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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRE-BRIEF FOR U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT INTERVIEW

DATE: November 7, 1985
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 P.M.
FROM: LARRY SPEAKES *LS*

I. PURPOSE

A pre-brief for the President for his interview with U.S. News and World Report.

II. PARTICIPANTS

The President
The Vice President
Donald T. Regan
Robert C. McFarlane
Patrick J. Buchanan
Larry Speakes
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Edward P. Djerejian

III. PRESS PLAN

None.

IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The participants enter the Oval Office and after an exchange of greetings begin the pre-briefing for the Presidential interview with U.S. News and World Report.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1985

MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached briefing material is identical to that which was provided to you yesterday for the wire services interview.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. L. Chew", is positioned above the printed name.

David L. Chew

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENTIAL INTERVIEW WITH U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT

DATE: November 7, 1985
LOCATION: The Oval Office
TIME: 2:00 P.M.

FROM: LARRY SPEAKES 8

I. PURPOSE

This will be the only pre-Geneva Presidential interview with a major news magazine.

II. BACKGROUND

A Presidential interview with U.S. News will be widely read in this country as well as overseas. This will be the first formal interview with U.S. News since October 1984.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President

Mortimer Zuckerman, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief
Henry Trewhitt, Deputy Foreign Editor
Charles Shelby Coffey III, Editor
David Gergen, Managing Editor, Government News
Harold Evans, Editorial Director
Joe Shapiro, White House Correspondent
Jim Hildreth, White House Correspondent

Chick Harrity, Photographer

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House and U.S. News photographers only.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

After a brief greeting, the participants are seated for the interview. Apart from the usual physical setup for Oval Office interviews, this one will take place with the President seated at his desk.

Attachment: Talking Points

YURCHENKO CASE

On November 4, 1985, Vitaliy Sergeyevich Yurchenko appeared at a press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Washington where he made a series of allegations which are completely false and without any foundation.

The Facts

- o On August 1, 1985, Mr. Yurchenko, a senior officer of the Soviet KGB, defected of his own volition to the American Embassy in Rome, Italy.
- o He requested asylum in the United States and signed a statement to that effect, and asylum was granted.
- o Since his arrival in the United States on August 2, Mr. Yurchenko has willingly cooperated with both the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI in providing information about Soviet intelligence activities throughout the world and the organization of the KGB.
- o At no time was Mr. Yurchenko held or coerced by improper, illegal, or unethical means.
- o It is Mr. Yurchenko's right to return to the Soviet Union once the United States Government is, in fact, assured that this action is genuinely of his own choosing.
- o The information he provided over the last three months continues to be processed and assessed by the intelligence community.

Soviet Actions

- o At 5:30 p.m. on November 4, the Soviet Charge, Mr. Oleg Sokolov, informed the Acting Secretary of State John Whitehead that Mr. Yurchenko was in the Soviet Embassy.
- o He repeated Yurchenko's story of "abduction", protested his alleged mistreatment, and said Mr. Yurchenko was requesting permission to return to the U.S.S.R.
- o Mr. Whitehead refuted the various Soviet charges, including the charge that Yurchenko had been drugged and brought to this country against his will.
- o Mr. Whitehead told the Soviets that before we allow Yurchenko to leave this country, we will insist on a meeting with him in an environment free of Soviet coercion to satisfy ourselves about his real intentions.

HOPES AND GOALS FOR GENEVA

Differences Remain

- o We have undeniable difficulties in the US-Soviet relationship. These come from the profound differences in the way we view individuals, how we organize our societies, and how we deal with other countries.
- o We will continue to compete for years to come. At the same time, we recognize that we live in one world, and must compete in peace. The Soviets have to act with restraint and responsibility, not just towards us but to all states.

Opportunities

- o I think the US and the Soviet Union have made progress in the relationship over the past few years.
 - We have agreed that our ultimate objective is elimination of nuclear arms, and we are negotiating in Geneva over how to begin that process.
 - We have also begun to talk to each other about problems in various regions of the world.
 - We have held useful, cabinet-level exchanges since January in the areas of trade, agriculture, housing and the environment. (EPA Director Thomas travels to Moscow in mid-November.)
- o If the Soviets come to Geneva ready to begin the road to realistic agreements, they will find us ready.

A Strong Hand

- o I will go to Geneva with a strong hand.
 - We have rebuilt America's economy and military strength and strengthened our alliances. We are once again confident of the future.
 - Soviets' return to arms negotiations and recent counterproposal resulted from the perseverance and patience of the American people, and the support and unity of our allies.

SHULTZ TRIP TO MOSCOW

Accelerating Dialogue

- o Secretary Shultz' talks in Moscow were useful and businesslike. We were pleased at the opportunity to exchange views with General Secretary Gorbachev before our meeting in Geneva.
- o Secretary's presence in Moscow, at Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's invitation, reflects the seriousness with which both sides view this opportunity to improve our bilateral relationship.
- o Moscow talks also reflect the fact that our bilateral dialogue continues to gain momentum. I hope we will begin to see results from this dialogue soon.

Across our Agenda

- o Secretary's talks with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev covered all of our agenda: arms control, my regional initiative, human rights and bilateral issues.

Narrowing Differences

- o Moscow talks met their principal goal: defining those areas where progress may be possible.
- o Thus, I see them as one further step in the process of advancing our bilateral relationship. This is a process that has been going on for several years; my meeting with Gorbachev is another part of it; it will continue in the months and years to come.

Specific Agreements Reached in Moscow

- o George Shultz and Bud McFarlane return later today from Moscow, and I will be discussing with them the details of their meetings when they get back.
- o Meanwhile, I will not go into specifics about what was discussed in confidential meetings.

Looking Forward to Geneva Meeting

- o I haven't yet met General Secretary Gorbachev, of course, so many of my conclusions about him must remain tentative, and based to a large degree on the same sources as yours.

US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Conflict ...

- o There are clearly areas of conflict in US-Soviet relations. They have existed to various degrees since 1917, but they have been particularly apparent since the end of the Second World War.
- o Soviet actions during the past decade or so have exacerbated these conflicts.
 - We and our Allies are threatened by the massive Soviet buildup of military arms.
 - Soviet actions in other countries, such as Afghanistan, raise questions about the Soviet Union's ultimate objectives.
 - And we do not understand why the Soviet government takes such harsh actions against Soviet citizens who seek only to monitor their government's observance of international human rights commitments.

... and Cooperation

- o Although I believe we and the Soviets will continue to compete for years to come, it is clear that we do share some common interests.
 - These common interests were apparent during World War II.
 - They are also apparent more recently in other areas, such as efforts to avoid nuclear proliferation. Both we and the Soviets realize that improved relations could serve both our interests.

Goal: Improvement

- o The record of the past 40 years, unfortunately, reflects radical swings between conflict and cooperation in our bilateral relationship.
- o One of my principal goals in Geneva will be to lessen these swings; to cooperate where we can and to compete peacefully where we cannot. I cannot think of anything that would be more important for the long-term US-Soviet relationship.

US ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Need for Give-and-Take

- o We and the Soviets have agreed that our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and we are negotiating in Geneva on how to begin that process.
 - We have proposed very deep cuts in nuclear arms.
 - The Soviets recently have presented specific ideas which also call for deep reductions. That's a welcome step.
 - Now is the time to engage in the genuine give-and-take needed to achieve an agreement. Our negotiators have the flexibility to do so. We hope the Soviets do as well.

US Positions

- o Our position is characterized by:
 - Deep cuts
 - No first strike advantage
 - Defensive research because defense is safer than offense
 - No cheating
- o In START, we have proposed sharp reductions in offensive forces, in a stabilizing and equitable way.
 - We seek to enhance stability and improve security by placing special limitations on the most destabilizing forces -- ballistic missiles, particularly multiple warhead ICBMs.
- o Our INF proposal, zero-zero, would eliminate totally US and Soviet LRINF missiles, or, as an interim measure, reduce to the lowest possible equal number of US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads, on a global basis.
- o My hope for the future is that we can move toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play a growing role.
 - We are currently seeking to discuss with the Soviets in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, and ways for jointly managing a stable transition to a peace based on defensive systems rather than the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Disarray?

- o Throughout my presidency I have asked for a wide array of options on arms control questions, as well as other issues. I would have it no other way. A wide array of opinions is the sign of a healthy administration; we should not mistake it for disarray in the executive branch.

Specific Numbers Proposed

- o I know there have been many stories in the press speculating on the details of our latest proposal tabled in Geneva -- I believe the proper place for negotiation is Geneva, not in the media.

SOVIET COUNTERPROPOSAL

Counterproposal Welcome

- o We welcome the fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a counterproposal at the Geneva arms control talks that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions.
- o As I said in my UNGA address, the new Soviet proposal has seeds that should be nurtured. We have done so with our own new proposal.
- o The Soviets return to the bargaining table, and their counterproposal in particular, resulted from our patience and perseverance, and the unity and support of our allies.

But Not Acceptable as Is

- o The Soviet counterproposal contained elements which did not meet our ideas of arms control
 - It would not promote strategic stability, since it does not deal effectively with the Soviet first-strike force which threaten our ICBMs.
 - Its proposed reductions would result in US inequality in weapons, throw-weight and delivery vehicles.
 - It is anti-European and anti-Asian, because it would have us reduce systems defending our allies without limiting comparable Soviet systems which threaten them.
 - It would cut off the US SDI research program despite the fact that the Soviet Union has been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research. Research limitations, as the Soviets sometimes admit, cannot be effectively verified.
 - It would inequitably prevent US force modernization needed for maintaining deterrence, while preserving Soviet advances.
 - Key elements of the Soviet counterproposal are not verifiable.

FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENTS

Soviet Position

- o The Soviets have recently proposed a freeze of US LRINF missiles deployed in Europe. They also seek compensation in the INF talks for the independent strategic nuclear deterrents of Britain and France.
- o The Soviets have also offered to negotiate separately with the French and the British regarding their respective nuclear forces.

US Position

- o British and French nuclear forces are those nations' independent strategic deterrents.
- o They are not available for the defense of other European members of NATO, within the NATO context which applies to some US forces. British and French forces are very small compared to the size of the Soviet arsenal.
- o Soviet insistence on compensation for the independent strategic nuclear forces of Britain and France is an assertion of the right to match the forces of all other nuclear states combined and thus to attain Soviet nuclear superiority over each of them.
- o The Soviet offer to negotiate separately with the British and French is a matter for those countries to consider.
- o The leaders of Britain and France have made statements on this subject. Both have indicated that it would not be appropriate for them to enter into such negotiations until the USSR and US have agreed to significant reductions of strategic forces.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

A Strong Belief

- o The Soviet Union clearly believes in strategic defenses. During the past 25 years it has increased its active and passive defense measures and conducted extensive research in a clear effort to blunt the effectiveness of US and allied deterrents.
- The Soviets continue to improve their ballistic missile defense system around Moscow -- the only operational system in the world.
- Their construction of a large phased-array radar near Kransnoyarsk is a clear violation of the 1972 ABM treaty, and an indication of their intention to provide a nationwide ballistic missile defense.

Soviet Strategic Defense Programs

- o Since the late 1960s, the Soviet Union has had a substantial research program into advanced technologies for ballistic missile defense.
- This program includes many of the same technologies involved in the US Strategic Defense Initiative.
- It represents, however, a far greater investment of plant space, capital and manpower than our SDI.
- o In addition to its advanced-technology ABM system, the Soviet Union maintains the world's only operational anti-satellite system and the world's largest conventional air defense system.

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE

Particularly Disturbing

- o I have been particularly disturbed about repeated instances of Soviet noncompliance with their arms control agreements.
- o In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security and to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them.

Major Violations

- o A few important examples have been the deployment of the SS-25, encryption of telemetry during Soviet missile testing, and the construction near Krasnoyarsk of a large phased-array radar in violation of the ABM treaty.
- o At the most recent Nuclear Planning Group meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Brussels, Ministers took "the most serious view" of Soviet violations of treaties.
- o I have submitted reports to Congress in January 1984 and February 1985. Congress has requested a third report, due December 1.

No Corrective Action

- o The Soviets have yet to provide satisfactory explanations or to undertake actions to alleviate US concerns.

Interim Restrain

- o Nonetheless, last June I decided to continue our policy of not undercutting existing strategic arms agreements to the extent the Soviets exercise comparable restraint.
- o We will constantly review this policy with several factors in mind:
 - Soviet conduct, including correction of violations;
 - continued growth in Soviet strategic forces;
 - Soviet seriousness in the Geneva NST negotiations.
- o I have directed the Defense Department to identify specific actions we can take to augment as necessary our strategic modernization program in proportionate response to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of, uncorrected Soviet violations.
 - This confidential report is due November 15. We will be assessing it carefully within the Administration.

REGIONAL ISSUES

UNGA Initiative

- o The plan I outlined at the UN is an effort to set up a flexible, comprehensive framework for the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in solving very serious problems.
- o The regional conflicts I would like to address have caused severe strains in East-West relations. They have made many people in the US and elsewhere question the Soviet Union's intentions.

Regional Problems

- o We want to address the urgent social and economic problems of Central America and help promote stability and democracy. Soviet and Cuban policies of intervention and export of revolution promote instability and waste the human and economic resources of the region. Nicaragua has supported insurgencies in neighboring countries, increased its military strength to alarming levels, and made clear its contempt for democracy.
- o In the Middle East, the Soviet Union has yet to prove it can play a constructive role. The Soviet Union consistently attacks the very concept of direct negotiations between the parties.
- o We deplore the apartheid system, but it is an issue that the South Africans themselves must solve. We have tried over the last four years to bring the Angolans into a negotiating framework, which could lead to an agreement in Angola and in Namibia. The Soviets have not contributed to this effort; indeed, it has helped fuel the conflict by providing huge amounts of military assistance to Angola.
- o We have spared no effort to help the people of Ethiopia, who are recovering from a terrible famine. The Soviets, on the other hand, provide the Ethiopian government 1700 military advisors, while the Cubans provide some 2500 combat troops.
- o We are concerned by the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, which the Soviets underwrite through massive aid to Hanoi. If the Soviets respond positively to my regional initiative, perhaps we can help solve the situation in Cambodia.

HUMAN RIGHTS

A Natural US Concern

- o The American people are deeply concerned with the question of human rights. We do not seek to impose our system on others. But we are a nation of immigrants; many of our citizens maintain close ties with friends and family overseas.
- o We thus have a natural interest in the state of human rights in the Soviet Union. The Soviet government has international human rights and humanitarian commitments, and we will insist that it observe them.
- o More fundamentally, one of the painful lessons of this century is that we cannot be indifferent to human rights; when a country does not respect the basic human rights of its citizens, it cannot be trusted to respect the basic rights of other countries.

BILATERAL INITIATIVES

Need to Do More

- o We think there is a great deal to be done in the field of US-Soviet bilateral cooperation.
 - Contacts should be more than relations between governments; they should be people-to-people.
 - We would like to expand personal contacts, to increase the sharing of knowledge and culture, and to improve communication between our two societies.

Exchanges

- o Our cabinet-level discussions on commerce, agriculture, housing and the environment show that we take our exchanges very seriously.
 - Scientific and technical exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union give each country's experts an opportunity to share in the benefits of the other's expertise, while building personal relationships with their colleagues.
 - We are ready to have scientific or technical exchanges that offer mutual benefits.

Trade

- o Trade can have important benefits for both the US and the Soviet Union.
 - We support mutually beneficial trade with the Soviet Union.
 - The fact is, however, that trade, like other issues, is bound to be affected by the overall state of US-Soviet relations.
 - Realizing the full potential of our trading relationship will take time -- and the removal of barriers such as human rights problems.

PUBLIC OPINION AND SOVIET PROPAGANDA

Western Political Process

- o We must take into account the democratic political process as we approach Geneva. We cannot, nor would we want to, alter our political process in the weeks ahead.
- o This means a continuing process of consultations with our legislative branch, as well as a recognition that there will be differing opinions on some issues.
- o Moreover, we have allies, rather than satellites. We truly consult with our allies, who must in turn take account of their own democratic processes.
- o I think it is clear, however, that on the fundamental East-West issues, American public opinion speaks with one voice, and that we have the solid support of our democratic allies.

Soviet Propaganda

- o It is also clear that the Soviet government does not operate under such restraints. It has spent recent months directing a large-scale propaganda campaign at the Western public.
- o The point of this campaign is clear: they want to raise Western public expectations to unrealistic levels, in the hope of pressing us to make unilateral concessions. If, on the other hand, the Geneva meeting does not meet these unrealistic expectations, the Soviets want to be in a position to blame us.
 - The truth is, US-Soviet relations are neither as bad as they have been in the past, nor as good as we'd like them to be.
 - I am used to the Soviets' personal criticism, and I am in good company; after all, every US President since Truman has been accused of worsening US-Soviet relations at one time or another.
- o Most importantly, we have a sophisticated public, well informed by our free public debate. We and our allies can see through the Soviet propaganda campaign.

SOUTH AFRICA

Basic Message

- o The US seeks the elimination of apartheid. US urges reform and a more just system based on the consent of the governed. Economic sanctions which harm blacks and punish progressive US companies are clearly counter-productive.
- o But continuing violence in South Africa and failure of SAG to clarify its intentions with respect to reform led me to send a strong signal to SAG: apartheid must go; now is the time to get process of negotiation leading to meaningful reform underway.
- o Executive Order does not represent policy shift. Actions taken are consistent with my intent to maintain active presence of American companies, churches, teachers, diplomats, in pushing for change. They reflect my judgment on how US can best bring its influence to bear.

Seeking the End to Apartheid and Political Reform

- o Apartheid is a major source of instability in the region.
- o US seeks end to violence, end of state of emergency and negotiations leading to end of apartheid.
- o We regret arrests/detentions, deplore continuing violence killings and oppose forced removals. We urge South African government to open meaningful dialogue with black leaders.
- o I respect Bishop Tutu; we both want end to apartheid. But I reject his characterization of me as racist. It simply is not true.
- o Measures in my Executive Order are not designed to destroy South African economy or hurt those we are trying to help; targeted on specific elements of SAG apparatus which enforce apartheid.
- o President Botha has spoken encouraging words about reform, but SAG needs to clarify its intentions. Action needed.
- o US firms are a force for change, should adhere Sullivan Code; have given \$115 million to black housing and education; US firms now pushing for end of apartheid.

In Angola, Continue to Push Parties Toward Negotiated Settlement

- o US Government mediating SAG/Angola negotiations; both agreed to seek settlement based on UN Security Council Resolution 435 and Cuban troop withdrawal. Recent events set back negotiating process, but both sides have recently indicated negotiating door is open.
- o Soviet policy in Angola fuels violence and contrasts with US policy which seeks negotiated settlement and withdrawal of all foreign troops. UNITA is important force that must be part of internal Angolan reconciliation and deserves our support.

TERRORISM

Terrorism Overview

- o Terrorism, a growing and international problem, respects no borders, no citizenship -- some 20 countries' citizens were aboard the Achille Lauro. US, Soviet, British, French citizens have been kidnapped in Lebanon. Over 600 incidents last year, up 20 percent from previous five-year average. About 570 incidents in first nine months of this year -- 150 more than in same period last year. Citizens of more than 75 nations have been victims of terrorism so far this year.
- o Forty percent of the terrorist incidents occur in Western Europe (about one quarter of these are Mideast-related); 35 percent in the Mideast; 15 percent in Latin America and 10 percent elsewhere.
- o Terrorists increasingly use tactics designed to kill and wound the victims. In 1984, 11 Americans died and 31 were wounded in terrorist attacks. To date in 1985, 16 US citizens killed and 111 injured.
- o More than 90 potential terrorist incidents have been thwarted by good security, good intelligence and international cooperation in past 11 months.

US Policy

- o The US will continue to counter terrorism with all the means at its disposal, and will maintain its policy of not making concessions to terrorists and discouraging others from doing so.
- o Terrorists are criminals, and they should not be released because countries find it politically difficult to prosecute or retaliate against them.
- o Recent developments show there is a great need for even better international cooperation and understandings.
- o We seek the cooperation of all concerned states and are prepared to work with them to counter the barbaric and criminal actions of terrorists.
- o Secretary Shultz has discussed terrorism with the Soviets. We welcome the release of the Soviet hostages and want our hostages released without delay.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH MRS. BARBARA NEWINGTON

DATE: Thursday, November 7, 1985
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 2:55-3:00 p.m.

FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN 

I. PURPOSE

To greet Mrs. Barbara Newington of Greenwich, Connecticut, and express your appreciation for her support to you and your policies, particularly those regarding Central America.

II. BACKGROUND

Mrs. Newington, whose husband died of cancer a few years ago, is one of those selfless Americans who believes strongly in the policies and programs you have defined for our country. She has made significant contributions in support of several important issues and her assistance has "made the difference" in various campaigns. She was a major contributor to your re-election and provided funds for a major media effort aimed at passage of legislation relating to our Central American policies. Over the past few years, she has contributed nearly \$500K in support of these issues. Talking points are attached at Tab I.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President, Don Regan, Mrs. Barbara Newington, Pat Buchanan, and Oliver North

IV. PRESS PLAN

None.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The President greets Mrs. Newington in the Oval Office for five minutes expressing his appreciation for her dedication and support for his Presidency and policies. Photo op.


Prepared by:
Oliver North

Presidential Meeting w/Mrs. Barbara Newington, November 7, 1985



FYI:

This is a sample of what Mrs. Newington has done for our causes in the past. Here are some of her contributions:

1.	Get-out-the-vote ads (5 states)	\$ 28,000.00
2.	Presidential inaugural congratulations <u>The New York Times</u> <u>The Wall Street Journal</u> <u>The Washington Post</u>	\$ 93,000.00
3.	Reagan defense policy ads	\$ 17,000.00
4.	Nicaraguan refugee fund dinner	\$ 50,000.00
5.	Nicaragua policy ads, 1st vote	\$100,000.00
6.	Nicaragua policy ads, 2nd vote	\$ 75,000.00
7.	Production costs for Nicaragua policy ads (both votes)	<u>\$ 59,000.00</u>
	TOTAL	\$422,000.00



MEETING W/BARBARA NEWINGTON, NOV 7, 2:55 P.M.

- MRS. NEWINGTON, I'VE HEARD SO MUCH ABOUT YOU. I'M VERY GLAD TO MEET YOU.
 - I KNOW OF YOUR SUPPORT FOR OUR VARIOUS ISSUES AND THAT YOUR CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE DONE MUCH TO HELP THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA.
 - THE T.V. ADVERTISING YOU MADE POSSIBLE LAST SPRING WAS CRITICAL TO OUR EFFORT TO EDUCATE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE SITUATION IN THIS CRITICAL REGION.
 - THANK YOU FOR ALL YOU HAVE DONE AND GOD BLESS YOU.
- 
- 

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SWEARING-IN CEREMONY FOR EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR.

Thursday, November 7, 1985

The Roosevelt Room

4:30 p.m.

FROM: BRIGADIER GENERAL M.P. CAULFIELD *WS*
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE

I. PURPOSE

To formally swear in Edward V. Hickey, Jr., as a Federal Maritime Commissioner. (A private ceremony was held at the Commission on Wednesday, November 6th.)

II. BACKGROUND

You appointed Mr. Hickey to the Federal Maritime Commission on November 5, 1985 and also designated him Chairman. Until then, as an Assistant to the President, he had served as Director of Special Support Services and Director of the White House Military Office since January 20, 1981.

III. PARTICIPANTS

Attorney General Edwin Meese
Edward V. Hickey, Jr.
Mrs. Edward V. Hickey, Jr. (Barbara)
Danny Hickey (son - age 15)
Cadet David Hickey (son - age 19)
John Hickey (son - age 20)
Paul Hickey (son - age 22)
Corporal Joseph Hickey (son - age 23)
Michael Hickey (son - age 24)
Plus members of the White House Staff and family friends

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- Mr. Hickey introduces his family to the President
- The Attorney General administers the oath with the President observing
- Family photo opportunity