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NSC 00045 04/16/1982 [National Security Study Directive 1-82, Strategic Doctrine] (1 of 3)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

Withdrawer

CAS

12/7/2010

File Folder

NSC 0045 4/16/82 (1)

FOIA

M10-325

Box Number

91284

RAKU

ID Doc Type	Doci	ıment Description		No of	Doc Date	Restrictions
			•	Pages	DOC Date	resultions
101746 MINUTES	RE NS	SC MEETING (HAN	IDWRITTEN)	5	4/16/1982	B1
	R	10/16/2006	NLRRM06-015 #1			
101747 MINUTES	RE NS	SC MEETING (INC	LUDES CHART)	9	4/16/1982	B1
	PAR	10/16/2006	NLRRM06-015 #1	4		
101748 MEMO	WILL MEET		HE PRESIDENT RE	1	ND	B1
	R	4/4/2013	M325/1			
101749 DRAFT NSDD		·		1	ND	B1
	R	4/4/2013	M325/1			
101750 DRAFT NSDD	SAME	E AS 101749		1	ND	B1
	R	4/4/2013	M325/1			
101751 NOTE	MIKE	TO JOHN POINDE	EXTER RE PAPER	1	ND	B1
	R	11/3/2005	M1293 #6			
101752 MEMO	CLAR	K TO THE PRESID	DENT RE MEETING	1	4/15/1982	B1
	R	11/3/2005	M1293 #7			
101753 PAPER	RE TA	ALKING POINTS		1	ND	B1
	R	11/3/2005	M1293 #8			
101754 PAPER	RE PA	ART I		7	ND	B1
	R	11/3/2005	M1293 #9			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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NSC 0045 4/16/82 (1)

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RAKU

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ID Doc Type	Docu	ıment Description		No of Pages		Restrictions
101755 PAPER	RE PA	RT II		2	ND	B1
	R	4/4/2013	M325/1			
101756 PAPER	RE PT	III-A SUMMARY		3	ND	B1
	R	11/3/2005	NLRRM1293 #11			
101757 PAPER	RE PT	`, III-A		10	ND	B1
	R	9/12/2016	M325/1			
101758 PAPER	RE PT	`. III-B SUMMARY		2	ND	B1
	R	4/4/2013	M325/1			
101759 PAPER	PT. III	I-B		13	ND	B1
	PAR	11/3/2005	NLRRM1293 #14			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records

NSC Meeting Files

File Folder: NSC00045 16 Apr 1982 Box 91284

Archivist: mjd FOIA ID: na Date: 08/06/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. minutes	Re: NSC meeting [handwritten], 5p	4/16/82	PLEI
2. minutes	Re: NSC meeting, (includes chart), 9p	4/16/82	P1/F1
3. memo	William Clark to the President re: meeting, 1p	nd	P1/F1
4. draft NSDD	1p	nd	P1/F1
5. draft NSDD	1p	nd	P1/F1
6. note	Mike to John Poindexter, re: paper, 1p	nd	PHAL
7. memo	R 11/3/05 M 129 3 #6 Clark to the President re: meeting, 1p R 1: #7	4/15/82	PI/F1
8. paper	Re: talking points, 1p.	nd	P1/F1_
9. paper	R 11 11 #8 Part I, 7p R 11 11 #9	nd	P1/F1_
10. paper	Part II, 2p	nd	P1/F1
11. paper	Part III-A, summary, 3p R 11/3/05 M1293#11	nd	PIÆL
12. paper	Part III-A, 10p	nd	P1/F1
13. paper	Part III-B, summary 2p	nd	P1/F1
14. paper	Part III-B, 13p PART 11/3/05 M1293#14	nd	P1/F1
1			1

RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]. P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
- financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]. P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

April 15, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

MICHAEL O. WHEELER NW

SUBJECT:

Attendance List for the NSC Meeting,

April 16, 1982 (U)

The following officials plan to attend the National Security Council meeting on NSSD 1-82 which is scheduled for April 16, 1982, at 11:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. (C)

The Vice President

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy (Chief of Staff to the Vice President)

State:

Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Acting Secretary of State)

اعسم : OSD

> Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Dep Sec Frank C. Carlucci

CTA:

Mr. William J. Casey

OMB:

Mr. William Schneider (Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs)

IISIIN :

Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS:

General David C. Jones Lt General Paul F. Gorman

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on April 15, 1983

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date \$/26/21

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE:

SUBJECT:

4/16/82

NSSD 1-82

11:00-12:05

Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:

Mr. Lawrence C. Eagleburger

Mr. Richard R. Burt

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

OMB:

Mr. William Schneider

USUN:

Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

TCC.

General David C. Jones

Lt General Paul F. Gorman

White House:

Mr. Edwin Meese III

Judge William P. Clark

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

Mr. Richard G. Darman

Admiral John M. Poindexter

NSC:

Mr. Thomas C. Reed

Colonel Allan Myer

Colonel Michael O. Wheeler

Major Chris Shoemaker

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
NARA, Date 8/21/41

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC 22-5

NSC:

Mr. Thomas C. Reed

Col Allan Myer Maj Chris Shoemaker

+ Wheeler

Approved	•	As	Amended	

Attached is a proposed seating plan for this meeting. (U)

THE CABINET ROOM

Poindexter

	Kirkpatrick	Eagle	burger	Preside	nt W	einberg	er C	arlucci	Schn	eider
		,						<u></u>		
							•			
	Jones	Cacon	Clark	Vice Pro	20120	at Moods	D ~ le			
	oones	casey	CIGIK	Vice Pre	=2TGE1	it meese	e Bak	er	ΓΊ	urphy
	Gorman		McFar]	Lane	Reed	Myer	Shoe	maker		

(anol,

4/6

This is for the 1st

NSSD-1 NSC. Let's get a

recommended list of

participants from let Myer,

have the West Wing chop

on it, and then call.

Thombes.

MW

MW

ant this

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

April 6, 1982

FOR:

MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON

NSC Meeting

Friday, April 16

11:00 to 12:00

Cabinet Room

CONFIRMED

April 7, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM:

MIKE WHEELER UW :---

SUBJECT:

April 16 NSC Meeting

(S8-1-022N)

Al Myer suggests the following be The Vice President - () No. ()
State - English ()
OSD - () () ()

OMB

CIA ·

JCS.

4/10

Mike W:

Per our telephone conversation, here is April 16 which the note per the NSC has not been calendared as of today.

I do have calendared the April 27, NSC NSSD 1-82.

jh

NSC MEETING

Friday, April 16, 1982 11:00-12:00 The Cabinet Room

The President to Chair

Subject; National Security Strategy

Invitees (Per Al Myer)

VΡ

State

OSD

OMB

CIA

JCS

DSC Part spants - Person

THE WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

11:00 AM Friday, April 16, 1982

COLONEL MICHAEL O. WHEELER

CLASSIFIED

top Secret

NSC Meeting 4/16/82 NSSD 1-82

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By NARA, Date 8/16/97

top Secret

TOP SEGRE 135 (Carlucci not here) (Baker out /in fout L8-1 GERM 4/16/82 J.C. - introductory remarks - 1st occasion for boundfalling all 5 10" am parts - Pres. has read i commented on drafts - another meeting planned - agreement on 1st 4, 5th still in debate T.R. - Duccesson to PD18/52 - 5 papers: O not lobjectives & environment 2) discusses need for many strategies wous (econ, pol, mil, etc.) (new reliance - offers Soviets a vulneralily) Dreatonal military objectives (priorities NAmer, then NATO, then oil SIDA, then Dack in a week to discuss decisions Ed Meese - don't per anything in strategies (part 2) on coverd - aims control T.R. - integral part Kintpoliticle - where does it fil? T.R. - diplamatic ... across-the-board - other studies underway principle not to do by mil alane Meese - can look at them as implementation of basic strategies " change "econ" to "pol' & econ" Casey - covert action in surgencies - Soviet threat to major · Choke points throughout world - assume it will be brought out a week from now Till - absolutely - secundy airestance best use of # Weinberger - no quarrel whatever - best way to defend U.S. - Congress impeding TiR. - if forced [break to xerox] J.C. - ... move to 3C, SWA Til. - go around bable - do ne defend in SWA or counterattack elsewhere NARA, DATE 10/16/06

2 TOP SECRET

Eagleburger - our view, & Sec Haigs, is that we defend effectively in the area "Iself - if we adopt a strategy that sends the Dienal "well walk away," make difficult - move on 5-ye plan to produce & divisions for there - can't Day these are sufficient - but older Wainburger - don't disagree that we need to hold oil fields - non 7 divisions - but assumption seems to be that we'll limit to area - 40 Soviet divisions, onove withing a couple of days, no need to use sealiff divisions within about 14 days we can project I divisions within about 14 das refund, new beginners so we can project 7 divisions (operates force structure) (2) more friendly atmosphere in mid-last - option/language preferred is that we'd have to work in other areas/freaters to hold the oil fields - need substantially increased force structure to do this Jones - no disagreement & Stale - need to get 7 divisions there as quickly as possible - From war came - would get overwhelmed over time if only couple blandred niles for Soviets, Thousand for us ... I hand out wording for Weinberger - I repeat points for all escalatory global Stratigy

TOP SECRET

3

Pres: D've always thought that if Soviets ready to take us on they'll do 'I - but won't do it if Day think there's a theat to their - what if presence in Europe vice US, and we can convince our allies to make it a multiple effort Weinberger: yes ... consistent w/ my words Hes: Russia's Ristory O no Threat to Hother Russia @lid them elsewhere Weinberger: that's the essence of my proposal T.R.: Base's addition a good one - this wording is good Jones: and doesn't cause problem if quoted in Post Eagleburger: we could live at language so long as 7 Livisiens facair remains over 5 ye aim if take out of Europe, major pol. problems Weinborder: but must kecoan ze that only so much Can be done of 16 JC: insert____ Weinburger: need to convince Eur that their interests Die outside Eur. coaleburger; need directive to work hard Wembereer, must have base in SWA J.C. ; Questions? Burt: Does wording mean 7 div? Weinberger: wording can mean anothing at all-question is whether we'll how the resources Tres: what about Israil?

TOP SECRET

MOU ... but don't would to turn others Weinberger: in persion into cremies - education problem of trainendous dimensions Jones: broader issue than SWA - means an ability to fight LOWI against USSR if read liberally - resource implications Ode very great Epass chart around 7 To up to Grany more resources than we're funded for today - will be discussed later. ill studies, but didn't want to leave misunderstanding as we discuss Objectives Til.; chart out of later part Weinberger; plans how we haven't built max Jones: man need to revisit objectives if were moving from escalatory strategy, hugh tresource Unplications Weinberger: point Al made in the forme in his talk her no rejection of 1st use Kes; strengti help in arms talks Weinberger; Sula Earleborder: need Eur 1 EW GNP > USSR Schneider: history to go to 1400 w/ too big a gap between objectives and resources to deliver Pres: >

TOP SECRET

J.C. – Tom, Summarize T.R. – alternative wording modes Deuse – Propose

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CHRON FILE

UNCLASSIFIED WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

ACTION

April 19, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

CHRISTOPHER SHOEMAKER

ALLAN MYER &/ Am acul

SUBJECT:

NSC Minutes

Attached are the minutes from the NSC meeting on April 16 which dealt with NSSD 1-82, Part I, II, and III A-C.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve these minutes.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I NSC Minutes

UNCLASSIFIED
WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
NON 8/16/65



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME

January 5, 1982, 4:00 p.m.,

AND PLACE:

The Cabinet Room

SUBJECT:

Poland

PARTICIPANTS:

The President

The Vice President

State

Secretary Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel

Treasury

Secretary Donald T. Regan

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Deputy Secretary Frank C. Carlucci

Agriculture

Secretary John H. Block

Commerce

Secretary Malcolm H. Baldrige

Mr. David A. Stockman

Mr. William J. Casey

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

General David C. Jones

Mr. Edwin Meese III Mr. James A. Baker III Judge William P. Clark Admiral James W. Nance Ms. Janet Colson

White House

Dr. Norman A. Bailey Dr. Geoffrey Kemp Dr. Allen J. Lenz Dr. Richard E. Pipes

Minutes

Clark. Mr. President, we have two agenda items today for which we have allocated one hour. First, an update on Poland and our actions concerning Poland and the USSR. Second, United Nations actions on the Golan Heights. These items will not necessarily require decisions today.

SECRET Review January 5, 1988 DECLASSIFIED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

DATE, TIME

April 16, 1982; 11:00 A.M.-12:05 P.M.

AND PLACE:

Cabinet Room

SUBJECT:

NSSD 1-82

PARTICIPANTS:

The President
The Vice President

State

Acting Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger Richard Burt, Director, Politico-Military Affairs OSD

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA

Mr. William J. Casey

OMB

Mr. William Schneider, Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs

USUN

Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

JCS

General David C. Jones Lieutenant General Paul F. Gorman

White House

Mr. Edwin Meese III
Mr. James A. Baker III
Judge William P. Clark
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
Admiral John M. Poindexter
Mr. Richard Darman


NSC

Mr. Thomas C. Reed Colonel Allan Myer Colonel Michael O. Wheeler Major Christopher Shoemaker

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NAPA, Date 126/59

TOP SECRET

Review 4/19/2002 Cl'd & Ext. by W.P.Clark Reason for Ext.: NSC 1.13(e)



Minutes

Judge Clark: Today we meet to consider the first five parts of NSSD 1-82. The President signed the document on February 5, and this is the first occasion we have had to roundtable parts of it. The President has asked Tom Reed to chair the effort, and the President has read and commented on the papers as they have been produced. There will be one more meeting of the NSC to consider the final four parts of the study. The importance of this study is indeed great; it will guide not only budget decisions but also national security for the balance of the century.

We have general agreement on the first four sections; the one issue we have is in the fifth section. I suggest that we focus our attention on that section. I now ask Tom Reed to discuss the first four sections and the issue we face in the fifth.

This effort is this Administration's successor to PD-18 and PD-62. As you will see, there are substantial differences between our document and those of our predecessors. I will now run through, very briefly, the first four parts and summarize the principal findings. Part I outlines our basic national objectives and the global environment in which our objectives must be met. The threats we face and the nature of our objectives are such that we are at a time of greatest danger to our national security since World War II. It is highly likely that, over the course of this decade, fundamental changes in East-West relations will occur. In general, our objectives, as outlined in Part I, are more assertive and less passive than the approach of our predecessors. For example, we call for active measures to counter Soviet expansionism, to encourage the liberalizing tendencies in the Soviet bloc, and to force the Soviet Union to bear the brunt of its economic mismanagement. The bottom line is we are helping encourage the dissolution of the Soviet Empire.

Part II is a bridge between the military component and the other components of our national strategy. We cannot rely on military force alone to achieve our objectives. If we are to succeed, we must integrate all components.

Part III-A summarizes the threats that we face to our national security. Soviet imperialism remains the major threat. Some feel that the Soviets have now concluded that they have a window of opportunity and may press their advantage into a confrontation. We do not accept that view; this section concludes that it is unlikely the Soviets will challenge us directly in the near future.

Part III-B outlines the role of the Allies. Allies are indespensable; we cannot go it alone. But we need more help from the Allies than in the past, and this makes us more vulnerable to Allied behavior. This is the reality, however, and we must deal with it.

-TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS MO6-015#1A

By AT, NARA, Date 10/16/06

Part III-C. This section establishes our regional military objectives. Importantly, it begins by stating that we must plan for global war; the 2½ or 1½ war strategy of the past is no longer sufficient. The Soviet Union is a global military power and our strategy must deal with that reality. We must, at the same time, set priorities among regions so that we are not forced into a decision on whether to escalate or to sacrifice vital interests. The global priorities laid out in the paper are those that we have had for several decades: North America, NATO, Southwest Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, and Africa, in that order.

The issue in this section deals with Southwest Asia. It asks basically what should we try to do in Southwest Asia by the end of the decade. There are two basic options: either we should plan to retaliate on a worldwide basis if the Soviets attack in Southwest Asia; or we should plan to defend in the Gulf.

Before we address this issue, I invite your comments on the other sections.

Mr. Meese: What about the covert-political components of national strategy?

Mr. Reed: The interagency review group concluded that those were really strategies of implementation rather than components of national security.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: Under what general component do covert and political actions fit?

Mr. Reed: They fit under a number of components; partially under diplomatic, military, and economic. But we did not believe it would be correct to treat it separately in this paper. Again, we consider that issues such as arms control and covert action should be treated as implementing measures. The purpose of Part II was to show the other legs of our national strategy and not to discuss implementing tactics. However, this paper does discuss one aspect of this topic; specifically, unconventional warfare in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Meese: I agree that these subjects are tactics of implementation, but I think we can solve the problem by calling the economic component in Part II "economic/political."

Mr. Casey: Covert action is primarily directed against specific insurgent threats.

which control key choke points are under severe threat, and we need to devote more covert action and security assistance to help them out.

E.O. 12958

As Amended Sec. 1.4c, of

-----CIUI

Mr. Reed: We will discuss security assistance in more detail in ten days at the next NSC meeting on this topic. However, I would argue that it is an enormously cost-effective instrument.

<u>Secretary Weinberger</u>: Security assistance is the cheapest and best way of defending the United States. We must convince Congress of this.

Mr. Reed: This is a clear example of how Congress is impeding efficient expenditure of defense dollars. We must get rid of the tangle of restrictions.

Judge Clark: We will focus on security assistance in ten days.

Mr. Eagleburger: Al Haig shares completely the view that security assistance is crucial. We must take a firm stand in dealing with this on the Hill.

Secretary Weinberger: We must take action to increase the number of friends we have around the world. They need to know that we are all in this thing together. We need to increase their cooperation with our efforts even in areas outside their immediate regions.

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: We need a political dimension to our national objectives. The best way to defend our interests is to support friendly governments. It is a conceptual mistake not to think about the political dimension in national objectives.

Mr. Meese: There are other items which do not fit wholly under the diplomatic component; an item such as South American land reform is an example. It is important, therefore, to add the political component to the economic component in Part II.

Judge Clark: It appears to me that we have general agreement on Parts I, II, III-A, and III-B. I suggest that we now move to the issue in Section III-C: what do we do about Southwest Asia?

Mr. Reed: I suggest that we go around the table and discuss two questions. First, are the wartime priorities, which we have accepted for two decades, still our policy; and, second, what do we want to try to build for Southwest Asia? Do we want to build the capability to defend in Southwest Asia, or do we recognize the difficulties there and counter-attack in other parts of the world? Would we give up oil for pineapples or bananas?

Mr. Eagleburger: Al Haig's position is strong support for Option Two as presented in the paper. Southwest Asia is our second most important region for strategic and natural resource reasons. It is necessary to posture our forces to defend in the area. The State Department worries that, if we adopted the first option, we will lose credibility in the region, and our

Allies will be less inclined to help. We will be telling them that we are willing to give up this area of vital interest. We need to build a force of seven divisions that could be used in Southwest Asia. Even that force may not be sufficient to stand up against a determined Soviet attack. However, it will provide a much more credible deterrent and reassurance for our regional friends and our European Allies.

Secretary Weinberger: Nobody disagrees with the importance of the oil fields; we need to hold them for our national security. We also do not disagree on the requirements for seven divisions, but we need to understand what we are dealing with. The assumption in Option Two is that we could limit the conflict to the region. In fact, the Soviets themselves might be delighted to do just that. The Soviets could mount 40 divisions in just a few days, and they would enjoy shorter lines of communications. On the other hand, we could project two divisions in 14 days and would then have to worry about resupply and reinforcement.

If we want to have the capability to defend the oil fields in the region, we will need to do three things. First, we will have to increase enormously our defense resources in order to expand greatly our air- and sealift assets. Second, we will have to expand our force structure. At this point, we have 16 divisions, and resources may force us to deactivate one. Third, we will have to have a far more friendly atmosphere in the region. We cannot defend the Persian Gulf unless we have the full cooperation of regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Yet, Saudi Arabia is totally unwilling to associate itself with our military efforts. Jordan is making overtures to the Soviet Union, and Israel remains politically isolated. We do not have the bases we require.

We have a lot to do before we will be able to defend the oil fields. Considering the way Option B is phrased, we simply cannot do it.

The option DOD would prefer is to work in other theaters to hold the oil fields. It is not a question of giving up the oil fields; the question is how best to defend them. The threat of escalation is the key. We also need to work with NATO to overcome their great reluctance to help us in Southwest Asia. This is somewhat ironic since the loss of Persian Gulf oil would hurt Europe far more than us. The UK is the only country that is thinking about defense outside the NATO area. Option B would require budget and force structure increases, and far more friends in the region than we now have. We would need bases well in advance of a contingency.

E. O. 12958 As Amended Sec. 1.40, d

TOP SECRET WORKING PAPER

ALTERNATIVE WORDING

To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that should the Soviet Union attack in SWA, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict in theater and the threat of escalation.

General Jones: I agree with State; we need to work as hard as we can to get seven divisions to Southwest Asia. In a recent war game, in which we made the most optimistic assumptions, we found that we could hold in Iran for a while, but would eventually lose. We need a credible capability for Southwest Asia, but also need the threat of escalation. [General Jones then distributed suggested language for Section C.]

Secretary Weinberger: We cannot give up the oil fields. We need to have the Soviets face the prospects of major conflict with the United States in the region and the threat of escalation. The realities dictate that we cannot defend in-place.

The President: I have always been of the view that the Soviets, if they think they are ready to engage us, will not need an excuse, but at the same time they will not engage us if they feel threatened. What we need is presence so that they know if they come in, they will have to confront the US. Can't we use our presence in Europe to that effect?

Secretary Weinberger: That's the underlying theme of the new language that has just been circulated. We need a presence in the region, plus we need a threat of escalation.

The President: You look at Russian history. Protecting the homeland has always been of paramount importance. If they know that we might respond to them by hitting them anywhere in the world, that's a strong deterrent.

Mr. Reed: If the Soviets know they will face a war with the US in Southwest Asia and that we will be prepared to escalate if necessary, that will be an effective deterrent. I support the JCS proposal.

Mr. Eagleburger: State can live with the language if seven divisions remains our objective. We also need to carefully avoid implying that we will draw forces from the central front in Europe for use in Southwest Asia. That could cause big problems with the Allies.

Secretary Weinberger: That's true, but there's a limit to how far you can stretch sixteen divisions.

Judge Clark: We should insert in the JCS language "...conflicts with the US...".

Secretary Weinberger: Our big problem in NATO is to get our Allies to see beyond Europe.

Mr. Meese: I agree. In fact, NATO has larger interests in Southwest Asia than we do.

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Mr. Eagleburger: NATO will be more apt to support our objectives outside of Europe if the Allies see the US is serious about keeping up our forces.

Secretary Weinberger: That's what we are doing.

Mr. Eagleburger: It will also help with our Saudi relationship.

Secretary Weinberger: We desperately need bases in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Burt: Let me ask a specific question. Does "military '
forces" mean seven divisions plus support?

Secretary Weinberger: Yes, at a minimum. But those divisions are going to need support. The danger is that they might be committed to Southwest Asia and then cut off.

The President: What about use of our oldest ally in the region, Israel?

Secretary Weinberger: We need to do a lot of work to avoid alienating other states.

suspicion of Israel throughout the region.

General Jones: Let me make clear the implications for broader strategy of another part of the paper.

Resource reater object

implications are enormous. This is a far greater objective than those we are now planning for. [General Jones then passed out a graphic illustration of our budgetary shortfall.] I want to ensure that everybody understands what it is that we are saying.

Mr. Reed: That issue is taken up in Section G, which says that we cannot get there from here, and there is a large gap between resources and plans. There are enormous risks involved.

Secretary Weinberger: The FYDP is not the panacea. We have clear constraints and have a long way to go. Our reach is exceeding our grasp, but the gap will become far greater if we do not fund the FYDP.

General Jones:

there are enormous problems. Bear in mind that seven divisions we are now allocating for Southwest Asia are seven divisions that will not be available for Europe.

E. O. 12958 As Amended Sec. 1,4c, d The President: We will do whatever is necessary to meet our objectives. A vigorous defense build-up will also be a great help at arms control talks. The Soviets do not believe that they can keep up with us.

Mr. Eagleburger: We must also continue to push the Europeans to do more.

The President: If you compare Western Europe to the Soviet Union, you find that our Allies collectively have a greater population and higher GNP. Why should the Russians look ten feet tall and our Allies look like pygmies?

Mr. Schneider: We should not have too conspicuous a gap between objectives and programs. We need to ensure a high level of congruence. Otherwise Congress will become unmanageable.

The President: We have a far more coherent policy than Congress.

Mr. Reed: To summarize, the NSC has accepted the alternative proposed by General Jones. The President has also approved the package.

The NSC adjourned at 12:05.

The decisions reached were:

- (1) Parts I, II, III-A and III-B were approved as written, except that Part II will be amended to include an economic/political component of national strategy.
- (2) Part III-C was accepted and the issue was resolved by accepting JCS language, as amended by the NSC. This language is to be included as peacetime military objectives for Southwest Asia and reads:

To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that should the Soviet Union attack in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater* and the threat of escalation.

This language means seven divisions plus support.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT April 21, 1982

ACTION

CHRON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P./CLARK

FROM:

ALLAN A. MYER COM

CHRIS SHOEMAKER

SUBJECT:

National Security Council Decision

Attached is a memorandum from you to the President (Tab I) presenting the decisions on U.S. National Security Strategy, Parts I, II, and III A-C reached at the April 16 National Security Council meeting for the President's formal approval.

Because the decisions reached at the April 16 meeting will drive the remainder of the study, it is of great importance that the President sign the attached memorandum and NSDD (Tab A) as soon as possbile.

RECOMMENDATION

30 FM That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I Memo from you to the President

Tab A Proposed NSDD

SECRET/SENSITIVE WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED

te House Guidelines, August 28

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

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NLRR M325/1 # 101748

BY KML NARA DATE 4/4/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

Decisions at the April 16, 1982 Meeting of

the National Security Council

Issue

What were the decisions at the April 16 meeting of the National Security Council?

Facts

On February 5, by signing NSSD 1-82, you directed the drafting of a U.S. National Security Strategy for NSC consideration. An exhaustive interagency review chaired by the NSC staff produced the first five segments of the study, and they were addressed by the NSC on April 16 for consideration and decision. The remaining four segments are now scheduled for NSC consideration on April 27. The NSDD at Tab A is an interim document designed to formalize decisions on the first four parts.

Discussion

At the meeting, the NSC approved the following:

- 1) Parts I, II, III-A and B were approved as written except that Part II will amend the economic component of our national strategy by adding a political component.
 - 2) Part III-C (Regional Military Objectives) was approved with the revision provided by General Jones and amended by the NSC. The NSC approved this revision with the understanding that the language meant a seven-division force for Southwest Asia.

Recommendation

OK NO

That you approve NSC decision to approve Parts I, II, III-A-C as stated above, and sign the NSDD at Tab A.

TOP SECRET

Review April 16, 2002

Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P. Clark

Reason for extension: NSC 1.13(e)

Prepared by:
Allan A. Myer
Chris Shoemaker

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WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

On February 5, 1982, I directed that a major review of our national security be undertaken. The first five parts of this study were reviewed by the National Security Council on April 16, 1982.

As a result of that review, I direct that the following serve as interim guidance for the study and for the resulting national security strategy.

- Parts I, III-A and III-B of NSSD 1-82 (attached) are 1) approved as written.
- 2) Part II is approved, except that the economic component of our national strategy will be changed to an economic/political component.
- Part III-C is approved with the following language 3) added as a peacetime military objective for Southwest Asia:

"To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater and the threat of escalation."

This language is understood to mean that a peacetime military objective for the defense program is a capability to project and sustain a seven-division force in Southwest Asia by the end of the FYDP.

The specific language contained in each of the first five parts of NSSD 1-82 may be modified as necessary to reflect decisions made in the last four parts.

This NSDD will be superseded by a final NSDD to be issued after the completion of the entire study.

TOP SECRET

Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P.Clark Review April 20, 1988 Reason for ext.: NSC 1.13(f)

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BY KIL NARA DATE 4/4/13

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER

NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

On February 5, 1982, I directed that a major review of our national security be undertaken. The first five parts of this study were reviewed by the National Security Council on April 16, 1982.

As a result of that review, I direct that the following serve as interim guidance for the study and for the resulting national security strategy.

- 1) Parts I, III-A and III-B of NSSD 1-82 (attached) are approved as written.
- 2) Part II is approved, except that the economic component of our national strategy will be changed to an economic/political component.
- 3) Part III-C is approved with the following language added as a peacetime military objective for Southwest Asia:

"To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the US in-theater and the threat of escalation."

This language is understood to mean that a peacetime military objective for the defense program is a capability to project and sustain a seven-division force in Southwest Asia by the end of the FYDP.

The specific language contained in each of the first five parts of NSSD 1-82 may be modified as necessary to reflect decisions made in the last four parts.

This NSDD will be superseded by a final NSDD to be issued after the completion of the entire study.

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Cl'd. & ext'd. by W.P.Clark Review April 20, 1988 Reason for ext.: NSC 1.13(f)

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NLRR M325/1 # 101750
BY KNL NARA DATE 4/4/13

National Security Council The White House

Package # <u>90728</u>

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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

4/17/82

Any presidential decision ought to be cast as an NSDD. Thus the cover is OK but it should have attached an NSDD setting forthe exactly what the Presiden approved.

In the NSDD we can put a section that with respect to the threat, the section is approved subject, of course to updating to take into account events which may take place ad interim.

Also, on the addition of the political category, I think Tom's effort

to

associate "political" with diplomatic makes more sense. In short, "...the spectrum of components to our strategy should be revised to reflect political/diplomatic vice Hiplomatic."

Budul

agree que

Return to alan hye

-> John Poindexter

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John,

My only concern is an institutional listone " one. The threat Section (ITA) is a well-croffed Statement (indeed, one of the best I've peen), but it reflects a pre-Falklands/Halvinas era. This means that the Latin America Section (PP 8-9) doesn't sufficiently account for the kinds of threats to our interest that the current crisis entails. Historians could have a field day in matching the current text of that Section (if "approved as written" today) against the operational written "today) against the operational realities of our foreign tolicy... a Sort of left hand doesn't know what the right one's doing "Slaut.

This could be handled by pointing out to the Fresident that approval doesn't foreclose some "facts-of-life" updating of this sort, to allow matters which are well known to the principals in today's meeting (who historian's won't have access to) to be reflected in the documents (which historians will see).

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BY NARA, DATE 11/3/05

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THE WHITE HOUSE

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

11:00 AM Friday, April 16, 1982

The President

The President has seen_

MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

April 15, 1982

INFORMATION

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NIS M1293 #7

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK WE BY AND NARA, DATE 11/3/05

SUBJECT:

NSC Meeting, Friday, April 16, 1982

Issue. Should the first five segments of the review of U.S. National Security Strategy (NSSD 1-82) be approved?

Facts. On February 5, by signing NSSD 1-82, you directed the drafting of a National Security Strategy for NSC consideration. An exhaustive interagency review chaired by the NSC staff has produced the first five segments of the study and they are ready for discussion, decision, and approval.



The five segments are: (1) Part I, U.S. National Objectives and the International Environment; (2) Part II, Implementing Strategies; (3) Part III-A, Threat; (4) Part III-B, Role of Allies; (5) Part III-C, Regional Military Objectives. You have seen drafts of each of these segments.

The final four segments of the review will be the subject of an NSC meeting now scheduled for April 27.

Discussion. Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIB have broad interagency agreement.

Part IIIC has produced one major issue: the question of what conventional military capability should we be building for Southwest Asia? Inherent in this issue are fundamental questions of military strategy and force development.

Decisions to be taken:

- Approve Parts I, II, IIIA-C, NSSD 1-82
- What military capability should we be building for Southwest Asia?

Attachments

Tab A Talking Points

Tab B NSSD 1-82, Parts I, II, IIIA-C

Discussion Papers (Parts IIIA-C) and Issue Paper (Part IIIC)

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POP SECRET ATTACHMENT Review April 12, 1988 Prepared by:

Allan A. Myer/Thomas C. Reed



Talking Paper for Use at the April 16 NSC Meeting

- -- I want to underscore what Bill Clark has said about the importance of this effort. In my view, this study should lead to the most clear articulation of our national strategy that this Administration will produce.
- -- We have come under some criticism from various sources about our reported lack of a national strategy. These accusations are clearly untrue, but what we have failed to do is present our strategy both to ourselves and to the country in a comprehensive package.
- -- I appreciate the cooperation between agencies and the efforts which have marked this study to date. We now need to make some hard decisions in this group.
- The key to success in this effort as well as other National Security Study Directives is to present sharply focused issues, no matter how contentious they may be. We serve no purpose in hiding issues or in pretending that they don't exist. I fully expect this study and other studies to examine all aspects of our strategies and to bring contentious issues to this forum.

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U.S. National Security Strategy

PART I

National Objectives and the International Environment

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U.S. National Security Strategy

Part I

National Objectives and the International Environment

Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States shall serve the following broad purposes:

- -- To preserve the political identity, framework and institutions of the United States as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. (U)
- -- To protect the United States -- its national territory, citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack. (U)
- -- To foster the economic well-being of the United States, in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources. (U)
- -- To foster an international order supportive of the vital interests of the United States by maintaining and strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic development and national independence throughout the world. (U)

The International Environment

United States national security policy will be guided by the following assessment of the current international situation and of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of our broad objectives. (U)

The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the most formidable threat to the United States and to American interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the

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Review March 9, 2002 Classified & Extended by William P. Clark Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)



last decade has called into question the ability of the United States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet Union and its allies across the spectrum of conflict. At the same time, the Soviet policy of unparallelled global expansionism challenges the strategic interests and position of the United States around the world. (8)

The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority means that the U.S. cannot depend on nuclear forces to offset its general purpose force deficiencies. This fact, expanded Soviet conventional capabilities and a growing capability to project their military power, have increased the relative importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities. The increased likelihood that a U.S.-Soviet conflict could be both global and protracted, heightens the need for a substantial U.S. industrial base for mobilization.

Building on their strengthened military position, the Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated political/military/economic strategy combining selective use of their own and proxy military and security forces, arms sales and grants, economic incentives and disincentives, manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations, diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally and to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to strategic resources and land and sea routes; second, by isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies, friends, and neutrals, and third, by undermining political will in the west. (S)

At the same time, the Soviets will continue to have important vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to exhibit serious structural weaknesses. The appeal of Communist ideologies appears to be decreasing throughout much of the world, including the Soviet bloc itself. The Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has revealed some of the limitations on the effectiveness of Soviet power projection capabilities. Non-Russian nationalities are growing relative to the dominant Russian population. Events in Poland have underlined, and could contribute further to, the internal weakness of most Warsaw Pact countries. (5)

The passing of the Brezhnev era and the likelihood of an ensuing succession struggle will make Soviet policy less predictable. Political and economic vulnerabilities at home could induce new leaders to seek reduced tensions abroad. However, greater military strength and possibly a greater sense of international self-confidence among the younger generation of leaders could make them more willing to risk confrontation with the West. (5)

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In the Near East and Southwest Asia, the chronic instability of the region both within and among states, including the Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and religious movements, together with an expanded Soviet presence, poses a critical threat to Western political, economic and security interests. (S)

A critical stake in this region is the oil in the Persian Gulf. The western economic system needs ready access to it while control of this energy source by the Soviet Union would give it a strangle hold over the West and enormously ease the Soviet economic difficulties. Herein lies an issue of potential superpower confrontation. (8)

The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the Soviet Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have begun an ideological evolution away from Soviet-style Communism. As such, China plays an important role in United States global policy toward the Soviet Union. At the same time, the uncertainties of China's future internal evolution and the possibility of a closer relationship with the USSR pose a latent long-term threat to U.S. and allied interests. (TS)-

Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient unproductive economies, rising expectations, rapid social change, the persistence of traditional conflicts and the prevalence of violence, create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many countries of the Developing World. (S)

Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire nuclear weapons threatens the viability of the international non-proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences for regional stability as well as for the security of the United States. (S)

The unwillingness of our major allies to expand their military programs significantly and to rethink political and military strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet threat are driven by economic requirements, domestic political conditions and differing views of the nature and objectives of the adversary. However, the economic strength and shared interests and values of the nations within the Western alliance are assets of great importance if effectively mobilized. (S)

For all of these reasons, the decade of the eighties will pose the greatest challenge to the survival and well-being of the U.S. since World War II. Our response to this challenge could result in a fundamentally different East-West relationship by the end of the decade. (8)

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Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy

The national security policy of the United States will be guided by the following global objectives:

- -- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its allies, and other important countries across the spectrum of conflict, to defeat such attack should deterrence fail, and to prevent or neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate or coerce the U.S. or others through its military power. (8)
- To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout the world by strengthening existing alliances, by improving relations with other nations that have potential strategic importance for us, by forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S. interests, by selective diplomatic and economic initiatives, by economic policies that enhance our influence, by helping to resolve regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests, and by expanded political action and information efforts. (S)
- To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces. (5)-
- -- To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its influence through their use of diplomacy, arms transfers, economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and disinformation. (S)-
- -- To foster, if possible in concert with our allies, restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the Soviet Union and allied countries. (TS)
- To limit the growth of, and where possible, to reduce Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating the sustained commitment of the U.S. to increase its military strength, to redress any significant imbalance favoring the Soviet Union, pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements that limit Soviet power, and preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies and resources to the Soviet Union. (TS)

- -- To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to foreign energy and mineral resources. (U)
- -- To ensure U.S. access to space and the oceans. (U)
- -- To discourage further proliferation of nuclear weapons. (U)
- -- To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and investment programs that promote economic development and the growth of humane social and political orders in the Third World. (U)
- -- To ensure a well-functioning international economic system with minimal distortions to trade and investment and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and resolving differences.

In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will be guided by the following operational objectives in specific regions:

- In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while strengthening NATO capabilities and, if necessary adjusting NATO strategy to deter and defeat the threat posed by dramatically improved Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces; to counter West European political trends that inhibit effective U.S. and allied action in this direction; to encourage the European allies to provide support for our objectives in other regions, particularly Southwest Asia; to work with the Europeans in their efforts to overcome the serious economic problems that have limited the freedom of action of certain Western governments; to increase the costs of, Soviet repression of popular movements and institutions in Poland and other East European countries; and to maximize prospects for their independent evolution. (TS)
- In the Western Hemisphere, to blunt and contain the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South America; to reduce and if possible eliminate Soviet influence in Cuba; to discourage the USSR from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic threat to the security of the hemisphere; to strengthen U.S. political and military relationships with key countries; to promote sustained economic progress in the Caribbean Basin area, and to assist friendly governments in combatting Marxist-Leninist insurgencies. (TS)

- -- In Africa, to defeat aggression, subversive and terrorist activities sponsored by Libya or other forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces on the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to strategically important mineral resources, while promoting improvement in regional racial policies; and to establish a U.S. presence on the continent and adjacent areas. (AS)
- In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances; to recognize our relationship with Japan as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia; to encourage Japan to increase its military capabilities to be able to participate meaningfully with the U.S. in a rational division of labor in the Asia-Pacific area by attaining the self-defense power necessary to provide for regional security in the Northwest Pacific in this decade; to deter aggression by North Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Vietnamese presence in Laos and Kampuchea; while maintaining our unofficial relationship and fulfilling our obligations to Taiwan, preserve a broad, effective working relationship with the PRC, and to encourage its interest in friendship with the U.S. and to strengthen its ability to resist Soviet invasion and intimidation, so that the PRC remains a strategic counter against the Soviet Union without posing a threat to U.S. and allied interests over the long term; to encourage the economic and political development of the ASEAN states as a source of stability within Southeast Asia; to strengthen the U.S. strategic relationship with Australia and New Zealand within the ANZUS framework. (TS)
- In the Near East, Southwest and South Asia, to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to gain and maintain sufficient influence and presence to support U.S. interests in the region; to preserve the independence of Israel and other key states in the region and to strengthen their ability to resist aggression or subversion by a regional or extraregional power or movement; to gain the cooperation of countries outside the region in accomplishing our various objectives in the region; to enhance the possibility of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict in a manner that respects the security interests of all parties; to secure the withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate further military intervention or subversion by the Soviet Union, Soviet proxies, or regional states or movements hostile to Western interests; to ensure a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction of sizeable U.S. forces; to encourage India to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union, and to establish stable relations with other states in the region; and to support the further development of a secure and independent Pakistan. (T8)

U.S. National Security Strategy

PART II

Implementing Strategies

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BY KML NARA DATE 4/4/13

HUP OEGKEL

Part II

Implementing Strategies

The overall national objectives of the United States are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies that principally include the following:

- -- diplomatic;
- -- information;
- -- economic;
- -- military.

The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires the development and integration of each set of strategies into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S. national power and the strategies for their use do not stand alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this study provides the common starting point towards this end.

The overall study process will build upon this common starting point by means of individual study segments. Part III of this study will consider the military component only. The other components of U.S. national strategy as outlined above are the subject of companion studies being undertaken on an expeditious basis. Additional studies will also be undertaken concerning the role of intelligence, covert operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing strategies. (C)

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U.S. National Security Strategy

PART III

Military Component

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NLS M1293 #11

BY 50, NARA, DATE 11/3/05

U.S. National Security Strategy

PART III
Military Component

Section A
Threats to U.S. National Security



NSSD 1-82 Summary of Part III-A: Threats to United States National Security

- 1. The key military threats to US security during the 1980s will continue to be posed by the USSR and its allies and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet Union continues to expand and modernize its military forces. Current Soviet leaders, moreover, are probably prepared to accept sacrifices to sustain this expansion, which they see as the most important element in the growth of their influence. The Soviets are concerned about current US modernization programs, but probably anticipate that US defense spending will be tempered by domestic resistance.
- 2. Conflict resulting from regional tensions that could again involve us in a war with a Soviet client is much more likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. In such a conflict, the risk of confrontation with the USSR would vary according to the situation; but, as a result of their expanded strategic military power, the Soviets are probably less averse than in the past to take risks which might lead to such a confrontation. Such action is most likely in a region in which they have superiority, face unstable countries, and do not face US allies—especially in Southwest Asia. Moreover, they may expect that the burden of avoiding such a confrontation is shifting to the US. We do not believe that at present the USSR is prepared to initiate military action directly against the US or its allies but rather sees military power as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure along the Soviet periphery and elsewhere, and for use, if necessary, in conflict with the US.
- 3. The Soviet buildup, combined with weak resistance, has also encouraged Soviet activities in the Third World. Using proxies and a diversified arsenal of arms, military training, logistical assistance, propaganda, and economic aid, the USSR, in opportunistic fashion, exploits indigenous unrest in many regions to undermine US influence, to bring Soviet sympathizers to power, and to acquire additional military bases. A number of Soviet friends act as surrogates for the USSR and, in the cases of Cuba, Libya, the PLO, and Syria, as conduits for Soviet-bloc arms and training to groups that undertake terrorism.
- 4. In Europe, the USSR continues to strengthen its theater nuclear and conventional forces. Moscow is deeply concerned about unrest in Poland and engages in exploiting and encouraging US-West European differences and the West European "peace movement." In East and Southeast Asia, the Soviets endeavor to contain China, and to hedge against the possibility of a Washington-Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of Soviet military might. Additionally, military threats to US security in this region include the possibility of aggression by North Korea or Vietnam.
- 5. In the Middle East, the most severe dangers are that Iran might succumb to increased Soviet influence and large-scale military intervention; that friendly states may be attacked by other local states—most immediately that the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs—; and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets. In addition, acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that would harm US interests in the region.
- 6. In Latin America Communist exploitation of social and political unrest in Central America will continue to pose the most serious challenge to US interests in the hemisphere since Cuba became allied with the USSR. Military threats in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently quite small. There are, however, a number of potential flashpoints in Africa that impinge on US security interests that could draw in the superpowers while others would probably not result in Soviet involvement.

End of Summary

NSSD 1-82 Part III-A

Threats To United States National Security

- 1. Throughout the 1980s the growing military might of the USSR, its gradually increasing capacity to operate far from its frontiers, and its willingness to provide military advisers and arms to radical governments and insurgency movements in the Third World will pose growing challenges to the US. The growth in Soviet strategic nuclear power and conventional military capability along its borders is especially striking. However, actual extensions of Soviet power have depended on perceived opportunities around the world, opportunities heightened by the absence of effective resistance. Moreover, it will become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to sustain their military buildup as their economic growth slows.
- 2. Despite the growth in Soviet strength, a premeditated US-Soviet military conflict is much less probable than conflict resulting from regional tensions, especially in the Middle East, that could once again involve the US in a war with a Soviet ally or client. Without attributing to the Soviet leadership a propensity to assume high risks, increased relative Soviet power suggests that the USSR might take bolder action in lower-level crises than in the past.
- 3. The sense of enhanced security created by the Soviet military posture may encourage the USSR to continue to take advantage of local unrest in the developing world through proxies, the provision of arms, advisers, and the deployment of its combat forces in a few countries. It will continue to do so wherever Moscow perceives that it can undermine pro-Western governments, especially if this can be done without risking a confrontation with the US.
- 4. In addition, nuclear proliferation will become an increasingly serious problem in coming years as more countries acquire the ability to make nuclear weapons and, in some instances, actually do so.
- 5. During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought-after goal of superpower status alongside the US. However, Moscow did not regard "parity" or acceptance of "detente" as requiring adherence to a global code of conduct acceptable to Washington. Moscow has perceived the US as politically constrained not only by the trauma of Vietnam but by an inability to achieve domestic consensus on foreign policy. In turn, the Soviets have probed US resolve in the Third World, as witnessed by their military support ventures in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets have also exploited detente to promote divisions between the US and its NATO allies, and, most importantly, to encourage neutralism in West Germany.
- 6. The scale of Soviet investment in nuclear forces demonstrates their importance in Moscow's strategy. They believe that in the present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses sufficient strategic capabilities to devastate the other after absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders state that nuclear war with the US would be a catastrophe that must be avoided and that they do not regard such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have not accepted mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. They have been willing to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when it serves their interests, but they prefer possession of superior capabilities and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing in a conflict with the US. A tenet in their strategic thinking appears to be that the better **DECLASSIFED**


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prepared the USSR is to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that potential enemies will be deterred from attacking the USSR and its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and military actions.

- 7. The USSR will continue to improve the striking power and survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate range nuclear offensive forces, overcome some of the weaknesses of its strategic defenses, and improve their supporting command, control, and communications systems. Because the Soviets rely heavily on ICBMs, the increasing vulnerability of their ICBM silos to improving US weapons will cause them to be concerned with the adequacy of their strategic force capabilities. The Soviets are expanding the capabilities of their SLBM force and are developing mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental bomber. Even with ongoing improvements in their strategic defenses, the Soviets will be unable to prevent massive damage to the USSR from surviving US strategic forces.
- 8. Soviet efforts in non-acoustic sensors for ASW and directed energy weapons could have profound consequences if major technological breakthroughs occur, although we do not foresee such successes in the near future. It is unlikely that the Soviets could develop prototype high-powered directed energy weapons for antisatellite applications until the late 1980s or for ballistic missile defense until the 1990s. Deployment of operational systems would require an additional several years to a decade. However, Soviet military capabilities in space will continue to improve, especially in the use of manned space platforms and in antisatellite capabilities.
- 9. The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations. Soviet leaders are aware that the course of a nuclear conflict will probably not go according to plans, but they have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operations in nuclear war, improving their ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR.
- The Soviets have vigorously modernized and expanded their theater and peripheral nuclear forces. They are now in a better position to escalate a European conflict and have acquired increased capabilities to use peripheral strike forces opposite China and throughout the Eurasian periphery.
- 11. Soviet leaders view their current strategic position as supporting the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion of Soviet influence abroad. They do not believe that they currently enjoy significant strategic military advantages over the US, and they do not wish a major confrontation, but they are probably less fearful of this occurring than they were five years ago. Thus, although the Soviets are unlikely to initiate military hostilities in an area of central importance to the US like the Persian Gulf, they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by instability in Iran or Pakistan, and they may increasingly expect that the burden of avoiding confrontation should shift to the US-reflecting the change in the "correlation of forces" since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
- 12. Although they fear the possible consequences of US military modernization efforts, the Soviets seem willing to wait for current US determination to wane as a result of domestic opposition. None of the current contenders to succeed Brezhnev seems likely to depart radically from established Soviet priorities. The military establishment has great influence on current Soviet policy formulation and that influence may increase during a succession struggle. As a result, Brezhnev's immediate successors are unlikely





to change the present emphasis on defense spending or decrease their efforts to project Soviet power.

- 13. In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly modernized their massive land and air forces opposite Europe and China. When fully mobilized after 30 days, the Soviets can bring to bear concurrently 124 divisions in Central Europe, 28 divisions against Iran, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf region, and 51 divisions against China. Significantly, the Soviets have separate forces for each of these theaters and can take major action in one theater without drawing down capabilities elsewhere. Although they have not developed forces specifically for overseas operations, they have developed an ability to project forces on a modest scale into the Third World, and this is one of the most rapidly expanding areas of Soviet capability. They are significantly increasing their airlift capability, VSTOL aircraft carriers and fast sealift capability. Most significantly, the USSR's 7 airborne divisions are maintained in a high state of readiness and are a potential tool of Soviet intervention. For the most part, however, the Soviets will continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World.
- 14. Complementing other efforts is Moscow's involvement in support of revolutionary violence worldwide. Some radical regimes have come to power with Moscow's aid, while others have done so largely on their own—for instance in Nicaragua and Ethiopia—and later turned to the USSR for support. The USSR also directly or indirectly supports a number of national insurgencies and ethnic—separatist movements by providing them with arms, advice, military training, and political backing. In addition, the USSR and Eastern Europe support allied or friendly governments and entities—notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, South Yemen, Syria, and Cuba—which in turn directly or indirectly aid the subversive or terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of violent revolutionaries. Overall, there will be increasing terrorist threats to US military and civilian personnel and facilities which will stem from disparate conditions, political causes, and groups. An increase in anti-American terrorism is expected in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and, to a lesser extent, southern Africa.
- 15. The Soviets will undoubtedly attempt to increase hard-currency earnings as well as promote political and strategic interests through arms sales. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military sales, military technicians and advisers, and military training are important sources of political influence in the Third World. There has been an influx of large numbers of Soviet-bloc military technicians and civilian advisers in Third World countries. In 1981 these totalled over 80,000 in the Middle East, about 10,000 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 11,000 in Asia. The amount of influence such assistance buys is arguable, but there is no question the arms sold enable the buyers to engage in stronger military actions. Although recipients of Soviet aid are capable of changing policies against Soviet interests—as shown by Egypt—the Soviets have gained political leverage, a potential basis for a greater military presence in the future, and, in some cases, actual battlefield experience. And the military training of large numbers of Third World nationals in the East Bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of sympathizers.
- 16. The Soviets have a number of military vulnerabilities in each of their five services. At the highest level, there are serious questions about the reliability of their NSWP allies. Their strategic bomber force is old and vulnerable to modern air defenses. Their SSBNs are relatively noisy, and their ASW systems are inadequate. Their strategic air defenses would in general perform poorly against low-altitude penetrators. Their general purpose forces also have deficiencies, for instance, in advancing under unforseen and quickly changing circumstances. They also have logistical vulnerabilities, including a heavy reliance on rail transportation.



- 17. The Soviets face severe economic problems. Economic growth throughout the 1980s will probably be 2% or less per year. Contributing to this bleak economic outlook are slow growth in the labor force, slowing growth of energy production, prolonged foreign exchange stringencies, greater costs in extracting raw materials, and continuing difficulties in introducing new technology. Living standards in the USSR will probably stagnate owing to the growing defense burden and inefficent investment practices. As Soviet citizens perceive a decline in the quality of life, productivity growth will also decline unless dramatic economic reforms are introduced—an unlikely prospect. These problems will force Moscow to make difficult choices among priorities. While it will be increasingly difficult for it to sustain growth in military spending, the primacy of the military will continue in Soviet planning.
- 18. Although Soviet economic troubles are not dominated by a shortage of energy, the Soviet economy is consuming increasing amounts of energy at progressively higher cost. Oil exports, the biggest hard currency earner, are declining; oil and coal production at best is stagnant; only natural gas production is expanding. Moscow will have to decide among domestic needs for energy, politically sensitive—and highly subsidized—sales to allies, and oil sales to the West for badly needed hard currency.
- 19. The Soviets have several external problems. Hostility with China and turmoil along the USSR's borders (e.g., Poland and Afghanistan) reinforce its obsession with the need for order and friendly regimes along its frontiers. The potential for ideological contamination of its allies and friends, due to recent events in Poland and Afghanistan, also gives them cause for concern. Moreover, internal unrest and insurgency have come to plague a number of Soviet clients; these countries continue to consume scarce resources.



- 20. Parallel to Moscow's military effort, the Soviets will try to pursue an arms control dialogue with the West. The strategic arms control process in particular remains important as a means of constraining military competition with the US. A major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce the possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might jeopardize Moscow's strategic nuclear status.
- 21. So far the Soviets have continued to constrain their strategic force programs in accordance with the SALT I Interim Agreement and the key provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty. If the Soviets conclude there is no prospect in the near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, they may decide to go beyond the SALT II constraints. Among the earliest indications that they had decided to do so would be the failure to dismantle older systems as new ones are deployed, the testing of ICBMs with more RVs than permitted under SALT II limits, and the testing of more than one new ICBM. They are well positioned for potential force expansion and could increase the number of MIRVed ICBMs, continue SSBN production without any SSBN dismantlement, increase Backfire production, and test and deploy new strategic systems. We are not able to judge whether, if the Soviets wished to expand significantly several of their nuclear force capabilities simultaneously, they would encounter constraints in the availability of fissile material. The history of Soviet willingness to sign long-term contracts for the sale of enriched uranium suggests that Moscow has not been concerned about potential shortfalls in nuclear material for weapons.
- 22. The Soviets probably want to preserve the ABM treaty without amendments for at least the next few years. They are concerned that the US could eventually deploy effective ABM systems. Also, their own systems are still under development, and they are probably not confident about how effective a widespread ABM defense might be. There are, however, uncertainties about US actions and Soviet technical capabilities beyond the mid-1980s that might cause the Soviets to revise their views of a widespread ABM defense.

23. To sum up, it is doubtful that Soviet leaders perceive a "window of opportunity" in the next several years, but they very likely believe that schisms in the West and domestic inhibitions in the US provide them some latitude for additional actions. During the next 3-5 years, Moscow may attempt to secure political advantage from its military arsenal in anticipation of US force modernization programs. From the perspective of the present and probable future Soviet leadership, there will remain important deterrents to major military actions. These include the dangers seen in a direct conflict with the US, doubts about the reliability of their Eastern European allies, worries about Chinese exploitation of any Soviet losses, and an awareness of the greater Western economic capacity to support extended wartime operations. These concerns clearly do not preclude action abroad but they constrain them.

Europe

- 24. For the foreseeable future, it will be a Soviet objective to acquire and maintain forces capable of winning a war in Europe whether conventional or nuclear, and the Soviets have kept a clear numerical edge over NATO. NATO's strength and the instability in Eastern Europe make the Soviets very unlikely to initiate military hostilities against NATO, but they will use their military advantages to exert political pressure on NATO members and probably also to continue to encourage US-West European differences. This effort has been especially strong against the key NATO ally, West Germany, which remains divided from East Germany and so is especially susceptible to Soviet influence
- 25. The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on Western, not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large, combat-ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities. They prefer to achieve theater objectives without using nuclear weapons. They apparently believe that a theater nuclear war would arise either if NATO used nuclear weapons to avoid losing a conventional war—circumstances in which the Soviets would plan on preemptive use of their nuclear weapons—or, less likely, if the Warsaw Pact had to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO break-through. In such a conflict the Soviets would use, in addition to tactical nuclear weapons, peripheral and some intercontinental range missiles and aircraft against NATO's forward-based nuclear forces.
- 26. The military balance in Europe poses a problem for Soviet policy. The Soviets know that, if they appear too threatening, they risk galvanizing NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued a dual policy: improving its military strength—including SS-20 deployments and procurement of Backfire bombers—while engaging in arms control talks, attempting to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a massive propaganda campaign—supplemented by covert activities—designed to undermine public support for NATO's defense effort, particularly INF. Such Soviet efforts concentrate on West Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
- 27. Potentially the most threatening problem for the USSR is the questionable reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in a war with the West, and recent events in Poland have made it more pressing.
- 28. The military balance in Europe and NATO will be affected by developments in Western Europe. Strains within NATO and the potential estrangement of some West European neutrals from some US policies are likely to make US relations with these countries more contentious. The West European allies will seek increasingly to coordinate their policies in order to present the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This tendency toward divergence within the Alliance may increasingly hinder NATO as a mechanism for determining and coordinating security policy.



East and Southeast Asia

- 29. The Far East is second only to Europe in strategic importance for Soviet military policy. In contrast with Europe, the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy. Furthermore, the Soviet supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is dangerously close to a hostile China.
- 30. In the coming few years, Soviet military power in East Asia will seek to contain or reduce China's influence, decrease American and Japanese influence, discourage anti-Soviet policies on the part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution of a Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system.
- 31. The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could involve US forces is in Korea. North Korea is dedicated to reunifying the Peninsula on its own terms, and the decade-long North Korean military buildup is aimed at promoting a military option. The US security commitment and US military presence, the strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to maintain the status quo are substantial deterrents to a North Korean move. However, these factors may not be sufficient to prevent a North Korean attack, particularly if the US were preoccupied elsewhere.
- 32. Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to contain China and diminish US influence. For their sizeable economic investment in support of Vietnamese policy, the Soviets have already realized substantial returns. They have a highly visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have gained access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities. These facilities enable the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean deployments and to expand intelligence collection capabilities in the region. Even though Vietnam is a major drain on Soviet economic resources, Moscow probably will seek greater influence in Southeast Asia.
- 33. Action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely cause of expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese forces might strike into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it could no longer tolerate Thai support of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla forces in Kampuchea. A Vietnamese attack would have severe consequences, especially in view of US and Chinese security ties to Thailand and the USSR's commitment to Hanoi. China might initiate a second border war with Vietnam to tie down Vietnamese forces. Soviet forces might then apply pressure on China. A Sino-Soviet conflict would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese relationship, forcing the United States to decide whether it wished to be involved and, if so, how.
- 34. Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is reasonably secure, the Soviets probably expect no change in China's hostile posture toward the USSR. At the same time, they expect intensified US pressure on Japan to assume a greater security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against the USSR. They have also seen a reaffirmation by the United States of its commitment to maintain sizeable forces in South Korea.
- 35. Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the Soviets in a global war or whether they would attempt to seize and hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on their political objectives and the military situation in other theaters. In general, the Soviets would want to avoid a "two-front" war. In a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Soviets would probably seize portions of North China and establish new buffer zones



along the frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the US would be faced with coercive threats or military operations designed to prevent the use of Japanese bases.

36. China has deployed a small force of ICBMs and MRBMs and is developing an SLBM. A shared Chinese-US assessment of the Soviet threat is likely--not certain--to insure that this missile force remains trained on Soviet targets. The same circumstances also lead China to support most US interests in the trilateral strategic relationship among the US, China, and the USSR. Only a sharp and prolonged retrogression in Chinese-US bilateral ties would change this equation significantly and cause China to reemerge as a threat to US interests in its own right.

The Near East, South, and Southwest Asia

- 37. There are a large number of potential military threats to US interests in this region. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the war between Iran and Iraq have made the Persian Gulf area the dominant US strategic concern in the Middle East. The most severe danger is that Iran might succumb to increased Soviet influence or a large-scale military intervention with the Soviets using the 1921 Soviet-Iran treaty as a legal pretext.
- 38. Other potential dangers in the region are that friendly states may be attacked by other local states—most immediately that the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs—; and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal insurrections, possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets.
- 39. However it might happen, Soviet political or military control of the principal oil supplies to the West European and Japanese economies could threaten the dissolution of our alliance system by subjecting our allies to Soviet pressure. In addition, the Soviets might view control over some of the lowest cost energy in the world as a potentially important contributor to easing their serious economic difficulties. If friendly governments, dependent on Soviet support, were to assume power in one or more oil-rich states, the Soviets could acquire a valuable flow of hard currency.
- 40. The most immediate threats to US interests in the Gulf region are from Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and the potential of direct Iranian military attacks on Gulf regimes, or more likely, acceleration of Iranian sponsored subversion. In addition, Pakistan may be subjected to increased Soviet pressure and possibly military action in retaliation for its support of the Afghan insurgents. The Soviets already have sought to intimidate Islamabad by diplomatic warnings, by condoning, if not provoking a number of attacks by Afghan helicopters on Pakistani border outposts, and by supporting antigovernment terrorist elements.
- 41. The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the present the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against Israel. Even without this advantage, Israel will maintain its wide margin of military superiority over the Arab states. Although this superiority would serve to deter a premeditated Arab attack, actions in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a wider conflict in which the possibility of Soviet intervention must be considered.
- 42. Another threat is posed by Libya, with its sizeable equipment inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for subversion and terrorism. Although Qadhafi may from time to time modify his activities, his efforts to undermine moderate regimes and Western influence in the area will continue. Nevertheless, the Libyan military will remain ineffective in exploiting its plethora of weapons in conventional combat.



- 43. Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion, the war in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and Algeria will remain a lesser threat to US interests than the conditions around the Persian Gulf and the threat of Arab-Israeli hostilities.
- 44. Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part by Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the development of a nuclear weapons production capability. India will become increasingly concerned and might undertake either a military strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities or the production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New Delhi's calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities of weapons-usable fissile material. Any Indian attack could rapidly escalate into a full-scale war.

Latin America

- 45. The threat environment in Latin America through the mid-1980s will be dominated by Communist exploitation of social and political trends in Central America. However, it is most unlikely that the USSR would be prepared to engage in a major confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean or Central America.
- 46. Cuba is capable of taking independent action as well as operating in concert with the USSR—or in response to its wishes. Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and opportunities to undermine US prestige, Castro since 1978 has increased assistance to revolutionaries in the region. The Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has gradually expanded its involvement—efforts complemented by some East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and the PLO. Unless faced with important new costs or inducements, Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
- 47. Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet upgrading of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have enabled the USSR to make extensive use of Cuban facilities, and have resulted in Soviet-Cuban collaboration abroad. By now, the principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and to use Nicaragua as a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere in the region. External support has enabled the Sandinistas to build the region's largest standing army, and this buildup is intimidating governments in the region and will give the Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution.
- 48. The threats to US security interests from Cuba are compounded by its capability for effective military action within the Caribbean region. While there is little likelihood of Cuban offensive military action against the US, there are a number of US targets vulnerable to Cuban actions such as harassment of various sea and air routes. It is, however, unlikely that Cuba would undertake such drastic action unless it felt directly threatened by US activity. Cuba might act, however, at the insistence of the Soviets during a time of general war.
- 49. A continuation of present trends could result in victory for the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would heighten prospects for revolutionaries in Guatemala and elsewhere in the region. It may be that those Communist and radical Arab forces providing external support and management help to the insurgencies intend to make Central America a battleground over the next few years which would distract, weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of the world. These scenarios could bring revolution to Mexico's border and to Panama, and this region will come to have even greater significance for US security interests if present trends continue.

- 50. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, there is little direct military threat to the US, but other troubles for US security interests. There has been a trend over the last 15 years away from close traditional ties with the US which has been reflected in a reluctance on the part of many Latin American governments to accept US leadership or to cooperate with the US on a number of political, economic, and security issues. A neutral or hostile position on the part of Latin American nations could have significant negative consequences for the US, particularly in the case of the larger, more important countries like Brazil and Argentina which have the military potential to contribute to US defense objectives or will have the potential to develop nuclear weapons during this decade.
- 51. There is a potential threat to the Panama Canal and its facilities which are vulnerable to a variety of actions that could disrupt operations or close the Canal for varying lengths of time. In addition, traditional antagonisms between countries such as Argentina and Chile, although unlikely to lead to major or sustained armed conflict, could produce border clashes and short-term hostilities. Political and economic instability in Latin America will continue to provide opportunities for direct or indirect Soviet involvement in the future.

Sub-Saharan Africa

- 52. Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are currently quite small and involve the possibility of local conflicts or domestic instabilities broadening to draw in the superpowers on the side of local clients. For the most part the problems are indigenous: racial animosities and ethnic and tribal communalism.
- 53. Of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in Africa may create for the US in the next several years, the most acute could be:
 - -- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by providing military assistance—either directly or through the Cubans—to Soviet clients in the event of internal instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability in Chad or Sudan.
 - -- Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of advisers and equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in order to prop up Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia if threatened with internal collapse.
 - Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a third country—with or without Soviet encouragement.
 - Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
 - An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region.
 - Stepped up Cuban and Soviet involvement with southern African states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and Havana to counter South Africa's military posture.
- 54. Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely to endanger long-term Western access to strategic metals or oil. The Soviets would not be able to seize Sub-Saharan strategic metals for themselves, or-barring a collapse of political order in South Africa—to impose a prolonged denial of them to the West. Rather, the USSR seeks to promote political objectives and to enhance the USSR's future strategic capabilities in the area. While not necessarily entailing Soviet involvement, there are other potential flashpoints that may impinge on US security interests in Africa through the mid-1980s (e.g., Ethiopia's activities in the Horn, South Africa's domestic and foreign policies, and internal conflict in Zaire).

55. Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not necessarily assure heightened future Soviet influence. The Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their failure to back the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and Mozambique to seek economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s the Soviets will be vulnerable to Western counteraction in areas of current Soviet influence.

Continuing Uncertainties

56. Although the future portrayed here is fraught with problems for the US, it is quite possible that on balance this assessment is too optimistic. Soviet willingness to employ military force on a larger scale than they have so far might be substantially increased by the late 1980s if events move in their favor more strongly than suggested above: the US does not sustain its military buildup, the growth of "peace" sentiment in the US, the spread of neutralism in Western Europe—especially West Germany—, a deterioration in Sino-US relations, or greater disarray in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

- 57. The following are the key intelligence issues of continuing concern for further collection and analysis:
 - Will the Soviets continue to remain within SALT limits for their strategic forces even though existing agreements have expired?
 - Are the Soviets likely to break out from the ABM treaty? How would they respond to a US abrogation of this treaty?
 - Is it likely that the Soviet Union would significantly reduce defense spending in response to domestic economic problems? How severe will these problems be? Will there be any radical change in the policy objectives of the current and post-Brezhnev leaders?
 - Is any major change likely in the current situation in the Far East, to include Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet-Japanese-US relations, and the Korean Peninsula?
 - Is it likely that the USSR will exploit opportunities or weaknesses in Iran, Pakistan, or elsewhere in the Persian Gulf region by means of direct military intervention?
 - Will the Soviets react to INF deployments in Western Europe with similar deployments in Cuba?

U.S. National Security Strategy

PART III
Military Component

Section B Role of Allies and Others

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The Role of Allies and Others Summary

Given the loss of US strategic superiority and the overwhelming growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities, together with the increased political and economic strength of the industrial democracies and the heightened importance of Third World resources, the US must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of allies and others to protect our interests and those of our friends. While our ability to cooperate with allies and friends offers a potentially effective counter to Soviet threats, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

- 2. A strong unified NATO is indispensable to protecting Western interests. To attain this goal, the US must press for implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and INF modernization. We must also continue to promote improvement in integrated logistical support (e.g., host nation support—HNS). For its part, the US must maintain its NATO commitments for forward deployment and early reinforcement.
- 3. While encouraging all NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their peacetime marginal resources preferentially to dual-purpose capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burdens outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the US.
- 4. Outside Europe, the US will place primary reliance on regional states to deal with non-Soviet threats, providing security assistance as appropriate. The US will remain the primary power for directly resisting the Soviets. If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. The effectiveness of US military capabilities for either Soviet or other contingencies will depend on access to facilities en route and in the region of conflict, and on other tangible forms of support (e.g., HNS and prepositioning).
- 5. In Southwest Asia, the US will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles.
- 6. In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts (including economic assistance), although we should not now ask Japan to expand its defense responsibility beyond the protection of sea lines of communication out to 1000 nautical miles. We should assist the ROK tobecome increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities, while maintaining the current US-ROK division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair); and we should work to facilitate increased defense cooperation between Korea and Japan. We can also act to enhance the durability of the US-Chinese security relationship, although significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own for that purpose.

End of Summary

TOP SECRET
RDS-3 4/13/02



NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B The Role of Allies and Others

Introduction

Since the establishment of a Western security framework in the years immediately following World War II, global power relationships have shifted in several ways. First, there has been a shift in the US-USSR nuclear balance from clear US superiority to a state of rough parity with the prospect of US inferiority. Equally marked, however, is the altered balance, especially in economic and political terms, between the US and its industrial allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably larger share of the world product than the US. In addition, the post World War II decolonization process has made the industrial democracies increasingly dependent for a number of critical resources upon nations of the Third World, some of which are vulnerable to Soviet and proxy activity and many of which find it easier to blame their problems on the West than to face up to them directly.

As a result of these changes, the US must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources as well. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

Europe

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. Although US conventional military power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense and that they expect to have a greater voice in Alliance decisions.

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TOP SECRET RDS-3 4/13/02

Western interests require the improvement of the defense capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during periods of economic difficulty. The US must emphasize the need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to redress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. While nuclear forces, particularly US nuclear forces, are essential to deterrence, they do not constitute a balanced defense force and should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for avoiding conventional defense improvements. We should, therefore, press for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, reinforçement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW, and C'), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while the US and the Soviets continue to negotiate an INF Agreement in Geneva.

Concomitantly, the US should adhere to its forward deployment and early reinforcement commitment of having ten Army divisions with corresponding Air Force and Marine support in Europe within ten days of a reinforcement decision. Notwithstanding the fact that our NATO Allies contribute a majority of the active ground combat and tactical air forces and two-thirds of the total (active and reserve) NATO force structure, US force commitments — particularly ground combat and tacair commitments — are required by the sheer magnitude of the direct Soviet threat which is unparalleled in any other strategic theater. Allied doubts about our willingness to maintain a significant ground and tacair commitment would undercut our efforts to press them to improve their own conventional capabilities and would risk lowering of the nuclear threshold.

In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, member nations must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their defense efforts beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense of national preferences. To that end, we should pursue opportunities with our Allies for the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments which yield increased combat effectiveness and more efficient use of defense

resources. At the same time, we must recognize that there are limits on standardization (e.g., the desire of each major NATO nation to design and procure its own tanks and tactical aircraft). Our goals should be realistic and emphasize interoperability as a complement or an alternative to standardization.

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Because of their geographic location and industrial resources, we should continue to support the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of the European neutral/non-aligned countries. Accordingly, we should assist these nations in developing sufficient conventional military capability to protect their territorial integrity and independence, while accepting the fact that their policies dictate they maintain a distance between East and West.

In addition, the US and its Allies must be prepared to conduct unconventional warfare operations in Eastern Europe to take advantage of Soviet political vulnerabilities in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact. Unrest in Poland and other Eastern European countries offers fertile ground on which NATO might build in wartime through psychological and other operations.

Rather than attacking the Alliance directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside Burope where there is less risk of superpower confrontation, while at the same time hoping to erode NATO's political consensus. The region in which events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA), where the West faces two interrelated threats.

The larger threat is that of direct Soviet military intervention. Only the United States has the power to deter or counter Soviet intervention in SWA. With the exception of haval.

forces, European support in such a contingency would be more significant politically than militarily. The more proximate threats, however, arise out of regional conflict and domestic instability in the regional states. European powers, acting in concert with regional states, have the capability of responding to some lower order threats and may in some cases be better placed to do so. Additionally, intervention by European instead of American forces would generally be a less escalatory step and would provide less of a pretext for Soviet intervention in a regional conflict.

Thus, in addition to asking the Allies to improve their defense posture in Europe (including in some cases compensation for US forces diverted to SWA), we must continue to urge those Allies in a position to do so (primarily the UK and France) to share the political and military burdens outside Europe in areas where regional conflicts and internal strife as well as Soviet threats could harm Western interests. Such burden sharing outside Europe should include being prepared to fight along side (or instead of) the US. Such Allied assistance out-of-area could, in some cases, compensate for specific US force deficiencies against the Soviet threat (e.g., French minesweeping capabilities for SWA contingencies). We should also pursue bilateral arrangements with some of the Allies (e.g., combined contingency planning such as took place with the UK and France during the first phase of the Iran-Iraq War).

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We must, however, recognize that only a few European countries, primarily the UK and France, have the capabilities to influence events outside Europe, and even they are not fully committed to out-of-area combined security efforts. The FRG has the capabilities but is inhibited by its history and the current legal interpretation of its constitution from such a role, except for economic and in some cases security assistance.

•In brief, our strategy should be one which encourages all Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. At the same time, our own efforts in other regions (e.g., SWA) of necessity are relatively independent of what our Allies contribute.

Southwest Asia (SWA)

The security environment in SWA bears little resemblance to that in Europe. The greater likelihood of regional conflicts and/or internal instabilities considerably complicates the problems of security planning. Moreover, not only is there no formal security framework, but the Arab-Israeli and other regional conflicts sometime set our regional friends against one another. Nonetheless, while an alliance structure is unobtainable, a set of well-defined bilateral security cooperation relationships should be pursued.

For direct response to regional (non-Soviet) conflicts and local instability, the US will rely primarily upon forces indigenous to the region (or in some cases UN peacekeeping forces), with the possibility of ultimately backing them up with quick reaction forces from the US, if necessary, and from our European Allies, if possible and appropriate. For non-US contingency forces, US lift may be necessary. Such a division of responsibility is both politically advisable and necessary to preserve the flexibility of US forces for involvement in contingencies with the Soviets.

In order to contain such crises and ensure that direct US military involvement is not required or is minimal, regional states will require capabilities which are sufficient to respond to contingencies without outside augmentation. To that end, regional states will need access to arms, logistical support, technological expertise, and training. Some states, e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan, will require security assistance to pay for these arms and associated transfers. Some will also require economic assistance to help maintain stability, absorb the impact of military spending, and deny opportunities which could be exploited by the Soviets and their proxies. The United States, together with other external allies and the more affluent states of the region, must be prepared to provide such assistance.

Should external military assistance be necessary to maintain the security of a friendly regional state in the face of non-Soviet threats and/or to foreclose opportunities for subversion or intervention by Soviet surrogates, the prime candidates to aid embattled governments should be other regional states. To ensure that such capabilities exist within the region, the US will support the establishment and maintenance of appropriate regional contingency forces by certain key regional states. The US would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift for such forces.

If additional or alternative assistance is necessary, US allies from outside the region, e.g., the UK or France, may, if possible and appropriate, be preferable to the US both politically (for the recipient) and in order to avoid escalating to the possibility of a superpower confrontation. US lift support may be necessary, however. In any case, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not be necessary, however, to tailor significant US forces to hedge against such contingencies.

In response to the threat of direct Soviet aggression (which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted), only the US can provide the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to deter or counter a Soviet attack. However, the US cannot stand alone. Without the cooperation and participation of friendly regional states and external allies, we are unlikely either to deter the Soviets or to contain conflict to the In this regard, the capabilities of regional states (and possibly of certain European Allies) to respond to lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will also contribute to deterring or countering the Soviets. In particular, friendly regional air defense capabilities can cover the initial projection of US forces into SWA. Israeli capabilities could also provide a considerable benefit in contingencies involving direct Soviet attacks into the region and in a war involving US and Soviet naval/air forces in the Mediterranean. theless, the US will have to provide the primary forces for resisting the Soviets.

Moreover, because of continuing political sensitivities in the region, it is important that US rapid deployment capabilities be perceived as focusing on the Soviet threat. Such emphasis by the US should make easier the task of drawing our European Allies into regional security efforts and should help allay regional concerns regarding unsolicited US involvement in purely local/regional security affairs.

Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, however, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arabisraeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations. Consequently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be pursued with both persistence and flexibility.

As in Europe, the US cannot militarily help regional states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional

-TOP SECRET

- 8 -

facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the value of facilities access both for deterrence and during contingencies, such cooperation must, if possible, be manifest in peacetime through public agreements, contingency planning and/or exercises. In some instances, infrastructure improvements will also be necessary, most likely involving US military construction funds. In addition, both to demonstrate cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities militarily, the US must seek host nation logistical support (HNS) and facilities at which to preposition certain types of US equipment and supplies.

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an important peacetime presence in the region. In the near-term, we will maintain US presence by continuous naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and operations in the Persian Gulf as well as by periodic Army and Air Force deployments to the region to participate in combined exercises with local friends and external allies. In the longer-term, we must seek arrangements to allow forward deployments of US ground, naval, and air forces in the region, including forward elements of the RDJTF, should the political environment permit.

In conclusion, we should support (through our own and allied security assistance) the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats, with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Pakistan for regional contingency roles. We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those forces as intended for such missions. Additionally with respect to Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies can augment our combat capabilities, as well as provide en route or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

The amount and extent of the Japanese defense effort is limited by its constitution and history. Nevertheless, Japan and the US have agreed on a division of defense responsibilities. Japan's Prime Minister has indicated that Japan can provide legally for the self-defense of its territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles from the Home Islands. The Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. To the extent that their contribution does increase, it will increase the flexibility to use US forces for other missions in the Pacific or elsewhere.

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In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a beneficial role in supporting US interests in East Asia. Our policy should be directed at making the ROK increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities. At present, by virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with forward deployed US forces now in the region, maintains stability on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic strength of its economy (despite its current problems) is such that the ROK should be able to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the US force presence, security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. Any increases in Korean defense investment, however, should maintain the current division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair).

In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both Australia and New Zealand are seeking to improve security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally, and through the Five Power Defense Arrangement which includes the UK. Such cooperation strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/Soviet threat in the region. Australia also could provide expanded base and other support facilities, in addition to its potential direct military contribution in the Indian Ocean as well as the Southeast Asian region.

*The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which are important to US security interests in Asia. The Philippines provide a major and perhaps irreplaceable US base network for support of our military posture in the region and en route access to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en route access. In return, the US helps these two countries deal with their security problems and supports Thailand as a buffer against Vietnamese expansionism, essentially through security assistance.

As in Southwest Asia, the US relies in Southeast Asia primarily on local states to deal directly with internal instability, with US and other security assistance as necessary. Should external threats or externally supported security problems require direct outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government's own efforts with the forces of other states of the region, while seeking to maintain our own flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia at a time when extraregional demands on US forces (e.g., Persian Gulf) also are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state to provide for its own defense, with US security assistance where required. However, recent fears of US withdrawal from the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if US pressure on East Asian states for greater defense efforts were seen as a ploy for reducing US forces and commitments.

Latin America

The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet Union, US military forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba as a potential base for operations against the US or its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a staging area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean or Pacific lines of communication, the US would also be responsible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic and South Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contribute to the defense of sea lines of communication, through access for US forces and the employment of their own naval forces. Additional analysis, however, is required to determine the parameters of such cooperation.

As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political support and emphasize security and economic assistance. In some instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to project power into the region. We should also seek to keep the remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region.

Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention

TOP SECRET

- 13 -

of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America, and we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot gain their support.

US military forces, therefore, represent the essential backup should local forces be unable to counter the insurgencies. We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ US forces under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio Treaty or a sub-regional grouping such as the Central American Democratic Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Africa

The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa through the use of surrogates, chief among them Libya and Cuba. Because of Libya's international behavior, the US has sought to rein in its activities through political and military means. While we would prefer to deal with Libyan threats exclusively through friendly states and must help those states to strengthen their military capabilities so they can stand up to Libya, we must be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it.

Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states of the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater. In Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and perhaps Zaire and Liberia, in return for our providing security assistance, host nations can provide facilities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US or Allied rapid reaction forces.

Against other local and regional threats, we rely primarily on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist with security and economic assistance, and we ask our external allies and affluent friends to do the same. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. France, the UK, and Belgium are the major actors in that regard. We may also support regional peacekeeping efforts such as the OAU in Chad. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security efforts probably would be necessary.

End of Paper