There were no passengers aboard.	-	-	-
9/6/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A pipe bomb exploded near a crowded market place.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the bombing.
9/9/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A firebomb was tossed at a bus, while a bomb was safely defused in Gilo, where a bomb had exploded the previous week.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for setting the Gilo bomb.
9/10/85	Ramallah, West Bank	A fire bomb was tossed at an Israeli car parked near a hospital.	-	-	-

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9/15/85	Copenhagen, Denmark	Two bombs exploded on the eve of Rosh Hashanah outside a kosher food store and a travel agency specializing in trips to Israel.	12 wounded	Danes	-
9/16/85	Rome, Italy	A grenade was tossed into a cafe filled with diners. A Lebanese-born Palestinian was arrested and charged with the attack.	38 wounded	9 Americans 29 Italians	The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems, thought to have ties with the Abu Nidal faction claimed responsibility.
9/19/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A gasoline bomb was thrown at a bus stop on Mt. Zion. It was the second bombing at the same spot within a week.	-	-	
9/22/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A booby-trapped vehicle was safely disarmed.	-	-	-
9/23/85	Acre, Israel	A bomb exploded in the main street of the town.	1 wounded	Israeli	-
9/25//85	Lanarca, Cyprus	On Yom Kippur, three Palestinian terrorists boarded an Israeli yacht docked at the port and were captured after a 10-hour siege during which they killed the three Israelis aboard.	3 killed	Israelis	The PLO disclaimed responsibility, but a caller to the Jerusalem office of a French news agency claimed that the PLO's Force 17 was responsible, to free Force 17 members captured

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					at sea in late August. One terrorist was discovered to be an Englishman, a self-described "fascist" who had joined the PLO in 1982, and was a member of Force 17.
9/25/85	Rome, Italy	A bomb exploded at the British Airways office. A Palestinian confessed to the attack and was arrested.	14 wounded	?	As in the September 16 attack in Rome, the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems claimed responsibility.
9/26/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb exploded near a bus stop on Mt. Scopus, near Hadassah Hospital. Another bomb - in a booby-trapped car was safely defused.	2 wounded	Israelis	Both the PLO and the DFLP claimed responsibility for the Mt. Scopus bombing.
9/26/85	West Bank	A roadside bomb was detonated by remote control on the Jerusalem - Dead Sea Road as a car went by.	-	-	-
9/27/85	Jerusalem, Israel	A bomb exploded at a bus stop near Gilo.	7 wounded	Israelis	-
9/27/85	Halhoul, West Bank	A bus was fired on in an ambush.	7 wounded	6 Israelis 1 Arab	-

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9/28/85	Hebron, West Bank	A hand grenade was tossed at a military vehicle. It missed its mark.	1 killed 3 wounded	Arab Arabs	-
9/29/85	Haifa, Israel	Two bombs exploded almost simultaneously in downtown Haifa.	5 wounded	Israeli	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attacks.
9/30/85	Jerusalem, Israel	Two gasoline bombs were thrown at a restaurant.	-	-	The PLO claimed responsibility for the attack.
9/30/85	Amsterdam, Netherlands	A bomb exploded at the local office of El Al Israel's airline.	-	-	Fatah claimed responsibility for the attack.
10/2/85	Buenos Aires, Argentina	A bomb exploded at a Jewish school.	-	-	
10/2/85	Jerusalem, Israel	Two Israeli civilians, a man and a woman, were shot to death while hiking in the Judean Hills south of the city.	2 killed	Israelis	The PLO's Force 17 claimed responsibility for the killings.
10/6/85	Kibbutz Sarid, Israel	An Israeli man was shot to death from an ambush while out horseback riding.	1 killed	Israeli	-

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10/6/85	Kibbutz Sarid, Israel	An Israeli man was shot to death from an ambush while out horseback riding.	1 killed	Israeli	-

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MICHIGAN REGIONAL OFFICE 163 Madison Avenue, Suite 120, Detroit, MI 48226	(313) 962-9686
MISSOURI-SOUTHERN ILLINOIS REGIONAL OFFICE 225 S. Meramec, Clayton, Missouri 63105	(314) 726-3303
MOUNTAIN STATES REGIONAL OFFICE 300 South Dahlia Street, Suite 202, Denver, CO 80222	(303) 321-7177
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NEW YORK CITY REGIONAL OFFICE 823 U.N. Plaza, New York, NY 10017	(212) 490-2525
NEW YORK STATE REGIONAL OFFICE 65 South Broadway, Tarrytown, NY 10591	(914) 332-1166
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ORANGE COUNTY REGIONAL OFFICE 2700 North Main St., Suite 500, Santa Ana, CA 92701	(714) 973-4733
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PACIFIC SOUTHWEST REGIONAL OFFICE 6505 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 814, Los Angeles, CA 90048	(213) 655-8205
PALM BEACH COUNTY REGIONAL OFFICE 120 So. Olive Ave., Suite 400, West Palm Beach, FL 33401	(305) 832-7144
PLAINS STATES REGIONAL OFFICE 333 So. 132 Street, Omaha, NB 68154	(402) 333-1303
SAN DIEGO REGIONAL OFFICE 7850 Mission Center Court, #207, San Diego, CA 92108	(619) 293-3770
SOUTH CENTRAL REGIONAL OFFICE 535 Gravier Street, Suite 501, New Orleans, LA 70130	(504) 522-9534
SOUTHEAST REGIONAL OFFICE 3384 Peachtree Road, NE, Suite 660, Atlanta, GA 30326	(404) 262-3470
SOUTHWEST REGIONAL OFFICE 4211 Southwest Freeway, Suite 209, Houston, TX 77027	(713) 627-3490
WESTERN PENNSYLVANIA/WEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL OFFICE Allegheny Bldg., 429 Forbes St., 7th Fl., Pittsburgh, PA 15219	(412) 471-1050

NATIONAL OFFICE

ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH
823 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017
(212) 490-2525



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

500 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 300 • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

December 2, 1985

ARAFAT'S PERSONAL ROLE IN TERRORISM

When Yasser Arafat announced from Cairo that the PLO would limit its terrorist attacks to "the occupied Arab lands," Egyptian President Mubarak hailed this as a renunciation of terror and a sign that he was extending a hand for peace. But it quickly became apparent that Arafat was trying to hide his terrorist program behind empty words.

- Egyptian officials said that the "Cairo Declaration" meant PLO terrorism would be limited to the West Bank. But Arafat was quick to clarify, saying: "It is not responsible to announce that we will confine our operations to the West Bank...military operations are not excluded from Israeli territory." (Radio Monte Carlo, November 15, 1985)
- And in case his declaration was interpreted as a sign that he was ready for peace, Arafat insisted: "I don't simply want, I demand, more (commando) operations, and more resistance against this occupation until it leaves our land." (Arab News, November 11, 1985)

In fact, the "Cairo Declaration" was little more than a reaffirmation of PLO terrorism against Israel. But this should come as no surprise as Arafat has clearly spelled out the PLO strategy for the destruction of Israel.


- Arafat has repeatedly stated that terrorism is the PLO's policy of *choice*: "Armed struggle will continue to be our main option for achieving all of our militant people's objectives and aspirations." (Baghdad Voice of the PLO, October 17, 1985)
- He has made clear who he regards as legitimate targets of armed struggle: "What we face in our occupied land are settlers totalling 3,500,000 individuals." (Voice of Palestine, April 30, 1985) Recently he praised the "daring" Egyptian soldier who murdered seven Israeli tourists.
- He has also made clear his rejection of negotiations: "Our war is going to be a long and hard one. Palestine will not be regained through peaceful solutions or through the Israeli Labor Party, as some believe, but through fighting and Palestinian blood." (QNA, December 19, 1984)
- And he has made it clear that this armed struggle is not only aimed at Israel, but at the United States also: The United States "has become the principal adversary to us." (al-Sharq al-Awsat, October, 18, 1985)

The "Cairo Declaration" was just another attempt by Arafat to put a new face on the same policy. Yasser Arafat remains the kingpin of PLO terror.

WHITE HOUSE DIGEST

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White House Office of Media Relations and Planning

July 20, 1983



Intelligence information has linked the PLO with terrorist and guerrilla organizations around the world.

Excerpted from "The PLO in Central America"

Arafat on the U.S.

The U.S. is "a principal adversary,"¹ while the U.S.S.R. is "our friend and ally."² "The United States is conducting terrorism, as it has done in Guatemala, Vietnam, Latin America, Central America, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and by implanting Israel in Palestine as 'a terrorist entity.'"³ Zionism is "the imperialist center . . . a bridgehead for the United States."⁴ "Israel is the major hand of U.S. terrorism in the Middle East."⁵ Washington's attitude "is not partiality for Israel, but rather a direct confrontation between us and the United States."⁶ "The Arab nation and its masses must deal with the U.S." by "boycotting it politically."⁷ "As for me, my objective is to defy the Americans and resist their policies."⁸

1. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 18, 1985.
2. Voice of Palestine, May 16, 1985
3. Voice of Palestine, April 30, 1985
4. Voice of Palestine, May 15, 1985
5. MENA, October 13, 1985
6. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 18, 1985
7. Ibid.
8. Agence France Press, Paris, November 19, 1984



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

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December 4, 1985

ARAFAT AND TERRORISM

Terrorist Acts Claimed by Arafat's Wing of the PLO Since February 11, 1985

Date	Incident	Responsibility claimed by	Date	Incident	Responsibility claimed by
2/11	Incendiary bomb attack on an Israeli bus on the West Bank	PLO General Command(1)	5/8	Israeli navy sinks a rubber dinghy off the coast of Tyre carrying Palestinian guerrillas heading for the Israeli coast	PLO General Command
2/14	Molotov cocktail thrown at an Israeli bus on road to Jerusalem	PLO General Command	5/12	Explosions at: * bus stop near Shaara Tzedek hospital in Jerusalem * Shimon road near Bet Shemesh * Givat Shareit near Bet Shemesh * Liberty Bell Park in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
2/14	Molotov cocktails thrown at a bus carrying Israeli settlers on the West Bank	PLO General Command	5/13	Machine gun and grenade attack against an Israeli vehicle on West Bank	PLO General Command
2/14	Derailment of a train between Haifa and Tel Aviv	PLO General Command	5/14	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in West Bank	PLO General Command
2/19	Israeli bus hijacked near Hebron	PLO General Command	5/16	Machine gun attack against an Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command
2/22	Israeli bus hijacked on West Bank	PLO General Command	5/26	Detonation of a remote - controlled explosive charge in Haifa	PLO General Command
2/24	Molotov cocktails thrown at an Israeli bus near Bethlehem	PLO General Command	5/29	Detonation of a remote - controlled explosive charge in Afula	PLO General Command
2/26	Bomb attack on a shop in Ashdod	PLO General Command	5/31	Detonation of a remote - controlled device in Tammun	PLO General Command
2/26	Hand grenades thrown at a Tel Aviv restaurant	PLO General Command	6/6	Incendiary bomb attack on a gas station in Hebron	PLO General Command
3/12	Explosive charge near Israeli settlement in West Bank	PLO General Command	6/9	Machine gun attack against an Israeli truck in Gaza	PLO General Command
3/13	Molotov cocktail thrown at branch of Bank Leumi in Jerusalem	PLO General Command	6/10	Incendiary bombs hurled at an Israeli bus near Nabulus	PLO General Command
4/8	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command	6/10	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Nabulus	PLO General Command
4/9	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli vehicle near Bethlehem	PLO General Command	6/10	Attack on an Israeli bus with incendiary bombs on West Bank	PLO General Command
4/14	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli bus near Hebron	PLO General Command	6/12	Explosive charge detonated in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
4/14	Attack on an Israeli vehicle near Hebron	PLO General Command	6/17	Attack on an Israeli vehicle near Bethlehem	PLO General Command
4/22	Fedayeen naval operation - attempt to launch an attack from the sea against the center of Israel	PLO General Command	6/17	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli vehicle near Hebron	PLO General Command
4/26	Explosion at Qiryat Milekhi	PLO General Command	6/17	Explosive charge detonated at a bus stop in Ramot (Jerusalem)	PLO General Command
4/28	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Nabulus	PLO General Command	6/17	Explosive charge detonated at a bus stop on French Hill (Jerusalem)	PLO General Command
4/28	Incendiary bomb attack on an Israeli vehicle on the Beersheva - Jerusalem road	PLO General Command	6/17	Explosive charges planted near a warehouse in Tel Aviv factory in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
5/1	Grenade attack on an Israeli bus	PLO General Command	6/19	Several mines planted on roads in the Golan Heights	PLO General Command
5/2	Missile attack in Bat Yam	PLO General Command			
5/6	High explosive charge planted on the road to Betah	PLO General Command			

(1) Palestine Revolutionary Forces General Command is the military spokesman for Yasser Arafat.

Date	Incident	Responsibility claimed by
6/20	Explosion near an industrial plant in Kiryat Gat	PLO General Command
6/20	Civilian guard stabbed in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
6/23	Hand grenade attack in Nablus	PLO General Command
6/23	Incendiary bomb thrown at Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command
6/24	Explosion at a bus stop in Nave Yaacov section of Jerusalem	PLO General Command
6/26	Deputy director of Ramleh prison attacked	PLO General Command
6/27	High explosive charge detonated on the Tel Aviv beach near the U.S. Embassy	PLO General Command
7/7	Bomb explosion at a bus stop near Holon, injuring 5 Israelis	PLO General Command
7/9	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Hebron	PLO General Command
7/9	Explosion in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/11	Explosion in main square of Nazareth	PLO General Command
7/11	Explosion in King Saul Hotel in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
7/15	Machine gun attack on Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
7/16	Explosion at Israeli police station at Hebrew University	PLO General Command
7/17	Machine gun attack in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/17	Incendiary bomb attack in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/17	Explosion at a shipping company in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/17	Explosion at kibbutz factory in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/18	Ambush and machine gun attack of Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
7/19	Bomb defused near Jericho	PLO General Command
7/26	Israeli public buses bombed outside of Jerusalem	PLO General Command
7/31	Explosion in Haifa factory	PLO General Command
8/4	Explosive charge planted at Israeli transport station	PLO General Command
8/8	Israeli man shot in Bani-Suhalyah	PLO General Command
8/16	Explosive charge detonated in Hebron	PLO General Command
8/20	Car exploded in Netanya bus station	PLO General Command
8/22	Bomb thrown at bus near Nablus	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosives detonated in main square in Nablus	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosives planted in factory in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosion in Herzliya industrial center	PLO General Command
9/2	Incendiary bombs thrown at vehicle near Jabliyah camp	PLO General Command
9/9	Attack on Tel Aviv police station	PLO General Command
9/10	Incendiary bomb thrown at Jerusalem bus station	PLO General Command
9/14	Bomb attack on Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command

Date	Incident	Responsibility claimed by
9/25	Three Israelis killed on yacht off Cyprus	Force 17 (Arafat's personal guard)
9/30	El Al office bombed in Amsterdam	Fatah
10/1	Bomb exploded at Turks Market in Haifa	PLO General Command
10/1	Incendiary bombs thrown at vehicle near Al-Nusayrat camp	PLO General Command
10/1	Incendiary bomb thrown at restaurant in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
10/1	Remote-controlled explosives detonated near Tiban	PLO General Command
10/5	Three Israelis killed in Mt. Refa'im area	PLO General Command
10/10	Two Israeli seamen murdered in Barcelona, Spain	Force 17
10/12	Explosive charges detonated at restaurant in Tel Aviv	PLO General Command
10/13	Bomb exploded at Barbis Shak settlement	PLO General Command
10/14	Bomb exploded at Israel Aircraft Industries plant in Dimona	PLO General Command
10/16	Incendiary bomb thrown at bus near the Hebron Gate (Jerusalem)	PLO General Command
10/19	Israeli settler stabbed in Sabastiyah of the West Bank	PLO General Command
10/23	Incendiary bombs burn Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
11/4	Two bombs exploded on French Hill, Jerusalem	PLO General Command
11/5	Two bombs exploded; one in Haifa, one in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
11/6	Remote-controlled explosives detonated at settlement	PLO General Command
11/8	Central bus station in Kfar Saba bombed	PLO General Command
11/9	Explosive charges detonated at cotton storage area in Nazareth	PLO General Command



AIPAC MEMORANDUM

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October 3, 1985

ARAFAT AND TERRORISM

Terrorist Acts by Arafat's Wing of the PLO
Since February 11, 1985

2/11	Incendiary bomb attack on an Israeli bus on the West Bank	PLO General Command(1)
2/14	Molotov cocktail thrown at an Israeli bus on road to Jerusalem	PLO General Command
2/14	Molotov cocktails thrown at a bus carrying Israeli settlers on the West Bank.	PLO General Command
2/14	Derailment of a train between Haifa and Tel Aviv	PLO General Command
2/19	Israeli bus hijacked near Hebron	PLO General Command
2/22	Israeli bus hijacked on West Bank	PLO General Command
2/24	Molotov cocktails thrown at an Israeli bus near Bethlehem	PLO General Command
2/26	Bomb attack on a shop in Ashdod	PLO General Command
2/26	Molotov cocktail thrown at an Israeli military vehicle in Gaza	PLO General Command
2/26	Explosive charges in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
2/26	Hand grenades thrown at a Tel Aviv restaurant	PLO General Command
3/7	Remote control device set off under an Israeli patrol near Hebron	PLO General Command
3/12	Explosive charge near Israeli settlement in West Bank	PLO General Command
3/12	Incendiary bomb thrown at a military patrol in Hebron	PLO General Command
3/13	Molotov cocktail thrown at branch of Bank Leumi in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
3/22	Shelling of Netulla	PLO General Command
4/8	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command
4/9	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli vehicle near Bethlehem	PLO General Command
4/10	Molotov cocktails thrown at an Israeli patrol near Al-Khadiir	PLO General Command
4/14	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli bus near Hebron	PLO General Command
4/14	Attack on an Israeli vehicle near Hebron	PLO General Command
4/22	Fedayeen naval operation - attempt to launch an attack from the sea against the center of Israel	PLO General Command

4/26	Explosion at Qiryat Milakhi	PLO General Command
4/28	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Nabulus	PLO General Command
4/28	Incendiary bomb attack on an Israeli vehicle on the Beerzheva - Jerusalem road	PLO General Command
5/1	Grenade attack on an Israeli bus	PLO General Command
5/2	Missile attack in Bat Yam	PLO General Command
5/6	High explosive charge planted on the road to Betah	PLO General Command
5/8	Israeli navy sinks a rubber dinghy off the coast of Tyre carrying Palestinian guerrillas heading for the Israeli coast	PLO General Command
5/12	Explosions at: • bus stop near Shaara • Tzedak hospital in Jerusalem • Shimon road near Bet Shamesh • Givat Sharret near Bet Shamesh • Liberty Bell Park in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
5/13	Machine gun and grenade attack against an Israeli vehicle on West Bank	PLO General Command
5/14	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in West Bank	PLO General Command
5/16	Machine gun attack against an Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command
5/16	Detonation of a remote - controlled explosive charge in Haifa	PLO General Command
5/29 & 5/31	Detonation of a remote - controlled explosive charge in Afula	PLO General Command
5/31	Machine gun ambush of an Israeli patrol in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
6/6	Incendiary bomb attack on the military governor in Janin	PLO General Command
6/6	Grenade thrown at border guards near Hebron	PLO General Command
6/6	Detonation of a remote - controlled device in Tammun	PLO General Command
6/8	Machine gun attack on a military truck in Gaza	PLO General Command
6/8	Incendiary bomb attack against patrols on West Bank	PLO General Command
6/8	Incendiary bomb attack on a gas station in Hebron	PLO General Command

(1) Palestine Revolutionary Forces General Command is the military spokesman for Yasser Arafat

6/9	Machine gun attack against an Israeli truck in Gaza	PLO General Command
6/10	Incendiary bombs hurled at Israeli bus near Nabulus	PLO General Command
6/10	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Nabulus	PLO General Command
6/10	Attack on an Israeli bus with incendiary bombs on West Bank	PLO General Command
6/12	Explosive charge detonated in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
6/17	Attack on an Israeli vehicle near Bethlehem	PLO General Command
6/17	Incendiary bomb thrown at an Israeli vehicle near Hebron	PLO General Command
6/17	Explosive charge detonated at a bus stop in Ramot (Jerusalem)	PLO General Command
6/17	Explosive charge detonated at a bus stop on French Hill (Jerusalem)	PLO General Command
6/17	Explosive charges planted near a warehouse in Tel Aviv factory in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
6/17	Incendiary bomb thrown at a patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
6/19	Several mines planted on roads in the Golan Heights	PLO General Command
6/20	Explosion near an industrial plant in Kiryat Gat	PLO General Command
6/20	Civilian guard stabbed in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
6/21	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
6/22	Hand grenade thrown at a foot patrol near Nabulus	PLO General Command
6/22	Hand grenade attack in Nabulus	PLO General Command
6/22	Incendiary bomb thrown at Israeli bus on West Bank	PLO General Command
6/24	Explosion at a bus stop in Nava Yaacov section of Jerusalem	PLO General Command
6/26	Attack on a patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
6/26	Deputy director of Ramleh prison attacked	PLO General Command
6/27	High explosive charge detonated on the Tel Aviv beach near the U.S. Embassy	PLO General Command
7/2	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/7	Bomb explosion at a bus stop near Molen, injuring 3 Israelis	PLO General Command
7/7	Bomb explosion near a soldier's hitchhiking station east of Tel Aviv	PLO General Command
7/9	Incendiary bomb attack against military governor's headquarters in Janin	PLO General Command
7/9	Hand grenade attack on an Israeli vehicle in Hebron	PLO General Command
7/9	Explosion in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/11	Explosion in main square of Nazareth	PLO General Command
7/11	Explosion in King Saul Hotel in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
7/11	Attack on Israeli patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/15	Machine gun attack on Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
7/16	Israeli soldier stabbed in Bethlehem	PLO General Command
7/16	Explosion at Israeli police station at Kibray University	PLO General Command
7/17	Machine gun attack in Gaza	PLO General Command

7/17	Incendiary bomb attack in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/17	Explosion at a shipping company in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/17	Explosion at kibbutz factory in Haifa	PLO General Command
7/18	Ambush and machine gun attack of Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
7/20	Military vehicles ambushed in Galilee	PLO General Command
7/20	Bomb defused near Jericho	PLO General Command
7/22	Israeli military vehicle machine-gunned	PLO General Command
7/23	Bomb planted in military station in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
7/26	Israeli public buses bombed outside of Jerusalem	PLO General Command
7/27	Hand grenade thrown at military vehicle in Gaza	PLO General Command
7/31	Explosion in Haifa factory	PLO General Command
8/2	Machine gun attack against military vehicle	PLO General Command
8/4	Explosive charge planted at Israeli transport station	PLO General Command
8/4	Attack on military vehicle in Jerusalem	PLO General Command
8/6	Israeli soldier attacked near Beit Hanun	PLO General Command
8/8	Israeli man shot in Bani-Suhaylah	PLO General Command
8/14	Hand grenades thrown at military patrol in Gaza	PLO General Command
8/16	Explosive charge detonated in Hebron	PLO General Command
8/20	Incendiary bombs thrown at patrols in Gaza	PLO General Command
8/20	Car exploded in Metanya bus station	PLO General Command
8/22	Bomb thrown at bus near Nabulus	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosives detonated in main square in Nabulus	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosives planted in factory in Ashqelon	PLO General Command
8/22	Explosion in Herzliya industrial center	PLO General Command
8/25	Two Israeli soldiers shot in West Bank	PLO General Command
9/1	Incendiary bombs thrown at military bus in Nabulus	PLO General Command
9/2	Incendiary bombs thrown at vehicle near Jabliyah camp	PLO General Command
9/4	Attack with automatic weapons on Israeli military vehicle	PLO General Command
9/4	Incendiary bomb attack on military vehicle	PLO General Command
9/9	Attack on Israeli military vehicle in Tel Aviv	PLO General Command
9/9	Attack on Israeli military vehicle in Tel Aviv	PLO General Command
9/9	Attack on Tel Aviv police station	PLO General Command
9/10	Incendiary bomb thrown at Jerusalem bus station	PLO General Command
9/13	Grenade attack on Israeli patrol	PLO General Command
9/13	Incendiary bomb thrown at Israeli patrol	PLO General Command
9/14	Bomb attack on Israeli vehicle	PLO General Command
9/25	Three Israelis killed on yacht off Cyprus	Force 17 (Arafat's personal guard)



October 11, 1985

ARMS SALES TO JORDAN NOW -- UNDERCUTTING THE PEACE PROCESS

Proponents of sophisticated arms sales to Jordan have advocated that peace prospects and Middle East stability would be enhanced by such a move. Quite the opposite is true.

The proposed \$1.9 billion sale of advanced weaponry to Jordan would undercut the current search for peace and would further destabilize an already dangerous region by fueling the spiraling Middle East arms race.

1) Jordan remains officially in a state of war with Israel, maintains its links with the PLO (which remains dedicated to Israel's destruction), and has yet to enter, without preconditions, into direct negotiations with Israel.

Pouring additional arms into Jordan would increase the dangers for Israel along its eastern front, the area closest to Israel's key air bases and the largest stretch of land contiguous to Israel from which an Arab military offensive could be launched.

2) A massive influx of arms into Jordan, when taken in the context of the heavy general Arab arms buildup against Israel, would force Israel to ask for additional arms, a very costly prospect which would add to Israel's economic problems. Facing the economic difficulties that it does, Israel does not have additional resources to waste on more arms simply to rectify a change in the arms balance which should not occur in the first place.

3) Arms sales to Jordan would inevitably result in a large flow of Soviet weaponry to Syria, Jordan's chief rival. Thus, not only would Jordan find itself back at square one vis-a-vis Syria, but Israel's defense posture would be additionally weakened by a renewed transfer of Soviet arms to Damascus. Syria, one of Israel's most radical foes, would be further tempted to begin attacks from Israel's northern front. In a full-scale military confrontation, Israel would then have to contend with strong forces along both its northern and eastern frontiers.

4) Instead of moving the Arab states further along the path of peace, sophisticated arms sales provide them with the means of continuing their hostility towards Israel. Jordan, a potential frontline state in any military clash with Israel, cannot be relied upon to guarantee that it would not use its weapons against Israel. For example, despite so-called Jordanian guarantees that it would not use against Israel 200 American tanks acquired in 1966, those weapons were used in Jordan's aggression of 1967, many of them being captured by Israel.

If the United States seeks to reward Jordan for movement towards peace, such a gesture logically should come after peace talks are underway, and not before. It is in this spirit that in June 1985 the Senate adopted a resolution requiring that weapons sales to Jordan be conditional upon Jordan being "publicly committed to the recognition of Israel and to negotiate promptly and directly with Israel under the basic tenets of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." Jordan will find that Israel is an eager partner in the search for peace.



October 14, 1985

ABU AL-ABBAS -- ARAFAT'S PARTNER IN TERROR

Despite Arafat's hollow denials of PLO responsibility for the seizure of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and for the brutal murder of a defenseless elderly American tourist, Mr. Leon Klinghoffer, evidence is mounting concerning the key role of the Palestine Liberation Front and its leader Abu Al-Abbas in the outrageous events. Who is Abu Al-Abbas and what is the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)?

Abu Al-Abbas (whose other names are Muhammad Abbas and Muhammad Zidan) is a Palestinian Arab, whose family originated in Haifa, but who himself was born in Syria. Until 1976, he served as the spokesman for Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- General Command and also as the spokesman for the PLO Rejectionist Front. The PLF itself was established in 1977, after it split away from Jibril's organization. The reason: sharp disagreements over Syria's role in Lebanon (supported by Jibril) which led to a growing rift with the PLO. Abu Al-Abbas was then and is still today well-known for his anti-Syrian and pro-Iraqi positions.

In May 1983, the PLF itself split into two rival factions when Taalat Yakoub, who previously had periodically rotated with Abu Al-Abbas as leader of the PLF, aligned himself with Syria and Arafat's opponents in the PLO. Abu-Abbas and his supporters remained loyal to Arafat.

Thus, in addition to his role as Secretary-General of the PLF, Abu Al-Abbas eventually became a member also of the PLO Executive Committee in 1984 during the Palestine National Council's 17th session in Amman.

The PLF is known for its extremist position against peace with Israel and in a press conference held at the end of the PLF's 7th General Conference in Tunis (Sept. 5-11) called for escalating the "armed struggle" (i.e. terrorism) against Israel. Arafat himself participated in the conference's opening session.

The PLF has perpetrated since 1979 a number of terrorist attacks, some of which fortunately had not succeeded.

April 22, 1979 -- Four PLF terrorists infiltrated into the Israeli northern coastal town of Nahariya, broke into one of the homes and took hostages, resulting in the murder of four innocent civilians, including 2 young girls (The hijackers of the Achille Lauro included among the names of the PLO terrorists whose release from Israel they demanded, the PLF leader of the Nahariya attack, Sami Kantari).

August 18, 1979 -- A ship bearing four PLF terrorists -- on their way to carry out a terrorist attack in Israel -- was captured off Nahariya. Three of the terrorists were captured, while one was killed.

June 10, 1980 -- The PLF claimed responsibility for planting two bombs which exploded in the town of Petah Tikva.

March 7, 1981 -- In the western Galilee (near Kibbutz Afek), two motorized gliders were discovered on the ground. The two PLF terrorists who had flown them were apprehended before being able to attack, revealing during their interrogation that they had planned to attack civilian targets in Haifa and Nahariya.

April 28, 1981 -- Near Mnarah, a gas balloon was shot down, killing the two PLF terrorists inside who had tried to infiltrate Israel.

April 28, 1982 -- In the district of Ramallah, in Anta, a local policeman was murdered in an ambush near his home. The PLF claimed responsibility for the attack.

June 5, 1984 -- Four PLF terrorists were captured on the Golan Heights. Their mission was to take hostages in exchange for the release of PLO terrorists held in Israeli jails.

And now, the act of piracy and murder in the Mediterranean!!

EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.



שגרירות ישראל
ושינגטון

November 4, 1985

Dear Friend,

The attached White Paper -- The Threat of PLO Terrorism -- is a unique and unprecedented document.


It is a comprehensive and up-to-date survey of the PLO's goals, organizational structure, leadership, and operations. Based on invaluable evidence and testimony garnered from recently captured terrorists, it reveals the persistent pattern of PLO terrorism since its 1982 expulsion from Beirut until the Achille Lauro hijacking.

The study exposes the duplicity by which the PLO leadership adopts the pose of statesmanlike moderation while stepping up its terrorist activities -- and shows that no meaningful change has occurred in its strategy, tactics and aim, which remains the liquidation of Israel.

This document demonstrates that the PLO, by its character and actions, disqualifies itself from any role in authentic peace negotiations.

Just published by our Foreign Ministry, this White Paper can serve as a valuable resource of information and analysis.

Sincerely yours,


Asher Na'im
Minister of Information

PLEASE NOTE

Due to a technical error, the titles of the charts on pp. 21-22 are reversed.

Chart on p. 21 refers to attacks which took place outside Israel.

Chart on p. 22 refers to attacks which occurred in Israel, the administered areas and cross-border attacks.



THE THREAT OF PLO TERRORISM

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem, 1985

**THE
THREAT
OF PLO
TERRORISM**

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Jerusalem, 1985

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BACKGROUND

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established by a decision of the Arab League in 1964 as an instrument in the Arab war against Israel. Since then, it has been financed and maintained by various Arab governments. The PLO serves as the umbrella organization of a number of terrorist factions, each following its own line with regard to tactics. (See Appendix A.)

All the affiliated groups, however, are united in subscribing to the PLO charter, the Palestinian National Covenant, which states that the *“armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine. Thus it is the overall strategy, not merely a tactical phase”* (Article 9); *“The liberation of Palestine ... aims at the elimination of the Zionist presence”* (Article 15); and *“the Arab Palestinian people ... reject all substitutes for the total liberation of Palestine”* (Article 21). These ideas and goals are reiterated in most of the thirty-three Articles of the Covenant, which has been confirmed repeatedly, in full, by the PLO.

In February 1969, Yasser Arafat, at the head of the PLO's largest constituent faction, Fatah, took control of the entire organization. Since then, the PLO has perpetrated some 8,000 acts of terror, mostly against Israeli civilian targets, causing the deaths of over 650 Israelis and the wounding of thousands more. Other victims have included Jews abroad, innocent bystanders of many nationalities and Arab political opponents.

Among the world's terror organizations, the PLO, with Fatah at its core, is the only one that —

has as its declared aim the liquidation of a sovereign state;

- is sponsored by sovereign states, receiving financial and material assistance from Arab governments, some of which also provide it with operational bases on their territory;
- has offices and contacts throughout the world and is the centre of regional and international terrorism.

The PLO has fostered, trained, armed and financed terror groups all over the world and of every political complexion. PLO terrorism, unchecked, breeds further terrorism, because the success of terrorists in one part of the world encourages terrorists everywhere.

Until 1970, when it was routed and expelled by King Hussein ("Black September"), the PLO was based mainly in Jordan. After that, it established itself in Lebanon, which was too weak to oppose it. There it generated instability and civil strife, and used the area to launch attacks against Israel.

Since the PLO's expulsion from Beirut, as a result of Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, it has been reorganizing mainly in Tunisia, Jordan, North and South Yemen, Iraq and Algeria, and from these bases it has been continuing its terrorist activities.

* * *

Following the agreement between King Hussein of Jordan and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat on 11 February 1985 (see Appendix B), many in the West have been claiming that the PLO has opted for a peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict; that it has abandoned terror; and that acts of terror are no longer being carried out by Arafat's Fatah, but rather by radical Palestinian organizations which oppose Arafat's political approach.

Although some PLO leaders have slightly moderated their statements, and Arafat himself, in media interviews, has voiced a few slogans condemning terror and favouring peace, a comprehensive examination of the actions and pronouncements of Fatah shows clearly that their views have not changed in substance. Hypocrisy, lying and double-talk continue to be the PLO's major tools for explaining its positions. Furthermore, not only is terror still the ideological and pragmatic core of the PLO, but its scope has significantly broadened since the Hussein-Arafat agreement. The targets: schoolchildren, teachers, commuters, shoppers and tourists.

This document, which relates mainly to Arafat's Fatah organization, is based on facts and figures, many of which were obtained from captured terrorists. It depicts the PLO as it is, showing the ways in which it carries out terrorist activities; revealing how its leadership is directly linked to acts of terror while often denying any connection with these acts; outlining the PLO's reorganization since its expulsion from Lebanon; detailing the operations of Fatah's terror network in Europe; profiling individual terrorists and their connection with PLO-Fatah; refuting the perception of Arafat as a moderate; pointing out the escalation of terror in the wake of the Jordan-PLO Agreement; and documenting the fact that no meaningful change has taken place in the PLO's views and goals, whose essence remains, as it has always been, the liquidation of Israel.

PLO REORGANIZATION SINCE 1982

Following the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in August 1982, PLO forces and facilities were dispersed to a number of Arab states. Over a period of time, they became concentrated mainly in Tunisia and Jordan, with PLO headquarters and other central facilities being located in Tunisia.

TUNISIA

The PLO's military and political facilities in Tunisia are located mainly in three areas:

In the Hamam-Shat region on the Mediterranean coast, about 12 miles southeast of Tunis: Arafat's headquarters; Fatah's operations division and war room; the PLO's military division and its mobilization, supply and finance administrations; the headquarters of "Force 17" (see Page 8); and the headquarters of the PLO's Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), headed by Abu al-Abbas.

Within the city of Tunis, in hotels, apartments and offices: top-ranking officials of the PLO's upper political echelons, and senior personnel of Fatah's operational branch, the "Western Front."

In a military camp about 50 miles south of Tunis: some 500 Fatah terrorists and trainees.

Both the headquarters complex and the military camp are guarded by Tunisian police and soldiers, and entry to them is barred to Tunisian civilians. These places have been turned into quasi-extraterritorial areas, under the complete control of Arafat and his associates.

Because of the concentration of most of the PLO's and Fatah's leadership in Tunis after 1982, the city has become the major centre for the planning, financing, organizing and activation of terror attacks against Israel and other targets. It also serves as the port of exit for weapons being smuggled to Europe, to Fatah's terror network there and to other terrorist groups.

JORDAN

Since the beginning of 1984, a Fatah terror infrastructure has gradually been built up in Jordan, alongside its political institutions. The Fatah and PLO presence in Jordan today includes:

The "Western Front" operational group of Fatah, charged with planning and carrying out acts of terror against Israel; responsible for the mobilization and training of terrorists in Jordan, and for smuggling arms and explosives from Jordan to Israel; headed by Abu Jihad (real name: Khalil al-Wazir), Arafat's assistant and close confidant, who was responsible for, among others, the 1975 attack on the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv, in which 11 people were killed and another 11 wounded, and the 1978 hijacking of a tour bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv coastal highway, in which 33 were killed and 82 wounded. Within the "Western Front" organization, terrorist activities in the Jerusalem area are directed by Abu Firas, and in Judea and Samaria by Mahmoud al-Ghol.

A Fatah force composed of 600 terrorists who are part of the organization's regular forces, under the command of Colonel Nasir-Yusef. These terrorists are based in a military camp near the city of Hau, east of Zarka.

The "Bader Force," comprising 1,500 soldiers, which has been in Jordan since the early 1970's, under the authority of the Jordanian army. Senior elements in this force have strong links with the Fatah terror apparatus in Amman.

FATAH'S 'FORCE 17'

"Force 17" was established in the early 1970's by Ali Hassan Salameh as a small bodyguard unit whose function was to protect Arafat and other PLO leaders. It has gradually grown into a force of 800 which, in addition to its security functions, carries out assassinations and attacks — on Arafat's personal instructions — against his rivals within Fatah or against rival Palestinian organizations. After the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in August 1982 and from Tripoli in December 1983, the members of "Force 17" were dispersed to Tunisia, North Yemen, South Yemen, Iraq and PLO installations around the world. The force's headquarters were set up in Tunisia, at Hamam-Shat, close to Arafat's offices.

The commander of "Force 17," since March 1979, has been Abu Tayeb (Colonel Mahmoud Ahmed Mahmoud an-Natour), who enjoys Arafat's complete confidence. Abu Tayeb began to visit Amman regularly in 1982 and established an office there, in addition to his headquarters in Tunisia. According to evidence given by one of the terrorists captured on the yacht *Ganda* (see Page 18), a meeting of the senior commanders of "Force 17" (Major As'ad Baghdad, Muhammad Hussein Jum'a, Abu Sharah and others) was held at the end of December 1984 at the Regency Hotel in Amman, chaired by Abu Tayeb. At this meeting, Abu Tayeb reported that he had initiated, on personal instructions from Arafat, a survey of Fatah's situation, and determined that terror against Israel must be stepped up and activated from the place closest to Israel — Jordan. Abu Tayeb declared that a new attack framework must be established, in addition to the "Western Front."

NEW TERRORIST UNIT

About two months later, following the signing of the Jordan-PLO Agreement (see Appendix B), Fatah began organizing this new terror framework, headed by Abu Tayeb. Subsequently, in his office in Amman, Abu Tayeb met with Palestinians from Judea and Samaria and gave them funds for carrying out anti-Israel activities. From April 1985, he began to mobilize men from his own "Force 17," as well as new recruits from among the Palestinian Arabs in Jordan and Judea-Samaria, for terrorist actions against Israel.

Abu Tayeb is responsible to Abu Muatassem (Brigadier Ahmad Ibrahim Afanyeh), head of the PLO operations department, now in Tunisia. Abu Muatassem, a Jordanian army officer who deserted and joined Fatah in 1970, is one of Arafat's top assistants.

Another person connected with the new terror framework is Muhammad Milhem, former mayor of Halhoul, in Judea, who was expelled by the Israeli authorities for inciting the local population against Israel. Today a resident of Jordan, Milhem serves on the PLO Executive Committee. According to the testimony of a captured terrorist, Milhem is responsible for supplying arms and explosives to members of "Force 17" in Jordan, and participates in the planning of Abu Tayeb's and Abu Muatassem's terror activities. In March 1985, he took part in planning attacks in the Jenin area of Samaria. In April 1985, a special terrorist unit was sent from North Yemen to the Wahdat refugee camp in Amman, and placed at Milhem's disposal. A few days later, after a meeting of the PLO's military council in Tunisia, Milhem, Abu Tayeb, Abu Muatassem and the deputy commander of the "Bader Force" met in Amman to plan an attack in Tel Aviv.

In October 1985, Milhem was one of two PLO Palestinians in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation invited by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to participate in talks with British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, in an attempt to bring the PLO into the Middle East peace process. In issuing the invitation at the end of her trip to Egypt and Jordan, the Prime Minister asserted that both PLO representatives would, when in London, publicly renounce terrorism and violence and indicate their acceptance of Security Council resolutions, including 242 and 338 (see Appendix C). Upon their arrival, however, the two PLO representatives refused to sign the undertakings, agreed on prior to their visit, and the meeting was cancelled.

FATAH'S NETWORK IN EUROPE

Towards the end of 1984, Fatah began to expand its terror infrastructure in both Eastern and Western Europe, based mainly on PLO offices in various countries. At the same time, it began to plan and carry out attacks. Abu Tayeb convened a meeting in Amman in December 1984 at which he reported that he had completed the reorganization of "Force 17" members at PLO offices in Europe, thus laying the foundation for future terrorist activity.

The PLO uses visits of its high-ranking officials to smuggle weapons and explosives, and PLO offices in Europe are full partners in this activity. At the end of December 1984, for example, the Romanian authorities discovered a large weapons cache, including Kalachnikov rifles, pistols, grenades, etc. in the home of Abu Salim, a member of "Force 17" and currently its representative in Cyprus. (See also Attacks in Europe, Page 18.)



One of the three Israelis slaughtered in the Larnaca marina, 25 September 1985. Inset: one of the three PLO murderers being taken into custody.

THE JORDAN PLO AGREEMENT

On 11 February 1985, an agreement (see Appendix B for full text) was signed by King Hussein of Jordan and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, its purpose defined as being "to march together towards a just, peaceful settlement of the Middle East issue and towards the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, including Jerusalem..." The Agreement was ratified by the PLO Executive Committee on 18 February and officially announced to the public on 23 February.

In Western political circles as well as the media, there have been continuing references to this agreement as "a step in the right direction" and as a PLO concession on several cardinal points:

apparent acceptance of UN Resolution 242 (Point 1);

acceptance of the principle of "land in exchange for peace" (Point 1);

relinquishment of the demand for an independent Palestinian state (Point 2);

retreat from some of the previously claimed prerogatives arising from the PLO's designated role as "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" (Point 5).

The PLO, however, has rejected these interpretations, insisting that no change has taken place in its positions on the issues involved:

ON UN RESOLUTION 242

In reference to Point 1 of the Jordan-PLO Agreement, King Hussein, in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on 31 May 1985, stated that —

the Palestinians are willing to accept United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.

However, the PLO does not interpret Point 1 of the Agreement as referring to Security Council Resolution 242 (see Appendix C for full text) but, rather, collectively to all UN resolutions regarding the Arab-Israel conflict. Moreover, in approving the Agreement on 18 February 1985, the PLO Executive Committee explicitly rejected 242; and, when asked by a correspondent of *The Wall Street Journal* (7 June 1985) to reiterate King Hussein's statement on the PLO's acceptance of 242, Yasser Arafat responded:

No, no — I won't repeat it. I'm not a monkey. I issue my own political declarations.

ON 'LAND IN EXCHANGE FOR PEACE'

Jordan's foreign minister, Taher al-Masri, in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on 19 March 1985, said:

The importance of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement is that it publicly obligates the PLO, for the first time, to accept the principle of "land in exchange for peace."

The PLO, however, does not read the "land for peace" formula as a call for the establishment of permanent peace with Israel in return for Israel's withdrawal from certain territories claimed by the Arabs. Rather, it views this formula within the context of its "policy of stages" — that is, the programme formulated in 1974 by the 12th Palestinian National Council. The policy of stages refers to the establishment of a mini-Palestinian state (or "national entity") on the territory from which Israel would withdraw, as a step towards the subsequent creation of a secular, democratic Palestinian state extending to the Mediterranean Sea — in other words, replacing the State of Israel. The words "land" and "peace," in this reading, take on an entirely different meaning from the one they appear to have. Khaled al-Hassan, head of Fatah's information department, recently put it this way:

Everyone who accepted the decisions of the Palestinian National Council and the policy of stages, and everyone who accepted the Fez decisions, which were approved by the Palestinian National Council, cannot oppose the sentence "land in exchange for peace," since at its starting point is the policy of stages.

(Al-Anba, Kuwaiti daily, 12 June 1985)

ON AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE

As for Point 2 of the Agreement, in reference to "the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine," Jordan's foreign minister, Taher al-Masri, said that the Accord calls for a confederal relationship between Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza. This, in effect, solves the question of the independent Palestinian state, and means that the PLO no longer insists on this demand.

(Speech to the American Enterprise Institute, 19 March 1985)

Masri repeated this assertion at a Washington press conference on 5 June 1985.

Three facts speak against this interpretation of the Agreement:

The Agreement refers to "the two states of Jordan and Palestine." States, by definition, are independent.

A confederation, by definition, is between two or more sovereign states. The use of the word "confederation," therefore, implies the establishment of an independent Palestinian state prior to its being confederated with Jordan.

PLO leaders have stated explicitly that this is their understanding of this provision. Thus Khaled al-Hassan, head of Fatah's information division:

The confederation will be between two sovereign states. A Palestinian state will be established before the confederation, even if the confederation is established five minutes after independence.

(*Quotidien de Paris*, Paris daily, 25 March 1985)

Abu Iyad, head of Fatah's military department:

According to the Palestinian National Council decisions, an independent Palestinian state must first be declared, and only afterwards will the confederation with Jordan be established.

(Reuters, 6 June 1985)

Farouk Kaddoumi, head of PLO political department:

The Palestinians must realize their right to independence and self-determination, and only afterwards will the Palestinian people decide if it is interested in confederation with Jordan.

(Press conference in Stockholm, 6 June 1985)

Hani al-Hassan, political adviser to Arafat:

The Amman agreement is exceedingly clear: It speaks of Arab confederal union between two states — Jordan and Palestine.

(*Al-Baydir as-Siyassi*, Jerusalem weekly, 15 June 1985)

In addition to what is stated in the Agreement itself, PLO leaders claim that, on 4 March 1985, Arafat received a Memorandum of Clarification from King Hussein, according to which "the Palestinian people's right to self-determination resides in a Palestine state confederally linked with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."

ON PLO ROLE AS 'SOLE REPRESENTATIVE'

The Agreement (Point 5) calls for an international conference to be attended, among others, by the PLO in its capacity as "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," within a "joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation."

There is an inherent contradiction between these two elements — sole representation and a joint delegation. Some observers point to the second element as evidence that the PLO has retreated from its claim as stated in the first element. The PLO, however, not only stresses the sole representation, but it does so in terms that render the joint delegation element virtually meaningless.

The following is from the Fatah Central Committee's Memorandum of Clarification of 20 March 1985:

The PLO, as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, is the body recognized by the Arabs and the world as having exclusive legitimation to negotiate without granting power of attorney or consent or permission to any other party to participate with it in representing the Palestinian people in all matters.

THE AGREEMENT FROM THE PLO'S VIEWPOINT

Arafat entered into the agreement with Jordan mainly for three reasons:

- to prevent Hussein from negotiating alone with Israel;
- to pave the way for a renewal of the PLO presence in Jordan;
- to gain United States recognition, without acceding to its conditions: acceptance of UN Resolution 242 and recognition of Israel's right to exist.

The expulsion of the PLO terrorists from Beirut in 1982, in the wake of Israel's Operation Peace for Galilee, brought the PLO to one of the lowest points in its history: Its members were dispersed throughout the Middle East, and, when Arafat asked to convene the Palestinian National Council, Jordan turned out to be the only Arab country willing to host it.

For Arafat, the practical outcome of his pact with Hussein has been the gradual return of PLO personnel and offices to Amman, which is close to Israel and to the areas under its administration — Samaria, Judea and Gaza — in order to utilize Jordan as a base to step up terror acts ("armed struggle") against Israel and to incite the residents of the areas to harass the Israeli authorities.

In his book, *The Jordanian Agreement*, published in Amman in July 1985, Khaled al-Hassan, head of Fatah's information division, clarifies this goal:

There was no alternative to the PLO's return to an area bordering on the homeland and to an escalation of the armed struggle, which is one of the fixed principles of the Palestinian action strategy. The only possible place is Jordan, since the borders of Egypt, Syria and Lebanon have been closed, for reasons we need not discuss here. The return to Jordan is a strategic interest and need of both Palestine and Jordan. The return to Jordan necessitates an agreement to regulate the relations between them.

The Jordan-PLO Agreement reflects neither moderation nor concessions on basic PLO positions: It does not, as the PLO itself sees it, deviate from PLO policy as approved by the organization's authorized institutions and as embodied in the decisions of Arab summits. On 18 February 1985, one week after the signing, the PLO Executive Committee issued the following statement:

The joint activity of Jordan and the PLO is based on Palestinian legitimacy, as expressed in the decisions of the Palestinian National Council, especially at its 16th and 17th sessions; on Arab legitimacy, in the decisions of Arab summits; and on international legitimacy, as expressed in the decisions of the UN.

Similar decisions have since been adopted by other PLO and Fatah institutions.

The Agreement has not produced any change in the PLO's strategic aim, which remains the liquidation of Israel and the establishment of a "democratic, secular" state on Israel's ruins. The Arafat wing of the PLO envisages the accomplishment of this aim in stages, with each stage to be achieved through a combination of terrorism ("armed struggle") and political-diplomatic means. Both the broad strategy and the policy-of-stages tactic have been spelled out on numerous occasions — as, for example, by the Hassan brothers, Hani and Khaled, confidants of Arafat:

Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political adviser:

So long as the Palestinian democratic state has not been established in all of Palestine, there can be no absolute and final solution to the Palestinian problem. I am speaking also of those lands that were Palestinian before 1948, from the river to the sea. This is the strategic goal. Clearly, such a goal is not attained all at once, but rather in stages.

(*As-Sayyad*, Lebanese daily, 15 April 1985)

Khaled al-Hassan, head of Fatah's information division:

The conflict is long and all-encompassing, and its outcome will be determined only by the elimination of either Arab nationalism or Zionism. There is a contradiction between these two movements, which can only be resolved through the elimination of one of them. However, since we see no possibility of quickly achieving the final aim, we operate through a policy of stages, upon which the Palestinian National Council decided in 1974.

(*Al-Anba*, Kuwaiti daily, 1 June 1985)

The PLO maintains that political activity must be accompanied by "armed struggle":

Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political adviser:

The armed struggle sows, and the political struggle reaps; he who sows not, reaps not.

(Radio Monte Carlo, 16 March 1985)

Nabil Sha'at, member of the Fatah Central Committee:

Political solutions alone cannot be sought without continuing the armed struggle.

(*Ash-Shark al-Awsat*, Saudi daily published in London, 18 August 1985)

Abu Jihad, head of Fatah's military branch and responsible for West Bank affairs:

The carrying out of sea warfare by Palestinian fighters is an expression of the firm decision to continue and to escalate this armed struggle, whatever the difficulties may be... Political activity was never an obstacle to the continuation of military activity, but rather a means to advance and develop it.

(*Al-Anba*, Kuwaiti daily, 24 February 1985)

Ahmad Abd ar-Rahman, Arafat's spokesman:

The revolutionary march will continue, despite the difficulties and obstacles, in order that the armed struggle may advance with ranks unified, as the armed struggle is the only way to Palestine.

(*Filastin ath-Thawra*, Cypriot weekly, 16 March 1985)

Fatah Revolutionary Council:

Armed struggle is the primary form of the Palestinian struggle to realize national goals. On the basis of this struggle, the Revolutionary Council hereby decides to approve the plan, accepted by the Central Committee, to escalate the armed struggle in the occupied land.

(Concluding statement, conference in Tunis, 6 April 1985)

Hani al-Hassan, Arafat's political adviser:

The future will, in the end, prove that we are capable of continuing the armed struggle because, if we are not, then neither shall we be fit claimants to represent the Palestinian people.

(*Ash-Shark al-Awsat*, Saudi daily published in London, 16 April 1985)

Yasser Arafat, PLO Chairman:

The most recent guerrilla action, which was carried out off the coast of Palestine [the attempt of the ship *Atavarius* to land a Fatah terrorist squad] was not the last; rather, it constitutes the beginning of a series of additional actions which will hurt Israel.

(*Ar-Rai al-'Am*, Kuwaiti daily, 25 April 1985)



Arafat with seajack-mastermind Abu al-Abbas.

PLO TERROR FOLLOWING THE JORDAN-PLO AGREEMENT

Since the signing of the Hussein-Arafat agreement, there has been a marked upward trend in the number of PLO attacks in Israel and abroad.

The identities of the specific Palestinian terror organizations involved in all the attacks is not yet known. Considering the cases, however, where the perpetrators have been positively identified, Fatah, headed by Arafat, has played the dominant role, both in the number of attacks and in the scope of the loss of life some of these attacks were intended to produce.

ATTEMPTED ATTACKS FROM THE SEA

The Ship Atavarius

On the night of 20-21 April 1985, an Israel Navy vessel sank the Fatah ship *Atavarius*, foiling a planned attack in Israel. Of the 28 persons on board, 8 were rescued. The terrorists' mission was to take over the IDF General Staff Headquarters in Tel Aviv, to hold hostages and to demand the release of 150 Fatah members jailed in Israel. The originator and planner of this mission was Abu Jihad, Arafat's deputy and head of the assault force, "Western Front." Most of the planning and supervision took place in Amman. On the eve of the *Atavarius*' departure on 13 April 1985 from Algeria, Abu Jihad came on board and personally briefed the captain and the terrorists, who were members of Fatah's sea unit and had undergone long and intensive training in Algeria.

Abu Jihad, in an interview regarding the planned mission with the Saudi daily, *Ash-Shark al-Awsat*, on 26 April 1985, said:

The action expresses the willpower and the strong determination of the Palestinian people to continue the armed struggle against the occupying enemy.... Our revolution will not forego the continuation of the struggle to hurt the enemy and to cause losses among his forces. The action is significant also as regards the masses of the Arab people, many of whom concluded, as they followed the PLO's political activity, that it was moving towards a political arrangement and political solutions, while in fact political activity does not preclude continuation of military actions.

The Yacht *Casselardit*

On the night of 24-25 August 1985, an Israel Navy vessel captured the yacht *Casselardit*, carrying 8 Fatah terrorists and two foreign crewmen, an Australian and an American. The terrorists' mission was to carry out a massacre in northern Israel by taking over a civilian bus and killing its passengers. The men belonged to the new terrorist grouping within Fatah, headed by Abu Muatassem and under the command of Abu Tayeb. The terrorists were trained for their mission in Algeria, and transferred to the city of Tunis, where they received a final operational briefing from Abu Muatassem's assistant, Lieutenant-Colonel Shastri. From Tunisia, they were flown to Cyprus, where they received assistance from the local PLO office and boarded the yacht to carry out their mission.

The Yacht *Ganda*

On 31 August 1985, an Israel Navy vessel intercepted the yacht *Ganda*, capturing five officers and men belonging to "Force 17." The mission had been to carry out a terrorist strike in northern Israel. This operation, too, was planned by Abu Muatassem and Abu Tayeb.

LAND-BASED ATTACKS

Over 70 of the attacks carried out against Israel since March 1985 — including the murders of an Israeli couple near Beit Shemesh, west of Jerusalem (30 June 1985), and of an Israeli civilian shopping in Nablus (30 July 1985) — were proved to have been perpetrated by Fatah's "Western Front" or by its new terror grouping, headed by Abu Muatassem and Abu Tayeb. The remaining attacks were committed either by Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, or were the actions of yet unidentified sources.

The attacks carried out by the "Western Front" are planned and guided from Amman. In early October 1985, Israeli forces eliminated a murder gang which belonged to this group.

The attacks of the new terror apparatus may be directed from Amman and/or Tunis, depending on where the personnel involved are located. When Abu Tayeb, who lives in Amman, has a plan for an attack, he flies to Hamam-Shat in Tunisia to consult with Abu Muatassem and, if the project and its funding are approved, Abu Tayeb then holds an operational meeting in the offices of "Force 17" at Hamam-Shat or in a private apartment in Tunis. Depending on the nature of the plan, further operational details for implementing the attack may be discussed in Jordan.

ATTACKS IN EUROPE

A large proportion of attacks outside Israel have been carried out in Europe against Palestinian and other Arab elements, as well as against Israeli and Jewish targets, indicating the existence of a wide-ranging terror network, ready to take risks in

European countries. The perpetrators of these terrorist strikes were Fatah men, belonging to the Abu Muatassem group and the organization's intelligence branch, in many cases operating out of Tunis. Some of these terrorists have been caught by West European authorities:

- In Frankfurt, a Fatah member was arrested in February 1985 for possession of explosives.
- In Rome, in July 1985, a Fatah member carrying forged documents was arrested.

In Madrid, in July 1985, two Fatah members belonging to "Force 17" were caught. They carried explosives and plans for carrying out a terror attack.

Most of the planning of foreign attacks takes place in Tunisia. For example, the plan to attack Israel's diplomatic mission in Greece was formulated at a meeting at "Force 17" headquarters at Hamam-Shat (Tunisia) on 14 March 1985. The meeting was chaired by Abu Tayeb, and participants included Ali Zaibak, the "Force 17" representative in Greece; Abu Noor, the "Force 17" commander in Tunisia; and his deputy, Jihad al-Ghol. For various reasons, the plan failed, and the head of the attack force was admonished personally by Arafat.

The Larnaca Murders

On 25 September 1985, three terrorists stormed an Israeli yacht in the marina at Larnaca, Cyprus, and murdered its three passengers — a woman and two men. Although the PLO promptly denied any connection with the attack, and Arafat even condemned it, it has been proved beyond doubt that the murderers, who gave themselves up to the Cypriot authorities, were members of "Force 17":

Ali Nassif (real name: Salah-Nassif Wahwab), aged 24, belonged to "Force 17" in Tunisia, under the command of Abu Noor, and from time to time guarded Arafat in his office at Hamam-Shat. He later was part of the staff of the "Force 17" representative in Greece, Ali Zaibak, and in 1984 served as the bodyguard of Milhem Barakat, the PLO representative in Athens. Salah-Nassif personally took part in at least two terror attacks: in Greece, in July 1984, against the Israel mission; and in Spain, in August 1984, against the Libyan ambassador in Madrid.

Mahmoud Khaled Abdallah (real name: Osama Tukan), aged 27, is the son of a well-known family in Nablus. In 1978, he joined the Fatah in Lebanon. In November 1983, he was attached to "Force 17" in Tripoli, from where he was evacuated to South Yemen in December 1983. In 1985, Tukan was transferred to "Force 17" headquarters in Tunisia, where he served under the command of Captain Turki, later to be captured on the yacht *Ganda*.

■ Ryan Michael Edison, a British mercenary aged 28, was a member of the neo-Nazi party. At the end of 1982, he joined Fatah in North Yemen. He later became part of "Force 17," serving alternately in Tunisia and Yemen.

Following the murders at Larnaca, the president of Cyprus tried to approach Arafat to clarify to which group the murderers belonged, but with no success. At the same time, Arafat was engaged in denying, through the media, any connection with the attack.

The Hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*

On 7 October 1985, the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro*, bound for the Israeli port of Ashdod, was hijacked. The original intention of the hijackers had been to reach Israeli soil, to take hostages and demand the release of Fatah terrorists being held in Israeli jails. However, the gang's presence was discovered while the ship was still in Egyptian waters, and the terrorists changed their plans, hijacked the ship and made their demands then and there. Some time later, they shot and killed 69-year-old Leon Klinghoffer, an ailing Jewish American confined to a wheelchair, and threw his body overboard.


The terrorist organization which carried out the hijacking and murder was the Abu al-Abbass faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), which since 1977 has been closely linked with Arafat's Fatah; after the split within Fatah (1983), the links between Abu al-Abbass and Arafat grew even stronger. At the end of 1984, following a meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Tunisia, Arafat saw to it that Abu al-Abbass was elected to membership on the PLO Executive Committee. His headquarters are in Hamam-Shat, close to Arafat's, and he receives from him about \$100,000 a month.

Considering the close association between Arafat and Abu al-Abbass, it is inconceivable that Arafat had known nothing of the planned operation, as he claimed, and that he had "no control" of the group that carried out the hijacking. In fact, it is virtually certain that Arafat did know in advance of the action, and that, when the original plan misfired, Arafat decided to cut his losses and, by appearing in the role of "mediator" in the affair, try to deflect world anger over what had happened.


The Barcelona Murders

On the weekend of 5-6 October 1985, two Israeli seamen were tortured and murdered in the Spanish port of Barcelona. An anonymous caller told a Western news agency in Madrid that "Force 17" had carried out the killings. One of the suspects arrested for the murders had been apprehended before, in Israel, for terrorist activities.

ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, June 1984—September 1985 **(Attacks in Israel and the Administered Areas, and Cross-Border Attacks)**



**ATTACKS/FOILED ATTACKS ON ISRAELI, JEWISH AND OTHER TARGETS
OUTSIDE ISRAEL June 1984—September 1985**



DENIAL AND DECEPTION

PLO-Fatah headquarters in Tunisia direct PLO policy regarding the publicizing of their terror actions. Sometimes they contact the news media directly, submitting announcements in the name of the PLO. Fatah makes a point of publicizing some of its attacks through the PLO radio station, currently located in Baghdad.

When Arafat decides to dissociate himself and his PLO from a terrorist act, usually when it has misfired and/or aroused unexpected wrath in world public opinion, he simply denies having had anything to do with it — emphasizing the point, sometimes, by appearing on the scene in the guise of a mediator offering his good offices to secure the release of hostages, punish the wrongdoers and the like. Needless to say, he has no difficulty, in such cases, getting the perpetrators of the action to comply with his wishes — since they are under his command.

The list of instances in which Arafat has taken such “know-nothing” positions — only to have it shown, later, that the truth was precisely the reverse — is too long to be presented here. A few prominent examples will suffice to make the point:

DECEPTION: When the Israel Air Force on 1 October bombed PLO headquarters and facilities in Tunisia, Arafat declared the US armed forces had participated in the operation.

FACT: The United States not only had no part in the operation, but had known nothing of it until the American Ambassador had been informed of it after the raid had been completed.

DECEPTION: In a television interview, Arafat heatedly denied that the Jewish-American passenger Leon Klinghoffer had been killed by the hijackers of the Italian ship *Achille Lauro*, insisting that “it was a heart-attack.”

FACT: The body was washed ashore a few days later, with two bullets lodged in it, and identified as that of Leon Klinghoffer. He had been shot from behind while sitting in his wheelchair, by one of the PLO terrorists, and thrown into the sea.

DECEPTION: Arafat denied any role in the triple-murder of Israelis in the Larnaca harbour on 25 September.

FACT: The deed was perpetrated by known and identified operatives of Arafat’s own elite bodyguard unit, “Force 17.”

DECEPTION: When Hisham as-Saudi, a wealthy Palestinian Arab living in Cyprus, survived an attempt on his life last year, Yasser Arafat was the first to phone Saudi and offer his congratulations on his escape from death.

FACT: Arafat himself had given “Force 17” the order to “liquidate” Saudi, whom he suspected of plotting against him.

DECEPTION: When a bus in Jerusalem was blown up by Fatah terrorists on 6 December 1983, killing four persons and injuring 46, Arafat said the blown-up vehicle had been “an army bus.”

FACT: The vehicle blown up was city bus No. 18, carrying mostly shoppers and school children returning home for lunch.

DECEPTION: In 1972, an organization calling itself “Black September” began carrying out kidnappings and other terrorist acts. Arafat at first disclaimed any connection with or knowledge of the group.

FACT: Later it was revealed that “Black September” was a code-name for Arafat’s own Fatah.

DECEPTION: Arafat denied all connection with the seizure of the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum in March 1973 and the murder of the US Ambassador, the US Chargé d’Affaires and the Belgian Chargé d’Affaires.

FACT: It turned out that the deed had been done by a “Black September” gang, and that the order to kill the diplomats had been phoned to the terrorists personally by Yasser Arafat.

ISRAEL’S AIR RAID ON PLO HEADQUARTERS

In response to the repeated acts of terrorism perpetrated against it and its citizens, Israel on 1 October 1985 bombed the headquarters of the PLO at Hamam-Shat in Tunisia, the nerve center of its worldwide operations. Israel’s forces took special care to pinpoint the targets, which included —

- a number of buildings that served as Arafat’s headquarters and offices;
the communications and operations centre of the Arafat wing of Fatah;
- Fatah’s military administration office, also housing the PLO’s central archives; the office of Abu Muatassem, head of Fatah’s operations department and of the new terror grouping;
“Force 17’s” Tunisian headquarters, as well as its jail.

The land for these facilities, located some 12 miles southeast of the capital city of Tunis, was made available to the PLO by the Tunisian government, in violation of international law. Oppenheim and Lauterpacht, in their “Treatise on International Law,” Vol. I, pages 292-3, state the following:

States are under a duty to prevent and suppress such subversive activity against foreign governments as assumes the form of armed hostile expeditions or attempts to commit common crimes against life or property. Moreover, while subversive activities against foreign states on the part of private persons do not, in principle, engage the international responsibility of a state, such activities, when emanating directly from the government itself or indirectly from organizations receiving from it financial or other assistance..., amount to a breach of international law.

About 65 people were killed in the attack, 10 of them Tunisian security personnel, and the rest PLO terrorists. Among them were —

■ Lieutenant-Colonel Abdallah Ghash, known as Shastri, was Abu Muatassem's deputy and took part in the preparation of all the attacks planned by him. Previously, Shastri had served as a battalion commander of a Fatah military force. In August 1985, he briefed the terrorist squad that had sailed on the yacht *Casselardit* with the intent of perpetrating a large-scale massacre in northern Israel.

■ Shafiq Risa'a al-Ansar, known as Ali Zaibak, had belonged to Fatah's "Black September" in the early 1970's. Subsequently, he participated in the planning and perpetration of a number of attacks against Israeli targets abroad and against economic installations in Holland, West Germany and Italy. In 1973, he was arrested in Vienna as a member of a group which had intended to take over the transit camp for Soviet Jewish immigrants at Schoenau. He served as Arafat's bodyguard (1978-79), was operations officer of "Force 17" in Europe (1980-82) and, from then on, lived in Athens, where he was responsible for the Greek contingent of "Force 17."

■ Jihad al-Ghol was the deputy commander of "Force 17" in Tunisia. He took part in the planning of attacks outside Israel and was responsible for organizing special murder squads.

■ Abu Ghosh was an operations officer who had taken an active part in the briefings given to the terrorist squad that sailed on the *Atavarius*.

Unlike the PLO terrorists killed in Israel's operation in Tunisia — whose guilt has been proved — the great majority of the victims of PLO terror attacks have been innocent civilians. Ambassador Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel's UN Representative, described the phenomenon in these words:

They were not the incidental and regrettable civilian casualties of military actions. They themselves were the intended victims, the designated targets of the PLO, because the methods of the PLO are identical to its aim: deliberate and systematic murder of Israelis and Jews — and, ultimately, murder of the Jewish State itself.

(From an address at UN Security Council, 2 October 1985)

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Tunisia has in recent years become the main focus of PLO terrorism; more recently, Jordan also became a centre of PLO activity.

PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat is personally involved in the PLO's terrorist operations.

Since the signing of the Jordan-PLO Agreement of February 1985, there has been a marked increase in the scope both of the PLO's organizational infrastructure and of its anti-Israel terror operations.

There are considerable discrepancies between the Jordanian interpretation of the Agreement and that of the PLO.

Fatah, the largest of the PLO's constituent organizations, has established an active terror network in Europe. PLO offices in Europe are directly involved in this activity.

Arafat's public relations are predicated on deceit, hypocrisy and outright lies. His own declarations, as those of his lieutenants and other PLO spokesmen, are tailored to the tactical needs of the moment and the audience to which they happen to be directed, and they frequently contradict each other as well as the facts.

Neither the PLO as a whole, nor Fatah under the leadership of Arafat, has relinquished its ultimate goal of liquidating the State of Israel.


The overwhelming majority of victims of PLO terror attacks have been defenceless civilians. Moreover, as demonstrated in southern Lebanon (before 1982), in Beirut, in Tripoli and elsewhere, the PLO deliberately plants its bases among civilians. Civilians are the key to the PLO's tactics: It kills civilians — and it hides behind civilians.

The threat to the prospect of peace in the Middle East, therefore, comes not from Israel's anti-terrorist campaign, but from the PLO murderers themselves. Thus, the fight against terror is a fight for peace. It is those who support the PLO, with Arafat at its head, those who seek ways to have a dialogue with it, those who see the PLO as having moderated its views and those who are under the illusion that the terror will not strike them — who constitute the greatest obstacle to the peace process.

There will be and can be no peace in the Middle East until the nations of the world join the fight against PLO terrorism.

APPENDICES

STRUCTURE OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)



Appendix A:

DATA ON THE PLO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

(based on a background paper issued by the IDF Spokesman, August 1985)

The chief institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are:

Palestinian National Council (PNC) — a quasi-parliament which meets every few years, and may be convened in response to any development judged to be pertinent to the Palestinian cause. The PNC sets basic policy guidelines in both internal and external affairs.

Executive Committee — the governing body responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the PLO with its various departments and bureaus.

Central Council — the advisory body to the Executive Committee. Drawing its membership from the PNC, the council constitutes a parliamentary watchdog over the actions of the Executive Committee when the PNC is not in session.

The component organizations of the PLO are the following:

FATAH (loyalists)

Fatah, headed by PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, is the largest and most important PLO grouping.

On 20 December 1983, after the rebellion within its ranks, some 4,000 terrorists loyal to Arafat were evacuated from the Lebanese port of Tripoli and joined 4,000 of their comrades in terrorist camps scattered throughout the Arab world.

The dispersed terrorists have been reorganized in a number of Arab countries, within military frameworks such as the Palestine Liberation Army, which is directly responsible to the host country's military (as in Jordan and Egypt). In principle, all these scattered forces remain under PLO leadership. A process of reorganization and retraining of these forces is currently taking place, including the development of airborne and naval infrastructures — in North Yemen, at Hodeida, and on the island of Qamran, respectively.

Over the years, Fatah has been a steady advocate of independent action, and has consistently opposed Syrian attempts to dominate PLO policies. Since the PLO's evacuation from Beirut in 1982, Fatah has suffered from internal dissension, climaxed by the *de facto* split, in May 1983, of pro-Syrian Fatah members and their establishment of a separate Syrian-backed rebel faction. The Fatah loyalists, however, are still the dominant element in the PLO, serving as a focus for all Palestinian Arab groups that oppose Syrian or other Arab states' attempts to dictate PLO policies.

Arafat and other Fatah leaders maintain regular contacts with the Soviet leadership.

Fatah is a multi-faceted organization with a network of branches, many of which are based on loyalty to some specific personality and operate largely as the private domain of that individual. The chief bodies of Fatah are:

Major Political Institutions

General Conference — the supreme decision-making body.

Revolutionary Council — deals with political and operational matters when the General Conference is not in session.

Central Committee — comprised of the top leadership of Fatah and deals with day-to-day policy.

Security and Terror Groups

"Western Front" — led by Abu Jihad, this terrorist group deals mainly with targets in Judea-Samaria and in Israel.

United Security — led by Abu Iyad, this group deals mainly with organizational and security problems.

Security and Information — led by Abu al-Houl, this group is chiefly responsible for internal security and for preventive actions. It also aids the two previously-mentioned groups by providing them with information.

Central Operations — led by Abu Muatassem, this group deals with Fatah's military structure and coordinates the activities of the various Fatah groups in the field.

F T

Under the leadership of Abu Musa, this group of some 2,500 terrorists broke off from the Fatah loyalists in May 1983. It is headquartered in Damascus and draws its support from left-wing members of Fatah and from Fatah military units deployed in Lebanon and Syria. While belonging to the pro-Syrian camp within the PLO, it seeks to project an image of independence and autonomy.

The rebels' military command in Lebanon, at Al-Istabel in the Bekaa Valley, controls both military and para-military forces, which continue to operate within the institutional and organizational frameworks of the Fatah group they quit, including the Yarmuk and Karameh brigades.

Task forces are being trained with the aim of carrying out terrorist operations (the "Western Sector" apparatus, under Khaled al-Amla) at camps (Hamoriye, Doma, Beit Na'im) in Syria which fell into their hands during fighting with the Fatah loyalists in mid-1983.

PO

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(PFLP)

Headed by George Habash, and headquartered in Damascus, the PFLP numbers 500-600 men. It is one of the most important groups in the PLO, since it is not an agent for any other body, nor does it act on behalf of any Arab country. It combines advocacy of the PLO's freedom of action and decision-making with a Marxist ideology and political links with the Soviet Union.

The PFLP's structure is based on the principle of "democratic centralism," with various political bureaus being responsible to a central committee.

Together with Hawatmeh's DFLP (see below), the Habash Front forms a centrist bloc in its position vis-à-vis the internal crisis in the PLO. Politically, it stands midway between Fatah and the pro-Syrian groups. Cooperation between the PFLP and the DFLP is achieved by means of a joint leadership.

The PFLP's military-terrorist forces are stationed in Syria and Lebanon, and include six battalions, of which one artillery battalion is under joint PFLP-DFLP command. A group called "Subjugated Lands," operated together with the DFLP, holds among its objectives military-terrorist assaults against Israel.

DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION OF THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DLO)

Under the leadership of Naif Hawatmeh and with headquarters in Damascus, the DFLP comprises 900-1,000 terrorists. Together with Fatah and the PFLP, it forms the core of the PLO, stands for the PLO's freedom of action and decision-making, and is not sponsored by any Arab regime. Like the Habash Front (PFLP), the DFLP espouses a Marxist ideology and is based on "democratic centralism," with a central committee and political bureaus as its major institutions. It also maintains regular political contact with the Soviet Union.

Hawatmeh's Front has strong links with the Habash Front; together, they play a mediatory role between the Arafat camp and the pro-Syrian groups.

DFLP forces are organized in four infantry battalions and one artillery unit, all deployed in Lebanon. Their command is at Ta'albiye, under the leadership of Khaled Abd ar-Rahim.

The DFLP has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Israel and Lebanon. The headquarters of the "Subjugated Lands" unit, central military intelligence and special forces, which are responsible for planning and executing these operations, are located in Damascus and the Bekaa Valley. DFLP training camps are situated mostly in Syria.

POPULAR ORGANIZATION OF THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE — GENERAL COMMAND (PFLP-GC)

The PFLP-GC is built, to a large extent, on the charisma of its leader, Ahmad Jibril, and draws its power almost exclusively from its military strength — about 800 terrorists. Side by side with Saika (see below), it acts as the advocate of Syrian policies within the PLO.

PFLP-GC headquarters are at Rehan, in the Damascus area. Among its training camps in Syria is "Camp 17th September" at Ein Sahab; its security department is also located in Syria. PFLP-GC headquarters in Lebanon are at Deir Znun. The organization commands the Sabra-and-Shatilla Battalion, an artillery unit, rocket launchers and a naval unit.

During the rebellion within Fatah, 100-150 terrorists under the leadership of Abu Jabar, then Jibril's Chief of Central Security, split off from the PFLP-GC and are now in Algeria, South Yemen, Cyprus and the Beirut area.

SAIKA

Consisting of about 1,000 terrorists and led by Issam al-Kadhi, Saika is the terrorist arm of Syria's Ba'ath party and serves as a loyal instrument of Syrian policy within the PLO.

The Saika group forms part of the political institutions of the Ba'ath party's Palestinian section. Its security department cooperates with Syrian security forces. During the 1983 rebellion in Fatah, many Saika terrorists joined Arafat's forces and were subsequently evacuated to Tunisia and Cyprus.

Saika's command, headquartered in Damascus, is responsible for its forces deployed in Syria and Lebanon. In Lebanon, its command is located at Ta'anil, and its forces are organized in five battalions stationed in various parts of the country (Bekaa Valley, northern Lebanon, the mountain region). It also controls militias, mostly in the mountain region, as well as terrorist groups in the Sidon area. Saika operates training camps and offices in the Tartus area of Syria, among other locations.

POPULAR STRUGGLE FRONT (PSF)

Headed by Samir Ghisha and headquartered in Damascus, the PSF numbers about 600 terrorists. It is in the pro-Syrian camp of the PLO and works in close coordination with Saika and the PFLP-GC. It follows a Marxist ideology and is administratively based on a central committee and various political bureaus.

Its military command, at Ta'albiye in Lebanon, is responsible for the group's forces deployed in the Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, northern Lebanon and Beirut.

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT (PLF)

The PLF comprises several hundred terrorists who split off from the PFLP-GC. Ideologically, it is close to the Habash and Hawatmeh Fronts. The internal crisis in the PLO has led to the *de facto* split of this group into three factions:

A pro-Arafat group led by Abu al-Abbas, formerly the PLF's military chief, on whose personality the faction is mainly based. Its command is located in Tunisia and in southern Lebanon; in Lebanon, it is represented also in Tripoli and Beirut.

A pro-Syrian group, headed by Abd al-Fatah al-Ghanem (a member of the PLF's Central Committee) who took over the PLF's Syrian offices in early 1984. Headquartered in Damascus, this group commands forces in Syria, where it has training bases, and in Lebanon.

■ A faction leaning towards the Habash and Hawatmeh Fronts, headed by Tala'at Yaakub, the PLF's secretary-general. Its forces are located mostly in Lebanon, while its command is apparently in Damascus.

In April 1985, the Fatah rebels, PFLP, PFLP-GC, Saika, PSF and two factions of the PLF formed the Palestinian National Salvation Front, a pro-Syrian alignment designed to counteract the influence of the Arafat-led Fatah loyalists, who constitute the current PLO leadership.

ARAB LIBERATION FRONT (ALF)

Consisting of a few hundred terrorists and led by Abd ar-Rahim Ahmad, the ALF was established by the Iraqi Ba'ath party and receives its instructions from Baghdad. Its positions shift with Iraqi policies. It is currently allied with Arafat and backs his stand against Syria.

The offices and training bases of the ALF are located in Iraq. In Lebanon, it has forces only in the Tripoli and Beirut areas.

ABU NIDAL FACTION

Under the leadership of Sabri al-Bana, known as Abu Nidal, this PLO faction consists of an estimated 500-800 terrorists and supporters in various Arab countries and around the world, especially in Europe.

The faction was formed at the end of 1973 as a result of Abu Nidal breaking with Fatah over its position regarding a political settlement following the Yom Kippur War. Until the end of 1980, it operated under the full patronage of the Iraqi regime, after which its support declined. In November 1983, the group's members were expelled from Iraq, and only its facilities in Baghdad remained operative. Today most of the group's installations are in Syria and Lebanon, with possibly some in Libya and Iran.

Upholding the original radical Fatah ideology, Abu Nidal exploits PLO propaganda organs such as the *Sawt al-Filastin* (Voice of Palestine) radio station and the weekly *Filastin ath-Thawra al-Mekawma*.

The number of attacks the group has perpetrated in Europe indicates that it has an operational infrastructure (relying mainly on "students") capable of carrying out terrorist actions outside the Middle East. Its operations may be receiving support from Iraqi institutions abroad, as well as Syrian aid. To date, the faction has a record of some 60 terrorist attacks against various targets in the Middle East and Europe, against Palestinians considered "traitors to the Palestinian cause," and Israel-related targets, including mass-murder missions and assassinations.

POPULAR ARAB LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Led by Naji Alush, this group was formed following its break with the Abu Nidal faction in 1979. It draws its support from dozens of activists and supporters in Lebanon, Syria, Libya and in Europe, where infrastructures are known to exist in Spain, West Germany and Britain. The Movement maintains contact with other PLO groups, mainly Fatah and the Habash Front.

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-SPECIAL COMMAND (PFLP-SC)

Headed by Salim Abu Salem, also known as Abu Muhammad, the PFLP-SC comprises some 100 terrorists and supporters. Its command includes Military Chief Zaki Hilu, Chief of Organization and Recruitment Sida al-Atari (Abu Firas) and Chief of Administration Sharif al-Hasni.

The PFLP-SC has branches in various Arab countries, as well as in Cyprus and apparently in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Each office acts independently, with approval of the PFLP-SC leadership needed only in the planning of actual terrorist attacks.

Contacts are maintained with other PLO groups, especially Fatah, the Habash Front and the PLF, as well as with foreign terrorist organizations such as the Japanese Red Army, German groups, the Armenians (ASALA), the Basque ETA movement and the Revolutionary Armed Factions in Lebanon.

THE ARAB ORGANIZATION OF 15TH MAY

Headquartered in Baghdad and led by Muhammad Amri, known as Abu Ibrahim, this faction numbers some 50-70 terrorists and supporters. Its name derives from the date of the Arab states' invasion of Israel on 15 May 1948, the day after Israel declared its independence.

The Abu Ibrahim group maintains close operational contact with Iraqi intelligence, which provides it with financial support, documentation services, recruitment, training facilities and weaponry. Clandestine infrastructures are also known to exist in Kuwait, Lebanon and Europe.

To date, the group has carried out 24 attacks and attempted attacks on Jewish/Israeli, Arab and foreign targets, mostly bomb attacks utilizing sophisticated techniques such as concealing explosive devices in innocent-looking objects. Two attempts to strike against an El Al plane by means of an explosives-laden suitcase took place in December 1983 and June 1984.

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Appendix B

TEXT OF JORDAN-PLO AGREEMENT

Following is the full text of the Jordan-PLO Agreement as announced on Radio Amman, 23 February 1985:

Proceeding from the spirit of the Fez summit resolutions approved by the Arabs and from UN resolutions on the Palestine question, in accordance with international legitimacy, and proceeding from a joint understanding toward building a distinguished relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples, the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the PLO have agreed to march together toward a just, peaceful settlement of the Middle East issue and toward the termination of the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories, including Jerusalem, in accordance with the following bases and principles:

1. Land in exchange for peace as cited in the UN resolutions, including the Security Council resolutions.
2. The Palestinian people's right to self-determination. The Palestinians should exercise their inalienable right to self-determination when the Jordanians and Palestinians manage to achieve this within the framework of an Arab confederation (*ittihad kinfidirali 'arabi*) that is intended to be established between the two states of Jordan and Palestine.
3. Solving the Palestinian refugees problem in accordance with the UN resolutions.
4. Solving all aspects of the Palestine question.
5. Based on this, peace negotiations should be held within the framework of an international conference to be attended by the five UN Security Council permanent member-states and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, which is the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative, within a joint delegation — a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Appendix C

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338

Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

- (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
- (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
- (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Resolution 338 of 22 October 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

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How Central Is the Palestinian Problem? (PLC)

By BENJAMIN NETANYAHU

We are frequently told that the "Palestinian problem" lies at the heart of the present unrest in the Mideast. Solve this problem and you will have peace in the area. And the U.S., which is often the target of Arab hostility and criticism, will enjoy a stable and enduring alliance with the Arab world.

However plausible this idea may appear, it does not correspond to Middle Eastern realities.

In the last 30 years, virtually every Arab state has been at war or on the verge of war with at least one of its Arab neighbors. Not one part of the Arab world has escaped this grim regularity.

In North Africa, Libya has clashed with Egypt and Tunisia, threatened Sudan and financed efforts to topple other Arab regimes. Egypt under Nasser invaded Yemen and now trades threats with Qadhafi. Algeria has waged surrogate warfare against Morocco using the Polisario forces in the Sahara.

In the Arabian peninsula, the two Yemens have been warring intermittently for years. Saudi Arabia, while trying to buy off all potential enemies in the Arab world, in turn seeks to dominate the smaller states of the Gulf and has pressed territorial claims against all of them. Kuwait frets over Saudi encroachment on its territory, but worries even more about Iraq, which claims Kuwait in its entirety.

And in the heart of the Middle East, Syria has attacked Jordan, jostles with Iraq and has made a shambles of Lebanon in seven years of ruthless occupation.

The fact that nearly all of these states are frequently bound by treaties of unity and endless protestations of brotherhood and friendship counts for nothing.

Lawrence's Characterization

The Arab world is littered with broken agreements. At the first sign of a neighbor's vulnerability, aggression erupts against the potential victim, to be checked only by the perception or presence of countervailing power. Thus when Saddam Hussein of Iraq perceived post-revolutionary Iran as weak and ripe for plunder, he swiftly revoked the border agreement he had signed five years earlier with the shah and invaded Iran's oil-rich provinces. As early as 1928, T.E. Lawrence characterized the Arab regimes as "tyrannies cemented with blood" and said that "it will be generations before any two Arab states join voluntarily." Fifty-five years later nothing has changed.

No lasting peace is possible among the Arab states as long as the tendency for violence remains central in Arab political life, and every Arab regime will continue to depend on force even for its internal survival. Since King Farouk, every Egyptian ruler has been a military man, relying on the army to crush opposition. Libya is ruled by a colonel and a small clique of of-

ficers. The army runs Algeria, and Hassan of Morocco depends on the loyalty of his army to sustain his regime. In Saudi Arabia not one but two armies (they watch each other) protect the princes. In Syria, an Alawite officer corps run by Assad's brother suppresses dissent, sometimes with mass murder as at Hama recently. Hussein of Jordan relies on his Bedouin forces to subdue any threat to his rule. Hussein of Iraq depends on his secret police and army. Virtually every Arab leader has been the target of attempted or successful assassination.

None of these conflicts has anything to do with Israel. None of this violence has Israel as its target. Yet most of the discussions about achieving "peace" in the Middle East focus exclusively on the Arab-Is-

raeli conflict and ignore the pervasive violence that characterizes the Arab world.

To assume that this turbulence and endemic instability will disappear, or even subside, with the theoretical resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is to expect the impossible. Even the disappearance of Israel would not make the slightest difference.

Making peace among themselves is hard enough for the Arab states. Making peace with non-Arabs is even harder. For the Arabs regard the area from Morocco to the Persian Gulf as theirs, as Arab, despite the presence of numerous peoples that make up a sizable portion of the population—Berbers, Kurds, Copts, Druse, Jews, Circassians, Armenians, blacks and others. These non-Arab or non-Moslem peoples can be accepted only in a state of subjugation, within a dominant Arab domain, never as independent equals. That is why the Arabs would be as hostile to any non-Arab sovereign state—say a Berber one in North Africa, or a Coptic state in lower Egypt—as they are to the Jewish state of Israel.

While the specific enmity to Israel is deeply rooted in this general intolerance, Israel's sin is particularly odious in Arab eyes. For the Jews of Israel are the only non-Arab people to have successfully defied Arab domination and achieved independence.

Thus, the very existence of Israel challenges the concept of a unified and uninterrupted Arab domain. Even the presumed champion of Palestinian statehood, Yasser Arafat, has said: "The question of borders does not interest us. Palestine is only a small drop in the great Arab ocean. Our nation is a great Arab nation extending from the Atlantic to the Red Sea and beyond."

It is not surprising that hardly a syllable was uttered about a "Palestinian people" or about the "Palestinian homeland" in Judea and Samaria until Israel gained control of that strategic area in 1967. The theme of "homelessness" has been especially promoted since then and inflated far beyond its real proportion. For most Palestinian Arabs have homes. Many of them, in fact, live as full citizens in eastern Palestine, or Jordan, which constitutes nearly 80% of mandatory Palestine. Similarly, most of the Arabs of Judea-Samaria are not homeless refugees; they hold Jordanian citizenship and live in the same homes they occupied before the establishment of Israel. Several hundred thousand work in the Gulf oil states, but are no more "homeless" than are, for example, the many

nied to many non-Arab peoples living under Arab rule.

The Palestine refugee problem is not the cause but the result of the two major assaults on Israel's life by the Arabs in 1948 and 1967. Before those attempts Israel didn't possess Judea-Samaria, which some now urge her to surrender, supposedly because retention of them is the barrier to "peace." Relinquishing Judea-Samaria, which strategically dominates the approaches to Israel from the east, would merely strip Israel of her minimum security zone and the basis of deterrence against the bellicose Arab armies surrounding her. It would bring back the situation of May 1967, in which Israel lived as if with a noose around its neck.

A Hollow Threat

Telling Israel that the best security is peace—a peace that would depend on treaties and guarantees alone and would require Israel to surrender a crucial element of its deterrence—is to flout reality. It would be as if the U.S., in exchange for Soviet promises for "peace," were required to dismantle its forward defenses that provide it with the crucial warning time necessary to protect North America from a Soviet attack.

And what about the threat that if another Palestinian state isn't created "moderate" Arab regimes will turn to the Soviet Union? This is a hollow threat. There is no question here of Arab "disenchantment" with the West because there was never an enchantment to begin with. The democratic way of life is repugnant to all Arab regimes. That is why there has never been a shred of democracy in any Arab country, save for tiny Lebanon, where it struggles to survive against the forces of intolerance and terrorism that plague the Arab world. If there are Arab states that look to the West, it isn't because of organic links but because of self-interest that cannot be satisfied anywhere else. For this reason only, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms will continue to rely on the West for either aid, or weaponry, or markets, clearly recognizing that they are too weak, and the Soviet Union too close, for them to do without American protection.

The ongoing unrest in the Middle East isn't generated by the Palestinian problem, but by the propensity for violence in the Arab world and the general intolerance toward non-Arab peoples. Neither these tendencies, nor the need of some Arab states for the West, will be affected in any way by whether or not Israel yields up the sliver of territory (roughly the size of Greater Los Angeles) that is, however, indispensable for its defense.

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thousands of Americans who work in Saudi Arabia. That a few hundred thousand remain unintegrated is because the Arab states have kept them incarcerated in refugee camps for political reasons. As long ago as 1957, Elfan Rees, the adviser on refugees to the World Council of Churches, noted: "I hold that, political reasons aside, the Arab refugee problem is the easiest of the postwar refugee problems to solve. By faith, by language, by race and by social organization, they are indistinguishable from their fellows of the host country."

Whatever remains of the refugee problem can and should be resolved by the Arab world that has created and sustained it. Should they dedicate to it a tiny fraction of their enormous resources of land and money, they could make the problem disappear overnight.

It has long been recognized that to be a minority is not necessarily a tragedy. All nations have their minorities. The tragedy is to be everywhere a minority. This was precisely the Jewish situation before the creation of the state of Israel. As for the Arabs, they employ a reverse logic. For them it is a tragedy to be a minority anywhere in the vast swatch of land of the Middle East and North Africa. It is not enough for them that the Palestinian Arabs constitute the entire population of Jordan, and the western Palestinians the majority of that population. They now demand a second Palestinian state in the western part of Palestine, which would add one more state to the 21 they already have. They find it intolerable that some Arabs may live as a minority in Israel just as other peoples have lived as minorities in their midst. The only difference is that the Arab citizens of Israel enjoy the civil liberties and the rule of law (despite calumnious claims to the contrary) that are de-

Face Up to the P.L.O.'s True Nature

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By Benjamin Netanyahu

If nothing else, the Achille Lauro incident should have opened the West's eyes to the true nature of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The trouble is that even when faced with absolute evil, the mind refuses to accept what can be plainly seen. Thus in the 1930's, when reports of the unspeakable crimes committed in the Soviet Gulag reached the West, there were some who attributed them to "irresponsible" elements in the Soviet secret police.

How else if not by this mechanism of denial can we explain the world's willingness to believe Yasir Arafat's claims that he is "against terrorism"? That the hijacking of the Achille Lauro was committed by his "enemies"? That he only wanted to "mediate" the hostages' release and "punish" the culprits?

In fact, the Achille Lauro was commandeered by P.L.O. terrorists whose direct commander, Mohammed Abbas, is one of Mr. Arafat's closest deputies. Yet even when Mr. Abbas's men bungled the operation, Mr. Arafat thought he could get off without blame: The killers were to be spirited out of Egypt to P.L.O. headquarters in Tunis, while Mr. Arafat basked in Western applause for ending the crisis. His image as a moderate reinforced, he would then make his anticipated appearance at the United Nation's 40th anniversary celebration.

Fortunately, for once it didn't work. The terrorists were swiftly apprehended by the United States. Freed hostages described how the killers hailed Mr. Arafat as they beat elderly passengers. Intercepted communications between the murderers and their commander revealed they were not renegades but minions of the P.L.O. The evidence of Mr. Arafat's complicity became overwhelming. Less than 48 hours after he had offered condolences to the family of the slain hostage, Leon Klinghoffer, he denied that a murder had taken place, then threatened the United States for bagging his gunmen. Seldom has there been a more dramatic unmasking of murder and duplicity.

But this was hardly the first time that Mr. Arafat tried such a ploy. He discovered long ago that a little diplomacy and deception go a long way to assuage the West's unease about P.L.O. terrorism — that talk of "moderation" and "diplomatic options" can often erase the memory of the most heinous crimes. Thus, it has become a cornerstone of his policy to disavow such crimes even while issuing the orders to carry them out.

He first resorted to this tactic in 1970, disavowing the supposedly uncontrollable "splinter group" Black September, most notorious for the slaughter of 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. The P.L.O. itself later admitted that the group had been under Mr. Arafat's direct command. In 1979, another "mysterious" Palestinian group seized Egypt's Embassy in Turkey. Mr. Arafat negotiated the release of hostages with terrorists who later turned out to be his own men.

Of course, Mr. Arafat does not always disavow knowledge and responsibility. In other cases, P.L.O. spokesmen proudly claim credit. In the last year alone, Mr. Arafat launched some 600 terror attacks against innocent civilians, killing and severely wounding 75 Israelis — shoppers, cab drivers, teachers, tourists and the P.L.O.'s perennial favorite,

children. Yet, incredibly, many in the West persist in being duped, treating the P.L.O. as a legitimate government, accepting its emissaries and exerting pressure on Israel to establish a P.L.O. state on its border.

Such people don't seem to understand that the destruction of Israel remains the P.L.O.'s unchanging goal, reconfirmed every year in its Charter and repeated explicitly by Mr. Arafat's deputies. As recently as May, Abu Nazir, a leader of al Fatah, said: "When we demand the establishment of a Palestinian state, or even a Jordan-P.L.O. confederation, this is a strategy leading to the establishment of a state over all of Palestine. The 'phased policy' provides us with a springboard towards further goals."

Another senior deputy, Khaled al Hassan, explained: "While the 'phased policy' prescribes accepting anything possible during the first phase, we are determined to carry on the battle until the final goal is attained. The struggle will be long and will be decided only when Zionism is annihilated."

It is one thing for Arab countries to promote the P.L.O. as a cover for their own refusal to make real peace with Israel. It is another for Western governments to parrot endless incantations about Mr. Arafat's "reasonableness" and "moderation." By now, it should be clear enough that the P.L.O. is not a political organization that dabbles in terrorism but a terror organization that dabbles in politics. As for the peace process, if it depends in any measure on the P.L.O., it will never lead to peace. □

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