

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection:

Green, Max: Files, 1985-1988

Folder Title:

Pending (2 of 3)

Box: Box 20

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>



SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAMS

The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representations on the maps are not necessarily authoritative.

The illustrations of Soviet strategic defense facilities and systems included in this publication are derived from various U.S. sources; while not precise in every detail, they are as authentic as possible.

Preface

In March 1983, President Reagan presented a dramatic new vision of a world in which we would no longer have to depend on nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear conflict. He presented that vision, and that challenge, in this way:

What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?

The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the President announced that night, marks the first, essential step toward the realization of his ultimate goal. The SDI is a research program, designed to examine the promise of effective defenses against ballistic missiles based on new and emerging technologies. If such defenses prove feasible, they would provide for a more stable and secure method of preventing war in the future, through the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses which threaten no one.

The Strategic Defense Initiative has been the subject of much discussion within the United States and allied countries since its initiation. Such exchanges are essential in our free societies and can only help ensure that the vision behind the research program can be achieved. There has been comparatively little public discussion, however, about the trend in Soviet defensive as well as offensive forces which provides the essential backdrop to the SDI. Indeed, the Soviet Union has intentionally tried to mislead the public about its strategic defense activities.

As this publication documents, Soviet efforts in most phases of strategic defense have long been far more extensive than those of the United States. The USSR has major passive defense programs, designed to protect important assets from attack. It also has extensive active defense systems, which utilize weapons systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key assets. Soviet developments in the area of active defenses fall into three major categories: air defense; ballistic missile defense based on current technologies; and research and development on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles.

Important recent Soviet activities in strategic defenses include:

- Upgrading and expansion of the world's only operational Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system around Moscow;
- Construction of the Krasnoyarsk ballistic missile detection and tracking radar that violates the 1972 ABM Treaty;
- Extensive research into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles including laser weapons, particle beam weapons, and kinetic energy weapons;
- Maintenance of the world's only operational antisatellite (ASAT) system;
- Modernization of their strategic air defense forces; and
- Improvements in their passive defenses by maintaining deep bunkers and blast shelters for key personnel, and enhancing the survivability of some offensive systems through mobility and hardening.

The following pages examine in detail Soviet programs in defenses against ballistic missiles, air defense, and passive defense. A summary of key Soviet offensive


force developments is presented in the annex to this document, since those are critical to an understanding of the impact of Soviet strategic defense programs. Soviet offensive forces are designed to be able to limit severely U.S. and allied capability to retaliate against attack. Soviet defensive systems in turn are designed to prevent those retaliatory forces which did survive an attack from destroying Soviet targets.

Given the long-term trend in Soviet offensive and defensive force developments, the United States must act in three main areas to maintain security and stability both in the near term and in the future.


First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear forces in order to ensure the essential military balance in the near term, and to provide the incentives necessary for the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions.

Second, we must act now to start constructing a more reliable strategic order for the long term by examining the potential for future effective defenses against ballistic missiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a prudent and necessary response to the ongoing extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that permitted by the ABM Treaty. The overriding importance of the Strategic Defense Initiative, however, is the promise it offers of moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence in the future and of providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union to agree to progressively deeper negotiated reduction in offensive nuclear arms.

The third approach is one of negotiation and diplomacy. We are even now looking forward to a transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. Toward those ends, we are endeavoring at the negotiations in Geneva to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals and to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and the possibility of a future transition to a more defense-reliant deterrence.



CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense



GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

Introduction

In the late 1960s, given the state of defensive technology at the time, the United States came to believe that deterrence could best be assured if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and thereby impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly beyond any potential gains. That concept called for a reduction by both the Soviet Union and the United States in their strategic defensive forces, the maintenance of a balance between the two sides' offensive nuclear forces, and negotiated nuclear arms reductions which would maintain the balance at progressively lower levels.

In accordance with those principles, the United States exercised great restraint in offensive nuclear arms and at the same time dramatically lowered its defensive forces. Thus, we removed most of our defenses against Soviet bombers; decided to maintain a severely limited civil defense program; ratified the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on U.S. and Soviet defenses against ballistic missiles; and then deactivated the one ABM site which we were allowed under that Treaty. The basic idea that stability and deterrence would be maintained if each side had roughly equal capability to retaliate against attack also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process of the 1970s.

The Soviet Union, however, failed to show the type of restraint, in both strategic offensive and defensive forces, that the United States hoped for when the SALT process began. The

USSR has consistently refused to accept meaningful and verifiable negotiated reductions in offensive nuclear arsenals. Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have greatly expanded and modernized their offensive nuclear forces and invested an approximately equal sum in strategic defenses. The USSR has an extensive, multifaceted operational strategic defensive network which dwarfs that of the United States as well as an active research and development program in both traditional and advanced defenses against ballistic missiles. Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements in both the offensive and defensive areas, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of very serious concern. The aggregate of current Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory — precisely what the ABM Treaty was designed to prevent.

Soviet offensive and defensive force developments pose a serious challenge to the West. If left unchecked and unanswered, they would undermine our ability to retaliate effectively in case of Soviet attack. The situation would be even more severe if the Soviet Union were to have a monopoly on advanced defenses against ballistic missiles in addition to its sizable offensive and defensive forces. In that case, the USSR might come to believe that it could launch a nuclear attack against the United States or our allies without fear of effective retaliation. At the very least, it might see a realistic chance of successful nuclear blackmail.

Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

The Soviet Approach

The Soviet emphasis on strategic defense is firmly grounded in Soviet military doctrine and strategy, which call for the following actions in the event of nuclear war:

- destruction and disruption of the West's nuclear-associated command, control, and communications;
- destruction or neutralization of as many of the West's nuclear weapons as possible on the ground or at sea before they could be launched;
- interception and destruction of surviving weapons — aircraft and missiles — before they reached their targets; and
- protection of the Party, the State, military forces, industrial infrastructure, and the essential working population against those weapons that survived attacks by Soviet offensive forces.

In pursuit of these goals the USSR puts considerable stress on a need for effective strategic defenses as well as offensive forces. In the Soviet view, the USSR could best achieve its aims in any nuclear war if it attacked first, destroying much of the U.S. and allied capability for retaliation. Defensive measures, both active and passive, would in turn prevent those enemy forces that survived a Soviet first-strike from destroying targets in the USSR.

Marshall V. D. Sokolovskiy, in *Military Strategy* — the basic Soviet strategic treatise, originally published in 1962 — defined the aim of Soviet strategic defenses in this way: "They have the task of creating an invincible system for the defense of the entire country. ... While, in the last war, it was sufficient to destroy 15-20 percent of the attacking air operation, now it is necessary to assure, essentially, 100 percent destruction of all attacking airplanes and missiles."

Soviet offensive and defensive force developments over the past 25 years demonstrate that the strategy articulated by Sokolovskiy still applies. The following pages present a detailed description of the actions undertaken by the Soviets in the area of strategic defenses. In order to explain the totality of the Soviet strategic military effort, a description of offensive force developments is provided in the annex to this document.

Defensive Forces

Over the last 25 years the Soviets have increased their active and passive defenses in a clear and determined attempt to blunt the effect of U.S. and allied retaliation to any Soviet attack. Passive defenses are non-weapons measures — such as civil defense and hardening — which protect important assets against attack. Active defenses utilize weapon systems to protect national territory, military forces, or key assets.



Evidence of the importance the Soviets attach to defensive damage-limitation can be traced back to the beginning of the nuclear age. National Air Defense became an independent service in the late 1950s and since 1959 has generally ranked third in precedence within the Soviet Armed Forces, following the Strategic Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces.

By the mid-1960s, two new mission areas — antisatellite defense and anti-missile defense — were added to the National Air Defense mission. As a result, the Soviet Union has the world's only operational anti-satellite (ASAT) system, which has an effective capability to seek and destroy critical U.S. satellites in low-earth orbit. In addition, Soviet efforts to attain a viable strategic defense against ballistic missiles have resulted in the world's only operational ABM system and a large and expanding research and development program.


The Soviet emphasis on the necessity of research into defenses against ballistic missiles was demonstrated by then-Minister of Defense Grechko shortly after the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, when he told the Soviet Presidium that the Treaty "places no limitations whatsoever on the conducting of research and experimental work directed towards solving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strikes."

Ballistic Missile Defense

The Soviets maintain the world's only operational ABM system around Moscow. In 1980, they began to upgrade and expand that system to the limit allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The original single-layer Moscow ABM system included 64 reloadable above-ground launchers at four complexes and DOG HOUSE and CAT HOUSE battle management radars south of



Moscow Ballistic Missile Defense




The Moscow ballistic missile defenses identified in map at right include the Pushkino ABM radar, above, GALOSH anti-ballistic missile interceptors, top left, and new silo-based high-acceleration interceptors, top right.

Moscow. Each complex consisted of TRY ADD tracking and guidance radars and GALOSH interceptors (nuclear-armed, ground-based missiles designed to intercept warheads in space shortly before they reenter the Earth's atmosphere).

When completed, the modernized Moscow ABM system will be a two-layer defense com-

posed of: silo-based, long-range, modified GALOSH interceptors; silo-based, high-acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated engagement and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. The silo-based launchers may be reloadable. The new system will have the 100 ABM

Ballistic Missile Early Warning, Target-Tracking, and Battle Management




launchers permitted by the ABM Treaty and could be fully operational by 1987.

The Soviet system for detection and tracking of ballistic missile attack consists of a launch-detection satellite network, over-the-horizon radars, and a series of large phased-array radars.

The current launch-detection satellite network can provide about 30 minutes warning of any U.S. ICBM launch and determine the general origin of the missile. Two over-the-horizon

radars directed at the U.S. ICBM fields also could give 30 minutes warning.

The next operational layer of ballistic missile detection consists of 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These radars can distinguish the size of an attack, confirm the warning from the satellite and over-the-horizon radar systems, and provide target-tracking data in support of anti-ballistic missile forces.



The 11 large HEN HOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars, at left, at six locations on the periphery of the USSR provide warning and target-tracking data in support of the Soviet ABM system. The DOG HOUSE radar, at right, provides battle management for the anti-ballistic missile interceptors around Moscow.

The Soviets are now constructing a network of six new large phased-array radars that can track more ballistic missiles with greater accuracy than the existing HEN HOUSE network. Five of these radars duplicate or supplement the coverage of the HEN HOUSE network, but with greatly enhanced capability. The sixth, under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, closes the final gap in the Soviet early warning radar coverage against ballistic missile attack. Together, the six new large phased-array radars form an arc of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest Soviet Union, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest.

The United States is now constructing new ballistic missile early warning radars, known as PAVE PAWS, that are located on the periphery of our territory and oriented outward. Both the U.S. and the USSR, in signing the ABM Treaty, recognized the need for ballistic missile early warning radars. At the same time, they recognized that ballistic missile early warning radars can detect and track warheads at great distances and therefore have a significant anti-ballistic missile potential. Such an ABM capability would play an important role in a nationwide ABM defense, which the Treaty was designed to prevent. As a result, the


U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed that future ballistic missile early warning radars must be located on a nation's periphery and oriented outward. In that way, the desirable and legitimate goal of early warning could be advanced while minimizing the danger that an effective nationwide battle management network could result.

The Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning, and violates the 1972 ABM Treaty. It is not located within a 150-kilometer radius of the national capital (Moscow) as required of ABM radars, nor is it located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and pointed outward as required for early warning radars. It is 3,700 kilometers from Moscow and is situated some 750 kilometers from the nearest border — Mongolia. Moreover, it is oriented not toward that border, but across approximately 4,000 kilometers of Soviet territory to the northeast.


The Soviet Union has claimed that the Krasnoyarsk radar is designed for space tracking, rather than ballistic missile early warning, and therefore does not violate the ABM Treaty. Its design, however, is not optimized for a space-tracking role, and the radar would, in any event, contribute little to the existing Soviet

space tracking network. Indeed, the design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of other radars that are known —

and acknowledged by the Soviets — to be for ballistic missile detection and tracking, including ballistic missile early warning. Finally, it



The Soviet Union is violating the ABM Treaty through the siting, orientation and capability of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk.



The receiver and transmitter of the large phased-array, ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Pechora. The design of the Krasnoyarsk radar is essentially identical to that of the Pechora radar. Unlike the Pechora radar, however, the Krasnoyarsk radar does not meet the ABM Treaty requirement that early warning radars be located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and be oriented outward.

closes the last remaining gap in Soviet ballistic missile detection coverage. The Krasnoyarsk radar, therefore, is being constructed in direct violation of the ABM Treaty.

The growing Soviet network of large phased-array ballistic missile detection and tracking radars, of which the Krasnoyarsk radar is a part, is of particular concern when linked with other Soviet ABM efforts. Such radars take years to construct; their existence might allow the Soviet Union to move rather quickly to construct a nationwide ABM defense if it chooses to do so. The Soviets are also developing components of a new ABM system which apparently are designed to allow them to construct individual ABM sites in a matter of months, rather than the years that are required for more traditional ABM systems. Soviet activities in this regard potentially violate the ABM Treaty's prohibition on the development of a mobile land-based ABM system or components. We estimate that by using these components, the Soviets could undertake rapidly-paced ABM deployments to strengthen the defenses of Moscow and defend key targets in the western USSR and east of the Urals by the early 1990s.

In addition, the Soviets have probably violated the prohibition on testing surface-to-air missile (SAM) components in an ABM mode by conducting tests involving the use of SAM air defense radars in ABM-related testing activi-

ties. Moreover, the SA-10 and SA-X-12 SAM systems may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles.

Taken together, all of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related activities are more significant — and more ominous — than any one considered individually. Cumulatively, they suggest that the USSR may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

Advanced Technologies for Defense Against Ballistic Missiles

In the late 1960s, in line with its long-standing emphasis on strategic defense, the Soviet Union initiated a substantial research program into advanced technologies for defense against ballistic missiles. That program covers many of the same technologies involved in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, but represents a far greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower.

Laser Weapons

The USSR's laser program is much larger than U.S. efforts and involves over 10,000 scientists and engineers and more than a half dozen major research and development facilities and test ranges. Much of this research takes place at the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where the Soviets also conduct traditional ABM research. Facilities there are estimated to include several air defense lasers, a laser that



The directed-energy R&D site at Sary Shagan proving ground includes ground-based lasers that could be used in an antisatellite role today and possibly a ballistic missile defense role in the future.

may be capable of damaging some components of satellites in orbit, and a laser that could be used in feasibility testing for ballistic missile defense applications. A laser weapon program of the magnitude of the Soviet effort would cost roughly \$1 billion per year in the U.S.

The Soviets are conducting research in three types of gas lasers considered promising for weapons applications: the gas-dynamic laser; the electric discharge laser; and the chemical laser. Soviet achievements in this area, in terms of output power, have been impressive. The Soviets are also aware of the military potential of visible and very short wave-length lasers. They are investigating excimer, free-electron, and x-ray lasers, and have been developing argon-ion lasers for over a decade.


The Soviets appear generally capable of supplying the prime power, energy storage, and auxiliary components needed for most laser and other directed-energy weapons. They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic generator which produces over 15

megawatts of electrical power — a device that has no counterpart in the West. The Soviets may also have the capability to develop the optical systems necessary for laser weapons to track and attack their targets. Thus, they produced a 1.2-meter segmented mirror for an astrophysical telescope in 1978 and claimed that this was a prototype for a 25-meter mirror that would be constructed in the future. A large mirror is considered necessary for a space-based laser weapon.

Unlike the U.S., the USSR has now progressed in some cases beyond technology research. It already has ground-based lasers that could be used to interfere with U.S. satellites, and could have prototype space-based antisatellite laser weapons by the end of the decade. The Soviets could have prototypes for ground-based lasers for defense against ballistic missiles by the late 1980s, and could begin testing components for a large-scale deployment system in the early 1990s.

The remaining difficulties in fielding an oper-

Soviet ABM/Space Defense Programs




Soviet programs for ABM and Space Defense, which include advanced technologies and space based weapons, were in place prior to the 1972 ABM Treaty and have continued to expand in scope and size. During the same time period, U.S. ABM/Space Defense research has been limited in scope as well as the level of effort in terms of resources invested.

*Potential capability of the Moscow ABM system.

ational system will require still more development time. An operational ground-based laser for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be deployed until the late 1990s, or after the year 2000. If technology developments prove successful, the Soviets may deploy operational space-based antisatellite lasers in the 1990s, and might be able to deploy space-based laser systems for defense against ballistic missiles after the year 2000.

Particle Beam Weapons

Since the late 1960s, the Soviets have been involved in research to explore the feasibility of space-based weapons that would use particle beams. We estimate that they may be able to test a prototype particle beam weapon intended to disrupt the electronics of satellites in the 1990s. A weapon designed to destroy satellites could follow later. A weapon capable of physically destroying missile boosters or



The USSR's operational antisatellite interceptor is launched from the Tyuratam Space Complex, where two launch pads and storage for additional interceptors and launch vehicles are available.



The Soviet orbital antisatellite (ASAT) weapon is operational and designed to destroy space targets with a multi-pellet blast.

warheads probably would require several additional years of research and development.

It is still uncertain whether ground-based charged particle-beam weapons are feasible — that is, whether the beam will propagate in the atmosphere. A space-based neutral particle beam weapon, however, would not be affected by the atmosphere or by the earth's magnetic field.

Soviet efforts in particle beams, and particularly on ion sources and radio frequency quadrupole accelerators for particle beams, are very impressive. In fact, much of the U.S. understanding as to how particle beams could be made into practical defensive weapons is based

on Soviet work conducted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Radio Frequency Weapons

The USSR has conducted research in the use of strong radio frequency signals that have the potential to interfere with or destroy critical electronic components of ballistic missile warheads. The Soviets could test a ground-based radio frequency weapon capable of damaging satellites in the 1990s.

Kinetic Energy Weapons

The Soviets also have a variety of research programs underway in the area of kinetic en-

ergy weapons, using the high-speed collision of a small mass with the target as the kill mechanism. In the 1960s, the USSR developed an experimental "gun" that could shoot streams of particles of a heavy metal such as tungsten or molybdenum at speeds of nearly 25 kilometers per second in air and over 60 kilometers per second in a vacuum.

Long-range, space-based kinetic-energy systems for defense against ballistic missiles probably could not be developed until the mid-1990s or even later. The USSR could, however, deploy in the near-term a short-range, space-based system useful for satellite or space station defense or for close-in attack by a maneuvering satellite. Soviet capabilities in guidance and control systems probably are adequate for effective kinetic energy weapons for use against some objects in space.

Computer and Sensor Technology

Advanced weapons programs — including potential advanced defenses against ballistic missiles — are also dependent on remote sensor and computer technologies which are currently more highly developed in the West than in the Soviet Union. The Soviets are therefore devoting considerable resources to improving their abilities and expertise in these technologies. An important part of that effort involves an increasing exploitation of open and clandestine access to Western technology. For example, the Soviets have long been engaged in a well-funded effort to purchase U.S. high-technology computers, test and calibration equipment, and sensors illegally through third parties.

Antisatellite Developments

The USSR has had for more than a dozen years the world's only operational antisatellite system, a co-orbital device which enters into the same orbit as its target satellite and, when it gets close enough, destroys the satellite by exploding a conventional warhead. In addition, the nuclear-armed GALOSH ABM interceptor deployed around Moscow may have ASAT capability, and Soviet ground-based lasers could possibly damage some sensors on some U.S. satellites.

Furthermore, as noted earlier, the Soviets are engaged in research and, in some cases development, of weapons which ultimately may

serve as ballistic missile defense systems, but probably will first provide antisatellite capabilities.

Air Defense

Although the United States began dismantling most of its defenses against Soviet bombers in the 1960s, the Soviet Union has continued to invest enormous resources in a wide array of strategic air defense weapon systems. Taken together, the Soviet strategic air defense network is a potent and increasingly capable force which would attempt to limit the retaliatory capability of our strategic bombers and cruise missiles.

The Soviets have deployed numerous strategic air defense systems with excellent capabilities against aircraft flying at medium and high altitudes. They are now in the midst of a major program to improve their capabilities against aircraft and cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes. That effort includes partial integration of strategic and tactical air defenses, the upgrading of early warning and surveillance capabilities, the deployment of more efficient data transmission systems, and the development and initial deployment of new aircraft, associated air-to-air missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft.

Soviet Territorial Air Defense



Interceptor Aircraft Bases ———— •

Strategic SAM Concentrations ———— ■

Radars (BMD, EW, OTH types) ———— •

Currently, the Soviets have nearly 12,000 SAM launchers at over 1,200 sites, 10,000 air defense radars, and more than 1,200 interceptor aircraft dedicated to strategic defense. An




The new Il-76/MANSTAY aircraft is illustrated as configured for its Airborne Warning and Control Systems mission.


additional 2,800 interceptors assigned to Soviet Air Forces (SAF) could also be employed in strategic defense missions. In contrast, the U.S. has approximately 300 interceptor aircraft based in the U.S. dedicated to strategic defense, 118 strategic air defense warning radars, and no operational strategic surface-to-air missile launchers. These figures do not include tactical air defenses deployed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

The newest Soviet air defense interceptor aircraft, the MiG-31/FOXHOUND, has a look-down/shoot-down and multiple-target engagement capability. More than 85 FOXHOUNDS are now operationally deployed at several locations from the Arkhangelsk area in the northwestern USSR to the Far East Military District. Two new fighter interceptors, the Su-27/FLANKER and the MiG-29/FULCRUM, also have look-down/shoot-down capabilities and are designed to be highly maneuverable

USSR Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft




US Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft





The MiG-29/FULCRUM all-weather, air superiority fighter-interceptor reflects the USSR's continuing drive to produce new generations of tactical and strategic aircraft. The FULCRUM is fitted with AA-10 missiles and the USSR's most modern look-down/shoot-down radar.



in air-to-air combat. These three aircraft are equipped with two new air-to-air missiles — the long-range AA-9 (for the FOXHOUND) and the medium-range AA-10 (for the FULCRUM and FLANKER) — that can be used against low-flying targets.

The USSR is also deploying the MAINSTAY airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, which will improve substantially its capabilities for early warning and air combat command and control, especially against low-flying aircraft and cruise missiles.

The Soviets maintain the world's most extensive early warning system for air defense, composed of a widespread network of ground-based radars linked operationally with those of their Warsaw Pact allies. As previously noted, more than 10,000 air surveillance radars of various types provide virtually complete coverage at medium to high altitudes over the USSR, and in some areas well beyond the Soviet Union's borders. Three over-the-horizon radars for ballistic missile warning could provide additional warning of the approach of high-flying aircraft.

The USSR also has an active research and development program to improve its air surveillance network. In 1983, it began to deploy two new types of air surveillance radars which will enhance Soviet capabilities for air defense, electronic warfare and early warning of cruise missile and bomber attacks. The Soviets are

also continuing to deploy improved air surveillance data systems that can rapidly pass data from outlying radars through the air surveillance network to ground-controlled intercept sites and SAM command posts.

Soviet strategic surface-to-air missiles provide low-to-high-altitude barrier, area, and terminal defenses under all weather conditions. Five systems are now operational: the SA-1, SA-2, and SA-3, and the more capable SA-5 and SA-10. The recent Soviet air defense reorganization permits efficient integration of strategic and tactical SAM systems. While most tactical SAMs have a shorter range than their strategic counterparts, many have better capabilities against targets flying at low altitude.

Over the years the Soviets have continued to deploy the long-range SA-5 and have repeatedly modified the system. Further deployment



The mobile version of the SA-10 SAM will soon be operational.



The surface-to-air missiles of the SA-X-12 air defense system are designed to counter high-performance aircraft, will also have a capability against tactical ballistic missiles, and may have a potential against some strategic ballistic missiles as well.

and upgrading of the SA-5 to enhance its capability to work in conjunction with low-altitude systems like the SA-10 are probable.

The SA-10 can defend against low-altitude targets with small radar cross-sections, like cruise missiles. The first SA-10 site was operational in 1980. Over 60 sites are now operational and work is progressing on at least another 30. More than half these sites are located near Moscow; this emphasis on Moscow and the patterns noted for the other SA-10 sites suggest a first priority on terminal defense of command and control, military, and key industrial complexes.

In keeping with their drive toward mobility as a means of weapons survival, the Soviets are

developing a mobile version of the SA-10 which could become operational late this year. This mobile version could be used to support Soviet theater forces and to permit periodic changes in the location of SA-10 sites within the USSR so as to counter U.S. retaliatory forces more effectively.

The Soviets are also flight-testing another important mobile SAM system, the SA-X-12, which is able to intercept aircraft at all altitudes, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 may have the potential to intercept some types of strategic ballistic missiles as well. This is a serious development because these systems are expected to be deployed widely through-

out the Soviet Union in the 1980s. They could, if properly supported, add a significant point-target defense coverage to a nationwide Soviet ABM deployment.

Passive Defenses

Soviet military doctrine calls for passive defenses to act in conjunction with active forces to ensure the wartime survival and continuity of Soviet nuclear forces, leadership, military command and control units, war-related industrial production and services, the essential work force, and as much of the general population as possible. The U.S. passive defense effort is far smaller and more limited; it is no way comparable to the comprehensive Soviet program.

Physical hardening of military assets to make them more resistant to attack is an important passive defense technique. The USSR has hardened its ICBM silos, launch facilities, and key command and control centers to an unprecedented degree. Much of today's U.S. retaliatory force would be ineffective against those hardened targets. To maintain effective deterrence, the United States must be able credibly to threaten prompt retaliation against the full spectrum of Soviet targets, including those which have been greatly hardened.

Soviet leaders and managers at all levels of the government and Communist Party are provided hardened alternate command posts located well away from urban centers — in addition to many deep bunkers and blast shelters in Soviet cities. This comprehensive and redundant system, patterned after a similar system for the Soviet Armed Forces, provides hardened alternate facilities for more than 175,000 key party and government personnel throughout the USSR.

Elaborate plans have also been made for the full mobilization of the national economy in support of a war effort. Reserves of vital materials are maintained, many in hardened underground structures. Redundant industrial facilities are in active production. Industrial and other economic facilities have been equipped with blast shelters for the work force, and detailed procedures have been developed for the relocation of selected plants and equipment. By planning for the survival of the essential work force, the Soviets hope to reconstitute

vital production programs using those industrial components that could be redirected or salvaged after an attack.

In addition, the USSR has greatly emphasized mobility as a means of enhancing the survivability of military assets. The SS-20 and SS-25, for example, are mobile. Rail-mobile deployment of the SS-X-24 is expected before the end of the decade. The Soviets are also developing an extensive network of mobile command, control, and communications facilities.

Soviet Statements on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

These extensive Soviet activities in strategic defense, combined with the large Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the past two decades, have been eroding the retaliatory capabilities of U.S. strategic forces on which deterrence has long rested. If the USSR in the future were unilaterally to add an effective advanced defense against ballistic missiles to its offensive and other defensive forces, it would pose a very serious new threat to U.S. and allied security.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative is designed to counter the trend in the Soviets' favor. It is thus not unexpected that Soviet reactions to the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative have been strongly negative. Through an intensive, worldwide propaganda campaign, the USSR evidently hopes that it can dissuade the United States from pursuing this research program, thereby preserving the possibility of a Soviet monopoly in effective defenses against ballistic missiles — a monopoly that could give the USSR the uncontested damage-limiting first-strike capability that it has long sought.

Thus, Soviet statements on the SDI must be seen in light of the extensive, long-term growth in Soviet offensive and defensive forces and of their major research effort to develop advanced weapons for defense against ballistic missiles. They should also be viewed in light of comparable Soviet propaganda campaigns on other issues. The USSR engaged in a major propaganda effort in the late 1970s and early 1980s to preserve its monopoly in longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces, and has adopted many of the same tactics to prevent the United States from acquiring an operational ASAT system to balance its own.

On April 22, 1983, a month after the President's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative, a published letter signed by more than 200 senior Soviet scientists denouncing the initiative appeared in the New York Times. It is interesting and instructive to note that a number of the signatories have been instrumental in the development of both traditional and advanced ballistic missile defensive systems: Petr D. Grushin, Vladimir S. Semenikhin, Fedor V. Bunkin, Yevgeniy P. Velikhov, Vsevolod S. Avduyevskiy, Aleksandr M. Prokhorov, and Nikolay G. Basov. Velikhov, for example, was for several years the director of the Institute of Atomic Energy laboratories at Troitsk,



Dr. Y.P. Velikhov has been a central figure in the development of the USSR's high energy laser weapons. As Chairman of the committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War, Dr. Velikhov is also the leading Soviet scientific spokesman against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

where lasers for strategic and tactical applications are being developed. Avduyevskiy has long been involved with strategic weapons research and now has responsibility for a number of projects concerned with the military use of space, including a space-based laser weapon. Other signatories have spent their careers developing strategic offensive weapons and other military systems: Vladimir N. Chelomey, Valentin P. Glushko, Aleksandr D. Nadiradze, and Viktor P. Makeyev in ICBMs and SLBMs; Oleg K. Antonov and Aleksandr S. Yakovlev in military aircraft; Nikolay Isanin in nuclear submarines; Yuliy B. Khariton in the Soviet military nuclear energy program; and Martin I. Kabachnik in chemical warfare.

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative

The U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative offers the possibility of a better, more stable deterrence based increasingly on defenses that are survivable, militarily effective, and cost-effective relative to offensive forces. If our research shows that such defenses against ballistic missiles are feasible, they would allow us to move from deterrence based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation, toward enhanced deterrence characterized by greater reliance on defensive capabilities that threaten no one. The Strategic Defense Initiative is also a prudent and necessary response to the very active Soviet efforts in offensive and defensive forces. It responds directly to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing Soviet deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any near-term Soviet decision to expand rapidly its ABM capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. It also provides insurance against an eventual Soviet attempt to deploy an effective advanced system for defense against ballistic missiles unilaterally.

SDI research complements our efforts to achieve significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear forces. In the near term, we are seeking reductions of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and discussing defensive and space arms, in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations which opened in Geneva in March 1985. The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed that there is a fundamental relationship between offensive and defensive systems and that neither can be considered in isolation.

In the longer term, if we were to deploy advanced defenses against ballistic missiles, such defenses could increase significantly the incentives for further negotiated deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces because they could reduce or eliminate the military utility of ballistic missiles. Such significant reductions would, in turn, serve to increase the effectiveness of defensive systems.

The SDI research program emphasizes advanced non-nuclear defensive technologies. It will provide to a future President and Congress, possibly in the early 1990s, the technical knowledge required for a decision on whether

to develop and later deploy advanced defensive systems. Extensive discussions with our allies would take place prior to any future decision to move beyond research to development and deployment.

Any future deployment would also be a matter for discussion and negotiation as appropriate with the Soviet Union, as provided in the ABM Treaty. Even now we are seeking to engage the Soviets at Geneva in a discussion of the relationship of offensive and defensive forces and of a possible future transition to greater reliance on defensive systems.

While we could not allow a Soviet veto over a decision which would have such a major impact on U.S. and allied security, it is our intention and hope that — if new defensive technologies prove feasible — we and the Soviets would be able both to move to a more defense-reliant balance. What we envision is thus just the opposite of an arms race or a search for military superiority. We seek instead an approach that would serve the security interests of the United States, our allies, the Soviet Union, and the world as a whole.

Annex

Offensive Forces

Soviet military doctrine and strategy call for superior offensive forces capable of executing a successful first strike. The Soviet buildup in offensive forces over the last two decades has been designed to move in that direction.

Soviet strategic offensive forces introduced since 1971 include:

- four new types of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) — the SS-17, 18, 19, and 25. In addition, the USSR probably has deployed the SS-16 in violation of the SALT II Treaty;
- five new types of ballistic missile-carrying submarines;
- four new types of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs);
- five improved versions of existing SLBMs;
- long-range cruise missiles; and
- a new variant of the BEAR bomber carrying strategic air-launched cruise missiles.

That buildup is all the more striking when compared to the relative restraint exercised by the U.S. in its acquisition of nuclear weapons systems during the same period. The number of strategic and tactical nuclear warheads in the U.S. stockpile peaked in 1967. We had one-third more nuclear weapons then than we have now. Moreover, the total explosive power (measured in megatonnage) of our nuclear weapons was four times greater in 1960 than it is today.

Our latest B-52 bomber was built in 1962. Although we modernized the missiles our submarines carried with the POSEIDON C-3 in 1971 and TRIDENT I C-4 in 1979, we did not introduce a single new ballistic missile-carrying submarine from 1966 until 1981, when we began deploying the TRIDENT submarine at the rate of about one a year. In fact, our ballistic missile submarine force declined by one-fourth between 1966 and 1981, from 41 boats to 31. During the time we were decreasing the number of our SSBNs, the Soviet Union deployed 62 new ballistic missile-carrying submarines.

Similarly, the U.S. began deploying its newest ICBM, the MINUTEMAN III, fifteen years ago; today, we have fewer ICBMs than we did in 1967. By contrast, the Soviet Union has added about 800 ICBMs to its arsenal since that year. Of greatest concern for strategic stability has been the development and deploy-


ment of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. Since the late 1970s, the USSR has deployed more than 300 SS-18s, each twice as large as the U.S. PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying ten warheads, and 360 SS-19s, each approximately the size of the PEACEKEEPER/MX and carrying six warheads. The Soviets already have enough hard-target-capable ICBM warheads today to attack all U.S. ICBM silos and launch control centers and will have a larger number of hard-target capable warheads in the future. (A weapon with hard-target capability has sufficient accuracy and yield to destroy targets that have been hardened to withstand the effects of a nuclear detonation.)

In addition to the rapid growth in its ICBM force, the Soviet Union is engaged in a major modernization and expansion of its strategic bomber and submarine forces. The bulk of Soviet strategic offensive nuclear warheads has traditionally been on ICBMs, while the U.S. has maintained a balanced force, with fewer than one-quarter of our strategic weapons on ICBMs. The growth in modern Soviet strategic offensive forces of all types is thus not only exacerbating the imbalance between U.S. and Soviet ICBMs, but also steadily eroding the traditional countervailing U.S. advantage in SLBMs and strategic bomber systems.

When the SALT I Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms was signed in 1972, the USSR had roughly 2,300 strategic ballistic missile warheads, and the throw-weight of its ballistic missile force was about 3 million kilograms. (Throw-weight is a basic measure of ballistic missile destructive capability and potential.) By the time the SALT II agreement was signed in 1979, the Soviet strategic arsenal had more than doubled to roughly 5,500 strategic ballistic missile warheads with a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 4 million kilograms. Today, the Soviet Union has over 8,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads and a ballistic missile throw-weight of about 12 million pounds.

Perhaps even more troubling is the fact that the USSR's offensive nuclear force buildup continues unabated, with a large number of new systems at or nearing deployment. For example, the Soviets are:

- continuing production of the BEAR H bombers which carry the AS-15 long-range



air-launched cruise missile. They are also developing a new strategic bomber, the BLACKJACK, which, when deployed before the end of the decade, will be larger than either the U.S. B-1B or B-52;

- completing development of the SS-X-24 and have announced deployment of the SS-25 ICBM. The SS-25 violates the SALT II agreement, since it is a prohibited second new type of ICBM;
- deploying two new classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), the DELTA IV and the TYPHOON, and associated SLBMs. They are also testing a new sea-launched cruise missile, the SS-NX-21.

The combination of U.S. restraint and Soviet expansion and modernization of its strategic offensive forces means that U.S. forces are becoming increasingly obsolete. We are therefore modernizing our strategic nuclear forces to ensure the balance necessary for continued deterrence. That program includes development of the PEACEKEEPER/MX ICBM, a smaller single-warhead ICBM (popularly known as MIDGETMAN), the B-1B bomber, an advanced technology bomber, and the TRIDENT II SLBM. We are also deploying long-range air- and sea-launched cruise missiles and TRIDENT SSBNs. Our strategic modernization program is essential not only for the military balance, but also to induce the Soviets to agree to nego-

tiated offensive force reductions which would enable us to maintain the balance at far lower levels of armaments.

The Soviet Union has also greatly expanded its nuclear forces of less-than-intercontinental range, which primarily threaten our friends and allies. The USSR has developed an entirely new generation of nuclear short-range ballistic missiles. Of gravest concern has been the creation and subsequent rapid expansion of the SS-20 longer-range intermediate-range missile force, which threatens our friends and allies in Europe and Asia. NATO had no equiv-

alent systems when the USSR began to field this modern, mobile, highly accurate, triple-warhead missile. As of September 1985, the Soviets had deployed 441 SS-20s, with over 1,200 warheads. Not only is the SS-20 force continuing to grow, but the Soviets are also testing a modified version of the SS-20 which is expected to be even more accurate. In contrast, NATO plans to deploy 572 single-warhead PERSHING II and ground-launched cruise missiles and stands ready to reduce or reverse those deployments if we can reach an equitable, verifiable arms reduction agreement with the USSR.

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE PHONE ► ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

649 . 4686

| RECEIVED BY | DATE | TIME |
|-------------|------|------|
| | | |

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
★ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE PHONE ► ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

| RECEIVED BY | DATE | TIME |
|-------------|------|------|
| | | |

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
★ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO: Heath

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Bob Kagan
OF (Organization)

☒ PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

fully not control;

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

cancel for
AEI thing
on Friday
→

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)

Prescribed by GSA

☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO: Heath

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Janice Barberieri
OF (Organization)

☒ PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

state
647-9686

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

VB

RECEIVED BY DATE TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)

Prescribed by GSA

☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

→ Zee
→ Clerk to Anne
→ at I
Plato Hotel
Tibetans

647-7024

fax
544-2434

Bob Ferguson

Next - re next who's mtg at B&I

W. Miranda

1. ~~2:15~~ 3:00 - with the 2:

2) need ~~for~~ interpreter

→ address
Board Room 8th Flr
Chancery.
Dist.

3) saw bio of Miranda to Josh
Gusatchik -

Bio
→

→ Lev Tibern Plaza

→ how many
→ type →
1 hour
30
NEO
CIV
LIBRA

→ Ser

Tivern Plaza

71-ff
1 hour

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

Matt

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY-

☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Janis Barbieri

OF (Organization)

State Dept.

☒ PLEASE PHONE ►

☐ FTS

☐ AUTOVON

647-9686

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN

☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL

☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

RECEIVED BY

Colman

DATE

1/7

TIME

2:25

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)

Prescribed by GSA

☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210)

FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

JACOB STEIN
20 JERUSALEM AVENUE
HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK 11801

December 17, 1987

Mr. Craig Fuller
Chief of Staff
Office of the Vice President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20501

Dear Craig:

On January 20, 1988, the Zionist Organization of America is holding its annual dinner at the Garden City Hotel, Garden City, L.I.

I am to be the Guest of Honor at this dinner.

I understand the Vice President is attending a fund raising dinner in Washington that night but I would very much welcome some words from him via a video tape which I can arrange to be played at the dinner and reflected on a large screen. If this is agreeable, I would suggest that the Vice President's remarks include a salute to the ZOA as it marks its 90th year of activity and a salute to the State of Israel on its 40th anniversary and whatever words of his choosing, he cares to say, about Jack Stein.

I am attaching some information about the ZOA. Israel is marking its 40th Anniversary and it would be helpful if the Vice President would state, once again, his strong supportive position in favor of American-Israeli relations.

Although the Vice President and I have known each other for 17 years, I am enclosing, for whatever help it may be, a copy of my resume although I would like to think that my relationship with the Vice President goes beyond resumes and is of a more intimate nature.

12/29 - WCB

12/31 - told Mr. Stein

12/23

Heaton

on if we
have time to
do the tape...

JK

7
JACOB STEIN
20 JERUSALEM AVENUE
HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK 11801


December 17, 1987
Mr. Craig Fuller
Washington, D.C.
PAGE 2

If this is agreeable to you and the Vice President, please let me know how I can assist. I will, of course, defray any of the costs incurred.

Many thanks for your help.

Wishing you and your family all the best for the Christmas Season and for a Healthy, Happy and Successful New Year.

Cordially,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jack".

JS:FF

JACOB STEIN
20 JERUSALEM AVENUE
HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK 11801

MEMORANDUM SHEET

ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

The Zionist Organization of America was founded on July 5, 1898 and is now marking its 90th Anniversary.

Its founders were "moved by a love of Zion and inspired by the hope of a resettlement within its borders of homeless Jews the world over".

The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) is active in support of Soviet Jews and the resettlement of Ethiopian Jewry, conducts seminars on the meaning and application of Zionist principles today. Has programs enabling hundreds of high school youngsters from the United States to study in Israel.

The Zionist Organization of America is a very active political force on the American scene, urging strong American-Israeli relations. One of its past presidents,

Mr. Ivan Novick, is a member of the "Bush Team".

The Zionist Organization of America maintains a prestigious educational complex in Israel, training specialists in agricultural schools, technical and aviation schools and the nursing profession.

I am enclosing some of their literature which shows on the cover the picture and name of the current president, Mr. Milton Shapiro.

JACOB STEIN

Residence Address: 15 Winfield Terrace, Great Neck, New York 11023
(516) 482-6383

Office Address: 20 Jerusalem Avenue, Hicksville, New York 11801
(516) 938-6012

Jacob Stein is 71 years of age and has been a resident of Great Neck, Long Island, New York for 44 years.

Mr. Stein is a graduate of Columbia University, School of Business, and holds a degree of Bachelor of Science in Business.

He is a Licensed Real Estate Broker and has been active in land development and commercial and industrial construction for over 40 years.

His present affiliations are:

- o Board of Directors, Key Bank of Long Island
- o Board of Directors, Key Bank Atlantic, Inc.
- o Board of Trustees, Stony Brook University Foundation
- o Director, International Synagogue
- o Director, National Committee on American Foreign Policy, Inc.
- o Director, Stony Brook Realty Foundation
- o Executive Committee, National Jewish Coalition
- o Executive Committee, National Jewish Committee on Scouting
- o Board of Governors, World Jewish Congress; Co-Chairman, International Affairs Commission
- o National Chairman, Israeli State College at Beit Berl, Inc.
- o Member, American Friends of Hebrew University
- o Member, American-Israeli Friendship League
- o Member, Long Island Real Estate Board
- o Member, National Association of Realtors

His past affiliations are as follows:

- o Past-Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
- o Past President, United Synagogue of America
- o Past President, Temple Israel of Great Neck

His Government related activities are as follows:

- o 1981-82 - Special Advisor to the White House
- o 1982 - United States Delegate to the United Nations Human Rights Conference in Geneva, Switzerland
- o 1984-85 - President's Task Force on International Private Enterprise
- o Currently serves as a Member of the Defense Policy Advisory Committee on Trade (DPACT)

Mr. Stein has authored many articles of religious and political interest and has lectured widely across the United States and abroad on all aspects of life in America.

Mr. Stein enjoys an active family life with his wife, Jean. They have two sons and one daughter. Richard is an Associate Professor of Medicine at Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York. Stuart, an attorney, is a partner of the law firm of Certilman, Haft, Lebow, Balin, Buckley & Kremer, located in East Meadow, New York. Linda is a Registered Nurse residing in Greenlawn, Long Island, New York.

GEORGE BUSH

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1987

Mr. Jacob Stein
20 Jerusalem Avenue
Hicksville, New York 11801

Dear Jack:

Having recently had to "pass" on your December 14 meeting with the Conference of Presidents makes it extra hard to follow my Scheduling Director's letter to you with yet another regret.

I don't remember when I've been so booked so far in advance. The evening of January 20 has us committed here in Washington.

Your comments about developing support are an encouragement and reflect your hard work. Congratulations to you on being properly recognized by your constituents. Congratulations to me for being your friend.

Sincerely,



George Bush



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

November 16, 1987

Mr. Jacob Stein
20 Jerusalem Avenue
Hicksville, New York 11801

Dear Mr. Stein:

This is in further reference to your letter inviting the Vice President to attend a meeting with the Conference of President's of Major American Jewish Organizations on December 14, 1987.

Unfortunately, as you have discussed with the Vice President and Craig Fuller due to the heavy demands on the Vice President's schedule during his visit to New York, he will be unable to join you. He would, however, like to take this opportunity to express his appreciation for your kind invitation to attend the Conference.

We have also just received your letter of October 23, 1987 inviting the Vice President to attend the Zionist Organization of America Testimonial Dinner on January 20, 1988.

I will be in touch with you in the near future once we start firming up the Vice President's schedule for that time.

Sincerely,

Hector F. Irastorza, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the Vice President
for Scheduling



JACOB STEIN
20 Jerusalem Avenue, Hicksville, N.Y. 11801
(516) 938-6012

November 2, 1987

Dear George:

Thanks for the book, "Looking Forward".

You're right - October 12th is my birthday
and October 12th is your debut into the Presi-
dential Race - calling on us both to "Look For-
ward".

With warmest regards.

~~JS:FF~~
Cordially,

JS:FF

*2 letters attached -
Scheduling has action.
2*

Conference of Presidents meeting with the
Jewish Organizations, that afternoon from
3:30 PM to 5:00 PM.

Each presidential candidate is being invited
to meet individually with the Conference of
Presidents. I think such a meeting is in
order. Can you do it?

Cordially,

~~JS:FF~~
JS:FF

From the desk of
George Bush

Tom -

11-9-87

*See that
Craig sees
these invitations
we must reply
GB*

JACOB STEIN
20 JERUSALEM AVENUE
HICKSVILLE, NEW YORK 11801

October 23, 1987

Vice President George Bush
White House
Washington, DC

Dear Mr. Vice President

Dear George:

The Zionist Organization of America, one of the heavyweight major Jewish organizations, is holding a testimonial dinner in my honor on the 20th of January, 1988 at the Garden City Hotel in Garden City, Long Island. I ask you to please consider being a distinguished guest and speaker that evening.

I understand that it comes in the midst of a frantic campaign period, but, if you are not otherwise committed, a very strong political statement in Long Island can be made that evening.

I am beginning to sense the development of a broad base of support for George Bush in the community and I hope that it continues to gain strength.

All the best to you and Barbara.

Cordially,


JACK

JS:FF

*-Janni
- pls. let
in. The
was attached
to another
invitation.*

*9 1/2
sched
VP*

ADDRESS TO ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

I very much appreciate this opportunity to join the leadership of the Zionist Organization of America in celebrating both the 90th anniversary of your prestigious organization and the 40th anniversary of the State of Israel. Also, the very warmest greetings to my friends Jean and Jack Stein, and congratulations Jack on your being honored for a lifetime of service to the Jewish community.

I've known Jean and Jack Stein for more than seventeen years -- since the time Jack served as Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations and I served as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In those positions we had many occasions to meet and I'm proud to say we became more than colleagues, we became good friends.

During this Administration, Jack and I again had the pleasure of working together when he served as a Special Advisor to the White House and later as a United States Delegate to the United Nation's Human Rights Conference. More recently, Jack accompanied me on a very memorable visit to Israel where I benefited immensely from his insights and personal knowledge of Israel and its leaders.

I'd also like to take this occasion to salute the Zionist Organization of America for its contributions over the last 90 years in support of Israel -- first the idea, then the reality. You have laid the foundation for the special and unshakeable relationship which exists between our country and Israel.

I have had the privilege of meeting with the president of your organization, Milton Shapiro, and in learning of your important programs to nurture that special relationship and to discuss issues of particular concern. In that regard, I would like to note how proud I was to have been able to participate in the "Freedom Sunday" rally in support of Soviet Jewry. What a joy it was to participate in the same program with Anatoly Scharansky, Ida Nudel, and other Soviet refuseniks, who now live in their homeland of Israel. We must keep up the struggle until all those who wish to leave the Soviet Union can do so and those who wish to stay can lead Jewish lives in freedom.

Finally, I would like to join you in saluting the State of Israel on its 40th anniversary. What Israel has achieved in just four short decades, culturally, scientifically and nationally -- against a background of continuous hostility -- knows no parallel. Israel and the United States, Israelis and Americans -- there are strong bonds of kinship that will only grow stronger with each passing year.

I know I share your hope that this year will see the beginning of true peace for Israel. I know some believed that Israel would always remain a Zionist dream. You helped make that dream come true. And with your continued support, Israel will some day make the dream of peace come true as well. Mazel Tov to the Zionist Organization. Remain strong and dedicated to your noble ideals. Finally, Barbara and I send our best wishes to Jack Stein -- a friend of Israel and, I am proud to say, a friend of George Bush, too.




WEST POINT JEWISH CHAPEL FUND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SUITE 520 • 100 MERRICK ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE, N.Y. 11570 • (516) 764-5516

January 15, 1988



President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

This is to respectfully request that you be the principal speaker and Guest of Honor at a dedication ceremony for the West Point Jewish Chapel recently gifted to the United States Government.

The ceremony can be held anytime convenient to you during the week of May 2, 1988. The dedication will be a truly historic occasion. We anticipate that among the more than 500 attendees will be persons prominent in religious, civic and military activities.

Your participation would immeasurably enhance this ceremony particularly since the Chapel was built with funds raised privately, an inspiring example of what you personally have suggested with your "Private Sector Incentive Program".

The immense historical and political significance of the new Jewish Chapel, taking its place alongside the Protestant and Catholic Chapels, emphasizes to all the world the greatness of our Democracy . . . the three major religions standing together on a hilltop overlooking the historic "Plain" at West Point and serving our nation.

The Chapel stands as a living symbol of the contributions made by American Jews to the military history of the United States since the days of the Revolution. In addition to serving as a center for religious worship, Judaica studies and holiday observances for the cadets, instructors and post personnel, the Chapel familiarizes cadets of all faiths with Jewish history and traditions, thereby helping to produce future leaders with a better understanding of their fellow Jewish officers and comrades in arms.

We have asked General Dave R. Palmer, Superintendent of the United States Military Academy, to forward this invitation to you to indicate that our dedication ceremony is being conducted with the full support and coordination of the authorities at West Point.

Thank you for your consideration.

Very truly yours,

Herbert M. Ames
President


HMA:mc



WEST POINT JEWISH CHAPEL FUND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SUITE 520 • 100 MERRICK ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE, N.Y. 11570 • (516) 764-5516



VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

January 22, 1988

Mr. Max Green
Associate Director for Public Liaison
Old Executive Office Building
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Green:

I thought the enclosed correspondence to the President and the Superintendent of the Military Academy would be of interest to you.

Very truly yours,

Herbert M. Ames
President

HMA:mc
Enclosure

OFFICERS AND TRUSTEES

President

Herbert M. Ames

Vice-Presidents

Herbert S. Lichtenberg, WP '55

Stanley J. Love, WP '46

John M. Murphy, WP '50

Lewis L. Zickel, WP '49

Treasurer

Alan A. Lichtenberg, WP '51

Secretary

Robert R. Granik, WP '45

Trustees

Harold Gottesman, WP '50

Louis Gross, WP '54

Alvin E. Orlian, WP '43

Robert B. Peltz, WP '50

Major General Jerome N. Waldor, USAFR, WP '50

Military Officers

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., USA, Ret.

General William A. Knowlton, USA, Ret.

~~General Sam S. Walker, USA, Ret.~~

General Donald V. Bennett, USA, Ret.

General Mark W. Clark, USA, Ret.

General Michael S. Davison, USA, Ret.

General Harold K. Johnson, USA, Ret.

General M. B. Ridgway, USA, Ret.

Lieutenant General Sidney B. Berry, USA, Ret.

Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF, Ret.

Lieutenant General Bennett L. Lewis, USA, Ret.

Major General Robert Bernstein, USA, Ret.

Major General Eugene Fox, USA

Major General Gerd S. Grombacher, USA

Major General Robert H. Schellman, USA, Ret.

Major General Robert B. Solomon, USA

Brigadier General Max Etkin, USA, Ret.

Brigadier General Edward Hirsch, USA, Ret.

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, USN, Ret.

Officers and Executives of National Secular and Religious Organizations

Seymour Reich

President, B'nai B'rith

Nathan Perlmutter

Executive Director, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

Dr. Eugene Fisher

Executive Secretary, Secretariat for Catholic Jewish Relations

Rabbi Paul L. Hait

Executive Director, New York Board of Rabbis

Theodore Mann

President, American Jewish Congress

Frank Kreutzer

President, United Synagogue of America

Rabbi Herbert Baumgard

President, Synagogue Council of America

Herbert M. Millman

Executive Vice-President Emeritus, National Welfare Board

R. Rev. Paul Moore, Jr.

Episcopal Bishop of New York

Edwin Goldwasser

National Commander, Jewish War Veterans of the United States

Kassel Abelson

President, Rabbinical Assembly

Norman Hill

President, A. Philip Randolph Institute

Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler

President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations

Rabbi Michell Geller

President, Association of Jewish Chaplains of the Armed Forces

Rabbi Milton N. Polin

President, Rabbinical Council of America

NATIONAL

ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Senators and Congressmen

Senator Joseph R. Biden

Senator Rudy Boschwitz

Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato

Senator Jeremiah Denton

Senator J. James Exon

Senator John Glenn

Senator Barry Goldwater

Senator Chic Hecht

Senator Carl Levin

Senator Charles M. Mathias

Senator Howard M. Metzenbaum

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Senator Sam Nunn

Senator Larry Pressler

Senator Arlen Specter

Senator John C. Stennis

Senator Strom Thurmond

Representative Gary L. Ackerman

Representative Anthony C. Beilenson

Representative Howard Berman

Representative Mario Biaggi

Representative Barbara Boxer

Representative William L. Dickinson

Representative Roy Dyson

Representative Ben Erdreich

Representative Bobbi Fiedler

Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr.

Representative Barney Frank

Representative Martin Frost

Representative Sam Gejdenson

Representative Benjamin Gilman

Representative Dan Glickman

Representative Willis D. Gradison, Jr.

Representative Bill Green

Representative Frank J. Guarini

Representative Thomas F. Hartnett

Representative Elwood Hillis

Representative Marjorie S. Holt

Representative Steny H. Hoyer

Representative Ken Kramer

Representative Tom Lantos

Representative Marvin Leath

Representative William Lehman

Representative Sander M. Levin

Representative Mel Levine

Representative Nicholas Mavroules

Representative Raymond J. McGrath

Representative Barbara A. Mikulski

Representative Melvin Price

Representative James H. Scheuer

Representative Charles E. Schumer

Representative Norman Sisisky

Representative Ike Skelton

Representative Lawrence J. Smith

Representative Stephen J. Solarz

Representative Samuel S. Stratton

Representative Bob Stump

Representative Henry A. Waxman

Representative Ted Weiss


Representative G. William Whitehurst

Representative Charles Wilson

Representative Howard Wolpe

Representative Ron Wyden

Representative Sidney R. Yates




WEST POINT JEWISH CHAPEL FUND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

SUITE 520 • 100 MERRICK ROAD, ROCKVILLE CENTRE, N.Y. 11570 • (516) 764-5516

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS



January 15, 1988

Lt. Gen. Dave R. Palmer
Superintendent
United States Military Academy
West Point, NY 10996

Dear Dave:

Here is our invitation to the President.

Your offer to forward this invitation to President Reagan exemplifies the superb cooperation you have afforded the Chapel project.

Your warm-hearted assistance is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Herbert M. Ames

HMA:mc
Attachment

DEC 21 1987

LAW OFFICES

WOLF, BLOCK, SCHORR AND SOLIS-COHEN

TWELFTH FLOOR PACKARD BUILDING
S.E. CORNER 18TH AND CHESTNUT STREETS
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102

(215) 977-2000
TELECOM: 977-2994
TWX: 710-870-1827
WOLBLORR PHA

FLORIDA OFFICE
PHILLIPS POINT
SUITE 900
777 SOUTH FLAGLER DRIVE
P.O. BOX 24815
WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33416-4815
(305) 850-8600
TELECOM: (305) 833-0862

ASSOCIATED WITH KOZLOV, SEATON & ROMANINI, P.C.
(A FIRM OF NEW JERSEY ATTORNEYS)

COUNSEL
HOWARD GITTIS

OF COUNSEL
ROBERT B. WOLF
HELEN SPIGEL BAX
SAMUEL H. LEVY
MORRIS L. FORER
DONALD BEAN
BERNARD M. MORISH

WILLIAM J. DANIEL
ARNOLD J. ROGOFF
JEROME L. WOLF***
ALAN SINGER
LEONARD P. GOLDBERGER
RONALD A. KRAUSE
WILLIAM G. PREY
ALFRED J. MALEPATTO*
PAMELA S. BOGOWIN
BRUCE BROTHSAL
VIRGINIA M. DUFFY
DEBRA TELL THOMPSON
ROBERT A. SILVERMAN
ANDREW A. CHIRLE
JOHN H. SCHAPIRO
FRANCINE FRIEDMAN**
PATRICK MATUSEY
JAMES B. WILLIAMS
JEFFREY B. WOLIN
KEITH A. JAMES
ANTHONY R. TWARDOWSKI
RICHARD H. LOWE
RAYMOND O. AGRAM**
WILLIAM J. TAYLOR
LAWRENCE G. BRAITMAN
STEVEN N. HAAS
MICHAEL A. HASSARA
C. SCOTT HASSLER*
MARK S. MALTZMAN
SCOTT W. CICHON*
JEROLD J. NOVICK
MARK R. TANOWITZ
RICHARD J. BUSIS
RHONDA Q. TEITELBAUM
BRIDGET A. BERRY*
TRISTRAM R. FALL, III
LAURIE L. GILDAN*
JEFFREY A. LEONARD
GARY A. MILLER
JAY D. SEID
ROBERT S. ADELSON
NINA L. COHEN
LINDA A. FOSSEL
STEVEN S. GRASSELL
RICHARD M. HOROWITZ
H. LYNDA KUGEL
MARK G. LICHTENSTADTER
SHELDON G. POLLACK
ERIC L. SETTLE
HOWARD P. TREATHAN

ALBERT C. BRADLOW
JUDITH WIDMAN
JENNIFER A. STILLER
STEVEN E. BERNSTEIN
DENNIS OAKES
ROMA ESKEN YOUNG
JEREMY T. ROSENBLUM
THOMAS M. CLARK
MANOY O. MARA ESOLO
JAMES S. WILER
JAMES W. HATOUR
DAVID SITLIN
WAYNE A. WEINER
KEVIN C. MCCULLOUGH
CHARLENE A. BRAIDA
ANDREW J. DUBROFF
M. ELLEN MOFFETT
NEIL S. WITKES
DONALD BEAN, JR.
GARY L. LOZOFF
DAVID L. BOOKEPAN
CAROL E. SWANSON
GERALD E. GEITCH
MARK P. BIDAUD
MICHELE M. CLARK
DEBRA ELESANOFF
DAVID G. MANDELBAUM
MICHAEL M. MELOY
FRANK A. ROTH
ROSS O. GOLDBERG
ELIZABETH A. RENAUD
BRIAN T. CORREY
MICHAEL D. ECKER
LEWIS D. GITLIN
MARTHA R. COOPER
ROBERT D. FOX
BRENDA J. GLASER-ABRAM
GARY L. LESHRO
CLIFFORD D. SCHLESINGER
MARY ELIZABETH WARD
JONATHAN A. SEGAL
J. JOSEPH CULLEN
WARREN E. TUFELD
JOHN A. L. GRUBBS
PETER C. JACOBS
GAIL S. LEWIS
PATRICIA A. MILES
STANLEY B. SCHNEIDER
DEBORAH J. TANG

MITCHELL E. PANZER
FRANKLIN POUL
DANIEL C. COHEN
STANTON S. OSWALD
ALVIN H. DORSKY
DAVID J. KAUFMAN
ALLAN H. REUBEN
MICHAEL M. OFAN
MICHAEL L. TEMIN
CHARLES G. KOPP
ALAN J. DAVIS
RAGAN A. HENRY
LEONARD J. COOPER
STEVEN A. ARBITTER
HENRY F. MILLER
JAY L. GOLDBERG
HENRY A. GLADSTONE
H. ROBERT FIEBACH
GERALD J. MCCOMONY
BERNARD CHAMIN
JEFFREY B. SCHWARTZ
ELLIOT S. GERSON
LEONARD J. BUCH
WILLIAM A. ROGOFF
PAUL E. SHAPIRO
DONALD M. JOSEPH
JAMES R. REDEKER
MICHAEL M. SHERMAN
MARC M. SILBERT
ROBERT M. L. BOOTE
DAVID M. DORET
STEWART M. WEINTRAUB
IAN A. L. STROGATZ
DAVID R. GLYN
HERMAN C. FALA
STEVEN B. KING
WILLIAM J. GREEN
HENRY L. SHRAGER
MICHAEL A. BUDIN
ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG
ELIZABETH H. MAI
THOMAS P. WITT
BRUCE S. KATCHER
JOSEPH S. FINKELSTEIN
BARRY M. KLAYMAN
DAVID F. SIMON
ARTHUR R. BLOCK
M. NORMAN GOLDBERGER
JEFFREY S. SALTZ
MARK L. ALDERMAN
DONALD M. MILLINGS
ROBERT I. FRIEDMAN
ROBERT B. MCKINSTRY, JR.

RAYMOND J. BRADLEY
FRANKLIN L. SPITZER
ROBERT E. MOCH
ANTHONY S. MINISI
ALBERT J. FELDMAN
W. THOMAS BERNIMAN
CARL W. SCHMEIDER
SEYMOUR KURLAND
GEORGE M. BRAMTZ
ROBERT M. BEGAL
MARK K. RESSLER
GERALD GORNIEH
ALAN H. MOLOD
EDWARD M. GLICKMAN
LOWELL H. DUBROW
E. GERALD RIESENBERG
JOSEPH M. HANNO
RONALD M. WIENER
WILLIAM J. MOREHOUSE
STEPHEN M. GOODMAN
DANIEL FROMLOAN
HAROLD JACOBS
ROBERT C. FODWIL
IVAN L. LIGHT
JAMES A. ROSENSTEIN
JOHN S. ROBERTS, JR.
LOUIS COFFEY
JAT R. BAER
JAMES S. BURNS
ALAN S. KAPLINWXT
ARTHUR A. ZATZ
DENNIS L. COHEN
GREGORY F. MAGARITY
MARC E. GOLD
PHILIP E. CARBER
BARRY F. SCHWARTZ
ROBERT M. MCHAIR, JR.
KENNETH G. SPILLIAS
HOWARD BREGMAN
ROBERT L. BLACKSBURG
SHERRY S. BARKIN
MATTHEW M. KAMENBS
DAVID H. HOFSTEIN
THOMAS J. GALLAGHER, III
BERNARD LEE
JASON M. SHARGEL
BRIAN P. FLAHERTY
SANDRA A. BLOCH
BRY M. RUSLIN
JEFFREY L. SHAFF
HELVYN J. TARNOPOL
KENNETH J. WARREN
DAVID M. LAYMAN*

December 16, 1987

DIRECT DIAL NUMBER:

(215) 977-2188

Jerry Goodman, Executive Director
National Conference on Soviet Jewry
10 E. 40th Street, Suite 907
New York, NY 10016

Re: Tufeld

Dear Jerry:


A neighbor of mine who has just returned from the Soviet Union confirmed the tragic news that Izolda Tufeld again has a large brain tumor. She is dying. Despite our efforts, it appears that she may die without ever seeing her grandchildren and without seeing again her only child, her son Igor, who she saw last in 1977 when he left Moscow as a teenager to settle in Israel. Enclosed for your interest is a copy of a telegram which Vladimir Tufeld has addressed to Ronald and Nancy Reagan. I have enclosed an extra copy of this telegram. I would appreciate it if you would send this to the appropriate person on the White House staff. Thank you in advance for your help.

Sincerely yours,

Alan H. Molod

AHM:nll
Enclosure

МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ТЕЛЕГРАММА

| | | | | | |
|--------|-----------|------|--|-----------|----------------------|
| Слов | П л а т а | | Министерство  связи СССР | ПЕРЕДАЧА: | |
| | руб. | коп. | | го | час. |
| | | | № | № связи | |
| | | | | Передал | |
| Итого | | | Место подачи и страна (в импринтальном падеже) | | Служебные отметки |
| Принят | | | сл. го час. мин. | | |

Категория и отметки особого вида

Фамилия адресата Ronald Nancy ReaganDecember 1987(в импринтальном падеже) Адрес White HouseГород, страна Washington USA

After our letters of November our state became worse. Izolde's cat scan showed large tumor brain. She needs speed operation threatens her life.

Our six telegrams to Gorbachev Presidium Shevardnadze no answers.

We forced separated from our only son Igor grandsons Israel eleven years.

Help us to see them before operation. Save two invalids until not late.

Devoted Izolde Vladimir Tufeds Moscow 120 Chkalova 4/2 apt 272 USSR

Tufeds Moscow 120 Chkalova 4/2 apt. 292 USSR.

Coleman -

One of our constituents
would like to ~~rent~~ the OAS
building for a ^{dinner} party. They
understand they go need to
go thru the U.S. mission.

Find out:

OAS mission
647-9376

- 1) contact person #
- 2) How procedure need
to follow to get it.

Mrs. Coolidge
647-9912

177

Letter Am. McCormick
\$1500 an hr.
3 hr. minimum

~~letter~~ #
far in advance
(depends - they have
some for cr. ix.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 16, 1987

RESPONSE DUE DATE: December 23, 1987

REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: MARLIN FITZWATER MARTY COYNE
 JACK COURTEMANCHE NANCY RISQUE
 X PAUL STEVENS BOB TUTTLE
 JAMES MCKINNEY ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE
 FRANK DONATELLI WILLIAM BALL
 X REBECCA RANGE KENNETH CRIBB
 TOM GRISCOM

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

Please provide your recommendation on the following scheduling request:

EVENT: For the President to address a major symposium on "SDI-
The First Five Years" sponsored by the Institute for
Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc. and the Conference of
Management Associates.

DATE: March 13-16, 1988.

LOCATION: Omni Shoreham Hotel.

Additional information concerning this event is attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:


Accept Regret Surrogate Message
Priority Video
Routine Written

If your recommendation is to accept, please cite reasons below:

PLEASE RETURN TO SANDY WARFIELD IN OEOP, ROOM 182 BY THE
RESPONSE DUE DATE ABOVE SO THAT YOUR COMMENTS MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS WE PROCEED WITH THIS REQUEST. THANK YOU.

*Documentation 10/8
3/14/88*

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.



Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

Jacquelyn K. Davis
Executive Vice President

Central Plaza Bldg., Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone (617) 492-2116
TELEX/TWX: 710-328-1128

RECEIVED *DLK*
me

DEC 09 1987

SCHEDULING
OFFICE

December 7, 1987

The Honorable Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Director of Presidential Appointments
and Scheduling
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Ryan:

As you know, March 1988 will mark the fifth anniversary of President Reagan's address to the nation introducing the Strategic Defense Initiative. On this occasion the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, in cooperation with Conference Management Associates, will sponsor a major international symposium on the strategic defense program in Washington, D.C. To be held from March 13 to March 16, 1988 at the Omni Shoreham Hotel, "SDI - The First Five Years" will bring together members of the scientific-technical, academic, and policymaking communities in order to assess the progress of the strategic defense initiative research program relative to the goals set forth by the President.

This symposium will present a unique opportunity to address the critically important issue of the future of our SDI program before a supportive audience which we anticipate will number between 500 and 1000. Working closely with the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, we already have a commitment from General Abrahamson to participate in the conference, and contributions are expected from the leading SDI researchers and important strategic defense policymakers from the United States and abroad. Only the President himself, however, can give the participants in the symposium a sense of the vision he has for the future of America's strategic defense. The symposium sponsors, the Advisory Board, and conference participants would be deeply appreciative of the opportunity to have President Reagan address the symposium at this important juncture in the history of strategic defense. Please find enclosed my letter of invitation to President Reagan.


The Honorable Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
December 7, 1987
Page 2

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis has had a long and abiding interest in the concept of strategic defense, and has analyzed many of the key questions associated with SDI in its recent publications. The SDI Symposium represents a logical outgrowth and extension of this work. On behalf of the SDI Scientific Advisory Board, I would be most grateful if you would bring to President Reagan's attention this event, and the forum that it presents for him to address the vitally important issues of strategic defense and its future for the United States.

We are, of course, prepared to make any adjustments in our program to accommodate the President's schedule, but I would suggest the 14th and 15th of March, 1988, as possible dates for your consideration. To facilitate your work, I have enclosed a tentative agenda for the symposium which outlines the format and thematic structure we plan to follow. I am also enclosing a copy of the most recent Report of Operations of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis for your information. If you should have any questions, I will be happy to provide you with all information you might need.

May I take this opportunity to thank you in advance for any assistance you may be able to offer in our effort to build broad understanding of the accomplishments of the SDI program in its first five years and to move it, strengthened, into the next five years.

Sincerely,


Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:mbd
Enclosures

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc.

an associated branch with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University



Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
President

Jacquelyn K. Davis
Executive Vice President

Central Plaza Bldg., Tenth Floor
675 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139
Telephone (617) 492-2116
TELEX/TWX: 710-328-1128

December 7, 1987

President Ronald W. Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Next March will mark the fifth anniversary of your speech which laid the foundations for the Strategic Defense Initiative. This occasion presents an appropriate moment to assess the progress made in achieving the goals that you set forth in your landmark address of March 23, 1983.

Accordingly, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, in association with Conference Management Associates, will convene a large symposium on "The Strategic Defense Initiative: The First Five Years" from March 13 - 16, 1988 at the Omni Shoreham Hotel in Washington, D.C. The objective of this meeting is to discuss the achievements of the SDI program over the last five years. The symposium will bring together, from the United States and abroad, members of the scientific community engaged in strategic defense research, as well as leading analysts from the policy arena and representatives from industry. This forum would offer a unique opportunity for you to address what has been accomplished, together with your assessment of what is yet to be done to bring your vision to fruition.

Please accept this letter as an invitation to deliver a keynote address at this gathering. We are, of course, prepared to adjust our program to conform with your schedule. However, I propose for your consideration an address on the evening of either March 14 or 15, 1988.

This fifth anniversary of the Strategic Defense Initiative is a truly auspicious time for you not only to review progress in the SDI program but also to give further impetus to the goals that you so eloquently set forth in your address five years ago. As one who has strongly supported your efforts to provide for our national security, I hope that you will find it possible to accept this invitation.

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

RLP:mbd

SDI: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM

MARCH 13 - MARCH 16, 1988
OMNI SHOREHAM HOTEL
WASHINGTON, DC

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD

Dr. William Barletta
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory

Dr. C. Neil Beer
Western Research Corporation

Dr. Charles Brau
Quantum Institute
University of California at
Santa Barbara

Dr. John C. Browne
Los Alamos National
Laboratory

Dr. Edward Conrad
Kaman Sciences Corporation

Dr. Thomas Dillon
GA Technologies, Inc.

Mr. Wallace E. Kirkpatrick
DESE Research & Engineering

Dr. Walter C. Morrow, Jr.
Lincoln Laboratory

Dr. Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis

Dr. Robert L. Rinne
Sandia National Laboratories

Dr. Stephen Rockwood
SAIC

Mr. Ronald Stivers
Consultant

Dr. Lowell L. Wood
Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory

Dr. Gary Workman
Johnson Research Center
University of Alabama

Dr. Charles Zraket
The MITRE Corporation

Wednesday
March 16

9:00 - 12 Noon

Session V - Advanced Technology Weapons

12 Noon - 1:30 PM

Luncheon - Guest Speaker

To Be Announced

2:00 - 5:00 PM

Session VI - The Logistics of SDI: Deploying,
Operating, and Maintaining a Strategic Defense

NOTE:

Exhibit Hall will be open from 10:00 AM to 6:00 PM on
Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.

WASHINGTON

RESPONSE DUE DATE: December 23, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: MARLIN FITZWATER MARTY COYNE
 JACK COURTEMANCHE X NANCY RISQUE
 PAUL STEVENS BOB TUTTLE
 X JAMES MCKINNEY ARTHUR CULVAHOUSE
 FRANK DONATELLI WILLIAM BALL
 REBECCA RANGE KENNETH CRIBB
 TOM GRISCOM

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

Please provide your recommendation on the following scheduling request:

EVENT: For the President to be the guest of honor at the 88th Annual Wallow of the Military Order of the Carabao.

DATE: February 6, 1988.

LOCATION: Sheraton Washington Hotel.


Additional information concerning this event is attached.

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept _____ Regret _____ Surrogate _____ Message _____
Priority _____ Video _____
Routine _____ Written _____

If your recommendation is to accept, please cite reasons below:

PLEASE RETURN TO SANDY WARFIELD IN OEOB, ROOM 182 BY THE
RESPONSE DUE DATE ABOVE SO THAT YOUR COMMENTS MAY BE
CONSIDERED AS WE PROCEED WITH THIS REQUEST. THANK YOU.



MILITARY ORDER OF THE CARABAO

ADDRESS REPLY:

c/o The ARMY AND NAVY CLUB, 901 17th STREET, N.W., FARRAGUT SQUARE, WASH., D.C. 20006-2503

Grand Patriarch of the Herd (First Vice Comdr.)
ADM. ARLEIGH BURKE, USN

Grand Bell Carabao (Second Vice Comdr.)
LT. GEN. FREDERICK L. WIESEMAN, USMC

Grand Jefe de los Amigos (Third Vice Comdr.)
LT. GEN. WILLIAM W. QUINN, USA

Grand Jefe de los Bedidos (Fourth Vice Comdr.)
MAJ. GEN. JOHN R. ALISON, USAF

Grand Jefe de los Banos (Fifth Vice Comdr.)
ADM. ISAAC C. KIDD, JR., USN

Grand Jefe de los Cargadores (Sixth Vice Comdr.)
BRIG. GEN. CHARLES L. COGSWELL, USMC

Grand Councillor of the Herd (Seventh Vice Comdr.)
LT. COL. OLIVER GASCH, USA

Main Guard
V. ADM. WILLIAM I. MARTIN, USN

Historiador
COL. BROOKE NIHART, USMC

Winder of the Horn
COL. JEROME E. EILER, USAF

Carretonero
R. ADMIRAL RALPH M. GHORMLEY, USN

Grand Paramount Carabao
BRIG. GEN. RICHARD A. EDWARDS, JR., USA

Grand Lead and Wheel Carabao
LT. COL. T. PAUL RIEGERT, USMC

Auxiliar
COL. JOHN S. ROOSMA, JR., USAF

Lead and Spring (Secretary)
CAPT. WILLIAM W. HARRIS, JR., USAF

Lead and Swing (Treasurer)
C.W.O. GORDON F. HEIM, USMC

Grand Padre de los Carabao
MAJ. JOSEPH W. HARTMAN, USA

Consejero General
COL. JAMES L. FOWLER, USMC

Director del Banquete
MAJ. GEN. W. DAVID PRICE, USAF

Auxiliar
COL. DAVID T. MOORHEAD, USA

Procurador de la Fiesta
SGT. KIM GREGORY, USA

Co-Directors
SGT. ALVIN SPIVAK, USAF
SGT. BERNARD A. GOODRICH, USMC

Director de Muecas
COL. JOHN R. BOURGEOIS, USMC

Auxiliars
MAJ. TIMOTHY FOLEY, USMC
CAPT. JOHN R. ZIMMERMAN, USMC

LOS CONSEJEROS EN BOQUE
(Councillors in the Field)

ADM. GEORGE W. ANDERSON, USN
LT. GEN. HERMAN NICKERSON, JR., USMC

COL. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, USA
LT. COL. ROGER HB. DAVIS, USAF

Jefe de Vaquerias
CAPT. FREDERICK H. HALLETT, USN

Auxiliars
CDR. THOMAS F. WIENER, USN
MR. JAMES A. HOYT, JR.

Veterinario
MAJ. DARRELL C. CRAIN, USA

Auxiliar
CDR. GERALD H. MCATEER, USN

Director de Artistas
MR. GIB CROCKETT

Director de Informacion
CAPT. JOHN J. HARTNETT, USMC

Gambelling Carabao
LT. WILLIAM O. RITTER, USN

MgySgt. MICHAEL S. RYAN, USMC
MgySgt. EDWARD L. JAMES, USMC

MR. RANDELL G. COOK

Scanned

PAST GRAND PARAMOUNT CARABAOs

| | |
|---|---------|
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1901 |
| Lieut. General Adna R. Chaffee, USA | 1902 |
| Brigadier General Cyrus S. Roberts, USA | 1902 |
| Lieut. General S. B. M. Young, USA | 1903 |
| Colonel Robert R. Stevens, USA | 1903 |
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1904 |
| Paymaster General H. T. B. Harris, USN | 1905 |
| Major General Charles F. Humphrey, USA | 1906 |
| Major General George F. Elliott, USMC | 1907 |
| Brigadier General William Crozier, USA | 1908 |
| Rear Admiral Thomas C. McLean, USN | 1909 |
| Captain John J. Knapp, USN | 1910-11 |
| Brigadier General Robert K. Evans, USA | 1912 |
| Major General James B. Aleshire, USA | 1913 |
| Admiral Thomas B. Howard, USN | 1914 |
| Rear Admiral Hugo Osterhaus, USN | 1915 |
| Brigadier General George P. Scriven, USA | 1916 |
| Captain John H. Gibbons, USN (During World War) | 1917-20 |
| Major General Wendell C. Neville, USMC | 1921 |
| Major General Frank McIntyre, USA | 1922 |
| Major General Harry H. Bandholtz, USA | 1923 |
| Admiral Edward W. Eberle, USN | 1924-25 |
| Major General John L. Hines, USA | 1926 |
| Major General Marritte W. Ireland, USMC | 1927 |
| Captain Chester Wells, USN | 1928 |
| Colonel Joseph M. Heller, MRC, USA | 1929 |
| Major General Ben H. Fuller, USMC | 1930 |
| Captain David M. Addison, USN | 1931 |
| General Douglas MacArthur, USA | 1932 |
| Major General Robert U. Patterson, USA | 1933 |
| Admiral William H. Standley, USN | 1934 |
| Brigadier General Hugh Matthews, USMC | 1935 |
| Colonel John P. Wade, USA | 1936 |
| Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, USA | 1937 |
| Rear Admiral George T. Patton, USN | 1938 |
| Major General James C. Brackinridge, USMC | 1939 |
| Colonel Henry H. Sheen, USA | 1940 |
| Brigadier General A. Owens Soames, USA | 1941 |
| Rear Admiral Walter R. Sexton, USN | 1942 |
| Vice Admiral Clark H. Woodward, USN | 1943 |
| Major General James A. Ullo, USA | 1944 |
| Major General Kenzie W. Walker, USA | 1945 |
| Brigadier General Charles R. Sanderson, USMC | 1946 |
| Admiral William F. Halsey, USN | 1947 |
| General Jonathan M. Wainwright, USA | 1948 |
| General Carl Spaatz, USAF | 1949 |
| General Clifford B. Gates, USMC | 1950 |
| Vice Admiral Harry G. Hamlet, USCG | 1951 |
| Colonel Douglas C. Cordiner, USA | 1952 |
| Vice Admiral George W. Calver, USN | 1953 |
| Colonel Joseph F. Siler, USA | 1954 |
| Brigadier General William J. Flood, USAF | 1955 |
| General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC | 1956 |
| Captain Earle D. Chesney, USN | 1957 |
| General Charles L. Bolte, USA | 1958 |
| Lieut. General Ira C. Eaker, USAF | 1959 |
| Colonel Jean W. Moreau, USMC | 1960 |
| Vice Admiral Leland P. Lovette, USN | 1961 |
| Major General Herbert M. Jones, USA | 1962 |
| Major General Howard C. Davidson, USA | 1963 |
| General Graves B. Erskine, USMC | 1964 |
| Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN | 1965 |
| Lieut. General Claude B. Farnbaugh, USA | 1966 |
| Vice Admiral Kenneth K. Cowart, USCG | 1967 |
| General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., USAF | 1968 |
| Lieut. General Alan Shapley, USMC | 1969 |
| Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie, USN | 1970 |
| General George H. Decker, USA | 1971 |
| General Joseph R. Holzapfel, USAF | 1972 |
| General Leonard F. Chapman, USMC | 1973 |
| Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN | 1974 |
| Lieut. General Arthur G. Trudeau, USA | 1975 |
| Lieut. General Marvin L. McNickle, USAF | 1976 |
| Lieut. General Frederick L. Wieseman, USMC | 1977 |
| Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN | 1978 |
| Lieut. General E. H. Almquist, USA | 1979 |
| Major General John R. Alison, USAF | 1980 |
| Lieut. General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC | 1981 |
| Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN | 1982 |
| Lieut. General William W. Quinn, USA | 1983 |
| Major General William D. Price, USAF | 1984 |
| Brigadier General Charles L. Cogswell, USMC | 1985 |
| Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN | 1986 |

December 1, 1987

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

My Dear Mr. President:

~~The Eighty-Eighth Annual~~ ~~Willow of the~~
~~Military Order of the Carabao~~ will be held on
~~Saturday, February 6, 1988 at the Sheraton Washing-~~
~~ton Hotel.~~


As I believe you know, this annual dinner is held in honor of our Military Services and includes as its special guests, key leaders of the Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Services and other important members of the Administration. The evening is highlighted with a delightful show by the Carabao Players lampooning the Washington Scene, particularly the Military establishment.

The Carabao would be greatly honored if you could attend this dinner as its special Head Table guest of honor.

Our evening starts at 6 P.M. with a reception with dinner following promptly at 7 P.M. It is a black tie affair which usually ends around 10:30 P.M. We expect approximately 1,000 guests to attend.

We would be privileged if you could be our guest at the Eighty Eighth Annual Wallow and would appreciate your office advising us as to this possibility.

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Richard A. Edwards, Jr.", written in dark ink. The signature is fluid and stylized, with a large initial "R" and "E".

Richard A. Edwards, Jr. USA

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 427931

IV 087

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: SEPTEMBER 26, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: MR. HENRY A. DUDLEY

7 86-18

SUBJECT: INVITATION TO ATTEND THE 87TH ANNUAL WALLON
OF THE MILITARY ORDER OF THE CARABAO ON
FEB 14 87 IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

| | | ACTION | | DISPOSITION | |
|----------------|--------------|--------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| ROUTE TO: | | ACT | DATE | TYPE | C COMPLETED |
| OFFICE/AGENCY | (STAFF NAME) | CODE | YY/MM/DD | RESP | D YY/MM/DD |
| MARY RAWLINS | | ORG | 86/09/26 | FR | A 86/09/06 |
| REFERRAL NOTE: | | | | | |
| REFERRAL NOTE: | | | | | |
| REFERRAL NOTE: | | | | | |
| REFERRAL NOTE: | | | | | |
| REFERRAL NOTE: | | | | | |

COMMENTS: IV 870214 870214 DC WASHINGTON

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

MI MAIL USER CODES: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

| | | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---|
| *ACTION CODES: | *DISPOSITION | *OUTGOING | * |
| * | * | *CORRESPONDENCE: | * |
| *A-APPROPRIATE ACTION | *A-ANSWERED | *TYPE RESP=INITIALS | * |
| *C-COMMENT/RECOM | *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL | *OF SIGNER | * |
| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | *CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | *OUTGOING | * |
| *R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * | | | * |
| *S-FOR-SIGNATURE | | | * |
| *X-INTERIM REPLY | | | * |

COPY
from ORM

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75,OEOb) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

October 6, 1986

Dear Mr. Dudley:

Thank you for your invitation for the President to attend the 87th Annual Wallow of the Military Order of the Carabao on February 14, 1987 in Washington, D.C.

We appreciate your extending this opportunity. We hope you will understand we are unable to make a commitment for the President this far in advance. In order not to delay your planning, we suggest you proceed with your program not counting on his acceptance. If you wish, you may then feel free to renew your invitation closer to the date -- perhaps eight weeks in advance -- for consideration at that time.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Director, Presidential
Appointments and Scheduling

Mr. Henry A. Dudley
Military Order of the Carabao
The Army and Navy Club
Post Office Box 20
Washington, DC 20006

FJR:JAJ:ckbf
FJR-18



MILITARY ORDER OF THE CARABAO

(ADDRESS REPLY: c/o ARMY AND NAVY CLUB, P.O. BOX 20, FARRAGUT SQ., WASH., D.C. 20006)

Grand Patriarch of the Herd (First Vice Comdr.)
ADM. ARLEIGH BURKE, USN

Gran Bell Carabao (Second Vice Comdr.)
(Vacant)

Gran Jefe de los Amigos (Third Vice Comdr.)
LT. COL. ROGER H.B. DAVIS, USAF

Grand Counselor of the Herd (Fourth Vice Comdr.)
LT. COL. OLIVER GASCH, USA

Gran Jefe de los Banos (Fifth Vice Comdr.)
MAJ. GEN. RINALDO VAN BRUNT, USA

Main Guard
V. ADM. WILLIAM I. MARTIN, USN

Auxiliar
COL. ALBERT F. SCHOEPPER, USMC

Historiador
COL. BROOKE NIHART, USMC

Winder of the Horn
CAPT. HARRY K. PICKETT, USAF

Auxiliar
MR. JOHN BIGBEE

Carrotonero
CWO GORDON F. HEIM, USMC

Auxiliar
MAJ. CHARLES H. COGSWELL, USA

Grand Paramount Carabao
ADM. ISAAC G. KIDD, JR.

Grand Lead and Wheel Carabao
LT. COL. T. PAUL RIEGERT, USMC

Auxiliar
COL. JOHN ROOSMA, USAF

Lead and Spring (Sec. Treas.)
LT. RALPH M. BOGART, USN

Auxiliar
CAPT. WILLIAM W. HARRIS, JR., USAF

Gran Padre de los Carabao
MAJ. JOSEPH W. HARTMAN, USA

Consejero General
COL. JAMES L. FOWLER, USMC

Director del Banquete
LT. CDR. HENRY A. DUDLEY, USN

Auxiliar
BRIG. GEN. RICHARD A. EDWARDS, JR., USA

Co-Directors de la Fiesta
SGT. BERNARD A. GOODRICH, USMC

SGT. KIM GREGORY, USA
SGT. ALVIN SPIVAK, USAF

Director de Musica
COL. JOHN R. BOURGEOIS, USMC

Auxiliar
CAPT. TIMOTHY FOLEY, USMC
CAPT. JOHN R. ZIMMERMAN, USMC

LOS CONSEJEROS EN BOQUE
(Counsellors in the Field)

ADM. GEORGE W. ANDERSON, USN
ADM. ROBERT S. CARNEY, USN

ADM. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, USN
COL. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, USA

Jefe de Vaquerias
CAPT. FREDERICK H. HALLETT, USN

Auxiliar
CDR. THOMAS F. WIENER, USN
MR. JAMES A. HOYT III

Veterinario
MAJ. DARRELL C. CRAIN, USA

Auxiliar
CDR. GERALD H. MCATEER, USN

Directores de Arteses
MR. GIB CROCKETT

Director de Informacion
CAPT. JOHN J. HARTNETT, USMC

Gamboling Carabao
LT. WILLIAM D. FITTER, USN
MajSgt. MICHAEL S. RYAN, USMC
MajSgt. EDWARD JAMES, USMC
MR. RANDY COOK, USN

September 22, 1986

PAST GRAND PARAMOUNT CARABAO

| | |
|---|---------|
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1901 |
| Lieut. General Adna R. Chaffee, USA | 1902 |
| Brigadier General Cyrus S. Roberts, USA | 1902 |
| Lieut. General S.B.M. Young, USA | 1903 |
| Colonel Robert R. Stevens, USA | 1903 |
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1904 |
| Paymaster General H.T.B. Harris, USN | 1905 |
| Major General Charles F. Humphrey, USA | 1906 |
| Major General George F. Elliott, USMC | 1907 |
| Brigadier General William Crozier, USA | 1908 |
| Rear Admiral Thomas C. McLean, USN | 1909 |
| Captain John J. Knapp, USN | 1910-11 |
| Brigadier General Robert K. Evans, USA | 1912 |
| Major General James B. Ainslie, USA | 1913 |
| Admiral Thomas B. Howard, USN | 1913 |
| Rear Admiral Hugo Osterhaus, USN | 1915 |
| Brigadier General George P. Scriven, USA | 1916 |
| Captain John H. Gibbons, USN (During World War) | 1917-20 |
| Major General Wendell C. Neville, USMC | 1921 |
| Major General Frank McIntyre, USA | 1922 |
| Major General Harry H. Bandholtz, USA | 1923 |
| Admiral Edward W. Eberle, USN | 1924-25 |
| Major General John L. Hines, USA | 1926 |
| Major General Merritt W. Ireland, US | 1927 |
| Captain Chester Wells, USN | 1928 |
| Colonel Joseph M. Haller, MRC, USA | 1929 |
| Major General Ben H. Fuller, USMC | 1930 |
| Captain David M. Addison, USN | 1931 |
| General Douglas MacArthur, USA | 1932 |
| Major General Robert U. Patterson, USA | 1933 |
| Admiral William H. Standley, USN | 1934 |
| Brigadier General Hugh Matthews, USMC | 1935 |
| Colonel John P. Wade, USA | 1936 |
| Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, USA | 1937 |
| Rear Admiral George T. Pittingill, USN | 1938 |
| Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC | 1939 |
| Colonel Henry H. Shean, USA | 1940 |
| Brigadier General A. Owens Seaman, USA | 1941 |
| Rear Admiral Walton R. Sexton, USN | 1942 |
| Vice Admiral Clark H. Woodward, USN | 1943 |
| Major General James A. Uno, USA | 1944 |
| Major General Kenzie W. Walker, USA | 1945 |
| Brigadier General Charles R. Sanderson, USMC | 1946 |
| Admiral William F. Eberle, USN | 1947 |
| General Jonathan M. Wainright, USA | 1948 |
| General Carl Soatz, USAF | 1949 |
| General Clifton B. Bates, USMC | 1950 |
| Vice Admiral Harry G. Hamlet, USCG | 1951 |
| Colonel Douglas C. Cordiner, USA | 1952 |
| Vice Admiral George W. Calver, USN | 1953 |
| Colonel Joseph F. Siler, USA | 1954 |
| Brigadier General William J. Flood, USAF | 1955 |
| General Lamuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC | 1956 |
| Captain Earle D. Chesney, USN | 1957 |
| General Charles L. Sotta, USA | 1958 |
| Lieut. General Ira C. Eaker, USAF | 1959 |
| Colonel Jean W. Moreau, USMC | 1960 |
| Vice Admiral Leland P. Lovette, USN | 1961 |
| Major General Herbert M. Jones, USA | 1962 |
| Major General Howard C. Davidson, USA | 1963 |
| General Graves B. Erskine, USMC | 1964 |
| Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN | 1965 |
| Lieut. General Claude B. Ferenbaugh, USA | 1966 |
| Vice Admiral Kenneth K. Cowart, USCG | 1967 |
| General Frederic H. Smith, Jr., USAF | 1968 |
| Lieut. General Alan Shapley, USMC | 1969 |
| Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie, USN | 1970 |
| General George H. Decker, USA | 1971 |
| General Joseph R. Holzapple, USAF | 1972 |
| General Leonard F. Chapman, USMC | 1973 |
| Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN | 1974 |
| Lieut. General Arthur G. Truesdell, USA | 1975 |
| Lieut. General Marvin L. McNickle, USAF | 1976 |
| Lieut. General Frederick L. Wieseman, USMC | 1977 |
| Admiral Thomas H. Moore, USN | 1978 |
| Lieut. General E. H. Almquist, USA | 1979 |
| Major General John R. Alison, USAF | 1980 |
| Lieut. General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC | 1981 |
| Admiral James L. Hatloway, III, USN | 1982 |
| Lieut. General William W. Quinn, USA | 1983 |
| Maj. Gen. William D. Price, USAF | 1984 |
| Brigadier General Charles L. Cogswell, USMC | 1985 |

Dear Mr. President:

The Eighty-Seventh Annual Wallow of the Military Order of the Carabao will be held on February 14, 1987, the second Saturday of February

As before, the reception and cocktails will begin at 6 p.m. at the Sheraton Washington Hotel, with dinner starting promptly at 7 p.m. The Carabao Players again are promising to give us a thoroughly entertaining and clever show. We will give you further details at a later date and your official invitation will be sent early in December. We are writing to you now in the hope that you will mark your calendar for this very special occasion.

Hoping that we will have the honor and privilege of having you as our guest for this eighty-seventh annual dinner honoring the Military Services of the United States, I am

Sincerely,

Henry A. Dudley
Henry A. Dudley
Director del Banquete

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

ID# 451451

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: JANUARY 09, 1987

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: ADMIRAL ISAAC C. KIDD

SUBJECT: WRITES TO REAFFIRM THE INVITATION TO ATTEND
THE 87TH ANNUAL DINNER OF THE MILITARY ORDER
OF THE CARABAO ON FEB 14 87 IN WASHINGTON,
DC

SECRET

RECEIVED

JAN 12 1987

SCHEDULING
OFFICE

ACTION

DISPOSITION

ROUTE TO:
OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)

ACT DATE TYPE
CODE YY/MM/DD RESP D YY/MM/DD

MARY RAWLINS

ORG 87/01/09

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

REFERRAL NOTE:

COMMENTS: IV 870214 870214 DC WASHINGTON

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:

MEDIA:L INDIVIDUAL CODES:

MI MAIL

USER CODES: (A)

(B)

(C)

*ACTION CODES: *DISPOSITION *OUTGOING *
* * * *CORRESPONDENCE: *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *A-ANSWERED *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL * OF SIGNER *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE *C-COMPLETED * CODE = A *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET *S-SUSPENDED *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC * * OUTGOING *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY * * * *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE * * * *
*X-INTERIM REPLY * * * *

COPY
from ORM

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

January 28, 1987

Dear Admiral Kidd:

This is in follow-up to your earlier invitation for the President to attend the 87th Annual Wallow of the Military Order of the Carabao on February 14.

Again, we appreciate your extending this opportunity to the President. I regret to write that in light of developments in his calendar for that time, we are unable to add this to his schedule. However, the President asked that I convey to you his very best wishes and sincere appreciation.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Director, Presidential
Appointments and Scheduling

Admiral Isaac D. Kidd, Jr., USN
Military Order of the Carabao
Army and Navy Club
Farragut Square, Post Office Box 20
Washington, DC 20006

FJR:JAJ:ckbf
FJR-30

cc: w/inc to MsgUnit for cons
cc: Chris McCarrick-FYI ✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mary -

I think we should
send Mr. and Mrs. ^W
to ~~KIDD~~. I would
call out there a
number. I do.
I think we should
send ~~some~~ ^{some} ~~one~~ ^{one}

Linda

MILITARY ORDER OF THE CARABAO

(ADDRESS REPLY: c/o ARMY AND NAVY CLUB, P.O. BOX 20, FARRAGUT SQ., WASH., D.C. 20006)

Schedule

Grand Patriarch of the Herd (First Vice Comdr.)
ADM. ARLEIGH BURKE, USN

Grand Bell Carabao (Second Vice Comdr.)
(Vacant)

Gran Jefe de los Amigos (Third Vice Comdr.)
LT. COL. ROGER H.B. DAVIS, USAF

Grand Counselor of the Herd (Fourth Vice Comdr.)
LT. COL. OLIVER GASCH, USA

Gran Jefe de los Banos (Fifth Vice Comdr.)
MAJ. GEN. RINALDO VAN BRUNT, USA

Main Guard
V. ADM. WILLIAM I. MARTIN, USN

Auxiliar
COL. ALBERT F. SCHOEPPER, USMC

Historiador
COL. BROOKE NIHART, USMC

Winder of the Horn
CAPT. HARRY K. PICKETT, USAF

Auxiliar
MR. JOHN BIGBEE

Carretoneros
CWO GORDON F. HEIM, USMC

Auxiliar
MAJ. CHARLES H. COGSWELL, USA

Grand Paramount Carabao
ADM. ISAAC C. KIDD, JR.

Grand Lead and Wheel Carabao
LT. COL. T. PAUL RIEGERT, USMC

Auxiliar
COL. JOHN ROOSMA, USAF

Lead and Swing (Sec. Treas.)
LT. RALPH M. BOGART, USN

Auxiliar
CAPT. WILLIAM W. HARRIS, JR., USAF

Gran Padre de los Carabao
MAJ. JOSEPH W. HARTMAN, USA

Consejeros General
COL. JAMES L. FOWLER, USMC

Director del Banquete
LT. CDR. HENRY A. DUDLEY, USN

Auxiliar
BRIG. GEN. RICHARD A. EDWARDS, JR., USA

Co-Directores de la Fiesta
SGT. BERNARD A. GOODRICH, USMC
SGT. KIM GREGORY, USA
SGT. ALVIN SPIVAK, USAF

Director de Musica
COL. JOHN R. BOURGEOIS, USMC

Auxiliar
CAPT. TIMOTHY FOLEY, USMC
CAPT. JOHN R. ZIMMERMAN, USMC

LOS CONSEJEROS EN BOQUE
(Councilors in the Field)
ADM. GEORGE W. ANDERSON, USN
ADM. ROBERT S. CARNEY, USN
ADM. JAMES D. RICHARDSON, USN
COL. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, USA

Jefe de Vagueros
CAPT. FREDERICK M. HALLETT, USN

Auxiliar
CDR. THOMAS F. WIENER, USN
MR. JAMES A. HOYT III

Veterinario
MAJ. DARRELL C. CRAIN, USA

Auxiliar
CDR. GERALD H. MCATEER, USN

Directores de Aristas
MR. GIB CROCKETT

Director de Informacion
CAPT. JOHN J. HARTNETT, USMC

Gamboling Carabao
LT. WILLIAM O. RITTER, USN
MgySgt. MICHAEL S. RYAN, USMC
MgySgt. EDWARD JAMES, USMC
MR. RANDY COOK, USN

January 6, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

On September 22, Henry Dudley, Director del Banquete of the Military Order of the Carabao, wrote to you advising that our Eighty-seventh Annual Dinner will be held this year at the Sheraton Washington Hotel on Saturday, February 14, 1987. He stated in his letter that it was our hope that we would have the privilege of having you as our guest for this occasion.

The invitation was purposely sent early and I am writing to you now to reaffirm our invitation and to tell you that it is a private affair. There are no speeches and the media are not invited to attend. There will be about 1,200 very patriotic gentlemen in attendance. The Carabao Players put on an excellent show doing a take-off on the military establishment. It is clever and done in good taste. I truly believe it compares favorably with anything on Broadway. It is an impressive, delightful evening and we think you would enjoy it immensely.

It would be a great honor for all of us, Mr. President, and we hope very much that it will be possible for you to be with us.

With greatest esteem,

Isaac C. Kidd, Jr.
Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., USN

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

PAST GRAND PARAMOUNT CARABAOs

| | |
|---|---------|
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1901 |
| Lieut. General Adna R. Chaffee, USA | 1902 |
| Brigadier General Cyrus S. Roberts, USA | 1902 |
| Lieut. General S.B.M. Young, USA | 1903 |
| Colonel Robert R. Stevens, USA | 1903 |
| Brigadier General Charles A. Woodruff, USA | 1904 |
| Paymaster General H.T.B. Harris, USN | 1905 |
| Major General Charles F. Humphrey, USA | 1906 |
| Major General George F. Elliott, USMC | 1907 |
| Brigadier General William Crozier, USA | 1908 |
| Rear Admiral Thomas C. Hagan, USN | 1909 |
| Captain John J. Knap, USN | 1910-11 |
| Brigadier General Robert K. Evans, USA | 1912 |
| Major General James B. Aleshure, USA | 1913 |
| Admiral Thomas B. Howard, USN | 1914 |
| Rear Admiral Hugo Osterhaus, USN | 1915 |
| Brigadier General George P. Scriven, USA | 1916 |
| Captain John H. Gibbons, USN (During World War) | 1917-20 |
| Major General Wendell C. Neville, USMC | 1921 |
| Major General Frank McIntyre, USA | 1922 |
| Major General Harry M. Bandholtz, USA | 1923 |
| Admiral Edward W. Eberle, USN | 1924-25 |
| Major General John L. Hines, USA | 1926 |
| Major General Merritt W. Ireland, US | 1927 |
| Captain Chester Wells, USN | 1928 |
| Colonel Joseph M. Heller, MRC, USA | 1929 |
| Major General Ben H. Fuller, USMC | 1930 |
| Captain David M. Adrison, USN | 1931 |
| General Douglas MacArthur, USA | 1932 |
| Major General Robert U. Patterson, USA | 1933 |
| Admiral William H. Standley, USN | 1934 |
| Brigadier General Hugh Matthews, USMC | 1935 |
| Colonel John P. Wade, USA | 1936 |
| Brigadier General Frank T. Hines, USA | 1937 |
| Rear Admiral George T. Pettigill, USN | 1938 |
| Major General James C. Breckinridge, USMC | 1939 |
| Colonel Henry H. Sheen, USA | 1940 |
| Brigadier General A. Owens Seaman, USA | 1941 |
| Rear Admiral Walton R. Sexton, USN | 1942 |
| Vice Admiral Clark H. Warner, USN | 1943 |
| Major General James A. Uilo, USA | 1944 |
| Major General Kenzie W. Walker, USA | 1945 |
| Brigadier General Charles R. Sanderson, USMC | 1946 |
| Admiral William F. Halsey, USN | 1947 |
| General Jonathan M. Wainwright, USA | 1948 |
| General Carl Spaatz, USAF | 1949 |
| General Clifton B. Cates, USMC | 1950 |
| Vice Admiral Harry G. Hamel, USCG | 1951 |
| Colonel Douglas C. Cordman, USA | 1952 |
| Vice Admiral George W. Calver, USN | 1953 |
| Colonel Joseph F. Siler, USA | 1954 |
| Brigadier General William J. Flood, USAF | 1955 |
| General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., USMC | 1956 |
| Captain Earle D. Chesney, USN | 1957 |
| General Charles L. Boite, USA | 1958 |
| Lieut. General Ira C. Eager, USAF | 1959 |
| Colonel Jean W. Moreau, USMC | 1960 |
| Vice Admiral Leland P. Lovette, USN | 1961 |
| Major General Herbert M. Jones, USA | 1962 |
| Major General Howard C. Davidson, USA | 1963 |
| General Graves B. Erskine, USMC | 1964 |
| Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN | 1965 |
| Lieut. General Claude B. Bendaugh, USA | 1966 |
| Vice Admiral Kenneth K. Cover, USCG | 1967 |
| General Frederick H. Smith, Jr., USAF | 1968 |
| Lieut. General Alan Shapley, USMC | 1969 |
| Vice Admiral Robert B. Pirie, USN | 1970 |
| General George M. Decker, USA | 1971 |
| General Joseph R. Holzapple, USAF | 1972 |
| General Leonard F. Chapman, USMC | 1973 |
| Admiral Jerauld Wright, USN | 1974 |
| Lieut. General Arthur G. Trudeau, USA | 1975 |
| Lieut. General Marvin L. McNickle, USAF | 1976 |
| Lieut. General Frederick L. Wieseman, USMC | 1977 |
| Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN | 1978 |
| Lieut. General E. H. Almquist, USA | 1979 |
| Major General John R. Allison, USAF | 1980 |
| Lieut. General Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC | 1981 |
| Admiral James L. Holloway, III, USN | 1982 |
| Lieut. General William W. Ounn, USA | 1983 |
| Major General William D. Price, USAF | 1984 |
| Brigadier General Charles L. Cogswell, USMC | 1985 |