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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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CAS 12/8/2010

File Folder NSC 0045 4/16/83 (3)

FOIA

M10-325

Box Number 91284

RAKU

9

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101776	PAPER	RE PT. III-C SUMMARY R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #1 (NLRRM1295 #1)	2	ND	B1
101777	PAPER	PT. III-C (DUPE OF 101761) PAR 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #2 (NLRRM1295 #2); PAR 4/4/2013 M325/1	10	ND	B1
101778	INDEX	RE DISCUSSION AND ISSUE PAPERS R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #3 (NLRRM1295 #3)	1	ND	B1
101779	DISCUSSION PAPER	RE NSSD 1-82 PT. IIIA R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #4 (NLRRM1295 #4)	3	ND	B1
101780	DISCUSSION PAPER	RE NSSD 1-82 PT. IIIB R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #5 (NLRRM1295 #5)	2	ND	B1
101781	ISSUE PAPER	R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #6 (NLRRM1295 #6)	3	ND	B1
101782	DISCUSSION PAPER	R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #7 (NLRRM1295 #7)	3	ND	B1
101788	MEMO	MYER TO WHEELER RE NSC MEETING R 6/3/2001	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
101783	DISCUSSION PAPER	SAME AS 101780 R 11/3/2005 NLRRM1294 #5 (NLRRM1295 #8)	2	ND	B1
101784	PAPER	RE PT. IIIB CONCLUSIONS R 7/6/2010 NLRRM1295 #9	1	ND	B1
101785	PAPER	RE PT, IIIB R 7/6/2010 NLRRM1295 #10	4	ND	B1
101786	PAPER	RE PT IIIB PAR 9/24/2010 NLRRM1295 #11	13	ND	B1
101787	ROUTING SLIP	PAR 11/3/2005 NLRRM1295 #12; PAR UPHELD 6/11/2013 M325/1	1	4/8/1982	B1 B3

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Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
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FOIA ID: na

Date: 08/31/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	Part III-C, summary, 2p <i>R M1294 #1 (M1295 #1) 11/3/05</i>	nd	P1/F1
2. paper	Part III-C, 10p <i>R M1294 #2 (M1295 #2) 11/3/05</i>	nd	P1/F1
3. index	re: discussion and issue papers, 1p <i>R M1294 #3 (M1295 #3) 11/3/05</i>	nd	P1/F1
4. discussion paper	re: NSSD 1-82 Part IIIA, 3p <i>R " #4 (" #4) "</i>	nd	P1/F1
5. discussion paper	Re: NSSD 1-82 Part IIIB, 2p <i>R " #5 (" #5) "</i>	nd	P1/F1
6. issue paper	3p <i>R " #6 (" #6) "</i>	nd	P1/F1
7. discussion paper	3p <i>R " #7 (" #7) "</i>	nd	P1/F1
8. discussion paper	text same as item 5, 2p <i>R " #5 (" #8) "</i>	nd	P1/F1
9. paper	re: Part IIIB, conclusions, 1p <i>R 7/6/10 M1295 #9</i>	nd	P1/F1
10. paper	Part IIIB, 4p <i>R 7/6/10 M1295 #10</i>	nd	P1/F1
11. paper	Part IIIB 13p <i>Part. 9/24/10 M1295 #11</i>	nd	P1/F1
12. routing slip	(partial), 1p <i>R 11/3/05 M1295 #12</i>	4/8/82	P1/F1 P3
<i>7A. memo myal to Whaller re USC mtg. 1p. 6/3/01</i>		<i>nd</i>	<i>61</i>

RESTRICTIONS

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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: MEETING FILE

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M1295

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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8	PAPER	NSSD 1-82 PART III B (M1295#8, SAME AS	2	ND
		M1294 #5)		

U.S. National Security Strategy

PART III
Military Component

Section C
Regional Military Objectives

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS M1274 #1 & M1275 #1

BY SMJ, NARA, DATE 11/3/05

~~TOP SECRET~~REGIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVESSUMMARY

The US must plan, in conjunction with its allies, for a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies. This means planning theater priorities such that the Soviet Union, even with early gains, could not force the US to choose between initiating nuclear war and accepting the permanent loss of vital Western interests.

While recognizing that the political and military situation at the time of war will dictate strategy decisions, and that a US-Soviet conflict may well expand beyond one theater, the following priorities apply for global wartime planning: highest priority is North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication (LOCs). The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies, supporting LOCs and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa. Peacetime priorities may not parallel wartime priorities. Specific US regional objectives are keyed to this global context.

In contingencies not involving direct Soviet aggression, our strategy is to rely on regional states to the extent possible.

In Europe, our primary objective is to strengthen NATO's capability to deter or defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the US will support NATO strategy which requires forward defense with conventional forces supported by the possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime, US objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities; to improve nuclear and chemical forces; and to obtain increased Allied defense contributions in Europe and Southwest Asia.

In the Near East/Southwest Asia, our principal objectives are to prevent the spread of Soviet influence; to protect Western access to oil; to maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage; and to support moderate states against aggression and subversion. US military strategy is to deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets in the theater; and to prepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere.

In the Far East, our wartime objectives are viewed primarily in the context of a global war. They are: to maintain control of Pacific LOCs; to protect US bases; to fulfill commitments to allies; in conjunction with regional states, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from the Far East; and to secure Japanese self-defense including long-range LOC protection. In peacetime, we seek a more active defense partnership with Japan, a more durable US-PRC relationship, and continued stability on the Korean Peninsula.

In the Western Hemisphere, our primary wartime objective is the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin and the Panama Canal. In peacetime, our objectives are to modernize North America's strategic air defense system; to reverse Communist gains in Latin America; and to increase US military presence.

In Africa, our wartime objectives are to neutralize hostile forces in strategic locations and to protect Western access to the region's mineral resources. US peacetime objectives are to obtain additional facilities access and transmit rights, and to assist countries resisting Soviet-sponsored subversion.

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End of Summary

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MILITARY OBJECTIVES

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M325/1 #101777

BY KNL NARA DATE 4/4/13

I. Global

A. Introduction

The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ military force to achieve our political objectives and secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan, in conjunction with allies, for a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet Union and its allies. At the same time, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests. Contingency planning should, however, include options for military actions in regions of clear U.S. advantage to dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. In this context, the threat of counteroffensives elsewhere is an essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend U.S. interests in the area in which they are threatened. Moreover, a decision to expand a war geographically must take account of the facts that the Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on other fronts at least as attractive as ours, and that geographic expansion and nuclear escalation considerations are linked.

In contingencies involving direct Soviet aggression, the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defending U.S. and allies interests. In lower order, non-Soviet contingencies, we plan to rely on regional states and other friends and allies to the extent possible to deter or counter threats to common interests.

B. Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation

Due to the global military capabilities of the Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters, the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would expand beyond one theater to other theaters must be recognized and planned for. This does not mean that we must have the capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanced forces and establishing priorities for sequential operations among theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our allies, apply our military power in the most effective way. This includes preventing the Soviet Union from being able to force the U.S. to choose between initiating nuclear war and accepting the loss of vital Western interests. While recognizing that the political and military situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions, the following priorities will apply for wartime planning:

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Review April 7, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

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- The highest priority is the defense of North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the LOCs leading there to.
- The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin America and Africa.

In areas other than NATO and Southwest Asia, U.S. actions will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.

Priorities for peacetime resource allocation may not always correlate to the above wartime priorities since special emphasis on specific capabilities may be required.

C. Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations with living standards equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the common defense. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy" must be much firmer in insisting upon increased defense efforts by affluent nations which possess the potential to do more in the defense realm.

II. Regional Objectives

In the event of war with the Soviet Union, regional objectives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed in a global perspective.

A. Europe

The security of Europe is closely linked to that of the United States. The unprecedented challenges to Western security, coupled with a continuing growth in economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by nations on both sides of the Atlantic to the coalition warfare strategy of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems such as burdensharing and anti-nuclear movements exist, it will remain important that we continue to recognize that the defense of Europe is vital to the national security of the United States.

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E.O. 12958
~~As Amended~~
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)



Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the European region:

Wartime Objectives

- To protect the territorial integrity of Western Europe.
- To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with conventional forces in a forward defense, and to deter Soviet use of chemical or nuclear weapons in accordance with current NATO strategy.
- To fully engage all NATO members in the conflict.
- To be able to sustain a war at least as long as the Warsaw Pact can.
- To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by engaging Pact forces on their own territory, disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting the cohesion of the Pact alliance.
- To establish and maintain control of Atlantic LOCs.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To enhance deterrence through improvements in NATO's conventional defense capabilities while also improving nuclear and chemical forces.
- To achieve increased Allied contributions to the defense of Western Europe and from Allies capable of doing so increased contributions in other areas of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia.

- To secure a more effective division of labor within NATO through cooperative efforts, such as Host Nation Support Agreements.

B. Near East/Southwest Asia. The United States has two primary national security interests in the region. The first is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty of regional states friendly to the U.S. The second is to maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in concert with intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be prepared to meet threats of any magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale Soviet aggression.

In this context, defense policy has three overriding objectives:

1. Deter Soviet overt military aggression and protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for and demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to prevent a Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for realistic combined planning must be unrelenting. Second, if deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets in the theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The third tier of Defense planning is to prepare for executing counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S. has advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential for this conflict to become global must be recognized and planned for.

For at least the next several years, we are unlikely to succeed in achieving our objectives against a determined Soviet attack in Southwest Asia. Furthermore, it is questionable whether either superpower could restrict to one theater a war which would impact critically upon the economies of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan.

2. Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any realistic combination of Arab foes.

[REDACTED] As the most militarily powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance would be of considerable benefit in the course of a conflict with the Soviets, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, as augmentation for the Southern Flank.

3. Support moderate states against external aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to help strengthen substantially the self-defense capabilities of key states in the region.

To accomplish these objectives for the region, the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting

the employment of U.S. forces. Allies will be expected to offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to contribute militarily to meeting specific threats if such participation would not substantially reduce their war fighting capability in their home region and would provide a beneficial contribution to the conflict.

Within the context outlined above, the following are the specific U.S. military objectives for the Near East, Southwest and South Asia region:

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and sea lines of communications essential to Western security. (This includes threats of all magnitude from internal subversion to Soviet aggression.)
- To preserve the independence of Israel.
- To engage friendly regional states, Western Allies and other extra-regional states in the execution of our strategy.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To prevent Soviet hegemony and extension of influence.
- To acquire, by the end of the decade, sufficient capability to have reasonable assurance of achieving U.S. wartime objectives in Southwest Asia while seeking to limit the likelihood of expansion of the conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines of communication (LOCs).
- To enhance deterrence by improving our capability to deploy, support, and sustain military forces against a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia.
- To maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage over any combination of Arab foes.
- To support moderate states against external aggression and subversion.
- To ensure access to a network of military facilities in the region for the rapid introduction and sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.
- To obtain overflight, landing, bunkering and access to enroute facilities for the deployment and support of U.S. combat forces.
- To obtain military contributions (including agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies in support of U.S. objectives in the region.

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- To maintain a strong naval presence in the area, together with as substantial a presence on land as can be managed given regional sensitivities and political constraints.
- To increase peacetime planning with regional states for wartime contingencies, including host nation support, prepositioning and combat roles for indigenous forces.

C. Far East. Our foremost peacetime objective in the Far East is, in conjunction with our allies and other friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pacific. Asian security relationships are fundamental to offsetting successfully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific is predicated on the stabilizing relationship between two security anchors. One anchor in Northeast Asia depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as well as the U.S. relationship with China. The other anchor in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely to the remainder of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force improvements and strengthened U.S. security relationships are required to establish and maintain an effective defensive network secured at both ends of the region. A direct U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context of a global war. Therefore, although other contingencies in the region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities short of U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional wartime objectives in Asia listed below are those supportive of global wartime objectives.

Wartime Objectives

- To maintain control of the Pacific lines of communication, including those to the Indian Ocean, and the bases needed to support the global strategy.
- To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in the region, obtain allied support in the conflict, and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy forces for use against NATO.
- To have Japan provide for its own defense, including SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, and if possible, contribute more broadly to regional defense efforts.
- To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in the USSR's Far Eastern territories.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To transform our relationship with Japan into an active defense partnership in which Japan significantly increases its own defense capabilities and, over time, contributes more broadly to regional defense.
- To continue to develop our relationship with the PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for closer future cooperation as appropriate.
- To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there, and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence, primarily by assisting the ROK to become increasingly self-sufficient in its defense capabilities.
- To increase peacetime planning with our allies for wartime contingencies.
- To have other regional states assume a greater share of the responsibility for the common defense and assist them in improving their capabilities to fulfill it.
- To improve the support of regional states for U.S. power projection from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
- To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia from which to foster actions inimical to our interests and those of our allies.

D. Western Hemisphere

The defense of North America is this nation's primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain strategic nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements among Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion. The U.S. must continue to build on interests shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.

Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central American region, is an area with which we are closely associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders, our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the Caribbean to Europe.

The South American continent is also a focus of major U.S. interests. Though strategically less pivotal to us than the Caribbean, South America includes several nations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations and which are among our most important trade partners. In addition, the east coast of South America faces the South Atlantic sea routes which represent a major petroleum lifeline for Europe and the United States.

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To defend North America (including Hawaii, Alaska and the contiguous Caribbean Basin).
- To neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in the Caribbean Basin.
- To control LOCs in the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and South Pacific including the Panama Canal.
- To prevent further aggression and subversion against regional states by forces hostile to U.S. interests.

Peacetime Military Objectives

- To modernize the strategic air defense system for North America.
- To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada and other areas in Latin America.
- To broaden regional military-to-military contacts and seek the active military cooperation of key countries in regional territorial defense, in the security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and South Pacific sea lines of communication and in facilitating air and ocean movement.

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- To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and facilities access, logistical support, and operating, transit, and overflight rights.
- To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S. military presence in the region.

E. Africa. Africa's mineral resources (including oil), plus its strategic location astride the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic (and therefore political) terms; the military requirement for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets (and Libya) control over key African states and territory from which they could interdict the supply of minerals and oil from Africa and the Middle East. In case of a military struggle for control of the Middle East, Africa is important as a strategic territory for the movement of major Western forces to the area via the Mediterranean, across North Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally important, as a base for facilities from which both air and naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, around the Cape, and the south Atlantic.

In peacetime, in addition to being a major source for minerals important to U.S., West European, and Japanese industry, Africa remains an important area for the political contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal elements currently available are economic, security assistance, and special operations. Successful implementation of a counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the development of a climate of supportive Congressional and public opinion, and the restoration of substantial "internal security" and covert action capabilities.

Wartime and Crisis Objectives

- To employ air and naval forces to neutralize Soviet or other hostile forces (especially Libya) in strategic locations in the region and adjacent waters.
- To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the region's mineral resources, key facilities, and LOCs.

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Peacetime Military Objectives

- To gain base access and transit rights in pro-Western African states for the deployment and subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa, Southwest Asia, South Atlantic, and contiguous areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access.
- To assist countries throughout Africa that are the targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions.

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DISCUSSION AND ISSUE PAPERS

Discussion Paper:	Threat to US National Security	Tab I
Discussion Paper:	Role of Allies and Others	Tab II
Issue Paper:	Conventional Force Capability for Southwest Asia	Tab III
Discussion Paper:	Determination of Priorities; NATO and Southwest Asia	Tab IV

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NLS M1294 #3 + M1295 #3

BY BMF, NARA, DATE 11/3/05

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NSSD 1-82 Part IIIA:
Threats to United States National Security

DISCUSSION PAPER

Issue: Is the Soviet Union more likely to employ military force in the 1980s directly against the US and its allies than is currently believed by the Intelligence Community?

A: Analysis:

We do not believe that at present the USSR intends to initiate military action directly against the US or its allies, but rather sees its military power primarily as the necessary backdrop for exerting pressure along the Soviet periphery and elsewhere. The strategic nuclear power of US, the credibility of US commitments to allies and friends, US and allied war potential, the US ability to project its military power all encourage the Soviets to be cautious in employing their own politico-military power. There are, however, a number of factors whose impact on Soviet readiness to employ their own military force or that of their proxies remains obscure and that might encourage the Soviets to use force more explicitly and directly in ways that could lead to US-Soviet confrontation.

B. Factors:

1. Soviet Perceptions of the US Will to Act: In recent years, Soviet willingness to employ military force or to encourage its proxies to do so was encouraged by perceptions of a lack of US will to respond to Soviet actions. The current US military buildup is dispelling such Soviet perceptions to some extent. However, US inability to sustain its military buildup or the growth of isolationist sentiments in the US might persuade Soviet leaders of US inability or unwillingness to resist Soviet aggression. The recrudescence of such Soviet perceptions would increase the danger of US-Soviet confrontation and encourage the Soviets to believe that in such confrontation the US would blink first.
2. Cohesion of Anti-Soviet Forces: Currently, the cohesion of anti-Soviet forces and the credibility of US commitments to its allies and friends act as critical deterrents to Soviet aggression. If the Soviets perceive that the US is withdrawing from key commitments or if key US friends (e.g., Saudi Arabia) or allies (e.g., West Germany) appear as though they are backing away from their ties to the US, the barriers to Soviet aggression would be significantly lowered. The spread of neutralism in Western Europe or the deterioration of Sino-US relations would probably alter Soviet perceptions of the cohesion of anti-Soviet forces and encourage the Soviets to believe they could use military force with lower risk.

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3. Soviet Perceptions of Opportunities or Threats in Contiguous Areas: To some extent, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 was encouraged by the Iranian revolution and rapid deterioration of the US position in Southwest Asia. Greater disarray or instability in areas contiguous to the USSR - especially, Iran, Iraq, or Pakistan--might tempt the Soviets to intervene and create more favorable conditions for doing so. The Soviets might also become more willing to employ military force in contiguous areas if the US appeared to be reestablishing its presence in a major way--in Iran, for instance - so that it appeared as a threat to Soviet security.
4. Soviet Perceptions of US Military Modernization: We believe that the Soviets are concerned about current US modernization programs but probably anticipate that US defense spending will be tempered by domestic resistance. Their perception could change if US military modernization continues. The Soviets may grow increasingly concerned about the security and adequacy of their land-based strategic forces and may become willing to break out of the limits for strategic forces in the SALT II draft agreement, or to abrogate the ABM treaty. Major technological breakthroughs by either side would destabilize the strategic equation and enhance unpredictability that might lead to US-Soviet confrontation.
5. Soviet Economic Difficulties: Despite increasing pressures on its economy, we believe that current Soviet leaders are probably prepared to accept sacrifices to sustain the expansion of their military forces. Potential Western exploitation of Soviet economic weaknesses already troubles the Soviets. The "Threat" paper states that we do not see a Soviet "window of opportunity," but if economic pressures on the USSR and its allies, especially energy shortages, produce greater barriers to investment in military modernization or provoke significantly greater unrest in the Eastern Bloc, Soviet leaders conceivably could conclude that they had best act while they are still able to, especially against targets in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
6. Vulnerabilities of Empire: The fissiparous tendencies in the Soviet empire are currently manageable. Were these conditions to deteriorate significantly, however, the Soviets would be tempted to use military force to overcome them. They would certainly do so in Eastern Europe and might in more remote areas as well. The Soviets, for example, might use military force against Pakistan to cut off assistance to the Afghan rebels or support Vietnamese use of force against Cambodian sanctuaries in Thailand.

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7. Soviet Leadership Changes. Perhaps the greatest imponderable involves the likelihood of new leadership in the USSR in the near future. We believe that Brezhnev's likely successors will continue existing Soviet policies. However, the passing of Brezhnev from the scene might bring into power a group which would press for still more rapid military modernization in the USSR and might be tempted to use military instruments more openly and frequently than Brezhnev's coterie. Such a group might believe that, in the 1980s--unlike the 1960s--the US would have to retreat from such a confrontation. Alternatively, the new leadership may seek accommodation with the US in order to reduce defense spending and put its economic house in order. In any event, Brezhnev's successors are likely to have little experience in foreign affairs and less of a stake in Brezhnev's policies.

~~TOP SECRET~~NLS M/294 #5 & M/295 #5NSSD 1-82, Part III, ~~SB~~^{not} tion B, NARA, DATE 11/3/05The Role of Allies and Others
Discussion PaperTopic

Outside Europe, what role should our friends and allies play in helping the US to defend common interests?

Key Considerations

• Rather than attacking NATO directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside Europe, while at the same time hoping to erode the Alliance's political consensus. While direct military conflict outside Europe between the US and the USSR is less probable than conflict resulting from regional tensions, the Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to probe at or create distractions away from US vital interests through political pressure, subversion, or the use of surrogate forces. Consequently, the US, its allies, and friends must be prepared to deal with threats to common interests outside NATO.

• Outside Europe the threats to local and regional stability which do not involve the Soviet Union directly are sufficiently numerous that planning for US direct involvement in defense of Western interests in all such contingencies would require far larger forces than currently programmed in the five year defense plan and would risk the diminution of US capabilities to oppose the Soviets.

• Non-US forces dealing with non-Soviet threats diminish the possibility of superpower confrontation.

• At the same time, potential or actual US direct military involvement is an essential ingredient in deterring or countering Soviet military aggression anywhere in the world.

• Moreover, US forces tailored for Soviet threats are generally capable of meeting lesser non-Soviet threats, if necessary and appropriate.

• However, in order for US military capabilities to be fully effective in deterring or countering Soviet aggression or in dealing with non-Soviet threats, the US needs allied/friendly assistance: access to facilities en route or in the region of conflict, host nation logistical support, etc.

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- Coalition combat forces, with regional and/or allied elements, would further enhance US capabilities for both deterrence and warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

- Outside Europe the US will place primary reliance upon regional states to deal militarily with non-Soviet threats, providing US security assistance as appropriate.

- In Southwest Asia the US will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles beyond their own borders.

- The US will remain the primary military power for directly resisting the Soviets.

- If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not, however, be necessary to tailor significantly US forces to hedge against such contingencies.

- The effectiveness of US military capabilities will depend upon access to facilities en route or in the region of conflict and upon other forms of logistical support. The US will seek such support through negotiated agreements if possible, using security assistance as remuneration to host governments if necessary.

- While encouraging all our NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal defense resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out of area and European missions.

- We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burdens outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the US. Against the Soviets, Allied assistance would enhance deterrence and help contain the conflict, if deterrence failed. In non-Soviet contingencies, Allied involvement, if appropriate and possible, might be preferable to US involvement and could diminish the possibility of superpower confrontation.

- Regional forces should also be encouraged, when appropriate, to be prepared to assist the US in combat against the Soviets.

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ISSUE PAPER

Issue

What conventional force capability should be developed by the end of this decade to counter the Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Southwest Asia (SWA)?

Options

- Option A: To enhance deterrence by improving our capability to deploy, support, and sustain military forces against a Soviet attack in Southwest Asia. (DOD)
- Option B: To acquire sufficient capability to have reasonable assurance of achieving U.S. wartime objectives in Southwest Asia while seeking to limit the likelihood of expansion of the conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines of communication. (STATE)

Facts

- ° The United States has two primary security interests in Southwest Asia: First, to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the region; second, to maintain continued western access to Persian Gulf oil. In wartime, our key objectives are to maintain control of and protect the Persian Gulf oilfields, transshipment points, and lines of communications essential to Western security.
- ° The Soviet Union possesses a marked advantage to deploy and sustain forces in Southwest Asia. That advantage will remain throughout the decade.
- ° The Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on other fronts at least as attractive as ours.
- ° In order to project and sustain U.S. forces in Southwest Asia, the U.S. is and will remain dependent on substantial support from regional and extraregional friends and allies.

Description of Options

- ° Both options employ the same basic military components to enhance our deterrent posture: in-theater capabilities (to include substantial and continuous military presence in the Indian Ocean/Southwest Asia), with rapidly deployable forces, a clear commitment to combat Soviet forces in the theater and the potential for escalation. At least in this context, the threat of escalation is and will remain an essential element of U.S. deterrent strategy.
- ° The distinction between the options is in the planned capability of U.S. forces to meet direct Soviet aggression in the region.

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- °° Option A recognizes the Soviet military advantage in the region and the substantial escalatory pressures that would be present in any U.S.-Soviet conflict. This option holds that it is neither physically nor fiscally possible to defend successfully in the Southwest Asian theater alone against a determined Soviet attack. This option would rely on direct combat in the theater and counteroffensives on other fronts early on, in order to dissuade the Soviet Union from continuing its attack and to ensure that the lines of communication to Southwest Asia were under U.S. control.
- °° Option B recognizes that it is in our interest to limit the scope of any conflict with the Soviet Union and that we should not prejudge the inevitability of escalation. Given Soviet advantages in the region and on other fronts, coupled with the potential gains which the Soviet Union could obtain from control over regional oil, the Soviet Union could themselves seek to limit the conflict to the region. This option would commit U.S. forces to engage fully Soviet forces in the region in order to prevent them from gaining control over the Persian Gulf. Soviet forces would not be engaged on other fronts unless the in-theater defense was unsuccessful, until after the Soviet Union widened the war, or unless it is clearly in the U.S. advantage to do so.
- ° Both options recognize and plan for the potential of a U.S.-Soviet conflict in Southwest Asia to become a global war.

Discussion

- ° Due to the global military capabilities of both superpowers and the interrelationship of strategic theaters, any U.S.-Soviet conflict will produce substantial escalating pressures.
- ° It is in the interest of the U.S. to limit any U.S.-Soviet conflict to conventional means. However, deterrence is enhanced by an integrated strategy which compels the Soviet Union to reckon with the probability of nuclear escalation and the resulting risks and costs. Additionally, geographic escalation and nuclear escalation considerations are linked.
- ° In order to project and sustain U.S. forces in Southwest Asia, the U.S. will remain dependent on substantial support from regional and extraregional allies and friends. In order for the entire Rapid Deployment Force to be employed effectively in the region, the United States must secure a substantial increase in assured access, overbuild, basing rights, and other accommodations. We are currently heavily constrained in our ability to ensure the full cooperation of Saudi Arabia because of the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute and domestic Saudi considerations. At the same time, a U.S.-Saudi contingency dialogue is evolving.
- ° Our military assessments indicate that, in the near-term, a successful in-theater defense against a determined Soviet attack cannot be achieved. This means that whatever option is selected for the long-term our current warfighting strategy will necessarily continue to place significant emphasis on geographic escalation.

- ° By acquiring a visible, robust conventional warfighting capability, the United States can hope to frustrate Soviet plans to establish political-military hegemony in the region in peacetime. In wartime, this in-theater capability could provide additional flexibility and may provide the U.S. an alternative to spiraling escalation or defeat.
- ° Whichever option is selected, the U.S. must deal with the realities of force limitation. Mobility forces, for example, would have to be almost entirely committed to the support of Southwest Asia requirements, thereby precluding its availability to simultaneously reinforce NATO.
- ° Option B is clearly more expensive than Option A -- in DOD's view, at least \$70 Billion above the FYDP -- and would provide less flexibility in dealing with budgetary implications of a failure to fund fully the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP)
- ° No effort to limit a conflict to a specific region or front can ever be entirely successful. The requirement to secure lines of communication will drive a certain level of conflict expansion in itself. DOD believes that in order to project forces safely to a war in Southwest Asia, we must attack Soviet bases in Cuba, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, and possibly Libya, and attack worldwide their submarines, surface ships, reconnaissance aircraft, and bombers flying over the oceans.
- ° In State's view, a strategy which implicitly acknowledges that the U.S. will rely on counteroffensives elsewhere to protect its interests in Southwest Asia is unlikely to command the support of regional states, or to build confidence among extraregional allies who will be concerned about the U.S. spreading the conflict to their area. State also feels that such a strategy will implicitly concede Southwest Asia to a determined Soviet attack.

RECOMMENDATION

Option A _____ Option B _____

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DISCUSSION PAPER

TOPIC: In determining broad priorities for the allocation of resources in peacetime and wartime planning, what comes first: NATO or Southwest Asia?

Key Considerations

- ° The security of Western Europe and the assurance of continued access to Persian Gulf oil are both vital to the security of the United States. Given the sustained buildup of Soviet capabilities worldwide and the heightened threat in Southwest Asia, and because U.S. forces for the mid-term are insufficient to achieve all military objectives simultaneously, our strategy will require difficult choices.
- ° Western Europe is vital to the U.S. because of its geostrategic position, economic power and military contribution. For this reason, NATO and the LOCs leading thereto are second only to the defense of North America in priority for global wartime planning.
- ° Southwest Asia is vital to the Western allies (and hence to the U.S.) because the loss of access to Persian Gulf oil would leave Europe and Japan exposed to severe political and economic coercion.
- ° In a major war in either or both theaters, it must be assumed that neither the West nor the East would be able to obtain oil from the Persian Gulf, especially for the first few months. Control of the region during wartime, however, would give either side a significant military advantage.
- ° Unless the United States and its allies undertake a sustained effort to improve their military posture in both NATO and Southwest Asia, we will face a situation that seriously threatens our ability to deter or counter Soviet use of military power for purposes of coercion or direct aggression in both regions.

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Review April 7, 2002

Classified & Extended by William P. Clark

Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/3/05

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- ° Southwest Asia is exposed, and Soviet military posturing in region continues unabated. No combination of regional forces alone, no matter how determined, could prevent Soviet military victory. European NATO members are neither willing nor able to provide substantial combat power to Southwest Asia contingencies. Yet the region is vital to all Western partners. U.S. rapid deployment potential offers the West the best chance of protecting our vital interests.
- ° The maintenance of a credible deterrent and warfighting posture in NATO requires a substantial military effort by all NATO members throughout this decade.
- ° U.S. cannot carry a disproportionate burden of protecting Western interests; burdensharing for both regions is a necessity. However, if the U.S. does less in NATO, European NATO will probably do less. The essence of the dilemma is that the United States does not have the resources to close the gap in both NATO and Southwest Asia.

Discussion

- ° If the U.S. does less in NATO, either in peacetime or in wartime planning, there is potential for weakening NATO cohesion and for reinforcing European pressures for accommodation with the Soviet Union. U.S. actions must be sensitive to Soviet efforts to divide the Alliance.
- ° There is a close strategic connection between NATO and Southwest Asia; a loss of access to regional oil could severely strain the Alliance. There is also a likelihood that Soviet military aggression initiated in either theater would soon involve combat in both theaters.
- ° In order for the U.S. to maintain a credible deterrent, the Soviet Union must be confronted with the prospect of a major conflict with the U.S. should it threaten the oil resources of the Gulf. To achieve this goal, the U.S. must allocate a large investment for capabilities which could be used in Southwest Asia.
- ° U.S. and NATO forces have significant capability to deal with the Soviet threat to Europe now. The same is not true in Southwest Asia.

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- ° In order to meet a wide range of contingencies, our existing and programmed forces emphasize flexibility; they can deploy and operate in a number of threat environments. The current programming emphasis placed on mobility forces significantly contributes to this flexibility.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II
90218

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ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER OOM

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on NSSD 1-82, Friday, April 16, 1982

An NSC Meeting is scheduled for 11:00 a.m., April 16, 1982 to consider the first five segments of the NSSD 1-82 review. At the attachment is the forwarding memo with appropriate background materials for the meeting.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo with accompanying background materials at the Tab and distribute to appropriate agencies.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo with background material

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dy NARA, Date 6/3/03

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Review April 12, 1988

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 10, 1982

MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: April 16 NSC Meeting on NSSD 1-82, US National
Security Strategy

Attached is the final revised version of "The Role of
Allies and Others". Included are a Discussion Paper, Con-
clusions, a Summary, and the paper itself.


L. Paul Bremer, II
Executive Secretary

Attachments

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By MSH NARA, Date 8/26/97

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RDS-3 4/9/02

NLS M129445 M1275*8TOP SECRETBY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/3/05NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section BThe Role of Allies and Others
Discussion PaperTopic

Outside Europe, what role should our friends and allies play in helping the US to defend common interests?

Key Considerations

• Rather than attacking NATO directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside Europe, while at the same time hoping to erode the Alliance's political consensus. While direct military conflict outside Europe between the US and the USSR is less probable than conflict resulting from regional tensions, the Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to probe at or create distractions away from US vital interests through political pressure, subversion, or the use of surrogate forces. Consequently, the US, its allies, and friends must be prepared to deal with threats to common interests outside NATO.

• Outside Europe the threats to local and regional stability which do not involve the Soviet Union directly are sufficiently numerous that planning for US direct involvement in defense of Western interests in all such contingencies would require far larger forces than currently programmed in the five year defense plan and would risk the diminution of US capabilities to oppose the Soviets.

• Non-US forces dealing with non-Soviet threats diminish the possibility of superpower confrontation.

• At the same time, potential or actual US direct military involvement is an essential ingredient in deterring or countering Soviet military aggression anywhere in the world.

• Moreover, US forces tailored for Soviet threats are generally capable of meeting lesser non-Soviet threats, if necessary and appropriate.

• However, in order for US military capabilities to be fully effective in deterring or countering Soviet aggression or in dealing with non-Soviet threats, the US needs allied/friendly assistance: access to facilities en route or in the region of conflict, host nation logistical support, etc.

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• Coalition combat forces, with regional and/or allied elements, would further enhance US capabilities for both deterrence and warfighting vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Conclusions

• Outside Europe the US will place primary reliance upon regional states to deal militarily with non-Soviet threats, providing US security assistance as appropriate.

• In Southwest Asia the US will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles beyond their own borders.

• The US will remain the primary military power for directly resisting the Soviets.

• If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not, however, be necessary to tailor significantly US forces to hedge against such contingencies.

• The effectiveness of US military capabilities will depend upon access to facilities en route or in the region of conflict and upon other forms of logistical support. The US will seek such support through negotiated agreements if possible, using security assistance as remuneration to host governments if necessary.

• While encouraging all our NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal defense resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out of area and European missions.

• We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burdens outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the US. Against the Soviets, Allied assistance would enhance deterrence and help contain the conflict, if deterrence failed. In non-Soviet contingencies, Allied involvement, if appropriate and possible, might be preferable to US involvement and could diminish the possibility of superpower confrontation.

• Regional forces should also be encouraged, when appropriate, to be prepared to assist the US in combat against the Soviets.

End of Discussion Paper

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NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B

The Role of Allies and Others
Conclusions

1. A strong unified NATO is indispensable to protecting Western interests. To attain this goal, the US must press for implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and INF modernization. We must also continue to promote improvement in integrated logistical support (e.g., host nation support -- HNS). For its part, the US must maintain its NATO commitments for forward deployment and early reinforcement.

2. While encouraging all NATO Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their peacetime marginal resources preferentially to dual-purpose capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. We likewise should urge such Allies to share the political and military burdens outside Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or instead of) the US.

3. Outside Europe, the US will place primary reliance on regional states to deal with non-Soviet threats, providing security assistance as appropriate. The US will remain the primary power for directly resisting the Soviets. If no other reasonable alternative exists, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. The effectiveness of US military capabilities for either Soviet or other contingencies will depend on access to facilities en route and in the region of conflict, and on other tangible forms of support (e.g., HNS and prepositioning).

4. In Southwest Asia, the US will support the development of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional contingency roles.

5. In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts (including economic assistance), although we should not now ask Japan to expand its defense responsibility beyond the protection of sea lines of communication out to 1000 nautical miles. We should assist the ROK to become increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities, while maintaining the current US-ROK division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair); and we should work to facilitate increased defense cooperation between Korea and Japan, although it may not be achievable in the near-term. We can also act to enhance the durability of the US-Chinese security relationship, although significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own for that purpose.

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End of Conclusions

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NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B

The Role of Allies and Others
Summary

The US must increasingly draw upon the resources and co-operation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

Europe

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. To attain this goal, the US must seek measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending. Additionally, we should maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities. We should also press for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement programs and continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while pursuing an INF Agreement in Geneva. At the same time, the US should adhere to its own NATO commitment for forward deployed forces and early reinforcement forces and capabilities.

In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, we should pursue with our Allies the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments. As a further cooperative effort, we have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) and Allied civilian airlift/sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe.

However, rather than attacking NATO directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies outside Europe where there is less risk of superpower confrontation, while at the same time hoping to erode Alliance political consensus. The region in which events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA).

Our strategy with respect to out-of-area threats, therefore, should be to encourage all Allies to maintain and

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increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources preferentially to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. En route access is a function that many NATO nations can contribute. Certain Allies can also provide security, economic, and training assistance, peacetime military presence (including participation in combined exercises), and capabilities (including both combat forces and air and sealift) for military operations in the event of hostilities in the region. In our bilateral relations with Turkey, we should seek a satisfactory outcome of the Collocated Operating Base negotiations and further progress on the Turkish military modernization effort to prepare the ground to draw the Turks more deeply into Southwest Asian security planning and to gain support for using their bases for Southwest Asian contingencies. Security assistance represents a vital ingredient for promoting Turkish force modernization and gaining Turkish cooperation in Southwest Asian contingencies.

Southwest Asia (SWA)

We should support the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats, with emphasis on certain key states for regional contingency roles.

We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those forces as intended for such missions. In Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies can augment our combat capabilities and provide en route or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be maintaining a hedge against the possibility of having to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

Given current political realities and military requirements, we should concentrate on access, improvement of facilities, HNS, and prepositioning in Egypt and Oman. In Saudi Arabia, we should seek through contingency discussions to identify the facilities and support which would be available to deploying US forces. We should also continue to examine the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for both regional contingencies and Soviet aggression against Pakistan. Israeli capabilities could provide a considerable

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benefit during direct Soviet attacks in SWA or in a US-Soviet war which involved hostilities in the Mediterranean.

However, because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin

The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia when other demands on US forces (e.g., Persian Gulf) also are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state to provide for its own defense, with US security assistance where required. However, recent fears of US withdrawal from the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if US pressure for greater local/regional defense efforts were seen as a ploy for reducing US forces and commitments.

Japan is willing to be responsible for its self-defense and for protection of the US-Japanese sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. We should not now ask the Japanese to assume any active defense roles beyond this geographic area. We should, however, develop a broad strategy for seeking a substantial increase in Japanese defense efforts. We should also continue to press Japan to bring its POL, munitions, other war reserve stocks, and related infrastructure up to full inventory objectives.

We can act to enhance the durability of the US-Chinese strategic relationship, but significant improvement in Chinese military capabilities to oppose the Soviet Union and tie down additional Soviet resources can only come if and as China can devote substantial additional resources of its own to that purpose. We should seek closer US-PRC security coordination regarding Thailand and Pakistan. The US and the PRC might also cooperate to service the Soviet equipment of states we wish to disengage from Soviet arms relationships.

Our policy toward the ROK should seek to make that country increasingly self-sufficient for its defense capabilities, backed up by a continued US force presence, a US security guarantee, and a steady, reliable security assistance program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would be helpful. We should also work to facilitate increased defense cooperation

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between Japan and Korea, although such cooperation may not be realistic in the near future.

In Southeast Asia, the US relies primarily on local states to deal with internal instability supported by US security assistance as necessary. Should external threats or externally supported security problems require direct outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government with the forces of other states of the region, while seeking to maintain US flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

Latin America

The primary Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war with the Soviet Union, US forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba (and if necessary Nicaragua) as a potential base for operations against the US or its lines of communication. In the South Atlantic and Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contribute to the defense of vital sea lines of communication.

The US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention of external allies, although we should seek to keep the remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region. US military forces therefore represent the essential backup. In some instances, we may seek facilities access (e.g., Honduras) to allow us to project power into the region.

Africa

Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, and Kenya have already offered to provide facilities access to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US and/or Allied rapid reaction forces.

We will rely primarily on local and regional forces, to respond to most local and regional threats. We must, however, be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security and peacekeeping efforts would probably be necessary.

End of Summary

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NSSD 1-82, Part III, Section B

The Role of Allies and Others

This paper surveys the international security environment and assesses cooperative defense roles for US allies and friends. The survey is by region (Europe, Southwest Asia, East Asia and the Pacific Basin, Latin America and Africa), with reference to transregional cooperation where appropriate. In each section, the paper considers the extent to which US programs and resource allocation decisions are dependent on the defense programs and military capabilities of our allies and friends. It also examines the extent to which the nature and size of allied and friendly contributions affect our common ability to deter and defend.

Introduction

Since the establishment of a Western security framework in the years immediately following World War II, global power relationships have shifted in several ways. First, there has been a shift in the US-USSR nuclear balance from clear US superiority to a state of rough parity with the prospect of US inferiority. Equally marked, however, is the altered balance, especially in economic and political terms, between the US and its industrial allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably larger share of the world product than the US. In addition, the post World War II decolonization process has made the industrial democracies increasingly dependent for a number of critical resources upon nations of the Third World, some of which are vulnerable to Soviet and proxy activity and many of which find it easier to blame their problems on the West than to face up to them directly.

As a result of these changes, the US must increasingly draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources as well. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to probe.

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Europe

A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protection of Western interests. Although US conventional military power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense and that they expect to have a greater voice in Alliance decisions.

Western interests require the improvement of the defense capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during periods of economic difficulty. The US must emphasize the need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to redress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. While nuclear forces, particularly US nuclear forces, are essential to deterrence, they do not constitute a balanced defense force and should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for avoiding conventional defense improvements. We should, therefore, press for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, reinforcement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW, and C³), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF modernization program, while the US and the Soviets continue to negotiate an INF Agreement in Geneva.

Concomitantly, the US should adhere to its forward deployment and early reinforcement commitment of having ten Army divisions with corresponding Air Force and Marine support in Europe within ten days of a reinforcement decision. Notwithstanding the fact that our NATO Allies contribute a majority of the active ground combat and tactical air forces and two-thirds of the total (active and reserve) NATO force structure, US force commitments -- particularly ground combat and tacair commitments -- are required by the sheer magnitude of the direct Soviet threat which is unparalleled in any other strategic theater. Allied doubts about our willingness to maintain a significant ground and tacair commitment would undercut our efforts to press them to improve their own conventional capabilities and would risk lowering of the nuclear threshold.

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In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabilities and the efficiency of resource allocations, member nations must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their defense efforts beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense of national preferences. To that end, we should pursue opportunities with our Allies for the development and production of interoperable and/or standardized armaments which yield increased combat effectiveness and more efficient use of defense resources. At the same time, we must recognize that there are limits on standardization (e.g., the desire of each major NATO nation to design and procure its own tanks and tactical aircraft). Our goals should be realistic and emphasize interoperability as a complement or an alternative to standardization.

As a further effort at cooperation and integration, we have obtained or are seeking host nation support (HNS) from our NATO Allies. [REDACTED]

In addition, we have signed Line-of-Communications (LOC) and Collocated Operating Base (COB) agreements with many NATO countries which also involve substantial HNS. Our European Allies also have agreed to make available some of their own civilian airlift and sealift to support the reinforcement and resupply of Europe (although there is room for further improvement in this area).

Because of their geographic location and industrial resources, we should continue to support the sovereignty, independence and neutrality of the European neutral/non-aligned countries. Accordingly, we should assist these nations in developing sufficient conventional military capability to protect their territorial integrity and independence, while accepting the fact that their policies dictate they maintain a distance between East and West.

Rather than attacking the Alliance directly, the Soviets are more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside Europe where there is less risk of superpower confrontation, while at the same time hoping to erode NATO's political consensus. The region in which events could most severely test Alliance cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA), where the West faces two interrelated threats.

The larger threat is that of direct Soviet military intervention. Only the United States has the power to deter or counter Soviet intervention in SWA. With the exception of naval

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forces, European support in such a contingency would be more significant politically than militarily. The more proximate threats, however, arise out of regional conflict and domestic instability in the regional states. European powers, acting in concert with regional states, have the capability of responding to some lower order threats and may in some cases be better placed to do so. Additionally, intervention by European instead of American forces would generally be a less escalatory step and would provide less of a pretext for Soviet intervention in a regional conflict.

Thus, in addition to asking the Allies to improve the defense posture in Europe (including in some cases compensation for US forces diverted to SWA), we must continue to urge those Allies in a position to do so (primarily the UK and France) to share the political and military burdens outside Europe in areas where regional conflicts and internal strife as well as Soviet threats could harm Western interests. Such burden sharing outside Europe should include being prepared to fight along side (or instead of) the US. Such Allied assistance out-of-area could, in some cases, compensate for specific US force deficiencies against the Soviet threat (e.g., French minesweeping capabilities for SWA contingencies). We should also pursue bilateral arrangements with some of the Allies (e.g., combined contingency planning such as took place with the UK and France during the first phase of the Iran-Iraq War).



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[REDACTED]

We also need mobility support (both lift and facilities access) for US forces that might be deployed to either NATO or SWA. Building upon their political and economic relations with countries in SWA, the Allies can provide security, economic and training assistance to local states. According to their capabilities, certain Allies can cooperate in maintaining peacetime military presence, conducting combined exercises in SWA, and enhancing their capabilities for military operations in the event of hostilities. In addition, we would expect former colonial powers to play a leading role in external security assistance in Africa.

[REDACTED]

We must, however, recognize that only a few European countries, primarily the UK and France, have the capabilities to influence events outside Europe, and even they are not fully committed to out-of-area combined security efforts. The FRG has the capabilities but is inhibited by its history and the current legal interpretation of its constitution from such a role, except for economic and in some cases security assistance.

In brief, our strategy should be one which encourages all Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe while specifically encouraging those who can contribute outside Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities which could support both out-of-area and European missions. At the same time, our own efforts in other regions (e.g., SWA) of necessity are relatively independent of what our Allies contribute.

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Southwest Asia (SWA)

The security environment in SWA bears little resemblance to that in Europe. The greater likelihood of regional conflicts and/or internal instabilities considerably complicates the problems of security planning. Moreover, not only is there no formal security framework, but the Arab-Israeli and other regional conflicts sometime set our regional friends against one another. Nonetheless, while an alliance structure is unobtainable, a set of well-defined bilateral security cooperation relationships should be pursued.

For direct response to regional (non-Soviet) conflicts and local instability, the US will rely primarily upon forces indigenous to the region (or in some cases UN peacekeeping forces), with the possibility of ultimately backing them up with quick reaction forces from the US, if necessary, and from our European Allies, if possible and appropriate. For non-US contingency forces, US lift may be necessary. Such a division of responsibility is both politically advisable and necessary to preserve the flexibility of US forces for involvement in contingencies with the Soviets.

In order to contain such crises and ensure that direct US military involvement is not required or is minimal, regional states will require capabilities which are sufficient to respond to contingencies without outside augmentation. To that end, regional states will need access to arms, logistical support, technological expertise, and training. Some states, e.g., Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan, will require security assistance to pay for these arms and associated transfers. Some will also require economic assistance to help maintain stability, absorb the impact of military spending, and deny opportunities which could be exploited by the Soviets and their proxies. The United States, together with other external allies and the more affluent states of the region, must be prepared to provide such assistance.

Should external military assistance be necessary to maintain the security of a friendly regional state in the face of non-Soviet threats and/or to foreclose opportunities for subversion or intervention by Soviet surrogates, the prime candidates to aid embattled governments should be other regional states. To ensure that such capabilities exist within the region, the US will support the establishment and maintenance of appropriate regional contingency forces by certain key regional states. The US would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift for such forces.

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If additional or alternative assistance is necessary, US allies from outside the region, e.g., the UK or France, may, if possible and appropriate, be preferable to the US both politically (for the recipient) and in order to avoid escalating to the possibility of a superpower confrontation. US lift support may be necessary, however. In any case, the US should also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local conflicts. It should not be necessary, however, to tailor significant US forces to hedge against such contingencies.

In response to the threat of direct Soviet aggression (which the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted), only the US can provide the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to deter or counter a Soviet attack. However, the US cannot stand alone. Without the cooperation and participation of friendly regional states and external allies, we are unlikely either to deter the Soviets or to contain conflict to the region. In this regard, the capabilities of regional states (and possibly of certain European Allies) to respond to lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will also contribute to deterring or countering the Soviets. In particular, friendly regional air defense capabilities can cover the initial projection of US forces into SWA. Israeli capabilities could also provide a considerable benefit in contingencies involving direct Soviet attacks into the region and in a war involving US and Soviet naval/air forces in the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the US will have to provide the primary forces for resisting the Soviets.

Moreover, because of continuing political sensitivities in the region, it is important that US rapid deployment capabilities be perceived as focusing on the Soviet threat. Such emphasis by the US should make easier the task of drawing our European Allies into regional security efforts and should help allay regional concerns regarding unsolicited US involvement in purely local/regional security affairs.

Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of many of our regional friends, however, their willingness to appear closely associated with the US is limited by the political vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the closeness of US-Israeli relations. Consequently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be pursued with both persistence and flexibility.

As in Europe, the US cannot militarily help regional states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional

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facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the value of facilities access both for deterrence and during contingencies, such cooperation must, if possible, be manifest in peacetime through public agreements, contingency planning and/or exercises. In some instances, infrastructure improvements will also be necessary, most likely involving US military construction funds. In addition, both to demonstrate cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities militarily, the US must seek host nation logistical support (HNS) and facilities at which to preposition certain types of US equipment and supplies.



To bolster both our capability and our credibility with regional states regarding our intent to participate in their defense against Soviet threats, the US will need to maintain

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an important peacetime presence in the region. In the near-term, we will maintain US presence by continuous naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and operations in the Persian Gulf as well as by periodic Army and Air Force deployments to the region to participate in combined exercises with local friends and external allies. In the longer-term, we must seek arrangements to allow forward deployments of US ground, naval, and air forces in the region, including forward elements of the RDJTF, should the political environment permit.

In conclusion, we should support (through our own and allied security assistance) the development of balanced and self-contained forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats, with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Pakistan for regional contingency roles. We should size and structure US forces for contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those forces as intended for such missions. Additionally with respect to Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies can augment our combat capabilities, as well as provide en route or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or regional contingencies.

East Asia and the Pacific Basin


The amount and extent of the Japanese defense effort is limited by its constitution and history. Nevertheless, Japan and the US have agreed on a division of defense responsibilities. Japan's Prime Minister has indicated that Japan can provide legally for the self-defense of its territory, its surrounding seas and skies, and the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles from the Home Islands. The Japanese should be encouraged to contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. To the extent that their contribution does increase, it will increase the flexibility to use US forces for other missions in the Pacific or elsewhere.



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The PRC causes the Soviets to devote resources against it that might otherwise go elsewhere. In addition, it provides a constraint upon Vietnamese actions against Thailand. It also lends political-military support and Third World credibility to US opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Angola (though not in other areas such as Latin America).



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capabilities so long as China is unwilling or unable to allocate substantial resources of its own to that purpose. We also should seek closer US-PRC coordination on security relations with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through China for a Pacific air line of communication to Southwest Asia. The US and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet equipment inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from Soviet arms relationships.

In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a beneficial role in supporting US interests in East Asia. Our policy should be directed at making the ROK increasingly self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities. At present, by virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with forward deployed US forces now in the region, maintains stability on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic strength of its economy (despite its current problems) is such that the ROK should be able to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the US force presence, security guarantee, and FMS program. Additional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. Any increases in Korean defense investment, however, should maintain the current division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces and predominantly US tacair).

In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both Australia and New Zealand are seeking to improve security cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally, and through the Five Power Defense Arrangement which includes the UK. Such cooperation strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/Soviet threat in the region. Australia also could provide expanded base and other support facilities, in addition to its potential direct military contribution in the Indian Ocean as well as the Southeast Asian region.

The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which are important to US security interests in Asia. The Philippines provide a major and perhaps irreplaceable US base network for support of our military posture in the region and en route access to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en route access. In return, the US helps these two countries deal with their security problems and supports Thailand as a buffer against Vietnamese expansionism, essentially through security assistance.

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As in Southwest Asia, the US relies in Southeast Asia primarily on local states to deal directly with internal instability, with US and other security assistance as necessary. Should external threats or externally supported security problems require direct outside assistance, the US would in the first instance look for ways to support the threatened government's own efforts with the forces of other states of the region, while seeking to maintain our own flexibility to deal with direct Soviet threats.

The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia at a time when extraregional demands on US forces (e.g., Persian Gulf) also are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state to provide for its own defense, with US security assistance where required. However, recent fears of US withdrawal from the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if US pressure on East Asian states for greater defense efforts were seen as a ploy for reducing US forces and commitments.

Latin America

The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet Union, US military forces would be responsible for neutralizing Cuba as a potential base for operations against the US or its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a staging area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean or Pacific lines of communication, the US would also be responsible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic and South Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contribute to the defense of sea lines of communication, through access for US forces and the employment of their own naval forces. Additional analysis, however, is required to determine the parameters of such cooperation.

As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the US would prefer to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political support and emphasize security and economic assistance. In some instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to project power into the region. We should also seek to keep the remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region.

Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention

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of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America, and we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot gain their support.

US military forces, therefore, represent the essential backup should local forces be unable to counter the insurgencies. We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ US forces under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio Treaty or a sub-regional grouping such as the Central American Democratic Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Africa

The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa through the use of surrogates, chief among them Libya and Cuba. Because of Libya's international behavior, the US has sought to rein in its activities through political and military means. While we would prefer to deal with Libyan threats exclusively through friendly states and must help those states to strengthen their military capabilities so they can stand up to Libya, we must be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situation warrant it.

Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states of the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater. In Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and perhaps Zaire and Liberia, in return for our providing security assistance, host nations can provide facilities access (either en route or final destination) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with US or Allied rapid reaction forces.

Against other local and regional threats, we rely primarily on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist with security and economic assistance, and we ask our external allies and affluent friends to do the same. In former colonial areas, we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take the lead where external assistance is necessary. France, the UK, and Belgium are the major actors in that regard. We may also support regional peacekeeping efforts such as the OAU in Chad. US lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional security efforts probably would be necessary.

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FROM MYER

DOCDATE 08 APR 82

*WJD
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KEYWORDS: AGENDA
NSSD

NSC

SUBJECT: AGENDA FOR 16 APRIL NSC MTG RE NSSD 1-82

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR

Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. William Schneider
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget

Mr. L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Meehan
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Colonel Charles F. Stebbins
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: NSSD 1-82, Review of US National Security Strategy (C)

A National Security Council meeting has been scheduled for April 16, 1982 at 11:00 a.m., in the Cabinet Room to discuss the US national security strategy review. (C)

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment

Agenda

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M20 NARA, Date 8/26/99

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Review April 8, 1988

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A G E N D A

1. NSSD 1-82, Review of US National Security Strategy Clark
 - Part I, National Objectives
 - Part II, Implementing Strategies
 - Part III, Sections A-C: Threat, Role of Allies, Regional Military Objectives

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By mjp NARA, Date 8/26/99

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MEMORANDUM

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ACTION

April 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER oau
SUBJECT: NSC Meeting on NSSD 1-82

Signed

The NSC meeting on NSSD 1-82 has now been confirmed for 11:00 a.m., April 16. The attendees and agenda listed at the attachment have been discussed and approved by Mr. McFarlane.

Background material cannot be forwarded until several issues are resolved at an Interagency Review Group meeting to be held on April 12.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign memo at Tab I.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Memo
 A Agenda

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*msd
8/26/99*

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Date: 8 APRIL 1982

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OSD, DEPT OF DEFENSE

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WILLIAM SCHNEIDER

OMB, 262 OEOB

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THOMAS CORMACK

CIA

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CHARLES STEBBINS

JCS, DEPT OF DEFENSE

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James G. Sullivan
Chief, Exec. Sec. Registry

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