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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

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**File Folder** ROMANIA - CABLES (3)

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
186957	PAPER	[PG. 2 ONLY]	1	2/4/1983	B1 B3
186930	PAPER	<i>D 1/9/2017 F1640/3 NLR-145-5-21-4-8#186930</i>	1	2/4/1983	B1 B3
186931	PAPER	RE. CEAUSESCU [PG. 2 ONLY]	1	2/19/1983	B1 B3
186932	PAPER	RE. ROMANIA	1	3/5/1983	B1 B3
186933	REPORT	RE. ROMANIA: CEAUSESCU UNDER PRESSURE [PARTIAL; PGS. 12-14 ONLY] <i>PAR 1/9/2017 F1640/3 #186933</i>	3	3/7/1983	B1 B3
186942	CABLE	BUCHAREST 6656	1	8/5/1983	B1

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186948	REPORT	RE. ROMANIA [PG. 2 ONLY]	1	10/10/1983	B1 B3
186950	CABLE	RE. INF	6	1/4/1984	B1
186953	PAPER	RE. ROMANIA [PG. 3 ONLY]	1	9/20/1984	B1 B3
186954	MEMO	ROBERT KIMMITT TO PAULA DOBRIANSKY RE. SECRETARY SHULTZ'S EVENING REPORT	1	9/27/1984	B1
186955	CABLE	RE. VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY MANEA MANESCU	4	10/2/1984	B1
186956	PAPER	RE. ROMANIA [PG. 3 ONLY]	1	1/2/1985	B1

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ROMANIA

Romania is a highly centralized communist state. The Communist Party, led since 1965 by Romania's current President, Nicolae Ceausescu, directs every significant aspect of life in the country.

Romania, with an annual per capita GNP of approximately \$2,100, has made considerable economic progress over the last four decades, changing from a largely agricultural country to one with a significant industrial sector. Romania has suffered serious economic setbacks in recent years, however, and in the last two years the standard of living has declined.

In the area of human rights there are major discrepancies between Romanian law and the nation's international commitments on the one hand and the Government's internal practices on the other. Political dissent and deviation from the party's policies are not tolerated. The use of intimidation and, to a lesser extent, physical pressure to discourage such activities is well-documented. The Romanian population is convinced of the omnipotence, capriciousness, and relentlessness of the Government's extensive security apparatus, and most Romanians either resort to private intrigues to circumvent the system or respond apathetically to it rather than pursue active resistance to the Government's policies and practices. The Government maintains a firm anti-emigration policy, but allows relatively large numbers of its citizens to emigrate, mainly for family reunification. It exercises close supervision over religious and cultural activities. The official Romanian response, thus far, to international concerns regarding Romania's human rights practices generally has been limited to action on individual cases.

1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, including  
Freedom from:

a. Killing

There are no documented cases of officially-inspired murder for political motives within Romania. However, there have been several reports of Romanian security personnel attacking or threatening individuals resident outside of the country. The most recent report involves a plot, revealed on August 31, 1982, to assassinate two expatriate Romanian writers in France, Paul Goma and Virgil Tanase, because of their criticism of President Ceausescu and his Government.

b. Disappearance

Reports of politically-motivated disappearances in Romania occasionally appear in the West. Many of these reports are from international organizations concerning well-documented

#### d. Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Reports continue of verbal threats, strong psychological coercion, and physical abuse of Romanian citizens by the Government, particularly in cases of political dissidents, intending emigrants, and religious activists. Conditions of confinement reportedly are poor and deteriorating, with continuing reports of physical abuse, overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, inadequate diets, long working hours, and minimal medical care. Prisoners occasionally are kept in near or complete isolation and at times are refused access to their families for as long as six months.

Rehabilitation through work is common under the Romanian system of justice, and the vast majority of prisoners must work while in prison. There are reports that labor camps exist in Romania, despite frequent denials by the Government. In addition, the so-called "forced domicile system" is a common form of punishment. This may involve work without wages and transfer to a workplace far from the prisoner's home. Because "forced domicile" rarely involves incarceration, it is generally considered a more lenient form of punishment by Romanians.

At least one execution for an "economic crime" took place in 1982. There continue to be reports that some prisoners and dissidents are confined and treated in psychiatric hospitals because of their political and religious beliefs. Confirmation (or credible refutation) of these reports, however, has been extremely difficult to obtain.

#### e. Arbitrary Arrest and Imprisonment

Police harassment and threats are a common feature of life in Romania, especially for those who are politically or religiously active beyond the narrow limits permitted by the Communist Party and the Government. Such activists are often subjected to arbitrary arrest, long periods of interrogation, confinement without charge, and occasionally even physical abuse. Reports that individuals are dismissed from their jobs and subsequently accused of "parasitism" (not having a job) or other lesser offenses not directly tied to their political or religious activities, are not uncommon. Political prisoners are rarely allowed to work outside of prison and are generally segregated from other prisoners. Romanian law does not provide for habeas corpus, and no effective legal remedy exists for persons held without charge. Detention without charge for short periods (2-4 days) occurs frequently.

On December 29, in honor of the 35th anniversary of the founding of the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Romanian Government for the first time since the early 1970's issued a full pardon for a large number of those incarcerated in the country's prisons. With certain exceptions, all those with

common practice for the Government to open the prosecution's case to the defense only a day or two before the trial. "Emergency trials" may be used to try and sentence a defendant in less than 48 hours.

#### g. Invasion of the Home

Despite the constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of the home, there continue to be numerous reports of forced entry into homes without a warrant. A substantial number of these reports involve political and religious dissidents.

### 2. Respect for Civil and Political Rights, Including:

#### a. Freedom of Speech and Press

In practice, there are no civil or political liberties beyond those allowed by the Communist Party and Government. The Constitution guarantees the full range of political and civil liberties, but prohibits the use of such liberties "for aims hostile to the socialist system," and thus restricts their practice to conform strictly with the views of the Government and the party. All civil and political expression is closely monitored. Independent criticism, open discussion of political, social, or economic conditions, or advocacy of change in any of those spheres is not tolerated. Any overt challenge to basic party policies or senior political personalities is normally met with harsh reprisal.

The printed word is government-controlled, and Western publications are only rarely available. Some entities, such as certain religious groups, are allowed to publish non-government-sponsored materials, but such publications are few in number and always within the guidelines set by the Government. Unauthorized importation or distribution of literature of any sort is strictly forbidden and has resulted in substantial fines and prison terms, particularly in cases involving Bibles and other religious literature. Several Romanian Christians were imprisoned during 1982 for distributing Bibles without the authorities' consent. Eleven ethnic Hungarians allegedly were arrested in November for publication of an underground journal, "Ellenpontok" or "Counterpoint." The eighth issue reportedly was sent to the Madrid Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and claimed that Hungarians in Romania were threatened with cultural extinction.

#### b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

No assemblies may be held, or organizations or associations formed, without government approval. There are no organizations or associations which actively encourage thought or expression beyond that permitted by the Communist Party and the Government. Although trade unions exist and play a limited



for unauthorized contact with their co-religionists. Attendance at functions sponsored by foreigners is carefully controlled, and regular attendance has led to interrogation, detainment, and occasionally to physical abuse. Telephone calls, particularly international calls, are monitored, and there is evidence that international mail is routinely opened, perused, and sometimes destroyed. In the last year there have been indications that the Government has increased its efforts to discourage Romanian contacts with foreigners at all levels. In 1982, a tax equivalent to 20 percent of an average monthly salary was added to citizens' telephone bills when more than one call was made to a destination outside of Romania.

### c. Freedom of Religion

Both the Government of Romania and the Communist Party staunchly support atheism and, despite constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, regularly discourage religious activity. Nevertheless, the Government recognizes and financially supports the activities of 14 officially-registered religious denominations active in the country. Among these are the Romanian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Unitarian, Baptist, Pentecostal, and Seventh Day Adventist churches, and the Jewish and Muslim faiths. The vast majority of Romanian believers belongs to the Romanian Orthodox Church. Despite government opposition, the open expression of religious beliefs is widespread throughout the country. Although people belonging to the "recognized" denominations may attend services freely according to the law, some of those who are religiously active experience government harassment and discrimination, such as transfer or loss of jobs, reduced salaries, demotions, arbitrary detention, and prolonged interrogation by the police.

Non-recognized denominations active in Romania include the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Mormons, and the Christian Scientists. The Romanian Uniate Church (affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church) was proscribed in 1948 and is not officially permitted to function today. Some of its members try to participate in the Roman Catholic Church, where possible. Members of non-recognized denominations are not permitted to practice their faith in public and face greater government repression than do members of the recognized religious groups.

There are well-documented reports that some Protestant groups, such as Baptists, Pentecostals, and Seventh Day Adventists, although recognized by the Government, are frequently harassed when they seek to gain converts outside of church buildings or when they resist laws which they believe are in conflict with their faith. Some of their ministers and members have been jailed, abused in prison, and forced into exile. Sectors of other recognized denominations, most notably the "Lord's Army" renewal movement within the Romanian Orthodox Church, have been subjected to equally severe official treatment for their

The Romanian Orthodox Church has slightly more than 10,000 priests and slightly fewer than 10,000 churches. The Church's six seminaries have between 1,600 and 1,800 students. The country's only Baptist seminary, which normally accepts new students every two years and currently has five students enrolled, reportedly has not admitted students this year, as scheduled. According to current estimates, fewer than 300 Baptist pastors serve over 1,000 churches. The Pentecostal Church has approximately 200 pastors for about 1,000 churches. It also has five students in its four-year seminary, and no new students have been admitted in the past two years. The Seventh Day Adventist Church has an average of one pastor for each four or five of its more than 500 congregations. The Adventist seminary, which currently has ten students, has been instructed not to accept new students. Since there is no rabbinical seminary, Jewish rabbis must be trained abroad.

d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Romanians may travel freely throughout the country. However, they must obtain official approval to change their permanent residence. Passports for foreign travel are difficult to obtain, and relatively few Romanians are allowed to travel abroad, especially to non-socialist countries. The Government maintains a strong anti-emigration policy and contends that Romanian citizens do not have the right to move permanently from their native land. The Government regards emigration as a betrayal of the country and uses a wide variety of means to discourage it. The administrative, social, and economic sanctions which have been imposed against intending emigrants include forced transfers or loss of jobs, demotions, reductions in salary, and other forms of discrimination. Under Romanian law, leaving or attempting to leave the country without official permission is a crime punishable by six months to three years in prison. According to government data, the total number of applications for emigration approved each year has about doubled since 1972, exceeding 18,000 in 1981. However, in October 1982 the Government announced the enactment of a decree requiring emigrants to repay in convertible currency the cost of their education from the secondary level on. This and other provisions of the decree, which had not been fully implemented by the end of 1982, have as one apparent aim the slowing of Romania's "brain drain".

The Romanian Government permits some emigration for family reunification and in "humanitarian cases". It also allows the emigration of Jews to Israel and ethnic Germans to the Federal Republic of Germany, mostly on a family reunification basis. Largely due to emigration, the Jewish population of Romania has declined from approximately 450,000 people at the end of World War II to about 32,000 today. Approximately 10,000 ethnic Germans have departed annually for the Federal Republic of Germany since 1977.



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secretary-general, Nicolae Ceausescu, who is also the president of the country. The various ethnic minority groups in Romania are represented at every level of the party structure. Their numbers are generally proportional to their share of the total population, but their influence, especially at the higher levels, is slight.

Romanian women participate at all levels of the party and state structure, but at the higher levels of government, party, and the economy their numbers are small. The Government is seeking to upgrade the role of women in the society, especially in the areas of education, access to employment, and comparable wages. As a result, women are employed in virtually all sectors of the economy, and there is equal opportunity in education.

The Romanian Constitution forbids any discrimination on the basis of ethnic background and guarantees the use of minority languages in books, newspapers, magazines, theaters, and education. When a minority group is present in large numbers in a geographic region, the use of its language in government and economic institutions is also protected. The Government claims it does not discriminate against the minorities, which comprise about 12 percent of the population. Nonetheless, there are limitations on minority groups' free expression of their cultural heritage. Government efforts to centralize and to economize by combining educational, social, and cultural activities frequently affect minority groups disproportionately and are often interpreted as the "Romanianization" of these groups. For example, the mergers of schools, theaters, or other such institutions often result in the loss of the minority ethnic groups' characteristics as the institutions become predominantly Romanian. This movement is viewed as cultural extinction by ethnic Hungarians, several of whom were arrested in November for publishing the underground "Ellenpontok," which attacked the Government's minority policies and practices.

Provision of government services for Romania's minority groups reflects these limitations. German and Hungarian-language radio programs are broadcast for several hours daily; however, television broadcasts in these languages are limited to three hours or less per week. German and Hungarian-language theaters and a Hungarian-language opera also exist. Minority language newspapers are readily available in Bucharest and in areas where minority groups are concentrated, although fewer such newspapers are published than in previous decades. The importation of all publications, including those in the Hungarian and German languages, is strictly controlled. Bilingual signs are uncommon even in areas where non-Romanian ethnic groups are in the majority, except for occasional street signs or those identifying public buildings.

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union in 1979. The Romanian Government does not answer inquiries regarding Father Calciu's conditions of imprisonment. The World Confederation of Labor (WCL) in Brussels filed a complaint in July 1981 with the International Labor Organization's Committee on Freedom of Association, requesting an ILO investigation into the arrests of SLOMR members, the whereabouts of the SLOMR leadership, and the alleged transfer of 3,000 miners in the 1977 Jiu Valley strike. During 1982, the ILO reported that it did not have sufficient information to answer the WCL's request, and that it was asking the Government of Romania for further information on the questions raised by the WCL. In October 1982, a joint US-Romanian consultation on emigration procedures held in Bucharest included discussion of human rights matters.

#### 4. Economic, Social, and Cultural Situation

Romania is officially designated a "developing country" by the World Bank. With a population of 22.4 million at the end of 1981, Romania's per capita GNP was just over \$2,100. From a largely agrarian economy at the end of World War II, the country has reached its present semi-industrialized state principally by maintaining extremely high rates of capital investment and by restricting consumption. By 1982, faced with rising costs for imports, energy shortages, and the requirement to repay large foreign debts, the national economy began to shift slightly from its previous heavy emphasis on rapid industrialization to a somewhat lower investment rate and increased attention to agriculture.

In 1981, 47 percent of the population lived in cities and towns. Rapid population shifts since 1948 have contributed to housing problems in urban areas, and the construction of apartments lags behind the Government's announced and highly ambitious targets. In 1980, average living space per inhabitant was reported as 9.7 square meters, with 1.41 persons per room.

According to Romanian law, all land belongs to the state. There are, however, provisions under which 9.4 percent of the country's agricultural land is allowed to be held by private citizens. In 1980, 60.6 percent of the agricultural land was used by agricultural cooperatives and 30 percent by state farms. Other property, including personal property and housing, may be privately owned, although there are a number of restrictions on the right to property. Economic enterprises are state-owned, except for a few services and handicraft shops.

The Romanian Constitution guarantees employment to all citizens and equal pay for equal work. While official records show full employment, in practice there is chronic underemployment, especially in the agricultural sector.

Romanian data indicate that in 1981, \$6.75 billion was allocated from the budget for education, culture, sports,

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levels. Evening courses and work-study programs are available to students at technical institutes. The World Bank reported a literacy rate of 98 percent as of 1976. An official government estimate in July 1982 placed the average daily caloric intake in Romania at 3,300 calories. The Government's report called for a reduction to 2,800-3,000 calories per day by 1985 in order to promote more healthful diets, reduce average weight, and prolong lifespans. Romanian food markets are frequently plagued with severe shortages, especially of meat, eggs, fish, and dairy products, including milk. This raises the question of nutritional deficiencies, particularly for infants, the elderly, and homebound, who are also affected by long food lines for many essential foods. Shortages have intensified in recent years because of poor harvests and distribution, inadequate storage facilities, and the increasing need to export food to finance imports. Measures now exist to punish those who hoard food. Certain food items are rationed, but this varies from region to region. The foodstuffs and consumer goods kept for the domestic market are inferior in quality to those exported for hard currency.

## 2. ROMANIA: MOMENT OF TRUTH ON FINANCIAL GAP DRAWS NEAR

Romania cannot place much more of its debt burden on the hard-currency trade sector or on the Romanian people. Past cuts in imports already have hurt production for export and substantially reduced the standard of living. But negotiations with Western bankers for a medium-term, \$150-million loan have dragged on for more than a month. Bankers may press for IMF conditionality if asked to extend substantial additional credit.

\* \* \*

The gap. Poor export performance and unplanned increases in oil imports reduced already scanty hard-currency reserves to an estimated \$400 million by July--enough to cover one month's imports. Debt service totaling \$1.6 billion is due by the end of 1985, of which only \$1.3 billion apparently will be covered by the current-account surplus and credits--including the \$150 million loan which the Romanian government hopes to draw on by September.

By imposing draconian austerity measures, Ceausescu managed to reduce Romania's foreign debt from \$10.1 billion at the end of 1981 to \$7.5 billion at year-end 1984. His vow in late 1984, however, to cut hard-currency imports an additional 30 percent to avoid further borrowing or another debt rescheduling appears to have been shelved for now. Industry already had been crippled by poorly planned cuts in imports of energy and raw materials. Working hours have been shortened and production periods staggered to conserve electricity.

Soviet oil. This year, Romania should be able to get a greater supply of Soviet crude on a regular clearing-account basis--a departure from past years when Soviet oil deliveries were strictly tied to Romanian counter-deliveries (or cash). This will divert to the Soviet Union more goods that might have been sold to the West but may allow the Romanians to trim hard-currency imports by five to seven percent.

Dim prospects. Plans for economic growth this year depend on unrealistically high productivity gains. Energy and other imported inputs remain in short supply. (Much of the imported oil is refined and exported in the form of products.) Additional import cuts might impinge on production and not save enough foreign exchange to enable Romania to meet its debt-service obligations. This would leave no alternative to increased borrowing.

Attempts to borrow substantial amounts, particularly if rescheduling were requested, would likely meet with demands for IMF participation by government and commercial creditors alike, a move Ceausescu might finally have to accept. Moscow, having acquiesced in Poland's application for IMF membership, should not be disturbed by an IMF program for Romania.

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ROMANIA: Ceausescu Under Pressure

BY RW NARA DATE 11/9/17

*Growing public frustration over President Ceausescu's failing economic policies is undermining confidence in his leadership and weakening his authority at home. His foreign policy decisions have alienated both East and West and have diminished chances for foreign economic assistance. Ceausescu should be able to keep domestic opposition in check for now. Continued economic decline, however, could provoke more unrest in coming months and endanger his position.*

25X1

Declining growth since the late 1970s was brought on primarily by Ceausescu's forced industrialization policies in the face of increasing scarcities of raw materials, energy, and skilled labor. This led to a hard currency payments crisis in 1981 and forced Romania into debt re-scheduling last year. Cuts in imports of energy and raw materials were made to satisfy foreign creditors, but they have helped push industrial production growth rates to their lowest levels since the period that immediately followed World War II.

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Consumers are bearing the brunt of the regime's policies. Food shortages are the worst in over two decades, partly because Bucharest is giving priority to exports of food to earn hard currency. Energy shortages have caused numerous factory closings, increasingly frequent electricity outages, and substantial reductions in public transportation.

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Pay cuts are becoming more common for failure to fulfill unrealistic production quotas, and workers fear that the government's scheme for their voluntary investment in its enterprises will be made compulsory. Discipline has been tightened at the workplace

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Under these conditions, public morale continues to fall and criticism of Ceausescu is increasingly open. Over the past several weeks workers have staged numerous

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State Dept review completed - see C05168744

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minor protests, including work stoppages and slowdowns.

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#### Turmoil in the Bureaucracy

Reports of divisions in the leadership, which first appeared after a major cabinet shakeup last year, have continued to circulate. In general, they depict an older, more hardline and anti-Western group pitted against younger and more highly educated officials. The hardliners currently seem closer to Ceausescu while the more moderate group has been weakened by recent purges.

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The friction evidently is focused on economic problems. Ceausescu, for example, apparently ignored the advice of Foreign Minister Andrei and other moderates when he decided to impose an "education tax" on prospective emigrants. Andrei recently told the US Ambassador that he had disagreed with "some of the decisions" leading to imposition of the tax.

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#### Diplomatic Isolation

Ceausescu seems to have gone out of his way to antagonize the West, which he evidently believes should have done more to help Romania. Implementation of the education tax will cost Romania most-favored-nation tariff status with the US, and it also could damage economic relations with West Germany, Romania's top hard currency trading partner.

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In addition, Romania's relations with its allies appear to be going downhill. Bucharest has resisted CEMA and Warsaw Pact integration, and the Romanians reportedly disagreed with the Soviets at the recent summit in Prague. Ceausescu, who apparently does not get along well with General Secretary Andropov, recently has been criticized by Soviet and other East European officials for mismanaging Romania's economy.

### Prospects

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The anti-Ceausescu focus of recent popular dissent is an ominous new development that could be used against him by future opponents. The President's recent purges of major party figures who had been close to him suggest that he already is having problems convincing colleagues of the wisdom of his policies. His diplomatic setbacks also may be raising questions about his judgment.

Ceausescu seems to have developed no new strategies to reverse the situation. Instead, he has come to rely increasingly on the military and security forces to keep him in power.

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Under such circumstances, the Soviets might support a move against Ceausescu if they believed it would succeed and not lead to instability. For now, however, Moscow is likely to be deterred by the apparent lack of alternative leaders in whom it could feel confident and by the unpredictability of popular reaction.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, RO, US, UR  
SUBJECT: CEAUSESCU MESSAGE ON INF

1. C - ENTIRE TEXT:

2. ON AUGUST 19, FOREIGN MINISTER STEFAN ANDREI GAVE CHARGE A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU TO PRESIDENT REAGAN CONCERNING INF IN EUROPE. HE ASKED THAT THIS LETTER BE TRANSMITTED AT ONCE TO THE PRESIDENT AND SAID A SIMILAR LETTER (SAME SUBSTANCE, DIFFERENT LANGUAGE) WAS BEING SENT TO FIRST SECRETARY ANDROPOV. ANDREI SAID THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA INTENDS TO MAKE THE LETTER PUBLIC AFTER PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY ANDROPOV HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO READ THE MESSAGE.

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3. HE REQUESTED THAT THE MESSAGE BE SENT ELECTRICALLY, IMPLYING THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ROMANIA WAS GOING TO PUBLISH THE TEXT SHORTLY. THE LETTER ITSELF WILL BE SENT BY CLASSIFIED POUCH, LEAVING BUCHAREST AUGUST 22.

4. ROMANIAN TEXT OF THE LETTER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT

BUCURESTI, 19 AUGUST 1983

STIMATE DOMNULE PRESEDINTE,

(PARA) POPORUL ROMAN, CA SI TOATE POPOARELE EUROPENE, ESTE PROFUND PREOCUPAT DE POSIBILITATEA TRECERII LA AMPLASAREA DE NOI RACHETE CU RAZA MEDIE IN EUROPA, CARE AR CREA O SITUATIE DEOSEBIT DE GRAVA, IN EUROPA SI IN LUME, AR DESCHIDE CALEA INTENSIFICARII CURSEI IN ARMARILOR, AR CRESTE PERICOLUL DE RAZBOI, SI IN PRIMUL RUND DE RAZBOI NUCLEAR, SI ARE PUNE IN PRIMEJ-DIE EXISTENTA TUTUROR POPOARELOR EUROPENE, -INSASI EXISTENTA VIETII, A CIVILIZATIEI UMANE.

(PARA) AVIND IN VEDERE ANGAJAMENTELE SI DECLARATIILE DUMNEAVOASTRA PORRIVIT CARORA STATELE UNITE ALE AMERICII SINT PENTRU REDUCEREA SI LICHIDAREA ARMAMENTULUI NUCLEAR DIN EUROPA, CONSIDER CA TREBUIE FACUT TOTUL PENTRU INCHEIEREA CU SUCCES IN ACEST AN A NEGOCIERILOR SOVIETO-AMERICANE DE LA GENEVA PRIVIND RACHETELE CU RAZA MEDIE DE ACTIUNE, CEEA CE AR CORESPUNDE INTERES-SELOR SI ASPIRATIILOR ARZATOARE ALE POPOARELOR EUROPENE SI ALE POPORULUI AMERICAN SI AR AVEA PROFUNDE IMPLI-CATII POZITIVE IN VIATA INTERNATIONALA ACTUALA.

(PARA) PAGE 2. IMPARTASINDU-VA INGRIJORAREA MEA IN LEGATURA CU FAPTUL CA PINA IN PREZENT NU S-AU INREGIS-TRAT PROGRESE LA NEGOCIERILE SOVIETO-AMERICANE DE LA GENEVA, APRECIEZ CA ESTE INCA TIMP CA, PRIN NOI EFOR-TURI, PRIN TRATATIVE DESFASURATE INTR-UN SPIRIT DE CONCLUCRARE SI ACTIONINDU-SE CU INTREAGA RASPUNDERE SI DE O PARTE SI DE ALTA, SA SE AJUNGA REPEDE LA UN ACORD

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CORESPUNZATOR CARE SA ASIGURE OPRIREA AMPLASARII DE NOI RACHETE, RETRAGEREA SI DISTRUGEREA CELOR EXISTENTE, CA O MASURA INTERMEDIARA, PE CALEA ELIBERARII CONTINENTULUI DE ORICE ARME NUCLEARE.

(PARA) CIT TIMP SE DESFASOAREA NEGOCIERILE SI CIT TIMP EXISTA O CIT DE MICA SANSA DE A SE AJUNGE LA NEAMPLASAREA DE NOI RACHETE, ESTE NECESAR SA SE FACA TOTUL PENTRU SUCCESUL TRATATIVELOR SOVIETO-AMERICANE DE LA GENEVA.

(PARA) IN CAZUL CA NU SE VA AJUNGE IN CADRUL ACESTOR NEGOCIERI LA UN ACORD PINA LA SFIRSITUL ACESTUI AN, ROMANIA CONSIDERA CA AR TREBUI FACUT TOTUL PENTRU A SE AJUNGE LA O INTELEGERE CA HOTARIREA NATO PRIVIND AMPLASAREA DE NOI RACHETE CU RAZA MEDIE DE ACTIUNE SA FIE AMINATA CEL PUTIN PINA LA SFIRSITUL ANULUI 1984, INCEPUTUL ANULUI 1985. ACEASTA AR DA POSIBILITATEA CONTINUARII TRATATIVELOR SI INCHEIERII LOR CU REZULTATE POZITIVE SI ARE DEMONSTRA DORINTA ATIȚ A S.U.A. CIT SI A U.R.S.S. DE A RASPUNDE ASTEPTARILOR SI INTERESLOR POPOARELOR EUROPENE, ALE POPOARELOR LUMII, ALE  
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PACII, INCREDERII SI SECURITATII PE CONTINENT. IN PERIOADA CONTINUARII NEGOCIERILOR, U.R.S.S. SA DEA GARANTII, IN SENSUL DECLARATIILOR ANTERIOARE, CA VA OPRI DESFASURAREA DE NOI RACHETE CU RAZA MEDIE DE ACTIUNE SI MODERNIZAREA LOR SI CA VA REDUCE IN MOD UNILATERAL O PARTE A ACESTORA AFLATE IN ZONA EUROPEANA A TERITORIULUI UNIUNII SOVIETICE. (PARA) PAGE 3. IN CONDITIILE IN CARE NU SE VA AJUNGE LA UN ACORD IN ACEASTA PRIVINTA, ROMANIA CONSIDERA CA AR FI POSIBIL SA SE AIBA IN VEDERE CEL PUTIN SA NU FIE AMPLASATE RACHETE CU RAZA MEDIE DE ACTIUNE PE TERITORIUL REPUBLICII FEDERALE GERMANIA, REPUBLICII DEMOCRATE GERMANE, REPUBLICII SOCIALISTE CEHOSLOVACE SI AL ALTOR STATE, CA O MASRU INTERMEDIARA, PINA LA REALIZAREA UNEI INTELEGERI FINALE PRIVIND RACHETELE CU RAZA MEDIE DE ACTIUNE IN EUROPA.  
(PARA) ROMANIA CONSIDERA CA PINA LA ELIBERAREA COMPLETA A EUROPEI DE ORICE FEL DE ARME NUCLEARE, AR AVEA

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O MARE IMPORTANTA CREAREA DE ZONE DENUCLARIZATE PE CONTINENT. IN ACEST SPIRIT, SE IMPUNE SA SE ACTIONEZE IN SPRIJINUL EFORTURILOR CONSACRATE CREARII DE ZONE DENUCLARIZATE IN BALCANI, IN NORDUL EUROPEI SI IN ALTE PARTI ALE CONTINENTULUI, CA O PARTE INTEGRANTA A PROCESULUI DE INFAPTUIRE A DEZARMARII SI SECURITATII PE CONTINENT. (PARA) ROMANIA PROPUNE CA S.U.A. SI U.R.S.S. SA ADOPTA HOTARIRI UNILATERALE DE INGHETARE A CHELTUIELILOR MILITARE PE URMATORII DOI ANI LA NIVELUL ANULUI 1983 SI IN ACEASTA PERIOADA SA SE DESFASOARE NEGOCIERI IN VEDEREA TRECERII LA REDUCEREA CHELTUIELILOR MILITARE. O ASEMENEA MASURA AR AVEA O MARE IMPORTANTA POLITICA, NU AR AFECTA SECURITATEA NICIUNEIA DINTRE PARTI, AR RASPUNDE INTERESELOR POPOARELOR SI AR CONTRIBUI LA CRESTEREA CLIMATULUI DE INCREDERE SI SECURITATE INTERNATIONALA.

(PARA) TOCMAI IN ACTUALELE CIRCUMSTANTE INTERNATIONALE ESTE MAI NECESAR CA ORICIND SA SE MANIFESTE SPIRIT DE INITIATIVE SI SA SE ADOPTA NOI MASURI CARE SA DUCA LA REDUCEREA TENSIIUNII INTERNATIONALE LA OPRIREA CURSEI INARMARILOR SI, IN PRIMUL RIND, A INARMARILOR NUCLEARE, LA INTARIREA POLITICII DE PACE, DESTINDERE SI COLABORARE INTERNATIONALA.

(PARA) PAGE 4. IMI EXPRIM CONVINGEREA CA IN SPIRITUL APELULUI PE CARE VI-L ADRESEZ IN NUMELE POPORULUI ROMAN, AL MEU PERSONAL, DUMNEAVOASTRA, S.U.A. VOR FACE TOTUL PENTRU INCHEIEREA CU CUCCES A NEGOCIERILOR SOVIETO-AMERICANE DE LA GENEVA, PENTRU A OPRI ESCALADAREA INARMARILOR NUCLEARE IN EUOPA, PENTRU A SE AJUNGE LA MASURI CONCRETE DE DEZARMARE NUCLEARA PE CONTINENT, CARE REPREZINTA UN DEZIDERAT VITAL AL TUTUROR POPOARELOR EUROPENE, AL TUTUROR POPOARELOR SI AR CONTRIBUI LA DESTINDERE SI IMBUNATATIREA CLIMATULUI VIETII INTERNATIONALE.

(PARA) FOLOSESC ACEST PRILEJ PENTRU A-MI EXPRIMA CONVINGEREA CA ACTIONIND IN SPIRITUL INTELEGERILOR SI



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DOCUMENTELOR CONVENITE LA NIVEL INALT INTRE STATELE NOASTRE SE VOR EXTINDE IN CONTINUARE RAPORTURILE BILATERALE DINTRE CELE DOUA TARI SI POPOARE SI SE VA INTENSIFICA, TOTODATA, CONCLUCRAREA IN INTERESUL POLITICII DE PACE, DEZARMARE, COLABORARE SI RESPECT AL INDEPENDENTEI NATIONALE A TUTUROR POPOARELOR. CU DEOSEBITA CONSIDERATIE.

(SIGNED) N. CEAUSESCU.

END TEXT.

THE EMBASSY'S QUICK TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT FOLLOWS:  
BEGIN TEXT:

BUCHAREST, AUGUST 19, 1983

ESTEEMED MR. PRESIDENT,

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE, LIKE ALL EUROPEAN PEOPLES, IS PROFOUNDLY PREOCCUPIED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF BEGINNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE, WHICH WOULD CREATE AN ESPECIALLY GRAVE SITUATION, IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD, WOULD OPEN THE WAY FOR AN INTENSIFICATION OF THE ARMS RACE, WOULD INCREASE THE DANGER OF WAR, AND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE NUCLEAR WAR, AND WOULD PUT IN PERIL ALL EUROPEAN PEOPLES, AND THE EXISTENCE OF LIFE ITSELF AND OF HUMAN CIVILIZATION.

(PARA) HAVING IN MIND YOUR COMMITMENTS AND DECLARATIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS FOR THE REDUCTION AND THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR

ARMS IN EUROPE, I CONSIDER THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING TO CONCLUDE WITH SUCCESS THIS YEAR THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA REGARDING INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES, WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE INTERESTS AND BURNING ASPIRATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES AND OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND WOULD HAVE PROFOUND POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS IN ACTUAL  
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INTERNATIONAL LIFE.

(PARA) SHARING WITH YOU MY CONCERN WITH THE FACT THAT UNTIL NOW NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA, I APPRECIATE THAT THERE IS STILL TIME, THROUGH NEW EFFORTS, THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS CARRIED OUT IN A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION AND ACTING WITH COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY BOTH BY ONE PARTY AND THE OTHER, TO ARRIVE QUICKLY AT A SUITABLE AGREEMENT WHICH WILL ASSURE THE HALTING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW ROCKETS AND THE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THOSE EXISTING, AS AN INTERMEDIATE MEASURE ON THE PATH OF FREEING THE CONTINENT OF ALL NUCLEAR ARMS. AS LONG AS THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN PROGRESS AND AS LONG AS THERE EXISTS EVEN A SMALL CHANCE OF HALTING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW ROCKETS, IT IS NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA.

(PARA) IN THE CASE THAT ONE WILL NOT ARRIVE AT AN

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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AGREEMENT IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL THE END OF THIS YEAR, ROMANIA CONSIDERS THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO DO EVERYTHING TO ARRIVE AT AN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE NATO DECISION REGARDING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES SHOULD BE PUT OFF AT LEAST UNTIL THE END OF 1984 OR THE BEGINNING OF 1985. THIS WOULD GIVE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONCLUDING THEM WITH POSITIVE RESULTS AND WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE DESIRE NOT ONLY OF THE US BUT ALSO OF THE USSR OF RESPONDING TO THE EXPECTATIONS AND INTERESTS OF THE EUROPEAN PEOPLES AND OF THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND OF PEACE, TRUST, AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT. IN THE PERIOD OF CONTINUING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE USSR WOULD GIVE GUARANTEES, IN THE SENSE OF PRIOR DECLARATIONS, THAT IT WILL HALT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES AND THEIR MODERNIZATION AND WILL REDUCE UNILATERALLY A PART OF THOSE LOCATED IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE OF THE USSR.

(PARA) IN CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH AN AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD IS NOT ARRIVED AT, ROMANIA CONSIDERS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE IN MIND AT LEAST THAT INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES NOT BE DEPLOYED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND OTHER STATES AS AN INTERMEDIATE MEASURE, UNTIL ACHIEVING A FINAL UNDERSTANDING REGARDING INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE.

(PARA) ROMANIA CONSIDERS THAT UNTIL THE COMPLETE FREEING OF EUROPE OF ANY FORM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT WOULD HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TO CREATE A DENUCLEARIZATION ZONE ON THE CONTINENT. IN THIS SPIRIT, ONE IS INCLINED TO ACT IN SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO CREATE A DENUCLEARIZED ZONE IN THE BALKANS, IN NORTHERN EUROPE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE CONTINENT

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AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING DISARMAMENT AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT.

(PARA) ROMANIA PROPOSES THAT THE US AND THE USSR ADOPT UNILATERAL DECISIONS TO FREEZE MILITARY EXPENDITURES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS AT 1983 LEVELS AND IN THIS PERIOD TO DEVELOP NEGOTIATIONS TO PASS ON TO REDUCING MILITARY EXPENDITURES. SUCH A MEASURE WOULD HAVE A GREAT POLITICAL IMPORTANCE, WOULD NOT AFFECT THE SECURITY OF NONE OF THE PARTS (OF EUROPE), WOULD RESPOND TO THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES, AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE CLIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND SECURITY.

(PARA) EVEN IN THE ACTUAL INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS STILL NECESSARY THAT ALL TIMES ONE SHOULD SHOW A SPIRIT OF INITIATIVE AND ADOPT NEW MEASURES WHICH WILL LEAD TO THE REDUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS, TO THE HALTING OF THE ARMS RACE, AND IN THE FIRST INSTANCE OF NUCLEAR ARMS, AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF POLICIES OF PEACE, DETENTE, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

(PARA) I EXPRESS THE CONVICTION IN THE SPIRIT OF THE APPEAL THAT I ADDRESS TO YOU IN THE NAME OF THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE AND IN MY OWN NAME, SIR, THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL DO EVERYTHING TO CONCLUDE SUCCESSFULLY THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA, TO HALT THE ESCALATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS IN

EUROPE, TO ARRIVE AT CONCRETE MEASURES FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ON THE CONTINENT, WHICH REPRESENTS A VITAL DESIRE OF ALL EUROPEAN PEOPLES AND OF ALL PEOPLES AND WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE RELAXATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE CLIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE.

(PARA) I USE THIS OCCASION TO EXPRESS MY CONVICTION THAT ACTING IN THE SPIRIT OF UNDERSTANDINGS AND DOCUMENTS AGREED ON AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BETWEEN OUR STATES, THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO

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COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES WILL EXPAND CONTINUOUSLY AND  
AT THE SAME TIME, THE COOPERATION IN THE INTEREST  
OF POLICIES OF PEACE, DISARMAMENT, COLLABORATION  
AND RESPECT FOR THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF ALL  
PEOPLES WILL INTENSIFY.

WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION

N. CEAUSESCU. END TEXT. CORRY

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(INF)

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BELGRADE, TUNIS FOR VICE PRESIDENT TRAVELLING PARTY  
FOR D. SULLIVAN, D. GREGG, JOHN GIBBONS.  
WHITE HOUSE FOR VP ADVANCE OFFICE  
CINCEUR, USDOCO, USAF, KIFOWR FOR POLADS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PRE 7' 49, UR, US  
SUBJECT: CEAUSESCU ON INF NEGOTIATIONS  
REF: BUCHAREST 1284 (NOTAL)

1. (C) SUMMARY: 0 SEPTEMBER 13, PRESIDENT  
CEAUSESCU SPELLED OUT CLEARLY ROMANIA'S POSITION ON  
THE INF DEPLOYMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE --  
WHICH, SINCE ANDROPOV'S AUGUST 28 INTERVIEW,  
COINCIDES WITH THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE  
NEXT TWO DAYS, THIS POSITION WAS FURTHER AMPLIFIED  
IN THE ROMANIAN PRESS. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) IN A SPEECH ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1983 AT TIRGU  
MURES, NICOLAE CEAUSESCU STATED: "ACTING DECISIVELY  
TO HALT THE DEPLOYMENT OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE  
TICKETS AND PASEING IT THE WITHDRAWAL AND DES-  
STRUCTION OF THOSE EXISTING, WE ARE FIRMLY CON-  
VINCED THAT THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE CAN AND SHOULD DO  
EVERYTHING IN ORDER NOT TO ADMIT THE INSTALLATION  
OF NEW ROCKETS IN EUROPE. WE MUST DO EVERYTHING  
TO ARRIVE AT  
CONCRETE UNDERSTANDING IN THIS  
PROBLEM AT THE NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA BETWEEN  
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES. WE  
ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO  
EVERYTHING THAT NO MORE NUCLEAR ROCKETS BE DEPLOYED  
ON THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE.; 5#8: 9#5! 0, 09, \$ 59 5#3  
8, 53435 9! 3;346, -SION, TO THE INTERESTS OF PEACE,

OF EVERY EUROPEAN PEOPLE AND OF THE PEOPLE OF THE  
ENTIRE WORLD.  
"UNDOUBTEDLY THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THESE ROCKETS,  
THE REDUCTION OF THOSE EXISTING AND THEIR DESTRUCTION  
SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER CONDITIONS OF AN  
EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES SHOULD BE  
REALIZED NOT THROUGH NEW ROCKETS, NOT THROUGH NEW  
ARMAMENTS, BUT RATHER THROUGH THE REDUCTION OF  
THOSE EXISTING TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. IT  
IS NECESSARY, WITHOUT A DOUBT, ALSO, TO TAKE INTO  
CONSIDERATION THE ROCKETS WHICH OTHER COUNTRIES  
IN EUROPE HAVE..."

3. (C) ACCORDING TO OUR ANALYSIS, THUS, CEAUSESCU'S  
(GOR) POSITION IS NOW THE FOLLOWING:  
--THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. 8,1 59 374903 #97) \$  
?3 ?)9: (3\$ 94 #-)53\$ -- BY ANY MEANS POSSIBLE.  
-- THEN, BUT ONLY AFTERWARD, THE USSR SHOULD REDUCE  
THE LEVEL OF THEBWSBWNF MISSILES AND DESTROY THE  
MISSILEX THUS REMOVED.

BT

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BY: [Signature] 11/17



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FOR D. SULLIVAN, D. GREGG, JOHN GIBBONS

WHITE HOUSE FOR VP ADVANCE OFFICE

CINCEUR, USDOCO, USAF, USAREUR FOR POLADS

-- THE LEVEL TO WHICH THE SOVIETS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR  
FORCES SHOULD BE EQUAL TO THE NUMBER OF FRENCH AND  
BRITISH MISSILES NOW IN SERVICE.

-- "EUROPE" IN THE GOR EYES STRETCHES FROM THE  
URALS TO SOMEWHERE IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN

WELL AWAY FROM THE WESTERN COASTS OF THE CONTINENT.

4. (C) CEAUSESCU HAS CONSISTENTLY, SINCE THE LATE  
1970'S, SUPPORTED THE SOVIET POSITION WITH REGARD  
TO BLOCKING THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE U.S. INF IN  
EUROPE. HIS VIEWS TODAY ARE

VIRUALLY IDENTICAL

TO THE SOVIETS. HE DID, HOWEVER, ANTICIPATE

(NOVEMBER 1981) -- PUBLICLY, AT LEAST -- THE

SOVIETS (ANDROPOV -- AUGUST 28, 1983) ON THE VIEW  
THAT THE USSR SHOULD DESTROY MISSILES REMOVED FROM  
EUROPE.

5. (U) AS IF TO ENSURE THAT NO ONE MISUNDERSTOOD  
ROMANIA'S (CEAUSESCU'S) POSITION, COLUMNIST GORGE  
SERAFIN IN THE LEAD ARTICLE IN THE SEPTEMBER 15  
ISSUE OF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MAGAZINE "LUMEA"  
EMPHASIZED THAT AN INF SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE INTO  
CALCULATION THE FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES AS  
WELL AS OTHER MEANS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY  
EQUIVALENT TO MISSILES.

THE SAME POINT WAS EMPHASIZED IN A SEPTEMBER 14  
SCIENTIA EDITORIAL WRITTEN BY ROMULUS CAPLESCU.

6. ON FEBRUARY 11, THE COMMUNIST PARTY DAILY  
SCIENTIA, REPORTING A FEBRUARY 8 INTERVIEW OF  
CEAUSESCU, STATED FOR THE FIRST TIME PUBLICLY  
THAT CEAUSESCU SUPPORTED ANDROPOV'S DECEMBER 21,  
1982 PROPOSAL REGARDING INF IN EUROPE THAT  
INCLUSION OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH MISSILES  
WAS NECESSARY.

7. IN THE CONTEXT OF PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU'S  
LETTERS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND ANDROPOV RE-  
GARDING INF NEGOTIATIONS, WE FIND THIS RECENT  
RE-EMPHASIS OF ROMANIA'S POSITION ODD. IF  
HIS VIEWS COINCIDE WITH THOSE OF THE SOVIETS,  
HE HARDLY CAN WEAR THE MANTLE OF A NON-ALIGNED  
THIRD PARTY IN THE INF DIALOGUE.

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Response to Letter from Greek Prime Minister Papandreu and Romanian

Pres. Ceausescu

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Bob Kimmitt	456-2224	
	<i>Martin</i>		
	<i>NSC/B</i>		
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TAGS: CSCE, NATO, SHUM, RO, CVIS

SUBJECT: US-ROMANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE

REF: (A) USNATO 1887, (B) STATE 70749

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS US-ROMANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE WAS A CONFIDENTIAL BILATERAL EXCHANGE, WE WOULD PREFER THAT MISSION NOT SHARE REPORT (REF A) WITH ALLIES IN NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, WITHOUT TING INTO THE DETAILS OF THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE, WE ARE PREPARED TO SHARE SEVERAL KEY POINTS. ACCORDINGLY, YOU MAY MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ALLIES.

3. -- THE SECOND US-ROMANIAN HUMAN RIGHTS ROUNDTABLE WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 27-29, 1984. THE ROMANIAN DELEGATION WAS HEADED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MARIA GROZA. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS ABRAMS HEADED THE U.S. DELEGATION.

4. -- ROMANIA ENJOYS ITS ROLE AS ONLY WARSAW PACT NATION TO HOLD BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE U.S. ON HUMAN RIGHTS

ISSUES, AND THIS WAS ANOTHER EXERCISE IN ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO SHOW ITS WILLINGNESS TO EMPHASIZE ITS CLAIM TO ADHERENCE TO CSCE PRINCIPLES.

5. -- THE U.S. REVIEWED A NUMBER OF ISSUES BASED ON CSCE PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES AND TRADE UNION RIGHTS. THE ROMANIANS RESPONDED AS EXPECTED, DEFENDING THEIR RECORD ON THESE RIGHTS ISSUES AND CITING THE IMPORTANCE OF "ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS" SUCH AS A GUARANTEED RIGHT TO WORK, EQUALITY FOR ALL CITIZENS, SEXUAL EQUALITY AND MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH.

6. -- THE U.S. RAISED A NUMBER OF INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS CASES, AND THERE WAS A LENGTHY EXCHANGE ON EMIGRATION ISSUES. THE ROMANIANS RESPONDED THAT THEY WERE NOT

PREPARED TO DISCUSS INDIVIDUAL CASES, BUT RATHER HAD EXPECTED A MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES. WE MADE THE POINT STRONGLY THAT WE BELIEVE INDIVIDUAL CASES SHOULD BE RAISED IN THESE ROUNDTABLES, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

7. -- THERE ARE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ROMANIA ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. IN THIS LIGHT, THE U.S. VIEWS THE ROUNDTABLE PROCESS AS ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO CALL ROMANIA'S ATTENTION TO IMPORTANT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES.

8. -- WE BELIEVE THESE ROUNDTABLES ARE VALUABLE. WE ARE EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSIONS WITH OTHER EAST EUROPEAN STATES. WE WILL MAINTAIN THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT DISCUSSIONS OF PRINCIPLE MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC ISSUES AND CASES. SHULTZ  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~Disarmament

Romania's approach to disarmament defies easy categorization. Although Romania is a Warsaw Pact member and hews generally to the Pact line on disarmament issues, it strays further from Soviet positions than does any of its allies. Moreover, Romanian officials claim privately that they have been able to exert a moderating influence on their allies on issues requiring consensus within the Pact. Moreover, Romania at times has resisted Soviet efforts to draw it into closer association with the Warsaw Pact, as in its refusal since 1968 to participate in joint field exercises, its rejection of Soviet proposals to integrate the Pact's military forces in peacetime and its resistance to Soviet pressure in 1978 to increase defense expenditures.

The Romanians state that their ultimate goal in Europe is the dissolution of military blocs and the removal of all nuclear weapons from the continent. They state that the existence of those blocs and weapons of mass destruction pose the most serious threat to the maintenance of peace and security in Europe. The Romanian approach to specific, current disarmament issues should be seen within the context of that longrange goal.

On INF, the Romanians have opposed both NATO deployments and Soviet counterdeployments, in effect holding the U.S. and the USSR equally responsible for the current impasse. Late last year, the GOR sent special emissaries to Moscow, Washington, and most of the other NATO capitals with proposals that the U.S. halt INF deployments and that the Soviets halt their countermeasures, begin to withdraw and destroy their missiles (SS-20s) and return to the bargaining table on INF in Geneva. Since the Romanians have made a number of public statements on INF in recent months and their formulations have varied, it is not always clear exactly where they stand. What is clear, however, is that some elements of the Romanian position have not been acceptable to the Soviets, a statement which could not be made about the policy of any other Warsaw Pact member on this issue.

The Romanians recently acted as spokesmen for the Warsaw Pact in proposing that military budgets be frozen and then reduced. This has been a pet scheme of Ceausescu's for some time, and it appears that only now has he succeeded in gaining the agreement of his allies to propose it formally. The Romanians have admitted to us privately their recognition that the proposal does not go far enough and would cause us certain problems. They have claimed, however, that under the rules of consensus operating within the Pact, it was the best they could do and argued that if preliminary talks were started, they and some other Pact members might gain greater flexibility on this issue.

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At the CDE, the Romanians have put forward a comprehensive proposal which combines elements of the Western position with measures acceptable to the Warsaw Pact. Their apparent goal is to bridge the differences between the two sides through what they consider to be a balanced proposal. The Romanian initiative has not received much notice or support from either side at Stockholm, but can be seen as another attempt to avoid total identification with the Warsaw Pact and its thus far inflexible CDE position.

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### Romania and the Peaceful Resolution of Regional Disputes

Romania prides itself on its active foreign policy and claims to play a constructive role in the peaceful resolution of regional disputes. Romania maintains good relations with most of the participants (South Africa being a notable exception) in four of the current major such disputes: Israel and the Arabs; Iran and Iraq; Ethiopia and Somalia; and southern Africa. While there is ample evidence of Romanian contacts with the participants in these conflicts, indications of Romanian influence, if any, are much harder to discern. Why, then, does Romania seek to involve itself in disputes that often are far from home and where no national interest may be directly involved? Ceausescu's desire to present himself as a world statesman and to enhance Romania's image as an "independent" actor on the international stage undoubtedly are major considerations. At the same time, such involvement probably is seen by Romania's leadership as contributing to the country's international acceptance and ability to protect and project its national interests as well.

### The Middle East

Romania has long been diplomatically active in the Middle East. The only Warsaw Pact country to retain relations with Israel after the 1967 war, Romania and Israel enjoy something of a special relationship (due in large part to the fact that about 90 percent of Romania's surviving Jews have emigrated to Israel since World War II). Romania has supported the Camp David Accords and sought to encourage the rapprochement between Israel and Egypt. At the same time, Romania supports Arafat and the PLO, believes the Palestinians should have a homeland on the West Bank, favors a large international conference to deal with Arab-Israeli problems, and maintains close relations with such radical Arab states as Iraq, Libya and Syria. Although Romania is in frequent contact with many of the top leaders in the Middle East, the effect of those meetings and of Romanian diplomacy in the region are difficult to discern.

### Iran and Iraq

Romania enjoys good diplomatic and trade relations with both antagonists in the Iran-Iraq conflict. During the Shah's

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time, Romania carried on extensive trade with Iran, upon which it relied heavily for oil imports. The Iranian Foreign Minister visited Bucharest in March, 1984. With Iraq, Romania has expanded trade in recent years, and reportedly provides some military supplies as well. We are not aware of any significant Romanian efforts to bring Iran and Iraq closer together.

#### Ethiopia and Somalia

President Ceausescu has visited the capitals of both countries more than once (most recently in 1983), and Romania maintains Embassies in and trade relations with both. However, its presence and leverage in both countries are slight, and it is difficult to imagine what influence it would be able to bring to bear to facilitate a peaceful solution.

#### Southern Africa

Romania (selectively) supports national liberation movements and has reasonably good relations with the African Front Line states. Romania backs SWAPO and has provided technicians and materiel to Angola. President Ceausescu visited Zimbabwe and Mozambique in 1983. Romania does not have diplomatic relations with South Africa and cannot be viewed in any sense as a significant factor in the Southern African equation.

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Balkan Cooperation

Romania's interest in Balkan cooperation (involving Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia) goes back to the 1930's at least and has been a significant element in postwar Romania's foreign policy since 1957, when Premier Chivu Stoica first proposed a conference to promote Balkan detente. In the 1960s and 1970s, Romania pushed actively for broad Balkan cooperation in the political, economic and cultural spheres. The ultimate goal, which the Soviets also have supported, has been to turn the Balkans into a "zone of peace," free of atomic weapons and foreign military bases. However, President Ceausescu generally has seen the achievement of that goal as the culmination of a step-by-step process in many fields toward closer and better intra-Balkan relations.

Whereas the Balkan cooperation theme was prominent in Ceausescu's speeches and the subject of numerous Romanian proposals and initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, with Balkan neighbors during the late 1960s and the 1970s, it has received somewhat less attention in recent years. The reasons for this change in emphasis are not entirely clear. However, it seems likely that Romania's serious economic problems and perhaps a growing realization of the practical limitations on the achievement of closer Balkan cooperation account for it in large part.

While Romania continues to support Balkan cooperation and apparently still holds to its broad, step-by-step approach, Bulgaria's Tudor Zhivkov has grabbed the spotlight more recently by actively promoting the Balkan Nuclear-Free Zone (BNFZ), largely to the exclusion of the other elements. The Romanians fully support the BNFZ, even if they do not necessarily agree entirely with Zhivkov's one-sided approach, possibly because, in addition to providing a way to get nuclear arms out of Greece and Turkey, the BNFZ also could be used as an effective argument against the emplacement of Soviet nuclear weapons in the Balkans.

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U.S.-Romanian relations are substantially shaped by two factors: the relative independence of Romania's foreign policy from the Soviet Union, and Romania's strict internal regime. Since the mid-1960's, Romania has sought to push out the limits of its foreign policy independence within the Warsaw Pact context. It publicly denounced the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, is the only Warsaw Pact state which maintains relations with Israel, and has openly criticized outside intervention in Kampuchea, Afghanistan, and Poland. While it is generally accepted that Romanian foreign policy independence is relative, and within limits of Soviet tolerance, the Romanians have seemingly managed to erode the limits of Soviet tolerance. Since the late 1960's, Romania has not contributed troops to Warsaw Pact maneuvers or allowed Pact maneuvers in the country. Transit of Romania by Warsaw Pact forces has been severely limited. The country has also pursued a policy of economic independence, heavily orienting its foreign trade toward the West and opposing Soviet efforts toward integration of the CEMA economies.

The Romanian internal scene is tough and restrictive, and has become more so in recent years through planned consumer shortages which are part of the government's austerity program to reduce foreign debt. Declining living standards have stimulated pressure for emigration despite the Romanian Government's "principled" opposition to emigration and sanctions against intending emigrants. There are particular concerns in the West about the Romanian Government's treatment of religious activists -- although the authorities recognize 14 religious denominations including Romanian Orthodox, Hungarian Reformed, Lutherans, Baptists, Pentecostals, Catholics, and Jews -- some neo-Protestant groups and dissidents have been actively discouraged. The treatment of ethnic minorities -- particularly Romania's ethnic Hungarians, the largest minority group in non-Soviet Eastern Europe -- is another object of concern. Still, Romanian human rights practices are not in the Soviet league, and the Romanian image suffers in Western eyes from the system's relative transparency as well as its human rights practices.

A key element in U.S.-Romanian relations, and a nexus of Romania's foreign and internal policies, is the trade/emigration linkage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974. Romania was the first East European country to receive annually renewable Most Favored Nation status under the emigration conditions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. Since

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then, Romanian emigration to the U.S., FRG, and Israel has been the subject of annual Congressional hearings. Traditionally, the U.S. administration and interested Congressmen were in position of calling on the Romanian authorities to allow more emigration. Special programs -- including the Third Country Processing program -- were devised for refugee processing of Romanians who received passports but lacked relatives in the U.S. to qualify them for immigrant visas. Recently, however, the number of Romanians approved for emigration to the U.S. exceeded the increasingly limited U.S. refugee numbers available for processing them. There are currently some 1,860 Romanian passport holders with exit visas for the U.S. who are awaiting U.S. refugee processing. Since these people incurred a range of official sanctions in order to obtain passports, and effectively severed their ties in Romania in receiving passports, their situation is cause for concern among Congressmen and family members in the U.S.

The U.S. and Romania consult actively on bilateral and international political issues. Recently, Council of State Vice President Manescu visited Washington and was received by President Reagan, as well as Secretary Baldrige, Acting Secretary Dam, and the Vice President. The Romanian Foreign Minister met with Secretary Shultz and Undersecretary Armacost in New York October 1. USIA Director Wick is visiting Romania October 3-7 and will meet with President Ceausescu and the Foreign Minister.

Romania's impressive economic growth in the 1970's (about 8% annually) was fueled by heavy borrowing from the West, resulting in a build up of over \$10 billion dollars in debt. Romania was forced to reschedule its debt in 1982 and 1983. However, it has avoided rescheduling in 1983, mainly by substantially cutting back on its imports, thus significantly lowering living standards. After U.S.-Romanian trade turnover reached \$1 billion in 1980 and 1981, it sank to \$570 million in 1982, primarily due to Romania's debt crisis. Bilateral trade reached almost \$700 million in 1983 and should reach \$1 billion in 1984. However, Romania is running a huge trade surplus with the U.S., a reversal of the trend until 1983.

Although Romania is treated for export control purposes more favorably than any other Warsaw Pact country, the Romanian Government is concerned that it will not be able to purchase U.S. technology important to its economic development. We have assured the Romanians that all cases would receive a full and fair hearing. Romania has made several requests for increases in limits on textile imports to the U.S. regulated by bilateral textile agreements. There is very little flexibility while the U.S. domestic industry is experiencing near zero growth.

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✓ ROMANIA

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(U) ROMANIA: THE CEAUSESCU PERSONALITY CULT GROWS

Summary

As Romania faces ever-greater domestic and foreign pressures, President Nicolae Ceausescu increasingly is surrounding himself with a coterie of close personal friends and family members. Their chief qualification is loyalty to Ceausescu. This practice, combined with heavy-handed image building, has created a cult of personality around Ceausescu which in turn is generating resentment, dislike, and opposition among the populace. For now, however, there is little direct threat to Ceausescu, because the opportunity to organize this opposition is minimal and alternatives to Ceausescu are not attractive.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ceausescu joined the outlawed Romanian Communist Party in the early 1930s and rose through its ranks quickly after the post-World War II communist assumption of power. He became the party secretary general in 1965 upon the death of his predecessor Gheorghiu Dej. The power, prestige, and titles he consolidated form the underlining of his still-growing personality cult. He became chairman of the State Council (chief of state) in 1967; chairman of the Socialist Democracy United Front (a front mass organization serving the party) in 1968; chairman of the Defense Council and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces in 1969; chairman of the Supreme Council of Economic and Social Development in 1973; President of the country in 1974 (when the position was created); and chairman of the National Council of Working People in 1977.

Ceausescu thus has gathered unto himself more personal responsibility for state and party matters--from foreign relations to culture, from

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Report 816-AR  
April 5, 1984

Auth State Waiver 11/6/15  
by PW 11/17



the military to the economy--than any other European leader. One of the hallmarks of his regime has been its ceremoniously announced "independence" of Soviet policy lines. Since the 1960s, Ceausescu has used this renegade stand to bolster his domestic and international image as an ardent nationalist and defender of Romanian independence.

#### Family Members Add to the Cult

As Ceausescu collected new authority and titles, he also began to surround himself with close family members. He went well beyond conferring the occasional nepotistic honorary title or comfortable perquisites typical of communist regimes and established these Myrmidons in positions of real responsibility and influence.

Elena Ceausescu is widely recognized as second in authority and power to Nicolae, her husband since 1947. Like her spouse, Elena was active in the underground communist movement before World War II. As a member of the Bucharest municipal party committee, she remained out of the political limelight (although she frequently accompanied Ceausescu abroad) until 1972 when she was elected to full membership in the party's Central Committee. In 1973, she was named to the Political Executive Committee (the Romanian Politburo); in 1977 she also joined that body's elite Permanent Bureau. She became chairman of the joint state/party National Council for Science and Technology in 1979; and in 1980, she was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister, jumping over three incumbents in line for the position and extending her party clout into the state apparatus.

Although her strongest influence on Romanian policies is as her husband's closest confidante and adviser, she has power in her own right as head of the Cadre Commission of the party's Central Committee. As such, she oversees appointments, promotions, and dismissals for party and state posts.

She has no background or qualifications for her current positions other than her ties to Nicolae. (Her educational background includes a doctorate--reportedly awarded, not earned--in chemical engineering.)

Nicu Ceausescu, one of Nicolae's sons, has benefited greatly from the political patronage of his parents. (His two older siblings have displayed no interest or involvement in political affairs.) His rise thus far has been through the ranks of youth organizations, but he is touted for future positions, probably in foreign affairs. He began his political career at approximately the same time as his mother. In 1973 he was elected vice-chairman of the Union of Romanian Students' Associations. He became a Union

of Communist Youth (UCY) Central Committee member in 1975; a UCY Central Committee secretary in 1976; a party Central Committee alternate member in 1979 (and a full member in 1983); a member of the Executive Bureau of the Socialist Democracy United Front and secretary of the Grand National Assembly (parliament) in 1980; and chairman of the Romanian National Committee for the organization of the UN's International Youth Year (1985) in 1981.

His latest advancements include apparent elevation to alternate membership in the party's Political Executive Committee and promotion to the post of first secretary of the UCY. The latter entails automatic assumption of the post of Minister of Youth Problems of the Council of Ministers.

Nicu's rise in the party and state hierarchies is due entirely to parental (mostly maternal) patronage. He appears by inclination more suited to the high life of an international playboy than to matters of state or party, but his father apparently wants the security of one more loyal underling.

Ilie Ceausescu, Nicolae's brother, also has profited from his brother's reliance on family. Ilie was able to parlay his military experience into election to the Grand National Assembly and the vice-chairmanship of its Defense Problems Commission in 1980, and then into an appointment in 1983 as secretary of the Higher Political Council of the Ministry of National Defense, which made him a Deputy Minister of Defense and gave him an automatic seat on the Council of Ministers. Now a lieutenant general, his latest promotion was early this year to membership on the Defense Council, the highest defense decisionmaking body on national security matters.

Other beneficiaries of Nicolae's patriarchal proclivities include two more brothers--Ion, vice-chairman of the State Planning Commission, and Nicolae A., a lieutenant general in the Interior Ministry. A brother-in-law, Gheorghe Petrescu, is vice-chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions.

#### Images of the Cult

Not only has Ceausescu brought in this family coterie to protect himself and his power, but he also has allowed, and no doubt encouraged, a well-orchestrated image building campaign typical of the personality cult. National celebrations and even family birthdays are used to burnish the Ceausescu image.

Two national celebrations last winter promoted the Ceausescu cult by linking him to Romania's heroes and historic accomplishments. The December 1, 1983, 65th anniversary of the Union of Transylvania with Romania was described by one foreign observer as



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"the most blatant, fulsome display of organized veneration" ever seen in Bucharest. Another compared the spectacles to those associated with Hitler and Nazi Germany. The organized "spontaneous" cheers of the crowd during Ceausescu's speech marking the occasion hailed the unity of Ceausescu and the people and served to make the day a celebration of Ceausescu and not of the 1918 unification.

The celebration on January 24, 1984, of the 125th anniversary of the Union of Moldavia and Wallachia produced the same hyperbolic praise for Ceausescu and comparisons with such past rulers as Prince Cuza, the first leader of the united Romanian principalities. Again, the occasion was used to stress the unity of the people, the party, and its leader, "the hero of the nation and hero of peace." Nicu used the event as a pretext for a major article praising his father's "brilliant initiatives," hailing Romania's advances under socialism (i.e., Ceausescu), and calling on Romanian youth to continue the process.

But none of these national occasions approached the excesses in the homage paid to Ceausescu on his 66th birthday on January 26. Last year's show of adulation for the joint celebration of his birthday and his 50 years of communist activity may have seemed untoppable, but the Romanians managed--adding greetings and pilgrimages to Ceausescu by various sectors of society (again the theme was unity of leader and people) and a ceremony at party headquarters staged by the Political Executive Committee. A new angle was his role as "peace hero...in the vanguard of the world pacifist movement," as the party daily put it. Ceausescu also was hailed for contributing "to the solution of the major problems of mankind."

Meanwhile, a mini-cult is being developed around other Ceausescu family members, particularly Elena and, to a lesser degree, Nicu. The January 7 celebration of Elena's (purported) 65th birthday outshone both her rank and the December 30, 1983, Day of the Republic festivities. She is being presented as the ideal model of female virtues, "the Woman-Mother," as well as outstanding revolutionary, politician, scientist, and peace campaigner. Her ultimate claim to fame is still as her husband's companion, but she is being portrayed in her own right as "an eminent political person and a scientist of world renown."

This family cult campaign has given Romanians icons: a perfect father/leader/hero as their President and the ideal woman/mother/scientist as his consort. Available evidence suggests that Ceausescu actually regards the cult as honest praise and uses it not only to bolster his ego but also to deflect popular attention from the dismal domestic scene. Furthermore, the emphasis on Romania's advancements under his beneficial guidance serves to

distance Ceausescu from the current economic shortages. In highlighting the unity of Ceausescu and his people, the cult obscures any connection between the President and his people's problems.

### Resentment is Building

Indications are growing, however, that the Romanian people are no longer content with slogans while their standard of living continues to deteriorate. As one Western press source put it, "the criticism [of Ceausescu and his cult] is not open; but in private talks, Romanians from mid-level technocrats to high-level bureaucrats have decreased the customary praise." This resentment has been manifested thus far primarily in grumblings, rumors, and jokes.

The Ceausescu family's image of infallibility is crumbling. The President increasingly is blamed for the failings of the Romanian economic system he put into being. Elena has become a target for hostile rumors; e.g., she is blamed for the fatal accident at the pyrolysis plant in Teleajin which led to the firing or reprimanding of several Ministry of Chemical Industry officials, including the minister and deputy minister. Comrade Doctor Chemical Engineer Elena Ceausescu is said to have forced the plant back into operation too soon after an overhaul, thus leading to an explosion. Elena's scientific credentials long have been suspect, and such stories serve to denigrate her professional qualifications.

### Prospects

As yet, this resentment and questioning of the Ceausescu cult are isolated and confined to small, impotent circles. The presence of the repressive security regime, which closely monitors any gatherings, precludes popular organizing or voicing of any opposition. The elites in society are kept disorganized and off guard by sporadic personnel shifts in Ceausescu's perennial search for scapegoats for his failed economic policies. This leaves little chance for others to build a power base from which to challenge Ceausescu and his entourage.

The occasional outbursts of domestic unrest--strikes, protests, and demonstrations--have concerned immediate needs only--higher wages, more food, better safety--and have not included demands for radical political or economic systemic changes. Indeed, the opposition in most cases has been directed at local management and bureaucrats.

Until these changes or the domestic situation itself deteriorates drastically and forces action, the personality cult is likely to keep Ceausescu isolated from his country's problems

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- 6 -

behind a wall of sycophants. His refusal or inability to address some of the basic problems affecting everyday life means, however, that Romanian resentment and hostility toward the regime will continue and some day may threaten Ceausescu's policies, the Ceausescu cult, and Ceausescu himself.

Prepared by Jane Miller Floyd  
632-9198

Approved by Martha C. Mautner  
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Romania

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E.O. 12356: N/A  
TAGS: PREL, PARM, INF, ECON, BU, RO  
SUBJECT: CURRENT ROMANIAN POSITIONS ON INF--THE  
CEAUSESCU VISIT TO BULGARIA

REF: BUCHAREST 2254; SOFIA 1182, 1225, 1247

1. WHILE ROMANIAN FORMULATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL HAVE VARIED DEPENDING ON THE OCCASION AND AUDIENCE, DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE CURRENT GOR AND RCP POSITION ON INF IS CONTAINED IN THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY'S DISARMAMENT APPEAL OF MARCH 25 AND THE RCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE "DOCUMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE PARTY AND STATE IN 1983 AND MAIN GUIDELINES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN 1984," WHICH WAS RELEASED ON MARCH 19. THE GNA APPEAL IS DIRECTED TO THE U.S. CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME SOVIET, AS WELL AS TO THE PARLIAMENTS OF OTHER CSCE SIGNATORY STATES.

2. BOTH DOCUMENTS CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO BE RESUMED BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE USSR AT GENEVA ON THE BASIS OF A MORATORIUM ON FURTHER U.S. MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENTS IN EUROPE AND ON FURTHER COUNTERMEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO

INSIST ON AN EXPRESSION OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW INF WEAPONS ALREADY DEPLOYED AS A PRECONDITION FOR RESUMING NEGOTIATIONS. A SENIOR TASS COMMENTATOR SHARPLY BUT INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED THE ROMANIAN POSITION, LABELING THE IDEA OF A FREEZE AT CURRENT LEVELS A DEVICE TO DECEIVE PUBLIC OPINION AND LEGITIMIZE U.S. DEPLOYMENTS.

3. DEPARTMENT AGREES WITH SOFIA'S OBSERVATION THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT ISSUED ON MARCH 30 FOLLOWING CEAUSESCU'S VISIT TO BULGARIA DIFFERS FROM THE CURRENT ROMANIAN POSITION ON INF, WITH ROMANIA ACCEPTING LANGUAGE CLOSE TO THE SOVIET POSITION. IN ADDITION TO INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY ANTI-U.S. AND ANTI-NATO RHETORIC, THE SOFIA ANNOUNCEMENT CALLS ON THE U.S. TO WITHDRAW ITS DEPLOYED INF WEAPONS AS WELL AS THE HALTING (NOT WITHDRAWAL) OF SOVIET COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS AND A RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE BULGARIANS ESSENTIALLY PREVAILED IN OBTAINING AN INF FORMULATION ACCEPTABLE TO MOSCOW. AT THE SAME TIME, BOTH SIDES, FOR THEIR OWN REASONS, AGREED ON A CALL "SIMULTANEOUSLY, FOR THE USSR TO STOP...THE APPLICATION OF COUNTERMEASURES....".

4. IN RETURN, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CEAUSESCU OBTAINED SOME CONCESSIONS FROM THE BULGARIANS ON THE ISSUE OF BALKAN COOPERATION.

-- WHILE THE BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY ON MARCH 30 CLAIMED THAT THE TWO SIDES SUPPORTED "CONVERSION OF THE BALKANS INTO A ZONE FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS" THE ACTUAL COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTED "THE SETTING UP OF NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES IN EUROPE" AS WELL--A MORE GENERAL FORMULATION CURRENTLY PREFERRED BY ROMANIA.

-- THE EARLY 1984 MEETINGS IN ATHENS WERE PORTRAYED AS AN "EXPERT CONFERENCE" ON "STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY, BUILDING OF CONFIDENCE, GOOD-NEIGHBORLINESS, AND COLLABORATION AMONG BALKAN COUNTRIES," WHILE PREVIOUS BULGARIAN COVERAGE HAD TREATED IT MOSTLY AS A MEETING TO DISCUSS THE BALKAN NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. AGAIN, THE MORE GENERAL ROMANIAN POSITION SEEMS TO HAVE WON OUT.

-- BUCHAREST GAINED A BULGARIAN CONFIRMATION OF BUCHAREST AS THE SITE FOR THE NEXT BALKAN EXPERT CONFERENCE.

5. ON MARCH 31, SOON AFTER HIS RETURN FROM SOFIA, CEAUSESCU RECEIVED CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WU ON A

VISIT TO BUCHAREST. ACCORDING TO FBIS, A BUCHAREST DOMESTIC SERVICE COMMENTARY ON THE VISIT (EVIDENTLY NO COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED) RETURNS TO THE GNA AND RCP MORATORIUM FORMULA: "THE SIDES STRESSED THE NEED TO INTENSIFY EFFORTS TO HALT THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN CERTAIN WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR COUNTERMEASURES ANNOUNCED BY THE USSR AND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN ORDER TO REACH AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT THAT SHOULD LEAD TO COMPLETELY FREEING THE CONTINENT OF SUCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."  
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ROMANIA

THE WHITE HOUSE

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WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

June 8, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~U.S. Presence at 40th Anniversary of Romanian Liberation

Ambassador Funderburk strongly urges that the U.S. not send a high level delegation to Romania's August 23 anniversary of "liberation" festivities. He points out that August 23 is actually the anniversary of the coup that overthrew the wartime government of General Antonescu and started in motion events that led six months later to effective communist control of Romania.

- o The celebration is developing into a testimonial to the reign of Ceausescu and his leadership -- which few outside of Ceausescu's own circle today endorse.
- o Considering the lack of enthusiasm on the part of our allies, U.S. attendance would be out of step with them and puzzling to others.

Funderburk does not believe high level attendance is necessary for the maintenance of good U.S.-Romanian relations, and recommends that he represent the U.S. at the festivities. (C)

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ROMANIA

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 27, 1984

SITUATION ROOM CHECKLIST

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Letter to the President from Ceausescu

In response to the President's May 24 letter, Romanian President Ceausescu writes that his recent discussions in Moscow with Chernenko left him with the impression that the Soviet Union desires a resumption of the INF negotiations in Geneva. Describing the dangers of an intensification of the arms race, Ceausescu emphasizes the need for the U.S. to take an initiative that would permit resolution of this "extremely grave" situation.

- o In this respect, Ceausescu suggests "one could have in mind that the U.S. would stop deployment of medium range missiles in Europe and the Soviet Union would stop applying nuclear counter-measures."
- o On this basis, negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S. could be resumed, leading to the "total elimination of medium range nuclear missiles and then of all nuclear missiles and then of all nuclear arms in Europe and in the world."

The Romanian president also stresses his continuing desire to collaborate with the U.S. and others for a successful conclusion of the conference on confidence building measures and disarmament at Stockholm, for reaching an agreement in the negotiations in Vienna, and for the adopting of effective disarmament measures at the Geneva conference.

While most of the letter is vintage Ceausescu, Foreign Minister Andrei emphasized in conveying it that the language suggesting how the INF talks might be resumed should be closely examined. Ambassador Funderburk notes that the language is indeed different than Ceausescu's -- and, for that matter, Soviet -- demands that the U.S. halt INF deployment and withdraw missiles already deployed as a prerequisite for the resumption of INF talks, and suggest that other proposals might be considered.

- o This may be Ceausescu's typical habit of reading more into Soviet thinking than is merited; he also could be fabricating, or simply trying to add luster to his own credentials as a useful go-between.

Nevertheless, on the chance that there may be something to Ceausescu's remarks, Funderburk suggests that Under Secretary Armacost consider exploring this thoroughly in his forthcoming talks with Romanian Ambassador Malitza. (C)

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E.O. 12356: DECL: 00/01/05  
TAG: PREL, PGOV, EREN, EFIN, EAGR, ETDO, RO  
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEASESCU'S INTERVIEW WITH  
NEARST CORRESPONDENT

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE ROMANIAN VERSION OF WRITTEN STATEMENTS PUT  
OUT BY CEASESCU BY NEARST NEWSPAPERS' (IN WALLACH AND  
CEASESCU'S WRITTEN REPLIES -- AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE  
FOUR HOUR OFF THE RECORD ORAL INTERVIEW (OUT WHICH  
WALLACH TOLD THE JOURNALIST, SEE REFTEL), AS PRINTED IN  
THE JULY 29 EDITION OF SCIENTIA, WITH THE INTERNATIONAL  
MEDIA ATTENTION. IN IT CEASESCU CALLS FOR THE RESUMPTION  
OF SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS, NOTING THAT IN HIS  
VIEW THIS WOULD BE MORE IF THE CONTINUING DEPLOYMENT OF  
THE U.S. INF AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES WERE HALTED.  
THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD, HE SAID, TO THE COMPLETE  
ELIMINATION OF U.S. INF AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURE  
AND SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES.

3. THE MEDIA AND ANALYSTS ASSURED THAT  
CEASESCU, WHO HAD HIS TALKS WITH THE U.S. EARLIER  
IN THE YEAR, HAD BEEN FIGHTING A TIGHTLY FIGHT FOR  
THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE INF FIELD ON THE BASIS OF  
THE SOVIET VIEWS. THE WRITTEN WORD OF CEASESCU'S  
STATEMENTS IS A STRONG EVIDENCE OF THE U.S. POSITION  
ON THE SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES TO THE U.S. INF FIELD.

(IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIETS QUICKLY DISABUSED THE WORLD OF  
ANY MISCONCEPTION THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO RESUME  
NEGOTIATIONS WITH MERELY A PRETEXT (U.S. DEPLOYMENTS).  
END SUMMARY.

4. IN GENERAL, CEASESCU EXPRESSED SATISFACTION ON  
RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON, ALTHOUGH HE POINTEDLY NOTES  
THAT THE HIGH POINT OF THESE RELATIONS CAME DURING THE  
PREVIOUS DECADE. THE ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CITES TWO AREAS  
OF TENSION: THE ANNUAL MFN HEARINGS AND THE PROBLEM OF  
EXPORT LICENSES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. ON THE FIRST  
ISSUE, CEASESCU REPEATS HIS WELL-KNOWN PERSONAL ANNOYANCE  
OVER THE ANNUAL PROCEDURE, CLAIMING THAT IT IS "ABNORMAL"  
AND A VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY IN RELATIONS  
BETWEEN STATES. ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CEASESCU SAYS  
FEARS THAT ROMANIA WILL PASS ON TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER COUNTRIES  
ARE EXAGGERATED AND TOTALLY UNJUSTIFIED. HE THAT ROMANIA'S  
"WELL DEVELOPED PROGRAM OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH" WOULD  
SOLVE MOST TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. HEAVEN, GIVEN  
SUFFICIENT TIME, BUT THAT THE PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF  
FREE ECONOMIC EXCHANGE.

5. WITH REGARD TO INF, CEASESCU SAID, AMONG OTHER THINGS,  
"I CONSIDER THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS, BOTH IN THE PAST  
AND ALSO NOW, INTERESTED IN ARRIVING AT AN AGREEMENT ON  
INTERMEDIATE RANGE ROCKETS; AND IN ADDITION, IN THE FIELD  
OF NUCLEAR ARMS. I WOULD BE INTERESTED TO HEAR  
CONSTANTIN GHEORGHE AND THE SOVIET UNION IN GENERAL  
UNDERSTAND WHAT A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IS AND ARE FIGHTING  
EVERYTHING IN SIGHT TO ELIMINATE IT. I WOULD BE  
INTERESTED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE IT TO AGREE TO  
HALT THE CURRENT OF DEPLOYMENT OF INF AT THE END OF  
1983. NOT ONLY BY THE U.S.A. BUT ALSO BY THE SOVIET  
UNION -- AND TO RESUME THE NEGOTIATIONS. I WOULD BE  
INTERESTED, THAT SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE

RESUMED WITHOUT DELAY. IN MY VIEW, IT IS POSSIBLE TO  
ACHIEVE THIS TASK. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HALT AT LEAST  
THE UNINTERRUPTED ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.  
ROCKETS AND COUNTERMEASURES ADOPTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.  
THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT FOR THE  
COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF THESE ROCKETS. THE THESIS  
ACCORDING TO WHICH THE HALTING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S.  
ROCKETS WOULD BE IN THEIR DISADVANTAGE HAS NO REAL  
VALIDITY BECAUSE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN FROM THE  
FACT THAT THEY WOULD NOT LAST YEARS, BUT WOULD ARRIVE  
IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AT THE ELIMINATION OF INTERMEDIATE  
RANGE ROCKETS AND AT A COMPLETE REDUCTION OF ALL  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 05116

NUCLEAR ARMS. HE ALSO CALLED FOR OTHER NATIONS -- BOTH NATO AND WARSAW PACT -- TO "EMULATE THE DUTCH" AND BLOCK, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY ANY FURTHER IMF DEPLOYMENTS.

6. AS CE/USESCU HAD EARLIER SPOKEN OF HIS JUNE MEETINGS WITH CH. HERMANO, CE/USESCU'S SUGGESTION THAT A FREEZE OF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS MIGHT GET THE SOVIETS BACK TO THE TABLE GOT THE ATTENTION OF WESTERN MEDIA AND DIPLOMATS, WHO SENSED A TRIAL BALLOON OR KIBBITZING. LITTLE ATTENTION SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN PAID TO THE BOTTOM LINE: ACCORDING TO THE CE/USESCU FORMULA, AS ALWAYS, SOVIET IMF MONOPOLY OR DOMINANCE WOULD BE ASSURED -- AND A SOVIET VETO OVER NATO NUCLEAR POLICY SET.

7. IN THE INTERVIEW, CE/USESCU DID NOT SPECIFICALLY BLAME THE U.S. FOR INCREASED EUROPEAN TENSIONS, AS HE HAS IN EARLIER STATEMENTS; BUT HE ALSO FAILS TO MENTION PREVIOUS SOVIET IMF DEPLOYMENTS, AN ELEMENT OF ROMANIAN FORMULATION PRIOR TO THIS YEAR.

8. AS PRESENTED IN SCINTEIA, THE INTERVIEW OPENS WITH CE/USESCU'S DEFENSIVE APPRAISAL OF THE ROMANIAN ECONOMIC SCENE. HE PROVIDES A TIRED LITANY OF STATISTICS SUPPORTING RAPID ECONOMIC GROWTH SINCE THE PREWAR PERIOD. HE SAYS THAT WESTERN COMMENTATORS ON THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY ARE WRITING IN IGNORANCE AND FROM PRECONCEIVED IDEAS. HE TRIES TO REBUT CHARGES THAT CORRUPTIONS EXIST IN THE ROMANIAN CONSUMER ECONOMY BY CITING EXISTENCE OF SURPLUS INVENTORIES OF APPAREL AND FOOTWEAR. SINCE A WORKER BY TRADE,

CE/USESCU GOES SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT THE ROMANIAN ECONOMY HAS REACHED A LEVEL BEYOND WHICH IT CANNOT GO IN SUPPLYING ITS CITIZENS SHOES, AND CHARGES THAT ROMANIAN CONSUMPTION OF 3.5-4 PAIRS OF SHOES PER YEAR IS TOO HIGH. AFTER A RATHER QUESTIONABLE ASSERTION THAT ROMANIAN DAILY PER CAPITA CALORIE INTAKE RANKS AMONG THE TOP TEN IN THE WORLD HE TIES HIS DISCUSSION OF AGRICULTURAL SUPPLIES TO THE QUESTION OF ROMANIA'S FOREIGN DEBT AND SOME WESTERN COMMENTATORS' VIEWS THAT MASSIVE AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS HAVE ALLOWED ROMANIA TO REDUCE EXTERNAL DEBT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY. HE STATES THAT EXPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES HAVE ACTUALLY DECREASED IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR LEVELS DURING THE 1970-75 PERIOD AND CONTINUES BY STATING INCORRECTLY THAT HIS REGIME HAS IMPOSED NO LIMITS ON DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. COMMENT: HE FAILS TO MENTION EITHER SIGNIFICANT CUTS IN IMPORTS IN RECENT YEARS, ROMANIAN STATISTICS WHICH SHOW SHARP DECREASES IN REAL RETAIL SALES OF FOOD, OR THE FACT THAT FORMAL RATIONING OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS HAS LONG BEEN IN EFFECT HERE. ENO COMMENT.

9. FOREIGN DEBT, CE/USESCU SAYS, HAS BEEN REDUCED THIRTY PERCENT IN RECENT YEARS. HE STATES, RATHER SIMPLISTICALLY THAT SINCE 1981 ROMANIA HAS INCURRED NO NEW DEBT EXCEPT THROUGH ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE IMF. HE SHARPLY CRITICIZES THE IMF, CHARGING THAT THE FUND HAS NOT OBSERVED ITS COMMITMENTS TO ROMANIA AND HAS IMPOSED UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON THE CONTINUITY OF THE IMF PROGRAM. HE REITERATES HIS POLICY THAT ROMANIA IN THE FUTURE WILL NOT CARRY ANOTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEBTS.

10. LEGAL COMMENT: THE OFFICIAL AGENCIES TRANSLATION OF THE ROMANIAN INTERVIEW TEXT PRINTED HERE DIFFERS MATERIALLY FROM THAT PART OF THE ENGLISH TEXT OBTAINED FROM WALLACH VIA VOA (ESSENTIALLY THE IMF AND DEBT TROOP

TRANSIT QUESTIONS). WE WILL BE INFORMED BY SLE, E. HALL WALLACH ENGLISH-LANGUAGE TEXT AND TO COMPARE THE TWO VERSIONS IN MORE DETAIL. END COMMENT.

FURDERBURK  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~  
CLASSIFICATION

57

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSMATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 5711

DATE TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

Robinson

Robinson

ATLock

Sestonovich

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: ON AUG 20

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

*Let -> Sec. 8/20/84*

*CLEAR  
TD 8/20/84*

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CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED TO: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

*Law* *EW 11/11/7*

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**B**

S/S #

RECEIVED

84 AUG 17 P 2: 34

**URGENT**

MESSAGE NO 511 CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE No. Pages 2

FROM: MBOYE S/S 23126 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO BUCHAREST: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE  
FROM THE VICE PRESIDENT

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
OVP	1-Don Gregg	395-4213	
NSC	2-Bob Kimmitt	456-2224	
	3- <del>REDACTED</del>		
	4-NSC/s		

FOR CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS CLEARANCE PLEASE BY COB MONDAY, AUGUST 20.

S/S Officer: [Signature]

CROSSHATCH

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

W/IEY:TALYNCH:TRS(W3027B)  
 12/84 EXT. 23298  
 BURT

W/IEY:RECOMBS  
 LPR:JANDERSON  
 S:  
 H:PHUGHES

EUR:RMPALMER  
 S/S-S(C)HJALBA  
 NSC:

IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST

12356: N/A

OPDC, RO, US

RRB *[initials]*  
 TAL *[initials]*  
 REC *[initials]*  
 RMP *[initials]*  
 JA *[initials]*  
 JAS *[initials]*

SUBJECT: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE

EMBASSY SHOULD PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MPA FOR  
 PRIME MINISTER DASCALESU FROM VICE PRESIDENT BUSH PRIOR  
 TO AUGUST 23. SEPTEL CONTAINS ROMANIAN NATIONAL DAY  
 MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN.

BEGIN TEXT.

PH

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I AM PLEASED TO JOIN WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN IN EXTENDING  
 MY OWN CONGRATULATIONS AND BEST WISHES ON THE 40TH  
 ANNIVERSARY OF ROMANIA'S LIBERATION.

ROMANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE FOUNDED ON FRIENDSHIP  
 AND OUR COMMON DESIRE FOR PEACE BASED ON RESPECT FOR  
 NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. I AM PLEASED BY THE CONTINUING  
 DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP THROUGH OFFICIAL  
 CONTACTS, TRADE AND COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES, AND BY THE  
 STRENGTHENING OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN OUR PEOPLES AT THE  
 OLYMPIC GAMES. I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN OUR  
 RELATIONS IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ *AW*

11/9/17

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ | 2

SINCERELY,

GEORGE BUSH

END TEXT.

1. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. WHITE HOUSE DOES  
NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY  
FOR YY

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

TOP SECRET  
CLASSIFICATION

Konania

61

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSHATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 5213  
DATE TIME: 1500/17 AUG 84

IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

Dobson  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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Robinson  
Mattich  
Sestonovich  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: COO Aug 20

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

OK w/ 1 change.  
TD  
8/20/84

Ret -> Sec  
8/20/84

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CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
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LOK pu  
11/1/87

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

84 AUG 17 P2:33

URGENT

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

84 AUG 17 P2:33

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

MESSAGE NO. 5713 CLASSIFICATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE No. Pages 2

FROM: MBova S/S 23126 7224  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO BUCHAREST: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	1-Bob Kinnitt	456-2224	
	<del>2- [REDACTED]</del>		
	3-NSC/S		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: CLEARANCE PLEASE BY COB AUGUST 20

S/S Officer: [Signature]

CROSSHATCH



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EUR/EEY:TALYNCH:TRS(M3024B)  
08/16/84 EXT. 23278  
EUR:RRBURT

EUR/EEY:RECOMBS  
S/CPR:JANDERSON  
S/S:

EUR:RMPALMER  
S/S-S(C):JALBA  
NSC:

PA

IMMEDIATE BUCHAREST

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPDC, RO, US

SUBJECT: NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO MPA FOR CEAUSESCU  
FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN PRIOR TO AUGUST 23.

2. BEGIN TEXT.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

IT IS MY ~~PARTICULAR~~ PLEASURE TO WRITE TO YOU THIS YEAR  
ON THE OCCASION OF ROMANIA'S NATIONAL DAY, THE 40TH  
ANNIVERSARY OF ROMANIA'S LIBERATION, TO CONVEY THE  
CONGRATULATIONS AND SINCERE GOOD WISHES OF THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE.

IN YOUR RECENT MESSAGE TO ME ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF  
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, YOU EXPRESSED SATISFACTION THAT  
ROMANIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE ON AN ASCENDANT COURSE.  
I TOO AM GRATIFIED. OVER THE PAST YEAR, YOUR COUNTRY HAS  
CONTINUED ITS IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO EASING  
INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL  
PROBLEMS. WE GREATLY VALUE THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO  
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTEREST OF A SAFER, MORE PEACEFUL

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

*Rw*  
*Jal*

RRB9  
TAL  
REC  
RMPA  
JA  
JA

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~ | 2

WORLD. TRADE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IS INCREASING, WITH BENEFITS FOR BOTH. AT LOS ANGELES A FEW WEEKS AGO, ROMANIAN ATHLETES EARNED DISTINCTION FOR THEIR COUNTRY AND WON NEW FRIENDS FOR THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. THE EVENTS OF THE LAST YEAR HAVE REAFFIRMED THE FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL RESPECT WHICH HAVE CHARACTERIZED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT OUR RELATIONSHIP WILL CONTINUE TO PROSPER IN THE FUTURE.

SINCERELY,  
RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT.

3. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL. WHITE HOUSE DOES NOT PLAN RELEASE BUT HAS NO OBJECTION TO RELEASE BY GOR. YY

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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### Box Number

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186953	PAPER  RE. ROMANIA [PG. 3 ONLY]	1	9/20/1984	B1 B3

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
186954	MEMO  ROBERT KIMMITT TO PAULA DOBRIANSKY RE. SECRETARY SHULTZ'S EVENING REPORT	1	9/27/1984	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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CLASSIFICATION

FILE ROMANIA

67

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
CROSSHATCH ACTION SHEET

MESSAGE # 147  
DATE TIME: 0750

IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMENT OFFICER TO CLEAR WITH THE  
DEP EXEC SEC PRIOR TO THE ASSIGNED DUE DATE.

ACTION OFFICER

COMMENT OFFICER

INFO

THOMPSON

Robinson

KIMMITT

Robinson

Dr. Tuck

Sestonovich

Steiner

ACTION: CONCUR TO DEP EXEC SEC VIA PHONE AND/OR COMMENT HERE AND HANDCARRY  
TO DEP EXEC SEC DUE DATE: COB 0500 84

ACTION OFFICER COMMENTS:

CLEAR

TD 10/5/84

CLEARED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_  
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\_\_\_\_\_

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~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/1/84 BY [signature]

68

WASHFAX RECEIPT  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED

84 OCT 3 9:40

SITUATION ROOM

B

S/S #

MESSAGE NO. 247 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 4

FROM J COLLINS S/S  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION  
CROSSHATCH TO BUCHAREST

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	MR. ROBERT KIMMITT		
OVP	MR. DON GREGG/PHIL HUGHES		
	<del>From</del>		
	<del>[Redacted]</del>		

FOR CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS

FOR CLEARANCE PLEASE BY: 10/5

S/S Officer: J COLLINS

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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186955	CABLE  RE. VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY MANEA MANESCU	4	10/2/1984	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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Romania

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

73

PAGE 01 BUCHAREST 6876 DTG: 011039Z NOV 84 PSN: 043735  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9807

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 06876

EUR/EEY FOR KUCHEL

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION 29 OCT USIA WASHDC BEING REPEATED  
FOR YOUR ACTION/INFO:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 6787

USIA

USIA FOR EU/YASHAROFF

E.O. 12356: OADR  
SUBJECT: U.S.-ROMANIA EXCHANGES: FOLLOW-UP TO DIRECTOR  
WICK VISIT

REF: (A) REMICK/MCBRIDE TELCON, OCTOBER 22, 1984, (B)  
USIA 65176

1. SUMMARY: HAVING RECEIVED NO INDICATION THAT MINISTRY OF EDUCATION IS SEEKING TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO CONCERNS EXPRESSED DURING DIRECTOR'S VISIT, POST RECOMMENDS THAT SIGNING OF BILATERAL AGREEMENT SCHEDULED FOR RENEGOTIATION AT THE END OF THIS YEAR BE DELAYED, THAT A GENERAL "SLOW-DOWN" BEGIN IMMEDIATELY IN TERMS OF DEALING WITH ROMANIAN REQUESTS AND THAT SPECIFIC RENEWALS OF TWO ROMANIAN FULBRIGHT GRANTS LISTED BELOW BE REJECTED. END SUMMARY.

2. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, AFTER CANCELLING MEETING ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED ON OCTOBER 16 TO DISCUSS MEANS OF RESOLVING CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH ADMINISTRATION OF EXCHANGE PROGRAM, HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO RESCHEDULE IT. POST HAS MADE DISCREET INQUIRIES ABOUT A NEW MEETING BUT RESPONSE HAS BEEN PUT OFF. THIS CONTINUED FOOT-DRAGGING BY MINISTRY OF EDUCATION PROMPTS POST, IN LIGHT OF REF TELCON, TO OFFER SOME LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM SUGGESTIONS FOR STEPS WHICH AGENCY MIGHT CONSIDER TAKING.

3. THE BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS WAS ORIGINALLY SIGNED IN DECEMBER 1974 AND RENEWED DECEMBER 1979. NOT TO BE CONFUSED WITH THE IMPLEMENTING ACCORD RENEGOTIATED IN DECEMBER 1983, THE UMBRELLA AGREEMENT IS AGAIN DUE FOR RENEWAL AT THE END OF THIS YEAR. POST RECOMMENDS THAT AGENCY DELAY SIGNING RENEWAL. POST

BELIEVES THAT ROMANIAN CONCERN FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES THUS ENDANGERED MAY PROMPT MINISTRY OF EDUCATION TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN SOLVING PROBLEMS DISCUSSED DURING DIRECTOR'S VISIT.

4. SECONDLY, POST RECOMMENDS THAT AGENCY CONTACT DEBDRACH WINCE AT NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION CONCERNING A PROPOSED EXCHANGE IN THE FIELD OF CELL MEMBRANE RESEARCH, THE FIRST PART OF WHICH IS SCHEDULED FOR BUCHAREST IN SEPTEMBER 1985. DR. WILLIAM JACOBUS OF JOHNS HOPKINS, THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED EXCHANGE, CALLED THE EMBASSY ON OCTOBER 24 TO LET US KNOW THAT HE WAS HERE AND TO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE. HIS CALL WAS THE FIRST INDICATION POST HAD OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS EXCHANGE PROJECT. AS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN NSF AND THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CALLS FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE TO BE NOTIFIED BY THE ROMANIAN SIDE WHENEVER SUCH VISITS TAKE PLACE, THIS FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE EMBASSY IS YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE PROBLEMS POST HAS BEEN EXPERIENCING WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE EXCHANGE PROGRAM. IN ITSELF A MINOR IRRITANT, IT IS BY NO MEANS UNIQUE. THIS CONSTANT FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE NECESSARY INFORMATION CALLED FOR BY THE AGREEMENT IS ONLY ONE OF THE OBSTACLES THROWN UP BY THE ROMANIAN SIDE. POST SUGGESTS A RE-EVALUATION OF WASHINGTON SUPPORT FOR THIS PROJECT.

5. MORE GENERALLY, POST SUGGESTS AN OVERALL SLOWDOWN IN RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, NCST OR OTHER ROMANIAN AGENCIES INVOLVED IN THE CURRENT DIFFICULTIES.

6. THE ROMANIAN SIDE TENDS TO ASSUME AUTOMATIC EXTENSIONS ARE POSSIBLE FOR ITS FULBRIGHT GRANTEES. WHILE POST ACCEPTS THE IDEA OF EXTENSIONS IN PRINCIPLE, WE ARE TROUBLED THAT SUCH EXTENSIONS HAVE BECOME THE RULE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION. THE AMERICAN SIDE, HOWEVER, INCLUDING POST, HAS TENDED TO ACCEPT ROMANIAN JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AND ALLOW THESE EXTENSIONS. TO DEMONSTRATE THAT WE VIEW DIRECTOR WICK'S CONCERNS SERIOUSLY, AND TO INSIST THAT THE ROMANIANS DO LIKEWISE, POST SUGGESTS THAT FUTURE ROMANIAN GRANTEES NOT BE GIVEN THE HERETOFORE ALMOST AUTOMATIC EXTENSIONS. SUCH EXTENSIONS VIOLATE THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT BY EFFECTIVELY AND DRASTICALLY REDUCING THE NUMBER OF ROMANIANS WHO CAN PARTICIPATE AND THUS REDUCING THE IMPACT OF THE PROGRAM.

7. FOR THE SHORT-TERM, POST RECOMMENDS THAT THE FOLLOWING TWO ROMANIAN APPLICATIONS FOR FULBRIGHT GRANT RENEWALS BE REJECTED: (A) LUCIAN ROSU: IN AN ATTEMPT TO BYPASS USIS BUCHAREST, MINED HAS SENT ROSU RENEWAL REQUEST DIRECT TO AGENCY THROUGH ROMANIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. EU SHOULD CONSULT WITH E/AEE (MARY HITT) ABOUT BACKGROUND. POST FIRST HEARD OF ROSU REQUEST IN REFTEL B AND FEELS STRONGLY THAT NO GRANTEE SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR A THIRD YEAR WITH-  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: State Waiver 11/6/15  
BY: RW NNDP DATE 11/9/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

74

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01  
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BUCHAREST 6876  
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TOR: 306/1321Z CSN: HCE455

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DE RUDKAR #6876/02 3061040  
O 011029Z NOV 84  
FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9808

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 06876

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION USIS WASHDC 29 OCT 84 BEING REPEATED  
FOR YOUR ACTION/INFO:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BUCHAREST 6787

USIA

USIA FOR EU/YASHAROFF

E. O. 12356: OADR  
SUBJECT: U. S. -ROMANIA EXCHANGES: FOLLOW-UP TO DIRECTOR

OUT VERY STRONG JUSTIFICATION AND ESPECIALLY IN THIS CASE  
WHERE AN OBVIOUS EFFORT IS BEING MADE TO CIRCUMVENT NORMAL  
CHANNELS. (B) DORIN URITESCU: KNOWING THAT RENEWAL FOR A  
THIRD YEAR IS NOT LOOKED UPON FAVORABLY BY THE AMERICAN  
SIDE, URITESCU ATTEMPTED TO GET AN IREX GRANT IN ORDER TO  
REMAIN IN THE U. S. MINED SUBMITTED HIS IREX APPLICATION  
LATE AND THE REQUEST WAS DENIED BY IREX. URITESCU AND  
MINED HAVE NOW APPROACHED POST TO GRANT ANOTHER EXTENSION.  
THIS TIME CHANGING STATUS FROM LECTURER TO RESEARCHER. IN  
ADDITION TO THE UNDESIRABILITY OF ANOTHER EXTENSION, POST  
SEES IN THIS AN ATTEMPT BY MINED TO CLAIM IT IS USING MORE  
MONTHS ON THE RESEARCH SIDE OF THE AGREEMENT AND THUS  
RESPONDING TO ONE OF THE CRITICISMS MADE DURING THE  
DIRECTOR'S VISIT. POST URGES REJECTION OF BOTH ROSU AND  
URITESCU REQUESTS. MCBRIDE  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

DOBRIANSKY, PAULA: FILES

*Withdrawer*

RB 1/9/2017  
W

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ROMANIA - CABLES (3)

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
186956	PAPER  RE. ROMANIA [PG. 3 ONLY]	1	1/2/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.